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China's Endeavors for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation
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The Information Office of China's State Council on Thursday September 1, 2005 issued a white paper titled China's Endeavors for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation. The following is the full text of the document:
Nuclear DisarmamentIV. Committed to National and Regional Disarmament
Biological and Chemical Weapons
Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS)
Large-scale Reduction of the Military PersonnelV. Actively Participating in International Non-Proliferation Efforts
Maintaining a Low Level of Defense Spending
Regional Disarmament and Confidence-Building Measures
Fulfilling International Obligations of Non-ProliferationVI. Tightening Non-Proliferation Export Control
Developing Relations with Multinational Export Control Mechanisms
Conducting Exchanges and Cooperation on Non-Proliferation
Promoting the Important Role of the UN
Legal System on Non-Proliferation Export ControlAnnexes
Non-Proliferation Export Control Organs
Rigorous Implementation of Laws and Regulations on Non-Proliferation Export Control
Greater Publicity for Laws and Regulations on Export Control and Education for Enterprises
The year 2005 marks the 60th anniversary of the victories of the Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War. The war of aggression launched by fascists and militarists brought about untold sufferings to the world and wreaked unprecedented havoc on human civilization. The world people won victories and peace with their blood and lives.
The year 2005 also marks the 60th anniversary of the founding of the United Nations (UN), the most universal, representative and authoritative inter-governmental international organization in the world. The establishment of the UN has embodied the aspiration of peoples around the world for building a new world of peace, equality, cooperation and prosperity. The UN, over the past 60 years, has worked unremittingly for and played an important role in easing conflicts, promoting disarmament, safeguarding peace and boosting development.
The Chinese nation loves peace and advocates that nothing is more valuable than peace and all nations should live in peace and harmony. Subjected to untold external aggression and suppression in its modern history, China fully understands how precious peace is. At present, the Chinese people are concentrating on development and nation-building along a road of peaceful development. China needs a long-lasting and stable international environment of peace for her development, which, in turn, will promote world peace and progress. China, holding high the banner of peace, development and cooperation, will remain committed to pushing forward the process of international arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation. China will never seek hegemony and will remain forever a staunch force for safeguarding world peace and promoting common development.
This White Paper, China's Endeavors for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, is published to fully elaborate on the Chinese Government's policies and positions on arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation and to give a systematic account of China's involvement in the international arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation affairs.
Peace, development and cooperation have become the trend of the times in the current world. World multi-polarization and economic globalization are developing in depth, and science and technology are advancing by leaps and bounds. Countries and regions have constantly strengthened their exchanges and cooperation as they are increasingly interdependent in security. World peace and development are facing rare opportunities as factors for maintaining peace and restraining war are increasing. It has become the consensus of the international community to enhance cooperation and jointly meet global challenges.
However, the world is far from tranquil as traditional security issues persist, local wars and violent conflicts crop up time and again and hot-spot issues keep emerging. Non-traditional security threats such as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), transnational crimes and infectious diseases are on the rise. The intertwined traditional and non-traditional threats pose severe challenges to inter-national security.
International arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation are closely linked with international security. Given more diversified threats to international security and larger numbers of unstable and unpredictable factors, the dimensions of arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation have been constantly expanded with increasing importance. Opportunities and challenges develop side by side while hopes and potential risks coexist.
On the one hand, as an integral part of the global security order, the international arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation regime is still playing an important role in safeguarding world peace and stability. Since the 1990s, fresh achievements have been scored in arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation. A number of important treaties have been concluded in such areas as the prohibition of chemical weapons and nuclear tests. The international consensus has been constantly strengthened on preventing the proliferation of WMD. The UN Security Council has unanimously adopted Resolution 1540 on nonproliferation. Political and diplomatic efforts have been continuously pursued to settle proliferation issues through dialogue and cooperation. Initiatives on strengthening the nonproliferation regime have been introduced. Security dialogues have been intensified among countries and regional security cooperation has been expanded. The aforementioned progress has enhanced mutual trust among countries, boosted the relaxation of the security situation and maintained international strategic stability.
On the other hand, there is still a long way to go in multilateral arms control and disarmament. The process of nuclear disarmament has been long and arduous. The nuclear deterrence strategy based on the first use of nuclear weapons has yet to be abandoned. The trend toward lowering the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons and developing new nuclear weapons is worrisome. There has been greater danger of weaponization of and an arms race in outer space. The universality of international treaties on arms control is still inadequate and negative examples of scrapping important arms control treaties occur from time to time. The multilateral arms control and disarmament regime is faced with difficulty. As the single multilateral disarmament negotiating body, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva has for years been unable to carry out substantive work. The international nonproliferation process is facing challenges. The prospect for settling regional nuclear issues is still blurry and the risks of terrorist organizations and other non-state entities acquiring WMD are growing.
Currently, the international process of arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation is at a crucial crossroad. It is an absolute necessity for the maintenance of international peace, security and stability to seize fresh opportunities, meet new challenges and consolidate and constantly strengthen the existing international regime on arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation. This also conforms to the people's will. The international community is in favor of maintaining multilateralism, pushing forward the international process of arms control and disarmament, constantly improving the international nonproliferation regime, stepping up international cooperation and coping with security challenges.
To promote a fair, rational, comprehensive and sound develop-ment of the international cause of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, the international community should follow the pur-poses and principles of the UN Charter and other universally recognized norms governing international relations, foster a new security concept featuring mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination, en-hance mutual trust through dialogue and promote common security through cooperation. The right of all countries to equal participation in international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation affairs should be guaranteed and the international process of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation promoted on the basis of no dero-gation of the security of all countries. The issue of non-proliferation should be dealt with by political and diplomatic means within the framework of international law. The existing international legal system on arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation should be main-tained, further strengthened and improved. The legitimate rights and interests of all countries as regards the peaceful use of science and technology should be guaranteed and the role of the UN and other multilateral organizations be brought into full play.
China pursues an independent foreign policy of peace, follows the road of peaceful development, works hard to integrate the efforts to safeguard its own national interests and promote common interests of all countries, and strives for a constructive role in international affairs.
In the field of arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation, China follows the new security concept featuring mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination, and commits itself to creating a favorable international and regional security environment, maintaining world peace and promoting common development.
In handling affairs related to international arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation, the Chinese Government always bases its policy-making on the judgment whether it serves to safeguard national sovereignty and security, whether it serves to maintain global strategic stability and whether it serves to promote security for all and mutual trust among countries.
Complete Prohibition and Thorough Destruction of WMD It is the shared aspiration of the international community as well as the goal of China to thoroughly destroy nuclear weapons and free the world from such weapons.
The end of the Cold War and the new security situation have made possible the substantial reduction of nuclear weapons, and then complete prohibition and thorough destruction of such weapons. Pushing forward nuclear disarmament process is of great significance to reducing the danger of nuclear proliferation, improving international security environment and promoting world peace and development.
China maintains that nuclear-weapon states should take the following measures to further promote nuclear disarmament process.
— An international legal instrument on the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons should be concluded at an early date.
— Nuclear disarmament should be a just and reasonable process of gradual reduction toward a downward balance. The two countries possessing the largest nuclear arsenals bear special and primary responsi-bilities for nuclear disarmament. They should earnestly comply with the treaties already concluded on reduction of nuclear weapons and further reduce their nuclear arsenals in a verifiable and irreversible manner so as to create conditions for achieving the ultimate goal of complete and thorough nuclear disarmament.
— Before the goal of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons is achieved, nuclear-weapon states should commit themselves to no first use of nuclear weapons and undertake unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones.
— Nuclear-weapon states should abandon the policies of nuclear deterrence based on the first use of nuclear weapons and reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their national security.
— Nuclear disarmament measures, including intermediate measures, should follow the guidelines of maintaining global strategic balance and stability and undiminished security for all.
— The CD should reach an agreement on program of work soon so as to begin at an early date negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) and to establish Ad Hoc Committees and start substantive work on such issues as nuclear disarmament and security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon states.
China stands for complete prohibition and thorough destruction of biological and chemical weapons and firmly opposes proliferation of such weapons.
Against the backdrop of increased threat of bio-terrorism and prominence of bio-security issue, it is of great realistic significance to continue to explore and formulate measures to strengthen the effectiveness of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) under the framework of this Convention. China holds that the international community should take the following actions.
— Encourage more countries to accede to the BWC and urge all its States Parties to fulfill their obligations in a comprehensive and faithful manner.
— Maintain and facilitate the multilateral process aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of the BWC and explore and formulate concrete measures through full consultations.
— Encourage more countries to submit to the UN declarations on confidence-building measures regarding the BWC.
The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is the first international legal instrument for complete prohibition and thorough destruction of a whole category of WMD with strict verification mechanism. It has set a successful example for multilateral arms control and nonproliferation efforts. To ensure full implementation of the CWC, China maintains:
— Chemical weapon possessors should double their efforts to complete the destruction of their chemical weapons at an early date in strict accordance with the CWC and subject themselves to effective supervision by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).
— It is imperative to further improve and optimize verification measures, allocate inspection resources in a fair and equitable manner and improve its cost-effectiveness.
— Continuously promote the universality of the CWC.
— The country concerned should fulfill its obligations under the Convention and honor its commitments, start at an early date the substantive destruction process for the chemical weapons it abandoned in China so as to destroy those weapons completely and thoroughly as soon as possible.
Preventing the Proliferation of WMD and Their Means of Delivery
Proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery is conducive neither to world peace and stability nor to China's security. China firmly opposes proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery. China believes that proliferation of WMD has complicated root causes. In order to prevent their proliferation, an integrated approach must be adopted to address both the symptoms and the root causes.
— All states should devote themselves to building a global security environment of cooperation and mutual trust, seeking universal im-provement of international relations and achieving security for all. This is the best way to eliminate the danger of proliferation as well as the prerequisite for a smooth nonproliferation process.
— All states should resort to political and diplomatic means to solve the proliferation problem. Non-proliferation means should help maintain and promote international security. Proper solutions to proliferation issues should be sought out through dialogue instead of confrontation, and through cooperation instead of pressuring.
— Full scope should be given to the central role of the UN and other international organizations. The existing nonproliferation mechanism should be strengthened and improved under the framework of international law and on the basis of equal and universal participation of all countries and democratic decision-making.
— A balance should be struck between nonproliferation and peaceful uses. The legitimate rights of each state to peaceful uses should be guaranteed while proliferation activities under the pretext of peaceful uses be prevented.
China views and handles missile defense issues from the perspective of maintaining global strategic balance and stability and safeguarding regional peace and security. China understands the security concerns of relevant countries about the proliferation of ballistic missiles and their technology and stands for political and diplomatic solution to this matter. Research, development and deployment of missile defense systems are by no means an effective way to solve the problem. China does not wish to see a missile defense system produce negative impact on global strategic stability, bring new unstable factors to international and regional peace and security, erode trust among big powers, or undermine legitimate security interests of other countries. China is even more reluctant to see some countries cooperate in the missile defense field to further proliferate ballistic missile technology. China believes that relevant countries should increase transparency in their missile defense program for the purpose of deepening trust and dispelling misgivings.
As the Taiwan question involves its core interests, China opposes the attempt by any country to provide help or protection to the Taiwan region of China in the field of missile defense by any means.
Preventing Weaponization of and an Arms Race in Outer Space
Outer space is the common wealth of mankind. At present, the danger of weaponization of outer space is increasing with each passing day. Taking weapons into outer space will lead to an arms race there and make it a new arena for military confrontation. Such a prospect is not in the interest of any country.
China has all along stood for peaceful use of outer space. The existing international legal instruments on outer space cannot effectively prevent weaponization of and an arms race in outer space. The inter-national community should take effective preventive measures, negotiate and conclude relevant international legal instrument to prohibit deployment of weapons in outer space and the threat or use of force against objects in outer space so as to ensure that outer space is used purely for peaceful purposes.
Addressing Humanitarian Concerns in the Arms Control Field
China is committed to properly addressing humanitarian issues in the arms control field. It holds that while humanitarian concerns are addressed, full consideration should be given to the legitimate military security needs of sovereign states as well as economic and technological capacities of all countries. As the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) accommodates both humanitarian concerns and legitimate military needs, all States Parties should implement the CCW in good faith and constantly enrich and improve it if situation requires.
Firmly combating illegal activities in the field of small arms and light weapons (SALW) is of great importance to maintaining regional peace, stability and development, fighting terrorism and cracking down upon such transnational organized crimes as drug-trafficking and smuggling. China stands for greater efforts at the national, regional and international levels to seek a comprehensive solution in this regard.
China has always attached importance to and been supportive of international efforts in the arms control and disarmament field. To oppose arms races and strive for disarmament has been an important part of China's foreign policy ever since the founding of the People's Republic. China has successively joined and faithfully implemented relevant international arms control and disarmament treaties. It has actively participated in important activities in the field of arms control and disarmament, including relevant discussions and negotiations in the UN and relevant international agencies, putting forward many reasonable and feasible proposals in this regard in a serious effort to promote the international arms control and disarmament process.
As a nuclear-weapon state, China has never evaded its due responsibilities and obligations in nuclear disarmament. China has always stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. Right after its first nuclear test in 1964, the Chinese Government issued a statement, solemnly proposing to the governments of all countries the convocation of a world summit to discuss the issue of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons.
China has persistently exercised the utmost restraint on the scale and development of its nuclear weapons. China has conducted the smallest number of nuclear tests among the five nuclear-weapon states. China has never taken part and will never take part in any nuclear arms race. China has never deployed nuclear weapons outside its own territories. In the 1990s, China closed down a nuclear weapon research and development base in Qinghai Province.
China's development of nuclear weapons has always been for the purpose of self-defense. Since the first day when it came into possession of nuclear weapons, the Chinese Government has solemnly declared that it would not be the first to use such weapons at any time and in any circumstance. Whether confronted with the nuclear threat and nuclear blackmail during the Cold War, or faced with the great changes that have taken place in the international security environment after the Cold War, China has always stayed true to its commitment. China's policy in this regard will remain unchanged in the future.
China has been actively promoting the conclusion of a multilateral treaty among nuclear-weapon states on mutual no-first-use of nuclear weapons against each other. In January 1994, China formally presented a draft text of the Treaty on the No-First-Use of Nuclear Weapons to the other four nuclear-weapon states. At the same time, China worked vigorously for arrangements among nuclear-weapon states on mutual no-first-use of nuclear weapons and mutual detargeting of nuclear weapons at each other. In September 1994, China and Russia declared that they would not be the first to use nuclear weapons against each other and would not target their strategic nuclear weapons at each other. In June 1998, China and the US declared the detargeting of their nuclear weapons against each other. In May 2000, China, together with the other four nuclear-weapon states, issued a joint statement declaring that their nuclear weapons are not targeted at any country.
Ever since the first day when it came into possession of nuclear weapons, China has committed unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones. In April 1995, the Chinese Government made a statement, reiterating its unconditional provision of negative security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon states, and at the same time undertaking to provide these countries with positive security assurances. In 2000, China and other nuclear-weapon states issued a joint statement, reaffirming their security assurance commitment made in Resolution 984 of the UN Security Council in 1995. China calls upon the other nuclear-weapon states to unconditionally provide positive and negative security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon states, and to conclude, through negotiations, an international legal instrument to this end at an early date.
China respects and supports the efforts by relevant countries and regions to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones or WMD-free zones on the basis of consultations among themselves and voluntary agreements in light of actual regional conditions. China believes that nuclear-weapon states should respect the status of nuclear-weapon-free zones and assume corresponding obligations. Proceeding from this position, China has signed and ratified Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, Protocols II and III of the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty and Protocols I and II of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty. China supports the efforts by the ASEAN countries and the five Central Asian countries to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones and is ready to sign relevant protocols as early as possible after the countries concerned have reached agreement on the texts. China supports endeavors to establish nuclear-weapon-free and WMD-free zones in the Middle East and hopes to see its early realization. China respects and welcomes Mongolia's status as a nuclear-weapon-free country. China supports denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
China has acceded to the Antarctic Treaty, the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies and the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, and has undertaken corresponding obligations.
China firmly supports the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). China has made significant contributions to the conclusion of the Treaty and was among the first to sign it. In July 1996, the Chinese Government declared a moratorium on nuclear test, and has all long honored such commitment. China supports the early entry into force of the CTBT and hopes that all countries will sign and ratify it at an early date. Meanwhile, China appeals to nuclear-weapon states and other relevant countries to maintain the moratorium on nuclear test before the CTBT comes into force. Currently, China is working vigorously on its domestic legal procedures for the ratification of the CTBT, and has established competent national agency to prepare for its implementation. China has actively participated in the work of the CTBT Preparatory Commission and all previous Conferences on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT.
China supports the early start of the negotiation of a treaty on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices on the basis of a comprehensive and balanced program of work to be reached by the CD in Geneva.
China suffered a lot from the use of biological and chemical weapons by foreign countries in history. The chemical weapons aban-doned by Japan on Chinese soil are still posing a grave and real threat to the lives and property of the Chinese people, and to the ecological environment.
China supports the efforts by the international community to ban biological and chemical weapons and has actively participated in the negotiations of relevant treaties or protocols. China has taken concrete actions to promote the process undertaken by the international community to achieve complete prohibition and thorough destruction of biological and chemical weapons.
China acceded to the BWC in 1984, and has always supported and actively participated in the multilateral endeavors aimed at strength-ening the effectiveness of the Convention. China has actively participated in the BWC Review Conferences and submitted reports on compliance with the BWC. Since 1988, China has submitted to the UN its annual declarations on the confidence-building measures pursuant to relevant decisions of the Review Conferences. China has also played an active role in the negotiations on a protocol to the BWC as well as in the annual meetings of the States Parties and meetings of the experts.
China actively participated in the negotiations of the CWC and had called strongly for addressing the issues of prohibiting the use of chemical weapons and the proper disposal of abandoned chemical weapons within the framework of the Convention, making it an inter-national legal instrument truly for the complete ban of chemical weapons.
As an original State Party to the CWC, China has made positive contributions to the effective implementation of the Convention and promotion of its universality. China has established and been constantly improving its national legislation and other measures for implementation of the Convention, as well as enhancing the capabilities of its National Authority. In accordance with the provisions of the Convention and the national conditions, China has set up implementation offices at both national and provincial levels, which constitute an effective nation-wide implementation system. In regions with advanced chemical industries, city and county level offices have also been established. China has, pursuant to the provisions of the Convention, submitted various categories of initial and annual declarations to the OPCW in a timely and comprehensive manner. By the end of June 2005, China has received 95 on-site inspections by the OPCW, the conclusions of which have all demonstrated that China has strictly implemented its obligations under the Convention.
The Chinese Government has been constantly promoting the implementation of the CWC in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and the Macao Special Administrative Region. In 2004, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region started to implement the CWC, as the relevant implementation legislation was adopted and declarations were submitted to the OPCW through China's Central Government. Preparatory work for implementation of the CWC in the Macao Special Administrative Region, including implementation legislation, has registered steady progress. The Chinese Government attaches importance to the implementation of the CWC in the Taiwan region of China and will continue to seek proper solution to the issue in accordance with the One China principle.
In 1999, the governments of China and Japan signed the Memorandum of Understanding on the Destruction of the Chemical Weapons Abandoned by Japan in China. Currently, relevant work of disposing the chemical weapons abandoned by Japan has moved from the phase of theoretical research and experiment to that of construction and implementation. The two sides have reached agreement on issues like the destruction technologies and location of destruction facility. Specific environmental standards have, by and large, been worked out. The preparatory work for the excavation and recovery of the chemical weapons abandoned by Japan and construction of the destruction fa-cility is currently under way as planned.
China takes an active part in the activities of the OPCW and has organized in China, jointly with the OPCW, three regional seminars on the implementation of the CWC and two training courses for inspectors. China also devotes itself to the promotion of economic and technological development in the chemical field, as well as trade and other international cooperation among States Parties for peaceful purposes.
China has been vigorously calling for attention and efforts by the international community to prevent an arms race in and the weaponization of outer space. China stands for the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on PAROS by the CD in Geneva to negotiate an international legal instrument on PAROS. As a first step, the CD should set out to conduct substantive work on the issue of PAROS at an early date.In 2000, China submitted to the CD a working paper entitled "China's Position on and Suggestions for Ways to Address the Issue of Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space at the Conference on Disarmament," pointing out that PAROS should be one of the top priorities on the CD's agenda, and proposing the reestablishment of the Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate an international legal instrument in this regard.
In June 2002, China, Russia, Belarus, Indonesia, Syria, Vietnam and Zimbabwe submitted to the CD a joint working paper entitled "Possible Elements for a Future International Agreement on the Prevention of Deployment of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects," putting forward specific proposals on the major elements for the future international legal instrument, which has gained wide support from many countries.
In August 2004, China and Russia jointly distributed two thematic papers at the CD, entitled "Existing International Legal Instruments and the Prevention of the Weaponization of Outer Space" and "Verification Aspects of Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space."
In March 2005, China and Russia, together with the UN Institute for Disarmament Research and the Simons Foundation of Canada, success-fully hosted an international conference in Geneva on "Safeguarding Outer Space Security: Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space".
In June 2005, China and Russia jointly distributed a thematic paper at the CD, entitled "Definition Issues Regarding Legal Instruments on the Prevention of Weaponization of Outer Space."
China supports the important role played by the UN and other multilateral institutions in addressing missile and related issues. China advocates the establishment of a fair and non-discriminatory multilateral mechanism universally accepted by the international community in the field of missile non-proliferation. The UN Group of Govern-mental Experts on Missiles is the first specialized mechanism for ad-dressing missile issues within the framework of the UN. China has participated in its work constructively.
China shares the non-proliferation objective of the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC) and took an active part in the discussions on the draft of the HCOC. Although China has not joined the HCOC, it has kept in touch with all parties including the subscribing states to the HCOC, making joint efforts to prevent the proliferation of ballistic missiles.
China earnestly fulfills its obligation under the CCW and has been dedicated to enhancing its effectiveness and universality. China has always been deeply concerned about civilian casualties caused by inappropriate use of landmines, in particular anti-personnel landmines (APL). China supports appropriate and reasonable restrictions on the use of landmines, so as to prevent their indiscriminate use against civilians.
Since its accession to the Amended Protocol on Landmines, China has strictly implemented the provisions of the Protocol. Public aware-ness and education campaigns concerning the implementation of the Protocol have been launched. A series of new military standards as required by the Protocol have been adopted. A comprehensive survey of old or obsolete landmines has been conducted, and a phased program of modification or destruction of such landmines is implemented. To date, hundreds of thousands of old or obsolete landmines have been destroyed. China has observed in good faith its commitment declared in 1996 to a moratorium on export of APL that do not meet the requirements of the Protocol. In the 1990s, China conducted two large-scale demining operations in the border areas, thus basically eliminating landmine problems within its borders.
China fully understands and sympathizes with other countries' sufferings caused by landmines and has been actively engaged in international de-mining assistance and cooperation. Since 1998, China has participated in de-mining operations in about 10 countries in Asia and Africa through various forms of assistance, including financial donations, providing demining equipment and technical training. In 2004, China and the Australian Network of International Campaign to Ban Landmines cosponsored a Humanitarian Mine/UXO Clearance Technology and Cooperation Workshop in Kunming.
Though China is not a party to the Ottawa Convention, it endorses the humanitarian purposes and objectives of the Convention and has been constantly strengthening exchanges and communication with its States Parties.
China also attaches importance to the issue of anti-vehicle land-mines (AVL). China is of the view that the issue of AVL should be ad-dressed differently from that of APL, as the extent of the humanitarian concerns caused by AVL and APL are different. China is in favor of a multi-faceted approach to addressing the issue, taking into full account the specific situation and actual capacities of different countries.
China played a constructive role in the negotiation and conclusion of the Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War and is in favor of its early entry into force. Currently, China is actively preparing for the ratification of this Protocol.
China supports multilateral efforts to combat the illicit trade in SALW and has actively participated in the relevant work within the UN framework. China played a constructive role in the negotiation of the Firearms Protocol and signed the Protocol in December 2002. China supports and actively participated in the negotiation of the UN Instrument on Identifying and Tracing Illicit SALW. It has earnestly implemented the UN Program of Action on SALW and has submitted its national reports in a timely manner. In April 2005, China hosted an international workshop on SALW in Beijing, which was co-sponsored with the UN, Japan and Switzerland.
China has unswervingly pursued a national defense policy that is defensive in nature. Under the premise of ensuring national security interests, China has always kept the quantity and size of its armed forces at the minimum level necessary for maintaining national security and has for many times taken the initiative to adopt unilateral disarmament.
Attaching high importance to the security, stability and development of the Asia-Pacific region, China has adhered to the principle of "building friendship and partnership with neighboring countries" and the policy of "fostering an amicable, peaceful and prosperous neighborhood," endeavored to seek effective approaches for confidence-building measures (CBMs), actively participated in the construction of regional security mechanism and devoted itself to establishing an Asia-Pacific security framework featuring dialogue rather than confrontation.
China made the decision to downsize its military personnel by one million in 1985. By 1987, the size of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) had been reduced from 4.238 million to 3.235 million and further reductions followed thereafter. By 1990, the number of armed forces had been cut down to 3.199 million, downsized by a total of 1.039 million.
Since 1990, China's armed forces have undergone a series of adjustments and their size has continued to shrink. China decided in 1997 to once again downsize its military by 500,000 within three years, reducing its military size to the level of 2.5 million. In 2003, China decided to further cut down the number by 200,000 within two years and to reduce its military size to the level of 2.3 million.
The wide scope and magnitude of China's unilateral disarmament in such a relatively short period of time are rarely seen in the history of international arms control and disarmament. This has fully demonstrated the firm belief of the Chinese Government and people on the arms control and disarmament cause as well as their sincere aspiration for peace and development.
China has always put emphasis on the control of its defense expenditure scale. The defense spending is appropriately allocated under the guideline of coordinated development of national defense and economy. Since the adoption of the reform and opening-up policies, the Chinese Government has kept its defense expenditure under strict control in order to concentrate its strength on economic development. From 1979 to 2004, the percentages of China's defense expenditure to its financial expenditure of the same period followed a downward curve on the whole. It was 17.37% in 1979, and 7.76% in 2004, down by about 10 percentage points.
China's overall defense expenditure remains at a relatively low level in the world. This is not only reflected in the absolute amount of defense expenditure, but also in the percentages to the GDP and financial expenditure. In 2004, China's defense expenditure registered 219.986 billion yuan, accounting for 1.61% of that year's GDP and 7.76% of that year's financial expenditure and amounting to only 5.77% of that of the US, 41.03% that of the United Kingdom, 75.65% that of France and 63.97% that of Japan. China's defense budget for 2005 is 247.756 billion yuan.
Note: Statistics in the chart are sourced from the national defense reports, financial reports or other government reports released by the said countries. In 2003 and 2004, the average dollar-yuan exchange rate was 8.2770 and 8.2768 respectively.
Chart 3: Percentage of Defense Expenditure to GDP and to State Financial Expenditure of Some Countries in 2004 (%)
Country US Russia UK France Japan China To GDP 4.02 2.69 3.50 2.01 0.98 1.61 To State Financial Expenditure 20.09 15.49 8.33 11.14 5.97 7.76
Based on the economic development and revenue growth, China has moderately increased its defense expenditure in recent years. However, the increase was relatively small. For most years since the 1990s, the growth rate of China's defense expenditure has been lower than that of the state financial expenditure. The increased part of the defense expenditure has primarily been used for the following purposes: 1. Increase of the salaries and allowances of the military personnel to ensure the improvement of their living standards in step with the socio-economic development; 2. Further improvement of the social insurance system for servicemen, including the establishment of systems like casualty insurance, medical insurance for ex-servicemen, housing subsidy, basic life guarantee for accompanying spouses of servicemen and social insurance subsidy; 3. Support for the structural and organizational reform of the military and proper resettlement for the 200,000 servicemen recently discharged from active service; 4. Increased investment in the development of high-caliber talents in the military, and refined incentive mechanism for talented people to ensure the achievement of the PLA's Strategic Project for Talented People; and 5. Moderate increase of equipment expenses to improve the PLA's defensive combating capability under the conditions of modern technology, particularly high technology.
Chart 4:Comparison Between the Growth Rates of China's Defense Expenditure and State Financial Expenditure from 1995 to 2004 (%)
The Chinese Government has always adhered to the principle of strict control, strict management and strict supervision of defense expenditure and has established a full-fledged management and legal system. The Chinese Government, pursuant to the National Defense Law of the People's Republic of China, ensures the necessary funds for national defense, incorporates the entire expenditure in the state budget and exercises management over it in accordance with the Budget Law of the People's Republic of China. Examined and approved by the National People's Congress, China's defense budget is open and transparent.
China attaches great importance to and actively promotes the cooperation on regional disarmament and CBMs. It has reached a series of agreements and consensus with relevant neighboring countries, thus making contributions to the improvement of regional security environment and enhancement of common development. These agreements reflect the new security concept initiated by China and embody the principles and spirit that are of universal significance to security dialogue and cooperation in Asia-Pacific, including mutual and equal security; seeking security through dialogue and cooperation; equal consultation and mutually beneficial cooperation; being not against a third state; no threat or harm to the security and stability of other countries; insisting on national defense policy of defensive nature; friendly exchanges in the military field, etc.
In July 1994, China and Russia signed the Agreement on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities. In April 1996, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan signed the Agreement on Confidence-Building in the Military Field Along the Border Areas. In April 1997, China signed the Agreement on the Mutual Reduction of Military Forces in the Border Areas with the aforementioned countries. These agreements opened the cooperation process of the "Shanghai Five" and laid down a solid foundation for the establishment and development of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). For more than four years since its establishment, SCO has formed a full-fledged institutional system and legal basis, smoothly launched the cooperation in the security, economic and other fields and is growing into a significant mechanism promoting regional security, stability and development.
In September 1993, China and India signed the Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility Along the Line of Actual Control in the China-India Border Areas. In November 1996, the two countries signed the Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures in the Military Field Along the Line of Actual Control in the China-India Border Areas. In April 2005, the two countries signed the Protocol on Modalities for the Implementation of Confidence-Building Measures in the Military Field Along the Line of Actual Control in the China-India Border Areas, which is an agreement on the concrete implementing approaches of relevant clauses in the Agreement signed in 1996. The signing and implementation of these agreements have played important and positive roles in maintaining peace and tranquility in the China-India border areas, promoting the friendly relations between the two countries and facilitating the peaceful resolution of the border issue.
In November 2002, China and ASEAN signed the Declaration on the Conduct of the Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), which showed all parties' common desire to maintain stability and carry out cooperation in this region. The parties concerned undertook to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means, refrain from taking any actions that would complicate or escalate disputes, promote mutual trust through dialogues between defense officials and voluntary notification of joint military exercise, and actively carry out cooperation in the fields of marine environmental protection, marine scientific research, safety of navigation and communication at sea, search and rescue operation and combating transnational crimes. In December 2004, China and ASEAN held the Senior Officials Meeting on the Implementation of the DOC, at which important consensus was reached on launching the South China Sea cooperation and the decision was made on the establishment of a Joint Working Group for the implementation of the DOC. In August 2005, the first meeting of the Joint Working Group was convened in the Philippines.
China attaches great importance to the role played by the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), supports its CBMs and voluntarily submits the Annual Report on Security Outlook every year. Since 1997, China has hosted two Inter-sessional Meetings on CBMs of the ARF and under-taken eight CBMs programs, including Training Courses on Chinese Security Policies, Seminar on Military Logistics Support and Seminar on Strengthening Cooperation in the Field of Non-traditional Security Issues. China supports gradual expansion of defense officials' participation in the ARF. At the ARF's Tenth Meeting of Foreign Ministers in 2003, China put forward the proposal of convening a meeting on security policies, and in November 2004, the first ARF Security Policy Conference was held in Beijing.
Preventing the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery is the common task of the international community. China firmly opposes the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery and has actively participated in international non-proliferation process. China has joined all international treaties and relevant organizations in the field of non-proliferation, and has maintained active exchanges and cooperation with other countries and relevant multinational export control mechanisms. China has actively participated in the diplomatic efforts of the international community to address relevant non-proliferation issues, working to promote resolution of such issues by peaceful means through dialogues and cooperation.
Since joining the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1992, China has faithfully honored all its obligations and dedicated itself to maintaining and enhancing the universality, effective-ness and authority of the NPT. China remains committed to promoting the three goals of the NPT, namely, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, nuclear disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
China joined the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1984. In 1988, China signed the Agreement Between the People's Re-public of China and the IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in China, and voluntarily placed its civilian nuclear facilities under the IAEA safeguards. China signed with the IAEA the Protocol Additional to the IAEA Safeguards Agreement in 1998, and in early 2002 formally completed the domestic legal procedures necessary for the entry into force of the Additional Protocol, thus becoming the first nuclear-weapon state to complete the relevant procedures.
In November 1991, the Chinese Government announced that it would, on a continuing basis, notify the IAEA of China's export to or import from non-nuclear-weapon states of any nuclear material of over one effective kilogram. In July 1993, China formally undertook that it would voluntarily notify IAEA of all its import and export of nuclear material as well as its export of nuclear equipment and related non-nuclear material. In May 1996, China pledged not to provide assistance, including nuclear export and personnel and technical exchanges and cooperation, to nuclear facilities of non-nuclear-weapon states not under the IAEA safeguards. At present, acceptance of the IAEA full-scope safeguards by importing countries has been set by China as the precondition for nuclear export.
China attaches great importance to the key role of the CWC in preventing proliferation of chemical weapons. China has promulgated a series of laws and regulations and adopted relevant control lists, which constitute a whole set of effective control mechanism covering production, sales, use, export and import of scheduled chemicals of the CWC. China has kept close contact with other States Parties to the CWC on export and import of scheduled chemicals, verifying and clarifying its export and import data in a timely manner and strictly implementing the provisions of the CWC on transferring scheduled chemicals to non-states parties.
China strictly fulfills its obligation under the BWC and has promulgated a series of laws and regulations to exercise strict control over export of dual-use biological agents and related equipment and technologies.
China values the important role of the multinational export control mechanisms in the field of non-proliferation. China has conducted active dialogues and exchanges with these mechanisms, learning from and drawing on their useful experience and practices for its own reference.
In October 1997, China joined the Zangger Committee. In June 2004, China joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group and is now managing export control in strict accordance with the rules and list of the Group.
In February and May 2004, China held two rounds of dialogues with the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in Paris and Beijing respectively, exchanging views on export control regimes, control lists and law-enforcement in the missile field as well as China's membership in the MTCR. In September 2004, China officially submitted its application for membership of the MTCR.
China also keeps contacts and exchanges with the Australia Group. The two sides held two rounds of consultations in March 2004 and March 2005 respectively, during which views were exchanged on the non-proliferation situation in the biological and chemical field, implementation of the CWC and the BWC, operation of the Australia Group and China's non-proliferation policy and export control measures.
In April 2004 and May 2005, China held two rounds of dialogues with the Wassenaar Arrangement in Vienna, exchanging views on the principles of export control on conventional weapons and related dual-use items and technologies, the control list and "the best practice." The two sides agreed to hold regular dialogues in the future.
China attaches importance to and actively participates in bilateral exchanges and cooperation on non-proliferation, whereby it is able to draw on the useful experience and practices of other countries in this field. China has maintained consultations and exchanges with Australia, France, Germany, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Pakistan, Russia, the UK, the US and the EU. In December 2004, China and the EU signed the Joint Declaration on Non-Proliferation and Arms Control, in which the two sides confirm that China and the EU are major strategic partners in the fields of disarmament and non-proliferation, and define the priority areas for cooperation in this regard. China has also, in strict compliance with its non-proliferation policies and export control laws and regulations, worked with relevant countries to crack down on prolif-eration activities through information exchange and law-enforcement cooperation.
China supports the role of relevant regional organizations and mechanisms in the field of non-proliferation, and has participated in relevant exchanges and dialogues in a constructive manner, exploring effective ways to address non-proliferation issues at the regional level. China has participated in the initiatives of the ARF to strengthen non-proliferation efforts. China will, in cooperation with the US and Singapore, hold an ARF seminar on non-proliferation in 2006. China is ready to keep contact and coordination with other parties to jointly promote the regional non-proliferation process.
As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China supports the important role played by the UN in the field of non-proliferation in further consolidating international consensus and deepening international cooperation.
In early 1992, the UN Security Council issued a Presidential Statement, defining the proliferation of WMD as a threat to international peace and security. China played a constructive role in drafting the Statement.
In April 2004, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1540 unanimously. As the first resolution specifically on non-proliferation adopted by the Security Council, it is conducive to promoting and enhancing international cooperation on the basis of existing international laws, and to properly addressing the problem of acquisition and trafficking of WMD, their means of delivery and the related materials by non-state actors. China actively participated in the consultations on the Resolution, put forward many constructive proposals and made important contributions to its adoption. In October 2004, China submitted its national report on implementation of the Resolution in accordance with the provisions of the Resolution, which introduced in detail measures taken by the Chinese Government to prevent and combat proliferation activities by non-state actors in the areas of legislation, law-enforcement and international cooperation.
Effective export control serves as an important means to pursue the non-proliferation goal. As a country with certain capacity in industry, science and technology, China has adopted highly responsible policies and measures in this regard. After years of endeavor, China has completed a transition in its non-proliferation export control from an administrative pattern to one based on law with relevant measures basically in line with common international practices.
Since the mid-1990s, China has gradually set up a comprehensive legal system for export control of nuclear, biological, chemical, missile and other sensitive items and technologies as well as all military products. The Chinese Government has promulgated the Regulations of the PRC on the Control of Nuclear Export and the Regulations of the PRC on the Control of Nuclear Dual-Use Items and Related Technologies Export in the nuclear field; the Regulations of the PRC on the Export Control of Dual-Use Biological Agents and Related Equipment and Technologies, the Regulations of the PRC on the Administration of the Controlled Chemicals together with the Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Regulations, the Controlled Chemicals List and the Measures on the Export Control of Certain Chemicals and Related Equipment and Technologies in the biological and chemical field; the Regulations of the PRC on the Export Control of Missiles and Missile-Related Items and Technologies in the missile field; and the Regulations of the PRC on the Administration of Arms Export in the arms export field.
China's legislation on export control widely embraces such inter-national practices as licensing system, end-user and end-use certification, list control and "catch-all" principle. In order to reduce the risk of proliferation, relevant regulations also stipulate that nuclear exports and the export of controlled chemicals and military products can only be handled by a few trading companies designated by the Government. All regulations spell out in detail penalty measures for illegal exports.
The scope of control of the aforementioned regulations is basically identical with international practices. For example, in the nuclear field, the control list tallies completely with those of the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group and will undergo constant adjustments corresponding to changes made to them; in the biological and chemical field, the lists are basically the same as those of the Australia Group; the missile list also conforms by and large with the annex to the MTCR. In real practice, the competent export control departments of the Chinese Government may also exercise, on an ad interim basis, export control according to law on items and technologies not on these lists.
In addition, the Foreign Trade Law of the PRC, the Customs Law of the PRC, the Criminal Law of the PRC, the Administrative Punishments Law of the PRC, the Regulations of the PRC on the Import and Export Control of Goods and the Regulations of the PRC on the Import and Export Control of Technologies also provide a legal basis for China's non-proliferation export control.
China's non-proliferation export control involves many of the government's functional departments. So far, a mechanism for a clear di-vision of responsibility and coordination has been established among these departments.
China's nuclear export comes under the control of the Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND), in coordination with other relevant government departments. Arms export, including the export of missiles, and facilities and key equipment used directly for the production of missiles, is under the control of the COSTIND and the relevant department under the Ministry of National Defense, in coordination with other government departments concerned.
The export of nuclear dual-use items, dual-use biological agents, certain chemicals, and the missile-related dual-use items and technology for civilian use is under the control of the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), in coordination with other government departments concerned. Among them, the export of nuclear dual-use items and missile-related dual-use items and technologies is subject to examination by the MOFCOM, in coordination with the COSTIND. The export of dual-use biological agents and technologies related to animals and plants is subject to examination by the MOFCOM, in coordination with the Ministry of Agriculture if needed. The export of dual-use biological agents and technologies related to humans is subject to examination by the MOFCOM, in coordination with the Ministry of Health if needed. The export of equipment and technologies related to dual-use biological agents and of equipment and technologies related to certain chemicals is subject to examination by the MOFCOM, in coordination with the State Development and Reform Commission if needed. The export of controlled chemicals is subject to examination by the State Development and Reform Commission, in coordination with the MOFCOM.
The export of sensitive items and related equipment and technologies that relate to foreign policy is subject to examination by the above-mentioned competent departments, in coordination with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Where the export items entail significant impact on national security and public interests, the competent departments shall, jointly with other relevant departments, submit the case to the State Council and the Central Military Commission for approval.
The General Administration of Customs (GAC) is responsible for supervision and control of the export of the above-mentioned items and technologies, and it also participates in investigating and handling cases of illegal exports. The Customs have the authority to question whether the items from the exporters are sensitive items and technologies, and to request the exporters to follow regulations and apply to competent government departments either for export license or for relevant certificates to show that the exports are not controlled items.
The Chinese Government attaches great importance to law enforcement and has adopted a series of effective measures to ensure the implementation of laws and regulations on export control.
In November 2002, the MOFCOM formulated the Measures on the Administration of Export Registration for Sensitive Items and Technologies. In December 2003, the MOFCOM and the GAC jointly formulated the Provisional Measures on the Administration of Export Licenses on Sensitive Items and Technologies. These measures standardized the export of sensitive items and technologies as well as the application, approval, issuance, use and verification of license. In January 2004, the MOFCOM and the GAC jointly launched a computer control system for the export of sensitive items and technologies by connecting within the same network different agencies that approve and issue the license with the supervision branch of the Customs. This has greatly enhanced the capacity to supervise and control the export of sensitive items and technologies.Based on control lists for nuclear, biological, chemical and missile exports, the MOFCOM and the GAC jointly compiled the Export Licensing Catalogue of Sensitive Items and Technologies covering 658 items and technologies, of which 34% have had their customs code determined. China's Customs also extensively apply hi-tech equipment in various links in the process of supervision and control of customs clearance, which has significantly upgraded the capacity of on-site law enforcement and efficiency of examination.
Relevant competent authorities on export control have set up a "national expert supporting system for export control" that engages experts from nuclear, biological, chemical and missile fields to assist competent authorities in making correct and scientific judgments on relevant items during the process of export examination and approval.
In non-proliferation export control, the Chinese Government adheres to the principle of enforcing the law strictly and punishing all offenders. For any suspected case of illegal export of sensitive items and technologies, competent authorities carry out careful investigation and handle it according to law. Since the end of 2002, the Chinese Government has dealt with scores of cases of various types concerning illegal export of sensitive items and technologies. Competent authorities have put the companies involved in these cases on a "watch list" so as to prevent the recurrence of similar activities.
In May 2004, the Chinese Government established an inter-agency contingency mechanism for export control and spelt out in detail the responsibilities, division of labor and work procedures of relevant export control departments in dealing with emergency cases in this respect. This has provided an institutional safeguard for swift and effective handling of such cases.
The Chinese Government attaches importance to educating and training law enforcement officials for export control, especially those at the grass-roots level, so as to raise their policy awareness and capability to exercise export control according to law. After the release of relevant laws and regulations on export control, the MOFCOM carried out comprehensive training programs on policies, laws and regulations for commerce officials at local levels. In places prone to cases of illegal export, the MOFCOM also holds, on non-regular basis, special training courses on policies, laws and regulations and law-enforcement of export control. In May 2004, the GAC, jointly with relevant organs in charge of non-proliferation export control, conducted training programs for on-site customs officials across the country on policies, laws and regulations with regard to the export control of sensitive items and technologies.
The Chinese Government has taken various measures to make the legislation on export control known to enterprises, with a view to raising their awareness and self-discipline to abide by the law. Major measures include: to publish the full text of laws and regulations on export control on the web sites of competent government departments; to get export enterprises familiarized, by organizing regular training courses and lectures and distributing pamphlets, with policies, laws and regulations on export control as well as the procedures for export examination and approval to ensure that the enterprises implement them in real earnest and run their business according to law; to set up a hotline to timely clear up doubts or questions from the enterprises; and to investigate and punish illegal exporters and make them public.
The Chinese Government encourages and guides the enterprises to build their own internal mechanisms for non-proliferation export control and implement accountability for non-proliferation in accordance with their own specific situations. Some enterprises have set up offices for non-proliferation export control to disseminate information of relevant national policies and legislation, draw up specific measures for implementation within the enterprises, and supervise their own scientific research, production and business operations so as to ensure that the enterprises abide by national laws and regulations. They also have in place an accountability mechanism in which the legal person is responsible for non-proliferation work of his/her enterprise while administrative and other personnel in relevant sections sign responsibility pledges and fulfill their non-proliferation obligations accordingly. The Chinese Government also encourages enterprises to exchange experiences in export control.
The non-proliferation export control is a long-term task. The Chinese Government will keep on improving its legislation in this regard, enhancing the capacity-building of law enforcement, setting up and optimizing internal mechanisms, and reinforcing publicity of legisla-tion as well as education and training for enterprises, in a bid to make due contributions to the international non-proliferation endeavor.
In the Nuclear Field
Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (signed in August 1973, the instrument of ratification deposited in June 1974)
Additional Protocols II and III to the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty (signed in February 1987, the instrument of ratification deposited in October 1988)
Agreement Between the People's Republic of China and the Inter-national Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in China (signed in September 1988, effective since September 1989)
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (acceded in February 1989)
Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (acceded in February 1991)
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (acceded in March 1992)
Convention on Nuclear Safety (signed in 1994, ratified in April 1996)
Protocols I and II to the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (signed in April 1996, the instrument of ratification deposited in October 1997)
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (signed in September 1996)
Protocol Additional to the Agreement Between the People's Re-public of China and the IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in China (signed in December 1998, entered into force in March 2002)
In the Chemical Field
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (signed in January 1993, the instrument of ratification deposited in April 1997)
In the Biological Field
Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (acceded in November 1984)
In the Conventional Field
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects and Protocols I-III (signed in September 1981, the instrument of ratification deposited in April 1982; the amended Article 1 of the Convention ratified in June 2003, the instrument of ratification deposited in August 2003)
Amended Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices Annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (Amended Protocol II) (the instrument of ratification deposited in November 1998)
Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons Annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (Protocol IV) (the instrument of ratification deposited in November 1998)
Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crimes (signed in December 2002)
In Other Fields
The Antarctic Treaty (acceded in June 1983)
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (instrument of accession deposited in December 1983)
Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (acceded in December 1988)
Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (acceded in June 2005)
In the Nuclear Field
Regulations of the PRC on the Control of Nuclear Export (promulgated in September 1997, revised in June 2001)
Regulations of the PRC on the Control of Nuclear Dual-Use Items and Related Technologies Export (promulgated in June 1998)
Measures on the Administration of Approval for Transfer and Transit of Nuclear Items (For Trial Implementation) (promulgated in January 2000)
In the Biological Field
Regulations of the PRC on the Export Control of Dual-Use Biological Agents and Related Equipment and Technologies (promulgated in October 2002)
In the Chemical Field
Regulations of the PRC on the Administration of Controlled Chemicals (promulgated in December 1995)
Controlled Chemicals List (promulgated in May 1996, supplemented in June 1998)
Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Regulations of the PRC on the Administration of Controlled Chemicals (promulgated in March 1997)
List of New Chemicals Controlled in Category 3 (promulgated in June 1998)
Measures on the Export Control of Certain Chemicals and Related Equipment and Technologies (promulgated in October 2002)
In the Missile Field
Regulations of the PRC on the Export Control of Missiles and Missile-Related Items and Technologies (promulgated in August 2002)
In the Arms Export Field
Regulations of the PRC on the Administration of Arms Export (promulgated in October 1997, amended in October 2002; the Military Products Export Control List promulgated in November 2002)
Measures on the Administration of Export Registration for Sensitive Items and Technologies (promulgated in November 2002)
Provisional Measures on the Administration of Export Licenses on Sensitive Items and Technologies (promulgated in December 2003)
Export Licensing Catalogue of Sensitive Items and Technologies (promulgated in December 2003)
Other Related Laws and Regulations
Foreign Trade Law of the PRC (promulgated in May 1994, amended in April 2004)
Administrative Punishments Law of the PRC (promulgated in March 1996)
Customs Law of the PRC (promulgated in January 1987, amended in July 2000)
Amendments to the Criminal Law of the PRC (promulgated in December 2001)
Regulations of the PRC on the Import and Export Control of Technologies (promulgated in December 2001)
Regulations of the PRC on the Import and Export Control of Goods (promulgated in December 2001)
Agreement Between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of India on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility Along the Line of Actual Control in the China-India Border Areas (signed in September 1993)
Agreement Between China and Russia on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities (signed in July 1994)
Joint Statement by the President of the People's Republic of China and the President of the Russian Federation on No-First-Use of Nuclear Weapons and Detargeting of Strategic Nuclear Weapons Against Each Other (signed in September 1994)
Agreement on Confidence-Building in the Military Field Along the Border Areas Among China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan (signed in April 1996)
Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures in the Military Field Along the Line of Actual Control in the China-India Border Areas (signed in November 1996)
Agreement on the Mutual Reduction of Military Forces in the Border Areas Among China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan (signed in April 1997)
Agreement Between the Ministry of National Defense of the PRC and the Department of Defense of the USA on Establishing a Consultation Mechanism to Strengthen Military Maritime Safety (signed in January 1998)
Declaration on the Conduct of the Parties in the South China Sea (signed in November 2002)
Protocol Between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of India on Modalities for the Implementation of Confidence-Building Measures in the Military Field Along the Line of Actual Control in the China-India Border Areas (signed in April 2005)
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