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Money laundering and foreign Corruption:
Enforcement and effectiveness
Of the Patriot act.Supplemental staff Report on U.S. Accounts used by Augusto Pinochet
United States Senate
Permanent Subcommittee on investigations
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental AffairsNorm Coleman, Chairman
Carl Levin, Ranking Minority MemberIndex
III. Findings and Recommendations
IV. Supplemental information on Riggs relationship with Augusto Pinochet
A. Additional Riggs Accounts
V. Pinochet relationships at other Financial Institutions operating in the United States
A. Citigroup
I. Introduction
From 1999 to 2001, the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, at the request of Senator Carl Levin, Ranking Minority Member, conducted a detailed investigation into money laundering activities in the U.S. financial services sector, including in-depth examinations of money laundering activities in private banking, correspondent banking, and the securities industry. Two Minority staff reports were issued, and Subcommittee hearings were held in November 1999 and March 2001. [1] This investigative work provided the foundation for many of the anti-money laundering provisions in Title III of the USA Patriot Act enacted in October 2001. Among other key provisions, the Patriot Act obligated U.S. financial institutions to exercise due diligence when opening and administering accounts for foreign political figures, and established corrupt acts by foreign officials as an allowable basis for U.S. money laundering prosecutions.
In February 2003, at Senator Levin’s request and with the support of Subcommittee Chairman Norm Coleman, the Subcommittee initiated a bipartisan followup investigation to evaluate the enforcement and effectiveness of key anti-money laundering provisions in the Patriot Act, using Riggs Bank as a case history. During the course of this investigation, the Subcommittee issued numerous subpoenas and document requests. The Subcommittee staff reviewed over 100 boxes, folders, and electronic compact disks containing hundreds of thousands of pages of documents, including bank statements, account opening materials, wire transfers, correspondence, electronic mail, contracts, board minutes, materials related to specific bank accounts and transactions, bank examination materials, audit reports, legislative materials, and legal pleadings. The Subcommittee staff also conducted numerous interviews with representatives from financial institutions, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Federal Reserve, oil companies, various experts, and other persons with relevant information.
The investigation culminated in a Subcommittee hearing on July 15, 2004, and the issuance of a Minority Staff Report in conjunction with the hearing. [2] The hearing and report presented evidence showing systematic failures by Riggs Bank to uphold its anti-money laundering (AML) obligations and by federal regulators charged with ensuring bank compliance. To illustrate the problems, the 2004 hearing and report focused in detail on two sets of Riggs accounts, one involving former Chilean President Augusto Pinochet and the other involving the West African nation Equatorial Guinea.
Among other matters, the Subcommittee investigation determined that Riggs had served as a long-standing personal banker for Mr. Pinochet and deliberately assisted him in the concealment and movement of his funds while he was under investigation and the subject of a Spanish court order directing a worldwide freeze of his assets. Riggs opened multiple accounts for Mr. Pinochet with the knowledge and support of the Bank’s leadership; accepted millions of dollars in deposits from him with no serious inquiry into the source of his wealth; set up offshore shell corporations and opened accounts in the names of those corporations to disguise Mr. Pinochet’s ownership of the account funds; altered the names of his personal account to disguise his ownership; transferred $1.6 million from London to the United States while Mr. Pinochet was in detention in the United Kingdom and under a Spanish court order freezing his assets; conducted transactions through Riggs’s own administrative accounts to hide Mr. Pinochet’s involvement in some cash transactions; and delivered over $1.9 million in four batches of cashiers checks to Mr. Pinochet in Chile to enable him to obtain substantial cash payments in that country. The Subcommittee investigation also determined that Riggs Bank had concealed the existence of the Pinochet accounts from OCC bank examiners for two years, resisted OCC requests for information, failed to identify or report suspicious account activity, and closed the Pinochet accounts only after a detailed OCC examination in 2002. [3]
Shortly after the July 2004 Subcommittee hearing, representatives of Riggs Bank informed the Subcommittee that an internal inquiry by its Security & Investigations Group, which the bank first established in the summer of 2003, was beginning to identify additional Pinochet-related accounts in Washington, Miami, and London that should have been, but were not, identified in response to Subcommittee subpoenas. These additional accounts were controlled by Mr. Pinochet, members of his immediate family, or third parties whose accounts served as conduits for Pinochet funds. In addition, the Riggs office had located documents that should have been, but were not, produced in response to earlier Subcommittee subpoenas. Over the ensuing months, the Riggs Security & Investigations Group conducted a detailed review of these accounts and documents. The Subcommittee reviewed the new documentation, analyzed the information, and met with bank representatives.
In addition, the Subcommittee’s ongoing investigation determined that Riggs Bank was not alone in the United States in helping Mr. Pinochet gain access to the U.S. financial system. Beginning with transactions detailed in Riggs account records, the Subcommittee identified numerous accounts and transactions at other financial institutions involving Pinochet funds. The Subcommittee obtained and reviewed about 15 additional boxes of documents from other financial institutions, including bank statements, account opening materials, wire transfers, correspondence, checks, electronic mail, contracts, and other materials. The Subcommittee met with numerous representatives of financial institutions about the materials. This new information produced substantial evidence of additional, hidden bank and securities accounts that had been used by Mr. Pinochet in the United States.
During this phase of the Subcommittee’s investigation, additional civil and criminal proceedings related to the Pinochet accounts were initiated. In January 2005, Riggs Bank pled guilty to one U.S. felony count for failing to report suspicious activity to law enforcement, and paid a criminal fine of $16 million. [4] In February 2005, to settle civil and criminal charges filed by Spanish authorities for the alleged violation of the 1998 Spanish court order directing financial institutions to freeze Pinochet assets, Riggs Bank, Joseph Allbritton, and Robert Allbritton paid about $1 million in court costs and legal expenses and another $8 million to a foundation established to assist victims of the Pinochet regime. In return, the Spanish court dismissed the pending criminal and civil actions against officers and directors of Riggs Bank. [5]
II. Executive Summary
This supplemental Report describes the additional information obtained by the Subcommittee related to Pinochet accounts administered by Riggs and other financial institutions operating in the United States.
Newly identified Riggs documents and accounts establish that the relationship between Riggs Bank and Augusto Pinochet was more extensive than had been described to the Subcommittee prior to its 2004 hearing and Minority Staff Report. Instead of maintaining 9 accounts and certificates of deposit (CDs), as indicated to the Subcommittee earlier, Riggs actually had 28 Pinochet-related accounts and CDs. And instead of an 8-year relationship from 1994 to 2002, as earlier indicated, Riggs actually had a 25-year relationship with Mr. Pinochet and his family, from 1979 to 2004.
The newly identified Riggs accounts include 7 personal accounts for Mr. Pinochet, 4 of which were opened under a disguised variant of his name, and 3 of which were opened under an alias. Three additional accounts had been opened for members of Mr. Pinochet’s immediate family. Nine accounts had been opened in the name of third parties, all but one of whom were Chilean military officers. Bank records show that these military officer accounts were used at times as conduits to transfer Pinochet funds. One 1996 Riggs trip report described a Chilean military officer accountholder as “one of several front-men of General Pinochet.” [6]
The newly identified documents also demonstrate that Riggs senior officials played a more significant role in the Pinochet relationship than was made known to the Subcommittee prior to its 2004 hearing. For example, prior to the hearing, Riggs personnel disagreed over how many times Riggs personnel had traveled to Chile, who went on specific trips, who met with Mr. Pinochet, and who actually asked him to open a Riggs account in Washington. [7] In interviews, Riggs personnel consistently downplayed or could not recall the extent of personal interactions that took place between Riggs senior officials and Mr. Pinochet. The newly produced documents, which are contemporaneous with the events described, provide more information. They show, for example, that Riggs senior officials began visiting Chile as early as 1986, and met with Chilean military and government leaders on at least 7 occasions in 1986, 1994, 1996, 1997, 1999, 2000, and 2002. On at least 5 of these trips, Riggs senior officials met with Mr. Pinochet in Chile, participated with him in social as well as business events, corresponded with him from Washington, and presented him with gifts on behalf of Riggs Bank.
Riggs documents also show that the efforts of Riggs senior officials to solicit business from Mr. Pinochet were part of a wider bank strategy to develop and strengthen the bank’s relationship with the Chilean military during the 1990s. Riggs had enjoyed a profitable relationship with the Chilean military during the 1960s and 1970s. In 1979, however, according to a memorandum written by Mr. Pinochet’s private banker at Riggs, the Chilean Military Mission closed most of its official accounts at Riggs and moved them to the Bank of Nova Scotia in Canada, in response to the 1976 assassination of Chilean Ambassador Orlando Letelier in Washington, D.C. [8] During the 1990s, Riggs officials decided to try to restore the earlier relationship. In 1994, Riggs senior officials traveled to Chile, met with senior military and government officials, including Mr. Pinochet who was then Commander-in Chief of the Army, and were successful in convincing the Chilean military to return many of their accounts to Riggs Bank in Washington, where they remained until 2004.
Recently obtained material shows that Riggs was not the only U.S. financial institution that gave Mr. Pinochet access to the U.S. financial system. The evidence shows that, over the past 25 years, due to inadequate due diligence and, at times, actual facilitation of unusual transactions, U.S. financial institutions enabled Mr. Pinochet to construct an extensive and largely hidden network of U.S. bank and securities accounts, involving millions of dollars, which he used to move funds and transact business. Three financial institutions examined by the Subcommittee, Citigroup, Banco de Chile-United States, [9] and Espirito Santo Bank in Florida, maintained years-long U.S. relationships with and provided multiple financial accounts and services to Mr. Pinochet. Other financial institutions also helped Mr. Pinochet and his family move funds and transact business in the United States, including Banco Atlantico which is now part of Banco de Sabadell; Bank of America; Coutts & Co. (USA) International which is now part of Banco Santander; Ocean Bank in Miami; and PineBank N.A. in Miami. Evidence exists of still additional U.S. accounts related to Mr. Pinochet, but limited Subcommittee resources prevent an exhaustive analysis of all of the U.S. accounts used to assist Mr. Pinochet.
In addition to the 28 Riggs accounts and CDs, the Subcommittee has now identified nearly 100 U.S. financial accounts and CDs benefitting Mr. Pinochet or his immediate family over the past 25 years, several of which were only recently closed. For example, in response to Subcommittee inquiries, Citigroup has identified 63 U.S. accounts and CDs that it maintained for Mr. Pinochet and his family at various times from 1981 to 2005. All of the Citigroup personal accounts for Mr. Pinochet were opened under disguised variants of his name, such as Jose P. Ugarte or J. Ramon Ugarte, and were closed during the mid-1990s. Accounts and CDs were also opened in the name of Mr. Pinochet’s son, Marco Antonio Pinochet Hiriart; his daughters, Ines Lucia and Maria Veronica Pinochet; and offshore entities that Marco or Ines Lucia Pinochet controlled, including Meritor Investments, Trust MT-4964, and Redwing Holdings. While most of these accounts were closed in 2000 or 2001, a few closed in 2003 or 2004, and one is frozen but still open. Altogether these accounts handled millions of dollars.
The Subcommittee has also identified 24 U.S. accounts and CDs at Banco de Chile- United States benefitting Mr. Pinochet and his family from 1995 to 2004. These accounts were opened in the name of Mr. Pinochet, an immediate family member, or one of 6 offshore corporations controlled by Oscar Custodio Aitken Lavanchy, a Chilean attorney with ties to Mr. Pinochet. [10] These offshore corporations, each of which served at times as a conduit for Pinochet funds, maintained accounts at both Banco de Chile-United States and U.S. securities firms. Altogether, over a nine-year period, these Pinochet-related accounts received deposits totaling more than $7 million, including $6 million which had been transferred in 2002 from Riggs Bank, after Riggs closed its Pinochet accounts, and another $1.1 million transferred over time from accounts in Chile.
In addition, the Subcommittee has identified at least 6 U.S. accounts and CDs at Espirito Santo Bank in Florida that benefitted Mr. Pinochet and his family from 1991 to 2000. These accounts were opened in the name of Mr. Pinochet and his wife; an offshore corporation controlled by Mr. Pinochet called Trilateral International Trading Ltd.; an offshore trust controlled by Mr. Pinochet called the Santa Lucia Trust; and Mr. Pinochet’s daughter, Jacqueline Pinochet, who allowed her account to be used to send funds to Mr. Pinochet’s assistant, Monica Ananias Kuncar. Over an eight-year period, these Pinochet-related accounts received deposits totaling about $3.9 million.
Due to the many transactions, accounts, and financial institutions that the Subcommittee has identified, the Subcommittee investigation has been unable to calculate the total amount of Pinochet funds that were deposited into or moved through U.S. accounts, except to say that it involves millions of dollars. At a minimum, the total exceeds the $8 million found in Riggs accounts as of September 2001, [11] and the total is likely much higher. At Banco de Chile-United States, for example, records show that the Pinochet-related accounts received about $1.1 million in deposits over time from various sources in Chile. At Espirito Santo Bank, records show another $3.9 million in Pinochet funds deposited over time. At Citigroup, due to the many transactions and accounts involved and repeated transfers to and from other financial institutions, the Subcommittee was unable to determine the total amount of Pinochet funds held by that bank; Citigroup representatives were able to offer only a very rough estimate that at least $5 million and perhaps millions more flowed through the accounts during the years they remained open.
This Report focuses on the 28 Pinochet-related accounts and CDs at Riggs and the nearly 100 accounts and CDs at other financial institutions in the United States. It is important to note, however, that many of the financial institutions examined by the Subcommittee also maintained one or more accounts for Mr. Pinochet and his family in countries other than the United States. These accounts were located in Argentina, the Bahamas, Cayman Islands, Chile, Gibraltar, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. An examination of these non-U.S. accounts is beyond the scope of this Report.
Prior to 2004, it appears that U.S. regulators and law enforcement were generally unaware that Augusto Pinochet had constructed a web of largely hidden accounts in the United States and was using these accounts on a regular basis to move funds and transact business. His secretive opening of multiple accounts at multiple U.S. financial institutions over the years presents a cautionary tale about the ease with which a determined individual can manipulate the U.S. financial system, and the importance of transparency, due diligence, and information sharing by financial institutions, regulators, and law enforcement to guard against possible money laundering and foreign corruption.
III. Findings and Recommendations
Based upon its investigation, the Subcommittee staff makes the following findings of fact.
(1) More Extensive Pinochet Relationship. The relationship between Riggs Bank and Augusto Pinochet was more extensive than previously disclosed, encompassing 28 accounts instead of 9, spanning 25 years instead of 8, including secret accounts opened under misleading names, and involving more personal, high-level contact between Riggs officials and Mr. Pinochet than previously described.
(2) Military Officer Accounts. From 1981 to 2004, eight Riggs accounts, opened in the names of Chilean military officers, served as occasional conduits for Pinochet funds and, over time, transmitted more than $1.7 million to Pinochet-related accounts.
(3) Web of 125 U.S. Accounts. Over the past 25 years, multiple financial institutions operating in the United States, including Riggs Bank, Citigroup, Banco de Chile- United States, Espirito Santo Bank in Miami, and others, enabled Augusto Pinochet to construct a web of at least 125 U.S. bank and securities accounts, involving millions of dollars, which he used to move funds and transact business. In many cases, these accounts were disguised by using a variant of the Pinochet name, an alias, the name of an offshore entity, or the name of a third party willing to serve as a conduit for Pinochet funds.
(4) Transferring Suspect Funds. After U.S. bank regulators raised money laundering concerns about the Pinochet funds at Riggs Bank, the bank closed the accounts and transferred the funds to another financial institution operating in the United States, without notice that the funds were suspect. The U.S. regulators failed to follow the suspect funds when they left Riggs to determine whether they went to another U.S. financial institution.
Based upon its investigation, the Subcommittee staff makes the following recommendations.
(1) Section 314(b) Warning. A financial institution that closes or asks a client to close an account due to money laundering concerns, including a concern the account may contain the proceeds of foreign corruption, should, before transferring the funds to another financial institution, warn that financial institution under Section 314(b) of the Patriot Act that the transfer is the result of an account closure due to possible money laundering or foreign corruption concerns.
(2) Stopping Suspect Funds. Once U.S. financial regulators identify a suspect account, they should take reasonable steps to prevent suspect funds from being sent to another U.S. financial institution without an appropriate warning, identify related accounts at other financial institutions operating in the United States, and, if necessary, dismantle any network of suspect U.S. accounts.
(3) Section 314(b) Guidance. To increase the usefulness of Section 314(b), U.S. financial regulators should consider issuing guidance clarifying that the legal protections afforded by that section permit financial institutions to respond to requests for information, including by offering information about accounts and transactions that may help expose or prevent money laundering or terrorist activities.
(4) Intrabank Disclosures. The United States should work with the European Union to enable financial institutions with U.S. and E.U. affiliates to exchange client information across international lines to safeguard against money laundering and terrorist financing.
IV. Supplemental information on Riggs relationship with Augusto Pinochet
As explained in the 2004 report, Augusto Jose Ramon Pinochet Ugarte, former president of Chile, is a controversial political figure whose name is known world wide. After taking power in a 1973 coup, he served as President of Chile until 1990, and as Commander-in-Chief of the Chilean Army until 1998. After stepping down from the army, he became a “Senator for life.” [12] In court filings, press accounts, and other reports, Mr. Pinochet has been accused of involvement with human rights abuses, torture, assassinations, death squads, drug trafficking, arms sales, and corruption, but never convicted in a court of law. [13] Since 1996, he has been the subject of repeated litigation in Spain, [14] the United Kingdom, [15] Chile, [16] and other countries [17] by persons seeking to hold him accountable for crimes committed during his presidency. In each case prior to the Subcommittee’s 2004 hearing, Mr. Pinochet had been found by the presiding court to be unavailable, unfit, or immune to prosecution. [18]
On August 26, 2004, the Chilean Supreme Court held that Mr. Pinochet was not immune to prosecution in the “Operation Condor” case, involving the disappearance of certain political figures during the mid-1970s. [19] On December 13, 2004, the relevant trial court found Mr. Pinochet fit for trial in that case. In addition, a Chilean Judge ordered an investigation of the funds in Mr. Pinochet’s accounts at Riggs, located some of those funds, and froze them. On October 1, 2004, the Chilean Internal Tax Service filed a complaint against Mr. Pinochet for allegedly filing false tax returns. [20] In November 2004, the Chilean Judge located and froze another $4 million in Pinochet assets. [21] Mr. Pinochet apparently offered to pay $5 million in back taxes to free his assets, but on February 7, 2005, Chilean officials rejected the offer, apparently in part because some of the frozen assets were attached pursuant to criminal proceedings. [22]
Information obtained after the Subcommittee’s 2004 hearing shows that the relationship between Riggs Bank and Augusto Pinochet was more extensive than was previously indicated, encompassing a total of 28 accounts rather than 9 accounts, and spanning a total of 25 years rather than 8 years. [23] In addition to the 9 accounts described in the 2004 Minority Staff report, [24] Riggs has identified 19 more Pinochet related accounts located in its Washington, Miami, and London offices and affiliates. The oldest account was opened in Washington in July 1979, and the most recent accounts remained active in London until July 2004, when they were frozen by the bank. [25] Riggs senior officials also had more extensive business and personal interactions with Mr. Pinochet and his family than previously disclosed.
Riggs Bank has fully cooperated with all Subcommittee inquiries and produced all requested documentation, including documentation related to the extensive internal review of the Pinochet-related accounts conducted by the Riggs Security & Investigations Group. The Riggs Security & Investigations Group is to be commended for its thorough work and willingness to share its analysis with this Subcommittee. The information it provided was of great assistance in the Subcommittee’s supplemental investigation.
A. Additional Riggs Accounts
The newly identified Riggs accounts include 7 personal accounts and CDs for Mr. Pinochet, 4 of which were opened under a disguised variant of his name, and 3 of which were opened under an alias. Riggs also maintained 3 accounts for members of Mr. Pinochet’s immediate family. Nine additional accounts were opened in Miami in the name of ostensibly unrelated third parties, all but one of whom has been identified as a Chilean military officer. Bank records show that, at times, these accounts served as conduits for Pinochet funds.
When asked why these accounts were not disclosed earlier, Riggs identified a number of factors that had contributed to the delay in identifying them. Riggs first explained that it had given the Subcommittee the same records it had provided the OCC in 2002, without realizing they were incomplete. Riggs explained that the Miami and Washington accounts were more than ten years old, some were in the name of an alias or a third party, relevant documents had been lost or destroyed, most of the individuals familiar with the accounts had left the bank, and the various Riggs affiliates that opened the accounts had not fully communicated with each other. Riggs indicated that another important factor was that a senior Riggs official who was aware of many of the accounts did not identify them when asked. Peter Fowler, who was president and chief operating officer of Riggs Bank International Corporation in Miami from October 1994 to July 2000, and then senior vice president of the Latin American Embassy Banking Division in Washington, had failed to disclose the military officer accounts when the bank was collecting information in response to OCC inquiries in 2002, and in response to regulatory and Subcommittee inquiries in 2003 and 2004. After the Subcommittee hearing in July 2004, the Riggs Security & Investigations Group discovered the additional accounts when researching a check that had been sent from one of the military officer accounts to a Pinochet account. In August 2004, the bank fired Mr. Fowler.
Additional Personal Accounts. Of the 7 newly identified Riggs accounts that were opened for Mr. Pinochet, 4 were opened under a disguised variant of Mr. Pinochet’s name and 3 under the alias, Daniel Lopez. [26] The accounts are the following.
(1) Account No.413799878 was opened in the name of Jose Ugarte in Washington on July 20, 1979, and closed in July 1981.
(2) Account No. 350082 was opened in the name of Jose Ramon Ugarte in Miami on July 13, 1981, and closed on June 8, 1984.
(3) Account No. 76077573 was opened in the name of Daniel Lopez in Washington on January 8, 1985 and closed on an unknown date sometime after September 1994. [27]
(4) Account No. 450858 was opened in the name of Jose R. Ugarte in Miami on January 14, 1985, and closed on March 15, 1990.
(5) Account No. 707547 was opened in the name of Augusto P. Ugarte or Lucia Hiriart P. in trust for Maria Veronica Pinochet, Maria Jose Martinez P. and Lucia Amunategui P., in Miami on April 4, 1990, and closed on October 10, 1991.
(6) Account No. 710053 was opened in the name of Daniel Lopez, in trust for Augusto J. Pinochet, in Miami on August 5, 1993, and closed on March 14, 1996.
(7) Account No. 808691, a CD, was opened in the name of Daniel Lopez in Miami on an unknown opening and closing date, but which includes at least the period from August 1994 until January 1996.
Because these accounts were opened under a disguised variant of Mr. Pinochet’s name or under his Daniel Lopez alias, the extent to which they were known to Riggs senior officials in Washington is unclear. Several Riggs officials in Miami, however, were well aware of them, and even a cursory review of the account statements shows that they were carrying Pinochet funds.
The Lopez accounts are instructive. On March 22, 1990, for example, a $410,000 check made payable to “Augusto P. Ugarte” was drawn on the Daniel Lopez account in Washington, and used on April 4, 1990, to open Miami Account No. 707547 for “Augusto P. Ugarte” and “Lucia Hiriart P.” in trust for the Pinochet children (hereinafter “Ugarte/Hiriart Miami account”). [28] On July 31, 1990, a $302,000 check made payable to Augusto P. Ugarte was drawn on the same Lopez account and deposited into the same Ugarte/Hiriart Miami account. [29] In December 1990, a $11,520 check withdrew funds from the Lopez account and deposited them into the Ugarte/Hiriart Miami account. In December 1991, two checks totaling $79,626 withdrew funds from the Washington Lopez account and deposited them into the Ugarte/Hiriart Miami account. On September 1, 1994, a $56,000.25 check made payable to “J. Ugarte” withdrew funds from the Lopez account and deposited them into an account at Banco de Chile.
Additional transactions involving the Daniel Lopez account in Miami, Account No. 710053, shows that this account also served as a conduit for Pinochet funds. For example, the Miami Lopez account was initially funded in August 1993, with a $22,696.23 check drawn on the Lopez account in Washington. Additional deposits into the Miami Lopez account came from Banco de Chile accounts in Chile, including a $303,000 transfer in December 1993, and two transfers of $15,000 and $40,000 in January 1994. Two more deposits were sent by “M. Hiriart,” from accounts at Banco Atlantico, including a transfer of $250,000 in July 1994, and $627,000 in November 1994. Over the next two years, the Miami Lopez account sent significant sums to the Augusto Pinochet’s primary account in Washington, Account No. 76750393, including $300,000 in April 1995, $627,000 in January 1996, and $374,629.72 in March 1996. In addition, on one day, February 21, 1996, the Miami Lopez account sent 3 checks, for $44,000, $75,000 and $82,000, to an account held in the name of Mr. Pinochet’s assistant, Monica Ananias Kuncar. [30]
The Miami Lopez account also provided funds to purchase various CDs. The account documentation indicates that funds in the Lopez Miami account were used to purchase a $483,000 CD in March 1994. In July 1994, a $250,000 wire transfer sent by “M. Hiriart” from a Banco Atlantico account was used, in part, to purchase a $150,000 CD. On August 1, 1994, these two CDs were cashed and the funds combined to purchase a larger CD in the amount of $640,000, assigned to Lopez Account No. 808691. In November 1994, a $627,000 wire transfer sent by “Marco P. Hiriart” from Banco Atlantico was deposited into the Lopez Miami account. On May 1, 1995, the $627,000 was combined with the funds from the $640,000 CD, which had matured, and the funds were used to purchase a still larger CD in the amount of $1.1 million. Over time, this and other CDs associated with the Lopez account matured, were reconfigured, and used to buy other CDs. In January 1996, the Lopez Miami account sent a $627,000 wire transfer to the Pinochet account in Washington, Account No. 76750393.
These and other transactions make it clear that the Lopez accounts were conduits for Pinochet funds used in multiple, complex transactions.
Pinochet Family Accounts. The 3 newly identified Riggs accounts that were opened in the name of Mr. Pinochet’s immediate family members are the following. None included the name “Pinochet” in the name of the accountholder.
(1) Account No. 404276139 was opened in the name of Mr. Pinochet’s son, Marco Antonio Hiriart, in Washington on September 30, 1981, and closed on June 1, 2001.
(2) Account No. 75256035 was opened in the name of Mr. Pinochet’s daughter, Ines Lucia Hiriart, in London on May 31, 2000, and frozen on July 30, 2004, by Riggs.
(3) Account No. 75256032 was opened in the name of Ines Lucia Hiriart in London on May 21, 2001, and frozen on July 30, 2004, by Riggs.
Third Party Accounts. The 9 newly identified Riggs accounts that were opened in the name of third parties, but used at times as conduits for Pinochet funds are the following. All but one of the accountholders was a Chilean military officer.
(1) Account No. 350413 was opened in the names of Jorge Ballerino Sanford and/or Ramon Castro Ivanovic in Miami on November 23, 1981, and closed on July 2, 1984. At the time the account was open, Mr. Ballerino was a Chilean Army general, and Mr. Castro was an Army officer. Funds were used to purchase a CD. The maximum amount of funds in this account at one time was about $1.8 million.
(2) Account No. 350512 was opened in the name of Jorge Ballerino Sanford and/or Ramon Castro Ivanovic in Miami on January 11, 1982, and closed on January 21, 1985. Funds were used to purchase a CD. The maximum amount of funds in this account at one time was about $2.3 million.
(3) Account No. 450528 was opened in the name of John Long in Miami on June 11, 1984, and closed in 1985. Mr. Long was not a Chilean military officer, and his relationship to Mr. Pinochet, reasons for opening the account, and current status are unknown. The account was opened with a $287,381.80 check drawn on Riggs Miami Account No. 350413 opened for Jorge Ballerino and Ramon Castro. Funds were used to purchase a CD. More than $1.7 million passed through this account.
(4) Account No. 450874 was opened in the name of Guillermo Garin Aguirre in Miami on January 21, 1985, and closed on January 4, 1988. At the time the account was open, Mr. Garin was the Army Chief Vice-Commander, the second most senior command position in the Chilean Army. The account was opened with a $15,000 check drawn on the Riggs Miami account opened for John Long. Funds were used to purchase a CD. The maximum amount of funds in this account at one time was about $547,000.
(5) Account No. 451385 was opened in the name of Gustavo Collao Mira in Miami on January 4, 1988, and closed on April 10, 1989. At the time the account was open, Mr. Collao was a Chilean Army colonel. In 2004, Chilean press reports described him as one of Mr. Pinochet’s legal counsel. The account was opened with $43,715 transferred from the Riggs Miami account opened for Guillermo Garin Aguirre. Funds were used to purchase a CD. The maximum amount of funds in this account at one time was about $200,000.
(6) Account No. 451666 was opened in the name of Jose Miguel Latorre Pinochet in Miami on April 10, 1989, and closed on April 3, 1992. At the time of the account, Mr. Latorre was a Chilean Army lieutenant colonel. The account was opened with $47,000 transferred from the Riggs Miami account opened for Gustavo Collao Mira. Two weeks later, on April 29, 1989, another $116,868.73 was transferred from the Collao account. Funds were used to purchase 2 CDs. The maximum amount of funds in this account at one time was about $330,000.
(7) Account No. 709345 was opened in the name of Gabriel Vergara Cifuentes in Miami on December 13, 1991, and closed on May 25, 1995. At the time the account was open, Mr. Vergara was Director of the Chilean Army. The account was opened with $55,000 transferred from the Riggs Miami account opened for Jose Miguel Latorre Pinochet. Funds were used to purchase a CD. The maximum amount of funds in this account at one time was about $385,000.
(8) Account No. 710467 was opened in the name of Juan Ricardo Mac Lean Vergara in Miami on December 27, 1994, and closed on February 14, 1997. At the time the account was open, Mr. Mac Lean was Director of the Chilean Army Purchasing Office. The account was opened with a $45,000 check drawn on the Riggs Miami account opened for Gabriel Vergara Cifuentes. No funds were used to purchase a CD. The maximum amount of funds in this account at one time was about $678,000.
(9) Account No. 711762 was opened in the name of Eugenio F. Castillo Cadis, in trust for Juan Mac Lean, in Miami on February 14, 1997, and closed on April 29, 2004. At the time the account was open, Mr. Castillo was Director of the Chilean Army Purchasing Office, having replaced Mr. Mac Lean. The account was opened with $41,667.70 transferred from the Riggs Miami account opened for Juan Ricardo Mac Lean Vergara. No funds were used to purchase a CD. The maximum amount of funds in this account at one time was about $42,000.
These third party accounts were all opened in Miami by Riggs International Banking Corporation (RIBC) and collectively extended over more than 23 years, from 1981 until April 2004. All but one was controlled by a Chilean military official stationed in Santiago. The former head of RIBC, who held this position from 1981 to 1990, told the Subcommittee that it was his understanding that the military officer account was first established to enable the Chilean government to contract with U.S. businesses to help build a new Presidential residence in Chile. He explained that each accountholder was a military officer assigned to work with the Chilean President’s staff. He thought that each accountholder held the post for two to three years in Chile, was replaced, and Riggs then closed the existing account and transferred the balance to a new account opened for the replacement officer. According to the Riggs Security & Investigations Group, the Miami relationship manager who established the first few military officer accounts was the same employee who opened the first Pinochet accounts in Miami. That relationship manager referred to the military officer accounts as the “Casa Militar” or Military House accounts.
Bank records indicate that these military officer accounts were used at times as conduits for Pinochet funds, and that several Riggs officials in Miami were aware of this use. For example, a 1996 trip report written by a Riggs relationship manager in Miami described Juan Mac Lean, a military officer accountholder, as “one of several front-men of General Pinochet.” [31] A call report from February 1997, written by the same relationship manager, stated: “As per my supervisor’s comment, Mr. Juan MacLean is actually a front to General Pinochet (who holds an account at Riggs). Therefore, I am accepting Mr. MacLean’s introduction of Mr. Eugenio Castillo Cadiz as the continuation of the indirect relationship to General Pinochet.” [32] The head of RIBC wrote in a separate call report from 1996, that Mr. Mac Lean “discreetly said he represents a third party,” meaning Augusto Pinochet. [33] Riggs told the Subcommittee that Peter Fowler, head of RIBC from 1994 to 2000, was also aware of the military officer accounts.
Based on the records made available to the Subcommittee, at least $1.774 million was transferred from the military officer accounts into accounts controlled by Mr. Pinochet, his immediate family members, or his assistant. In addition, about $650,000 was deposited into the military officer accounts from accounts controlled by Mr. Pinochet or his family. Account records indicate that the largest individual transfers of funds took place from 1992 through 1996.
Two accounts provide examples of the transactions involving Mr. Pinochet. The first is Account No. 709345, opened for Gabril Vergara Cifuentes from December 1991 to May 1995. The maximum amount of funds in the account at any one time was about $385,000, but more flowed through the account over the nearly four-year period it was open. In total, about $617,000 was transferred from this account to accounts controlled by Mr. Pinochet, his family, or his assistant. Examples of transactions involving Mr. Pinochet include the following.
– On June 24, 1992, the military officer account accepted a $280,000 wire transfer from an unspecified Citibank account, believed to be one of the 63 Pinochet-related accounts.
– On August 31 1992, the military officer account issued two checks, for $175,420 and $82,325, which were deposited into Espirito Santo Bank Account No. 115391494 opened for A.P. Ugarte and M. Lucia Hiriart.
– On November 13, 1992, the military officer account accepted a $185,000 wire transfer from an unspecified Citibank account, believed to be one of the 63 Pinochet-related accounts.
– On November 25, 1992, the military officer account issued a $142,000 check which was deposited into Espirito Santo Bank Account No. 115391494 opened for A.P. Ugarte and M. Lucia Hiriart.
– On March 17, 1993, the military officer account issued a $43,000 check which was deposited into Espirito Santo Bank Account No. 115391494 opened for A.P. Ugarte and M. Lucia Hiriart.
– In September 1993, the military officer account issued three checks, for $20,000, $5,000 and $5,000, which were made payable to Mr. Pinochet’s assistant, Monica Ananias Kuncar, and cashed or deposited.
– On December 7, 1993, the military officer account issued a $2,000 check, which was made payable to Ines Lucia Hiriart, Mr. Pinochet’s daughter, and cashed or deposited.
– On July 25, 1994, the military officer account accepted a $147,000 wire transfer from a Banco Atlantico account in Zurich, Switzerland. [34]
– On August 30, 1994, the military officer account issued an $82,000 check which was deposited into Espirito Santo Bank Account No. 115391494 opened for A.P. Ugarte and M. Lucia Hiriart.
– On September 19, 1994, the military officer account issued a $65,000 check which was deposited into Banco de Chile Account No. 50006257104 in Chile for Jose Ugarte.
The second illustrative account is Account No. 710467, opened for Juan Ricardo Mac Lean Vergara from December 1994 until February 1997. The maximum amount of funds in the account at any one time was about $678,000, but more flowed through it over the more than twoyear period it was open. In total, about $840,000 was transferred from this account to accounts controlled by Mr. Pinochet, his family, or his assistant. Examples of transactions involving Mr. Pinochet include the following.
– On March 2, 1995, the military officer account cleared a $117,000 check which was made payable to J. Ugarte and deposited into Banco de Chile Account No. 50006257104 in Chile.
– On March 10, 1995, the military officer account cleared an $87,000 check which was made payable to J. Ugarte and deposited into Banco de Chile Account No. 50006257104 in Chile.
– On September 25, 1995, the military officer account accepted a $417,000 wire transfer from a Banco Atlantico Gibraltar account. The originator of the transfer is identified as “Mario P. Hiriart.”
– On February 22, 1996, the military officer account accepted a $225,985 wire transfer from a Banco Atlantico Gibraltar account. The originator of the transfer is identified as “Marco P. Hiriart.”
– On March 1, 1996, the military officer account cleared a $287,000 check which was made payable to Mr. Pinochet’s assistant, Monica Ananias Kuncar, and deposited into Banco de Chile Account No. 60069158 in Chile. The same day, four Banco de Chile cashiers checks totaling $287,000 were deposited into Riggs Account No. 76750393 in Washington D.C. for Augusto Pinochet Ugarte and Lucia Hiriart Rodriguez.
– On March 1, 1996, the military officer account cleared a $36,000 check which was made payable to Monica Ananias Kuncar and deposited into Banco de Chile Account No. 50006257104 in Chile.
– On March 28, 1996, the military officer account cleared two checks, for $107,000 and $200,536, which were made payable to “M. Hiriart” and deposited into Riggs Account No. 76750393 in Washington D.C. opened for Augusto Pinochet Ugarte and Lucia Hiriart Rodriguez.
– On April 2, 1996, the military officer account cleared a $6,227 check which was made payable to Monica Ananias Kuncar and deposited into Banco de Chile.
These and other transactions show that, at times, the military officer accounts served as conduits for Pinochet funds.
The account opened for John Long, who has not otherwise been identified by Riggs Bank, raises similar issues. This account was open for about a year. It was initially funded on June 11, 1984, with a $287,381.80 check from the military officer account opened for Jorge Ballerino Sanford and Ramon Castro Ivanovich, Account No. 350413. One month later, on July 2, 1984, the Ballerino-Castro account transferred another $840,194.29 into the Long account for a total of more than $1.1 million. The Long account used the $1.1 million to purchase a CD, subsequently renewed on at least 4 occasions. In January 1985, the Long account sent $15,000 to the military officer account that had just been opened for Guillermo Garin; $30,000 to a Bank of America account opened for the wife of Mr. Pinochet’s son, Augusto P. Hiriart; and another $30,000 to a Security Pacific Bank account opened for a Pinochet administration official, Patricio Madariaga. Account statements after January 1985 have not been located, including records related to a $400,000 transaction in December 1984, and disposition of the $650,000 remaining in the account at the end of January 1985. Records related to the $1.1 million CD have also not been located, and the disposition of these funds is currently unknown.
Most of the newly-disclosed accounts at Riggs, including the 8 military officer accounts, the John Long account, two of the Daniel Lopez accounts, and two accounts opened for “Jose” Pinochet, were opened in Miami by Riggs International Banking Corporation (RIBC). As an Edge Act Corporation, RIBC was regulated by the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta (“FRB”). FRB examination reports going back to 2000 do not mention AML concerns at RIBC, except in passing. In June 2003, however, after Riggs Bank began attracting negative press attention, the FRB initiated a targeted examination of RIBC which identified major AML deficiencies, including poor due diligence documentation, inadequate monitoring of accounts, and inadequate procedures to identify and report suspicious activity. A followup FRB examination in April 2004, found ongoing serious AML deficiencies and criticized RIBC for its failure to take corrective action on the problems identified a year earlier. In May, Riggs National Corporation announced plans to close RIBC which ceased operations in late 2004. Neither of the FRB examinations identified any of the Pinochet-related accounts discussed in this Report, even though each of the accounts was linked to Chile and many experienced multiple, large transactions. These Pinochet-related accounts were instead uncovered by the Riggs Security & Investigations Group.
B. Role of Riggs Senior Officials
Documents recently located by the Riggs Security & Investigations Group demonstrate that Riggs senior officials were well aware of the Pinochet relationship, and played a more significant role in maintaining the relationship than was made known to the Subcommittee prior to its 2004 hearing. For example, in interviews held prior to the hearing, Riggs personnel agreed that senior Riggs officials visited Chile, met with Mr. Pinochet, and explicitly asked Mr. Pinochet to open a Riggs account in 1994. They disagreed, however, as to exactly which Riggs officials went on the 1994 trip, who made the actual account solicitation, who went on other trips to Chile, and the extent to which the bank’s most senior officials cultivated the Pinochet relationship. [35] Newly provided documents indicate that Riggs senior officials, in fact, met with Mr. Pinochet in Chile on at least 5 separate occasions, participated with him in social as well as business events, corresponded with him from Washington, and presented him with gifts on behalf of Riggs Bank.
Riggs documents show that the efforts of senior Riggs officials on behalf of Mr. Pinochet were part of a wider bank strategy to develop and strengthen the bank’s relationship with the Chilean Armed Forces during the 1990s. Riggs documents show that the bank had longstanding relationships with the Chilean Navy, Air Force, Astilleros y Maestranzas de la Armada (the Navy Shipyard), the Direccion Aeronautica Civil (the civil aviation directorate), and the Military Mission to the United States, as well as the Chilean Embassy. While many of the military accounts left Riggs in 1979, Riggs was able to reestablish a number of those accounts in 1994. By 2002, Riggs maintained deposits for the Chilean military and embassy totaling about $100 million. [36]
Internal Riggs documents show that senior Riggs officials met with Chilean military and government officials on a regular basis, including during trips taken by Riggs officials to Chile in 1994, 1996, 1997, 1999, 2000, and 2002. [37] In addition, one trip report was discovered showing a trip by Riggs senior officials to Chile as early as 1986. At least 5 of these trips included meetings between senior Riggs officials and Mr. Pinochet. Recently provided documents containing information about these meetings offer additional evidence related to the relationship between the bank and Mr. Pinochet.
1986 Delegation. In August and September of 1986, Riggs International Banking Division officials traveled to Ecuador and Chile for a series of high level business meetings. Riggs chairman Joseph Allbritton joined the Riggs delegation for at least a week, including during its stay in Santiago, Chile, from August 19 until August 24. [38] While in Santiago, the Riggs delegation met with government and industry leaders, including Mr. Pinochet who was then President of Chile and Commander-in-Chief of the Army. [39] The meeting with Mr. Pinochet took place at “la Moneda,” Chile’s Presidential Palace.
1994 Delegation. The President of Riggs, Timothy C. Coughlin, led a Riggs delegation to Chile and Argentina from October 23 through October 28, 1994. He was accompanied by Paul Cushman III, then head of the bank’s International Banking Group, and Carol Thompson, then senior vice president of Latin America in the bank’s Embassy Banking Division. Their itinerary included visits with government, military, and banking officials. On October 25, the Riggs delegation met with Mr. Pinochet at the Chilean Armed Forces Building in Santiago. [40] The purpose of the visit was detailed in a November 3, 1994 Riggs memorandum written by Ms. Thompson and recently produced to the Subcommittee. That memorandum states:
“On October 25, 1994, Timothy Coughlin, Paul Cushman and I called on General Pinochet in order to express our gratitude for returning the official Chilean Military’s accounts from Bank of Nova Scotia to Riggs. During the late 1970's the Chilean Military Mission in Washington moved their official deposits to Canada. This was directly related to the assassination of Chilean Ambassador Letelier in 1976. In July 1994, the official accounts were brought back to Riggs. ... We also offered our personal banking services to General Pinochet and stated that we would also be pleased to make our services available to officers of the Chilean Military.
As a follow up, we will send him documentation in order to open a personal account.” [41]
The November 3, 1994 memorandum confirms the direct solicitation of Mr. Pinochet’s personal account by Riggs senior officers.
The next day, on November 4, 1994, the bank president, Mr. Coughlin, wrote to Mr. Pinochet expressing appreciation for his interest in the bank and its relationship with the Chilean Military Mission. Mr. Coughlin repeated the bank’s offer to open a personal account for Mr. Pinochet: “It would be an honor for us to open an account for you and to assist you with any banking services you may require outside of Chile.” Mr. Coughlin noted that Ms. Thompson would be sending the relevant account opening materials. [42] Mr. Coughlin concluded by writing: “I also want you to know that I have prominently displayed the very handsome medallion you presented me in my office at Riggs, and I will be pleased to show it to you if you ever decide to visit Washington D.C. and of course Riggs Bank.” [43]
1996 Delegation. In November 1995, General Ricardo Izurieta, at the time a military attache stationed in Washington and currently Commander-in-Chief of the Chilean Army, relayed an invitation from Mr. Pinochet to the chairman of Riggs Bank, Joseph Allbritton, to attend the Derby in Vina del Mar, the most prestigious horse race in Chile. [44] Mr. Allbritton accepted the invitation, attended the Derby in February 1996, and was “received by General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte at the Chilean Army Calvary School in Quillota for a special calvary review followed by a ceremony and luncheon.” [45]
On February 14, 1996, Mr. Allbritton sent the following letter to Mr. Pinochet.
“Dear General Pinochet:
I would like to express my profound thanks to you for according me and my associates such a magnificent reception at the Calvary School in Quillota on my visit to Chile. As a horse enthusiast, your fine young calvary officers, their horses and the superb performance they put on was excellent. It was indeed a personal pleasure to spend the day with you in Quillota and to have an opportunity to personally convey our appreciation for the longstanding relationship between the Chilean Armed Forces and the Riggs Bank. We attach great importance to our relationship with you and the Chilean Military and look forward to expanding our cooperation in the future.
Chile is clearly a very impressive country with an excellent future thanks to you and the policies and reforms you instituted. As I expressed to you, I will be only too pleased to be of assistance to you and your country in anyway I can in Washington, D.C.
I would like to thank you for the superb cufflinks you presented to me and please know that you would be most welcome to visit my wife Barby and me at our house in Middleburg, Virginia where we raise our thoroughbred race horses.
Sincerely,
[Joe]” [46]The following day, Mr. Allbritton sent a letter to General Izurieta, the Chilean military attache in Washington, thanking him for arranging the visit. The letter stated that Mr. Allbritton would brief him about the meetings in Chile, and that Mr. Pinochet now had a “standing invitation to visit our Lazy Lane Farm in Virginia, should he decide to visit the United States.” [47]
1997 Delegation. Documents show that, in the spring of 1997, prior to a visit to Chile, Riggs made a $5,000 donation to the Augusto Pinochet Ugarte Foundation (hereinafter “Pinochet Foundation”). A general request for a donation to this Foundation had been made by General Izurieta, according to a memorandum dated March 3, 1997, from Ms. Thompson to her superior, Raymond Lund, then head of the International Banking Division. [48] The following day Mr. Lund wrote to Riggs chairman recommending a donation in the amount of $5,000. [49] Both the chairman and the president of Riggs apparently approved of the donation. On April 22, 1997, the Pinochet Foundation president wrote to Mr. Allbritton thanking him for the donation. [50]
On October 27, 1997, a delegation of senior Riggs officials, including Mr. Allbritton, Mr. Coughlin, and senior officials from the bank’s international private banking and embassy banking divisions traveled to Chile. [51] Two weeks prior to the trip, Ms. Thompson prepared an overview of Riggs relationship with Chile for Mr. Allbritton. The overview included a survey of the Chilean agencies then doing business with Riggs and notes that as of the time of the trip, the Chile relationship represented more than $65 million in deposits and $600,000 in annual profit for the bank. [52]
On the morning of October 29, 1997, the Riggs delegation met with Mr. Pinochet at the Armed Forces building in Santiago. According to a Riggs call report, “the purpose of this visit was to personally greet the Commander- in-Chief and to thank him for the longstanding and profitable relationship that the Chilean Army maintains with Riggs Bank.” [53] That afternoon, Mr. Pinochet and his son Marco hosted a tea in honor of Mr. and Mrs. Joseph Allbritton at the Lo Curo Military Club in Santiago. [54] At some point during the visit, the Riggs delegation presented Mr. Pinochet with a Confederate Bond and two computer games. [55]
Upon returning to Washington, several Riggs senior officials sent letters to Mr. Pinochet disclosing a deepening relationship between him and the bank. On November 14, 1997, for example, the bank chairman wrote:
“Dear General Pinochet:
Just having returned from South America, Barby and I wanted to express our sincere appreciation for the warm reception accorded to us during our recent visit to Santiago. Please be assured that you and you Government have a strong advocate in the Riggs Bank and I earnestly share your views concerning enhanced trade and economic ties between our two countries.
I am pleased to report the business relationship between Riggs and the Chilean Military is prospering. I am also grateful for our thriving personal friendship, which you have demonstrated through your gracious hospitality and stalwart support of The Riggs.
As I mentioned to you in our discussions, the long-term prospects for Chile’s adherence to democratic, free market principles are strong, which is the direct result of your leadership. You have rid Chile from the threat of totalitarian government and an archaic economic system based on state-owned property and centralized planning. We in the United States and the rest of the Western hemisphere owe you a tremendous debt of gratitude and I am confident your legacy will have been to provide a more prosperous and safer world for your children and grandchildren.
I thank you for the marvelous gifts extended to both Barby and myself, including the history books, which I have found fascinating. I ask that you convey our best wishes to Marco Antonio and the rest of your family. I look forward to continuing our discussion and would be most pleased to reciprocate your gracious hospitality the next time you are in the United States.
Warmest personal regards ...” [56]
On October 31, 1997, the chairman’s wife, Barbara Allbritton, then a longstanding member of the Riggs board of directors, wrote the following to Mr. Pinochet:
“My dear General Pinochet:
It was a great pleasure and honor to be with you on Wednesday at tea at the Military Club. You were so very gracious to allow us this time with you and I was extremely pleased to have this appointment to meet and be with your son Marco Antonio.
The elegant lapis lazuli box you so kindly gave to me shall be used and displayed with a great deal of pride and pleasure. It shall be a reminder of this special time we spent with you during our trip to Santiago.
I do hope that you will come to visit us when your schedule allows. I shall look forward to receiving Mrs. Pinochet and having the pleasure of knowing her.
I am so appreciative of the book you sent to me that your daughter Lucia did on your life. After reviewing it I feel I know you and your family, and now I am excited about the possibility of meeting more of your family and having our friendship develop more.
With appreciation and respect for you and all you have done for our world.
Sincerely ....” [57]
On November 10, 1997, the bank president wrote to Mr. Pinochet a letter expressing appreciation for the hospitality shown during the trip.
“Dear General Pinochet:
Your gracious reception of the delegation from Riggs Bank during my Chairman’s recent visit to Chile is much appreciated ....
Riggs is privileged to serve Chile’s banking requirements, and we will do everything with our power to promote economic trade and military alliance between our two countries ....
The opportunity for all of us including our wives to meet with you and your son, Marco Antonio, was a particular pleasure. ...
Of the books that you have given me, I am just finishing my reading of ‘The Crucial Day.’ The factual objectivity with which you tell the story of Chile in the early 1970s is both fascinating and instructive. History provides for fair and proper judgement only when the true facts are know[n]. ...
Sincerely,
[Timothy C. Coughlin]
Timothy C. Coughlin
President” [58]On November 25, 1997, the bank president sent Mr. Pinochet a note via the Chilean Military Mission in Washington to commemorate his birthday.
“Dear General Pinochet:
On the occasion of your birthday today, all of your friends and supporters at Riggs Bank send you our appreciation and congratulations for all you have done for Chile. Please accept our best wishes for every success in your continuing service to Chile in 1998 and many happy returns to the date of your birth in the years to come.
Sincerely,
[Tim]
Timothy C. Coughlin
President” [59]1998 Delegation. On March 10, 1998, Mr. Pinochet stepped down as Commander-in- Chief of the Chilean Army, and the following day was sworn in as “Senator for life” in Chile. [60] Mr. Coughlin and Ms. Thompson traveled to Chile less than two weeks later to meet with senior Chilean military officials, including General Izurieta, the newly promoted Commander-in-Chief. On March 24, 1998, Mr. Coughlin and Ms. Thompson attended a luncheon with Mr. Pinochet. [61] After returning to Washington, the bank president wrote to Mr. Pinochet, thanking him for the reception and a gift of Chilean Army cuff links, “which my Chairman and I are proud to wear.” [62]
Later in 1998, as described in the 2004 Minority Staff Report released by the Subcommittee, [63] a Spanish magistrate issued two international arrest warrants for Mr. Pinochet for murder, torture, hostage-taking, and genocide. [64] On October 17, 1998, pursuant to those warrants, Mr. Pinochet was arrested at a London hospital where he was recuperating from back surgery. On October 19, the Spanish magistrate issued an attachment order against all bank accounts held directly or indirectly by Mr. Pinochet, his family members, or third parties in any country. [65] On November 5, Spain’s highest criminal court affirmed jurisdiction over Mr. Pinochet, and on December 10, ratified the attachment order against Pinochet bank accounts. [66] In the United Kingdom, on November 25, 1998, the British Law Lords denied Mr. Pinochet’s claim of diplomatic immunity, and then set aside that determination on December 17. [67]
The arrest of Mr. Pinochet in London was widely carried by the international, Chilean, and United States news media and was followed by violent demonstrations in Chile. [68] The subsequent legal and diplomatic disputes kept the story in telecasts and newspapers for months. [69]
1999 Delegation. For the first three months of 1999, Mr. Pinochet remained under house arrest in London. On March 13, 1999, a Riggs delegation, including bank chairman Joseph Allbritton, traveled to Chile for three days of meetings with senior Chilean military officials. [70] On March 24, 1999, the British Law Lords authorized an extradition hearing to determine whether Mr. Pinochet should be transferred to Spain. [71] Two days later, on March 26, Riggs allowed Mr. Pinochet to terminate a £1 million CD held in the name of his offshore corporation, Althorp, at the Riggs branch in London, and transfer the funds, totaling about $1.6 million in U.S. dollars, to a new CD in the United States. Riggs did not file any suspicious activity reports that would have alerted British, Spanish, or U.S. law enforcement to the existence of the Pinochet funds. [72]
2000 Delegation. On March 2, 2000, the United Kingdom determined that Mr. Pinochet was unfit to stand trial and should not be extradited to Spain. [73] Mr. Pinochet was released and immediately flew to Chile, arriving on March 3. [74] A Riggs delegation, which included bank chairman Joseph Allbritton, was then visiting Chile on a trip that had begun on February 25 and ended March 4, 2000, and included multiple meetings with senior Chilean military and banking officials. Internal Riggs memoranda addressing this trip do not mention Mr. Pinochet. A letter dated March 21, 2000, from Mr. Allbritton to General Izurieta, however, makes clear that Mr. Allbritton had been aware of Mr. Pinochet’s detention in the United Kingdom and return to Chile. The letter states: “Where do I begin to thank you? You graced our suite with the sweet smell of beautiful flowers and Chilean wine. You gave us your time on the very eve of the General’s return.” [75]
Legal proceedings against Mr. Pinochet did not abate after his return to Chile. By March of 2000, “nearly 60 human rights cases had been filed in Chile against Pinochet and were under active investigation.” [76] On August 8, 2000, the Chilean Supreme Court upheld an appeals court ruling that stripped Mr. Pinochet of his parliamentary immunity in the “Caravan of Death” trial.” [77]
A document recently provided by the Riggs Security & Investigations Group shows that Riggs had been following these legal proceedings closely. The day after the ruling, on August 9, 2000, Michael Cantacuzene of the Riggs Advisory Services Group issued a memorandum regarding a “Prominent International Private Banking Client.” The client is plainly Mr. Pinochet, although the memorandum never names him. The memorandum makes a series of strategic recommendations regarding the bank’s relationship with Mr. Pinochet in light of his loss of immunity from prosecution. It states: “Recent developments in Chile require Riggs to develop alternative strategies for working with our prominent client.” It predicts that Mr. Pinochet will “increasingly call on his assets outside of Chile,” and points out that “any draft requires the bank to complete payee information and to arrange delivery. These two requirements are fraught with potential, but surmountable, challenges. (e.g., KYC, BSA and customs).” [78]
The memorandum recommends informing Riggs senior management, public relations officials, and legal counsel of the potential for Riggs to receive subpoenas, legal and regulatory requests, and press inquiries, and developing an approval process for responding to them. [79] The memorandum also states:
“Reports indicate that very senior Riggs executives might be considering a trip to Chile and Latin America. A trip by senior Riggs executives to Chile and Latin America at this time poses significant risks to Riggs and our client. Riggs extensive relationships and contact with senior Chilean Military officials and departments is well known. The arrival of a senior Riggs executive delegation is a noteworthy event certain to be noticed. (The media and our client’s opponents are not unaware of the potential for a Riggs relationship with the client.) The Chilean military (including some Riggs clients) is actively supporting our client regardless of the civilian government’s strict instructions.” [80]
The memorandum accordingly recommends against senior Riggs officials visiting Chile for four to five months, suggesting instead that Mr. Pinochet’s personal banker meet with him “discreetly” within 30 days.
The report released by the Subcommittee in 2004, details how Riggs was able to “surmount” the “KYC, BSA and customs” “challenges” warned about in the Cantacuzene memorandum. Just 9 days after the memorandum was prepared, Riggs issued 8 cashiers checks, each in the amount of $50,000 and each made payable to Augusto Pinochet, and flew a Riggs banker to Chile to personally deliver them to Mr. Pinochet. It was the first of 4 deliveries of Riggs cashiers checks to Mr. Pinochet, as described in the Subcommittee’s earlier Minority Staff Report. These deliveries took place between August 18, 2000 and April 8, 2002, and provided Mr. Pinochet with $1.9 million from his Riggs accounts. [81] When asked why the bank had not simply wire transferred the funds to Chile, which would have been faster, less expensive, and more secure than physically transporting the checks, Riggs personnel did not provide a satisfactory explanation. [82] According to a Chilean appeals court finding, the checks “were cashed at Banco de Chile and Bank Boston by a third party, despite the fact that they were nominative. Then various amounts of the cash in dollars were changed to cash in Chilean pesos on the informal market so that said transaction would not be reported to the Central Bank.” [83]
2002 Delegation. In March 2002, a Riggs delegation, led by bank chairman Joseph Allbritton, returned to Chile for a series of meetings with senior military, government, and financial officials. As part of that trip, the Chilean Air Force hosted Mr. Allbritton on a tour of the Antarctic. A Riggs memorandum prepared for Mr. Allbritton for this trip observed that, when the Chilean accounts were viewed together, “average balances exceed $100 million.” [84] The internal Riggs documents do not mention Mr. Pinochet.
V. Pinochet relationships at other Financial Institutions operating in the United States
Information obtained by the Subcommittee indicates that Riggs Bank was not alone in helping Augusto Pinochet gain access to the U.S. financial system and, in some cases, conceal or move funds while he was subject to a 1998 Spanish court order directing financial institutions to freeze his assets. Working with Riggs documents that detailed Pinochet transactions involving other financial institutions, the Subcommittee has been able to identify nearly 100 U.S. financial accounts and CDs, in addition to the 28 Riggs accounts, that were opened for Mr. Pinochet, members of his immediate family, offshore entities controlled by Mr. Pinochet or his immediate family, or third parties who allowed their accounts to serve as conduits for Pinochet funds. The evidence shows that the earliest of these accounts was opened in 1981, and a few are still open in 2005.
The evidence associated with these accounts establishes that, over the past 25 years, due to inadequate due diligence, and, at times, the facilitation of unusual transactions, U.S. financial institutions enabled Augusto Pinochet to establish an extensive network of U.S. bank and securities accounts, involving millions of dollars, which he used to move funds and transact business. In addition to Riggs Bank, the largest Pinochet relationships identified by the Subcommittee in the United States were at Citigroup, Banco de Chile-United States, and Espirito Santo Bank in Florida. Additional Pinochet-related transactions or accounts were handled by Banco Atlantico which is now part of Banco de Sabadell; Bank of America; Coutts & Co. (USA) International which is now part of Banco Santander; Ocean Bank; and PineBank N.A. Evidence exists of still additional U.S. accounts related to Mr. Pinochet, but limited Subcommittee resources prevent an exhaustive analysis of all the U.S. accounts that have been used to assist Mr. Pinochet.
A. Citigroup
Citigroup is one of the largest financial institutions in the United States, managing assets in excess of $520 billion and reporting net income in 2004 of about $17 billion. [85] Citigroup is a publicly traded corporation which, through numerous branches and affiliates, offers a wide range of financial services to its clients, including retail banking, private banking, brokerage, and investment services. It maintains branches and affiliates in more than 100 countries.
The Subcommittee investigation has determined that Citigroup had a substantial, yearslong relationship with Augusto Pinochet and his family, which began in at least 1981. [86] In response to Subcommittee requests, Citigroup has identified 63 U.S. accounts and certificates of deposit (CDs) that were opened for Mr. Pinochet and his family in New York and Miami at various points in time from 1981 to 2004.
Of these 63 accounts and CDs, 15 were opened for Mr. Pinochet personally over a fourteen-year period, from 1981 to 1995. Another 19 were opened in the name of other Pinochet family members, such as Mr. Pinochet’s son, Marco Antonio Pinochet Hiriart; Mr. Pinochet’s daughter, Ines Lucia Pinochet Hiriart, and her husband Hernan Ubaldo Garcia Barzelatto; and Mr. Pinochet’s daughter, Maria Veronica Pinochet. In addition, Marco and Ines Lucia Pinochet opened 29 accounts and CDs in the name of offshore entities that Citigroup had established or arranged at their request, including Meritor Investments, Trust MT-4964N, and Redwing Holdings.
Over the years, Citigroup has provided individual Pinochet family members with many types of financial assistance, from arranging international wire transfers, to establishing offshore entities, to offering investment advice. Citigroup also issued credit cards to several family members and provided several with substantial loans. These loans included a 1993 loan of $2 million to Mr. Pinochet and his son; a 1993 loan of $195,000 to Redwing Holdings; a 1994 loan of $385,000 to Marco Pinochet; and 1996 loan of $500,000 to Meritor Investments. These loans were apparently repaid in full.
Moreover, since at least 1988, Citigroup has provided some Pinochet family members with financial accounts, CDs, and lines of credit in other countries, including Argentina, the Bahamas, Chile, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Citigroup has informed the Subcommittee that each of its non-U.S. relationships with the Pinochet family has now ended, some within the last six months. The services provided and the total amount of funds involved in these non-U.S. relationships remain unclear and are outside the scope of this Report.
Overall, Citigroup’s relationship with the Pinochet family in the United States extended over at least 24 years. The first set of accounts to be closed were the Augusto Pinochet personal accounts, the last of which closed in 1995, in part due to requests made by the client and in part due to a Citigroup initiative, as explained below. In 2000, at the request of Citigroup, Ines Lucia Pinochet began to close her accounts, the last of which actually closed in January 2001. In 2000,
Citigroup asked Marco Pinochet to close his accounts, but his personal accounts did not actually close until two years later in 2003, and the final Meritor Investment account closed in 2004. Several accounts opened for Mr. Pinochet’s other daughter, Maria Veronica Pinochet, also closed in 2004. One family member account is still in the process of closing. Citigroup has fully cooperated with Subcommittee inquiries about these accounts, and produced all requested documentation and related information in the United States. Citing bank secrecy laws, however, Citigroup produced very limited information about accounts and transactions involving its foreign affiliates in Argentina, the Bahamas, Chile, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Information about some transactions involving these foreign affiliates have been reconstructed from records produced by other financial institutions.
The 63 U.S. accounts and CDs provided by Citigroup to the Pinochet family, from 1981 to 2004, can be summarized as follows.
Personal Accounts. The 15 Citigroup accounts opened for Mr. Pinochet in the United States from 1981 to 1996, are the following. Six of these accounts were in New York, and 9 were in Miami. Each account was opened under a disguised variant of Augusto Pinochet’s name, with “J. Ramon” accounts in New York and “Jose” accounts in Miami.
(1) Account No. 10801792 was opened in the name of J. Ramon Ugarte in New York in on Nov. 15, 1981, and closed on November 22, 1995. In April 1984, the account was changed to add Marco P. Hiriart.
(2) Account No. 12032544 was opened in the name of Jose Pinochet and Lucia P. Hiriart in Miami on Feb. 25, 1985, and closed around July 1992. In May 1989, the name Jose Pinochet was changed to Jose P. Ugarte.
(3) Account No. CF11077601 was opened in the name of J. Ramon Ugarte and Marco P. Hiriart in New York on an unknown date and closed by no later than September 1994.
(4) Account No. CF11077602 was opened in the name of J. Ramon Ugarte and Marco P. Hiriart in New York on an unknown date and closed by no later than September 1994.
(5) Account No. 34000259, a CD, was opened in the name of J. Ramon Ugarte and Marco P. Hiriart in New York on a date prior to March 25, 1985, and closed on Sept. 23, 1996.
(6) Account No. 38803825 was opened in the name of Jose Pinochet in Miami on Aug. 4, 1986, and closed on a date prior to June 4, 1993. In May 1989, the name Jose Pinochet was changed to Jose P. Ugarte.
(7) Account No. 37010063, a CD, was opened in the name of Jose P. Ugarte in Miami on Sept. 13, 1989, and closed on May 11, 1992.
(8) Account No. 37011621, a CD, was opened in the name of Jose P. Ugarte in Miami on May 13, 1991, and closed on June 21, 1991.
(9) Account No. 39316662, a CD, was opened in the name of Jose P. Ugarte in Miami on Dec. 20, 1991, and closed on May 11, 1992.
(10) Account No. 32110270, a CD, was opened in the name of Jose P. Ugarte in Miami on June 3, 1992 and closed on June 23,1992.
(11) Account No. 32110294, a CD, was opened in the name of Jose P. Ugarte in Miami on June 23, 1992 and closed on July 16,1992.
(12) Account No. 38810821 was opened in the name of Jose P. Ugarte in Miami on an unknown date and closed on a date prior to June 4, 1993.
(13) Account No. 38811297 was opened in the name of Jose P. Ugarte in Miami on an unknown date and closed on a date prior to June 4, 1993.
(14) Account No. 39293300 was opened in the name of J. Ramon Ugarte and Marco P. Hiriart in New York on Nov. 17, 1993, and closed on Oct. 7, 1994.
(15) Account No. 40008200 was opened in the name of J. Ramon Ugarte and Marco P. Hiriart in New York on July 29, 1994, and closed on Dec. 5, 1995.
Pinochet Family Accounts. The 19 Citigroup accounts opened in New York and Miami in the name of Mr. Pinochet’s immediate family members are the following.
(1) Account No. 10040217 was opened in the name of Mr. Pinochet’s son, Marco P. Hiriart, in New York on June 7, 1985. In October 1989, the account name changed to Marco P. Hiriart in trust for J. Ramon Ugarte. In May 1999, the account name changed again, to Marco P. Hiriart in trust for his wife Maria Soledad Olave Gutierrez. The account closed on October 27, 2003.
(2) Account No.CF15597701 was opened in the name of Marco P. Hiriart in New York on October 2, 1986, and closed by September 1994.
(3) Account No.CF11077603 was opened in the name of Marco P. Hiriart in New York on August 11, 1987, and closed by September 1994.
(4) Account No. 39195900, a custody account, was opened in the name of Marco P. Hiriart on February 18, 1993. At some point, the account name changed to Marco P. Hiriart in trust for J. Ramon Ugarte. The account closed on March 12, 1996.
(5) Account No. 930018138001, a letter of credit, was opened in the name of Marco P. Hiriart in trust for Maria Soledad Olave Gutierrez on October 27, 1995, and closed on October 28, 1996.
(6) Account No. 38517601 was opened in the name of Marco P. Hiriart in trust for Maria Soledad Olave Gutierrez in Miami on January 13, 1997, and closed on April 29, 1999.
(7) Account No. 38020732 was opened in the name of Marco P. Hiriart in trust for Maria Soledad Olave Gutierrez in New York on February 6, 2001, and closed on May 15, 2003.
(8) Account No. 12015488 was opened in the name of Mr. Pinochet’s daughter, Lucia Pinochet Hiriart, in Miami on May 23, 1983, and closed on June 10, 1996.
(9) Account No. 38800186 was opened in the name of Lucia Pinochet Hiriart in Miami on May 24, 1983, and closed on November 6, 1995.
(10) Account No. 3100519634 was opened in the name of Mr. Pinochet’s daughter, Maria Veronica Pinochet, in trust for her children Francisca Lucia and Daniela Veronica Ponce, in September 1994, and closed on September 29, 2004.
(11) Account No. 6057055 was opened in the name of Maria Veronica Pinochet on November 7, 1995, and closed on April 26, 1996.
(12) Account No. 2600157858, a CD, was opened in the name of Maria Veronica Pinochet prior to July 1997, and closed in September 1999.
(13) Account No. 2600453426, a CD, was opened in the name of Maria Veronica Pinochet prior to July 1997, and closed in July 1999.
(14) Account No. 2605256372, a CD, was opened in the name of Maria Veronica Pinochet in trust for Francisca Daniela Ponce in April 2000, and closed in October 2003.
(15) Account No. 3107620283 was opened in the name of Maria Veronica Ponce in trust for Daniela Veronica Ponce and Francesca Ponce in October 2002, and closed on September 29, 2004.
(16) Account No. 5978 was opened in the name of Mr. Pinochet’s son-in-law, Hernan Garcia B., whose full name is Hernan Ubaldo Garcia Barzelatto, on June 16, 1988, and closed on December 14, 1999.
(17) Account No. 77165321 was opened in the name of Mr. Pinochet’s daughter-in-law, Maria Soledad Olave Gutierrez, on April 3, 2001, and closed on September 27, 2004.
(18) Account No. 54214877, an investment account, was opened in the name of Marco Pinochet’s wife, Maria Soledad Olave Gutierrez, on April 9, 2001, and closed in September 24, 2004.
(19) A brokerage account, opened for a family member in October 2002, was frozen by the bank in 2004, and is awaiting closure.
Third Party Accounts. The 29 Citigroup accounts or CDs opened in the name of offshore corporations or trusts associated with Marco and Ines Lucia Pinochet are the following. They include 5 opened in the name of Meritor Investments; 7 opened in the name of Trust MT- 4964N; and 17 opened in the name of Redwing Holdings.
(1) Account No. 10328149 was opened in the name of Meritor Investments Ltd. in New York on July 20, 1994, and closed on April 6, 2004.
(2) Account No. 394116, a custody account, was opened in the name of Meritor Investments Ltd. in New York on July 21, 1994, and closed on October 28, 2003.
(3) Account No. 25F01376, an investment account, was opened in the name of Meritor Investments Ltd. in New York on August 24, 2001, and closed on July 9, 2004.
(4) Account No. 403435, a brokerage account, was opened in the name of Meritor Investments Ltd. in New York on September 30, 1994, and closed on March 4, 2004.
(5) Account No. CF98307701 was opened in the name of Meritor Investments Ltd. in New York on an unknown date and closed by September 1994.
(6) Account No. 39315502, a CD, was opened in the name of Trust MT-4964N in Miami on May 20, 1991, and closed on February 22, 1993.
(7) Account No. CF97851201 was opened in the name of Trust MT-4964N in New York on May 21, 1992, and closed by September 1994.
(8) Account No. CF97653601 was opened in the name of Trust MT-4964N in New York on July 21, 1992, and closed by September 1994.
(9) Account No. 38811628 was opened in the name of Trust MT-4964N in Miami on November 23, 1992, and closed on February 27, 1995.
(10) Account No. 35007623, a CD, was opened in the name of Trust MT-4964N on February 22, 1993, and closed on August 27, 1993.
(11) Account No. 12102143 was opened in the name of Trust MT-4964N in Miami on April 30, 1993, and closed on February 28, 1994.
(12) Account No. 38202470 was opened in the name of Trust MT-4964 on January 26, 2000, and closed on April 3, 2000.
(13) Account No. 38810860 was opened in the name of Redwing Holdings Inc. in Miami on October 30, 1991, and closed on March 1, 1999.
(14) Account No. CF97713301 was opened in the name of Redwing Holdings Inc. in New York on November 22, 1991, and closed by September 1994.
(15) Account No. 12094294 was opened in the name of Redwing Holdings Inc. in Miami on February 18, 1992, and closed on August 29, 2000.
(16) Account No. 37012132, a CD, was opened in the name of Redwing Holdings Inc. in Miami on May 26, 1992, and closed on December 7, 1994.
(17) Account No.5931310314, a letter of credit, was opened in the name of Redwing Holdings Inc. on May 6, 1993, and closed on an unknown date.
(18) Account No. 731105851 was opened in the name of Redwing Holdings Inc. on August 9, 1993, and closed on September 7, 1994.
(19) Account No. 39325000, a custody account, was opened in the name of Redwing Holdings Inc. on December 28, 1993, and closed on June 25, 1996.
(20) Account No. 40300400, an investment fund, was opened in the name of Redwing Holdings Inc. on September 20, 1994, and closed on November 29, 1999.
(21) Account No. 38813416 was opened in the name of Redwing Holdings Inc. in Miami on June 4, 1996, and closed on June 13, 1996.
(22) Account No. 35012702, a CD, was opened in the name of Redwing Holdings Inc. on June 11, 1996, and closed on September 13, 1996.
(23) Account No. 38813509 was opened in the name of Redwing Holdings Inc. in Miami on September 13, 1996, and closed on March 11, 1997.
(24) Account No. 37021765, a CD, was opened in the name of Redwing Holdings Inc. in Miami on September 13, 1996, and closed on March 28, 1997.
(25) Account No. 38813689 was opened in the name of Redwing Holdings Inc. in Miami on March 27, 1997, and closed on April 17, 1997.
(26) Account No. 37025678, a CD, was opened in the name of Redwing Holdings Inc. in Miami on January 7, 1999, and closed on May 1, 2000.
(27) Account No. 32004246, a CD, was opened in the name of Redwing Holdings Inc. in Miami on December 13, 1999, and closed on April 12, 2000.
(28) Account No. 38814373 was opened in the name of Redwing Holdings Inc. in Miami on April 7, 2000, and closed on August 28, 2000.
(29) Account No. 38812080 in the name of Redwing Holdings Inc. was opened and closed in Miami on unknown dates.
Account Secrecy. Citigroup took a number of steps that helped to keep the existence of the Pinochet accounts secret. For example, none of the 15 personal accounts opened for Augusto Pinochet over a 14-year period ever carried his given name, in either New York or Miami. Instead, the 6 New York accounts used “J. Ramon Ugarte” or “Jose Ramon Ugarte.” The 9 Miami accounts used “Jose Ugarte” or “Jose Pinochet Ugarte,” later shortened to “Jose P. Ugarte.”
Some Pinochet family member names were also disguised. For example, all 6 of the New York accounts opened for Augusto Pinochet began or were converted to joint accounts with his son, but none of them used the son’s full name, instead identifying him as “Marco P. Hiriart.” The one Citigroup account opened for Mr. Pinochet and his wife styled his wife’s name as “Lucia P. Hiriart.” In contrast, Mr. Pinochet’s two daughters were named on their personal accounts as either “Lucia Pinochet Hiriart” or “Maria Veronica Pinochet.”
Citigroup also opened 29 accounts and CDs in New York or Miami in the name of offshore entities established or arranged by Citigroup at the request of Marco or Ines Lucia Pinochet. For example, Meritor Investments Ltd. is an offshore corporation which was established in the Bahamas in 1994, by Cititrust (Bahamas) Ltd. (hereinafter “Cititrust”) at the request of Marco Pinochet. Citigroup documents indicate that Meritor Investments is owned by Trust FT-5994N, a numbered trust which Cititrust had established in the Bahamas at the same time and for which Cititrust acts as the Trustee. [87] Citigroup documentation indicates that the sole beneficial owner of both Trust FT-5994N and Meritor Investments is Marco Pinochet. Cititrust and its affiliates have administered both the corporation and the trust since their inception. [88]
Citigroup also arranged for an offshore trust and corporation for Ines Lucia Pinochet. Trust MT-4964N is a numbered trust in the Bahamas established by Cititrust in 1991. Citigroup documentation indicates that Ms. Pinochet is this trust’s beneficial owner, and Cititrust and its affiliates have managed the affairs of this trust since its inception. Citigroup also arranged for Ines Lucia Pinochet to acquire control of an offshore corporation known as Redwing Holdings Inc., a bearer-share corporation in the British Virgin Islands (BVI). [89] According to Citigroup documentation, Ms. Pinochet is the beneficial owner of this corporation, which has been managed since her acquisition of it by Torman Ltd., rather than Citigroup. Although Citigroup does not normally establish bearer share corporations for its clients or open accounts for offshore corporations managed by third parties, it made an exception for Redwing Holdings and agreed to provide financial services to this bearer share corporation beginning in 1991.
From 1998 until March 2000, Augusto Pinochet was the subject of numerous civil and criminal proceedings in Spain, the United Kingdom, and Chile, including issuance of a 1998 Spanish court order directing financial institutions to freeze Mr. Pinochet’s assets on a worldwide basis. These proceedings and issuance of the freeze order were repeatedly described in international, Chilean, and U.S. news media reports. Throughout this period, Citigroup failed to alert any court or law enforcement entity to the accounts it had held for Mr. Pinochet personally until 1996, to the account held by Marco Pinochet in trust for “Ramon Ugarte” until 1999, or to the accounts the bank continued to manage for his children.
Due Diligence. Citigroup began its relationship with the Pinochet family more than 20 years ago, at a time when anti-money laundering (AML) laws were relatively new and a due diligence culture requiring banks to “know your customer” had not yet taken hold. Over time, U.S. banking regulations and laws increased due diligence and AML requirements, particularly for private banking accounts and accounts held by public figures, their immediate family members, and close associates. Most of the Pinochet accounts at Citigroup were handled by Citibank Private Bank and treated as public figure accounts requiring enhanced due diligence.
Over the past 10 years, despite having excellent anti-money laundering policies and procedures on paper, Citibank Private Bank has undergone repeated criticism for poor due diligence practices, lax implementation of its AML controls, and failure to close accounts for foreign public figures who appear to be depositing the proceeds of foreign corruption into their private banking accounts. For example, in 1996, as part of an industry-wide review of antimoney laundering controls in the private banking industry, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York examined Citibank Private Bank and found so many AML deficiencies that it conducted 3 major audits, from 1996 to 1998, to compel the bank to correct identified problems. In 1997, the Federal Reserve Bank and the OCC, Citigroup’s primary regulator, informed Citigroup’s Board of Directors of the Private Bank’s AML problems and asked for corrective action. In response, the Board initiated a “fundamental review” of the bank and, in 1998, announced a new strategy to move Citibank Private Bank away from providing clients with “secrecy” and toward providing them with good investment returns.
In November 1999, this Subcommittee held a hearing and issued a Minority Staff report presenting extensive evidence of Citibank Private Bank’s ongoing poor due diligence and AML practices, using four examples of private banking accounts held by public figures with millions of dollars in questionable funds, including nearly $90 million that had been deposited by Raul Salinas, brother of the then president of Mexico. [90] Citibank Private Bank committed to further reforms, especially for public figure accounts. In 2001, after the 9-11 tragedy, Congress enacted the Patriot Act which, among other provisions, imposed a statutory requirement on U.S. financial institutions to conduct enhanced due diligence of private banking accounts for foreign public figures, their family members, and close associates. In 2004, however, in an indication of ongoing AML deficiencies within the Private Bank, the Financial Services Agency of Japan determined that, due to poor AML practices and other misconduct, Citibank Private Bank had engaged in improper transactions and harmed customers, and ordered it to leave the country. In response, Citigroup closed down its Japanese private banking operations, apologized to Japan, and fired the head of Citibank Private Bank. [91]
Citigroup’s due diligence practices regarding the Pinochet accounts, while they improved over time, were marked by misinformation and substantial gaps. Citigroup’s most significant due diligence failures occurred with respect to the accounts opened for Augusto Pinochet.
– Augusto Pinochet Accounts. Citigroup opened its first account for Augusto Pinochet in New York in 1981, and its first account for him in Miami in 1985. Citigroup has limited records regarding the bank employees who opened and managed these accounts for the first few years, but records show that, from 1987 until the accounts closed in 1996, the New York accounts were handled by a single relationship manager in the New York branch. The Miami accounts were handled by a different relationship manager in the Miami branch from 1984 until the accounts closed in 1993. Apparently, the two relationship managers were not aware of their respective sets of Pinochet accounts. In addition, according to Citigroup, for many years, neither of these relationship managers realized that she was handling accounts for Augusto Pinochet, then the president of Chile; instead, each thought she was handling accounts for Augusto Pinochet’s brother.
Citigroup told the Subcommittee that, during the 9 years she handled his accounts, the Miami relationship manager never met her client, and was under the impression that “Jose Pinochet” was the brother of Augusto Pinochet and the uncle of Ines Lucia and Marco Pinochet. Citigroup told the Subcommittee that the relationship manager dealt primarily with Ms. Pinochet when handling the Miami accounts. Citigroup indicated that it was not until 1992, that the Miami relationship manager learned from Ms. Pinochet that “Jose” was, in fact, her father, Augusto Pinochet. Citigroup indicated that upon learning this information, the relationship manager promptly informed the head of the Citigroup Florida branch who, in turn, decided that his branch did not want to handle accounts for Augusto Pinochet. Over the course of about a year, the Florida branch closed all of its Augusto Pinochet accounts, with the last three closing sometime before June 1993.
Citigroup told the Subcommittee that the Miami relationship manager apparently did not communicate her discovery or the decision to close the Miami accounts to her counterpart in New York. Citigroup indicated that the Miami relationship manager may not have been aware of the New York accounts, since, during the early 1990s, relationship managers did not normally disclose their clients to each other, Citigroup did not then track all of the accounts associated with a particular client, and the New York accounts carried a different name, “J. Ramon Ugarte,” than the “Jose P. Ugarte” accounts in Miami.
Citigroup has indicated that the New York relationship manager handled the Pinochet New York accounts for about nine years, from about 1987 to 1996, without ever meeting her client. Citigroup told the Subcommittee that, throughout this period, the relationship manager thought that “J. Ramon Ugarte” was the brother of Augusto Pinochet. Citigroup indicated that the relationship manager learned the true identity of her client for the first time when informed by the bank earlier this year.
The New York branch gradually closed Mr. Pinochet’s 6 New York accounts over a twoyear period, from September 1994 to September 1996, acting each time in response to a request by Mr. Pinochet to close the relevant account. For three more years, until 1999, Mr. Pinochet was the beneficiary of a New York checking account opened in the name of “Marco P. Hiriart in trust for Ramon Ugarte.” [92]
During the years the Augusto Pinochet accounts were open in New York and Miami, the account documentation does not contain any substantive analysis of the source of his wealth or the source of the funds in his accounts, despite hefty balances that reached $3.1 million. [93] The New York account opening documentation in 1981 consists of a one-page application form with minimal information, documents showing that “Jose Ramon Ugarte” had accounts with two banks in Chile, and a copy of a passport for “Jose Ramon Ugarte,” bearing the signature, “J. Ramon Ugarte.” [94] The Miami account opening documentation in 1985, contains even less information. [95] It describes “Jose Pinochet Ugarte” as a retiree or “Empleado-Jubilado” and waives the requirement for two references. The form incorrectly describes “Lucia P. Hiriart” as his “niece.” In April 1990, a memorandum notes that the client changed the title on his accounts from “Jose Pinochet” to “Jose P. Ugarte,” without providing any explanation. [96] In 1994, the New York branch grants a “Documentation Waiver Request” for one of the accounts, relieving the relationship manager of an obligation to obtain written bank references for the client, since “J. Ramon Ugarte” had been an “excellent client since 1982.” [97]
In short, according to Citigroup, for the bulk of the 14 years Mr. Pinochet’s accounts were open in New York and Miami, the two relationship managers handling his accounts never met their client and did not know his true identity. In addition, neither ever evaluated the source of the funds in his accounts.
– Marco Pinochet Accounts. Citigroup’s due diligence analysis of Mr. Pinochet’s son, consistently styled as “Marco P. Hiriart” on Citigroup accounts, was also marked by deficiencies. Marco was closely associated with many of the accounts opened by his father at Citigroup. For example, all 6 of Augusto Pinochet’s New York accounts began or were converted to a joint account with Marco. Marco also held two New York accounts “in trust for J. Ramon Ugarte,” a checking account opened for fourteen years, from 1985 to May 1999, and a custody account opened for 3 years, from February 1993 until February 1996. Marco and Augusto took out a joint $2 million loan from Citigroup in 1993. Marco also opened multiple Citigroup accounts under his own name, with his wife, or in the name of his offshore corporation, Meritor Investments.
Citigroup’s account opening documentation for the first account opened under Marco’s own name, in June 1985, describes him as a “diplomat” and identifies his “business” as the “Embassy of Chile” in Washington, D.C. [98] Account opening documentation for subsequent accounts during the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s provide little or no additional information about his employment or business interests. In contrast, beginning in 1996 and extending to 2004, Citigroup prepared increasingly detailed analyses of his business interests in documentation associated with his personal accounts and the accounts opened for Meritor Investments. These analyses appear in a variety of documents over the years, entitled as client profiles, know-your-customer forms, or financial questionnaires. Some of these documents provide estimates of his net worth, estimates which varied from $9.1 million in an undated document, to $15 million in a 1998 client profile, to $5.3 million in a 2000 profile, which is the figure generally used in the final four years his accounts are open at Citigroup. [99] The documents dated 1996 and later describe the source of his funds as deriving from his ownership of several Chilean businesses, including a real estate investment company, a chain of clothing stores, a motorcycle and small boat import business, and a business that provides aeronautical equipment advisory services. [100] The documents also cite earlier bank loans that were used to generate investment returns and a portfolio of marketable securities. Several of the account documents mention confidentiality concerns. For example, a 1998 client profile states that Marco is “very concerned about confidentiality,” while another states that he “does not want contact from Chilean Citibank employees.” [101]
In mid-2000, the account documentation indicates that Citigroup made a decision to exit the relationship with Marco Pinochet. [102] This decision may have been part of a larger bank review of public figure accounts within the Private Bank. The decision was carried out very slowly over the following three years. The account documentation cites various reasons over time for exiting the relationship, including that Marco was not within the Private Bank’s target market, his accounts did not present sufficient business opportunities, and, in 2004, that negative information had surfaced about his father. Marco’s last personal account closed in October 2003. Three accounts held by Meritor Investments and two held by his wife closed in 2004. [103]
– Ines Lucia and Maria Veronica Pinochet Accounts. Beginning in 1983, Ines Lucia Pinochet opened multiple accounts at Citigroup under her own name; the name of her offshore corporation, Redwing Holdings; and the name of her offshore numbered trust, Trust MT-4964N. From 1983 until 1993, she was also the primary contact for Citibank Private Bank personnel in Miami on matters involving her father’s Miami accounts. Her sister, Maria Veronica Pinochet, opened her first accounts at Citigroup ten years later, beginning in 1995, all under her own name.
As with the Marco Pinochet accounts, the due diligence analysis of the Ines Lucia Pinochet accounts is very limited at first and becomes progressively more detailed. During the 1980s and early 1990s, virtually no analysis of deposits or transactions appears in the account documentation; beginning in 1998, increasingly detailed analyses are provided. The account documents identify the main sources of her wealth as real estate investments and marital assets. The documentation notes that her accounts were generally in six figures, and that her father had not played any apparent role in the banking relationship. On occasion, Ines Lucia Pinochet also obtained extensions of credit from Citigroup, which she repaid. In 1998, Citigroup began negotiations to close her accounts, because her assets were below the Private Bank’s minimum. In late 1999 or early 2000, the bank formed an exit strategy to end the relationship. The last of her personal, trust, and Redwing Holdings accounts closed in January 2001. Account documentation for Maria Veronica Pinochet is very limited. Several of her accounts closed in 2004.
For at least the first 13 years that the Marco and Ines Pinochet accounts were open, from 1983 to 1996, the Citigroup account documentation contains virtually no due diligence information on the source of their wealth or the source of the funds in their accounts, despite the deposit of millions of dollars into the Marco accounts and hundreds of thousands of dollars into the Ines accounts. Beginning in 1996, the bank’s due diligence analyses grow increasingly detailed, identifying specific assets and businesses that support the level of funds in the accounts. These later records do not attempt, however, to go back in time to explain how Marco and Ines Lucia Pinochet acquired their wealth prior to 1996.
Transactions of Interest. Bank records show that the 63 U.S. accounts and CDs opened by Citigroup for Mr. Pinochet and his immediate family members were used in a variety of ways. Some of the Pinochet accounts experienced numerous deposits and withdrawals, and contained substantial sums, at times in the millions of dollars. A number of the Pinochet accounts transferred funds to or from other Pinochet accounts at Citigroup, creating internal funding shifts which make it difficult to track the flow of funds. For example, in 1992, one Augusto Pinochet account contained more than $3 million; the same $3 million later appears to have been shifted to a Meritor account. At the same time, other Pinochet accounts saw relatively little activity and contained relatively modest amounts. In July 1995, based upon available records, it appears there was a minimum of $3.6 million in the Pinochet-related accounts in the U.S. open at that time.
While an exhaustive analysis is beyond the scope of this Report, a few transactions illuminate how Mr. Pinochet used the Citigroup accounts to move funds within the United States and across international lines, transact business, and construct an international web of secret accounts.
– In March 1990, Mr. Pinochet closed Riggs Bank Account No. 450858, which had been opened in the name of Jose R. Ugarte, and withdrew the remaining funds in the account, totaling $96,378.22, using a Riggs cashiers check. On March 15, 1990, that cashiers check was deposited into Miami Citigroup Account No. 12032544, which was then open in the name of Jose P. Ugarte and Lucia P. Hiriart.
– On June 24, 1992, an unidentified Citigroup account, believed to be one of the 63 Pinochet-related accounts, sent a $280,000 wire transfer to a military officer account at Riggs, Account No. 709345 in the name of Gabriel Vergara. A similar transaction took place on November 13, 1992, with a wire transfer for $185,000. In less than six months, then, these two transfers had moved a total of $465,000 from Citigroup to the Vergara account at Riggs.
– On April 25, 1996, Meritor Investments, the offshore corporation controlled by Marco Pinochet, sent a $403,000 wire transfer from Citigroup Account No. 10328149 in New York, through a Bahamas clearing account, to Washington Riggs Account No. 76750393 which was opened in the name of Augusto Pinochet Ugarte and Lucia Hiriart Rodriguez. These funds later contributed to a $1 million wire transfer to a Bahamas Riggs account opened in the name of Ashburton Co. Ltd., an offshore corporation controlled by Augusto Pinochet.
– On May 18, 2000, Citigroup closed accounts associated with Ines Lucia Pinochet and provided her with a $390,000 Citibank cashiers check made payable to Redwing Holdings Inc. On May 25, 2000, she deposited that check into her newly opened Riggs Account No. 75256035 in London.
Regulatory Oversight. From 1996 through 1998, U.S. bank regulators audited a number of aspects of Citibank Private Bank, but apparently never examined any of the Pinochet accounts, perhaps because the last Augusto Pinochet personal account closed in 1996, and the Marco Pinochet account held in trust for “Ramon Ugarte” did not carry his father’s given name.
As mentioned earlier, from October 1998 until March 2000, Augusto Pinochet was the subject of multiple civil and criminal proceedings and numerous international news media stories, including the issuance of a 1998 Spanish court order seeking to freeze his assets on a worldwide basis. Throughout this period, Citigroup failed to alert its U.S. regulators, or any court or law enforcement entity, to the accounts it had held for Mr. Pinochet until 1996, to the account held by Marco Pinochet in trust for “Ramon Ugarte” until 1999, or to the accounts the bank continued to hold for his children. [104]
On June 26, 2002, the OCC contacted Citigroup and asked whether Citibank Private Bank had any accounts for Mr. Pinochet or his wife, including accounts opened under a list of disguised variants of their names. [105] On June 27, 2002, an internal OCC email reports that the head of Citigroup’s global anti-money laundering group responded that an earlier global search had not turned up any Pinochet accounts at the bank.
“Citibank indicates that:
1) After a search of its comprehensive data base, the Private Banking unit did not identify any accounts relating to any of the specified names.
2) On the possibility that an account may exist in Citibank but outside of the Private Banking unit, [the head of Citigroup’s global anti-money laundering group] indicated that a global search for Pinochet had been conducted when the adverse publicity first arose = no accounts found. ... He stated Citibank would be happy to conduct additional followup if [account numbers or other detailed information] was available.” [106]
Based upon this information, the OCC did not pursue the matter further at Citigroup and did not learn of Citigroup’s relationship with the Pinochet family until 2004.
When asked about the 2002 OCC inquiry, Citigroup told the Subcommittee that, although it had records showing it received the inquiry, it had no record showing that the bank ever conducted any search in response to the request or provided the described information to the agency. The bank said that none of the bank personnel named in the emails recalled either conducting a search or responding to the OCC in this matter. The bank noted that its alleged response was provided less than 24 hours after the request was first made, which would have been highly unlikely and would not have permitted sufficient time for an electronic search of the bank’s records.
Citigroup also pointed out that, as of June 2002, Mr. Pinochet and his wife’s personal accounts had been closed for 6 years, and the bank was in the process of closing accounts for other Pinochet family members. Citigroup indicated that, even so, its normal practice would have been to inform its regulator of the closed and related accounts. Citigroup could not explain why this information was not conveyed to the OCC in 2002. It was not until July 2004, two years later, that Citigroup first alerted the OCC to its years-long relationship with the Pinochet family.
B. Banco de Chile
Banco de Chile is one of the oldest and largest banks in Chile. [107] With total assets in 2004 of $15.8 billion, it offers a wide range of financial services, including retail banking, private banking, and investment services. It is a publicly traded corporation, with headquarters in Santiago, Chile, and more than 240 branch offices throughout the country. Banco de Chile also operates in several other countries, but apparently accepts deposits only in Chile and the United States. A Chilean subsidiary of the bank, Banchile Corresdores de Bolsa S.A. (“Banchile”), provides the bank’s clients with brokerage and investment services.
Banco de Chile-United States maintains two offices in the United States, a branch office in New York first established in 1982, and an agency office in Miami, which was established in 1994 and upgraded to a branch office in early 2004. These U.S. branches primarily provide international banking services for the bank’s Chilean clients. In addition, Banchile acts as an introducing broker to help Banco de Chile clients open brokerage accounts in the United States. For a number of years, Banchile helped Banco de Chile clients open brokerage accounts at Lehman Brothers, a U.S. licensed broker-dealer. In 2004, Banchile began doing business with Pershing Securities, another U.S. licensed broker-dealer and a subsidiary of The Bank of New York. Banchile then moved the Banco de Chile client accounts from Lehman Brothers to Pershing Securities. [108]
Banco de Chile’s relationship with the Pinochet family began in 1973, when Mr. Pinochet opened his first account at the bank’s headquarters in Santiago, Chile. At the time, providing banking services to the country’s President was considered a great honor, particularly since Mr. Pinochet had a reputation for honest dealing. The number of Banco de Chile accounts opened by Mr. Pinochet and his family in Chile, the amount of funds, and the source of the funds in these accounts, have not been disclosed to the Subcommittee due to Chilean bank secrecy laws and are outside the scope of this Report. What is known is that the bank continued its relationship with the Pinochet family for 32 years, until questions arose about the Pinochet funds at Riggs Bank. In response, Banco de Chile re-evaluated the relationship and, in 2004, closed all Pinochet accounts in Chile and the United States. The bank’s decision to close the Pinochet accounts was controversial and has attracted both support and criticism in Chile.
The Subcommittee investigation has determined that Banco de Chile-United States maintained a nine-year relationship with Augusto Pinochet and his family, which began in 1995 and ended in 2004. Banco de Chile-United States has identified 24 New York and Miami accounts and CDs that were opened for Mr. Pinochet, members of his immediate family, and ostensibly unrelated third parties whose accounts served at times as conduits for Pinochet funds. These third parties were primarily offshore corporations controlled by a Chilean attorney, Oscar Custodio Aitken Lavanchy, who allowed them to serve as conduits for Pinochet funds. In addition, one account was opened in the name of a Chilean nonprofit organization, the Fundacion Presidente Pinochet Ugarte (hereinafter “Pinochet Foundation”). [109]
In addition to opening these accounts, Banco de Chile-United States has provided individual Pinochet family members with various types of financial services, from arranging international wire transfers, to opening investment accounts, to providing a substantial loan to Mr. Pinochet. This 1997 loan for $500,000 was repaid in full in 1999, as explained below.
In total, excluding loan proceeds, the U.S. accounts and CDs benefitting Mr. Pinochet appear to have accumulated funds in excess of $7 million. The vast bulk of these funds, about $6 million, was transferred into Banco de Chile-United States accounts by Riggs Bank in 2002, after Riggs ended its relationship with the Pinochet family. The remaining $1 million was deposited into the U.S. accounts over several years, primarily from Pinochet-related accounts in Chile at Banco de Chile. The source of the funds in the Chilean accounts has not been disclosed to the Subcommittee due to Chilean bank secrecy laws.
Banco de Chile fully cooperated with all Subcommittee inquiries and produced all requested documentation and information in the United States, including documentation related to an extensive internal review of the Pinochet-related accounts conducted at the request of the bank by outside legal counsel. Citing bank secrecy laws, however, Banco de Chile did not produce any information about Pinochet-related accounts and transactions in Chile. Information about accounts and transactions involving its Chilean operations have been reconstructed from Banco de Chile’s U.S. wire transfer records and records produced by other financial institutions.
The 24 U.S. accounts and CDs provided by Banco de Chile-United States to the Pinochet family, from 1995 to 2004, can be summarized as follows.
Personal Accounts. The 3 Banco de Chile-United States accounts opened for Mr. Pinochet in the United States are the following.
(1) Account No. 442506/321 was opened in the name of Maria Lucia Hiriart Rodriguez and Augusto Jose Ramon Pinochet Ugarte in New York on August 29, 1995, and closed on March 18, 1999.
(2) Account No. 401892/321 was opened in the name of Maria L. Hiriart Rodriguez and Augusto Jose R. Pinochet Ugarte in Miami on June 24, 1996, and closed on March 23, 1999.
(3) Account No. 401892/331/001/002/01 was opened in the name of “Pinochet Joint Miami TD,” establishing a CD, in Miami on May 29, 1998, and closed on November 9, 1998.
Pinochet Family Accounts. The 5 Banco de Chile accounts opened in the United States for members of the immediate family of Mr. Pinochet are the following. Several of these accounts contained modest amounts, and it is unclear whether or the extent to which each account may have been used as a conduit for transactions benefitting Mr. Pinochet.
(1) Account No. 401323/321 was opened in the name of Mr. Pinochet’s daughter, Jacqueline Marie Pinochet Hiriart, in Miami on September 27, 1995, and closed on December 14, 2000.
(2) Account No. 401323/301 was opened in the name of Jacqueline Marie Pinochet Hiriart in Miami on December 14, 2000, and closed on January 14, 2002.
(3) Account No. 340/204013231 was opened in the name of Jacqueline Marie Pinochet Hiriart in Miami on December 14, 2000, and closed in early 2005.
(4) Account No. 23000690 was opened in the name of Mr. Pinochet’s grandson, Alejandro Ponce Pinochet, in Miami on January 2, 2003, and closed in early 2005.
(5) Account No. 21014466 was opened in the name of Mr. Pinochet’s granddaughter, Francisca Lucia Ponce Pinochet, in Miami on August 30, 2004, and closed in early 2005.
Third Party Accounts. Between November 1997 and July 2003, Banco de Chile-United States opened 11 U.S. accounts in the name of third parties which served at times as conduits for Pinochet funds. All but one of these accounts was opened in the name of an offshore corporation controlled by Mr. Aitken. These corporations are Abanda Finance Ltd., which was incorporated in the British Virgin Islands (“BVI”); Belview International Inc., another BVI corporation; Sociedad de Inversiones Belview Int S.A., a Chilean corporation; Eastview Finance S.A., a BVI corporation; G.L.P. Ltd., a BVI corporation; and Tasker Investments Ltd., a BVI corporation. The final account was opened for the Pinochet Foundation.
(1) Account No. 101136/345/001/002/01-04, for 4 CDs, was opened in the name of Eastview Finance S.A. in Miami on November 10, 1997, and closed on March 24, 1999.
(2) Account No. 101136/335/001/002/01-04 was opened in the name of Eastview Finance S.A. in Miami on November 10, 1997, and closed on August 9, 1999.
(3) Account No. 101136/335/001/003/01 was opened in the name of Eastview Finance S.A. in Miami on July 10, 1998, and closed on August 31, 1998.
(4) Account No. 310/105033261 (503326/325) was opened in the name of Eastview Finance S.A. in New York on November 5, 1998, and closed on January 8, 2003.
(5) Account No. 503326/335/001/002/01 was opened in the name of Eastview Finance S.A. in New York on January 7, 1999, and closed on August 30, 2001.
(6) Account No. 310/105033831 (503383/324) was opened in the name of the Pinochet Foundation in New York on January 8, 1999, and closed on December 14, 2004.
(7) Account No. 310/102114411 (211441/305) was opened in the name of Abanda Finance Ltd. in New York on November 15, 1999, and closed on December 31, 2002. [110]
(8) Account No. 310/011001328 was opened in the name of Sociedad de Inversiones Belview Int S.A. in New York on July 17, 2002, and closed on November 8, 2002.
(9) Account No. 310/012002183 was opened in the name of Belview International Inc. in New York on July 23, 2002, and closed on September 20, 2004.
(10) Account No. 310/011004478 was opened in the name of GLP Ltd. in New York on November 19, 2002, and closed on September 16, 2004.
(11) Account No. 310/021005635 was opened in the name of Tasker Investment Ltd. in Miami on July 26, 2003, and closed on September 15, 2004.
Brokerage Accounts. In addition to opening bank accounts, Banco de Chile, through its affiliate Banchile acting as the introducing broker, helped Mr. Aitken open 5 brokerage accounts at U.S. securities firms for his offshore corporations Belview International Inc.; Eastview Finance S.A.; G.L.P. Ltd.; and Tasker Investments Ltd.
(1) Account No. 743-13165-17-765 was opened in the name of Belview International Inc. at Lehman Brothers in Miami on August 29, 2002, and closed on November 26, 2002.
(2) Account No. 743-13374-14-765 was opened in the name of GLP Ltd. at Lehman Brothers in Miami on November 21, 2002, and closed on May 18, 2004.
(3) Account No. 0AJ 002418 was opened in the name of GLP Ltd. at Pershing Securities in New York on February 24, 2004, and closed on February 11, 2005.
(4) Account No. 743-15017 was opened in the name of Tasker Investments Ltd. S.A. at Lehman Brothers in Miami on July 30, 2003, and closed on April 19, 2004.
(5) Account No. 0AJ 002392 was opened in the name of Tasker Investments Ltd. S.A. at Pershing Securities in New York on February 24, 2004, and closed on January 3, 2005.
Account Secrecy and Due Diligence. When opening U.S. accounts for Mr. Pinochet and his family, Banco de Chile-United States dealt openly with Mr. Pinochet, a former president and respected figure in Chile. The bank clearly knew him and his family members. The first three accounts the bank opened for Mr. Pinochet in the United States bore his name in an open and transparent manner. So did the five accounts opened for Pinochet family members. In general, these 8 accounts held relatively modest amounts, that attracted little concern.
The same cannot be said about the 15 U.S. bank and securities accounts that the bank opened or helped to open for offshore corporations controlled by Mr. Aitken. Oscar Aitken was known to Banco de Chile-United States as a Chilean attorney with ties to Mr. Pinochet and a principal partner in the law firm of Aguero, Aitken, Frias, and Henriquez. He was also a longstanding client of the bank in Chile, having opened his first account there in 1973.
Mr. Aitken opened his first personal account at Banco de Chile-United States in 1990. Four years later, in 1994, he opened his first U.S. account at Banco de Chile-United States for an offshore corporation. Banco de Chile told the Subcommittee that it did not help Mr. Aitken establish or manage any of his offshore corporations. In fact, the bank indicated that it does not have an offshore affiliate that routinely establishes or manages offshore entities for its clients, and only a limited number of its U.S. clients ever use an offshore corporation as a named accountholder. The bank told the Subcommittee that its internal review discovered that Mr. Aitken was associated with 8 or 9 such offshore corporations and had many more than any other client at Banco de Chile-United States. [111]
The bank’s internal review determined that both Mr. Pinochet and Mr. Aitken were treated as important clients by Banco de Chile-United States and by the head of the bank’s New York branch, the New York general manager, who often handled matters for these clients. The New York general manager was a longterm, well regarded employee of the bank, served as head of the New York branch from 1987 to 2002, and in November 2002, was promoted to country manager of U.S. operations. The bank’s internal review determined that he was well acquainted with Mr. Aitken and knew of Mr. Aitken’s ties to Mr. Pinochet whom the New York general manager greatly