Equipo Nizkor - Start I Treaty - Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I).

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Treaty Articles

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Conscious that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all humanity, that it cannot be won and must never be fought,

Convinced that the measures for the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms and the other obligations set forth in this Treaty will help to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war and strengthen international peace and security,

Recognizing that the interests of the Parties and the interests of international security require the strengthening of strategic stability,

Mindful of their undertakings with regard to strategic offensive arms in Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968; Article XI of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972; and the Washington Summit Joint Statement of June 1, 1990,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

Each Party shall reduce and limit its strategic offensive arms in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, and shall carry out the other obligations set forth in this Treaty and its Annexes, Protocols, and Memorandum of Understanding.

Article II

1. Each Party shall reduce and limit its ICBMs and ICBM launchers, SLBMs and SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, ICBM warheads, SLBM warheads, and heavy bomber armaments, so that seven years after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, the aggregate numbers, as counted in accordance with Article III of this Treaty, do not exceed:

(a) 1600, for deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers, deployed SLBMs and their associated launchers, and deployed heavy bombers, including 154 for deployed heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers;
(b) 6000, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers, including:

(i) 4900, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs;
(ii) 1100, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs on mobile launchers of ICBMs;
(iii) 1540, for warheads attributed to deployed heavy ICBMs.

2. Each Party shall implement the reductions pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article in three phases, so that its strategic offensive arms do not exceed:

(a) by the end of the first phase, that is, no later than 36 months after entry into force of this Treaty, and thereafter, the following aggregate numbers:

(i) 2100, for deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers, deployed SLBMs and their associated launchers, and deployed heavy bombers;
(ii) 9150, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers;
(iii) 8050, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs;

(b) by the end of the second phase, that is, no later than 60 months after entry into force of this Treaty, and thereafter, the following aggregate numbers:

(i) 1900, for deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers, deployed SLBMs and their associated launchers, and deployed heavy bombers;
(ii) 7950, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers;
(iii) 6750, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs;

(c) by the end of the third phase, that is, no later than 84 months after entry into force of this Treaty: the aggregate numbers provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article.

3. Each Party shall limit the aggregate throw-weight of its deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs so that seven years after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter such aggregate throw-weight does not exceed 3600 metric tons.

Article III

1. For the purposes of counting toward the maximum aggregate limits provided for in subparagraphs 1(a), 2(a)(i), and 2(b)(i) of Article II of this Treaty:

(a) Each deployed ICBM and its associated launcher shall be counted as one unit; each deployed SLBM and its associated launcher shall be counted as one unit.
(b) Each deployed heavy bomber shall be counted as one unit.

2. For the purposes of counting deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers and deployed SLBMs and their associated launchers:

(a) Each deployed launcher of ICBMs and each deployed launcher of SLBMs shall be considered to contain one deployed ICBM or one deployed SLBM, respectively.
(b) If a deployed ICBM has been removed from its launcher and another missile has not been installed in that launcher, such an ICBM removed from its launcher and located at that ICBM base shall continue to be considered to be contained in that launcher.
(c) If a deployed SLBM has been removed from its launcher and another missile has not been installed in that launcher, such an SLBM removed from its launcher shall be considered to be contained in that launcher. Such an SLBM removed from its launcher shall be located only at a facility at which non-deployed SLBMs may be located pursuant to subparagraph 9(a) of Article IV of this Treaty or be in movement to such a facility.

3. For the purposes of this Treaty, including counting ICBMs and SLBMs:

(a) For ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported in stages, the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM of a particular type shall be considered to be an ICBM or SLBM of that type.
(b) For ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles without launch canisters, an assembled missile of a particular type shall be considered to be an ICBM or SLBM of that type.
(c) For ICBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles in launch canisters, an assembled missile of a particular type, in its launch canister, shall be considered to be an ICBM of that type.
(d) Each launch canister shall be considered to contain an ICBM from the time it first leaves a facility at which an ICBM is installed in it until an ICBM has been launched from it or until an ICBM has been removed from it for elimination. A launch canister shall not be considered to contain an ICBM if it contains a training model of a missile or has been placed on static display. Launch canisters for ICBMs of a particular type shall be distinguishable from launch canisters for ICBMs of a different type.

4. For the purposes of counting warheads:

(a) The number of warheads attributed to an ICBM or SLBM of each existing type shall be the number specified in the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Memorandum of Understanding.
(b) The number of warheads that will be attributed to an ICBM or SLBM of a new type shall be the maximum number of reentry vehicles with which an ICBM or SLBM of that type has been flight-tested. The number of warheads that will be attributed to an ICBM or SLBM of a new type with a front section of an existing design with multiple reentry vehicles, or to an ICBM or SLBM of a new type with one reentry vehicle, shall be no less than the nearest integer that is smaller than the result of dividing 40 percent of the accountable throw-weight of the ICBM or SLBM by the weight of the lightest reentry vehicle flight-tested on an ICBM or SLBM of that type. In the case of an ICBM or SLBM of a new type with a front section of a fundamentally new design, the question of the applicability of the 40-percent rule to such an ICBM or SLBM shall be subject to agreement within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. Until agreement has been reached regarding the rule that will apply to such an ICBM or SLBM, the number of warheads that will be attributed to such an ICBM or SLBM shall be the maximum number of reentry vehicles with which an ICBM or SLBM of that type has been flight-tested. The number of new types of ICBMs or SLBMs with a front section of a fundamentally new design shall not exceed two for each Party as long as this Treaty remains in force.
(c) The number of reentry vehicles with which an ICBM or SLBM has been flight-tested shall be considered to be the sum of the number of reentry vehicles actually released during the flight test, plus the number of procedures for dispensing reentry vehicles performed during that same flight test when no reentry vehicle was released. A procedure for dispensing penetration aids shall not be considered to be a procedure for dispensing reentry vehicles, provided that the procedure for dispensing penetration aids differs from a procedure for dispensing reentry vehicles.
(d) Each reentry vehicle of an ICBM or SLBM shall be considered to be one warhead.
(e) For the United States of America, each heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, up to a total of 150 such heavy bombers, shall be attributed with ten warheads. Each heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs in excess of 150 such heavy bombers shall be attributed with a number of warheads equal to the number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which it is actually equipped. The United States of America shall specify the heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs that are in excess of 150 such heavy bombers by number, type, variant, and the air bases at which they are based. The number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which each heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs in excess of 150 such heavy bombers is considered to be actually equipped shall be the maximum number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which a heavy bomber of the same type and variant is actually equipped.
(f) For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, each heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, up to a total of 180 such heavy bombers, shall be attributed with eight warheads. Each heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs in excess of 180 such heavy bombers shall be attributed with a number of warheads equal to the number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which it is actually equipped. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall specify the heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs that are in excess of 180 such heavy bombers by number, type, variant, and the air bases at which they are based. The number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which each heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs in excess of 180 such heavy bombers is considered to be actually equipped shall be the maximum number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which a heavy bomber of the same type and variant is actually equipped.
(g) Each heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs shall be attributed with one warhead. All heavy bombers not equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs shall be considered to be heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, with the exception of heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, test heavy bombers, and training heavy bombers.

5. Each Party shall have the right to reduce the number of warheads attributed to ICBMs and SLBMs only of existing types, up to an aggregate number of 1250 at any one time.

(a) Such aggregate number shall consist of the following:

(i) for the United States of America, the reduction in the number of warheads attributed to the type of ICBM designated by the United States of America as, and known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as, Minuteman III, plus the reduction in the number of warheads attributed to ICBMs and SLBMs of no more than two other existing types;
(ii) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, four multiplied by the number of deployed SLBMs designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as RSM-50, which is known to the United States of America as SS-N-18, plus the reduction in the number of warheads attributed to ICBMs and SLBMs of no more than two other existing types.

(b) Reductions in the number of warheads attributed to Minuteman III ICBMs shall be carried out subject to the following:

(i) Minuteman III ICBMs to which different numbers of warheads are attributed shall not be deployed at the same ICBM base.
(ii) Any such reductions shall be carried out no later than seven years after entry into force of this Treaty.
(iii) The reentry vehicle platform of each Minuteman III ICBM to which a reduced number of warheads is attributed shall be destroyed and replaced by a new reentry vehicle platform.

(c) Reductions in the number of warheads attributed to ICBMs and SLBMs of types other than Minuteman III shall be carried out subject to the following:

(i) Such reductions shall not exceed 500 warheads at any one time for each Party.
(ii) After a Party has reduced the number of warheads attributed to ICBMs or SLBMs of two existing types, that Party shall not have the right to reduce the number of warheads attributed to ICBMs or SLBMs of any additional type.
(iii) The number of warheads attributed to an ICBM or SLBM shall be reduced by no more than four below the number attributed as of the date of signature of this Treaty.
(iv) ICBMs of the same type, but to which different numbers of warheads are attributed, shall not be deployed at the same ICBM base.
(v) SLBMs of the same type, but to which different numbers of warheads are attributed, shall not be deployed on submarines based at submarine bases adjacent to the waters of the same ocean.
(vi) If the number of warheads attributed to an ICBM or SLBM of a particular type is reduced by more than two, the reentry vehicle platform of each ICBM or SLBM to which such a reduced number of warheads is attributed shall be destroyed and replaced by a new reentry vehicle platform.

(d) A Party shall not have the right to attribute to ICBMs of a new type a number of warheads greater than the smallest number of warheads attributed to any ICBM to which that Party has attributed a reduced number of warheads pursuant to subparagraph (c) of this paragraph. A Party shall not have the right to attribute to SLBMs of a new type a number of warheads greater than the smallest number of warheads attributed to any SLBM to which that Party has attributed a reduced number of warheads pursuant to subparagraph (c) of this paragraph.

6. Newly constructed strategic offensive arms shall begin to be subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty as follows:

(a) an ICBM, when it first leaves a production facility;
(b) a mobile launcher of ICBMs, when it first leaves a production facility for mobile launchers of ICBMs;
(c) a silo launcher of ICBMs, when excavation for that launcher has been completed and the pouring of concrete for the silo has been completed, or 12 months after the excavation begins, whichever occurs earlier;
(d) for the purpose of counting a deployed ICBM and its associated launcher, a silo launcher of ICBMs shall be considered to contain a deployed ICBM when excavation for that launcher has been completed and the pouring of concrete for the silo has been completed, or 12 months after the excavation begins, whichever occurs earlier, and a mobile launcher of ICBMs shall be considered to contain a deployed ICBM when it arrives at a maintenance facility, except for the non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs provided for in subparagraph 2(b) of Article IV of this Treaty, or when it leaves an ICBM loading facility;
(e) an SLBM, when it first leaves a production facility;
(f) an SLBM launcher, when the submarine on which that launcher is installed is first launched;
(g) for the purpose of counting a deployed SLBM and its associated launcher, an SLBM launcher shall be considered to contain a deployed SLBM when the submarine on which that launcher is installed is first launched;
(h) a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber, when its airframe is first brought out of the shop, plant, or building in which components of a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber are assembled to produce complete airframes; or when its airframe is first brought out of the shop, plant, or building in which existing bomber airframes are converted to heavy bomber or former heavy bomber airframes.

7. ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers that have been converted to launch an ICBM or SLBM, respectively, of a different type shall not be capable of launching an ICBM or SLBM of the previous type. Such converted launchers shall be considered to be launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs of that different type as follows:

(a) a silo launcher of ICBMs, when an ICBM of a different type or a training model of a missile of a different type is first installed in that launcher, or when the silo door is reinstalled, whichever occurs first;
(b) a mobile launcher of ICBMs, as agreed within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission;
(c) an SLBM launcher, when all launchers on the submarine on which that launcher is installed have been converted to launch an SLBM of that different type and that submarine begins sea trials, that is, when that submarine first operates under its own power away from the harbor or port in which the conversion of launchers was performed.

8. Heavy bombers that have been converted into heavy bombers of a different category or into former heavy bombers shall be considered to be heavy bombers of that different category or former heavy bombers as follows:

(a) a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs converted into a heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, when it is first brought out of the shop, plant, or building where it was equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs;
(b) a heavy bomber of one category converted into a heavy bomber of another category provided for in paragraph 9 of Section VI of the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or Elimination of the Items Subject to this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Conversion or Elimination Protocol, or into a former heavy bomber, when the inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 13 of Section VI of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol is completed or, if such an inspection is not conducted, when the 20-day period provided for in paragraph 13 of Section VI of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol expires.

9. For the purposes of this Treaty:

(a) A ballistic missile of a type developed and tested solely to intercept and counter objects not located on the surface of the Earth shall not be considered to be a ballistic missile to which the limitations provided for in this Treaty apply.
(b) If a ballistic missile has been flight-tested or deployed for weapon delivery, all ballistic missiles of that type shall be considered to be weapon-delivery vehicles.
(c) If a cruise missile has been flight-tested or deployed for weapon delivery, all cruise missiles of that type shall be considered to be weapon-delivery vehicles.
(d) If a launcher, other than a soft-site launcher, has contained an ICBM or SLBM of a particular type, it shall be considered to be a launcher of ICBMs or SLBMs of that type. If a launcher, other than a soft-site launcher, has been converted into a launcher of ICBMs or SLBMs of a different type, it shall be considered to be a launcher of ICBMs or SLBMs of the type for which it has been converted.
(e) If a heavy bomber is equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, all heavy bombers of that type shall be considered to be equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, except those that are not so equipped and are distinguishable from heavy bombers of the same type equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. If long-range nuclear ALCMs have not been flight-tested from any heavy bomber of a particular type, no heavy bomber of that type shall be considered to be equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. Within the same type, a heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments, a training heavy bomber, and a former heavy bomber shall be distinguishable from one another.
(f) Any long-range ALCM of a type, any one of which has been initially flight-tested from a heavy bomber on or before December 31, 1988, shall be considered to be a long-range nuclear ALCM. Any long-range ALCM of a type, any one of which has been initially flight-tested from a heavy bomber after December 31, 1988, shall not be considered to be a long-range nuclear ALCM if it is a long-range non-nuclear ALCM and is distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs. Long-range non-nuclear ALCMs not so distinguishable shall be considered to be long-range nuclear ALCMs.
(g) Mobile launchers of ICBMs of each new type of ICBM shall be distinguishable from mobile launchers of ICBMs of existing types of ICBMs and from mobile launchers of ICBMs of other new types of ICBMs. Such new launchers, with their associated missiles installed, shall be distinguishable from mobile launchers of ICBMs of existing types of ICBMs with their associated missiles installed, and from mobile launchers of ICBMs of other new types of ICBMs with their associated missiles installed.
(h) Mobile launchers of ICBMs converted into launchers of ICBMs of another type of ICBM shall be distinguishable from mobile launchers of ICBMs of the previous type of ICBM. Such converted launchers, with their associated missiles installed, shall be distinguishable from mobile launchers of ICBMs of the previous type of ICBM with their associated missiles installed. Conversion of mobile launchers of ICBMs shall be carried out in accordance with procedures to be agreed within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

10. As of the date of signature of this Treaty:

(a) Existing types of ICBMs and SLBMs are:

(i) for the United States of America, the types of missiles designated by the United States of America as Minuteman II, Minuteman III, Peacekeeper, Poseidon, Trident I, and Trident II, which are known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as Minuteman II, Minuteman III, MX, Poseidon, Trident I, and Trident II, respectively;
(ii) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the types of missiles designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as RS-10, RS-12, RS-16, RS-20, RS-18, RS-22, RS-12M, RSM-25, RSM-40, RSM-50, RSM-52, and RSM-54, which are known to the United States of America as SS-11, SS-13, SS-17, SS-18, SS-19, SS-24, SS-25, SS-N-6, SS-N-8, SS-N-18, SS-N-20, and SS-N-23, respectively.

(b) Existing types of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs are:

(i) for the United States of America, the type of missile designated by the United States of America as Peacekeeper, which is known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as MX;
(ii) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the types of missiles designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as RS-22 and RS-12M, which are known to the United States of America as SS-24 and SS-25, respectively.
(c) Former types of ICBMs and SLBMs are the types of missiles designated by the United States of America as, and known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as, Minuteman I and Polaris A-3.

(d) Existing types of heavy bombers are:

(i) for the United States of America, the types of bombers designated by the United States of America as, and known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as, B-52, B-1, and B-2;
(ii) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the types of bombers designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as Tu-95 and Tu-160, which are known to the United States of America as Bear and Blackjack, respectively.

(e) Existing types of long-range nuclear ALCMs are:

(i) for the United States of America, the types of long-range nuclear ALCMs designated by the United States of America as, and known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as, AGM-86B and AGM-129;
(ii) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the types of long-range nuclear ALCMs designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as RKV-500A and RKV-500B, which are known to the United States of America as AS-15 A and AS-15 B, respectively.

Article IV

1. For ICBMs and SLBMs:

(a) Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of non-deployed ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs to no more than 250. Within this limit, the number of non-deployed ICBMs for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs shall not exceed 125.
(b) Each Party shall limit the number of non-deployed ICBMs at a maintenance facility of an ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs to no more than two ICBMs of each type specified for that ICBM base. Non-deployed ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs located at a maintenance facility shall be stored separately from non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs located at that maintenance facility.
(c) Each Party shall limit the number of non-deployed ICBMs and sets of ICBM emplacement equipment at an ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs to no more than:

(i) two ICBMs of each type specified for that ICBM base and six sets of ICBM emplacement equipment for each type of ICBM specified for that ICBM base; or
(ii) four ICBMs of each type specified for that ICBM base and two sets of ICBM emplacement equipment for each type of ICBM specified for that ICBM base.

(d) Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of ICBMs and SLBMs located at test ranges to no more than 35 during the seven-year period after entry into force of this Treaty. Thereafter, the aggregate number of ICBMs and SLBMs located at test ranges shall not exceed 25.

2. For ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers:

(a) Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs to no more than 110. Within this limit, the number of non-deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs shall not exceed 18.
(b) Each Party shall limit the number of non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs located at the maintenance facility of each ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs to no more than two such ICBM launchers of each type of ICBM specified for that ICBM base.
(c) Each Party shall limit the number of non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs located at training facilities for ICBMs to no more than 40. Each such launcher may contain only a training model of a missile. Non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs that contain training models of missiles shall not be located outside a training facility.
(d) Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of test launchers to no more than 45 during the seven-year period after entry into force of this Treaty. Within this limit, the number of fixed test launchers shall not exceed 25, and the number of mobile test launchers shall not exceed 20. Thereafter, the aggregate number of test launchers shall not exceed 40. Within this limit, the number of fixed test launchers shall not exceed 20, and the number of mobile test launchers shall not exceed 20.
(e) Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of silo training launchers and mobile training launchers to no more than 60. ICBMs shall not be launched from training launchers. Each such launcher may contain only a training model of a missile. Mobile training launchers shall not be capable of launching ICBMs, and shall differ from mobile launchers of ICBMs and other road vehicles or railcars on the basis of differences that are observable by national technical means of verification.

3. For heavy bombers and former heavy bombers:

(a) Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, former heavy bombers, and training heavy bombers to no more than 75.
(b) Each Party shall limit the number of test heavy bombers to no more than 20.

4. For ICBMs and SLBMs used for delivering objects into the upper atmosphere or space:

(a) Each Party shall limit the number of space launch facilities to no more than five, unless otherwise agreed. Space launch facilities shall not overlap ICBM bases.
(b) Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers located at space launch facilities to no more than 20, unless otherwise agreed. Within this limit, the aggregate number of silo launchers of ICBMs and mobile launchers of ICBMs located at space launch facilities shall not exceed ten, unless otherwise agreed. |1|
(c) Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of ICBMs and SLBMs located at a space launch facility to no more than the number of ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers located at that facility.

5. Each Party shall limit the number of transporter-loaders for ICBMs for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs located at each deployment area or test range to no more than two for each type of ICBM for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs that is attributed with one warhead and that is specified for that deployment area or test range, and shall limit the number of such transporter-loaders located outside deployment areas and test ranges to no more than six. The aggregate number of transporter-loaders for ICBMs for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs shall not exceed 30.

6. Each Party shall limit the number of ballistic missile submarines in dry dock within five kilometers of the boundary of each submarine base to no more than two.

7. For static displays and ground trainers:

(a) Each Party shall limit the number of ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers placed on static display after signature of this Treaty to no more than 20, the number of ICBMs and SLBMs placed on static display after signature of this Treaty to no more than 20, the number of launch canisters placed on static display after signature of this Treaty to no more than 20, and the number of heavy bombers and former heavy bombers placed on static display after signature of this Treaty to no more than 20. Such items placed on static display prior to signature of this Treaty shall be specified in Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding, but shall not be subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty.
(b) Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of heavy bombers converted after signature of this Treaty for use as ground trainers and former heavy bombers converted after signature of this Treaty for use as ground trainers to no more than five. Such items converted prior to signature of this Treaty for use as ground trainers shall be specified in Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding, but shall not be subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty.

8. Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of storage facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs and repair facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs to no more than 50.

9. With respect to locational and related restrictions on strategic offensive arms:

(a) Each Party shall locate non-deployed ICBMs and non-deployed SLBMs only at maintenance facilities of ICBM bases; submarine bases; ICBM loading facilities; SLBM loading facilities; production facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs; repair facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs; storage facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs; conversion or elimination facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs; test ranges; or space launch facilities. Prototype ICBMs and prototype SLBMs, however, shall not be located at maintenance facilities of ICBM bases or at submarine bases. Non-deployed ICBMs and non-deployed SLBMs may also be in transit. Non-deployed ICBMs for silo launchers of ICBMs may also be transferred within an ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs. Non-deployed SLBMs that are located on missile tenders and storage cranes shall be considered to be located at the submarine base at which such missile tenders and storage cranes are specified as based.
(b) Each Party shall locate non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs only at maintenance facilities of ICBM bases for mobile launchers of ICBMs, production facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs, repair facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs, storage facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs, ICBM loading facilities, training facilities for ICBMs, conversion or elimination facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs, test ranges, or space launch facilities. Mobile launchers of prototype ICBMs, however, shall not be located at maintenance facilities of ICBM bases for mobile launchers of ICBMs. Non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs may also be in transit.
(c) Each Party shall locate test launchers only at test ranges, except that rail-mobile test launchers may conduct movements for the purpose of testing outside a test range, provided that:

(i) each such movement is completed no later than 30 days after it begins;
(ii) each such movement begins and ends at the same test range and does not involve movement to any other facility;
(iii) movements of no more than six rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs are conducted in each calendar year; and
(iv) no more than one train containing no more than three rail-mobile test launchers is located outside test ranges at any one time.

(d) A deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs and its associated missile that relocates to a test range may, at the discretion of the testing Party, either continue to be counted toward the maximum aggregate limits provided for in Article II of this Treaty, or be counted as a mobile test launcher pursuant to paragraph 2(d) of this Article. If a deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs and its associated missile that relocates to a test range continues to be counted toward the maximum aggregate limits provided for in Article II of this Treaty, the period of time during which it continuously remains at a test range shall not exceed 45 days. The number of such deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles located at a test range at any one time shall not exceed three, and the number of such deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles located at a test range at any one time shall not exceed three.
(e) Each Party shall locate silo training launchers only at ICBM bases for silo launchers of ICBMs and training facilities for ICBMs. The number of silo training launchers located at each ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs shall not exceed one for each type of ICBM specified for that ICBM base.
(f) Test heavy bombers shall be based only at heavy bomber flight test centers and at production facilities for heavy bombers. Training heavy bombers shall be based only at training facilities for heavy bombers.

10. Each Party shall locate solid rocket motors for first stages of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs only at locations where production and storage, or testing of such motors occurs and at production facilities for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs. Such solid rocket motors may also be moved between these locations. Solid rocket motors with nozzles attached for the first stages of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall only be located at production facilities for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs and at locations where testing of such solid rocket motors occurs. Locations where such solid rocket motors are permitted shall be specified in Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding.

11. With respect to locational restrictions on facilities:

(a) Each Party shall locate production facilities for ICBMs of a particular type, repair facilities for ICBMs of a particular type, storage facilities for ICBMs of a particular type, ICBM loading facilities for ICBMs of a particular type, and conversion or elimination facilities for ICBMs of a particular type no less than 100 kilometers from any ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs of that type of ICBM, any ICBM base for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs of that type of ICBM, any deployment area for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs of that type of ICBM, any test range from which ICBMs of that type are flight-tested, any production facility for mobile launchers of ICBMs of that type of ICBM, any repair facility for mobile launchers of ICBMs of that type of ICBM, any storage facility for mobile launchers of ICBMs of that type of ICBM, and any training facility for ICBMs at which non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs are located. New facilities at which non-deployed ICBMs for silo launchers of ICBMs of any type of ICBM may be located, and new storage facilities for ICBM emplacement equipment, shall be located no less than 100 kilometers from any ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs, except that existing storage facilities for intermediate-range missiles, located less than 100 kilometers from an ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs or from a test range, may be converted into storage facilities for ICBMs not specified for that ICBM base or that test range.
(b) Each Party shall locate production facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs of a particular type of ICBM, repair facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs of a particular type of ICBM, and storage facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs of a particular type of ICBM no less than 100 kilometers from any ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs of that type of ICBM and any test range from which ICBMs of that type are flight-tested.
(c) Each Party shall locate test ranges and space launch facilities no less than 100 kilometers from any ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs, any ICBM base for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, and any deployment area.
(d) Each Party shall locate training facilities for ICBMs no less than 100 kilometers from any test range.
(e) Each Party shall locate storage areas for heavy bomber nuclear armaments no less than 100 kilometers from any air base for heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments and any training facility for heavy bombers. Each Party shall locate storage areas for long-range nuclear ALCMs no less than 100 kilometers from any air base for heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, any air base for heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, and any training facility for heavy bombers.

12. Each Party shall limit the duration of each transit to no more than 30 days.

Article V

1. Except as prohibited by the provisions of this Treaty, modernization and replacement of strategic offensive arms may be carried out.

2. Each Party undertakes not to:

(a) produce, flight-test, or deploy heavy ICBMs of a new type, or increase the launch weight or throw-weight of heavy ICBMs of an existing type;
(b) produce, flight-test, or deploy heavy SLBMs;
(c) produce, test, or deploy mobile launchers of heavy ICBMs;
(d) produce, test, or deploy additional silo launchers of heavy ICBMs, except for silo launchers of heavy ICBMs that replace silo launchers of heavy ICBMs that have been eliminated in accordance with Section II of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol, provided that the limits provided for in Article II of this Treaty are not exceeded;
(e) convert launchers that are not launchers of heavy ICBMs into launchers of heavy ICBMs;
(f) produce, test, or deploy launchers of heavy SLBMs;
(g) reduce the number of warheads attributed to a heavy ICBM of an existing type.

3. Each Party undertakes not to deploy ICBMs other than in silo launchers of ICBMs, on road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, or on rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs. Each Party undertakes not to produce, test, or deploy ICBM launchers other than silo launchers of ICBMs, road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, or rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs.

4. Each Party undertakes not to deploy on a mobile launcher of ICBMs an ICBM of a type that was not specified as a type of ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section VII of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Notification Protocol, unless it is an ICBM to which no more than one warhead is attributed and the Parties have agreed within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission to permit deployment of such ICBMs on mobile launchers of ICBMs. A new type of ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs may cease to be considered to be a type of ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs if no ICBM of that type has been contained on, or flight-tested from, a mobile launcher of ICBMs.

5. Each Party undertakes not to deploy ICBM launchers of a new type of ICBM and not to deploy SLBM launchers of a new type of SLBM if such launchers are capable of launching ICBMs or SLBMs, respectively, of other types. ICBM launchers of existing types of ICBMs and SLBM launchers of existing types of SLBMs shall be incapable, without conversion, of launching ICBMs or SLBMs, respectively, of other types.

6. Each Party undertakes not to convert SLBMs into ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, or to load SLBMs on, or launch SLBMs from, mobile launchers of ICBMs.

7. Each Party undertakes not to produce, test, or deploy transporter-loaders other than transporter-loaders for ICBMs for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs attributed with one warhead.

8. Each Party undertakes not to locate deployed silo launchers of ICBMs outside ICBM bases for silo launchers of ICBMs.

9. Each Party undertakes not to locate soft-site launchers except at test ranges and space launch facilities. All existing soft-site launchers not at test ranges or space launch facilities shall be eliminated in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol no later than 60 days after entry into force of this Treaty.

10. Each Party undertakes not to:

(a) flight-test ICBMs or SLBMs of a retired or former type from other than test launchers specified for such use or launchers at space launch facilities. Except for soft-site launchers, test launchers specified for such use shall not be used to flight-test ICBMs or SLBMs of a type, any one of which is deployed;
(b) produce ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs of a retired type.

11. Each Party undertakes not to convert silos used as launch control centers into silo launchers of ICBMs.

12. Each Party undertakes not to:

(a) produce, flight-test, or deploy an ICBM or SLBM with more than ten reentry vehicles;
(b) flight-test an ICBM or SLBM with a number of reentry vehicles greater than the number of warheads attributed to it, or, for an ICBM or SLBM of a retired type, with a number of reentry vehicles greater than the largest number of warheads that was attributed to any ICBM or SLBM of that type;
(c) deploy an ICBM or SLBM with a number of reentry vehicles greater than the number of warheads attributed to it;
(d) increase the number of warheads attributed to an ICBM or SLBM of an existing or new type.

13. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy an ICBM or SLBM with a number of reentry vehicles greater than the number of warheads attributed to it.

14. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test from space launch facilities ICBMs or SLBMs equipped with reentry vehicles.

15. Each Party undertakes not to use ICBMs or SLBMs for delivering objects into the upper atmosphere or space for purposes inconsistent with existing international obligations undertaken by the Parties.

16. Each Party undertakes not to produce, test, or deploy systems for rapid reload and not to conduct rapid reload.

17. Each Party undertakes not to install SLBM launchers on submarines that were not originally constructed as ballistic missile submarines.

18. Each Party undertakes not to produce, test, or deploy:

(a) ballistic missiles with a range in excess of 600 kilometers, or launchers of such missiles, for installation on waterborne vehicles, including free-floating launchers, other than submarines. This obligation shall not require changes in current ballistic missile storage, transport, loading, or unloading practices;
(b) launchers of ballistic or cruise missiles for emplacement on or for tethering to the ocean floor, the seabed, or the beds of internal waters and inland waters, or for emplacement in or for tethering to the subsoil thereof, or mobile launchers of such missiles that move only in contact with the ocean floor, the seabed, or the beds of internal waters and inland waters, or missiles for such launchers. This obligation shall apply to all areas of the ocean floor and the seabed, including the seabed zone referred to in Articles I and II of the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof of February 11, 1971;
(c) systems, including missiles, for placing nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction into Earth orbit or a fraction of an Earth orbit;
(d) air-to-surface ballistic missiles (ASBMs);
(e) long-range nuclear ALCMs armed with two or more nuclear weapons.

19. Each Party undertakes not to:

(a) flight-test with nuclear armaments an aircraft that is not an airplane, but that has a range of 8000 kilometers or more; equip such an aircraft for nuclear armaments; or deploy such an aircraft with nuclear armaments;
(b) flight-test with nuclear armaments an airplane that was not initially constructed as a bomber, but that has a range of 8000 kilometers or more, or an integrated platform area in excess of 310 square meters; equip such an airplane for nuclear armaments; or deploy such an airplane with nuclear armaments;
(c) flight-test with long-range nuclear ALCMs an aircraft that is not an airplane, or an airplane that was not initially constructed as a bomber; equip such an aircraft or such an airplane for long-range nuclear ALCMs; or deploy such an aircraft or such an airplane with long-range nuclear ALCMs.

20. The United States of America undertakes not to equip existing or future heavy bombers for more than 20 long-range nuclear ALCMs.

21. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics undertakes not to equip existing or future heavy bombers for more than 16 long-range nuclear ALCMs.

22. Each Party undertakes not to locate long-range nuclear ALCMs at air bases for heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, air bases for heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, air bases for former heavy bombers, or training facilities for heavy bombers.

23. Each Party undertakes not to base heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, or heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments at air bases at which heavy bombers of either of the other two categories are based.

24. Each Party undertakes not to convert:

(a) heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs into heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, if such heavy bombers were previously equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs;
(b) heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments into heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs or into heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs;
(c) training heavy bombers into heavy bombers of another category;
(d) former heavy bombers into heavy bombers.

25. Each Party undertakes not to have underground facilities accessible to ballistic missile submarines.

26. Each Party undertakes not to locate railcars at the site of a rail garrison that has been eliminated in accordance with Section IX of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol, unless such railcars have differences, observable by national technical means of verification, in length, width, or height from rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs or launch-associated railcars.

27. Each Party undertakes not to engage in any activities associated with strategic offensive arms at eliminated facilities, notification of the elimination of which has been provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol, unless notification of a new facility at the same location has been provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol. Strategic offensive arms and support equipment shall not be located at eliminated facilities except during their movement through such facilities and during visits of heavy bombers or former heavy bombers at such facilities. Missile tenders may be located at eliminated facilities only for purposes not associated with strategic offensive arms.

28. Each Party undertakes not to base strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations of this Treaty outside its national territory.

29. Each Party undertakes not to use naval vessels that were formerly declared as missile tenders to transport, store, or load SLBMs. Such naval vessels shall not be tied to a ballistic missile submarine for the purpose of supporting such a submarine if such a submarine is located within five kilometers of a submarine base.

30. Each Party undertakes not to remove from production facilities for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, solid rocket motors with attached nozzles for the first stages of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, except for:

(a) the removal of such motors as part of assembled first stages of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported in stages;
(b) the removal of such motors as part of assembled ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles in launch canisters or without launch canisters; and
(c) the removal of such motors as part of assembled first stages of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles in launch canisters or without launch canisters, for the purpose of technical characteristics exhibitions.

Article VI

1. Deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles shall be based only in restricted areas. A restricted area shall not exceed five square kilometers in size and shall not overlap another restricted area. No more than ten deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles may be based or located in a restricted area. A restricted area shall not contain deployed ICBMs for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs of more than one type of ICBM.

2. Each Party shall limit the number of fixed structures for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs within each restricted area so that these structures shall not be capable of containing more road-mobile launchers of ICBMs than the number of road-mobile launchers of ICBMs specified for that restricted area.

3. Each restricted area shall be located within a deployment area. A deployment area shall not exceed 125,000 square kilometers in size and shall not overlap another deployment area. A deployment area shall contain no more than one ICBM base for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs.

4. Deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles shall be based only in rail garrisons. Each Party shall have no more than seven rail garrisons. No point on a portion of track located inside a rail garrison shall be more than 20 kilometers from any entrance/exit for that rail garrison. This distance shall be measured along the tracks. A rail garrison shall not overlap another rail garrison.

5. Each rail garrison shall have no more than two rail entrances/exits. Each such entrance/exit shall have no more than two separate sets of tracks passing through it (a total of four rails).

6. Each Party shall limit the number of parking sites in each rail garrison to no more than the number of trains of standard configuration specified for that rail garrison. Each rail garrison shall have no more than five parking sites.

7. Each Party shall limit the number of fixed structures for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs in each rail garrison to no more than the number of trains of standard configuration specified for that rail garrison. Each such structure shall contain no more than one train of standard configuration.

8. Each rail garrison shall contain no more than one maintenance facility.

9. Deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles may leave restricted areas or rail garrisons only for routine movements, relocations, or dispersals. Deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles may leave deployment areas only for relocations or operational dispersals.

10. Relocations shall be completed within 25 days. No more than 15 percent of the total number of deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles or five such launchers and their associated missiles, whichever is greater, may be outside restricted areas at any one time for the purpose of relocation. No more than 20 percent of the total number of deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles or five such launchers and their associated missiles, whichever is greater, may be outside rail garrisons at any one time for the purpose of relocation.

11. No more than 50 percent of the total number of deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles may be engaged in routine movements at any one time.

12. All trains with deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles of a particular type shall be of one standard configuration. All such trains shall conform to that standard configuration except those taking part in routine movements, relocations, or dispersals, and except that portion of a train remaining within a rail garrison after the other portion of such a train has departed for the maintenance facility associated with that rail garrison, has been relocated to another facility, or has departed the rail garrison for routine movement. Except for dispersals, notification of variations from standard configuration shall be provided in accordance with paragraphs 13, 14, and 15 of Section II of the Notification Protocol.

Article VII

1. Conversion and elimination of strategic offensive arms, fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs, and facilities shall be carried out pursuant to this Article and in accordance with procedures provided for in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. Conversion and elimination shall be verified by national technical means of verification and by inspection as provided for in Articles IX and XI of this Treaty; in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol; and in the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Inspection Protocol.

2. ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, former heavy bombers, and support equipment shall be subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty until they have been eliminated, or otherwise cease to be subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty, in accordance with procedures provided for in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol.

3. ICBMs for silo launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs shall be subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty until they have been eliminated by rendering them inoperable, precluding their use for their original purpose, using procedures at the discretion of the Party possessing the ICBMs or SLBMs.

4. The elimination of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, mobile launchers of ICBMs, SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, and former heavy bombers shall be carried out at conversion or elimination facilities, except as provided for in Sections VII and VIII of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. Fixed launchers of ICBMs and fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs subject to elimination shall be eliminated in situ. A launch canister remaining at a test range or ICBM base after the flight test of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall be eliminated in the open in situ, or at a conversion or elimination facility, in accordance with procedures provided for in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol.

Article VIII

1. A data base pertaining to the obligations under this Treaty is set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding, in which data with respect to items subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty are listed according to categories of data.

2. In order to ensure the fulfillment of its obligations with respect to this Treaty, each Party shall notify the other Party of changes in data, as provided for in subparagraph 3(a) of this Article, and shall also provide other notifications required by paragraph 3 of this Article, in accordance with the procedures provided for in paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 of this Article, the Notification Protocol, and the Inspection Protocol.

3. Each Party shall provide to the other Party, in accordance with the Notification Protocol, and, for subparagraph (i) of this paragraph, in accordance with Section III of the Inspection Protocol:

(a) notifications concerning data with respect to items subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty, according to categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding and other agreed categories of data;
(b) notifications concerning movement of items subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty;
(c) notifications concerning data on ICBM and SLBM throw-weight in connection with the Protocol on ICBM and SLBM Throw-weight Relating to this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Throw-weight Protocol;
(d) notifications concerning conversion or elimination of items subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty or elimination of facilities subject to this Treaty;
(e) notifications concerning cooperative measures to enhance the effectiveness of national technical means of verification;
(f) notifications concerning flight tests of ICBMs or SLBMs and notifications concerning telemetric information;
(g) notifications concerning strategic offensive arms of new types and new kinds;
(h) notifications concerning changes in the content of information provided pursuant to this paragraph, including the rescheduling of activities;
(i) notifications concerning inspections and continuous monitoring activities; and
(j) notifications concerning operational dispersals.

4. Each Party shall use the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, which provide for continuous communication between the Parties, to provide and receive notifications in accordance with the Notification Protocol and the Inspection Protocol, unless otherwise provided for in this Treaty, and to acknowledge receipt of such notifications no later than one hour after receipt.

5. If a time is to be specified in a notification provided pursuant to this Article, that time shall be expressed in Greenwich Mean Time. If only a date is to be specified in a notification, that date shall be specified as the 24-hour period that corresponds to the date in local time, expressed in Greenwich Mean Time.

6. Except as otherwise provided in this Article, each Party shall have the right to release to the public all data current as of September 1, 1990, that are listed in the Memorandum of Understanding, as well as the photographs that are appended thereto. Geographic coordinates and site diagrams that are received pursuant to the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Exchange of Geographic Coordinates and Site Diagrams Relating to the Treaty of July 31, 1991, shall not be released to the public unless otherwise agreed. The Parties shall hold consultations on releasing to the public data and other information provided pursuant to this Article or received otherwise in fulfilling the obligations provided for in this Treaty. The provisions of this Article shall not affect the rights and obligations of the Parties with respect to the communication of such data and other information to those individuals who, because of their official responsibilities, require such data or other information to carry out activities related to the fulfillment of the obligations provided for in this Treaty.

Article IX

1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.

3. Each Party undertakes not to use concealment measures that impede verification, by national technical means of verification, of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty. In this connection, the obligation not to use concealment measures includes the obligation not to use them at test ranges, including measures that result in the concealment of ICBMs, SLBMs, mobile launchers of ICBMs, or the association between ICBMs or SLBMs and their launchers during testing. The obligation not to use concealment measures shall not apply to cover or concealment practices at ICBM bases and deployment areas, or to the use of environmental shelters for strategic offensive arms.

4. To aid verification, each ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall have a unique identifier as provided for in the Inspection Protocol.

Article X

1. During each flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, the Party conducting the flight test shall make on-board technical measurements and shall broadcast all telemetric information obtained from such measurements. The Party conducting the flight test shall determine which technical parameters are to be measured during such flight test, as well as the methods of processing and transmitting telemetric information.

2. During each flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, the Party conducting the flight test undertakes not to engage in any activity that denies full access to telemetric information, including:

(a) the use of encryption;
(b) the use of jamming;
(c) broadcasting telemetric information from an ICBM or SLBM using narrow directional beaming; and
(d) encapsulation of telemetric information, including the use of ejectable capsules or recoverable reentry vehicles.

3. During each flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, the Party conducting the flight test undertakes not to broadcast from a reentry vehicle telemetric information that pertains to the functioning of the stages or the self-contained dispensing mechanism of the ICBM or SLBM.

4. After each flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, the Party conducting the flight test shall provide, in accordance with Section I of the Protocol on Telemetric Information Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Telemetry Protocol, tapes that contain a recording of all telemetric information that is broadcast during the flight test.

5. After each flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, the Party conducting the flight test shall provide, in accordance with Section II of the Telemetry Protocol, data associated with the analysis of the telemetric information.

6. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article, each Party shall have the right to encapsulate and encrypt on-board technical measurements during no more than a total of eleven flight tests of ICBMs or SLBMs each year. Of these eleven flight tests each year, no more than four shall be flight tests of ICBMs or SLBMs of each type, any missile of which has been flight-tested with a self-contained dispensing mechanism. Such encapsulation shall be carried out in accordance with Section I and paragraph 1 of Section III of the Telemetry Protocol, and such encryption shall be carried out in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section III of the Telemetry Protocol. Encapsulation and encryption that are carried out on the same flight test of an ICBM or SLBM shall count as two flight tests against the quotas specified in this paragraph.

Article XI

1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections and continuous monitoring activities and shall conduct exhibitions pursuant to this Article and the Inspection Protocol. Inspections, continuous monitoring activities, and exhibitions shall be conducted in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Inspection Protocol and the Conversion or Elimination Protocol.

2. Each Party shall have the right to conduct baseline data inspections at facilities to confirm the accuracy of data on the numbers and types of items specified for such facilities in the initial exchange of data provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.

3. Each Party shall have the right to conduct data update inspections at facilities to confirm the accuracy of data on the numbers and types of items specified for such facilities in the notifications and regular exchanges of updated data provided in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.

4. Each Party shall have the right to conduct new facility inspections to confirm the accuracy of data on the numbers and types of items specified in the notifications of new facilities provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.

5. Each Party shall have the right to conduct suspect-site inspections to confirm that covert assembly of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs or covert assembly of first stages of such ICBMs is not occurring.

6. Each Party shall have the right to conduct reentry vehicle inspections of deployed ICBMs and SLBMs to confirm that such ballistic missiles contain no more reentry vehicles than the number of warheads attributed to them.

7. Each Party shall have the right to conduct post-exercise dispersal inspections of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles to confirm that the number of mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles that are located at the inspected ICBM base and those that have not returned to it after completion of the dispersal does not exceed the number specified for that ICBM base.

8. Each Party shall conduct or shall have the right to conduct conversion or elimination inspections to confirm the conversion or elimination of strategic offensive arms.

9. Each Party shall have the right to conduct close-out inspections to confirm that the elimination of facilities has been completed.

10. Each Party shall have the right to conduct formerly declared facility inspections to confirm that facilities, notification of the elimination of which has been provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol, are not being used for purposes inconsistent with this Treaty.

11. Each Party shall conduct technical characteristics exhibitions, and shall have the right during such exhibitions by the other Party to conduct inspections of an ICBM and an SLBM of each type, and each variant thereof, and of a mobile launcher of ICBMs and each version of such launcher for each type of ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs. The purpose of such exhibitions shall be to permit the inspecting Party to confirm that technical characteristics correspond to the data specified for these items.

12. Each Party shall conduct distinguishability exhibitions for heavy bombers, former heavy bombers, and long-range nuclear ALCMs, and shall have the right during such exhibitions by the other Party to conduct inspections, of:

(a) heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. The purpose of such exhibitions shall be to permit the inspecting Party to confirm that the technical characteristics of each type and each variant of such heavy bombers correspond to the data specified for these items in Annex G to the Memorandum of Understanding; to demonstrate the maximum number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which a heavy bomber of each type and each variant is actually equipped; and to demonstrate that this number does not exceed the number provided for in paragraph 20 or 21 of Article V of this Treaty, as applicable;
(b) for each type of heavy bomber from any one of which a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested, heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, training heavy bombers, and former heavy bombers. If, for such a type of heavy bomber, there are no heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, a test heavy bomber from which a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested shall be exhibited. The purpose of such exhibitions shall be to demonstrate to the inspecting Party that, for each exhibited type of heavy bomber, each variant of heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, each variant of heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, each variant of training heavy bombers, and a former heavy bomber are distinguishable from one another and from each variant of heavy bombers of the same type equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs; and
(c) long-range nuclear ALCMs. The purpose of such exhibitions shall be to permit the inspecting Party to confirm that the technical characteristics of each type and each variant of such long-range ALCMs correspond to the data specified for these items in Annex H to the Memorandum of Understanding. The further purpose of such exhibitions shall be to demonstrate differences, notification of which has been provided in accordance with paragraph 13, 14, or 15 of Section VII of the Notification Protocol, that make long-range non-nuclear ALCMs distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs.

13. Each Party shall conduct baseline exhibitions, and shall have the right during such exhibitions by the other Party to conduct inspections, of all heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, all training heavy bombers, and all former heavy bombers specified in the initial exchange of data provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section I of the Notification Protocol. The purpose of these exhibitions shall be to demonstrate to the inspecting Party that such airplanes satisfy the requirements for conversion in accordance with the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. After a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested from a heavy bomber of a type, from none of which a long-range nuclear ALCM had previously been flight-tested, the Party conducting the flight test shall conduct baseline exhibitions, and the other Party shall have the right during such exhibitions to conduct inspections, of 30 percent of the heavy bombers of such type equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs at each air base specified for such heavy bombers. The purpose of these exhibitions shall be to demonstrate to the inspecting Party the presence of specified features that make each exhibited heavy bomber distinguishable from heavy bombers of the same type equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs.

14. Each Party shall have the right to conduct continuous monitoring activities at production facilities for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs to confirm the number of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs produced.

Article XII

1. To enhance the effectiveness of national technical means of verification, each Party shall, if the other Party makes a request in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section V of the Notification Protocol, carry out the following cooperative measures:

(a) a display in the open of the road-mobile launchers of ICBMs located within restricted areas specified by the requesting Party. The number of road-mobile launchers of ICBMs based at the restricted areas specified in each such request shall not exceed ten percent of the total number of deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs of the requested Party, and such launchers shall be contained within one ICBM base for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs. For each specified restricted area, the roofs of fixed structures for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs shall be open for the duration of a display. The road-mobile launchers of ICBMs located within the restricted area shall be displayed either located next to or moved halfway out of such fixed structures;
(b) a display in the open of the rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs located at parking sites specified by the requesting Party. Such launchers shall be displayed by removing the entire train from its fixed structure and locating the train within the rail garrison. The number of rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs subject to display pursuant to each such request shall include all such launchers located at no more than eight parking sites, provided that no more than two parking sites may be requested within any one rail garrison in any one request. Requests concerning specific parking sites shall include the designation for each parking site as provided for in Annex A to the Memorandum of Understanding; and
(c) a display in the open of all heavy bombers and former heavy bombers located within one air base specified by the requesting Party, except those heavy bombers and former heavy bombers that are not readily movable due to maintenance or operations. Such heavy bombers and former heavy bombers shall be displayed by removing the entire airplane from its fixed structure, if any, and locating the airplane within the air base. Those heavy bombers and former heavy bombers at the air base specified by the requesting Party that are not readily movable due to maintenance or operations shall be specified by the requested Party in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section V of the Notification Protocol. Such a notification shall be provided no later than 12 hours after the request for display has been made.

2. Road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, heavy bombers, and former heavy bombers subject to each request pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article shall be displayed in open view without using concealment measures. Each Party shall have the right to make seven such requests each year, but shall not request a display at any particular ICBM base for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, any particular parking site, or any particular air base more than two times each year. A Party shall have the right to request, in any single request, only a display of road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, a display of rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, or a display of heavy bombers and former heavy bombers. A display shall begin no later than 12 hours after the request is made and shall continue until 18 hours have elapsed from the time that the request was made. If the requested Party cannot conduct a display due to circumstances brought about by force majeure, it shall provide notification to the requesting Party in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section V of the Notification Protocol, and the display shall be cancelled. In such a case, the number of requests to which the requesting Party is entitled shall not be reduced.

3. A request for cooperative measures shall not be made for a facility that has been designated for inspection until such an inspection has been completed and the inspectors have departed the facility. A facility for which cooperative measures have been requested shall not be designated for inspection until the cooperative measures have been completed or until notification has been provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section V of the Notification Protocol.

Article XIII

1. Each Party shall have the right to conduct exercise dispersals of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles from restricted areas or rail garrisons. Such an exercise dispersal may involve either road-mobile launchers of ICBMs or rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, or both road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs. Exercise dispersals of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles shall be conducted as provided for below:

(a) An exercise dispersal shall be considered to have begun as of the date and time specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 11 of Section II of the Notification Protocol.
(b) An exercise dispersal shall be considered to be completed as of the date and time specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 12 of Section II of the Notification Protocol.
(c) Those ICBM bases for mobile launchers of ICBMs specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 11 of Section II of the Notification Protocol shall be considered to be involved in an exercise dispersal.
(d) When an exercise dispersal begins, deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles engaged in a routine movement from a restricted area or rail garrison of an ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs that is involved in such a dispersal shall be considered to be part of the dispersal.
(e) When an exercise dispersal begins, deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles engaged in a relocation from a restricted area or rail garrison of an ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs that is involved in such a dispersal shall continue to be considered to be engaged in a relocation. Notification of the completion of the relocation shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 10 of Section II of the Notification Protocol, unless notification of the completion of the relocation was provided in accordance with paragraph 12 of Section II of the Notification Protocol.
(f) During an exercise dispersal, all deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles that depart a restricted area or rail garrison of an ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs involved in such a dispersal shall be considered to be part of the dispersal, except for such launchers and missiles that relocate to a facility outside their associated ICBM base during such a dispersal.
(g) An exercise dispersal shall be completed no later than 30 days after it begins.
(h) Exercise dispersals shall not be conducted:

(i) more than two times in any period of two calendar years;
(ii) during the entire period of time provided for baseline data inspections;
(iii) from a new ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs until a new facility inspection has been conducted or until the period of time provided for such an inspection has expired; or
(iv) from an ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs that has been designated for a data update inspection or reentry vehicle inspection, until completion of such an inspection.

(i) If a notification of an exercise dispersal has been provided in accordance with paragraph 11 of Section II of the Notification Protocol, the other Party shall not have the right to designate for data update inspection or reentry vehicle inspection an ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs involved in such a dispersal, or to request cooperative measures for such an ICBM base, until the completion of such a dispersal.
(j) When an exercise dispersal is completed, deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles involved in such a dispersal shall be located at their restricted areas or rail garrisons, except for those otherwise accounted for in accordance with paragraph 12 of Section II of the Notification Protocol.

2. A major strategic exercise involving heavy bombers, about which a notification has been provided pursuant to the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Reciprocal Advance Notification of Major Strategic Exercises of September 23, 1989, shall be conducted as provided for below:

(a) Such exercise shall be considered to have begun as of the date and time specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 16 of Section II of the Notification Protocol.
(b) Such exercise shall be considered to be completed as of the date and time specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 17 of Section II of the Notification Protocol.
(c) The air bases for heavy bombers and air bases for former heavy bombers specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 16 of Section II of the Notification Protocol shall be considered to be involved in such exercise.
(d) Such exercise shall begin no more than one time in any calendar year, and shall be completed no later than 30 days after it begins.
(e) Such exercise shall not be conducted during the entire period of time provided for baseline data inspections.
(f) During such exercise by a Party, the other Party shall not have the right to conduct inspections of the air bases for heavy bombers and air bases for former heavy bombers involved in the exercise. The right to conduct inspections of such air bases shall resume three days after notification of the completion of a major strategic exercise involving heavy bombers has been provided in accordance with paragraph 17 of Section II of the Notification Protocol.
(g) Within the 30-day period following the receipt of the notification of the completion of such exercise, the receiving Party may make a request for cooperative measures to be carried out in accordance with subparagraph 1(c) of Article XII of this Treaty at one of the air bases involved in the exercise. Such a request shall not be counted toward the quota provided for in paragraph 2 of Article XII of this Treaty.

Article XIV

1. Each Party shall have the right to conduct operational dispersals of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles, ballistic missile submarines, and heavy bombers. There shall be no limit on the number and duration of operational dispersals, and there shall be no limit on the number of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles, ballistic missile submarines, or heavy bombers involved in such dispersals. When an operational dispersal begins, all strategic offensive arms of a Party shall be considered to be part of the dispersal. Operational dispersals shall be conducted as provided for below:

(a) An operational dispersal shall be considered to have begun as of the date and time specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section X of the Notification Protocol.
(b) An operational dispersal shall be considered to be completed as of the date and time specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section X of the Notification Protocol.

2. During an operational dispersal each Party shall have the right to:

(a) suspend notifications that it would otherwise provide in accordance with the Notification Protocol except for notification of flight tests provided under the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles of May 31, 1988; provided that, if any conversion or elimination processes are not suspended pursuant to subparagraph (d) of this paragraph, the relevant notifications shall be provided in accordance with Section IV of the Notification Protocol;
(b) suspend the right of the other Party to conduct inspections;
(c) suspend the right of the other Party to request cooperative measures; and
(d) suspend conversion and elimination processes for its strategic offensive arms. In such case, the number of converted and eliminated items shall correspond to the number that has actually been converted and eliminated as of the date and time of the beginning of the operational dispersal specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section X of the Notification Protocol.

3. Notifications suspended pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Article shall resume no later than three days after notification of the completion of the operational dispersal has been provided in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section X of the Notification Protocol. The right to conduct inspections and to request cooperative measures suspended pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Article shall resume four days after notification of the completion of the operational dispersal has been provided in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section X of the Notification Protocol. Inspections or cooperative measures being conducted at the time a Party provides notification that it suspends inspections or cooperative measures during an operational dispersal shall not count toward the appropriate annual quotas provided for by this Treaty.

4. When an operational dispersal is completed:

(a) All deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles shall be located within their deployment areas or shall be engaged in relocations.
(b) All deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles shall be located within their rail garrisons or shall be engaged in routine movements or relocations.
(c) All heavy bombers shall be located within national territory and shall have resumed normal operations. If it is necessary for heavy bombers to be located outside national territory for purposes not inconsistent with this Treaty, the Parties will immediately engage in diplomatic consultations so that appropriate assurances can be provided.

5. Within the thirty-day period after the completion of an operational dispersal, the Party not conducting the operational dispersal shall have the right to make no more than two requests for cooperative measures, subject to the provisions of Article XII of this Treaty, for ICBM bases for mobile launchers of ICBMs or air bases. Such requests shall not count toward the quota of requests provided for in paragraph 2 of Article XII of this Treaty.

Article XV

To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties hereby establish the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. The Parties agree that, if either Party so requests, they shall meet within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission to:

(a) resolve questions relating to compliance with the obligations assumed;
(b) agree upon such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty; and
(c) resolve questions related to the application of relevant provisions of this Treaty to a new kind of strategic offensive arm, after notification has been provided in accordance with paragraph 16 of Section VII of the Notification Protocol.

Article XVI

To ensure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, each Party shall not assume any international obligations or undertakings that would conflict with its provisions. The Parties shall hold consultations in accordance with Article XV of this Treaty in order to resolve any ambiguities that may arise in this regard. The Parties agree that this provision does not apply to any patterns of cooperation, including obligations, in the area of strategic offensive arms, existing at the time of signature of this Treaty, between a Party and a third State.

Article XVII

1. This Treaty, including its Annexes, Protocols, and Memorandum of Understanding, all of which form integral parts thereof, shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. This Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification.

2. This Treaty shall remain in force for 15 years unless superseded earlier by a subsequent agreement on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms. No later than one year before the expiration of the 15-year period, the Parties shall meet to consider whether this Treaty will be extended. If the Parties so decide, this Treaty will be extended for a period of five years unless it is superseded before the expiration of that period by a subsequent agreement on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms. This Treaty shall be extended for successive five-year periods, if the Parties so decide, in accordance with the procedures governing the initial extension, and it shall remain in force for each agreed five-year period of extension unless it is superseded by a subsequent agreement on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms.

3. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from this Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

Article XVIII

Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing entry into force of this Treaty.

Article XIX

This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Done at Moscow on July 31, 1991, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the United States of America:
George Bush
President of the United States of America

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
M. Gorbachev
President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Annex
Agreed Statements

In connection with the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, the Parties have agreed as follows:

First Agreed Statement. The Parties agree, in the interest of the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty, not to transfer strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations of the Treaty to third States. The Parties further agree that this Agreed Statement and the provisions of Article XVI of the Treaty do not apply to any patterns of cooperation, including obligations, in the area of strategic offensive arms, existing at the time of signature of the Treaty, between a Party and a third State.

Second Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, in the event of the emergence in the future of a new kind of arm that one Party considers could be a new kind of strategic offensive arm, that Party shall have the right to raise the question of such an arm for consideration by the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission in accordance with subparagraph (c) of Article XV of the Treaty.

Third Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 13 of Article V and subparagraph 4(d) of Article III of the Treaty, ICBMs of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as RS-10, which is known to the United States of America as SS-11, may be deployed with no more than three reentry vehicles, provided that such reentry vehicles are not independently targetable.

Fourth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, in connection with the definition of the term "air-to-surface ballistic missile (ASBM)" provided for in the Annex to the Treaty on Terms and Their Definitions, hereinafter referred to as the Definitions Annex to the Treaty, the term is not intended to describe any missile that sustains flight, or any missile the payload of which sustains flight, through the use of aerodynamic lift over any portion of its flight path.

Fifth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that the replacement of silo launchers of heavy ICBMs under the provisions of subparagraph 2(d) of Article V of the Treaty shall only take place in the case of silo launchers destroyed by accident or in the case of other exceptional circumstances that require the relocation of existing silo launchers of heavy ICBMs. If such relocation is required, the Party planning to construct the new silo launcher shall provide the other Party with the reasons and plans for such relocation in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission prior to carrying out such relocation.

Sixth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that three airplanes of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as 3M, which is known to the United States of America as Bison, have been converted to transport oversized cargo; are used for purposes unrelated to the Treaty; and are not reconnaissance airplanes, tanker airplanes, or jamming airplanes, and thus do not meet the definition of the term "former heavy bomber" provided for in the Definitions Annex to the Treaty. These airplanes are not included within the totals listed in Section IV of, or Annex C to, the Memorandum of Understanding. The Parties further agree that all other airplanes of the Bison type will be considered to be former heavy bombers.

Seventh Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, with respect to the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article XIV of the Treaty authorizing operational dispersals, such dispersals shall be conducted only for national security purposes in time of crisis when a Party considers it necessary to act to ensure the survivability of its strategic forces. The Parties further agree that, while there are no limits on the number and frequency of such operational dispersals, in practice they will occur rarely.

Eighth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that:

(a) With respect to paragraph 28 of Article V of the Treaty, the strategic offensive arms of each Party shall be based only within its national territory at permanent bases specified in the Treaty that are equipped to support the long-term operation of strategic offensive arms. The obligations of paragraph 28 of Article V of the Treaty shall not affect the Parties' rights under generally recognized principles and rules of international law relating to the passage of submarines or flights of aircraft, or relating to visits of submarines to ports of third States.
(b) With respect to heavy bombers, the provisions of paragraph 28 of Article V of the Treaty shall not preclude the temporary stationing of heavy bombers outside the territory of a Party for purposes not inconsistent with the Treaty. If a Party stations heavy bombers outside its national territory for a period in excess of 30 days at any one time, it shall so inform the other Party through diplomatic channels before the end of the 30-day period, except that, if a Party has stationed more than 30 heavy bombers outside its national territory at any one time, it shall so inform the other Party within 48 hours.
(c) The Parties have the obligation, if concerns arise under this Agreed Statement, to discuss any ambiguity and, if necessary, to provide each other with information to resolve concerns. Such discussions could occur through diplomatic channels, as well as in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. The Parties do not rule out the possibility that clarifications provided in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission might, in certain cases, include inspections or visits.

Ninth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, for the purposes of subparagraph 19(a) of Article V of the Treaty, lighter-than-air aircraft such as balloons, drifting aerostats, and dirigibles shall not be flight-tested with, equipped for, or deployed with nuclear armaments.

Tenth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that:

(a) With respect to B-52 heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, the United States of America will provide no technical data or photographs of heavy bombers of the variants designated by the United States of America as, and known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as, B-52C, B-52D, B-52E, and B-52F, and will conduct no exhibitions of heavy bombers of such variants pursuant to paragraph 12 of Article XI of the Treaty or pursuant to the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Early Exhibitions of Strategic Offensive Arms Relating to the Treaty, of July 31, 1991. The Parties further agree that all such heavy bombers shall be located only at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, which is a specified conversion or elimination facility for heavy bombers and former heavy bombers, and that each such heavy bomber shall not depart Davis-Monthan Air Force Base before it has been eliminated in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol.
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 5 of Section VII of the Inspection Protocol, the conversion or elimination facility for heavy bombers and former heavy bombers at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base shall be subject to a baseline data inspection. If at any time the total number of heavy bombers and former heavy bombers that have been located at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base for more than seven days, and upon which the elimination process has not been initiated, exceeds five, this facility shall also be subject to data update inspections, which shall be counted against the quota provided for in paragraph 2 of Section VII of the Inspection Protocol.
(c) The procedures for baseline data inspections and data update inspections of heavy bombers and former heavy bombers at the conversion or elimination facility at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base shall be as modified below:

(i) Inspectors shall have the right only to count B-52C, B-52D, B-52E, and B-52F heavy bombers, and to view them in situ, as they are found.
(ii) Inspectors shall have the right to inspect other heavy bombers and former heavy bombers in accordance with the procedures provided for in Section II of Annex 4 to the Inspection Protocol, but only to the extent that the condition of such airplanes allows such procedures to be carried out. A member of the in-country escort shall provide the information on the condition of such airplanes.

(d) If the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the future has a conversion or elimination facility where at any time the total number of heavy bombers and former heavy bombers that have been located at such facility for more than seven days, and upon which the elimination process has not been initiated, exceeds five, such facility shall also be subject to data update inspections, in accordance with the procedures provided for in subparagraph (c)(ii) of this Agreed Statement.

Eleventh Agreed Statement. The Parties understand that the Conversion or Elimination Protocol does not provide procedures for the elimination of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs containing a stage equipped with a liquid-propellant main rocket engine or for the elimination of heavy bombers that have no tail sections. The Parties agree that such ICBMs and such heavy bombers shall not be eliminated until the appropriate procedures have been agreed within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. The Parties further agree that such ICBMs and such heavy bombers may be otherwise removed from accountability in accordance with the applicable procedures provided for in Section VII or VIII of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol.

Twelfth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, notwithstanding the definition of the term "former heavy bomber" provided for in the Definitions Annex to the Treaty, the 37 airplanes designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as Tu-95RTs, which are known to the United States of America as Bear D, and all airplanes designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as Tu-142, which are known to the United States of America as Bear F or Bear J, depending on how a particular airplane is equipped, shall not be considered to be former heavy bombers. The Parties further agree that all airplanes formerly known to the United States of America as Bear E and now known as Bear T, which are designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as Tu-95U, shall be considered to be training heavy bombers.

Thirteenth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that engineering models of silos may be located at the repair facility for ICBMs at Hill Air Force Base, Utah, United States of America, the number of which shall not exceed four. Such engineering models of silos shall be subject to the limitations on silo training launchers provided for in subparagraph 2(e) of Article IV of the Treaty, and they shall be specified in the Memorandum of Understanding as a separate category. Such engineering models of silos shall not be subject to inspection. The elimination of such engineering models of silos shall be carried out in accordance with procedures for silo training launchers in Section II of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol.

Fourteenth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, notwithstanding the provisions of subparagraph 11(a) of Article IV of the Treaty, the existing storage facilities for ICBMs located at Khrizolitovyy and Surovatikha, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, shall be located no less than 20 kilometers from any deployment area, provided that the distance between such facilities and any restricted area or maintenance facility of an ICBM base for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs is no less than 60 kilometers. Such storage facilities shall not be re-established after they have been eliminated in accordance with the Conversion or Elimination Protocol.

Fifteenth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that the existing training facility for ICBMs at Plesetsk, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, shall not be subject to the locational restriction on training facilities for ICBMs, provided for in subparagraph 11(d) of Article IV of the Treaty, with respect to any existing test range. No more than 12 non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs may be located at this training facility for ICBMs. After its elimination in accordance with the Conversion or Elimination Protocol, this training facility for ICBMs shall not be re-established.

Sixteenth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, with respect to the provisions of subparagraph 9(d) of Article III of the Treaty, each ICBM launcher or SLBM launcher existing as of the date of signature of the Treaty is capable of launching only an ICBM or SLBM of the type specified for that launcher in the Memorandum of Understanding.

Seventeenth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that the expression "not equipped" is understood to mean, for a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber, that such an airplane is not equipped for a particular kind of armament, which shall be confirmed by the necessary distinguishing features. Each Party shall determine the distinguishing features of its heavy bombers and former heavy bombers. If the other Party considers such distinguishing features to be insufficient, it may raise the issue within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

Eighteenth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, as of the date of signature of the Treaty, there are no heavy bombers permanently based at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, and that it therefore has not been specified as an air base for heavy bombers in the Memorandum of Understanding. The Parties further agree that, if in the future the United States of America permanently bases heavy bombers at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, all applicable provisions of the Treaty will apply to that facility, including those that provide for listing the facility in Annex C to the Memorandum of Understanding, for new facility inspections and data update inspections, and for notifications concerning the visits of heavy bombers and former heavy bombers.

Nineteenth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, in the event either Party wishes to develop mobile space launchers and space launch boosters associated with such launchers, the question could be addressed in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. Such systems would be allowed, provided that:

(a) Mobile space launchers and the space launch boosters associated with such launchers have differences from ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers and from ICBMs and SLBMs, respectively, observable by national technical means of verification;
(b) Mobile space launchers do not contain an ICBM or SLBM;
(c) The numbers of mobile space launchers and space launch boosters associated with such launchers that are produced and stored do not exceed space launch requirements; and
(d) Mobile space launchers and space launch boosters associated with such launchers are not located at an ICBM base for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs or an ICBM base for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs.

Additional provisions relevant to such systems could also be agreed by the Parties within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

Twentieth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 4 of Article VII of the Treaty:

(a) The United States of America shall have the right to refurbish and reuse, as launch canisters for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, those launch canisters for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs that remain at a test range or ICBM base after the flight test of such ICBMs.
(b) The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall have the same right, if it decides to change its existing practices for the elimination of such launch canisters.
(c) Notification of the movement of such launch canisters from the place where the flight test occurred to a refurbishment location shall be provided through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers no later than five days after the completion of the movement.

Twenty-first Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, in providing notifications in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol for "each change in data for categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding," only one notification shall be required for each event that results in changed data, notwithstanding the number of categories of data for which data must be changed based on the occurrence of such event.

Twenty-second Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that:

(a) Issues relating to the concurrent continuous monitoring activities in accordance with paragraph 14 of Article XI of the Treaty and continuous monitoring in accordance with paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles of December 8, 1987, hereinafter referred to as the INF Treaty, shall be agreed upon, prior to entry into force of the Treaty, within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission and within the framework of the Special Verification Commission. An agreement on these issues shall not affect substantive rights or obligations of the Parties under either Treaty.
(b) For the purpose of reaching the agreement provided for in subparagraph (a) of this Agreed Statement, the Parties shall proceed as follows:

(i) During the period when continuous monitoring at the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant, Udmurt Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, is conducted concurrently under the Treaty and under the INF Treaty, the Parties shall ensure the application of continuous monitoring procedures under the Treaty and of continuous monitoring procedures under the INF Treaty. The engineering site survey provided for in the Treaty will not be conducted at the Votkinsk facility.
(ii) In cases where continuous monitoring procedures under the Treaty and continuous monitoring procedures under the INF Treaty are identical, those procedures may be performed only once, with the results recorded, as appropriate, in the continuous monitoring report and in the inspection report.
(iii) The Parties shall agree on a list of the specific provisions of the INF Treaty and of the Memorandum of Agreement Regarding the Implementation of the Verification Provisions of the INF Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Memorandum of Agreement, on issues relating to pre-inspection requirements, notifications, activities beginning upon arrival at the point of entry, and general provisions related to continuous monitoring that shall be suspended upon entry into force of the Treaty at facilities inspected by means of continuous monitoring pursuant to the INF Treaty. Agreement on such a list shall not be considered to be an amendment to the INF Treaty proper and shall not have the effect of amending the INF Treaty. The provisions of the INF Treaty to be suspended may be suspended by making amendments to the Memorandum of Agreement or by being treated as "measures to improve the viability and effectiveness" of the Protocol Regarding Inspections Relating to the INF Treaty. The Parties shall also agree upon a list of the specific provisions of the Treaty that, in connection with the suspension of the above-mentioned provisions of the Protocol Regarding Inspections Relating to the INF Treaty and the Memorandum of Agreement, shall apply from the date of entry into force of the Treaty at such facilities.
(iv) After continuous monitoring activities commence in accordance with paragraph 14 of Article XI of the Treaty, continuous monitoring activities under the Treaty and continuous monitoring activities under the INF Treaty at the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant shall be conducted by a team of no more than 30 monitors. Issues related to increasing the quota of monitors for maintenance of the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system and replacement of monitors shall be governed by the provisions of the Inspection Protocol to the Treaty.
(v) Equipment used for the purposes of continuous monitoring at the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant pursuant to the INF Treaty may be used for continuous monitoring pursuant to the Treaty, including after termination of continuous monitoring pursuant to the INF Treaty, if the purpose of such equipment coincides with the purpose of the equipment under the Treaty. Equipment used exclusively for the purpose of continuous monitoring at the Votkinsk facility and the use of which is not provided for under the Treaty shall be used only pursuant to the INF Treaty. Continuous monitoring equipment for use exclusively under the Treaty may also be sent to, and installed at, the Votkinsk facility in accordance with the Treaty.
(vi) Specific issues that may arise in connection with the concurrent application of continuous monitoring procedures under both Treaties shall be considered within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission and the framework of the Special Verification Commission.

(c) Concurrent inspections under both Treaties may not be conducted at a facility subject to the Treaty and the INF Treaty. An inspection under one of the Treaties at such a facility shall be conducted no earlier than six days after an inspection has been conducted under the other Treaty at that facility.

Twenty-third Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, for the purposes of the prohibition of paragraph 25 of Article V of the Treaty and this Agreed Statement, the term "accessible" means able to be entered by waterborne craft on the surface of the water, while submerged, or while partially submerged. The Parties further agree that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will not make the underground structures located in the immediate vicinity of the Ara Inlet (Kola Peninsula), the Yagel'naya Submarine Base (Kola Peninsula), and the Pavlovskoye Submarine Base (Primorskiy Kray), all of which are used for purposes unrelated to the Treaty, accessible by any waterborne craft of any displacement whatsoever.

Twenty-fourth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, for the purposes of subparagraph 4(b) of Article III of the Treaty, a front section of a fundamentally new design would not have the essential features that are characteristic of any existing design of a front section with multiple reentry vehicles that has been deployed or tested on any ICBM or SLBM as of the date of entry into force of the Treaty. In particular, a front section of a fundamentally new design would not have a self-contained dispensing mechanism that dispenses reentry vehicles to different aim points sequentially. In addition, an ICBM or SLBM, the final stage of which executes a procedure for dispensing reentry vehicles, would not be considered to have a front section of a fundamentally new design. The Parties further agree that the fundamentally new nature of such a design would be verifiable by national technical means of verification.

Twenty-fifth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, with respect to the definition of the term "variant," an ICBM or SLBM of a type, a dimension of which differs from that of another ICBM or SLBM of the same type by more than three percent, but by less than the appropriate new type criteria, shall be considered to be a variant. The Parties further agree that a Party may declare an ICBM or SLBM to be a variant if its dimensions differ by less than three percent from those of another ICBM or SLBM of the same type.

Twenty-sixth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, subject to the limitations provided for in subparagraphs 4(b) and 11(c) of Article IV of the Treaty, a portion of the territory of an eliminated ICBM base may be declared to be a space launch facility after the following conditions are met:

(a) All strategic offensive arms specified for that ICBM base and all support equipment have been removed and all silo launchers of ICBMs or fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs, except those located in the portion of the territory of the ICBM base that the Party intends to subsequently declare as a space launch facility, are eliminated in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. The provisions of that Protocol shall not apply to silo launchers of ICBMs or fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs located in that portion of the territory of the base declared as a space launch facility.
(b) All activity associated with strategic offensive arms shall cease and shall not subsequently resume at the ICBM base.
(c) A close-out inspection shall be conducted at the ICBM base to confirm that the elimination of the base has been completed.
(d) Such eliminated ICBM bases shall not be reestablished.
(e) Nothing in this Agreed Statement shall affect the obligation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to eliminate, no later than seven years after entry into force of the Treaty, 154 silo launchers of ICBMs of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as RS-20, which is known to the United States of America as SS-18. In this regard, no SS-18 silo launchers of ICBMs among the 154 launchers to be eliminated shall be retained for use at a space launch facility.

The Parties further agree that, during a formerly declared facility inspection of the ICBM base, a portion of the territory of which has been declared as a space launch facility, the space launch facility shall not be subject to inspection.

Twenty-seventh Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that the six existing soft-site launchers located at Cape Canaveral, Florida, United States of America, shall be exempt from the provisions of paragraph 9 of Article V of the Treaty until such time that they contain or launch an ICBM or SLBM after the date of signature of the Treaty.

Twenty-eighth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that a first stage of an ICBM or SLBM that is maintained, stored, and transported as an assembled missile without a launch canister, may be located separate from other stages of such a missile only at a production facility for such ICBMs or SLBMs; a location, specified in Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding, where static testing of first stages occurs; a conversion or elimination facility for ICBMs or SLBMs, or, for ICBMs other than ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs and for SLBMs, another location where such an ICBM or SLBM is eliminated; or an exhibition site. Such a first stage may be moved between these locations only in connection with an exhibition conducted pursuant to paragraph 11 of Article XI of the Treaty as well as in connection with the elimination of such ICBMs or SLBMs.

If, however, such a first stage is located, separate from other stages of such a missile, at a location other than these locations, all ICBMs or SLBMs of that type shall thereafter be considered, for the purposes of the Treaty, to be ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported in stages, unless otherwise agreed.

The Parties further agree that an assembled missile or first stage of an ICBM that is maintained, stored, and transported as an assembled missile in its launch canister, may be located outside its launch canister only at a production facility for such ICBMs; for first stages of such ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, locations specified in Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding, where solid rocket motors of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs may be tested with or without nozzles attached; for other such ICBMs not subject to the limitations contained in paragraph 10 of Article IV of the Treaty, a location, specified in Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding, where static testing of first stages occurs; a conversion or elimination facility for ICBMs, or, for ICBMs other than ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, another location where such an ICBM is eliminated; or an exhibition site. Such a first stage may be moved between these locations only in connection with an exhibition conducted pursuant to paragraph 11 of Article XI of the Treaty as well as in connection with the elimination of such ICBMs. If, however, such a missile is located outside its launch canister, or such a first stage is located separate from other stages of such a missile, at a location other than these locations, all ICBMs of that type shall thereafter be considered, for the purposes of the Treaty, to be ICBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported in stages, unless otherwise agreed.

Twenty-ninth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that the STARS booster shall not be considered to be the Polaris A-3 SLBM since that booster has a different number of stages. The STARS booster shall be considered to be a booster used only for research and development purposes, subject to the provisions of paragraph 12 of Article VII of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles of December 8, 1987.

Thirtieth Agreed Statement. The Parties do not exclude the possibility that the bans on ballistic missiles on waterborne vehicles other than submarines and on launchers of such missiles contained in subparagraph 18(a) of Article V of the Treaty and the ban on air-to-surface ballistic missiles contained in subparagraph 18(d) of Article V of the Treaty shall not apply to launches of ICBMs and SLBMs from waterborne vehicles other than submarines or from airplanes, other than heavy bombers or former heavy bombers, for delivering objects into the upper atmosphere or space. Should the Parties reach agreement concerning the possibility of using ICBMs and SLBMs for delivering objects into the upper atmosphere or space from waterborne vehicles other than submarines or from such airplanes, provisions concerning procedures for such launches shall be agreed within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. By this Agreed Statement, the Parties do not waive any of their obligations or rights related to the non-proliferation of missiles and missile technology, stipulated in the Washington Summit Joint Statement of June 1, 1990.

Thirty-first Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that the provisions of Article X of the Treaty and of the Telemetry Protocol shall not apply to objects launched by ICBMs or SLBMs used to deliver objects into the upper atmosphere or space, after such objects either are in orbit or have achieved escape velocity.

Thirty-second Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, notwithstanding the provisions of subparagraph 3(b) of Section I of the Throw-weight Protocol and paragraph 1 of Section III and paragraph 4 of Section VII of the Notification Protocol, the Parties shall agree, within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, on the procedures for establishing the throw-weight accountability of an ICBM or SLBM of a new type in the event that a Party deploys an ICBM or SLBM of that type prior to its eighth flight test.

Thirty-third Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, for no more than two ballistic missile submarines of the United States of America that are equipped with Poseidon SLBMs and that are modified for use as special purpose submarines, the following provisions shall apply:

(a) Such submarines shall be permanently based only at ports that are not submarine bases specified in the Memorandum of Understanding. Such ports shall be specified in Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding and shall not be subject to inspection.
(b) In order to demonstrate that the launch tubes on such a submarine do not contain SLBMs, such tubes shall be opened, upon request of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, when such a submarine is located at the port at which it is permanently based, in accordance with the following procedures:

(i) After receipt of a request for the display of special purpose submarines in such a port, the special purpose submarines shall not leave port until the display is completed. If both special purpose submarines are located in the same home port when a request is made, both submarines shall be displayed, and the request shall count as one request for each such submarine.
(ii) Within 24 hours of the receipt of such a request, the decks of the special purpose submarine shall be cleared and all tubes shall be opened for a period of no less than 12 hours.

(c) The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall have the right to make two requests per submarine each year pursuant to subparagraph (b) of this Agreed Statement. If the requested Party is unable to conduct such a display because of the absence of such submarine from the port, it shall provide notification to the requesting Party through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers. In such an event, the number of requests to which the requesting Party is entitled shall not be decreased.
(d) Until they are eliminated in accordance with Section IV of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol, the 16 launchers that are on each special purpose submarine shall continue to count as 16 launchers for such a submarine against the maximum aggregate limit of 1,600 provided for in Article II of the Treaty and to count as 160 against the 6,000 and 4,900 limits also provided therein. When all other launchers of Poseidon SLBMs have been converted or eliminated, except for test launchers and launchers at space launch facilities, the Poseidon SLBM shall be considered to be a retired type of SLBM.

Thirty-fourth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, with respect to the criteria contained in subparagraph (f) of the definition of the term "new type" provided for in the Definitions Annex to the Treaty:

(a) The throw-weight of an ICBM or SLBM of a type declared to be a new type shall exceed the accountable throw-weight of an ICBM or SLBM of an existing type or of a previously declared new type by 21 percent or more. The change in the length of the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM of a type declared to be a new type shall be a change in relation to an ICBM or SLBM of the same existing type or the same previously declared new type by five percent or more.
(b) The change in the length of the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM of a type declared to be a new type in relation to an ICBM or SLBM of an existing type or previously declared new type shall be determined in accordance with paragraph 15 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding.
(c) The throw-weight of an ICBM or SLBM of an existing type or previously declared new type shall be the accountable throw-weight of this existing type or previously declared new type, specified in the Memorandum of Understanding.
(d) The throw-weight of an ICBM or SLBM of a type declared to be a new type shall be the greatest throw-weight demonstrated in flight tests of an ICBM or SLBM of that type to a range of no less than 11,000 kilometers for an ICBM, or a range of no less than 9,500 kilometers for an SLBM.
If an ICBM or SLBM of a type declared to be a new type is not capable of being flight-tested to such a range, it shall be flight-tested to a range of no less than 10,000 kilometers for an ICBM, or a range of no less than 8,500 kilometers for an SLBM.
(e) Should an ICBM of any type be declared to be a new type in relation to the SS-25 ICBM on the basis of an increase of 21 percent or more in throw-weight in conjunction with a change of five percent or more in the length of the first stage, the throw-weight of an ICBM of such a type declared to be a new type shall be the greatest throw-weight demonstrated in flight tests of an ICBM of that type to a range of no less than 11,000 kilometers.

Thirty-fifth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, if a Party provides, during any one year, telemetry data tapes for a greater number of flight tests, the other Party shall reimburse the tape-associated costs resulting from the difference in the number of flight tests. The costs associated with the purchase of the tapes and the copying of telemetric information onto the tapes, as well as the procedure for the reimbursement, shall be subject to agreement in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

Thirty-sixth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, with regard to Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota; Grand Forks Air Force Base, North Dakota; Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota; and Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics may conduct no more than one inspection at each of these Air Force Bases of the United States of America at any one time.

Thirty-seventh Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that:

(a) The limitations provided for in subparagraph 1(a) of Article IV of the Treaty shall not apply to ICBMs of retired types of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs to each of which one warhead was attributed.
(b) The limitations provided for in subparagraphs 1(d) and 4(c) of Article IV of the Treaty shall not apply to:

(i) ICBMs of retired types other than ICBMs of retired types of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs;
(ii) SLBMs of retired types; and
(iii) ICBMs or SLBMs of former types.

(c) The locational restrictions provided for in subparagraph 9(a) of Article IV of the Treaty shall not apply to ICBMs or SLBMs of former or retired types except for ICBMs of retired types of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs.
(d) ICBMs of retired types of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall not be located at ICBM bases or submarine bases.
(e) ICBMs and SLBMs of former and retired types shall not be specified in the Memorandum of Understanding except for the categories of data contained in Annex F for such retired types.
(f) Procedures contained in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol for the elimination or removal from accountability of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall not apply to ICBMs of retired types of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs to each of which one warhead was attributed.
(g) The provisions of Section IV of the Notification Protocol shall not apply to ICBMs or SLBMs of former or retired types except for ICBMs of retired types of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs to each of which more than one warhead was attributed.
(h) Notifications concerning data with respect to launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs of a former or retired type shall be provided in accordance with Sections I, II, and IV of the Notification Protocol and such launchers shall be subject to the limitations contained in subparagraphs 2(d) and 4(b) of Article IV of the Treaty, except as provided for in subparagraph (i) of this Agreed Statement.
(i) The one launcher located at the Vandenberg Air Force Base, California test range, that is equipped for flight testing only the Minuteman I ICBM, shall not be subject to the provisions provided for in Articles IV and VIII of the Treaty. If this launcher is later converted to launch other ICBMs or SLBMs, it will be subject to the provisions provided for in Articles IV and VIII of the Treaty.

Thirty-eighth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that there are no agreed provisions for establishing reference cylinders as provided for in the provisions in paragraph 23 of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs containing a first stage equipped with a liquid-propellant main rocket engine. The Parties agree that such procedures will be agreed within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission prior to the deployment of such ICBMs.

Annex
Terms and their definitions

This Annex contains definitions of terms that are used in the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, and its Annexes, Protocols, and Memorandum of Understanding.

For the purposes of the Treaty and its Annexes, Protocols, and Memorandum of Understanding:

1. (1) The term "air base" means a facility, other than a production facility for heavy bombers, a heavy bomber flight test center, or a training facility for heavy bombers, at which heavy bombers or former heavy bombers are based and their operation is supported.

2. (35) The term "aircraft" means any manned machine that can derive support in the atmosphere from interaction with the air other than the interaction of the air with the Earth's surface.

3. (118) The term "aircrew member" means an individual who performs duties related to the operation of an airplane and who is included on the inspecting Party's list of aircrew members in accordance with the provisions of Section II of the Inspection Protocol.

4. (34) The term "air-launched cruise missile (ALCM)" means an air-to-surface cruise missile of a type, any one of which has been flight-tested from an aircraft or deployed on a bomber after December 31, 1986.

5. (95) The term "airplane" means a power-driven, heavier-than-air aircraft that derives its lift in flight chiefly from aerodynamic reactions on surfaces that remain fixed under given conditions of flight.

6. (6) The term "air-to-surface ballistic missile (ASBM)" means a ballistic missile with a range in excess of 600 kilometers that is installed in an aircraft or on its external mountings for the purpose of being launched from this aircraft.

7. (5) The term "ballistic missile" means a missile that is a weapon-delivery vehicle that has a ballistic trajectory over most of its flight path.

8. (10) The term "bomber" means an airplane of a type, any one of which was initially constructed or later converted to be equipped for bombs or air-to-surface missiles.

9. (30) The term "category" means, for heavy bombers, one of the following classifications based on the kind of armament for which they are equipped or on their purpose: heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments, test heavy bomber, or training heavy bomber.

10. (53) The term "continuous monitoring" means carrying out procedures in accordance with the Inspection Protocol that involve inspection of containers, launch canisters, and vehicles leaving a monitored facility.

11. (21) The term "continuous monitoring activities" means activities conducted pursuant to paragraph 14 of Article XI of the Treaty, which, in accordance with the Inspection Protocol, include conducting an engineering site survey; establishing, operating, and maintaining a perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system; and conducting continuous monitoring.

12. (46) The term "conversion or elimination facility" means:

(a) for ICBMs or SLBMs, a specified facility for the elimination of ICBMs, SLBMs, launch canisters that remain after flight tests of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, or ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs or first stages of such ICBMs that remain after static testing;
(b) for mobile launchers of ICBMs, a specified facility for the elimination of mobile launchers of ICBMs;
(c) for SLBM launchers, a specified facility for the conversion or elimination of SLBM launchers;
(d) for heavy bombers or former heavy bombers, a specified facility for the conversion of heavy bombers, or the elimination of heavy bombers or former heavy bombers.

13. (33) The term "cruise missile" means a missile that is an unmanned, self-propelled weapon-delivery vehicle that sustains flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of its flight path.

14. (91) The term "deployed heavy bomber" means any heavy bomber other than a test heavy bomber, a training heavy bomber, or a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments.

15. (86) The term "deployed ICBM" means an ICBM that is contained, or is considered to be contained, in a deployed launcher of ICBMs.

16. (87) The term "deployed ICBM and its associated launcher" means a deployed ICBM and the deployed launcher of ICBMs that contains, or is considered to contain, the deployed ICBM.

17. (90) The term "deployed launcher of ICBMs" means:

(a) any silo launcher of ICBMs other than a silo test launcher, a silo training launcher, or a silo launcher located at a space launch facility; or
(b) any deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs.

18. (89) The term "deployed launcher of SLBMs" means any SLBM launcher installed on a submarine that has been launched, unless otherwise provided for in the Treaty.

19. (88) The term "deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs" means any mobile launcher of ICBMs, other than a mobile test launcher or a mobile launcher of ICBMs at a space launch facility, that contains, or is considered to contain, an ICBM.

20. (84) The term "deployed SLBM" means an SLBM that is contained, or is considered to be contained, in a deployed launcher of SLBMs.

21. (85) The term "deployed SLBM and its associated launcher" means a deployed SLBM and the deployed launcher of SLBMs that contains, or is considered to contain, the deployed SLBM.

22. (94) The term "deployment area" means an area, limited in size, within which routine movements and exercise dispersals of deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles are conducted.

23. (68) The term "distinguishable" means different on the basis of the totality of functional and external differences that are observable by national technical means of verification, or, when such observations may be inconclusive in the opinion of the inspecting Party, that are visible during inspection.

24. (13) The term "each year" means during a period of 12 months commencing on the date of entry into force of the Treaty or on an anniversary of that date.

25. (29) The term "encapsulation" means, for telemetric information, recording and not broadcasting such information during the flight test of a missile, and recovering it subsequently.

26. (122) The term "encryption" means, for telemetric information, the reversible transformation of such information that gives it a random character to prevent unauthorized access to such information.

27. (60) The term "facility" means an ICBM base, submarine base, air base, rail garrison, maintenance facility, restricted area, parking site, silo launcher group, ICBM loading facility, SLBM loading facility, production facility, repair facility, storage facility, training facility, conversion or elimination facility, test range, heavy bomber flight test center, space launch facility, or static display site.

28. (63) The term "facility subject to continuous monitoring" means a facility at which continuous monitoring activities are permitted but continuous monitoring has not yet commenced.

29. (105) The term "fixed structure for mobile launchers of ICBMs" means a fixed structure for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs or a fixed structure for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs.

30. (104) The term "fixed structure for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs" means a unique structure at a parking site for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs that can contain a train of standard configuration with rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs.

31. (103) The term "fixed structure for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs" means a unique structure, within a restricted area, that can contain road-mobile launchers of ICBMs.

32. (36) The term "flight test" means, for a missile, the launch and subsequent flight of a missile.

33. (12) The term "former heavy bomber" means a reconnaissance airplane, tanker airplane, or jamming airplane that is not equipped for nuclear armaments or non-nuclear air-to-surface armaments and:

(a) that was initially constructed on the basis of the airframe of an existing type of heavy bomber and satisfies the requirements for conversion in accordance with the Conversion or Elimination Protocol; or
(b) that has been converted from a heavy bomber in accordance with procedures provided for in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol, or in such a way that it satisfies the requirements for conversion in accordance with the Conversion or Elimination Protocol.

34. (11) The term "former type" means, for ICBMs or SLBMs, a type of existing ICBM or SLBM, any one of which had been deployed prior to entry into force of the Treaty, but none of which was deployed when the Treaty entered into force and none of which are currently deployed.

35. (17) The term "front section" means that portion of the payload of the final stage that contains the reentry vehicle or reentry vehicles and may, depending on design, include a reentry vehicle platform, penetration aids, and a shroud.

36. (112) The term "heavy bomber" means a bomber of a type, any one of which satisfies either of the following criteria:

(a) its range is greater than 8000 kilometers; or
(b) it is equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs.

A bomber shall not be considered to be a heavy bomber if it meets neither criterion (a) nor criterion (b), or if otherwise agreed.

A bomber shall not be considered to be a heavy bomber if it is not equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, if it is not a model or modification of an accountable heavy bomber, and if it is tested, equipped, and configured exclusively for maritime operations. For the purposes of this definition, the term "modification of an accountable heavy bomber" is understood to mean an airplane having a design essentially identical to the design of an accountable heavy bomber.

A bomber of a type, any one of which has an integrated planform area in excess of 310 square meters, but that is not declared by a Party as a heavy bomber, shall be considered to be a heavy bomber unless the deploying Party provides the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission with information demonstrating to the satisfaction of the other Party that this bomber does not meet the criterion provided for in subparagraph (a) and does not meet the criterion provided for in subparagraph (b).

Heavy bombers of the Parties of the types existing as of the date of signature of the Treaty are specified in Article III of the Treaty.

37. (113) The term "heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments" means a non-modern heavy bomber that is equipped only for non-nuclear armaments, and that satisfies the requirements for conversion in accordance with the Conversion or Elimination Protocol.

38. (117) The term "heavy bomber flight test center" means a facility, other than a production facility for heavy bombers, at which test heavy bombers are based and their operation is supported.

39. (111) The term "heavy ICBM" means an ICBM of a type, any one of which has a launch weight greater than 106,000 kilograms or a throw-weight greater than 4350 kilograms.

40. (110) The term "heavy SLBM" means an SLBM of a type, any one of which has a launch weight greater than 106,000 kilograms or a throw-weight greater than 4350 kilograms.

41. (3) The term "ICBM base" means:

(a) for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, an area in which a rail garrison and one associated maintenance facility are located. Such a maintenance facility may be located either within or outside the rail garrison;
(b) for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, an area in which one or more restricted areas and one associated maintenance facility are located;
(c) for silo launchers of ICBMs, an area in which one or more groups of silo launchers of ICBMs and one associated maintenance facility are located.

42. (115) The term "ICBM emplacement equipment" means equipment used to install an ICBM into a silo launcher of ICBMs.

43. (38) The term "ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs" means an ICBM of a type, any one of which has been contained on, or flight-tested from, a mobile launcher of ICBMs, or has been declared an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs.

44. (79) The term "ICBM launcher" means a device intended or used to contain, prepare for launch, and launch an ICBM.

45. (42) The term "ICBM loading facility" means a facility, outside an ICBM base and outside a test range, where ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs are loaded onto or unloaded from mobile launchers of ICBMs.

46. (39) The term "ICBM or SLBM the final stage of which executes a procedure for dispensing reentry vehicles" means an ICBM or SLBM of a type, any one of which has been flight-tested with more than one reentry vehicle and has executed a procedure for dispensing reentry vehicles during that flight test using a final stage engine; or an ICBM or SLBM that has released during a flight test of that missile a reentry vehicle or a penetration aid prior to termination of main engine thrust of the final stage and is an ICBM or SLBM of a type, any one of which has been flight-tested with more than one reentry vehicle.

47. (37) The term "in-country escort" means a group of individuals designated by the inspected Party to accompany and assist inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members throughout the in-country period, as provided for in the Inspection Protocol.

48. (71) The term "in-country period" means the period of time from the arrival of the inspection team, monitors, or aircrew members at the point of entry until their departure from the country through the point of entry.

49. (24) The term "inspected Party" means the Party to the Treaty whose facilities and locations are subject to inspection or continuous monitoring pursuant to Article XI of the Treaty.

50. (25) The term "inspecting Party" means the Party to the Treaty that conducts inspections or continuous monitoring activities.

51. (44) The term "inspection site" means a facility or location at which inspections may be conducted in accordance with the Inspection Protocol.

52. (27) The term "inspection team" means the group of inspectors assigned by the inspecting Party to conduct a particular inspection.

53. (26) The term "inspector" means an individual specified by one of the Parties to conduct inspections and included on that Party's list of inspectors.

54. (40) The term "intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)" means a land-based ballistic missile with a range in excess of 5,500 kilometers.

55. (16) The term "jamming" means, for telemetric information broadcast from a missile, creating interference on frequencies used for broadcasting such information.

56. (96) The term "launch-associated railcar" means a railcar that is directly associated with a rail-mobile launcher of ICBMs and that together with it provides for the preparation for launch and launch of a missile.

57. (83) The term "launch canister" means a container, directly associated with an ICBM, that can be or has been used for transporting and storing an assembled ICBM, with or without its front section, and from which an ICBM can be or has been launched.

58. (102) The term "launch weight" means the maximum weight of a fully loaded ICBM or SLBM at the time of first stage ignition, demonstrated during flight tests of ICBMs or SLBMs of that type.

59. (32) The term "long-range ALCM" means an ALCM with a range in excess of 600 kilometers.

60. (58) The term "long-range non-nuclear ALCM" means a long-range ALCM that is not nuclear-armed.

61. (123) The term "long-range nuclear ALCM" means a long-range ALCM that is nuclear-armed.

62. (61) The term "maintenance facility" means a facility that is part of an ICBM base and at which ICBMs and ICBM launchers are maintained and their operation is supported.

63. (72) The term "missile tender" means a naval ship that is used for storing, transporting, and loading SLBMs into SLBM launchers.

64. (49) The term "mobile launcher of ICBMs" means a road-mobile launcher of ICBMs or a rail-mobile launcher of ICBMs.

65. (50) The term "mobile training launcher" means a full-scale model of a mobile launcher of ICBMs that is not capable of launching an ICBM.

66. (52) The term "monitor" means an individual specified by one of the Parties to conduct continuous monitoring activities and included on that Party's list of monitors.

67. (51) The term "monitored facility" means a facility at which continuous monitoring has commenced.

68. (19) The term "monitoring team" means the group of monitors specified by the inspecting Party to conduct continuous monitoring activities.

69. (59) The term "new type" means, for ICBMs or SLBMs, a type of ICBM or SLBM, the technical characteristics of which differ from those of an ICBM or SLBM, respectively, of each type declared previously in at least one of the following respects:

(a) number of stages;
(b) type of propellant of any stage;
(c) launch weight, by ten percent or more;
(d) length of either the assembled missile without front section or length of the first stage, by ten percent or more;
(e) diameter of the first stage, by five percent or more; or
(f) throw-weight, by an increase of 21 percent or more, in conjunction with a change in the length of the first stage by five percent or more.

70. (55) The term "non-deployed ICBM" means an ICBM not contained, and not considered to be contained, in a deployed launcher of ICBMs.

71. (56) The term "non-deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs" means a mobile test launcher, or a mobile launcher of ICBMs at a space launch facility, or a mobile launcher of ICBMs that does not contain, and that is not considered to contain, an ICBM.

72. (54) The term "non-deployed SLBM" means an SLBM not contained, and not considered to be contained, in a deployed launcher of SLBMs.

73. (57) The term "non-modern heavy bomber" means a heavy bomber of a type, any one of which was initially based at an air base more than ten years earlier.

74. (124) The term "nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs" means, for heavy bombers, nuclear air-to-surface missiles with a range of less than 600 kilometers and nuclear bombs.

75. (77) The term "parking site" means a location, within a rail garrison, at which deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs are based and fixed structures for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs may be located.

76. (73) The term "payload" means, for a stage, all that separates from that stage, excluding the front section shroud and the propellant burned by that stage, beginning at the time when the velocity of the final stage is equal to 1,000 meters per second less than its velocity at the time of termination of main engine thrust of the final stage or at the time of the first release of a reentry vehicle or penetration aid, whichever occurs earlier.

77. (97) The term "perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system" means the physical barriers, buildings, and equipment along the perimeter, at the portal, and at the other exits of a monitored facility, that may be established, operated, and maintained by the monitors for purposes of continuous monitoring of such a facility.

78. (93) The term "perimeter continuous monitoring area" means the space within which the inspecting Party has the right to establish, operate, and maintain a perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system and to carry out continuous monitoring.

79. (70) The term "period of inspection" means the period of time from completion of the pre-inspection procedures until the commencement of post-inspection procedures.

80. (66) The term "procedure for dispensing reentry vehicles" means a maneuver of the self-contained dispensing mechanism or of the final stage of a missile, associated with targeting to an aim point and releasing one or more reentry vehicles, whether or not a reentry vehicle was actually released.

81. (75) The term "produce" means build, construct, or manufacture in any quantity, and includes serial production as well as one-of-a-kind manufacturing.

82. (62) The term "production facility" means:

(a) for ICBMs or SLBMs, a facility at which:

(i) ICBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles in their launch canisters, are assembled, including the joining of all stages and the loading of such missiles into launch canisters;
(ii) ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles without launch canisters, are assembled, including the joining of two or more stages;
(iii) first stages of ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported in stages are assembled;

(b) for ballistic missile submarines, a facility at which construction of ballistic missile submarines is performed;
(c) for mobile launchers of ICBMs, a facility at which the erector-launcher mechanism of a mobile launcher of ICBMs is mounted on the self-propelled chassis, trailer chassis, railcar, or flatcar;
(d) for heavy bombers or former heavy bombers, a facility at which assembly of a complete heavy bomber airframe or complete former heavy bomber airframe is performed.

83. (76) The term "prototype" means, for ICBMs or SLBMs, an ICBM or SLBM of a new type, none of which has been attributed with warheads or accountable throw-weight, no more than 20 of which have been flight-tested, and no launchers of which have been deployed.

84. (23) The term "rail garrison" means an area in which one or more parking sites are located and an associated maintenance facility may be located.

85. (22) The term "rail-mobile launcher of ICBMs" means an erector-launcher mechanism for launching ICBMs and the railcar or flatcar on which it is mounted.

86. (20) The term "range" means:

(a) for an ALCM, the maximum distance that can be covered by an ALCM of that type in its standard design mode flying until fuel exhaustion, determined by projecting its flight path onto the Earth's sphere from the point of launch to the point of impact;
(b) for a ballistic missile, the maximum distance measured by projecting the flight trajectory on the Earth's sphere between the launch point of a missile of that type, and the point of impact of a reentry vehicle;
(c) for an aircraft, the maximum distance that can be flown, without refueling, by an aircraft of that type when carrying an ordnance load of 7500 kilograms, with a full fuel load in the internal and external fuel tanks and a flight profile optimized to ensure minimum fuel consumption per kilometer. In this connection, the fuel remaining in the fuel tanks after landing shall be no more than five percent of the maximum capacity of the fuel tanks, and the distance covered during climb and descent shall be taken into account.

87. (98) The term "rapid reload" means reloading a silo launcher of ICBMs in less than 12 hours or a mobile launcher of ICBMs in less than four hours after a missile has been launched or removed from such a launcher.

88. (8) The term "reentry vehicle" means that part of the front section that can survive reentry through the dense layers of the Earth's atmosphere and that is designed for delivering a weapon to a target or for testing such a delivery.

89. (69) The term "relocation" means the one-way movement of a deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs and its associated missile from one declared facility to another declared facility, or from any location following the completion of a dispersal to a declared facility, or from any location during a routine movement to a declared facility other than to the maintenance facility associated with that restricted area or that rail garrison.

90. (47) The term "repair facility" means:

(a) for ICBMs or SLBMs, a specified facility, outside an ICBM base or a submarine base, for the repair or maintenance of ICBMs or SLBMs;
(b) for mobile launchers of ICBMs, a specified facility, outside an ICBM base, for the repair or maintenance of mobile launchers of ICBMs;
(c) for heavy bombers or former heavy bombers, a specified facility, outside an air base, for the repair or maintenance of heavy bombers or former heavy bombers.

91. (67) The term "residual propellant" means, when determining the maximum calculated throw-weight of an ICBM or an SLBM, the unusable propellant of a stage and the propellant of a stage reserved for off-nominal missile technical characteristics and missile flight conditions, expressed as a percentage of the total propellant mass of that stage.

92. (65) The term "restricted area" means an area within a deployment area, limited in size, in which deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles are based and in which fixed structures for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs may be located.

93. (99) The term "retired type" means, for ICBMs or SLBMs, a type of ICBM or SLBM, any one of which was deployed when the Treaty entered into force, but none of which are currently deployed due to the conversion or elimination of all launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs of the same type of ICBM or SLBM other than test launchers and launchers at space launch facilities.

94. (18) The term "road-mobile launcher of ICBMs" means an erector-launcher mechanism for launching ICBMs and the self-propelled or trailer chassis on which it is mounted.

95. (64) The term "routine movement" means the movement of a deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs and its associated missile for the purpose of training, maintenance, or testing that begins and ends at the same restricted area or rail garrison and does not involve movement to any other declared facility except movement to the maintenance facility associated with that restricted area or that rail garrison.

96. (2) The term "self-contained dispensing mechanism" means a device that separates from the final stage of a missile together with the front section and that independently targets and releases the reentry vehicle or reentry vehicles and penetration aids.

97. (120) The term "silo launcher of ICBMs" means a fixed launcher of ICBMs in a silo structure located in the ground.

98. (121) The term "silo training launcher" means a full-scale silo launcher specified for training purposes.

99. (119) The term "silo used as a launch control center" means a silo, other than a silo launcher of ICBMs, that is located at an ICBM base and that is used to control the launch of an ICBM.

100. (78) The term "SLBM launcher" means a device intended or used to contain, prepare for launch, and launch an SLBM.

101. (41) The term "SLBM loading facility" means a shore-based facility, outside a submarine base, where SLBMs are loaded onto or unloaded from ballistic missile submarines.

102. (80) The term "soft-site launcher" means any land-based fixed launcher of ICBMs or SLBMs other than a silo launcher.

103. (107) The term "solid rocket motor" means that part of a stage that consists of the case filled with solid fuel.

104. (43) The term "space launch facility" means a specified facility from which objects are delivered into the upper atmosphere or space using ICBMs or SLBMs.

105. (106) The term "stage" means, for ICBMs or SLBMs, a section of a missile that is equipped with a propulsion unit and that can provide its payload with an additional velocity of more than 1,000 meters per second.

106. (31) The term "storage crane" means a floating crane that is used to store, transport, and load or unload SLBMs.

107. (48) The term "storage facility" means:

(a) for ICBMs or SLBMs, a specified facility, outside an ICBM base, a submarine base, a test range, or a space launch facility, for the storage of ICBMs or SLBMs;
(b) for mobile launchers of ICBMs, a specified facility, outside an ICBM base, a test range, or a space launch facility, for the storage of mobile launchers of ICBMs;
(c) for heavy bombers or former heavy bombers, a specified facility, outside an air base, for the storage of heavy bombers or former heavy bombers.

108. (4) The term "submarine base" means a facility at which ballistic missile submarines are based and that provides shore-based support for such submarines, which may include the assembly, loading, maintenance, and storage of SLBMs, unless otherwise provided for in the Treaty.

109. (7) The term "submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM)" means a ballistic missile with a range in excess of 600 kilometers of a type, any one of which has been contained in or launched from a submarine.

110. (15) The term "support equipment" means vehicles and mobile or transportable equipment used to support the operation of an ICBM or SLBM.

111. (108) The term "telemetric information" means information that originates on board a missile during its flight test that is broadcast or recorded for subsequent recovery.

112. (81) The term "test launcher" means an ICBM launcher or an SLBM launcher located within a test range, unless otherwise provided for in the Treaty.

113. (28) The term "test range" means a designated land area, other than an ICBM base, from which launches of ICBMs or SLBMs are conducted.

114. (100) The term "train of standard configuration" means a train consisting of a specified number of rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and launch-associated railcars.

115. (45) The term "training facility" means:

(a) for ICBMs or SLBMs, a specified facility, outside an ICBM base or a submarine base, at which personnel are trained to use, operate, or maintain ICBMs or SLBMs and their launchers;
(b) for heavy bombers, a facility where training heavy bombers are based.

116. (114) The term "training heavy bomber" means a heavy bomber used for training that is not equipped for nuclear armaments or non-nuclear air-to-surface armaments, and that satisfies the requirements for conversion in accordance with the Protocol on Conversion or Elimination.

117. (82) The term "training launcher" means a silo training launcher or a mobile training launcher.

118. (116) The term "training model of a missile" means a full-scale, inert model of an ICBM or SLBM that is not capable of being launched and that differs from an ICBM or SLBM on the basis of external and functional differences that are visible during inspection.

119. (74) The term "transit" means the one-way movement from one facility or location to another facility or another location of:

(a) a non-deployed ICBM, other than an ICBM of a retired or former type;
(b) a non-deployed SLBM, other than an SLBM of a retired or former type;
(c) a launch canister that remains after the flight test of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs; or
(d) a non-deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs.

120. (109) The term "transporter-loader" means a vehicle that is capable of transporting an assembled ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs and from which such an ICBM can be loaded directly onto a mobile launcher of ICBMs, or onto which such an ICBM can be unloaded directly from a mobile launcher of ICBMs, outside facilities where non-deployed ICBMs may be located.

121. (14) The term "variant" means:

(a) for heavy bombers, a classification, declared by the inspected Party, of airplanes of one type and one category that are distinguishable from other airplanes of the same type and the same category;
(b) for long-range nuclear ALCMs, a classification, declared by the inspected Party, of items of the same type that are distinguishable from other items of the same type;
(c) for ICBMs and SLBMs, a classification, declared by the inspected Party, of ICBMs or SLBMs of the same type that are distinguishable from other ICBMs or SLBMs of the same type.

122. (92) The term "version" means, for mobile launchers of ICBMs, fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs, and support equipment, a classification, declared by the inspected Party, based on external differences from other such items for a particular type of ICBM or SLBM.

123. (9) The term "warhead" means a unit of account used for counting toward the 6000 maximum aggregate limit and relevant sublimits as applied to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers.

124. (101) The term "weapon-delivery vehicle" means, for ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, a missile of a type, any one of which has been flight-tested or deployed to carry or be used as a weapon, that is, as any mechanism or device that, when directed against any target, is designed to damage or destroy it.

( ) The number of the term in the Russian Text.

Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or Elimination of the Items Subject to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms

Pursuant to and in implementation of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties hereby agree upon procedures governing the conversion or elimination of the strategic offensive arms limited by the Treaty, as well as fixed structures and facilities.

I. Procedures for Elimination of ICBMs for Mobile Launchers of ICBMs and Their Launch Canisters

1. Elimination of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs and their launch canisters carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in this Section shall be carried out at conversion or elimination facilities for ICBMs and shall be subject to inspection. The Parties may agree, upon request of the possessing Party, on procedures for the phased elimination of existing types and variants of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs by the elimination in phases of the missile elements subject to elimination for such ICBMs and their launch canisters. Upon such agreement, such elimination shall be carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in this Section, except as otherwise provided for in such agreement. |1|

2. Prior to the confirmatory inspection pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Section, the inspected Party:

(a) shall remove the missile's reentry vehicle or vehicles;
(b) may remove the electronic and electromechanical devices of the missile's guidance and control system from the missile and its launch canister;
(c) may remove the missile from its launch canister, remove the missile attachment devices from the launch canister, disassemble the missile into stages and the self-contained dispensing mechanism, and detach rocket motor nozzles and interstage skirts of the missile from stages; |2|
(d) may remove propellant from stages;
(e) may remove or actuate auxiliary pyrotechnic devices installed on the missile and its launch canister;
(f) may remove penetration aids, including devices for their attachment and release; and
(g) may remove propulsion units from the self-contained dispensing mechanism.

These actions may be carried out in any order.

3. After arrival of the inspection team, and prior to the initiation of the elimination process:

(a) Inspectors shall confirm the types, and number of each type, of the missiles and their launch canisters to be eliminated by making the observations and measurements necessary for such confirmation. If inspectors are unable to determine the type of the missile in its launch canister, representatives of the inspected Party shall take steps to resolve the problem, including removing the missile from its launch canister, if necessary; and
(b) Inspectors and representatives of the inspected Party shall read the data from and inspect the unique identifier in accordance with Annex 6 to the Inspection Protocol.

After the procedures provided for in this paragraph have been carried out, the inspected Party may remove any remaining elements not subject to elimination pursuant to paragraph 4 of this Section, and the process of the elimination of the missiles and their launch canisters may begin. Inspectors shall observe the elimination process.

4. Elimination process for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs:

(a) If solid fuel has not been removed from stages, the stages shall be destroyed by explosive demolition or burned;
(b) Rocket motor nozzles and cases, as well as the interstage skirts of a missile remaining after completion of the procedures provided for in subparagraphs 2(c), 2(d), and 4(a) of this Section, or after the completion of static testing provided for in paragraph 3 of Section VII of this Protocol, shall be crushed, flattened, cut into two pieces of approximately equal size, or destroyed by explosion; and |3|
(c) The self-contained dispensing mechanism, as well as the front section, including the reentry vehicle platform and the front section shroud, shall be crushed, flattened, cut into two pieces of approximately equal size, or destroyed by explosion.

5. Elimination process for launch canisters of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs:

(a) The body of the launch canister shall be crushed, flattened, or destroyed by explosion; or
(b) If the body of the launch canister is composed of segments, each of the segments shall be cut into two pieces at a location that is not an assembly joint. A launch canister, the body of which is of unitary construction, shall be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size, or cut into three pieces in such a manner that pieces no less than 1.5 meters long are cut from the ends of the body of such a launch canister.

6. Upon completion of the above requirements, the inspection team leader and a member of the in-country escort shall confirm in a factual written report, containing the results of the inspection team's observation of the elimination process, that the inspection team has completed its inspection. This report shall be completed in accordance with Section XVIII of the Inspection Protocol.

7. ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall cease to be subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty after completion of the procedures provided for in this Section. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.

II. Procedures for Elimination of Silo Launchers of ICBMs, Silo Training Launchers, and Silo Test Launchers

1. Elimination of silo launchers of ICBMs, silo training launchers and silo test launchers shall be carried out in situ and be subject to verification by national technical means of verification.

2. Prior to the initiation of the elimination process for silo launchers of ICBMs and silo test launchers, all missiles and shipping containers for ICBMs or ICBM stages, as well as all support equipment, shall be removed at least 1000 meters from each such launcher to be eliminated.

3. A Party shall be considered to have initiated the elimination process for silo launchers of ICBMs, silo training launchers, and silo test launchers as soon as the silo doors have been opened, removed, or eliminated. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section IV of the Notification Protocol.

4. A silo launcher of ICBMs in the process of being eliminated shall be considered to contain a deployed ICBM, and thus to be subject to the limitations provided for in Article II of the Treaty, until the procedures provided for in subparagraph 6 (a) of this Section have been carried out. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.

5. A silo test launcher or a silo training launcher in the process of being eliminated shall cease to be subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty after completion of the procedures provided for in subparagraph 6 (a) or paragraph 7, respectively, of this Section. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.

6. Elimination process for silo launchers of ICBMs or silo test launchers:

(a) The silo door shall be removed, dismantled, or destroyed and the silo headworks and the silo shall be destroyed by excavation to a depth of no less than eight meters, or by explosion to a depth of no less than six meters; and
(b) Following completion of the procedures provided for in subparagraph (a) of this paragraph, the silo may be filled to the level of the bottom of the hole created by the excavation or explosion. To enhance safety, the resultant hole may be graded during the 180-day period provided for in paragraph 8 of this Section but not filled with earth until expiration of the 90-day period provided for in paragraph 9 of this Section.

7. Elimination of a silo training launcher shall be accomplished by removing, dismantling, or destroying the silo door and by destroying the silo headworks by excavation or explosion.

8. The elimination process for a silo launcher of ICBMs, a silo training launcher, and a silo test launcher shall be completed no later than 180 days after its initiation. If grading was performed during the elimination process, notification of the completion of such an elimination process shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section IV of the Notification Protocol.

9. Silos shall remain visible to national technical means of verification during the entire elimination process and for the following 90-day period, after which they may be filled with earth.

III. Procedures for Elimination of Mobile Launchers of ICBMs, Mobile Training Launchers and Fixed Structures for Mobile Launchers of ICBMs

1. Elimination of road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, road-mobile training launchers, rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, and rail-mobile training launchers carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in this Section shall be carried out at conversion or elimination facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs and shall be subject to inspection.

2. After arrival of the inspection team and prior to the initiation of the elimination process, inspectors shall confirm the types, and number of each type, of the items listed in paragraph 1 of this Section to be eliminated. After such confirmation, the elimination process may begin. Inspectors shall observe the elimination process.

3. Elimination process for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and road-mobile training launchers:

(a) The erector-launcher mechanism and leveling supports shall be removed from the launcher chassis;
(b) The framework of the erector-launcher mechanism on which the ICBM is mounted and erected shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size;
(c) Missile launch support equipment, including external instrumentation compartments, shall be removed from the launcher chassis;
(d) The mountings of the erector-launcher mechanism and of the launcher leveling supports shall be cut off the launcher chassis and each such mounting shall be cut at a location that is not an assembly joint into two pieces of approximately equal size;
(e) A portion of the self-propelled launcher chassis, at least 0.78 meters in length, shall be cut off aft of the rear axle and that portion shall be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size; and no component, including those removed in accordance with the procedures provided for in this paragraph, shall be mounted, welded, or attached by any other means to an eliminated launcher chassis so as to increase the length of such a chassis; and
(f) If a road-mobile launcher of ICBMs is not mounted on a self-propelled launcher chassis, the trailer chassis shall be cut at a location that is not an assembly joint into two pieces of approximately equal size.

Upon completion of these elimination procedures for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, the vehicle may be used only for purposes not inconsistent with the provisions of the Treaty.

4. Elimination process for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and rail-mobile training launchers:

(a) The erector-launcher mechanism shall be removed from the railcar (or flatcar);
(b) The framework of the erector-launcher mechanism on which the ICBM is mounted and erected shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size;
(c) Missile launch support equipment, including external instrumentation compartments, shall be removed from the railcar (or flatcar); and
(d) The railcar (or flatcar) shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size.

5. Upon completion of the above requirements, the inspection team leader and a member of the in-country escort shall confirm in a factual written report, containing the results of the inspection team's observation of the elimination process, that the inspection team has completed its inspection. This report shall be completed in accordance with Section XVIII of the Inspection Protocol.

6. Road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, road-mobile training launchers, rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, and rail-mobile training launchers shall cease to be subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty after completion of the procedures provided for in this Section. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.

7. Elimination of fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall be carried out in situ, shall be subject to verification by national technical means of verification, and shall be subject to inspection pursuant to paragraphs 8 and 9 of Article XI of the Treaty.

8. Elimination process for fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs:

(a) The superstructure of each fixed structure shall be dismantled or demolished, and removed from its base or foundation; and
(b) The base or foundation of each such structure shall be destroyed by excavation or explosion.

Upon completion of the above requirements, the elimination process for those structures shall be considered to be completed. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.

9. The destroyed base or foundation of each such fixed structure shall remain visible to national technical means of verification:

(a) for the 90-day period following the completion of the elimination process; or
(b) until an inspection of each such fixed structure at a restricted area or rail garrison is conducted pursuant to paragraph 8 or 9 of Article XI of the Treaty.

10. Upon completion of the inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 8 or 9 of Article XI of the Treaty or, if such an inspection was not conducted, upon expiration of the 90-day period provided for in subparagraph 9(a) of this Section, the hole resulting from the excavation or explosion of each such structure may be filled and the remains of the destroyed base or foundation of each such structure may be removed from the restricted area or rail garrison.

IV. Procedures for Elimination of SLBM Launchers

1. Elimination of SLBM launchers carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in this Section shall be carried out at conversion or elimination facilities for SLBM launchers and shall be subject to verification by national technical means of verification.

2. Prior to the initiation of the elimination process for SLBM launchers, all missiles shall be removed from such launchers.

3. A Party shall be considered to have initiated the elimination process for SLBM launchers as soon as the ballistic missile submarine has been positioned at the conversion or elimination facility with all missile launch tubes empty and launch-tube hatches opened or removed. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section IV of the Notification Protocol.

4. SLBM launchers in the process of being eliminated shall be considered to contain deployed SLBMs, and thus to be subject to the limitations provided for in Article II of the Treaty, until all the missile launch-tube hatches and their associated superstructure fairings are removed from the ballistic missile submarine. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.

5. Elimination process for SLBM launchers:

(a) The missile section shall be removed from the submarine; or
(b) The missile launch tubes, and all elements of their reinforcement, including hull liners and segments of circular structural members between the missile launch tubes, as well as the entire portion of the pressure hull, the entire portion of the outer hull, and the entire portion of the superstructure through which all the missile launch tubes pass and that contain all the missile launch-tube penetrations shall be removed from the submarine. Missile launch tubes that have been removed shall be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size and shall remain in the open in the vicinity of the submarine until completion of the elimination procedures, after which they may be removed from the conversion or elimination facility.

6. The elimination process for SLBM launchers carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in subparagraphs 5 (a) and 5(b) of this Section shall be completed no later than 270 days and 180 days, respectively, after initiation. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section IV of the Notification Protocol.

7. A ballistic missile submarine shall remain visible to national technical means of verification during the entire elimination process. If the elimination process has been carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in subparagraph 5(b) of this Section, then upon its completion, the submarine shall continue to be visible to national technical means of verification until provision of the notification provided for in paragraph 4 of Section IV of the Notification Protocol and for no less than the ten-day period following the provision of such a notification.

8. Upon completion of the elimination procedures for SLBM launchers, the submarine may be used for purposes not inconsistent with the provisions of the Treaty after:

(a) installing a section without SLBM missile launch tubes and penetrations for them, and without SLBM missile launch-tube reinforcements; or
(b) replacing the entire portion of the pressure hull, the entire portion of the outer hull, and the entire portion of the superstructure that were removed with portions without SLBM missile launch tubes and penetrations for them, and without SLBM missile launch-tube reinforcements.

Such submarines shall differ from ballistic missile submarines on the basis of external differences observable by national technical means of verification. Submarines that have been modified shall not have vertical launch tubes with a diameter large enough to accommodate the smallest SLBM of that Party.

V. Procedures for Elimination of Soft-Site Launchers

1. Elimination of soft-site launchers shall be carried out in situ and shall be subject to verification by national technical means of verification.

2. Prior to the initiation of the elimination process for soft-site launchers, all missiles, launch canisters, and shipping containers for ICBMs or SLBMs or for their stages shall be removed at least 1000 meters from each soft-site launcher to be eliminated.

3. A Party shall be considered to have initiated the elimination process for soft-site launchers as soon as it has begun implementation of the procedures provided for in subparagraph 4 (a) of this Section. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section IV of the Notification Protocol. A soft-site launcher in the process of being eliminated shall remain subject to the limitations provided for in subparagraph 2(d) of Article IV and paragraph 9 of Article V of the Treaty until the procedures provided for in subparagraphs 4(a) and 4(b) of this Section have been carried out. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.

4. Elimination process for soft-site launchers:

(a) All fixed launch and propellant-handling equipment, as well as erecting and handling equipment, and fuel tanks, associated with such a launcher shall be removed at least 1000 meters from the soft-site launcher to be eliminated. "Launch equipment" is understood to mean systems, components, and instruments required to launch missiles;
(b) The entire area, at least 20 meters in diameter and centered on the soft-site launcher, shall be excavated or exploded to a depth of no less than two meters; and
(c) To enhance safety, following completion of the procedures provided for in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph, the resultant hole may be graded during the 180-day period provided for in paragraph 5 of this Section but not filled with earth until expiration of the 90-day period provided for in paragraph 6 of this Section.

5. The elimination process for a soft-site launcher shall be completed no later than 180 days after its initiation. If grading was performed during the elimination process, notification of the completion of such elimination process shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section IV of the Notification Protocol.

6. Soft-site launchers shall remain visible to national technical means of verification during the entire elimination process and for the following 90-day period. After the 90-day period has elapsed, the hole may be filled with earth.

VI. Procedures for Conversion or Elimination of Heavy Bombers and Elimination of Former Heavy Bombers

1. Elimination of heavy bombers and former heavy bombers carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in this Section shall be carried out at conversion or elimination facilities for heavy bombers or former heavy bombers and shall be subject to verification by national technical means of verification and by inspection pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Section.

2. Each Party shall have the right to verify by inspection the initiation of the elimination process for heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. Each Party shall have the right to verify by inspection that the elimination of heavy bombers or former heavy bombers has been completed, except for those cases when the initiation of the elimination process for heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs was verified by inspection. If an inspection is conducted, inspectors shall make the observations and measurements necessary to confirm the type and category of the heavy bomber or former heavy bomber that is to be eliminated or that has been eliminated, as applicable.

3. Prior to the initiation of the elimination process for a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber, engines and equipment that are not part of the airframe may be removed except for the equipment that is necessary to confirm the type and category of the heavy bomber or former heavy bomber to be eliminated.

4. A Party shall be considered to have initiated the elimination process for a heavy bomber or a former heavy bomber as soon as the tail section with tail surfaces has been severed from the fuselage at a location obviously not an assembly joint. After this procedure has been carried out, the heavy bomber or former heavy bomber shall cease to be subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.

5. Elimination process for heavy bombers or former heavy bombers:

(a) The tail section with tail surfaces shall be severed from the fuselage at a location obviously not an assembly joint;
(b) The wings shall be separated from the fuselage at any location by any method; and
(c) The remainder of the fuselage shall be severed into two pieces, within the area of attachment of the wings to the fuselage, at a location obviously not an assembly joint.

6. A heavy bomber or former heavy bomber shall remain visible to national technical means of verification during the entire elimination process. The elimination process for a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber shall be completed no later than 60 days after initiation. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section IV of the Notification Protocol.

7. Upon completion of the elimination process for a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber, the remains of its airframe shall remain visible to national technical means of verification at the elimination site for a 90-day period, after which they may be removed. In the case of an inspection conducted to confirm that the elimination of a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber has been completed, the remains of its airframe may be removed after the completion of such an inspection.

8. If an inspection is conducted, the inspection team leader and a member of the in-country escort shall confirm, in a factual written report containing the results of the inspection team's observation of a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber that is to be eliminated or that has been eliminated, as applicable, that the inspection team has completed its inspection. This report shall be completed in accordance with Section XVIII of the Inspection Protocol.

9. Conversion of heavy bombers, carried out in accordance with this Section, shall be carried out at conversion or elimination facilities for heavy bombers or former heavy bombers, as follows:

(a) Heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs:

(i) Conversion of such heavy bombers into heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs shall be carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in paragraph 10 of this Section;
(ii) Conversion of such heavy bombers into heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments shall be carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in paragraphs 10 and 11 of this Section, as applicable; or
(iii) Conversion of such heavy bombers into training heavy bombers or former heavy bombers shall be carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in paragraphs 10, 11, and 12 of this Section, as applicable;

(b) Heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs:

(i) Conversion of such heavy bombers into heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments shall be carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in paragraph 11 of this Section; or
(ii) Conversion of such heavy bombers into training heavy bombers or former heavy bombers shall be carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in paragraphs 11 and 12 of this Section, as applicable;

(c) Conversion of heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments into training heavy bombers or former heavy bombers shall be carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in paragraph 12 of this Section.

10. To convert a heavy bomber so that it is no longer equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, all weapons bays equipped to carry long-range nuclear ALCMs shall be modified so as to render them incapable of carrying long-range nuclear ALCMs. All external attachment joints for long-range nuclear ALCMs and all external attachment joints for pylons for long-range nuclear ALCMs shall be removed or modified so as to render them incapable of carrying long-range nuclear ALCMs.

11. To convert a heavy bomber so that it is no longer equipped for nuclear armaments, all weapons bays equipped to carry nuclear armaments shall be modified so as to render them incapable of carrying nuclear armaments. All external attachment joints for nuclear armaments and all external attachment joints for pylons for nuclear armaments shall be removed or modified so as to render them incapable of carrying nuclear armaments.

12. To convert a heavy bomber so that it is no longer equipped for non-nuclear air-to-surface armaments, all weapons bays equipped for non-nuclear air-to-surface armaments shall be modified so as to render them incapable of carrying any air-to-surface armaments. All external attachment joints for such armaments and all external attachment joints for pylons for such armaments shall be removed or modified so as to render them incapable of carrying any air-to-surface armaments.

13. Upon completion of the above requirements, the converted heavy bomber shall not be flown, but shall be moved directly to the viewing site at the conversion or elimination facility. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section IV of the Notification Protocol. The converting Party may also provide an additional notification regarding the planned date of arrival of such a heavy bomber at the viewing site. The Party receiving such notification or notifications shall have the right, within the 20-day period beginning on the date the converted heavy bomber arrives at the viewing site, to inspect it to confirm that the procedures provided for in paragraphs 10, 11, and 12 of this Section, whichever are applicable, have been completed. Upon completion of such inspection, or, if an inspection was not conducted, upon expiration of the 20-day period, the inspected Party shall have the right to remove the converted heavy bomber or former heavy bomber from the viewing site.

14. If an inspection is conducted, the inspection team leader and a member of the in-country escort shall confirm, in a factual written report containing the results of the inspection team's observation of the converted heavy bomber or former heavy bomber, that the inspection team has completed its inspection. This report shall be completed in accordance with Section XVIII of the Inspection Protocol.

15. Upon completion of the inspection provided for in paragraph 13 of this Section or, if an inspection was not conducted, upon expiration of the 20-day period, the converted heavy bomber shall begin to be considered to be a heavy bomber of a different category or to be a former heavy bomber depending on the conversion procedures that have been carried out. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.

VII. Procedures for Removal from Accountability of ICBMs for Mobile Launchers of ICBMs as a Result of Flight Tests or Static Testing

1. Removal of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs from accountability as a result of flight tests shall be subject to verification by national technical means of verification.

2. Procedures for removal from accountability as a result of flight tests:

(a) Notification shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section VI of the Notification Protocol; and
(b) The ICBMs shall cease to be subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty after the flight tests. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.

3. Procedures for removal of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs or the first stages of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs from accountability as a result of static testing:

(a) The Party that has accomplished static testing of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs or a first stage of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall provide notification thereof in accordance with paragraph 5 of Section IV of the Notification Protocol.
(b) If static testing is accomplished through dissection, that is, removal of propellant segments for testing, each time the Party removes such a segment it shall provide notification thereof in accordance with paragraph 5 of Section IV of the Notification Protocol.
(c) The remains of the ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs or the first stage of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall be eliminated in accordance with applicable procedures provided for in Section I of this Protocol.

VIII. Other Procedures for Removal from or Changes in Accountability

1. ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, their launch canisters, silo launchers of ICBMs, silo training launchers, silo test launchers, mobile launchers of ICBMs, mobile training launchers, fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs, SLBM launchers, soft-site launchers, heavy bombers, former heavy bombers, static display items, and heavy bombers and former heavy bombers converted for use as ground trainers shall cease to be subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty after the completion of the procedures provided for in paragraph 2, 3, 6, or 8 of this Section, as applicable.

2. Accidental loss:

(a) If, in the judgment of the Party possessing an item subject to limitations provided for in the Treaty, that item is lost as a result of an accident, notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.
(b) The item shall cease to be subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty as of the date or assumed date of the accidental loss specified in such a notification.

3. Disablement beyond repair:

(a) If, in the judgment of the Party possessing an item accountable under the provisions of the Treaty, that item is disabled beyond repair, notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.
(b) The disabled item shall be eliminated at the site of disablement, or at a conversion or elimination facility, in accordance with applicable procedures provided for in this Protocol, including inspection.

4. Procedures provided for in paragraph 5 of this Section shall be used to change the accountability, as a result of static display, of ICBMs, SLBMs, launch canisters, ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, and former heavy bombers.

5. Static display:

(a) Prior to being placed on static display, an item referred to in paragraph 4 of this Section shall be rendered inoperable and unusable so that it cannot be used for purposes inconsistent with the Treaty.
(b) Upon completion of the requirements in subparagraph (a) of this paragraph, an item to be placed on static display, except for silo launchers of ICBMs, shall be transported to a location where it could be inspected. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section IV of the Notification Protocol.
(c) A Party shall have the right, within the 30-day period beginning on the date of receipt of the notification provided in accordance with subparagraph (b) of this paragraph, to conduct an inspection of such an item.
(d) If an inspection is conducted, the inspection team leader and a member of the in-country escort shall confirm in a factual written report, containing the results of the inspection team's observation of the item specified for static display, that the inspection team has completed its inspection. This report shall be completed in accordance with Section XVIII of the Inspection Protocol.
(e) Upon completion of the inspection provided for in subparagraph (c) of this paragraph, or, if an inspection was not conducted, upon expiration of the 30-day period, and after the item to be placed on static display, except for silo launchers of ICBMs, has been transported to and installed at its static display location, it shall be considered to be on static display. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.

6. If the Party possessing the item removes it from static display, that item shall be eliminated at the site of static display, or at a conversion or elimination facility, in accordance with applicable procedures provided for in this Protocol. Upon completion of such procedures, the eliminated item shall cease to be subject to the limitations provided for in subparagraph 7(a) of Article IV of the Treaty. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.

7. Heavy bombers or former heavy bombers converted for use as ground trainers:

(a) Procedures for changing accountability of heavy bombers or former heavy bombers as a result of conversion for use as ground trainers:

(i) At least one third of each wing or the entire vertical stabilizer of the heavy bomber or former heavy bomber shall be removed; and
(ii) Upon completion of the above requirements, the heavy bomber or former heavy bomber so converted shall cease to be subject to the limitations provided for in Article II and in subparagraphs 3(a) and 3(b) of Article IV of the Treaty. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.

(b) Upon the completion of the conversion process, a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber converted for use as a ground trainer shall remain visible to national technical means of verification for a 90-day period.

8. A heavy bomber or former heavy bomber converted for use as a ground trainer that is no longer used for such purposes shall be eliminated in situ or at a conversion or elimination facility for heavy bombers or former heavy bombers, in accordance with applicable procedures provided for in Section VI of this Protocol. Upon the completion of the appropriate elimination procedures, the heavy bomber or former heavy bomber converted for use as a ground trainer shall cease to be subject to the limitations provided for in subparagraph 7(b) of Article IV of the Treaty. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.

IX. Procedures for Elimination of Facilities

1. Pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article XI of the Treaty, each Party shall have the right to verify by inspection that the elimination of facilities provided for in paragraph 2 of Section XII of the Inspection Protocol has been completed. The completion of elimination of all other declared facilities shall be subject to verification by national technical means of verification.

2. Any declared facility shall be considered to be eliminated for the purposes of the Treaty as soon as all strategic offensive arms specified for such a facility, and all support equipment, have been removed and all silo launchers and fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs are eliminated in accordance with the procedures provided for in this Protocol. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.

This Protocol is an integral part of the Treaty and shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force so long as the Treaty remains in force. As provided for in subparagraph (b) of Article XV of the Treaty, the Parties may agree upon such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty. The Parties agree that, if it becomes necessary to make changes in this Protocol that do not affect substantive rights or obligations under the Treaty, they shall use the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission to reach agreement on such changes, without resorting to the procedure for making amendments set forth in Article XVIII of the Treaty.

Done at Moscow on July 31, 1991, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the United States of America:
George Bush
President of the United States of America

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
M. Gorbachev
President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms

Pursuant to and in implementation of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties hereby agree upon procedures governing the conduct of inspections and continuous monitoring activities provided for in Article XI of the Treaty.

I. General Obligations

For the purpose of helping to ensure verification of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty, each Party shall facilitate the conduct of inspections and continuous monitoring activities by the other Party in accordance with the provisions of this Protocol.

II. Provisions Concerning the Legal Status of Inspectors, Monitors, and Aircrew Members

1. Inspections and continuous monitoring activities shall be conducted by inspectors and monitors. Except as provided for in paragraph 6 of Section IV of this Protocol, inspectors and monitors shall be transported to the territory of the inspected Party by inspection airplanes. Inspectors and monitors, as well as aircrew members that operate these airplanes, shall be assigned in accordance with paragraphs 2, 3, 4, and 5 of this Section and subject to provisions of the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Early Exchange of Lists of Inspectors, Monitors, and Aircrew Members of July 31, 1991.

2. The list of inspectors shall not contain at any one time more than 400 individuals, and the list of monitors shall not contain at any one time more than 300 individuals. The number of individuals on the list of aircrew members shall not be limited. Inspectors and monitors shall be citizens of the inspecting Party. The Parties shall have the right to change, by mutual agreement, the number of inspectors and monitors that each of these lists may contain. For each proposed inspector, monitor, and aircrew member, the lists shall contain first name, middle name or patronymic, and last name; day, month, and year of birth; city, state or oblast, and country of birth; and passport number, if available.

3. Each Party shall have the right to inform the other Party of its agreement with, or objection to, the designation of each inspector, monitor, and aircrew member proposed, by providing a notification in accordance with paragraph 21 of Section III of this Protocol.

4. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 2 of this Section, each Party shall have the right to amend its lists of inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members no more than once in each 21-day period, by providing the other Party with a notification in accordance with paragraph 20 of Section III of this Protocol. With each change, the number of inspectors whose names are entered in the list of inspectors shall not exceed 30, the number of monitors whose names are entered in the list of monitors shall not exceed 25, and the number of aircrew members whose names are entered in the list of aircrew members shall not exceed 25. The Party receiving notification of an amendment to the list of inspectors, monitors, or aircrew members shall provide notification to the other Party, in accordance with paragraph 21 of Section III of this Protocol, of its agreement with or objection to the designation of each such inspector, monitor, or aircrew member.

5. No later than 25 days after entry into force of the Treaty, or no later than 30 days after receipt of a notification of amendments to the lists of inspectors, monitors, or aircrew members, the Party receiving such lists or proposed amendments thereto shall provide visas and, where necessary, such other documents to each individual to whom it has agreed, as may be required to ensure that each inspector, monitor, or aircrew member may enter and remain in the territory of that Party throughout the in-country period. The inspected Party shall ensure that such visas and appropriate documents shall be valid for a period of at least 24 months, and the inspecting Party shall ensure that persons receiving such visas and appropriate documents shall use them only for the purpose of conducting inspections or continuous monitoring activities in accordance with the provisions of this Protocol.

6. An individual on the list of inspectors may be objected to only if that individual is under indictment for a criminal offense on the territory of the inspected Party or if that individual has been convicted in a criminal prosecution or expelled by the Party reviewing the list. An individual on the list of monitors or aircrew members may be objected to if that individual is found unacceptable by the Party reviewing the list. The Party making such an objection shall so notify the other Party in accordance with paragraph 21 of Section III of this Protocol. Individuals who are objected to shall be deleted from the lists. In the event the inspected Party subsequently determines that an inspector, monitor, or aircrew member of the other Party is under indictment for a criminal offense on the territory of the inspected Party or has ever been convicted in a criminal prosecution or expelled by the inspected Party, or has violated the conditions governing the conduct of inspections or continuous monitoring activities provided for in this Protocol, the inspected Party making such determination may so notify the inspecting Party in accordance with paragraph 22 of Section III of this Protocol. In the event that the inspecting Party is so notified, that Party shall promptly recall that individual from the territory of the inspected Party, if that individual is there at such a time. The inspecting Party shall also delete the individual from the list of inspectors, monitors, or aircrew members.

7. In order to exercise their functions effectively, for the purpose of implementing the Treaty and not for their personal benefit, the inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members shall be accorded the following privileges and immunities:

(a) Inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members shall be accorded the inviolability enjoyed by diplomatic agents in accordance with Article 29 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of April 18, 1961.
(b) The office premises, except for those in the operations center, and living quarters for monitors shall be accorded the inviolability and protection accorded to the premises of the mission and private residences of diplomatic agents in accordance with Articles 22 and 30 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
(c) The papers and correspondence of inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members shall enjoy the inviolability accorded to the papers and correspondence of diplomatic agents in accordance with Article 30 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
(d) Inspection airplanes shall be inviolable. This shall not affect airplanes making regularly scheduled commercial flights that are used for the transportation of inspectors and monitors to points of entry, or their aircrews.
(e) Inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members shall be accorded the immunities accorded diplomatic agents in accordance with paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. The immunity from jurisdiction with respect to an inspector, monitor, or aircrew member may be waived by the inspecting Party in those cases when it is of the opinion that immunity would impede the course of justice and that it can be waived without prejudice to the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty. Waiver must always be express.
(f) Monitors shall be accorded the exemption from dues and taxes accorded to diplomatic agents in accordance with Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
(g) Inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members of a Party shall have the right to bring into the territory of the other Party, without payment of any customs duties or related charges, articles for their personal use, with the exception of articles, the import or export of which is prohibited by law or controlled by quarantine regulations.
(h) If the inspected Party considers that there has been an abuse of privileges and immunities provided for in this paragraph, consultations shall be held between the Parties to determine whether such an abuse has occurred. If it is determined that such an abuse has occurred, the inspecting Party shall take necessary measures to prevent a repetition of such an abuse.

The privileges and immunities provided for in this paragraph shall be accorded for the entire time the inspectors, monitors, or aircrew members are within the territory of the other Party, and thereafter with respect to acts previously performed in the exercise of their official functions. During their stay in the territory of the inspected Party, without prejudice to the privileges and immunities provided for in this paragraph, inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members shall be obliged to respect the laws and regulations of the inspected Party, shall be obliged not to interfere in its internal affairs, and shall not engage in any professional or commercial activity for personal profit on the territory of the inspected Party.

III. Notifications Concerning Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities

1. Each Party shall provide to the other Party the notifications provided for in this Section concerning inspections and continuous monitoring activities pursuant to Article VIII of the Treaty.

2. Notification of the standing diplomatic clearance number for inspection airplanes shall be provided no later than 30 days after entry into force of the Treaty, for the period until the end of the current calendar year, and subsequently no less than 30 days prior to the beginning of each following calendar year, and shall include:

(a) standing diplomatic clearance number; and
(b) calendar year.

3. Notification of an intention to conduct an inspection pursuant to paragraph 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, or 10 of Article XI of the Treaty, shall be provided no less than 16 hours in advance of the estimated time of arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry from outside the territory of the inspected Party and shall include:

(a) the point of entry;
(b) the date and estimated time of arrival at the point of entry;
(c) the date and time for the designation of the inspection site and the type of inspection; and
(d) the names of inspectors and aircrew members.

4. The date and time for the designation of the inspection site and the type of inspection shall be specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Section subject to the following conditions:

(a) For an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 2 or 4 of Article XI of the Treaty, the date and time for such designation shall be neither less than four hours nor more than 48 hours after the date and estimated time of arrival at the point of entry.
(b) For an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 3, 5, 6, or 10 of Article XI of the Treaty, the date and time for such designation shall be neither less than four hours nor more than 24 hours after the date and estimated time of arrival at the point of entry.
(c) For an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article XI of the Treaty, the date and time for such designation shall be no more than 48 hours after the notification of the completion of an exercise dispersal of mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles has been provided in accordance with paragraph 12 of Section II of the Notification Protocol, or no more than four hours after the date and estimated time of arrival at the point of entry, whichever is earlier.

5. Notification of an intention to conduct an inspection pursuant to paragraph 8, 9, 11, 12, or 13 of Article XI of the Treaty shall be provided no less than 72 hours in advance of the estimated time of arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry from outside the territory of the inspected Party and shall include:

(a) the point of entry;
(b) the date and estimated time of arrival at the point of entry;
(c) the inspection site and the type of inspection; and
(d) the names of inspectors and aircrew members.

6. Notification of an intention to replace inspectors conducting an inspection pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article XI of the Treaty shall be provided no less than seven days in advance of the estimated time of arrival of replacement inspectors at the point of entry from outside the territory of the inspected Party and shall include:

(a) the point of entry;
(b) the date and estimated time of arrival at the point of entry;
(c) the inspection site;
(d) the names of the incoming replacement inspectors and outgoing inspectors being replaced, including the name of the incoming inspection team leader, if such a replacement is planned; and
(e) the names of aircrew members.

7. Notification of an intention to conduct a sequential inspection, as provided for in paragraph 36 or 37 of Section VI of this Protocol, shall be provided in writing through a member of the in-country escort and shall specify:

(a) for an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, or 10 of Article XI of the Treaty, whether the inspection team intends to go directly to the next inspection site or return first to the point of entry; or
(b) for an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 8, 9, 11, 12, or 13 of Article XI of the Treaty, the next inspection site.

8. Notification of the date and time for the designation of the next inspection site and the type of inspection as provided for in paragraph 36 of Section VI or paragraph 19 of Section IX of this Protocol, shall be made in writing through a member of the in-country escort.

9. The date and time for the designation of the inspection site and the type of inspection shall be specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 8 of this Section, subject to the following conditions:

(a) If such notification is provided at the inspection site, the date and time for such designation shall be:

(i) no earlier than 18 hours after commencement of the period of inspection, except for cases where the notification is provided pursuant to paragraph 19 of Section IX of this Protocol;
(ii) no earlier than the completion of post-inspection procedures; and
(iii) no later than 12 hours after the completion of post-inspection procedures.

(b) If such notification is provided at the point of entry, the date and time for such designation shall be no earlier than four hours and no later than 24 hours after the return of the inspection team to the point of entry.

10. Notification of an intention to establish a perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system at a facility subject to continuous monitoring and of an intention to conduct an engineering site survey at such a facility, shall be provided no less than 30 days in advance of the estimated date of arrival at the point of entry of the monitoring team and engineering site survey equipment and shall include:

(a) the specification of the facility;
(b) the point of entry;
(c) the date and estimated time of arrival at the point of entry, and the preferred time of departure for the facility from the point of entry; and
(d) the names of the members of the monitoring team and aircrew members.

11. Notification of the date of commencement of continuous monitoring at a facility specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 10 of this Section and of the initial arrival of monitors at that facility to carry out continuous monitoring, shall be provided no less than 30 days in advance of the estimated date of arrival of monitors at the point of entry and shall include:

(a) the specification of the facility;
(b) the date when the procedures for continuous monitoring at that facility will commence;
(c) the point of entry;
(d) the date and estimated time of arrival at the point of entry, and the preferred time of departure for the facility from the point of entry; and
(e) the names of the monitors and aircrew members.

12. Notification containing a request for logistic support for a facility specified in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 10 of this Section shall include:

(a) the specification of the facility; and
(b) the request for logistic support in accordance with paragraph 19 of Section XVI of this Protocol.

13. Notification of an intention to enter the territory of the other Party to establish a perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system at a facility specified in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 10 of this Section, shall be made no less than seven days in advance of the estimated date of arrival of the monitors at the point of entry, if monitors that carry out continuous monitoring are present at that facility, and no less than 30 days in advance of the estimated date of arrival of the monitors at the point of entry, if no monitors that carry out continuous monitoring are present or have been present at that facility and shall include:

(a) the point of entry;
(b) the date and estimated time of arrival at the point of entry, and the preferred time of departure for the facility from the point of entry;
(c) the specification of the facility; and
(d) the names of the monitors and aircrew members.

14. Notification of an intention to enter the territory of the other Party to replace monitors at a facility specified in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 11 or 13 of this Section, shall be provided no less than seven days in advance of the estimated date of arrival of the monitors at the point of entry and shall include:

(a) the point of entry;
(b) the date and estimated time of arrival at the point of entry, and the preferred time of departure for the facility from the point of entry;
(c) whether the replacement shall be at the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, or at the airport associated with such a facility;
(d) the specification of the facility;
(e) the names of the incoming monitors and aircrew members; and
(f) the number of monitors to be replaced.

15. Notification of an intention to enter the territory of the other Party to maintain a perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system at a facility or facilities specified in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 13 of this Section, shall be provided no less than seven days in advance of the estimated date of arrival of the monitors at the point of entry and shall include:

(a) the point of entry;
(b) the date and estimated time of arrival at the point of entry, and the preferred time of departure for the facility from the point of entry;
(c) the specification of the facility or facilities; and
(d) the names of the monitors and aircrew members.

16. Notification of an intention to move to another facility at which monitors are present, or to leave the territory of the inspected Party shall be provided no less than 48 hours in advance of the preferred time of departure, through a member of the in-country escort at the facility from which the monitors will leave, and shall include:

(a) the preferred time of departure;
(b) the destination;
(c) the names of monitors;
(d) for the movement to another monitored facility, the purpose of travel; and
(e) the equipment and supplies to be transported by the monitors.

17. Notification of an intention to use an inspection airplane in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section IV of this Protocol shall be provided no less than 20 days in advance of the estimated date of its arrival at the point of entry or airport associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, and shall include:

(a) the type of airplane;
(b) the specification of all the facilities subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facilities for which the equipment and supplies are intended;
(c) the point of entry or the airport associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility;
(d) the estimated date of arrival at the point of entry or at the airport associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility;
(e) for each facility specified in subparagraph (b) of this paragraph, the approximate number of separate palletized or oversize units of cargo, including modular structures, and the approximate weight and dimensions of each such unit of cargo; and
(f) the type and approximate amounts of hazardous materials carried on the airplane that require special safety measures in transportation and handling.

18. Notification of the confirmation of an intention to use an inspection airplane that has been notified in accordance with paragraph 17 of this Section shall be provided no less than seven days in advance of the estimated date of its arrival at the point of entry or airport associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, and shall include:

(a) the number, time, and date of the notification provided earlier in accordance with paragraph 17 of this Section;
(b) the date and estimated time of arrival at the point of entry or at the airport associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility; and
(c) the names of aircrew members.

19. Notification of the response to a request by the inspecting Party contained in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 17 of this Section to land an inspection airplane at the airport associated with a facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility shall be provided by the inspected Party no less than 72 hours prior to the estimated time of its arrival specified in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 13, 14, 15, or 18 of this Section, and shall include:

(a) in case the inspected Party permits the airplane to land at the airport associated with the facility specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 17 of this Section:

(i) the name of the airport;
(ii) the route for the flight of the inspection airplane to the airport; and
(iii) whether or not an escort crew will be provided and, if provided, a list of the members of that aircrew; or

(b) in case the inspected Party does not permit the airplane to land at the airport associated with the facility specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 17 of this Section, the point of entry associated with the facility.

20. Notification of amendments made to the list of inspectors, monitors, or aircrew members in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section II of this Protocol shall include:

(a) the list or lists to be amended;
(b) if any inspector, monitor, or aircrew member is removed from the lists, the first name, patronymic or middle name, and last name; day, month, and year of birth; city, oblast or state, and country of birth; and the passport number, if available, of the person removed; and
(c) for each inspector, monitor, or aircrew member proposed for inclusion in the lists, the first name, patronymic or middle name, and last name; day, month, and year of birth; city, oblast or state, and country of birth; and passport number, if available.

21. Notification of agreement with or objection to the designation by the other Party of each inspector, monitor, or aircrew member proposed for inclusion on the lists provided for in paragraph 2 of Section II of this Protocol shall be provided no later than 20 days after entry into force of the Treaty or, with respect to subsequent amendments made to these lists, no later than 20 days after receipt of the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 20 of this Section, and shall include:

(a) the corresponding list or lists;
(b) for each inspector, monitor, or aircrew member, the first name, patronymic or middle name, and last name; day, month, and year of birth; city, oblast or state, and country of birth; and passport number, if available; and
(c) for each inspector, monitor, or aircrew member, agreement with or objection to the designation of that person.

22. Notification of an objection to an inspector, monitor, or aircrew member who is currently on the list of inspectors, monitors, or aircrew members, shall include:

(a) the corresponding list or lists;
(b) for each inspector, monitor, or air-crew member, the first name, patronymic or middle name, and last name; day, month, and year of birth; city, oblast or state, and country of birth; and passport number if available; and
(c) for each inspector, monitor, or aircrew member, the reason for the objection to that person.

23. Notification of a change or addition to the points of entry to the territory of the inspected Party shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section IV of this Protocol through diplomatic channels no less than five months prior to the beginning of the use of the new point of entry, and shall include:

(a) the point of entry to be changed, if applicable; and
(b) the new point of entry.

24. Notification containing data concerning the flight plan of an inspection airplane shall be provided no less than six hours prior to the scheduled departure time of such an airplane from the last airfield prior to entering the airspace of the inspected Party.

25. Notification of the approval of the flight plan of an inspection airplane filed in accordance with paragraph 24 of this Section shall be provided by the inspected Party no less than three hours prior to the scheduled time for departure of such an airplane from the last airfield prior to entering the airspace of the inspected Party.

26. Notification of an intention to conduct the cargo examination at a location other than the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility shall be provided by the inspected Party no less than 120 hours in advance of the estimated time of arrival of an inspection airplane used in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section IV of this Protocol. |1|

27. Notification of a change of a route for flights of inspection airplanes to and from a point of entry established on the territory of a Party shall be provided by that Party no less than 30 days in advance of the effective date of such change and shall include:

(a) the point of entry;
(b) the changed flight route, and
(c) the effective date of such change. |2|

28. Notification of the determination, in accordance with subparagraph 1(d) of Subsection E of Section VI of Annex 8 to this Protocol, of agreed geographic coordinates of reference points used at a point of entry for testing the operability of satellite system receivers, shall be provided by the inspected Party no later than 48 hours after such determination and shall include:

(a) the point of entry;
(b) the date of determination of the agreed geographic coordinates;
(c) the agreed geographic coordinates of each of the reference points; and
(d) a physical description of each of the reference points. |3|

29. Notification of the intent to change, in accordance with subparagraph 1(h) of Subsection E of Section VI of Annex 8 to this Protocol, a reference point used at a point of entry for testing the operability of satellite system receivers, shall be provided by the inspected Party no less than seven days in advance of the proposed effective date of the change and shall include:

(a) the point of entry;
(b) the agreed geographic coordinates of the reference point to be changed;
(c) the geographic coordinates of the new reference point; and
(d) the proposed effective date of the change. |4|

IV. Arrangements for Air Transportation

1. The United States of America and the Russian Federation shall each establish on its territory no more than three and no fewer than two points of entry. The Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine shall each establish one point of entry on its territory. The points of entry and their associated inspection sites shall be listed in Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding. Each Party may change a point of entry to its territory by providing notification of such a change to the other Parties in accordance with paragraph 23 of Section III of this Protocol. |5|

2. The inspected Party shall, for each facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, identify the airport associated with that facility. Provisions of this Protocol relating to points of entry, except for the provisions of paragraphs 2, 3, 4, and 14 of Section V of this Protocol, shall apply to such airports while inspection airplanes or equipment and supplies transported by such airplanes in accordance with paragraph 4 of this Section are located there.

3. The inspecting Party shall have the right to use inspection airplanes of the types specified in paragraph 2 of Annex 10 to this Protocol for the transportation of inspectors or monitors to the points of entry on the territory of the inspected Party. Such airplanes may, at the same time that they are transporting inspectors, carry equipment intended for inspections. Such airplanes may, at the same time that they are transporting monitors, carry equipment and supplies intended for continuous monitoring activities. The inspecting Party shall provide notification of each flight of an inspection airplane transporting inspectors or monitors in accordance with paragraph 3, 5, 6, 10, 11, 13, 14, or 15 of Section III of this Protocol.

4. The inspecting Party shall have the right to use inspection airplanes of types specified in paragraph 3 of Annex 10 to this Protocol for the transportation of cargo specified in an inventory provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Annex 7 to this Protocol. Such airplanes may, at the same time that they are transporting such cargo, carry monitors, and equipment and supplies intended for continuous monitoring activities, and, if such airplanes arrive at the point of entry, also inspectors and equipment intended for inspections. Such airplanes may carry only equipment, only supplies, or both at one and the same time. Flights of such airplanes shall take place only to the points of entry, and, for airplanes not transporting inspectors, on a case-by-case basis, with the permission of the inspected Party, into airports associated with facilities subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facilities. For airplanes making flights into airports associated with facilities subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facilities, the inspected Party shall have the right to provide an escort crew consisting of not more than two individuals (navigator and radio operator or navigator only) who shall board the inspection plane at the last airfield prior to entering the airspace of the inspected Party. The inspecting Party shall provide notification of each flight of an inspection airplane for the transportation of cargo in accordance with paragraph 17 of Section III of this Protocol and, if applicable, paragraph 3, 5, 6, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, or 18 of Section III of this Protocol.

5. During an operational dispersal conducted by one of the Parties, each flight of inspection airplanes used in accordance with paragraph 3 or 4 of this Section, to transport monitors, and to transport cargo to the territory of the Party that has declared an operational dispersal, and to the territory of the Party that has declared the suspension of inspections in connection with such a dispersal conducted by the other Party, shall be agreed through diplomatic channels.

6. The inspecting Party shall have the right to use airplanes making regularly scheduled commercial flights to transport inspectors and monitors to those points of entry that are served by such airplanes. The provisions of this Protocol shall not affect airplanes making regularly scheduled commercial flights that are used for the transportation of inspectors and monitors to points of entry, or their aircrews. Inspectors arriving on the territory of the inspected Party on an airplane making a regularly scheduled commercial flight shall have the right to bring equipment intended for inspections. Monitors arriving on the territory of the inspected Party on an airplane making a regularly scheduled commercial flight shall have the right to bring equipment and supplies intended for continuous monitoring activities.

7. An inspection airplane used in accordance with paragraph 4 of this Section may transport equipment and supplies for more than one facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility only if all such facilities are associated with the same point of entry and the flight is made to that point of entry.

8. The following routes for flights of inspection airplanes used in accordance with this Section to and from the points of entry shall be listed in paragraph 10 of Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding:

(a) from the west, directly to and from the points of entry to the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and western points of entry to the Russian Federation and the United States o f America;
(b) from the east, directly to and from the point of entry to the Republic of Kazakhstan and eastern points of entry to the Russian Federation and the United States of America;
(c) between the points of entry to the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and western points of entry to the Russian Federation. An inspection airplane of the United States of America shall use such routes only if it has arrived at one of these points of entry from the west;
(d) between the point of entry to the Republic of Kazakhstan and eastern points of entry to the Russian Federation. An inspection airplane of the United States of America shall use such routes only if it has arrived at one of these points of entry from the east.

Such flight routes shall be the basis for issuing standing diplomatic clearance numbers. Each Party shall assign alternate airfields in accordance with the rules of the International Civil Aviation Organization. Each Party may change routes for flights of inspection airplanes to and from points of entry established on its territory by providing a notification of such change to the other Parties in accordance with paragraph 27 of Section III of this Protocol. |6|

9. Flight plans for inspection airplanes shall be filed in accordance with the procedures of the International Civil Aviation Organization applicable to civil aircraft. The inspecting Party shall include in the remarks section of each flight plan the standing diplomatic clearance number and the notation: "Inspection airplane. Priority clearance processing required."

10. No less than three hours before the scheduled time for departure of an inspection airplane from the last airfield prior to entering the airspace of the inspected Party, the inspected Party shall ensure that the flight plan of the inspection airplane, filed in accordance with paragraph 9 of this Section, is approved so that the inspection team or monitors may arrive at the point of entry by the estimated arrival time.

11. The call sign "START-XXX" shall be assigned to inspection airplanes. The same odd-hundred call sign shall be assigned to inspection airplanes of the United States of America (for example, 1XX, 3XX, 5XX) and the same even-hundred call sign shall be assigned to inspection airplanes of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (for example, 2XX, 4XX, 6XX).

12. The number of aircrew members for each inspection airplane shall not exceed ten, except that the inspecting Party shall have the right to exceed that number of aircrew members by no more than 15 for inspection airplanes used in accordance with paragraph 4 of this Section, for the purpose of assisting in the delivery or removal of equipment and supplies intended for continuous monitoring activities or, on a case-by-case basis, with the permission of the inspected Party, for the purpose of conducting non-routine maintenance or repair of inspection airplanes located within the territory of the inspected Party.

13. The inspected Party shall provide parking, security protection, fueling, air navigation, airport facility, and ground technical and commercial services, as well as additional services as requested, for inspection airplanes of the inspecting Party at the point of entry or the airport associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility. The cost of parking and security protection for each such airplane shall be borne by the inspected Party. The cost of fueling and air navigation, airport facility, and ground technical and commercial services, as well as additional services as requested, shall be borne by the inspecting Party.

14. For each facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, the maximum weight of equipment and supplies that may be brought into or taken out by one flight of an airplane transporting monitors through the point of entry in accordance with the provisions of this Section shall be 3,000 kilograms, unless otherwise agreed within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. |7| This limitation on weight shall not apply to the cargo specified in the inventory provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Annex 7 to this Protocol.

V. Activities Beginning Upon Arrival at the Point of Entry

1. Inspection teams, monitors, and air-crew members shall arrive at the point of entry on the territory of the inspected Party that is associated with the inspection site or the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility. As soon as the airplane lands, the in-country escort shall meet: the inspection team or monitors, and aircrew members arriving at the point of entry on an inspection air-plane; or the inspection team or monitors arriving at the point of entry on an airplane making a regularly scheduled commercial flight. The in-country escort shall expedite the entry of the inspection team or monitors, and aircrew members, their baggage, and equipment intended for inspections, or equipment and supplies intended for continuous monitoring activities, into the territory of the inspected Party and shall accompany the inspection team and assist it in exercising its functions throughout the in-country period. The in-country escort shall have the right to accompany monitors and shall assist them in exercising their functions throughout the in-country period.

2. As soon as an airplane lands, diplomatic officials of each Party whose citizens are among the inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members arriving at the point of entry shall meet:

(a) the inspection team or monitors, and aircrew members arriving at the point of entry on an inspection airplane; or
(b) the inspection team or monitors arriving at the point of entry on an airplane making a regularly scheduled commercial flight.

Such diplomatic officials may accompany inspectors and monitors only during the stay of the inspectors and monitors at the point of entry, but may accompany the aircrew members throughout the in-country period. |8|

3. An inspection airplane arriving at the San Francisco point of entry shall land at Travis Air Force Base. No more than two diplomatic officials of the Party that provided the notification of the inspection in accordance with Section III of this Protocol and no more than one diplomatic official of each other Party whose citizens are among the inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members arriving at the point of entry shall be permitted to enter Travis Air Force Base for the purpose of meeting inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members arriving there. For that purpose, no less than four hours prior to the estimated time of arrival of such an airplane at Travis Air Force Base, the embassy or consular post of which such diplomatic officials are members shall transmit to the Department of State of the United States of America in Washington, D.C. by telephone, the names of the diplomatic officials involved and the registration number of the vehicle involved. The diplomatic officials so identified shall be granted access to the base no less than 30 minutes prior to the estimated time of arrival of such airplane. |9|

4. The inspected Party shall provide, or arrange for providing transportation to Travis Air Force Base of inspection teams and monitors that arrive at San Francisco International Airport on airplanes making regularly scheduled commercial flights. In such cases, no more than two diplomatic officials of the Party that provided the notification of the inspection in accordance with Section III of this Protocol and no more than one diplomatic official of each other Party whose citizens are among the inspectors and monitors arriving at the point of entry shall be permitted to accompany such inspection teams or such monitors onto Travis Air Force Base. No less than two hours prior to the estimated time of arrival of the inspection team or monitors at San Francisco International Airport, the embassy or consular post of which such diplomatic officials are members shall transmit to the Department of State of the United States of America in Washington, D.C., by telephone, the names of the diplomatic officials involved and the registration number of the vehicle involved, for the purpose of providing the diplomatic officials so identified access to Travis Air Force Base in order to accompany inspection teams or monitors. |10|

5. An inspector or monitor shall be considered to have assumed the duties of an inspector or monitor upon arrival at the point of entry on the territory of the inspected Party and shall be considered to have ceased performing those duties after departure from the territory of the inspected Party through the point of entry.

6. Throughout the in-country period, inspectors and monitors shall wear civilian clothes. During their stay at the inspection site, in the perimeter continuous monitoring area, and at other locations, as agreed by the inspection team leader or monitoring team leader and a member of the in-country escort, the inspectors and monitors shall wear unique badges provided by the inspecting Party.

7. Each Party shall ensure that equipment and supplies are exempt from all custom duties and are expeditiously processed at the point of entry.

8. Equipment and supplies that the inspecting Party, in accordance with paragraphs 15 and 16 of Section VI of this Protocol, brings into the country in which the inspection site or the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility is located shall be subject to examination each time they are brought into that country. Such equipment and supplies shall be examined by the in-country escort, in the presence of inspectors or monitors, or, for inspection airplanes used in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section IV of this Protocol, at the discretion of the inspecting Party, in the presence of aircrew members. The purpose of such examination shall be to ascertain to the satisfaction of each Party that the equipment or supplies cannot perform functions unconnected with the requirements of inspections or continuous monitoring activities.

9. Equipment and supplies that inspectors or monitors bring on inspection airplanes used in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section IV of this Protocol or on airplanes making regularly scheduled commercial flights shall be examined by the in-country escort at the point of entry. The examination of such equipment and supplies shall be completed prior to the departure of the inspection team or monitors from the point of entry for the inspection site or the facility subject to continuous monitoring or the monitored facility.

10. Equipment and supplies transported on inspection airplanes used in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section IV of this Protocol shall be examined in accordance with the provisions of Annex 7 to this Protocol.

11. If the inspected Party concludes as a result of an examination conducted in accordance with paragraph 8 of this Section that an item of equipment or supplies can perform functions unconnected with the requirements of inspections or continuous monitoring activities, the inspected Party may impound that item of equipment or supplies at the location of the examination. Equipment and supplies impounded at the point of entry or the airport associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or the monitored facility shall not be brought to an inspection site or to a facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, unless the inspected Party informs the inspecting Party otherwise.

12. If, during the examination of equipment or supplies a member of the in-country escort concludes that an item of equipment or supplies should not be cleared for use, the member of the in-country escort shall explain the reasons for that conclusion to the inspection team leader or the monitoring team leader, or an authorized representative of such a team. If the inspection team leader or the monitoring team leader, or the authorized representative of such a team, disagrees with the conclusion of the member of the in-country escort, the inspection team leader or the monitoring team leader, or the authorized representative of such a team, may explain the appropriateness of the item of equipment or supplies to the requirements of inspections or continuous monitoring activities. If the member of the in-country escort remains convinced of the original conclusion, that member of the in-country escort and the inspection team leader or the monitoring team leader, or the authorized representative of such a team, shall record their views in a joint document and each of them shall retain a copy of the document. The Parties may resolve disagreements on the use of impounded equipment or supplies through diplomatic channels, within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, or by other methods agreed by the Parties.

13. If the inspected Party has not informed the inspecting Party of a different decision, the equipment or supplies impounded at the point of entry or at the airport associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility shall be removed no later than the departure from the country of the inspection team that brought the impounded equipment or supplies or no later than the next departure of monitors from the country. The impounded equipment or supplies may be removed from the country, at the choice of the inspecting Party, either on an inspection airplane or on a civil aircraft making a regularly scheduled commercial flight. Until such equipment or supplies have been removed from the country, they shall be stored at the point of entry or the airport associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility. A storage method shall be used that requires the presence of representatives of both Parties for access to the impounded equipment or supplies.

14. Except as provided for in Annex 7 to this Protocol, each Party shall have the right to store equipment and supplies at the points of entry on the territory of the other Party. Storage of such equipment and supplies at each point of entry shall be within a secure structure or room. The inspecting Party may provide containers that are locked by locks and sealed by seals belonging to the inspecting Party, for storage of such equipment and supplies within the secure structure or room. The storage method used shall require the presence of representatives of both Parties for access to the equipment or supplies.

15. For an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, or 10 of Article XI of the Treaty, the inspection team leader shall, at or before the time for the designation of the inspection site specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section III of this Protocol, designate in writing to the inspected Party through the in-country escort, of the type of inspection and the inspection site, indicating its name and geographic coordinates. Such a designation of the inspection site shall be made either at the time specified in that notification at the airport of the point of entry, or, prior to that time, at the airport of the point of entry or at another place within the point of entry.

16. For reentry vehicle inspections of deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, if prior to the departure of the inspection team for the inspection site, a member of the in-country escort has informed the inspection team leader that there are no deployed ICBMs or SLBMs in all of the restricted areas of the ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs or the rail garrison or at a submarine base to be inspected, no later than one hour after such notification, the inspection team leader shall have the right to:

(a) inform the member of the in-country escort that the inspection of the designated base for mobile launchers of ICBMs or of the submarine base shall take place. In this case such inspection shall count against the quota provided for in paragraph 1 of Section IX of this Protocol;
(b) designate for inspection an inspection site associated with the same point of entry in accordance with the provisions provided in paragraph 15 of this Section or in paragraph 36 or 37 of Section VI of this Protocol;
(c) decline to conduct the inspection and leave the territory of the inspected Party. In this case the number of reentry vehicle inspections of deployed ICBMs and SLBMs to which the inspecting Party is entitled shall not be reduced.

17. For a data update inspection at an air base for heavy bombers, except for an air base at which are based only heavy bombers of a type from none of which a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested; an air base for former heavy bombers; a training facility for heavy bombers; or a storage facility for heavy bombers and former heavy bombers, that has been designated for inspection:

(a) If the number of heavy bombers, other than test heavy bombers, and former heavy bombers that are of types of heavy bombers and former heavy bombers based at the designated facility and that will be located at such facility at any time during the first 20 hours of the period of inspection, is less than 70 percent of the number of such airplanes specified as based at such facility, a member of the in-country escort shall so inform the inspection team leader prior to the departure of the inspection team to the inspection site. In such a case, the inspection team leader shall have the right:

(i) to inform a member of the in-country escort that the inspection of the designated facility will proceed; or
(ii) to designate another inspection site; or
(iii) to decline to conduct the inspection. In such a case, the number of data update inspections to which the inspecting Party is entitled shall not be reduced.

(b) If the inspection team leader is not so informed, or if the inspection team leader is so informed but decides to continue the inspection, then prior to the departure of the inspection team to the inspection site, a member of the in-country escort shall inform the inspection team leader of the name of the airfield within the national territory of the inspected Party at which will be located each heavy bomber or former heavy bomber that is specified as based at the facility designated for inspection, and that will be absent from the inspection site but located within the national territory of the inspected Party during the period of the inspection. A member of the in-country escort shall also inform the inspection team leader of the number and type of test heavy bombers that will be located at the inspection site at any time during the period that pre-inspection restrictions on heavy bombers and former heavy bombers will be in effect.
(c) For sequential inspections, the procedures provided for in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph shall be carried out at the location at which the inspection team leader designates the subsequent inspection site pursuant to paragraph 7 of Section III of this Protocol.

18. Throughout the in-country period, the inspected Party shall provide, or arrange for the provision of meals, lodging, work space, transportation, and, as necessary, medical and other urgent services for the inspectors, and aircrew members of the inspecting Party. Costs of all such services shall be borne by the inspected Party.

19. The inspected Party shall provide, or arrange for the provision of meals, lodging, transportation, and, as necessary, urgent medical services for the monitors while the monitors are at the point of entry; shall provide or arrange for the provision of transportation in connection with travel between the point of entry or the airport associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility and the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, and between the facilities subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facilities; and, at the request of the inspecting Party, shall provide or arrange for the provision of meals, lodging, work space, transportation and, as necessary, medical and other urgent services while monitors are at the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility. The cost of all services provided for monitors shall be distributed as follows:

(a) The cost of transportation and urgent medical services provided while monitors are at the point of entry shall be borne by the inspected Party.
(b) The cost of meals and lodging provided while monitors are at the point of entry shall be borne by the inspecting Party.
(c) The cost of temporary and permanent lodging and work space provided while the monitors are at the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, including utilities and maintenance for such lodging and work space, shall be borne by the inspecting Party.
(d) The cost of meals, provided at the request of the inspecting Party, while the monitors are at the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility shall be borne by the inspecting Party.
(e) The cost of transportation of monitors that arrive on an airplane used in accordance with paragraph 3 or 6 of Section IV of this Protocol, together with equipment and supplies that do not exceed the weight specified in accordance with paragraph 14 of Section IV of this Protocol, from the point of entry to the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility and from such a facility to the point of entry shall be borne by the inspecting Party.
(f) The cost of transportation of monitors, together with equipment and supplies that do not exceed the weight specified in accordance with paragraph 14 of Section IV of this Protocol, from one facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility to another such facility shall be borne by the inspecting Party.
(g) The cost of transportation of monitors from the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility to the embassy or consulate of the inspecting Party on the territory of the inspected Party and back, pursuant to paragraph 29 of Section XVI of this Protocol, as well as the provision of transportation, meals, and lodging during such travel, shall be borne by the inspecting Party.
(h) The cost of delivering equipment and supplies for continuous monitoring activities that arrive on an airplane used in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section IV of this Protocol, and the cost of transporting the monitors that arrive on such an airplane, from the point of entry to the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility and from such a facility to the point of entry shall be borne by the inspecting Party.
(i) The cost of delivering equipment and supplies for continuous monitoring activities that arrive on an airplane used in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section IV of this Protocol, and the cost of transporting the monitors that arrive on such an airplane, from the airport associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility to such a facility and from the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility to the airport associated with such a facility shall be borne by the inspecting Party.
(j) The cost of urgent evacuation of monitors, at the request of the inspecting Party, from the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility to the point of entry or airport associated with such a facility shall be borne by the inspecting Party.
(k) The cost of utilities and maintenance of the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system, including utilities and engineering support for the building for storage of equipment and supplies, shall be borne by the inspecting Party.
(l) The cost of transportation provided for monitors within the zone where monitors may move with the permission of the inspected Party and the free movement zone that are provided for in paragraph 8 of Section XVI of this Protocol shall be borne by the inspected Party.
(m) The cost of medical and other urgent services provided while the monitors are at the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility shall be borne by the inspecting Party.

20. For the goods and services provided by the inspected Party pursuant to paragraphs 18 and 19 of this Section, the following provisions shall apply:

(a) Meals for monitors, inspectors, and aircrew members shall be prepared meals and shall be served either in a dining facility or at a location agreed to by the inspection team leader and a member of the in-country escort.
(b) Lodging for inspectors and aircrew members shall be of the following types:

(i) Lodging for inspectors and aircrew members provided at the point of entry, and for inspectors conducting an inspection pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article XI of the Treaty at facilities where the elimination process occurs continuously or nearly continuously, shall be hotel-type accommodations.
(ii) Lodging for inspectors provided in all other cases shall be sufficient to permit inspectors to sleep. Such lodging need not be separate from the work space for inspectors provided at inspection sites.

(c) Lodging for monitors shall be in buildings built by the inspected Party for the inspecting Party, except that lodging for monitors at the point of entry shall be hotel-type accommodations. Until construction of such buildings is completed the inspected Party shall provide monitors with apartment-type accommodations in existing buildings.
(d) For transportation of inspectors and monitors, the following provisions shall apply:

(i) At the inspection site, the inspected Party shall provide a sufficient number of vehicles to transport the inspection team, and up to five vehicles to transport the subgroups that may be designated by the inspection team leader.
(ii) For monitors at the point of entry and within the zone where monitors may move with the permission of the inspected Party and within the free movement zone that are provided for in paragraph 8 of Section XVI of this Protocol, the inspected Party shall provide vehicles. The drivers of such vehicles shall be considered to be members of the in-country escort.

21. The inspecting Party shall provide or arrange for the provision of meals, lodging, work space, transportation, and, as necessary, medical and other urgent services for the escort crew of the inspected Party pursuant to paragraph 4 of Section IV of this Protocol while such escort crew is at or in the vicinity of the last airfield from which the inspection airplane will depart prior to entering the airspace of the inspected Party. Costs for all such services shall be borne by the inspecting Party. The inspecting Party shall provide or arrange for transportation of the escort crew to the last airfield from which the inspection airplane will depart prior to entering the airspace of the inspected Party. The cost for such travel shall be borne by the inspecting Party.

22. Coverage of the activities of inspection teams and monitoring teams by representatives of the mass media on the territory of the inspected Party shall be arranged as follows:

(a) at the points of entry the inspected Party shall provide such representatives an opportunity to photograph and televise the arrival and departure of inspection teams and monitoring teams;
(b) the Parties shall agree on a case-by-case basis through diplomatic channels to provide representatives of the mass media an opportunity to interview inspectors and monitors, to include taking photographs and making audio-visual recordings;
(c) the activities of representatives of the mass media shall be arranged so that such activities do not interfere with the conduct of inspections, continuous monitoring activities, or the process of elimination; and
(d) the Parties shall not allow representatives of the mass media to accompany inspectors during inspections or monitors during the conduct of continuous monitoring activities.

VI. General Rules for the Conduct of Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities

1. Inspectors and monitors shall discharge their functions in accordance with this Protocol.

2. Inspectors and monitors shall not disclose information obtained during inspections or continuous monitoring activities except with the express consent of the inspecting Party. They shall remain bound by this obligation after their assignments as inspectors or monitors have ended.

3. The boundaries of an inspection site shall be the boundaries of the facility specified on the site diagram that is received pursuant to the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Exchange of Geographic Coordinates and Site Diagrams relating to the Treaty of July 31, 1991, or provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.

4. At any facility containing non-contiguous parts of an inspection site that are connected with roads depicted on the site diagram, such roads shall not be considered part of the inspection site. Containers, launch canisters, or vehicles located on such roads shall not be subject to inspection until such containers, launch canisters, or vehicles enter the inspection site during the period of inspection. An item that is transported from one non-contiguous part of the facility to another non-contiguous part of the facility shall not be considered to be in transit provided it is transported directly on roads shown on the site diagram.

5. In discharging their functions, inspectors and monitors shall communicate with personnel of the inspected Party only through the in-country escort.

6. Except as provided for in this Protocol, inspectors and monitors shall not interfere with ongoing activities at an inspection site or a facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility and shall not hamper or delay the operation of a facility. Inspectors and monitors shall take no actions affecting the safe operation of a facility.

7. In carrying out their activities, inspectors and monitors shall observe safety regulations established at the inspection site or perimeter continuous monitoring area including those for personal safety, as well as regulations for the protection of equipment and maintenance of the controlled environment within a facility. The in-country escort shall provide safety briefings in the inspected Party's language. These briefings shall be interpreted by the inspected Party into the inspecting Party's language. The inspected Party shall provide, as necessary, individual protective gear.

8. A member of the in-country escort shall ensure necessary lighting for inspectors and monitors to carry out the procedures provided for in this Protocol.

9. If inspectors or monitors, in discharging their duties, take actions that are not in accordance with the rules and procedures governing the conduct of inspections or continuous monitoring activities, the in-country escort may inform the inspection team leader or the monitoring team leader, or an authorized representative of such a team, who shall take appropriate measures to prevent a repetition of such actions. If the questions or ambiguities are not resolved at the site, the in-country escort may include a statement in the inspection report or continuous monitoring report concerning such actions, and the inspection team leader or monitoring team leader may include in the report a response to such a statement.

10. If members of the in-country escort, in discharging their duties, take actions that are not in accordance with the rules and procedures governing the conduct of inspections or continuous monitoring activities, the inspection team leader or monitoring team leader, or an authorized representative of such a team, may inform the in-country escort, who shall take appropriate measures to prevent a repetition of such actions. If the questions or ambiguities are not resolved at the site, the inspection team leader or monitoring team leader may include a statement in the inspection report or continuous monitoring report concerning such actions, and the in-country escort may include in the report a response to such a statement.

11. Except as otherwise provided in this Protocol, the movement and travel of inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members shall be at the discretion of the in-country escort. In case of need for the urgent departure or emergency evacuation of inspectors or monitors from the territory of the inspected Party or urgent travel to the embassy or consulate of the inspecting Party on the territory of the inspected Party, the inspecting Party shall inform the inspected Party of the need for each such departure, evacuation, or travel and the nature of the urgency or emergency. The inspected Party shall arrange without undue delay such departure, evacuation, or travel. The inspecting Party, may, on a case-by-case basis, with the permission of the inspected Party, evacuate inspectors or monitors, using its own airplane and at its own expense, from the airport closest to the inspection site or the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility. In all cases, the inspected Party shall determine the means of transportation and routes involved in travel. During each such departure, evacuation, or travel, the inspected Party shall have the right to examine the personal baggage of inspectors or monitors, except papers.

12. At an inspection site, representatives of the inspected facility shall be included among the in-country escort. For continuous monitoring activities, the Parties shall designate, at each of their facilities subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facilities, an in-country escort. The inspected Party shall ensure that a member of the in-country escort at the facility is continuously available to monitors either in person or by telephone.

13. Throughout the period of stay at the point of entry, at the inspection site, or at the perimeter continuous monitoring area, the inspected Party shall ensure that the inspectors and monitors can be in communication with the embassy of the inspecting Party located on the territory of the inspected Party using telephonic communications provided by the inspected Party. Monitors shall also have the right, subject to the provisions of paragraphs 16, 17, and 18 of Section XVI of this Protocol, to use a satellite system for communications between the monitoring team and the territory of the inspecting Party. The inspected Party shall provide means of communication between inspection team subgroups. Such means of communication shall be under the control of the inspected Party.

14. For inspections conducted pursuant to paragraph 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, or 10 of Article XI of the Treaty, the inspected Party shall transport the inspection team from the point of entry to the inspection site no later than nine hours after the time for the designation of the inspection site specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section III of this Protocol, except that for inspections conducted pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article XI of the Treaty at ICBM bases for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, the inspected Party shall transport the inspection team to the inspection site no later than 24 hours after that time. If an inspection is conducted after completion of a previous inspection as provided for in paragraph 36 of this Section, the inspected Party shall transport the inspection team to the inspection site within the following time periods:

(a) no later than nine hours after the time for the designation of the inspection site specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 8 of Section III of this Protocol, if such a notification is provided at the point of entry; or
(b) no later than 18 hours after the time for the designation of the inspection site specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 8 of Section III of this Protocol, if such a notification is provided at the inspection site.

15. The inspection team shall have the right, subject to the provisions of paragraphs 8 and 9 of Section V of this Protocol, to bring onto the inspection site documents intended for inspections, as well as equipment, the maximum number of which for any specific item shall not exceed the number specified in Annex 8 to this Protocol for the corresponding item in the list of equipment for any given type of inspection. During its stay at the inspection site the inspection team shall have the right to store the equipment in the work space for inspectors. Such equipment shall be stored under the control of the inspection team. Throughout the in-country period the inspectors shall permit the in-country escort to observe such equipment.

16. Monitors shall have the right, subject to the provisions of paragraphs 8, 9, and 10 of Section V of this Protocol and of Annex 7 to this Protocol, to bring, and shall have the right, subject to the provisions of paragraph 10 of Section V of this Protocol and of Annex 7 to this Protocol, to deliver to each facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility documents intended for continuous monitoring activities, as well as equipment provided for in Annexes 8 and 9 to this Protocol and supplies. Throughout the in-country period the monitors shall permit the in-country escort to observe such equipment and supplies, except when those supplies are located in the living quarters for the monitors, and except when such equipment and supplies are located in their office premises that enjoy inviolability or protection in accordance with subparagraph 7(b) of Section II of this Protocol.

17. The inspecting Party shall provide to the inspected Party through diplomatic channels a list of items of equipment, provided for in Annex 8 or 9 to this Protocol, indicating the manufacturer's name and the model, if not previously provided. Technical specifications of such items of equipment shall be agreed by the Parties without undue delay and prior to the first time such items of equipment are brought or delivered to the territory of the inspected Party. The inspecting Party shall have the right to replace, upon agreement with the inspected Party, equipment provided for in Annex 8 or 9 to this Protocol with other equipment, subject to the following provisions:

(a) If the purpose and characteristics of the replacement equipment are similar to the purpose and characteristics of the equipment provided for in Annex 8 or 9 to this Protocol, such equipment shall, at the choice of the inspected Party, be agreed upon either before such equipment is delivered to the territory of the inspected Party or upon completion of the examination of the equipment conducted in accordance with paragraph 8 of Section V of this Protocol or in accordance with paragraph 4 or 8 of Annex 7 to this Protocol when applicable. For that purpose, the inspecting Party shall provide to the inspected Party through diplomatic channels a list and description of such equipment, indicating the manufacturer's name and the model, if available, and the type of inspection or the place in the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system where the equipment will be used or installed. This list and this description shall be provided in the time agreed for the provision of the inventory in accordance with paragraph 1 of Annex 7 to this Protocol.
(b) If the Parties have not reached agreement regarding the replacement equipment in accordance with subparagraph (a) of this paragraph, or if the purpose or characteristics of the replacement equipment differ from the purpose and characteristics of the equipment provided for in Annex 9 to this Protocol, the question of the use of such equipment shall be agreed upon within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

18. During an inspection or continuous monitoring activities, inspectors or monitors shall have the right to use any of the equipment specified in Annex 8 or 9 to this Protocol for a specific type of inspection or for continuous monitoring activities, except for cameras, which shall be used only by the inspected Party, at the request of the inspecting Party. At the request of the inspectors or monitors, a member of the in-country escort shall take photographs in order to obtain two photographs of each object or building located within the inspection site or perimeter continuous monitoring area, designated by the inspectors or monitors, relating to which questions or ambiguities have arisen. One camera on a tripod shall be allowed for taking two photographs in sequence. Each Party shall retain one photograph of each item. The photographic equipment furnished by the inspecting Party shall be capable of producing instant development photographs.

19. Measurements recorded during inspections or continuous monitoring activities shall be certified by the signatures of an inspector or a monitor and a member of the in-country escort immediately after they are taken. Such certified data shall be included in the inspection report or continuous monitoring report. The result of each measurement of the weight or dimensions that deviates by no more than three percent from the relevant technical data provided pursuant to Article VIII of the Treaty shall be considered acceptable.

20. For the purposes of this Protocol, an item of inspection is understood to mean:

(a) for baseline data inspections, data update inspections, new facility inspections, close-out inspections, and formerly declared facility inspections at facilities other than air bases for heavy bombers, air bases for former heavy bombers, training facilities for heavy bombers, and storage facilities for heavy bombers or former heavy bombers: an ICBM or SLBM, a first stage of an ICBM or SLBM maintained, stored, and transported in stages, a first stage of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs, a solid rocket motor for a first stage of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs, a mobile launcher of ICBMs, or support equipment of the inspected Party;
(b) for baseline data inspections, data update inspections, new facility inspections, and close-out inspections at air bases for heavy bombers, air bases for former heavy bombers, training facilities for heavy bombers, and storage facilities for heavy bombers or former heavy bombers: a heavy bomber or a former heavy bomber of the inspected Party;
(c) for baseline data inspections, data update inspections, and new facility inspections at weapons storage areas that are subject to inspection at air bases for heavy bombers, air bases for former heavy bombers, and training facilities for heavy bombers: the smallest long-range nuclear ALCM of the inspected Party;
(d) for suspect-site inspections: an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs, a first stage of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs, or a solid rocket motor for a first stage of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs of the inspected Party; and
(e) for post-dispersal inspections of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles: a mobile launcher of ICBMs and its associated missile of the inspected Party attributed to the inspection site or, for such an inspection at a maintenance facility, a mobile launcher of ICBMs of the inspected Party attributed to the inspection site.

21. For the purposes of this Protocol, an item of continuous monitoring is understood to mean an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs or a first stage of such an ICBM, if such an ICBM is maintained, stored, and transported in stages.

22. For the purposes of this Protocol, for each structure, container, launch canister, covered or environmentally protected object, vehicle, or object, the expression "large enough to contain" or "large enough to be" an item of inspection or item of continuous monitoring is understood to mean that each of the measured linear dimensions, that is, length, width, height, and diameter, of such structure, container, launch canister, covered or environmentally protected object, vehicle, or other object is determined to be 97 percent or more of the corresponding linear dimensions specified for that item.

23. For each Party, the size criteria used in inspections shall be determined on the basis of the diameters and lengths of all the reference cylinders for the items of inspection of that Party, except that, for items of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics existing as of Treaty signature, such size criteria shall be determined on the basis of the diameter and length of the reference cylinder for the SS-25 ICBM. The specific size criteria for inspections are provided in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Annex 12 to this Protocol. The lengths and diameters of the reference cylinders shall be:

(a) for baseline data inspections, data update inspections, new facility inspections, close-out inspections, and formerly declared facility inspections at facilities other than air bases for heavy bombers, air bases for former heavy bombers, training facilities for heavy bombers, and storage facilities for heavy bombers or former heavy bombers:

(i) for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs: the diameter of the first stage of an ICBM of each type of ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs and the agreed percentage of the length of that stage;
(ii) for ICBMs and SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported in stages: the diameter of the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM of each type and 90 percent of the length of that stage, except for such ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs; and
(iii) for ICBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles in launch canisters or without launch canisters, and for SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles: the diameter and length of an ICBM or SLBM of each type in the shipment configuration that is the shortest configuration specified that holds an assembled ICBM or SLBM of that type without the front section, except for such ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs. |11|

(b) for suspect-site inspections: the diameter of the first stage of an ICBM of each type of ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs and the agreed percentage of the length of that stage.

24. For each Party, the size criteria used in continuous monitoring shall be determined on the basis of the diameters and lengths of all the reference cylinders for the items of continuous monitoring of that Party, except that, for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics existing as of Treaty signature, such size criteria shall be determined on the basis of the diameter and length of the reference cylinder for the SS-25 ICBM. These criteria shall be used at the portals of all monitored facilities of the inspected Party. The specific size criteria for continuous monitoring are provided in paragraph 3 of Annex 12 to this Protocol. The lengths and diameters of the reference cylinders shall be determined as follows:

(a) for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles in launch canisters: 90 percent of the diameter and 90 percent of the length of the launch canister for an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs in the shipment configuration that is the shortest configuration specified that holds an assembled ICBM of that type without the front section;
(b) for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported in stages: the diameter and length of the first stage of an ICBM of that type; and
(c) for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles without launch canisters: as agreed within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

25. The size criteria for inspection of containers or vehicles at a monitored facility producing ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs of a type of ICBM to which more than one warhead is attributed, conducted pursuant to paragraph 15 of Annex 5 to this Protocol, shall be determined using a reference cylinder whose diameter is 97 percent of the diameter of the first stage and whose length is 97 percent of the distance from the lower edge of the nozzle to the upper point of the forward end dome of the motor case of the first stage of an ICBM of that type.

26. If the inspection team or monitoring team is unable to carry out a procedure chosen by the inspected Party in accordance with the provisions of this Protocol to confirm that a covered or environmentally protected object, container, launch canister, vehicle, structure, or other object is or is not an item of inspection or an item of continuous monitoring either because such a team has not brought to the inspection site or perimeter continuous monitoring area agreed equipment to carry out that procedure or if, through no fault of the inspected Party, equipment brought by the inspecting Party for that procedure cannot function, the inspected Party shall have the right to decline to choose another procedure for such demonstration.

27. During an inspection or during continuous monitoring activities, inspectors or monitors shall have the right to request clarification. Such requests shall be made promptly through the in-country escort. The in-country escort shall provide clarifications that may be useful in resolving questions and ambiguities.

In the event questions and ambiguities relating to an object or building located within the inspection site or perimeter continuous monitoring area are not resolved, the inspected Party shall photograph such object or building at the request of the inspecting Party. If questions or ambiguities remain at the end of the inspection, or for continuous monitoring activities, at the end of the period covered by the report provided for in paragraph 2 of Section XVIII of this Protocol, relevant clarifications shall be included in the inspection report or continuous monitoring report, and each photograph retained by the Party shall be considered to be an integral part of the report.

28. An inspection team conducting an inspection pursuant to paragraph 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, or 10 of Article XI of the Treaty shall include no more than 10 inspectors. An inspection team conducting an inspection pursuant to paragraph 11, 12, or 13 of Article XI of the Treaty during the 165-day period after entry into force of the Treaty, shall include no more than 15 inspectors. After expiration of that period, such an inspection team shall include no more than 10 inspectors. An inspection team conducting an inspection pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article XI of the Treaty shall include no more than 20 inspectors. A monitoring team shall include no more than 30 monitors, except that the inspecting Party shall have the right to exceed that number of monitors at each facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility by:

(a) no more than 15 monitors for the engineering site survey and establishment of a perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system for no more than an aggregate of 90 days, unless the Parties agree otherwise;
(b) no more than five monitors for the maintenance of the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system for a period of no more than seven days for each visit by monitors for such purpose and for no more than an aggregate of 84 days each year for each monitored facility, after the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system is established, unless the Parties agree otherwise; and
(c) no more than 10 monitors for a period of no more than five days during the replacement of monitors in accordance with paragraph 39 of this Section.

At least two inspectors or monitors on each inspection team or monitoring team must speak the language of the inspected Party. An inspection team or monitoring team shall operate under the direction of the team leader and deputy team leader. There shall be no more than one inspection team or monitoring team at each inspection site or at each perimeter continuous monitoring area, respectively, at any one time. Upon arrival at the inspection site, the inspection team leader shall have the right to indicate subgroups consisting of no fewer than two inspectors each.

29. Pre-inspection procedures, including safety briefings and the provision of information relating to the conduct of the inspection and the inspection site, shall begin upon arrival of the inspection team or monitors at the inspection site or perimeter continuous monitoring area and shall be completed within one hour. The inspection team shall begin the inspection immediately upon completion of the pre-inspection procedures.

30. Prior to the completion of the pre-inspection procedures, the inspection team leader may designate not less than one subgroup from among the members of the inspection team to inspect vehicles leaving the inspection site in such a way that, in accordance with paragraph 6 of this Section, the operation of the facility is not hampered or delayed. If a subgroup of the inspection team is not designated, vehicles shall be free to depart the facility.

31. For an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, or 13 of Article XI of the Treaty, the period of inspection shall not exceed 24 hours. By agreement with the in-country escort, the period of inspection may be extended by no more than eight hours, except that in case of an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 2, 4, 11, 12, or 13 of Article XI of the Treaty, the period of inspection shall be extended for the time necessary to complete the inspection. Such an extension, with respect to baseline data inspections and new facility inspections of ICBM bases for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs shall be determined, as agreed by the Parties in each specific case, taking into account the time required to complete the inspection of all restricted areas and the maintenance facility of the designated base after the return of all road-mobile launchers of ICBMs to the restricted areas. For an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty, the period of inspection shall terminate upon completion of the inspection procedures, and as provided for in paragraph 16 of Annex 3 to this Protocol upon the arrival of the inspection team at the location designated by the inspected Party for conducting post-inspection procedures.

32. Post-inspection procedures, which include completing the inspection report in accordance with the provisions of Section XVIII of this Protocol, shall begin, when the period of inspection expires, at the location designated by the inspected Party and shall be completed no later than four hours after the arrival of the inspection team at that location, or no later than three hours after the arrival of all subgroups of the inspection team at that location, whichever is later.

33. For the purposes of this Protocol, a sequential inspection is understood to mean an inspection conducted by an inspection team after the completion of an inspection and prior to the departure of the team from the territory of the inspected Party. Sequential inspections shall be conducted only at facilities associated with the same point of entry by an inspection team that has not left the territory of the inspected Party.

34. For an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 2, 3, 4, 5, or 7 of Article XI of the Treaty, prior to an inspection of a structure within the inspection site, inspectors may be present at the exits of the structure whose entrances and exits are large enough to permit passage of an item of inspection. During an inspection of such a structure, no object, container, or vehicle shall leave the structure until inspected or until an inspector declares that he or she has no intention to inspect it.

35. For an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 2, 3, 4, 5, or 7 of Article XI of the Treaty, inspectors shall have the right during the period of inspection to patrol the perimeter of the inspection site and to be present at the exits of the site. No vehicle shall leave the inspection site during the period of inspection until inspected or until an inspector declares that he or she does not intend to inspect it.

36. If the inspection team intends to conduct a sequential inspection pursuant to paragraph 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, or 10 of Article XI of the Treaty, the inspection team leader, prior to completion of the pre-inspection procedures, shall provide a notification in accordance with paragraph 7 of Section III of this Protocol, and then, prior to completion of post-inspection procedures or no later than one hour after the return of the inspection team to the point of entry, shall provide a notification in accordance with paragraph 8 of Section III of this Protocol. No facility may be designated for inspection more than one time by each inspection team.

37. If the inspection team intends to conduct a sequential inspection pursuant to paragraph 8, 9, 11, 12, or 13 of Article XI of the Treaty, the inspection team leader, prior to completion of the post-inspection procedures but no less than 24 hours before the planned commencement of the sequential inspection, shall provide a notification in accordance with paragraph 7 of Section III of this Protocol. Arrangements for rest and the timing of the departure of the inspection team and of its arrival at the next inspection site shall be as agreed by the Parties.

38. If the inspection team does not intend to conduct another inspection, upon completion of the post-inspection procedures the inspection team shall return to the point of entry and then shall leave, within 24 hours, the territory of the inspected Party.

39. The inspecting Party shall have the right to replace monitors, subject to the provisions of paragraph 28 of this Section:

(a) directly at a facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility or at the airport associated with such facility no more than 34 times each year, provided that the replacement of monitors directly at the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility may be conducted no more than once in each three-week period; and
(b) directly at a facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility or at the airport associated with such facility when an inspection airplane used in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section IV of this Protocol arrives at such an airport.

One replacement of monitors counted against the limits provided for in this paragraph is understood to mean one arrival of monitors on the territory of the inspected Party in accordance with the notification provided for in paragraph 14 of Section III of this Protocol. The number of departures of such monitors from the territory of the inspected Party shall not exceed 34 in each year.

40. Monitors for the purpose of maintaining the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system at a facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility shall arrive on the territory of the inspected Party subject to the limits provided for in paragraph 39 of this Section and subject to the provisions of paragraph 28 of this Section. Such monitors may arrive together with or separately from replacement monitors.

VII. Baseline Data Inspections, Data Update Inspections, and New Facility Inspections Conducted Pursuant to Paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 of Article XI of the Treaty

1. Each Party shall have the right to conduct baseline data inspections beginning 85 days after entry into force of the Treaty and ending 205 days after entry into force of the Treaty. |12|

2. Except as provided for in paragraph 3 of this Section, each Party shall have the right to conduct data update inspections 205 days after entry into force of the Treaty and thereafter. |13| Each Party shall have the right to conduct a total of 15 such inspections each year, with no more than two such inspections each at any one facility.

3. In infrequent special cases, and for purposes not inconsistent with the Treaty, the inspected Party may temporarily exempt appropriate air bases from data update inspections. Notification of such exemptions shall be provided through diplomatic channels along with an explanation of the reason for the exemption.

4. Each Party shall have the right to conduct new facility inspections 45 days after entry into force of the Treaty and thereafter. Such inspections shall be conducted at facilities that were not specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section I of the Notification Protocol and that were specified in notifications provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol. Each such inspection shall be conducted at such a facility no later than 60 days after such notification has been provided. Such a facility shall not be subject to any other inspection before a new facility inspection has been conducted or, if no such inspection has been conducted, before the 60-day period for conducting such an inspection has expired.

5. Each Party shall have the right to conduct baseline data inspections, data update inspections, and new facility inspections at any of the following facilities: ICBM bases; submarine bases; ICBM loading facilities; SLBM loading facilities; repair facilities for ICBMs, SLBMs, or mobile launchers of ICBMs; storage facilities for ICBMs, SLBMs, mobile launchers of ICBMs, heavy bombers, or former heavy bombers; training facilities for ICBMs, SLBMs, or heavy bombers; conversion or elimination facilities for ICBMs, SLBMs, or mobile launchers of ICBMs; test ranges; air bases for heavy bombers, except for air bases for heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, at which are based only heavy bombers of a type from none of which a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested; and air bases for former heavy bombers. In addition, only for the inspection of weapons storage areas, each Party shall have the right to conduct baseline data inspections, data update inspections, and new facility inspections at air bases at which are based only heavy bombers of a type from none of which a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested.

6. No later than one hour after the time for the designation of the inspection site specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 3 or 8 of Section III of this Protocol, the inspected Party shall implement the following pre-inspection restrictions at the inspection site, which shall remain in effect until the inspection team completes its pre-inspection procedures, except as provided for in subparagraph 12(d) of this Section:

(a) For facilities other than facilities specified in subparagraph (b) of this paragraph, ICBMs or SLBMs, first stages of ICBMs or SLBMs, mobile launchers of ICBMs, and support equipment of the inspected Party; containers, launch canisters, and closed vehicles large enough to contain an item of inspection of the inspected Party; and covered or environmentally protected objects large enough to contain or to be an item of inspection of the inspected Party, as determined by paragraph 22 of Section VI of this Protocol, shall not be removed from the inspection site.
(b) For air bases for heavy bombers, air bases for former heavy bombers, storage facilities for heavy bombers or former heavy bombers, and training facilities for heavy bombers, heavy bombers and former heavy bombers, of types of airplanes based at the inspected facility, shall not leave the inspection site. However, test heavy bombers, information about which has been provided in accordance with subparagraph 17(b) of Section V of this Protocol, and heavy bombers of a type from none of which a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested, may leave the inspection site. For air bases for heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, air bases for heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, air bases for former heavy bombers, and training facilities for heavy bombers, closed vehicles and containers large enough to contain the smallest long-range nuclear ALCM of the inspected Party, covered or environmentally protected objects large enough to contain or to be a long-range nuclear ALCM of the inspected Party, and ALCMs large enough to be long-range nuclear ALCMs of the inspected Party shall not be removed from the weapons storage area. |14|
(c) For facilities that contain non-contiguous parts of an inspection site, once pre-inspection restrictions are in effect at the facility, a container, launch canister, or vehicle that has departed one non-contiguous part of a facility and is en route to another non-contiguous part of the same facility shall not be subject to pre-inspection restrictions until the container, launch canister, or vehicle enters an inspection site.

7. Each Party shall have the right to conduct no more than a total of ten baseline data inspections and new facility inspections at any one time, and no more than one such inspection at each facility. Each Party shall have the right to conduct no more than one data update inspection at any one time.

8. Upon arrival of the inspection team at the inspection site, a member of the in-country escort shall inform the inspection team leader of the numbers, and, as applicable, type, category, variant, and version of ICBMs, SLBMs, first stages of ICBMs or SLBMs, ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, ballistic missile submarines, fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs, empty launch canisters, support equipment, heavy bombers, and former heavy bombers at that inspection site. At the same time, the member of the in-country escort shall provide the inspection team leader with a copy of the site diagram of the inspection site, annotated to indicate the location at the inspection site of such items and the structures or vehicles in which they are located. The following shall also apply:

(a) In the case of air bases at which, pursuant to paragraph 5 of this Section, only the weapons storage area is subject to inspection, such information shall not be provided.
(b) For an inspection conducted at an ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs, if a member of the in-country escort informs the inspection team leader that there are more ICBMs at the maintenance facility of the inspected ICBM base than provided for in subparagraph 1(c) of Article IV of the Treaty, a member of the in-country escort shall designate the silo launchers of ICBMs that do not contain ICBMs but that are considered to contain ICBMs in accordance with subparagraph 2(b) or 6(d) of Article III of the Treaty.
(c) For an inspection conducted at an air base for heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, and for an inspection conducted at an air base for heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, except for air bases at which only the weapons storage area is subject to inspection pursuant to paragraph 5 of this Section, a member of the in-country escort shall inform the inspection team leader of the numbers, by category, type, and, if applicable, variant, of any heavy bombers that are on alert and the area where those heavy bombers are located. During pre-inspection procedures at air bases for heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, a member of the in-country escort shall inform the inspection team leader of the maximum number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which each type and variant of a heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs is actually equipped, indicating the numbers, by type and, if applicable, variant, of heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs based and located at the air base that are specified, for the United States of America, to be in excess of 150 heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, as provided for in subparagraph 4(e) of Article III of the Treaty, or, for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, to be in excess of 180 heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, as provided for in subparagraph 4(f) of Article III of the Treaty.
(d) If any of the items specified for an inspection site are absent from the inspection site at the time of the arrival of the inspection team at the inspection site, a member of the in-country escort shall inform the inspection team leader of the type and, if applicable, variant, and the reason for the absence of each item. For a facility for heavy bombers or former heavy bombers, a member of the in-country escort shall also provide, in addition to the information provided at the point of entry pursuant to subparagraph 17(b) of Section V of this Protocol, the category of each such heavy bomber and, for heavy bombers and former heavy bombers that are located outside national territory of the inspected Party, the general location of each such airplane.
(e) At a facility that contains non-contiguous parts of an inspection site connected by roads depicted on a site diagram, if any of those items declared absent are located on the roads connecting one non-contiguous part of the facility to another non-contiguous part of the facility, a member of the in-country escort shall inform the inspection team leader of the type, and if applicable, variant of a type, and reason for the absence of each item, its approximate location, and, its estimated time of arrival at an inspection site. Such items shall return to the inspection site not later than 18 hours after the commencement of the inspection.

9. For baseline data inspections, data update inspections, and new facility inspections, the inspectors shall have the right, subject to the provisions of paragraph 5 of Annex 6 to this Protocol, to read the data from the unique identifiers on all ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs except for such ICBMs deployed in silo launchers of ICBMs and except for such ICBMs deployed on mobile launchers of ICBMs that have not returned to their restricted areas due to circumstances brought about by force majeure and for which a member of the in-country escort has specified geographic coordinates in accordance with subparagraph 12(b) of this Section. |15|

10. For baseline data inspections, data update inspections, and new facility inspections, the inspection team shall have the right to confirm that ICBMs or SLBMs declared to be training models of missiles, or launch canisters declared to contain training models of missiles, are training models of missiles or contain such training models of missiles, unless such items are located in silo training launchers or in silo test launchers. |16|

11. For ICBM bases for silo launchers of ICBMs, the inspectors shall have the right to inspect the maintenance facility subject to the procedures provided for in Annex 1 to this Protocol. If the number of ICBMs located at the maintenance facility of the inspected ICBM base exceeds the number provided for in subparagraph 1(c) of Article IV of the Treaty, the inspectors shall have the right to inspect the silo launchers of ICBMs that the inspected Party declares not to contain ICBMs but that are considered to contain ICBMs in accordance with subparagraph 2(b) or 6(d) of Article III of the Treaty. Inspection of such a silo launcher of ICBMs shall be conducted in accordance with procedures provided for in Annex 2 to this Protocol for the purpose of confirming that it does not contain an ICBM. If the inspection team intends to inspect such silo launchers of ICBMs, the inspection team leader, upon completion of pre-inspection procedures, shall designate the silo launchers of ICBMs to be inspected and shall indicate a subgroup or subgroups, each consisting of no more than four inspectors, to conduct such inspections. No later than eight hours after completion of pre-inspection procedures, the inspected Party shall transport a subgroup of the inspection team to the silo launcher of ICBMs designated to be inspected.

12. For ICBM bases for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs:

(a) The inspected Party shall return all road-mobile launchers of ICBMs located outside restricted areas to the restricted areas of the ICBM base to be inspected except road-mobile launchers of ICBMs that are located at a maintenance facility, road-mobile launchers of ICBMs that are engaged in a relocation, and road-mobile launchers of ICBMs that cannot return to their restricted areas due to circumstances brought about by force majeure. The return of road-mobile launchers of ICBMs shall be completed within the following period of time:

(i) for baseline data inspections and new facility inspections, no later than 18 hours after the commencement of the period of inspection; or
(ii) for data update inspections, no later than 24 hours after the time for the designation of the inspection site specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 3 or 8 of Section III of this Protocol.

(b) For each restricted area, a member of the in-country escort shall, in addition to the information provided in accordance with paragraph 8 of this Section, inform the inspection team leader of the number of road-mobile launchers of ICBMs that have not returned to the restricted area. Such information shall be provided within the following periods of time:

(i) for baseline data inspections and new facility inspections, when the period of time for the return of road-mobile launchers of ICBMs in accordance with subparagraph (a) (i) of this paragraph has elapsed; or
(ii) for data update inspections, during pre-inspection procedures, when the period of time for the return of road-mobile launchers of ICBMs in accordance with subparagraph (a) (ii) of this paragraph has elapsed.
For baseline data inspections, data update inspections, and new facility inspections, the inspected Party may, at its own choosing, either designate the geographic coordinates of the road-mobile launchers of ICBMs that have not returned to their restricted areas due to circumstances brought about by force majeure, or transport the inspectors to such road-mobile launchers of ICBMs.

(c) Prior to the completion of the pre-inspection procedures, the inspection team leader shall designate which restricted area or restricted areas are to be inspected. For baseline data inspections and new facility inspections, the inspection team shall have the right to inspect all restricted areas and the maintenance facility that are part of the ICBM base to be inspected. For these purposes, the inspection team may be divided into at least two subgroups, each of which may independently inspect the designated locations. For data update inspections, the inspection team shall have the right to inspect one restricted area and the maintenance facility that are part of the ICBM base to be inspected. If an inspection of road-mobile launchers of ICBMs that have not returned to their restricted areas due to circumstances brought about by force majeure is permitted pursuant to subparagraph (b) of this paragraph, the inspection team leader shall also indicate whether the inspection team intends to inspect those road-mobile launchers of ICBMs whose geographic coordinates were not designated in accordance with subparagraph (b) of this paragraph, and shall indicate the subgroup assigned for this purpose.
(d) Pre-inspection restrictions with respect to each of the restricted areas designated for inspection in accordance with subparagraph (c) of this paragraph shall remain in effect until the arrival there of the inspectors. For data update inspections, pre-inspection restrictions with respect to restricted areas not designated for inspection in accordance with subparagraph (c) of this paragraph shall remain in effect until six hours after the completion of the pre-inspection procedures.
(e) The inspected Party shall transport the inspection team to the restricted area designated for inspection without undue delay and within the following period of time:

(i) to a restricted area located at a straight-line distance of less than 100 kilometers from the maintenance facility: no later than five hours after completion of pre-inspection procedures; or
(ii) to a restricted area located at a straight-line distance of 100 kilometers or more from the maintenance facility: no later than eight hours after completion of pre-inspection procedures.
During the period of inspection, road-mobile launchers of ICBMs located within these restricted areas at the time the inspection begins may depart such areas only with the consent of the inspectors.

(f) The maintenance facility and restricted areas shall be inspected subject to the procedures provided for in Annexes 1 and 2 to this Protocol.

13. For ICBM bases for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs:

(a) Inspectors shall have the right to inspect the maintenance facility and the rail garrison, including all rail lines, rail entrances/exits, parking sites, and associated structures except for those structures where reentry vehicles are stored, that are part of the ICBM base to be inspected, subject to the procedures provided for in Annexes 1 and 2 to this Protocol.
(b) For baseline data inspections and new facility inspections, the inspected Party shall concentrate at the inspected ICBM base all rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs attributed to that ICBM base no later than 18 hours after the commencement of the period of inspection.
(c) During the period of inspection, rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs located within the inspected ICBM base at the time the inspection begins may leave it only with the consent of the inspectors.
(d) The inspected Party shall provide the inspectors with the necessary transportation to permit them to inspect all rail lines within the inspected ICBM base during the daylight hours of the period of inspection.

14. For air bases for heavy bombers, air bases for former heavy bombers, training facilities for heavy bombers, and storage facilities for heavy bombers and former heavy bombers:

(a) The inspecting Party shall have the right to inspect all heavy bombers and former heavy bombers, of a type specified as based at that air base, that were located at the inspected facility at the time pre-inspection restrictions went into effect or that have returned to the facility in accordance with subparagraph (b) of this paragraph. Alert heavy bombers, however, shall be subject to inspection only in accordance with subparagraph (d) of this paragraph. Heavy bombers of a type from none of which a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested and test heavy bombers shall not be subject to inspection. Such inspections shall be conducted to confirm the data on the numbers, by type and, if applicable, category and variant, of heavy bombers and former heavy bombers; and to confirm that:

(i) heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs are not equipped for more long-range nuclear ALCMs than the number provided for in paragraph 20 or 21 of Article V of the Treaty, as applicable;
(ii) heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs are not equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs; and
(iii) heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, training heavy bombers, and former heavy bombers satisfy the requirements for conversion in accordance with Section VI of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol.

(b) For baseline data and new facility inspections at such facilities, the inspected Party, no later than 20 hours after commencement of the period of inspection, shall concentrate at the inspected facility all heavy bombers and former heavy bombers specified for it except for such heavy bombers and former heavy bombers that, due to circumstances brought about by force majeure, mechanical incapability, or temporary stationing outside the national territory of the inspected Party for purposes not inconsistent with the Treaty, cannot return to the inspected facility.
(c) Inspections of heavy bombers and former heavy bombers shall be conducted in accordance with the procedures provided for in Annex 4 to this Protocol.
(d) Inspectors shall have the right to inspect one alert heavy bomber of each type, category, and, if applicable, variant each year during baseline data inspections and data update inspections. Only heavy bombers loaded with nuclear armaments shall be considered to be alert heavy bombers.
(e) For inspections at such facilities, except for inspections at air bases for heavy bombers only of a type from none of which a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested, the item of inspection shall be a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber. For structures within the boundaries of the inspection site large enough to contain an item of inspection, inspectors shall have the right to ascertain whether or not that structure contains a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber.
(f) For air bases for heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, air bases for heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, air bases for former heavy bombers, and training facilities for heavy bombers, the inspecting Party shall have the right to inspect all weapons storage areas, and to inspect all covered or environmentally protected objects, containers, vehicles, and structures that are located within the boundaries of weapons storage areas and that are large enough to contain the smallest long-range nuclear ALCM of a type for which notifications of data according to categories of data contained in Annex H to the Memorandum of Understanding have been provided, to confirm the absence of long-range nuclear ALCMs. Such inspections shall be carried out subject to the procedures provided for in Annex 4 to this Protocol.

15. For test ranges, the inspection team shall have the right to inspect the entire inspection site subject to the procedures provided for in Annex 1 to this Protocol, with the following exceptions:

(a) In carrying out the procedures provided for in Annex 1 to this Protocol the inspected Party shall not be required to remove ICBMs or SLBMs contained in or located on soft-site launchers from such launchers, and such ICBMs and SLBMs shall not be subject to measurement; and
(b) For silo launchers of ICBMs located at the test range being inspected, regardless of where they are shown on the site diagram of the test range, the inspection team shall have the right to inspect, at its choice, no more than one silo launcher of ICBMs that the inspected Party declares not to contain an ICBM or a training model of a missile. Inspection of such a silo launcher of ICBMs shall be conducted subject to the procedures provided for in Annex 2 to this Protocol for the purpose of confirming that it does not contain an ICBM. |17|

16. For facilities other than those facilities specified in paragraphs 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15 of this Section, inspectors shall have the right to inspect the entire inspection site, subject to the procedures provided for in Annexes 1 and 2 to this Protocol.

17. For test ranges, conversion or elimination facilities for ICBMs, SLBMs, or mobile launchers of ICBMs, and ICBM bases, the inspection team shall have the right to inspect all launch canisters declared to be empty at each test range, conversion or elimination facility for ICBMs, SLBMs, or mobile launchers of ICBMs, and ICBM base.

18. Notwithstanding any other provisions of this Protocol, silo training launchers shall not be subject to inspection. |18|

VIII. Suspect-Site Inspections Conducted Pursuant to Paragraph 5 of Article XI of the Treaty

1. Each Party shall have the right 165 days after entry into force of the Treaty and thereafter, to conduct suspect-site inspections. Following each suspect-site inspection conducted by the inspecting Party, the number of data update inspections to which the inspecting Party is entitled, pursuant to paragraph 2 of Section VII of this Protocol, shall be reduced by one for that year.

2. Each Party shall have the right to conduct suspect-site inspections at each facility specified as subject to suspect-site inspections in paragraph 12 of Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding or in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol, if it is provided for in paragraph 3 of this Section.

3. A Party shall specify a facility as subject to suspect-site inspection and provide a notification thereof in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol for:

(a) each facility that after entry into force of the Treaty begins to produce ICBMs or SLBMs as large or larger than an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs of the inspected Party and is not subject to continuous monitoring, unless otherwise agreed; and
(b) each facility at which continuous monitoring has ceased.

4. Each Party shall have the right to conduct no more than one suspect-site inspection at any one time. Each Party shall have the right to conduct no more than two such inspections each year at the same facility.

5. The Parties may agree within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission to remove a facility from the list of facilities subject to suspect-site inspection.

6. No later than one hour after the time for the designation of the inspection site specified in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 3 or 8 of Section III of this Protocol, the inspected Party shall implement pre-inspection restrictions at the inspection site, which shall remain in effect until the inspection team completes the pre-inspection procedures. During the period of time that pre-inspection restrictions are in effect, vehicles, containers, and launch canisters large enough to contain an item of inspection of the inspected Party and covered objects large enough to contain or to be such items shall not be removed from the inspection site.

7. Inspectors shall have the right to inspect the entire inspection site, subject to the procedures provided for in Annex 1 to this Protocol, unless the Parties agree otherwise.

IX. Reentry Vehicle Inspections Conducted Pursuant to Paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty

1. Each Party shall have the right, 205 days after entry into force of the Treaty and thereafter, to conduct reentry vehicle inspections. |19| Each Party shall have the right to conduct a total of ten reentry vehicle inspections each year, with no more than two such inspections each year at any one facility.

2. Each Party shall have the right to conduct reentry vehicle inspections at ICBM bases and at submarine bases.

3. Each Party shall have the right to conduct no more than one reentry vehicle inspection at any one time. Neither Party shall have the right to conduct such an inspection simultaneously with any other type of inspection at the same facility. No more than one ICBM or SLBM may be inspected during each reentry vehicle inspection, except as provided for in paragraph 18 of this Section.

4. No later than one hour after the time for the designation of the inspection site specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 3 or 8 of Section III of this Protocol, the inspected Party shall implement the following pre-inspection restrictions at the ICBM base or submarine base, including the waters identified on the coastlines and waters diagram provided pursuant to paragraph 17 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding: |20|

(a) The inspected Party shall not open silo doors of silo launchers of ICBMs or hatches of launchers of SLBMs that were closed at the time the restrictions were implemented.
(b) The inspected Party shall not begin any work associated with the removal of ICBMs or SLBMs from silo launchers of ICBMs or launchers of SLBMs that were open at the time the restrictions were implemented.
(c) The inspected Party shall not begin any work associated with the removal of ICBMs from mobile launchers of ICBMs.
(d) The inspected Party shall not begin any work associated with the removal or installation of front sections of ICBMs or SLBMs in silo launchers of ICBMs or in launchers of SLBMs that were open at the time the restrictions were implemented.
(e) The inspected Party shall not begin any work associated with the removal or installation of front sections of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs.
(f) The inspected Party shall not remove mobile launchers of ICBMs from restricted areas or from rail garrisons.
(g) The inspected Party shall not move rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs into the maintenance facility.
(h) The inspected Party shall not move any ballistic missile submarine from within the waters identified on the coastlines and waters diagram provided pursuant to paragraph 17 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding, and shall not commence dry docking of ballistic missile submarines within such waters. |21|

5. In addition to the provisions provided for in paragraph 4 of this Section, upon arrival of the inspection team at the inspection site, the inspected Party shall not move mobile launchers of ICBMs that are located in restricted areas or the rail garrison, or ballistic missile submarines to which pre-inspection restrictions apply.

6. Pre-inspection restrictions provided for in paragraphs 4 and 5 of this Section shall not apply to work conducted to deal with an emergency involving a launcher, missile, or submarine.

7. Pre-inspection restrictions provided for in paragraphs 4 and 5 of this Section shall remain in effect until the procedures provided for in paragraph 10, 11, 12, or 13 of this Section have been completed, and for a launcher of ICBMs, fixed structure, restricted area, or ballistic missile submarine designated by the inspection team leader until inspectors have arrived at that location.

8. Upon arrival of the inspection team at the inspection site, a member of the in-country escort shall:

(a) For ICBM bases for silo launchers of ICBMs, inform the inspection team leader of the number of silo launchers of ICBMs for each type of ICBM based there, and provide the inspection team leader with a copy of the simplified site diagram of the ICBM base annotated to show the designator and location of each of those launchers at that base. If more than one type of ICBM is specified for that base, the site diagram shall show the silo launchers of ICBMs by type of ICBM.
(b) For ICBM bases for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, provide the inspection team leader with a copy of the simplified site diagram of the ICBM base annotated to show the type of ICBM for each restricted area.
(c) For ICBM bases for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, provide the inspection team leader with a copy of the simplified site diagram of the ICBM base, if there is such a diagram, and a copy of the site diagram of the rail garrison annotated to show the location of each of the rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs located outside fixed structures at the rail garrison. If more than one type of ICBM is specified for that ICBM base, the site diagram shall show the rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs by type of ICBM. Rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs located at the maintenance facility shall not be shown on the site diagram.
(d) For submarine bases, inform the inspection team leader of the location and type of each ballistic missile submarine to which pre-inspection restrictions apply, and of the type of SLBM for each such submarine, and provide the inspection team leader with a copy of the coastlines and waters diagram provided pursuant to paragraph 17 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding, annotated to show the location of each ballistic missile submarine within the waters identified pursuant to that paragraph, and the number of launchers on each such submarine. |22|

9. Upon the completion of pre-inspection procedures the inspection team leader shall designate in writing to a member of the in-country escort, in accordance with paragraph 10, 11, 12, or 13 of this Section, the launcher of ICBMs or SLBMs or fixed structure for mobile launchers of ICBMs containing the ICBM or SLBM to be inspected. The inspection team leader shall also have the right to designate for inspection, in the cases provided for in subparagraph 10(d), 11(g), 12(e), or 13(f) of this Section, one of the launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs, one of the fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs, or one of the restricted areas declared not to contain a deployed ICBM or deployed SLBM, and shall designate a subgroup consisting of no more than four inspectors to conduct such an inspection. The inspection of such a launcher of ICBMs or SLBMs shall be conducted in accordance with the procedures provided for in Annex 2 to this Protocol. The inspection of such a fixed structure shall be conducted in accordance with the procedures provided for in Annex 1 to this Protocol. After a launcher of ICBMs or SLBMs or a fixed structure for mobile launchers of ICBMs has been designated in accordance with paragraph 10, 11, 12, or 13 of this Section, a member of the in-country escort shall brief the inspectors on the route they will travel to reach the launcher of ICBMs or SLBMs or the fixed structure for mobile launchers of ICBMs.

10. For ICBM bases for silo launchers of ICBMs:

(a) If no silo launcher of ICBMs at the inspected ICBM base contains a deployed ICBM, a member of the in-country escort shall so inform the inspection team leader.
(b) Unless a member of the in-country escort has informed the inspection team leader that no silo launcher of ICBMs at the inspected ICBM base contains a deployed ICBM, the inspection team leader shall designate, using its designator or geographic coordinates, the silo launcher of ICBMs containing the ICBM to be inspected.
(c) If the designated silo launcher of ICBMs does not contain a deployed ICBM, a member of the in-country escort shall so inform the inspection team leader, who shall designate, in accordance with the procedures provided for in subparagraph (b) of this paragraph, another silo launcher of ICBMs containing the ICBM to be inspected.
(d) The inspection team leader shall have the right to designate for inspection one of the silo launchers of ICBMs identified by a member of the in-country escort, in accordance with subparagraph (c) of this paragraph, as not containing deployed ICBMs. The purpose of such an inspection shall be to confirm that such a silo launcher of ICBMs does not contain a deployed ICBM.

11. For ICBM bases for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs:

(a) If no road-mobile launcher of ICBMs at the inspected ICBM base contains a deployed ICBM, a member of the in-country escort shall so inform the inspection team leader.
(b) Unless a member of the in-country escort has informed the inspection team leader that no road-mobile launcher of ICBMs at the inspected ICBM base contains a deployed ICBM, the inspection team leader shall designate, using its name or geographic coordinates, the restricted area in which the ICBM to be inspected is located.
(c) If no road-mobile launcher of ICBMs in the designated restricted area contains a deployed ICBM for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, a member of the in-country escort shall so inform the inspection team leader, who shall designate, in accordance with the procedures provided for in subparagraph (b) of this paragraph, another restricted area in which the ICBM to be inspected is located.
(d) Unless a member of the in-country escort has informed the inspection team leader that no road-mobile launcher of ICBMs in the designated restricted area contains a deployed ICBM, a member of the in-country escort shall provide the inspection team leader with a copy of the site diagram of that restricted area annotated to show the location of each of the road-mobile launchers of ICBMs located outside of fixed structures in this restricted area, and the inspection team leader shall designate, using that site diagram, the road-mobile launcher of ICBMs, or fixed structure for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, in which the ICBM to be inspected is located.
(e) If a designated fixed structure contains more than one road-mobile launcher of ICBMs, a member of the in-country escort shall inform the inspection team leader of their locations using the annotated site diagram. The inspection team leader shall designate on the annotated site diagram the road-mobile launcher of ICBMs that contains the ICBM to be inspected.
(f) If a designated fixed structure for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs or a designated road-mobile launcher of ICBMs does not contain a deployed ICBM, a member of the in-country escort shall so inform the inspection team leader, who shall designate, in accordance with the procedures provided for in subparagraph (d) of this paragraph, another fixed structure or another launcher containing the ICBM to be inspected from among those fixed structures or launchers located in the same restricted area.
(g) The inspection team leader shall have the right to designate for inspection fixed structures for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs or road-mobile launchers of ICBMs that a member of the in-country escort has identified, in accordance with subparagraph (c) or (f) of this paragraph, as not containing deployed ICBMs. The purpose of such an inspection shall be to confirm that such fixed structures or such road-mobile launchers of ICBMs do not contain deployed ICBMs. The inspection team leader shall have the right to designate:

(i) All fixed structures for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and all road-mobile launchers of ICBMs located in one of the restricted areas of the inspected ICBM base, if a member of the in-country escort has informed the inspection team leader that the ICBM base does not contain deployed ICBMs for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs.
(ii) In all other cases, one of the fixed structures for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs or one of the road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, that, in accordance with subparagraph (f) of this paragraph, a member of the in-country escort has identified for the inspection team leader as not containing a deployed ICBM for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs.

12. For ICBM bases for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs:

(a) If no rail-mobile launcher of ICBMs at the inspected rail garrison contains a deployed ICBM, a member of the in-country escort shall so inform the inspection team leader.
(b) Unless a member of the in-country escort has informed the inspection team leader that no rail-mobile launcher of ICBMs at the inspected rail garrison contains a deployed ICBM, the inspection team leader, using the annotated site diagram provided for in paragraph 8 of this Section, shall designate the launcher or fixed structure containing the ICBM to be inspected. Rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs located at the maintenance facility may not be designated for reentry vehicle inspection.
(c) If a designated fixed structure for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs contains more than one rail-mobile launcher of ICBMs, a member of the in-country escort shall inform the inspection team leader of their locations using the annotated site diagram. The inspection team leader shall designate on the site diagram the launcher containing the ICBM to be inspected.
(d) If a designated fixed structure for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs or a designated rail-mobile launcher of ICBMs does not contain a deployed ICBM, a member of the in-country escort shall so inform the inspection team leader, who shall designate, in accordance with the procedures provided for in subparagraph (b) of this paragraph, another fixed structure or another launcher containing the ICBM to be inspected.
(e) The inspection team leader shall have the right to designate for inspection one of the fixed structures for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs or one of the rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs identified by a member of the in-country escort, in accordance with subparagraph (d) of this paragraph, as not containing deployed ICBMs. The purpose of such an inspection shall be to confirm that such a fixed structure or such a rail-mobile launcher of ICBMs does not contain a deployed ICBM.

13. For submarine bases:

(a) If no launcher of SLBMs at the submarine base contains a deployed SLBM, a member of the in-country escort shall so inform the inspection team leader.
(b) Unless a member of the in-country escort has informed the inspection team leader that no SLBM launcher at the base contains a deployed SLBM, the inspection team leader shall designate, using the annotated site diagram or map provided for in paragraph 8 of this Section, the ballistic missile submarine containing the SLBM to be inspected.
(c) If no SLBM launcher on the designated submarine contains a deployed SLBM, a member of the in-country escort shall so inform the inspection team leader, who shall designate for inspection, in accordance with the procedures provided for in subparagraph (b) of this paragraph, another ballistic missile submarine.
(d) Unless a member of the in-country escort has informed the inspection team leader that no SLBM launcher on the designated submarine contains a deployed SLBM, the inspection team leader shall designate the SLBM launcher containing the SLBM to be inspected.
(e) If the designated SLBM launcher does not contain a deployed SLBM, a member of the in-country escort shall so inform the inspection team leader, who shall designate, in accordance with the procedures provided for in subparagraph (d) of this paragraph, another SLBM launcher from among those SLBM launchers located on the same ballistic missile submarine.
(f) The inspection team leader shall have the right to designate for inspection one of the SLBM launchers identified by a member of the in-country escort, in accordance with subparagraph (c) or (e) of this paragraph, as not containing deployed SLBMs. The purpose of such an inspection shall be to confirm that such an SLBM launcher does not contain a deployed SLBM.
(g) SLBM launchers on submarines in dry dock may not be designated for a reentry vehicle inspection.

14. The inspected Party shall transport the inspection team to the designated launcher of ICBMs or SLBMs, to the designated restricted area, or to the designated fixed structure for mobile launchers of ICBMs that contain the deployed ICBM or SLBM to be inspected, without undue delay and within the following period of time:

(a) to a rail-mobile launcher of ICBMs: no later than three hours after completion of pre-inspection procedures;
(b) to an SLBM launcher: no later than three hours after completion of pre-inspection procedures;
(c) to a restricted area located at a straight line distance of less than 100 kilometers from the maintenance facility: no later than five hours after completion of pre-inspection procedures;
(d) to a restricted area located at a straight line distance of 100 kilometers or more from the maintenance facility: no later than eight hours after completion of pre-inspection procedures; or
(e) to a silo launcher of ICBMs: no later than eight hours after completion of pre-inspection procedures.

The times for transportation of an inspection team, provided for in this paragraph, shall also apply to the transportation of subgroups of an inspection team to the designated launcher of ICBMs or SLBMs, to the designated restricted area, or to the designated fixed structure for mobile launchers of ICBMs to confirm that they do not contain a deployed ICBM or SLBM.

15. For the purposes of this Section, a launcher of ICBMs or SLBMs containing an ICBM or SLBM without a front section shall be considered not to contain an ICBM or SLBM; in this connection, the inspection of such a launcher of ICBMs or SLBMs shall be conducted in accordance with the procedures provided for in subparagraph 7(c) of Annex 3 to this Protocol.

16. Reentry vehicle inspections shall be conducted in accordance with the procedures provided for in Annex 3 to this Protocol.

17. If a front section of an ICBM or SLBM to be inspected is viewed at a location outside the boundaries of the inspection site, the provisions of Section VI of this Protocol pertaining to the inspection site shall apply to that location, except for paragraph 3 of Section VI of this Protocol.

18. If an inspection team subgroup conducting an inspection, in accordance with paragraph 9 of this Section, of a launcher of ICBMs or SLBMs or a fixed structure for mobile launchers of ICBMs declared not to contain a deployed ICBM or SLBM discovers that such a launcher or fixed structure contains an ICBM or SLBM, the inspection team may inspect that ICBM or SLBM in addition to the ICBM or SLBM previously designated for inspection. The inspection of such an ICBM or SLBM shall not be counted against the quota provided for in paragraph 1 of this Section.

19. If a member of the in-country escort has reported that the ICBM base or submarine base to be inspected does not contain deployed ICBMs or deployed SLBMs, the inspection team leader shall have the right to:

(a) designate an inspection site associated with the same point of entry in accordance with the provisions provided for in paragraph 16 of Section V, or in paragraph 36 or 37 of Section VI of this Protocol;
(b) designate for inspection a launcher of ICBMs or SLBMs, restricted area, or fixed structure for mobile launchers of ICBMs, as provided for in subparagraph 10(d), 11(g), 12(e), or 13(f) of this Section, to confirm that such a launcher of ICBMs or SLBMs, fixed structure, or restricted area does not contain deployed ICBMs or deployed SLBMs. In this case the inspection shall be counted against the quota provided for in paragraph 1 of this Section; or
(c) to decline to conduct an inspection and to leave the territory of the inspected Party. In this case the number of reentry vehicle inspections for deployed ICBMs or deployed SLBMs to which the inspecting Party is entitled shall not be reduced.

X. Post-Dispersal Inspections of Deployed Mobile Launchers of ICBMs and their Associated Missiles Conducted Pursuant to Paragraph 7 of Article XI of the Treaty

1. Each Party shall have the right to conduct post-dispersal inspections of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles after a notification has been provided in accordance with paragraph 12 of Section II of the Notification Protocol. Such inspections shall be conducted at ICBM bases for mobile launchers of ICBMs specified in such a notification, subject to the following:

(a) for an exercise dispersal that involved only road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles, the inspecting Party shall have the right to inspect no more than 40 percent of the total number of ICBM bases for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs that were involved in the dispersal, or one such ICBM base for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, whichever is greater;
(b) for an exercise dispersal that involved only rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles, the inspecting Party shall have the right to inspect no more than 40 percent of the total number of ICBM bases for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs that were involved in the dispersal, or one such ICBM base for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, whichever is greater;
(c) for an exercise dispersal that involved both road-mobile and rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles, the inspecting Party shall have the right to inspect no more than 40 percent of the total number of ICBM bases for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs that were involved in the dispersal, or one such ICBM base for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, whichever is greater, and no more than 40 percent of the total number of ICBM bases for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs that were involved in the dispersal, or one such ICBM base for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, whichever is greater.

2. Neither Party shall have the right to conduct a post-dispersal inspection of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles concurrently with any other type of inspection at the same inspection site. Neither Party shall have the right to conduct, at the same inspection site, a post-dispersal inspection of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles concurrently with the implementation of cooperative measures to enhance the effectiveness of national technical means of verification.

3. From the time of completion of an exercise dispersal specified in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 12 of Section II of the Notification Protocol, the inspected Party shall implement the following pre-inspection restrictions at all ICBM bases for mobile launchers of ICBMs specified in such a notification:

(a) Mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles shall not be removed from restricted areas, rail garrisons, or maintenance facilities.
(b) The inspected Party shall not begin any work associated with the removal of ICBMs from mobile launchers of ICBMs, except that such work shall be permitted at the maintenance facility.

Pre-inspection restrictions shall not apply to work carried out to deal with an emergency involving a launcher or a missile.

4. All ICBM bases for mobile launchers of ICBMs to be inspected shall be designated by the inspection team leaders in accordance with paragraph 15 of Section V of this Protocol and within the time provided for in subparagraph 4(c) of Section III of this Protocol. If an inspection team leader has designated an inspection site less than four hours after arrival at the point of entry and before the inspected Party has completed the examination of equipment brought in by the inspectors, the inspected Party shall have the right to complete that examination after the designation of the inspection site by the inspection team leader. The period for the transportation of the inspection team to the inspection site, provided for in paragraph 14 of Section VI of this Protocol, shall begin upon completion of the examination of equipment but no later than four hours after the designation of the inspection site.

5. Pre-inspection restrictions shall remain in effect until an inspection team or inspection teams specify all ICBM bases for mobile launchers of ICBMs to be inspected. Pre-inspection restrictions at ICBM bases for mobile launchers of ICBMs to be inspected shall remain in effect until inspectors arrive there and pre-inspection procedures have been completed.

6. Upon arrival of the inspection team at the inspection site, a member of the in-country escort shall inform the inspection team leader of the number of mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles located at the inspection site and provide the inspection team leader with a copy of the simplified site diagram of the inspection site and all site diagrams of the inspection site, annotated to indicate the current location at the inspection site of such items and those structures in which they are located. For ICBM bases for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, a member of the in-country escort shall also inform the inspection team leader, for each restricted area, of each road-mobile launcher of ICBMs within the deployment area that has not returned to the restricted area of the inspected ICBM base, except road-mobile launchers of ICBMs that are on relocation outside the deployment area or are being transported by air, rail, or by waterborne vehicles within the deployment area.

7. For each road-mobile launcher of ICBMs that has not returned to the restricted area and of which the inspection team leader was informed in accordance with paragraph 6 of this Section, a member of the in-country escort shall, at the choice of that member, either designate the geographic coordinates of such a mobile launcher of ICBMs or ensure transportation of the inspectors to such a mobile launcher of ICBMs.

8. For an ICBM base for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, the inspection team leader shall designate, upon completion of the pre-inspection procedures, the restricted area or restricted areas of the ICBM base that are to be inspected. The inspected Party shall transport the inspection team or subgroups of the inspection team to the designated restricted areas within the following time period:

(a) to a restricted area located at a straight-line distance of less than 100 kilometers from the maintenance facility: no later than five hours after completion of pre-inspection procedures;
(b) to a restricted area located at a straight-line distance of 100 kilometers or more from the maintenance facility: no later than eight hours after completion of pre-inspection procedures.

9. The inspection team shall have the right to inspect all restricted areas and the maintenance facility that are part of the ICBM base for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs to be inspected, or the rail garrison and the maintenance facility that are part of the ICBM base for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs to be inspected. For ICBM bases for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, if the inspection team intends to inspect road-mobile launchers of ICBMs that have not returned to restricted areas and whose geographic coordinates have not been designated in accordance with paragraph 7 of this Section, the inspection team leader shall also indicate the subgroup to conduct such an inspection.

10. Pre-inspection restrictions shall remain in effect in each restricted area, rail garrison, and maintenance facility to be inspected until inspectors arrive there.

11. Inspectors shall have the right, subject to the provisions of paragraph 5 of Annex 6 to this Protocol, to read the data from the unique identifiers on all ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, except for ICBMs deployed on mobile launchers of ICBMs that have not returned to restricted areas and whose geographic coordinates have been designated by a member of the in-country escort in accordance with paragraph 7 of this Section.

12. During the period of inspection, mobile launchers of ICBMs located within restricted areas designated to be inspected or within a rail garrison designated to be inspected may leave those restricted areas or that rail garrison only with the consent of the inspectors.

13. During each post-dispersal inspection of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles, inspectors shall have the right to ascertain that the aggregate number of mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles located at the inspection site and the number of such items that have not returned there following the completion of the dispersal does not exceed the number specified for the inspected ICBM base. For that purpose, inspectors shall have the right to inspect the entire inspection site, subject to the procedures provided for in Annexes 1 and 2 to this Protocol.

XI. Conversion or Elimination Inspections Conducted Pursuant to Paragraph 8 of Article XI of the Treaty

1. Each Party shall conduct, and shall have the right to conduct, 45 days after entry into force of the Treaty and thereafter, conversion or elimination inspections in accordance with the provisions provided for in this Section and the procedures provided for in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol.

2. Upon arrival of the inspection team at the location specified in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section IV of the Notification Protocol, the inspected Party shall provide the inspection team with a schedule of conversion or elimination activities.

3. Within the period of time provided for in paragraph 1 of Section VII of this Protocol for baseline data inspections, each Party shall have the right to implement conversion or elimination procedures at no more than two sites at any one time if such procedures provide for conversion or elimination inspections.

4. The inspecting Party shall have the right to replace its inspectors conducting conversion or elimination inspections, subject to the following provisions:

(a) For each inspection site, replacement of inspectors shall be carried out not more than once every three weeks, and the number of inspectors subject to replacement in each case shall not be less than 50 percent of the inspectors located there.
(b) Replacement of inspectors shall be carried out at the inspection site, subject to the limitation on the maximum number of inspectors provided for in paragraph 28 of Section VI to this Protocol. If at any time the total of the number of inspectors at the inspection site and the number of those arriving on the territory of the inspected Party for replacement exceeds the maximum number of inspectors provided for in paragraph 28 of Section VI of this Protocol, the replacement of inspectors shall be carried out at the airport closest to the inspection site.
(c) Before the departure of the outgoing inspection team leader from the inspection site, the inspection team leader and a member of the in-country escort shall confirm in the inspection report that the inspection team as then constituted has completed its inspection with respect to the items presented to that team and shall indicate the number of items of each type for which elimination procedures have been completed. The specific procedures for eliminating the last item undergoing elimination at that site that were observed by the inspection team headed by the outgoing leader shall be completed before the departure of the outgoing inspection team leader from the inspection site.
(d) The inspected Party shall not resume the elimination procedures until the pre-inspection procedures have been completed for the newly arrived inspectors. Any delay in the resumption of the elimination procedures caused by the arrival of a new inspection team leader shall not exceed three hours.

5. In the case of a delay in the initiation of activities beyond the scheduled date specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section IV of the Notification Protocol:

(a) if the delay is five days or less and the inspection team is either en route to the point of entry or has arrived on the territory of the inspected Party, the inspected Party shall decide whether the inspection team should be located at the point of entry or at the inspection site for the period of the delay; or
(b) if the delay is more than five days and the inspection team has arrived on the territory of the inspected Party, the inspection team shall leave the territory of the inspected Party, unless the Parties agree otherwise.

6. For the elimination of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs and their launch canisters, inspectors shall make the observations and measurements subject to the provisions of paragraphs 3 and 6 of Section I of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol.

7. At conversion or elimination facilities where ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs and their launch canisters are eliminated by burning, explosive demolition, or explosion, as provided for in paragraphs 4 and 5 of Section I of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol, the inspected Party shall provide inspectors with binoculars that permit observation of the elimination process from a place designated by a member of the in-country escort.

8. For the elimination of road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, road-mobile training launchers, rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, and rail-mobile training launchers, inspectors shall make observations and measurements subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 of Section III of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol.

9. For the eliminated fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs, inspectors shall have the right to make observations subject to the provisions of paragraph 8 of Section III of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. The inspecting Party shall have the right to conduct an inspection of such a fixed structure within the 90-day period beginning on the date of the completion of the elimination process. Such an inspection shall be conducted during a baseline data inspection, data update inspection, reentry vehicle inspection, post-dispersal inspection of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles, or close-out inspection at the facility at which the fixed structure was located.

10. For the elimination of heavy bombers or former heavy bombers, inspectors shall have the right to make observations and measurements subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 8 of Section VI of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. Except for those cases when the initiation of the process of elimination of a heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs was verified by inspection, the inspecting Party shall have the right to conduct an inspection within the 90-day period beginning on the date of completion of the elimination process to confirm that the elimination of each heavy bomber or former heavy bomber has been completed.

11. For converted heavy bombers, inspectors shall have the right to make observations and measurements subject to the provisions of paragraph 13 of Section VI of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. The inspecting Party shall have the right to conduct an inspection within the 20-day period that begins on the date the converted heavy bomber arrives at the viewing site at the conversion or elimination facility as provided for in paragraph 13 of Section VI of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol, to confirm that it has been converted.

12. For changing the accountability of ICBMs, SLBMs, launch canisters, ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, and former heavy bombers by placing them on static display, inspectors shall have the right to make observations and measurements subject to the provisions of paragraph 5 of Section VIII of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. The inspecting Party shall have the right to conduct such an inspection within the 30-day period that begins on the date of the receipt of the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section IV of the Notification Protocol.

XII. Close-Out Inspections Conducted Pursuant to Paragraph 9 of Article XI of the Treaty

1. Each Party shall have the right to conduct close-out inspections at the facilities specified in paragraph 2 of this Section, the elimination of which has been specified in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol. Each such inspection shall be conducted within 60 days after such notification has been provided, or, for facilities that were specified in the Memorandum of Understanding but not specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section I of the Notification Protocol, within the period of time provided for in paragraph 1 of Section VII of this Protocol for baseline data inspections. No more than one close-out inspection shall be conducted at each facility.

2. Each Party shall have the right to conduct close-out inspections at any of the following facilities: ICBM bases; submarine bases; ICBM loading facilities; SLBM loading facilities; repair facilities for ICBMs, SLBMs, or mobile launchers of ICBMs; storage facilities for ICBMs, SLBMs, mobile launchers of ICBMs, heavy bombers, or former heavy bombers; training facilities for ICBMs, SLBMs, or heavy bombers; conversion or elimination facilities for ICBMs, SLBMs, or mobile launchers of ICBMs; test ranges; air bases for heavy bombers; and air bases for former heavy bombers.

3. The inspected Party shall transport the inspection team to the location specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol no later than 48 hours after its arrival at the point of entry.

4. Each Party shall have the right to conduct no more than two close-out inspections at any one time. No more than one such inspection utilizing the same point of entry shall be conducted at any one time.

5. A facility, the elimination of which has been specified in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol, shall not be subject to any inspection other than a close-out inspection until such an inspection is conducted or until the expiration of the 60-day period provided for such an inspection in paragraph 1 of this Section, whichever occurs earlier. If a facility that is specified in paragraph 2 of this Section is subject to a close-out inspection, that facility shall not be subject to a baseline data inspection.

6. During the course of each close-out inspection, inspectors shall have the right to confirm that the elimination procedures provided for in paragraph 2 of Section IX of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol have been completed. Inspectors shall have the right to inspect the entire inspection site, subject to the procedures provided for in Annex 1 to this Protocol.

XIII. Formerly Declared Facility Inspections Conducted Pursuant to Paragraph 10 of Article XI of the Treaty

1. Each Party shall have the right, 165 days after entry into force of the Treaty and thereafter, to conduct formerly declared facility inspections. Each Party shall have the right to conduct a total of three such inspections each year, with no more than two such inspections each year at any one facility. Such inspections may be conducted at facilities specified in paragraph 2 of this Section, the elimination of which has been specified in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol. For each such facility, formerly declared facility inspections may be conducted after close-out inspections have been conducted or, if such an inspection was not conducted, beginning 60 days after notification has been provided, in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol, of the elimination of the facility.

2. Each Party shall have the right to conduct formerly declared facility inspections at any of the following facilities: ICBM bases; submarine bases; ICBM loading facilities; SLBM loading facilities; repair facilities for ICBMs, SLBMs, or mobile launchers of ICBMs; storage facilities for ICBMs, SLBMs, or mobile launchers of ICBMs; training facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs; conversion or elimination facilities for ICBMs, SLBMs, or mobile launchers of ICBMs; and test ranges.

3. No later than one hour after the time for the designation of the inspection site, specified in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 3 or 8 of Section III of this Protocol, the inspected Party shall implement pre-inspection restrictions at the inspection site, which shall remain in effect until the inspection team completes the pre-inspection procedures. During the period of time that pre-inspection restrictions are in effect, containers, launch canisters, and enclosed vehicles, large enough to contain an item of inspection of the inspected Party and covered or environmentally protected objects large enough to contain or to be such items shall not be removed from the inspection site.

4. Each Party shall have the right to conduct no more than two formerly declared facility inspections at any one time. No more than one such inspection utilizing the same point of entry shall be conducted at any one time.

5. Inspectors shall have the right to inspect the entire inspection site, subject to the procedures provided for in Annex 1 to this Protocol.

XIV. Technical Characteristics Exhibitions and Inspections Conducted Pursuant to Paragraph 11 of Article XI of the Treaty

1. Except as provided for in paragraph 3 of this Section and subparagraphs 5(c) and 5(d) of Annex 11 to this Protocol, each Party shall conduct, no earlier than three days after notification has been provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section I of the Notification Protocol, but no later than 45 days after entry into force of the Treaty, technical characteristics exhibitions required by paragraph 11 of Article XI of the Treaty, of an ICBM and an SLBM of each type and variant thereof, and each version of a mobile launcher of ICBMs for each type of ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs, existing as of the date of entry into force of the Treaty. An exhibition of an ICBM or SLBM shall include an exhibition, in accordance with the procedures provided for in Annex 11 to this Protocol, of the ICBM or the SLBM; the first stage of the ICBM or SLBM; the launch canister, if applicable; and the self-contained dispensing mechanism, if applicable. Such exhibitions shall be pre-scheduled by agreement between the Parties.

2. Subsequent technical characteristics exhibitions of ICBMs and SLBMs of each new type, notification of which has been provided in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section VII of the Notification Protocol, and of new variants of ICBMs and SLBMs and new versions of mobile launchers of ICBMs, notification of which has been provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol, shall be conducted at the times specified in such notifications. Technical characteristics exhibitions of mobile launchers of ICBMs of each new type of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall be conducted at the same time as the technical characteristics exhibition of the ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs of the new type. An exhibition of an ICBM or SLBM of a new type shall include an exhibition, in accordance with the procedures provided for in Annex 11 to this Protocol, in close proximity, of the ICBM or SLBM; the first stage of the ICBM or SLBM; the launch canister, if applicable; and the self-contained dispensing mechanism, if applicable. Technical characteristics exhibitions shall be conducted separately from, and in addition to, baseline data inspections and data update inspections.

3. If, during exhibitions conducted in accordance with the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Early Exhibitions of Strategic Offensive Arms Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, the purpose of technical characteristics exhibitions has been met concerning data specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section I of the Notification Protocol for items existing as of entry into force of the Treaty, the technical characteristics exhibitions otherwise required to be conducted during the period provided for in paragraph 1 of this Section shall not be required. Technical characteristics exhibitions during this time period shall be required only concerning data on characteristics that have not been so demonstrated.

4. The technical characteristics exhibition sites shall be chosen by the inspected Party.

5. The inspection team shall arrive on the territory of the inspected Party no later than one day and no earlier than three days before the exhibition date. The inspected Party shall transport the inspection team to the exhibition site so that the inspection team arrives at the site in a timely manner.

6. During pre-inspection procedures for technical characteristics exhibitions, a member of the in-country escort shall:

(a) inform inspectors of the numbers of each type, variant and version, whichever is applicable, of the exhibited items; and
(b) point out to the inspectors, when applicable, in photographs, slides or drawings, the distinguishing features or external differences of such items.

7. During a technical characteristics exhibition, a member of the in-country escort shall point out the specific places on each exhibited item where measurements were taken to obtain the specified technical data and to obtain the dimensions specified in paragraphs 13, 14, 16, and, if applicable, 15, of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding. For measurements of the first stage of a solid propellant ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs, the inspected Party shall exhibit the first stage of such an ICBM in a configuration that permits inspectors to confirm the reference cylinder as provided for in subparagraph (a) (i) of paragraph 23 of Section VI of this Protocol. A member of the in-country escort shall point out the places on such a first stage that permit measurement of the distance from the point where the aft end dome of the motor case joins with the nozzle to the upper point of the forward end dome of the motor case, and the maximum diameter of such a stage excluding protruding elements. If necessary, the in-country escort shall have the right to use diagrams or sketches to indicate such places. Inspectors shall have the right to make such measurements. Such measurements shall be recorded pursuant to paragraph 19 of Section VI of this Protocol.

8. During technical characteristics exhibitions, inspectors shall have the right to confirm the length and diameter of the first stage of an ICBM and SLBM of each type and variant, as well as the diameter of the second or third stage if that diameter differs from the diameter of the first stage, and the length and diameter of the assembled ICBM or SLBM, as provided for in Annex 11 to this Protocol.

9. If a Party declares a new type of ICBM or SLBM in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section VII of the Notification Protocol, and if this new type is declared on the basis of a change in the first stage length used for confirming a new type, with or without a change in the throw-weight, compared to the first stage length of an ICBM or SLBM, respectively, of appropriate existing types and previously declared new types, the notifying Party shall:

(a) exhibit the first stage of the ICBM or SLBM of the new type for the purpose of confirming the first stage length used for confirming a new type of ICBM or SLBM; and
(b) exhibit the first stage of the ICBM or SLBM of appropriate existing types or previously declared new types of ICBMs or SLBMs, respectively, for the purpose of confirming the first stage length used for confirming a new type of ICBM or SLBM, if the length used for confirming a new type of ICBM or SLBM has not been previously confirmed on an ICBM or SLBM, respectively, of such existing types or previously declared new types of ICBMs or SLBMs.

When necessary, specific procedures for measuring the first stage length used for confirming a new type of an ICBM or SLBM shall be agreed within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

10. If a Party declares a new type of ICBM or SLBM in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section VII of the Notification Protocol, and if that new type is declared on the basis of a change in the launch weight of an ICBM or SLBM of that new type from the launch weight of an ICBM or SLBM, respectively, of appropriate existing types and previously declared new types, the inspecting Party shall have the right to weigh, or to determine by other agreed means the weight of, the ICBM or SLBM of the new type and ICBMs or SLBMs of an appropriate existing type or previously declared new type in order to verify their launch weights. Procedures for weighing or determining by other means the weight of such ICBMs or SLBMs shall be agreed within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission before the beginning of deployment of an ICBM or SLBM of such a new type.

11. If one Party declares a new type of ICBM or SLBM that the other Party believes has demonstrated a launch weight greater than 106,000 kilograms, the other Party shall have the right to raise its concern in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. Resolution of the issue may include, among other things, an agreement to weigh, or to determine by other means the weight of, the ICBM or SLBM in question in order to assist in the verification of its launch weight.

12. Procedures for weighing or for other means of determining the weight of ICBMs or SLBMs shall be agreed within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission no later than one year after a Party has proposed procedures for weighing or for other means of determining the weight of ICBMs or SLBMs. |23|

13. For an ICBM for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs of a new type or for an ICBM for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs of a new type, whichever is applicable, during the technical characteristics exhibition, the inspected Party shall demonstrate distinguishing features pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article III of the Treaty.

(a) If an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs of a new type is larger either in length or diameter than the launch canister for an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs of each existing type or previously declared new type, technical characteristics exhibitions pursuant only to paragraph 2 of this Section shall be required.
(b) For an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs of a new type, exhibited in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Section, if the length and the diameter of the ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs of a new type are less than or equal to the length and less than or equal to the diameter, respectively, of the launch canister for an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs of an existing type or previously declared new type, and if either Party believes that the additional procedures during the exhibition are necessary, based on the information contained in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section VII of the Protocol on Notification, with respect to the adequacy of the features that distinguish: the launch canister for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs of the new type of ICBM from the launch canister for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs of each existing type of ICBM or previously declared new type of ICBM; the mobile launcher of ICBMs for ICBMs of the new type from the mobile launchers of ICBMs for ICBMs of each existing type or previously declared new type; the mobile launcher of ICBMs with the associated missile of the new type installed from the mobile launcher of ICBMs with the associated missile of each existing type or previously declared new type installed, then the Party that has provided the notification shall conduct such an exhibition subject to the following additional procedures, unless otherwise agreed:

(i) The ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs of the new type shall be exhibited in close proximity to the launch canister for such an ICBM, containing an assembled ICBM without front section or, at the choice of the inspected Party, an empty launch canister associated with such an ICBM; a launch canister for an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs of each existing type and previously declared new type, containing an assembled ICBM without front section or, at the choice of the inspected Party, an empty launch canister associated with an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs of each existing type and previously declared new type of ICBM; and a mobile launcher of ICBMs of each existing type and previously declared new type of ICBM;
(ii) The inspected Party shall demonstrate the functionally related and external differences that distinguish the launch canister for the ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs of the new type from the launch canister of each existing type and previously declared new type of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs; and
(iii) The inspected Party shall demonstrate that the launch of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs of each existing type and previously declared new type cannot be carried out from the launch canister for the ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs of the new type, and that a launch of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs of the new type cannot be carried out from the launch canister for the ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs of each existing type and previously declared new type. If the incapability to carry out such launches has not been demonstrated to the satisfaction of the inspecting Party, the inspecting Party may raise the issue within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

14. Technical characteristics exhibitions shall be carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in Annexes 8 and 11 to this Protocol.

15. During inspections conducted during technical characteristics exhibitions, a member of the in-country escort, at the request of the inspectors, shall photograph each exhibited item in order to obtain three photographs of that item that satisfy the requirements provided for in paragraph 10 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding. Such photographs shall be produced using a camera system of the inspected Party. If an ambiguous situation arises, a member of the in-country escort, at the request of the inspectors, shall take photographs, subject to the provisions of paragraphs 18 and 27 of Section VI of this Protocol, using the camera system of the inspection team.

XV. Distinguishability Exhibitions and Inspections and Baseline Exhibitions and Inspections Conducted Pursuant to Paragraphs 12 and 13, Respectively, of Article XI of the Treaty, and Exhibitions of Long-Range Non-Nuclear ALCMs Conducted Pursuant to Notifications Provided in Accordance with Section VII of the Notification Protocol.

1. Except as provided for in paragraph 6 of this Section, each Party shall conduct, no earlier than three days after notification has been provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section I of the Notification Protocol, but no later than 45 days after entry into force of the Treaty, distinguishability exhibitions, required by paragraph 12 of Article XI of the Treaty, of heavy bombers, former heavy bombers, and long-range nuclear ALCMs of types, categories, and variants existing as of the date of entry into force of the Treaty. Such exhibitions shall be pre-scheduled by agreement between the Parties.

2. Each Party shall conduct, no earlier than the completion of distinguishability exhibitions by that Party, but no later than 165 days after entry into force of the Treaty, baseline exhibitions, required by paragraph 13 of Article XI of the Treaty, of heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, former heavy bombers, and training heavy bombers existing as of the date of entry into force of the Treaty. Such exhibitions shall be pre-scheduled by agreement between the Parties.

3. Subsequent distinguishability exhibitions conducted in connection with events, notification of which has been provided in accordance with Section VII of the Notification Protocol, shall be conducted no earlier than 15 days and no later than 30 days after such a notification has been provided. During such a subsequent distinguishability exhibition, the inspected Party shall not be required to exhibit all categories or, if applicable, all variants of an item of a particular type, provided that the purpose of the exhibition is met by a combination of the current exhibition and previous distinguishability exhibitions concerning that type. Such exhibitions shall be conducted separately from, and in addition to, baseline data inspections and data update inspections.

4. Subsequent baseline exhibitions of heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs shall be conducted no earlier than 15 days and no later than 135 days after notification that a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested from a heavy bomber of a type, from none of which a long-range nuclear ALCM had previously been flight-tested, has been provided in accordance with paragraph 10 of Section VII of the Notification Protocol. One such exhibition shall be conducted at each air base at which heavy bombers of that type equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs are specified to be based. Pre-inspection procedures for such an exhibition shall be carried out in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 8 of Section VII of this Protocol, to the extent that such provisions relate to the heavy bombers to be exhibited. During such pre-inspection procedures, the inspectors shall have the right to designate for inspection no more than 30 percent of such heavy bombers specified to be based at each air base. The inspectors shall not have the right to designate alert heavy bombers for inspection during such baseline exhibitions.

5. Exhibitions of long-range non-nuclear ALCMs pursuant to notification provided in accordance with Section VII of the Notification Protocol shall be conducted no earlier than 15 days and no later than 30 days after such a notification has been provided. Such exhibitions shall be conducted separately from, and in addition to, baseline data inspections and data update inspections.

6. If, during exhibitions conducted pursuant to the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Early Exhibitions of Strategic Offensive Arms Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, the purpose of distinguishability exhibitions has been met concerning data specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section I of the Notification Protocol for items existing as of entry into force of the Treaty, the distinguishability exhibitions otherwise required to be conducted during the period provided for in paragraph 1 of this Section shall not be required. Distinguishability exhibitions during this time period shall be required only concerning data on characteristics that have not been so demonstrated.

7. The sites of such exhibitions shall be chosen by the inspected Party.

8. The inspection team shall arrive on the territory of the inspected Party no later than one day and no earlier than three days before the exhibition date. The inspected Party shall transport the inspection team to the exhibition site so that the inspection team arrives at the site in a timely manner.

9. Such exhibitions shall be carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in Annex 4 to this Protocol.

10. During inspections of heavy bombers, former heavy bombers, and long-range nuclear ALCMs conducted during distinguishability exhibitions, and during inspections of long-range non-nuclear ALCMs conducted during exhibitions pursuant to a notification provided in accordance with Section VII of the Notification Protocol, a member of the in-country escort, at the request of the inspectors, shall photograph each exhibited item in order to obtain three photographs of that item that satisfy the requirements provided for in paragraph 10 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding. Such photographs shall be produced using a camera system of the inspected Party. If an ambiguous situation arises, a member of the in-country escort, at the request of the inspectors, shall take photographs, subject to the provisions of paragraph 18 and 27 of Section VI of this Protocol, using the camera system of the inspection team.

XVI. Continuous Monitoring Activities Conducted Pursuant to Paragraph 14 of Article XI of the Treaty

1. Each Party shall have the right, 30 days after entry into force of the Treaty and thereafter, to conduct continuous monitoring activities.

2. Each Party shall have the right to conduct continuous monitoring activities at production facilities for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs specified in paragraphs 3 and 4 of Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding.

3. Continuous monitoring activities shall cease at a monitored facility at which production of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs or first stages of such ICBMs has ceased, no later than one year after notification of the cessation of such production has been provided in accordance with paragraph 12 of Section I of the Notification Protocol, except that if such production ceases prior to May 31, 1994, continuous monitoring activities shall be permitted until May 31, 1995. Beginning on the date on which continuous monitoring activities are no longer permitted at such a facility:

(a) That facility shall be subject to a new facility inspection and data update inspections, in accordance with the provisions of Section VII of this Protocol, if it has been converted to a facility of a category listed in paragraph 5 of Section VII of this Protocol.
(b) That facility shall be subject to suspect-site inspections if it has not been converted to a facility of a category listed in paragraph 5 of Section VII of this Protocol.

4. If the inspected Party intends to produce at a monitored facility ICBMs or SLBMs or first stages for such ICBMs or SLBMs that are not subject to the numerical limits on non-deployed missiles provided for in paragraph 1 of Article IV of the Treaty and that are as large as or larger than the size criteria as provided for in paragraph 24 of Section VI of this Protocol, the inspected Party shall notify the inspecting Party no less than 180 days in advance of the planned exit of the first such ICBM, SLBM, or first stage. The Parties shall agree on additional verification procedures in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission in an expeditious manner so as not to delay the exit of the first ICBM, SLBM, or first stage of an ICBM or SLBM.

5. The inspected Party shall determine the perimeter of each facility subject to continuous monitoring that has been specified in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 10 of Section III of this Protocol and shall not change it without prior notification to the inspecting Party. The inspected Party shall construct and maintain a fence around the perimeter of each such facility.

6. The inspected Party shall designate along the periphery of each facility specified in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 10 of Section III of this Protocol, a perimeter continuous monitoring area the boundaries of which shall be agreed upon by the Parties for each such facility so that they shall be sufficient to establish a perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system.

7. If the inspected Party intends to change the perimeter of a facility at which work on establishing a perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system has begun or at which such a system has already been established, it shall inform the inspecting Party, in advance, of its intention to carry out such work, shall indicate the date planned for such work to begin, and provide through diplomatic channels a site diagram of that facility annotated to indicate the proposed changes to the boundaries of the perimeter continuous monitoring area. Before work to change the perimeter is begun, the Parties shall agree upon the new boundaries of the perimeter continuous monitoring area and upon the procedure for relocating the equipment for the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system. The procedure for relocating such equipment shall be agreed upon in such a way as to enable monitors to continue their continuous monitoring activities while work on changing the perimeter is in progress. The inspected Party shall bear the costs relating to relocation of the equipment for the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system resulting from changing the perimeter.

8. The inspected Party shall define, separately for each facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, a zone within which monitors shall have the right to travel with the permission of the in-country escort, and, as considered necessary by the inspected Party, accompanied by escorts. Areas from which monitors shall be excluded within these zones may be defined by the inspected Party. For each facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, the inspected Party shall define, if possible, a free movement zone within which the monitors shall have the right to move between their place of duty and their living quarters without the permission of the in-country escort.

9. The inspecting Party shall have the right, 30 days after entry into force of the Treaty and thereafter, to conduct an engineering site survey at a facility subject to continuous monitoring. The purpose of the engineering site survey is on-site familiarization with geological and topographic conditions and available logistical resources for establishing a perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system.

10. Within the perimeter continuous monitoring area, the inspecting Party shall have the right to establish, operate, and maintain a perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system. The equipment for such a system is specified in Annex 9 to this Protocol.

11. Monitors shall have the right of unlimited access, at times of their own choosing, to the perimeter continuous monitoring area. In each case, monitors shall inform a member of the in-country escort of their intent to examine the perimeter continuous monitoring area. The inspected Party shall maintain continuously, on a 24-hour basis, a member of the in-country escort at the monitored facility, to accompany monitors to any portion of the perimeter continuous monitoring area. For this purpose, a member of the in-country escort shall promptly provide monitors with a vehicle upon request. In the perimeter continuous monitoring area, the monitors shall be enabled to move around the entire monitored facility.

12. The monitors shall have the right to use in the perimeter continuous monitoring area their own systems for two-way radio communication with the operations center at the monitored facility that is provided for in subparagraph 22(a) of this Section. The operating frequency and power levels for these radio systems shall be agreed by the Parties prior to the use of such systems in the perimeter continuous monitoring area. These radio systems must operate only on a single agreed operating frequency and may not contain components permitting them to operate on other frequencies. A member of the in-country escort shall have the right to ascertain at any time that these radio systems are capable of operating only on the single, agreed operating frequency.

13. For a facility specified in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 10 of Section III of this Protocol, the inspected Party shall designate a portal with not more than one rail line. All objects, containers, launch canisters, and vehicles that are large enough to contain or to be an item of continuous monitoring of the inspected Party shall exit only through the portal commencing on the date specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 11 of Section III of this Protocol.

14. Except for the portal, the monitored facility shall have no other rail exits and shall have no more than two other road exits. Such exits shall be monitored as provided for in Annex 9 to this Protocol. The inspecting Party shall have the right to construct an environmental shelter with total floor space of up to 16 square meters at each exit.

15. There shall be no more than four additional exits from the monitored facility for personnel of the inspected Party. These exits shall be no wider than one meter.

16. No later than three months after the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 12 of Section III of this Protocol, the inspected Party shall, at the request of the inspecting Party, provide:

(a) two dedicated telephone lines providing direct communications between the monitoring team and the embassy of the inspecting Party with a single termination point, specified by the inspecting Party, at each end of a telephone line;
(b) one non-dedicated commercial telephone line for local and long distance communications throughout the existing telephone network within the territory of the inspected Party; and
(c) satellite communications equipment providing access to a telephone communications systems channel of the International Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT) or to an equivalent satellite communication system for telephonic communications between the monitoring team and the territory of the inspecting Party, if such equipment is not provided by the inspecting Party at the request of the inspected Party.

17. All expenses associated with the installation and operation of the dedicated direct telephone lines shall be borne by the inspected Party. All expenses associated with the installation and use of the non-dedicated commercial telephone line shall be borne by the inspecting Party. All expenses associated with the provision, installation, and maintenance of satellite communications equipment shall be borne by the inspected Party. If requested by the inspected Party, the inspecting Party may provide the satellite communications equipment. In such a case all expenses associated with the provision, installation, and maintenance of satellite communications equipment shall be borne by the inspecting Party. In any case all expenses associated with the use of the satellite communications system shall be borne by the inspecting Party.

18. Satellite communications equipment shall be under the control of the inspected Party, except that it shall be under the control of both Parties if provided by the inspecting Party. Monitors shall have the right to use the satellite communications system any time a monitor and a member of the in-country escort conclude that facsimile communications with the territory of the inspecting Party via the dedicated direct telephone lines to its embassy cannot be established within 20 minutes.

19. No later than six months after the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 12 of Section III of this Protocol, the inspected Party shall, at the request of and at the expense of the inspecting Party, provide the following logistic support:

(a) all utilities for the establishment, operation, and maintenance of the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system, including electrical power, water, fuel, heating, and sewage;
(b) basic construction materials, including concrete and lumber;
(c) the site preparation for the establishment of a perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system, and for the operations center. Such preparation may include earth moving operations, laying of concrete foundations, trenching between equipment locations, and utility connections; and
(d) transportation to the perimeter continuous monitoring area of all tools, materials, and equipment necessary for the establishment, operation, and maintenance of the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system.

20. Equipment and supplies brought into the territory of the inspected Party, subject to the provisions of paragraph 16 of Section VI of this Protocol, shall be delivered to the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility without undue delay.

21. Prior to the completion of construction of the buildings or shelters provided for in paragraph 14 and subparagraph 22(b) of this Section, the inspected Party at the request of the inspecting Party shall provide the monitors with temporary structures at the portal and road exits. Such temporary structures shall be provided at the expense of the inspecting Party.

22. Within the perimeter continuous monitoring area, the inspecting Party shall have the right to:

(a) construct, operate, and maintain at the portal an operations center for receiving and storing data;
(b) construct at the portal no more than three buildings with a total floor space of up to 150 square meters to house the operations center and monitoring team headquarters; and
(c) install at the portal and the road exits provided for in paragraphs 13 and 14 of this Section, the equipment for a perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system, as specified in Annex 9 to this Protocol.

23. Within the perimeter continuous monitoring area, the inspected Party, at the request of and at the expense of the inspecting Party, shall construct one building with floor space specified in such request, but of no more than 500 square meters, for use by the monitors for storage of equipment for continuous monitoring activities and of supplies.

24. Within the perimeter continuous monitoring area, the inspected Party shall have the right to construct at a location agreed upon with the inspecting Party, one building for conducting viewing procedures in accordance with this Protocol.

25. The monitoring team leader shall provide to the in-country escort:

(a) installation drawings, installation manuals, and other documentation, including any changes made to such documentation, to be used by the monitors at that facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility to install or test the equipment for the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system. Such documentation shall be provided to and discussed with the inspected Party prior to the commencement of the work described therein. During such discussions, the monitors shall provide clarification concerning such documentation; and
(b) manuals and any other documents, including any changes made to such documentation, to be used by the monitors to operate and maintain the equipment for continuous monitoring activity within the perimeter continuous monitoring area. Such documentation shall be provided to and discussed with the inspected Party prior to the use of such documentation for the operation and maintenance of equipment within the perimeter continuous monitoring area. During such discussions, monitors shall provide clarification concerning the use of such documentation.

26. The following restrictions shall apply within and near the perimeter continuous monitoring area:

(a) Unobstructed tunnels shall not be permitted under the perimeter continuous monitoring area; obstructed tunnels shall be subject to examination.
(b) Waterways, canals, or unobstructed culverts shall not be permitted to cross the perimeter continuous monitoring area; obstructed culverts shall be subject to examination.
(c) Aircraft shall not be permitted to arrive within the perimeter of the monitored facility unless the monitors have been informed in advance of their arrival, except for an emergency at such a facility. In case of an emergency, the in-country escort shall inform the monitors of the arrival of an aircraft within the perimeter of that facility immediately after such an arrival.
(d) Cranes shall not be permitted to be erected within 20 meters of either side of the boundaries of the perimeter continuous monitoring area unless the monitors have been informed in advance.

27. During the establishment, operation, or maintenance of a perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system, the inspecting Party shall not impede the inspected Party's access to any structures or security systems.

28. The inspecting Party shall provide an escort into any of its portal buildings constructed in accordance with paragraphs 22 and 23 of this Section, when the inspected Party desires access to such buildings.

29. Any two members of the monitoring team shall have the right to travel no more than one time per week to the embassy or consulate of the inspecting Party on the territory of the inspected Party. The monitoring team leader or the authorized representative of such a team shall inform a member of the in-country escort of the planned date of each such trip. The inspected Party shall make arrangements for each such trip in accordance with paragraph 11 of Section VI of this Protocol.

30. No more than nine diplomatic personnel of the inspecting Party who are members of the Treaty implementation unit of that Party's embassy or consulate on the territory of the inspected Party, shall have the right to travel, no more than two times each year, to each facility subject to continuous monitoring, if monitors are present at such a facility, or monitored facility, with no more than two persons traveling each time and staying at such a facility for no more than two days. Arrangements for such travel shall be made in accordance with established procedures for travel by diplomats to open areas. Such personnel shall be permitted unrestricted movement in the free movement zone associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility. In accordance with Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of April 18, 1961, the Parties agree to waive the inviolability of any article, including personal baggage, their diplomatic personnel may be carrying at the last airport prior to arrival at the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, except that this waiver of immunity shall not apply to papers. This waiver shall not apply to any other privileges and immunities accorded diplomatic personnel. Other requests for visits shall be considered on a case-by-case basis.

31. Once notification in accordance with paragraph 16 of Section III of this Protocol has been provided, monitors shall have the right to move from one facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility directly to another such facility and take with them equipment and supplies. The inspected Party may assign escorts to the monitors during such movements. The equipment and supplies brought with them may be examined by the inspected Party upon arrival at another facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility under the same terms as when they arrived on the territory of the inspected Party.

32. The inspecting Party shall not take any actions with respect to structures of the inspected Party without its consent. If the Parties agree that structures of the inspected Party are to be rebuilt or demolished, either partially or completely, the inspecting Party shall provide the necessary compensation.

33. The inspected Party shall not interfere with the installed equipment of the inspecting Party or restrict the access of the monitors to such equipment. The in-country escort shall have the right to observe such equipment during its installation, testing, operation, and maintenance at the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility.

34. The inspected Party shall not interfere with continuous monitoring activities.

35. For the purpose of continuous monitoring after dark or during inclement weather the inspected Party, at the request of and at the expense of the inspecting Party, shall ensure sufficient lighting at the portal, road exits, and along the perimeter of the monitored facility to permit monitors to carry out their functions, including obtaining clear images of items being verified using a system of video cameras.

36. Continuous monitoring of containers, launch canisters, and vehicles exiting from the monitored facility shall be carried out subject to the procedures provided for in Annex 5 to this Protocol.

XVII. Cancellation of Inspections

1. An inspection shall be cancelled if, due to circumstances brought about by force majeure, it cannot be conducted. If an inspection is cancelled due to circumstances brought about by force majeure, the number of inspections to which the inspecting Party is entitled shall not be reduced.

2. In the case of a delay, including a delay due to circumstances brought about by force majeure, that prevents an inspection team conducting an inspection pursuant to paragraph 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, or 10 of Article XI of the Treaty from arriving at the inspection site during the time specified in paragraph 14 of Section VI of this Protocol, the inspection team leader may either cancel or conduct the inspection. If an inspection is cancelled due to delay, the number of inspections to which the inspecting Party is entitled shall not be reduced.

3. If the time to transport an inspection team or subgroup exceeds the times specified in paragraphs 11 and 12 of Section VII, paragraph 14 of Section IX, or paragraph 8 of Section X of this Protocol, the inspection team leader may either cancel or conduct the inspection. If such an inspection is cancelled, the number of inspections to which the inspecting Party is entitled shall not be reduced.

4. For inspections conducted pursuant to paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 10 of Article XI of the Treaty, pre-inspection restrictions shall be cancelled if, due to circumstances brought about by force majeure, items subject to pre-inspection restrictions must be removed from the inspection site. In the case of pre-inspection restrictions being cancelled due to circumstances brought about by force majeure, the inspection team leader may either cancel or conduct the inspection. If an inspection is cancelled, the number of inspections to which the inspecting Party is entitled shall not be reduced.

5. If the inspected Party interrupts the procedures for a reentry vehicle inspection for reasons of personnel or equipment safety, the inspection team leader may cancel the inspection. In that case, the number of inspections to which the inspecting Party is entitled shall not be reduced.

XVIII. Inspection Reports and Continuous Monitoring Reports

1. During post-inspection procedures the inspection team leader shall provide the in-country escort with an official written inspection report in the language of the inspecting Party and an unofficial translation of the report in the language of the inspected Party. Such a report shall be provided no later than two hours after the beginning of the post-inspection procedures or no later than one hour after the arrival of all subgroups of the inspection team at the location where such procedures are carried out, whichever is later. The report shall be factual. It shall include the type of inspection conducted; the inspection site; the type and number of missiles, stages, launchers, heavy bombers, ballistic missile submarines, and support equipment subject to the Treaty observed during the period of inspection and all measurements recorded in accordance with paragraph 19 of Section VI of this Protocol. Photographs taken during the inspection as well as the site diagram or map of the inspection site provided for in paragraph 8 of Section VII, paragraph 8 or subparagraph 11(d) of Section IX, or paragraph 6 of Section X of this Protocol, shall be considered to be part of the report. The report shall be signed by the inspection team leader and by a member of the in-country escort. Each Party shall retain one copy of the report.

2. Within three days after the end of each month, the monitoring team leader shall provide the in-country escort with an official written continuous monitoring report in the language of the inspecting Party and an unofficial translation of the report in the language of the inspected Party. The report shall be factual. It shall include the number of vehicles declared to contain items of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty that left the monitored facility through the portal specified in paragraph 13 of Section XVI of this Protocol during that month. The report shall also include all measurements of containers contained in these vehicles recorded in accordance with paragraph 19 of Section VI of this Protocol. Photographs taken during continuous monitoring shall be considered to be a part of the report. The report shall be signed by the monitoring team leader and by a member of the in-country escort. Each Party shall retain one copy of the report.

3. The inspected Party shall have the right to include written comments in the report.

4. The Parties shall, when possible, clarify ambiguities regarding factual information contained in the inspection report or the continuous monitoring report. Relevant clarifications shall be recorded in the report.

Done at Moscow on July 31, 1991, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the United States of America:
George Bush
President of the United States of America

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
M. Gorbachev
President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Annex 1
Procedures for the inspection of covered objects, containers, launch canisters, vehicles, and structures

1. Inspectors shall have the right to confirm the numbers, and, if applicable, types, variants or versions of items of inspection that are specified for the facility to be inspected and declared for the inspection site in accordance with paragraph 8 of Section VII or paragraph 6 of Section X of this Protocol, and to confirm the absence of any other item of inspection at the inspection site. For this purpose in carrying out the procedures for inspections provided for in this Annex the size criteria provided in paragraph 23 of Section VI of this Protocol shall be used.

2. For an item of inspection that is outside a container or launch canister and that is not covered or environmentally protected, inspectors shall have the right to confirm that the item of inspection is an item of inspection of the declared type, and if applicable, variant or version by external viewing and by measurement of its dimensions at locations on the item of inspection designated by a member of the in-country escort. Upon completion of such viewing and measurements, the item of inspection shall not be subject to further inspection.

3. For an object that is outside a container or launch canister and that is not covered or environmentally protected, inspectors shall have the right to confirm by external viewing and by measurement of its external dimensions at locations on the object designated by a member of the in-country escort that it is not an item of inspection.

4. For a covered or environmentally protected object, a member of the in-country escort shall demonstrate to the satisfaction of inspectors that such an object is an item of inspection of the declared type, and if applicable, variant or version, or that it is not an item of inspection. At the choice of a member of the in-country escort, inspectors shall have the right to carry out one or more of the following procedures:

(a) View the covered or environmentally protected object from a place designated by a member of the in-country escort after a member of the in-country escort has partially or, if necessary, completely removed the cover or environmental protection:

(i) If, by viewing, inspectors confirm that the object is not an item of inspection, a container, or a launch canister, that object shall not be subject to further inspection.
(ii) If, by viewing, inspectors are unable to confirm that the object is not an item of inspection, inspectors shall have the right to carry out the procedures provided for in paragraph 3 of this Annex.
(iii) If, by viewing, inspectors confirm that the object is an item of inspection, a container or a launch canister, inspectors shall have the right to carry out the procedures provided for in paragraph 2, 5, 6, or 7 of this Annex.

(b) Measure the dimensions of the covered or environmentally protected object:

(i) If, by making such measurements, inspectors confirm that the object is not large enough to contain or to be an item of inspection, that object shall not be subject to further inspection.
(ii) If, by making such measurements, inspectors confirm that the object is large enough to contain or to be an item of inspection, inspectors shall have the right to carry out the procedures provided for in subparagraph (a) of this paragraph.

5. For a container, a member of the in-country escort shall demonstrate to the satisfaction of inspectors that the container contains an item of inspection of the declared type and, if applicable, variant of the type, or that it does not contain an item of inspection. At the choice of a member of the in-country escort, inspectors shall have the right to carry out one or more of the following procedures:

(a) Make measurements of the dimensions of the container:

(i) If, by making such measurements inspectors confirm that, by its dimensions, the container is not large enough to contain an item of inspection, the container shall not be subject to further inspection.
(ii) If, by making such measurements inspectors confirm that, by its dimensions, the container is large enough to contain an item of inspection, inspectors shall have the right to carry out procedures provided for in subparagraph (b) or (c) of this paragraph.

(b) View the interior of the container after a member of the in-country escort has opened the container, and, as necessary, measure the dimensions of its contents:

(i) If, by viewing the interior of the container and measuring the dimensions of its contents, inspectors confirm that the item of inspection is an item of inspection of the declared type or confirm that the container does not contain an item of inspection, the container shall not be subject to further inspection.
(ii) If, by viewing the interior of the container and measuring the dimensions of its contents, inspectors are unable to confirm that the item of inspection is an item of inspection of the declared type or unable to confirm that the contents of the container are not an item of inspection, inspectors shall have the right to carry out procedures provided for in subparagraph (c) of this paragraph.

(c) View the contents of the container, after a member of the in-country escort has removed the contents from the container:

(i) If, by viewing the contents of the container, inspectors confirm that the contents of the container are not an item of inspection, the container shall not be subject to further inspection.
(ii) If, by viewing the contents of the container, inspectors confirm that the contents of the container are an item of inspection or an unidentified object, inspectors shall have the right to carry out procedures provided for in paragraph 2 or 3 of this Annex.

6. For a launch canister that is declared to contain an item of inspection, a member of the in-country escort shall demonstrate to the satisfaction of inspectors that the launch canister is a launch canister for an item of the declared type. Inspectors shall have the right to view such a launch canister and, at locations on the launch canister designated by a member of the in-country escort, make measurements of its dimensions to confirm that those dimensions correspond to the dimensions specified for an item of the declared type. Upon completion of the viewing and the measurements, the launch canister shall not be subject to further inspection.

7. For a launch canister declared not to contain an item of inspection, a member of the in-country escort shall demonstrate to the satisfaction of inspectors that the launch canister does not contain an item of inspection. At the choice of a member of the in-country escort, inspectors shall have the right to carry out one or more of the following procedures:

(a) View the interior of the launch canister after a member of the in-country escort has opened the launch canister, by removing at least one of the end caps from the launch canister, and, as necessary, measure the dimensions of its contents.

(i) If, by viewing the interior of the launch canister and measuring the dimensions of its contents, inspectors confirm that the launch canister does not contain an item of inspection, the launch canister shall not be subject to further inspection.
(ii) If, by viewing the interior of the launch canister and measuring the dimensions of its contents, inspectors are unable to confirm that the contents of the launch canister are not an item of inspection, inspectors shall have the right to carry out procedures provided for in subparagraph (b) of this paragraph.

(b) View the contents of the launch canister, after a member of the in-country escort has removed the contents from the launch canister:

(i) If, by viewing the contents of the launch canister, inspectors confirm that the contents of the launch canister are not an item of inspection, the launch canister shall not be subject to further inspection.
(ii) If, by viewing the contents of the launch canister, inspectors are unable to confirm that the contents of the launch canister are not an item of inspection, inspectors shall have the right to carry out procedures provided for in paragraph 3 of this Annex.

8. For a launch canister that is declared to contain a training model of a missile, a member of the in-country escort shall demonstrate to the satisfaction of inspectors the features that confirm that such a launch canister contains a training model of a missile.

9. For a vehicle, a member of the in-country escort shall demonstrate to the satisfaction of inspectors that the vehicle contains one or more items of inspection of the declared type and, if applicable, variant or version, or that it does not contain an item of inspection. At the choice of a member of the in-country escort, inspectors shall have the right to carry out one or more of the following procedures:

(a) Make measurements of the dimensions of the enclosed space of the vehicle or the dimensions of the accesses into such a space:

(i) If, by making such measurements, inspectors confirm that the vehicle, by the dimensions of its enclosed space or the dimensions of the accesses into such enclosed space is not large enough to contain, or is not accessible to, an item of inspection, the vehicle shall not be subject to further inspection.
(ii) If, by making such measurements, inspectors confirm that the vehicle, by the dimensions of its enclosed space and the dimensions of the accesses into such enclosed space, is large enough to contain, and is accessible to, an item of inspection, inspectors shall have the right to carry out procedures provided for in subparagraph (c) of this paragraph.

(b) Make measurements of the dimensions of a partitioned enclosed space within the vehicle or of the dimensions of the accesses into such a space.

(i) If, by making such measurements, inspectors confirm that the partitioned enclosed space within the vehicle, by its dimensions or by the dimensions of the accesses into such a space, is not large enough to contain, or is not accessible to, an item of inspection, the partitioned enclosed space within the vehicle shall not be subject to further inspection.
(ii) If, by making such measurements, inspectors confirm that the partitioned enclosed space within the vehicle, by its dimensions and by the dimensions of the accesses into such a space, is large enough to contain, and is accessible to, an item of inspection, inspectors shall have the right to carry out procedures provided for in subparagraph (c) of this paragraph.

(c) View the interior of the vehicle or the partitioned enclosed space within the vehicle, or the open bed of the vehicle, from a place designated by a member of the in-country escort. This place shall be designated in such a way as to allow the inspectors to view the entire interior of the vehicle or the partitioned enclosed space within the vehicle, or the open bed of the vehicle.

(i) If, by viewing, inspectors confirm that the interior of the vehicle or partitioned enclosed space within the vehicle, or the open bed of the vehicle does not contain an item of inspection, an unidentified object, a covered or environmentally protected object, a container, or a launch canister, the vehicle or the partitioned enclosed space within the vehicle, or the open bed of the vehicle shall not be subject to further inspection.
(ii) If, by viewing, inspectors confirm that the interior of the vehicle or partitioned enclosed space within the vehicle, or the open bed of the vehicle contains an item of inspection, an unidentified object, a covered or environmentally protected object, a container or a launch canister, inspectors shall have the right to carry out the procedures provided for in paragraph 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, or 8 of this Annex.

After inspectors have completed the procedures to confirm the numbers, and, if applicable, types, variants or versions, of items of inspection or to confirm the absence of an item of inspection, the vehicle and the items of inspection, containers, launch canisters, or other objects contained therein may leave the inspection site.

10. For a structure other than a fixed structure for mobile launchers of ICBMs, a member of the in-country escort shall demonstrate to the satisfaction of inspectors that the structure contains one or more items of inspection of the declared type and, if applicable, variant or version, or that it does not contain an item of inspection. At the choice of a member of the in-country escort, inspectors shall have the right to carry out one or more of the following procedures:

(a) Make measurements of the dimensions of the structure or of the dimensions of the accesses into the structure:

(i) If, by making such measurements, inspectors confirm that, by its dimensions or by the dimensions of the accesses into the structure, the structure is not large enough to contain, or is not accessible to, an item of inspection, the structure shall not be subject to further inspection.
(ii) If, by making such measurements, inspectors confirm that, by its dimensions and by the dimensions of the accesses into the structure, the structure is large enough to contain, and is accessible to, an item of inspection, inspectors shall have the right to carry out procedures provided for in subparagraph (c) of this paragraph.

(b) Make measurements of the dimensions of the partitioned enclosed space within the structure or of the dimensions of the accesses into such a space:

(i) If, by making such measurements, inspectors confirm that the partitioned enclosed space within the structure, by its dimensions or the dimensions of the accesses into such a space, is not large enough to contain, or is not accessible to, an item of inspection, the partitioned enclosed space within the structure shall not be subject to further inspection.
(ii) If, by making such measurements, inspectors confirm that the partitioned enclosed space within the structure, by its dimensions and by the dimensions of the accesses into such a space, is large enough to contain, and is accessible to, an item of inspection, inspectors shall have the right to carry out procedures provided for in subparagraph (c) of this paragraph.

(c) View the interior of the structure or the partitioned enclosed space within the structure from a place designated by a member of the in-country escort. This place shall be designated in such a way as to allow the inspectors to view the entire interior of the structure or the partitioned enclosed space within the structure:

(i) If, by viewing, inspectors confirm that the interior of the structure or the partitioned enclosed space within the structure does not contain an item of inspection, an unidentified object, a covered or environmentally protected object, a container, a launch canister, or a vehicle, the structure or the partitioned enclosed space within the structure shall not be subject to further inspection.
(ii) If, by viewing, inspectors confirm that the interior of the structure or the partitioned enclosed space within the structure contains an item of inspection, an unidentified object, a covered or environmentally protected object, a container, a launch canister, or a vehicle, inspectors shall have the right to carry out procedures provided for in paragraph 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, or 9 of this Annex.

11. For a fixed structure for mobile launchers of ICBMs, a member of the in-country escort shall demonstrate to the satisfaction of inspectors that the fixed structure contains one or more mobile launchers of ICBMs of the declared type of ICBM and, if applicable, version of a mobile launcher of ICBMs of the declared type of ICBM and no other item of inspection or that it does not contain an item of inspection. Inspectors shall have the right:

(a) To make measurements of the dimensions of all fixed structures for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs to confirm that such fixed structures in a restricted area cannot contain more than the number of road-mobile launchers of ICBMs specified for that restricted area;
(b) To make measurements of the dimensions of all fixed structures for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs to confirm the specified dimensions of such fixed structures;
(c) To view the interior of each fixed structure from a place designated by a member of the in-country escort. This place shall be designated in such a way as to allow the inspectors to view the entire interior of the fixed structure for mobile launchers of ICBMs:

(i) If, by viewing, inspectors confirm that the interior of the fixed structure does not contain an item of inspection, an unidentified object, a covered or environmentally protected object, a container, a launch canister, or a vehicle, the fixed structure shall not be subject to further inspection.
(ii) If, by viewing, inspectors confirm that the interior of the fixed structure contains an item of inspection, an unidentified object, a covered or environmentally protected object, a container, a launch canister, or a vehicle, inspectors shall have the right to carry out procedures provided for in paragraph 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, or 9 of this Annex.

(d) To read the data from the unique identifiers applied to ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs as provided for in paragraph 5 of Annex 6 to this Protocol.

When carrying out procedures provided for in this paragraph, no more than a total of four inspectors shall be allowed inside a fixed structure for mobile launchers of ICBMs if such a fixed structure contains a mobile launcher of ICBMs.

Annex 2
Procedures for inspection of silo launchers of ICBMs, mobile launchers of ICBMs, and SLBM launchers

1. For an inspection of a silo launcher of ICBMs declared not to contain an ICBM, upon arrival of the inspection team subgroup at such a silo launcher of ICBMs, the inspection team subgroup shall have the right to ascertain that it is the designated silo launcher of ICBMs by comparing its geographic coordinates, determined using a satellite system receiver and the procedures provided for in Annex 8 to this Protocol, with the geographic coordinates specified for that silo launcher. After confirmation of coordinates, the inspected Party shall open the silo door. The inspectors shall have the right to view the interior of this ICBM launcher from a place designated by a member of the in-country escort, to confirm that it does not contain an ICBM or a first stage of an ICBM.

2. For an inspection of a road-mobile launcher of ICBMs declared not to contain an ICBM, if inspectors are unable to confirm by means of external viewing of the launcher that it does not contain an ICBM, inspectors shall have the right to view the interior of that road-mobile launcher of ICBMs through a maintenance hatch.

3. For an inspection of a rail-mobile launcher of ICBMs declared not to contain an ICBM, inspectors shall have the right to view the interior of the railcar of such a launcher through a maintenance hatch or from the entry compartment of that railcar to confirm that it does not contain an ICBM.

4. For an inspection of an SLBM launcher declared not to contain an SLBM, upon arrival of the inspection team subgroup at such an SLBM launcher, the inspected Party shall open the SLBM launcher hatch. Inspectors shall have the right to view the interior of the SLBM launcher, from a place designated by a member of the in-country escort, to confirm that it does not contain an SLBM or the first stage of an SLBM.

5. For baseline data inspections, data update inspections, and new facility inspections, after the viewing in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Annex has been completed, the inspection team subgroup shall return to the maintenance facility of the inspected ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs or, for a reentry vehicle inspection after the viewing in accordance with paragraph 1, 2, 3, or 4 of this Annex has been completed, the inspection team subgroup shall have the right, at its choice, to rejoin the inspection team or to go to the designated location where post-inspection procedures will be carried out.

Annex 3
Procedures for reentry vehicle inspections conducted pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty

1. The inspected Party shall have the right to prepare the front section for viewing in the launcher of ICBMs or SLBMs, in close proximity to it, in a vehicle, or at a specially allocated site determined by the inspected Party.

2. For silo launchers of ICBMs and SLBM launchers:

(a) Upon arrival of the inspection team at a designated silo launcher of ICBMs containing the ICBM to be inspected, inspectors shall have the right to confirm, in accordance with the procedures provided for in paragraph 1 of Annex 2 to this Protocol, that it is the silo launcher of ICBMs designated by the inspection team leader.
(b) Upon arrival of inspectors at the silo launcher of ICBMs or SLBM launcher containing the ICBM or SLBM to be inspected, a member of the in-country escort shall designate one or more places where the inspectors may be present. This place or these places shall be determined in a manner permitting inspectors to observe the upper silo or tube edge of such an ICBM or SLBM launcher and permitting inspectors to see any vehicles, containers, or objects that enter or leave the vicinity of the ICBM or SLBM launcher. The boundaries of that vicinity shall be determined by a member of the in-country escort. The place or places from which inspectors may observe the upper silo or tube edge of the ICBM or SLBM launcher shall be located no more than 50 meters from that launcher. In cases where a clear and unobstructed view cannot be achieved within a 50-meter distance, the inspection team leader and a member of the in-country escort may agree to a position or positions that permit a clear and unobstructed view of the upper edge of the launcher from a distance greater than 50 meters.
(c) Upon the arrival of inspectors at the designated silo launcher of ICBMs or SLBM launcher, if requested by the inspection team leader, a member of the in-country escort shall provide the inspectors the opportunity to familiarize themselves with the vicinity of this launcher in such a manner that inspectors may orient themselves and have an understanding of the relative positions of the launcher and such structures or vehicles as may be located in its vicinity.
(d) Inspectors shall have the right to maintain continuous visual observation of the upper silo or tube edge of such an ICBM or SLBM launcher or of vehicles, devices, or temporary structures used for the removal of the missile or the front section from the launcher or for the preparation of the front section for viewing. The purpose of such observation shall be to ascertain that no reentry vehicle is removed from the ICBM or SLBM launcher during the time period beginning with the opening of the ICBM silo launcher door or SLBM launcher hatch and ending with the completion of preparation of the front section for viewing or the removal of the missile or front section from the ICBM or SLBM launcher, whichever is earlier.
(e) Prior to the time of the opening of the ICBM silo launcher door or SLBM launcher hatch, a member of the in-country escort shall inform the inspection team leader of the opening. Inspectors shall have the right to observe the opening of the ICBM silo launcher door or SLBM launcher hatch; the time of the opening shall be at the discretion of the inspected Party.
(f) A member of the in-country escort shall demonstrate to the satisfaction of inspectors that any vehicles, containers, or objects that enter or leave the vicinity of the ICBM or SLBM launcher during the time period beginning with the opening of the ICBM silo launcher door or SLBM launcher hatch and ending with the completion of the preparation of the front section for viewing or the removal of the missile or front section from the ICBM or SLBM launcher, whichever is earlier, do not contain reentry vehicles.

3. As required, at the choice of the inspected Party, a mobile launcher of ICBMs that contains an ICBM to be inspected may proceed to a specially allocated site where the viewing of the front section of such an ICBM will be carried out, or where the front section will be separated from the ICBM. In that case, the inspection team shall have the right to maintain uninterrupted visual contact with the mobile launcher of ICBMs.

4. As required, at the choice of the inspected Party, a submarine whose launcher contains an SLBM to be inspected, may proceed to a specially allocated site where the viewing of the front section of such an SLBM will be carried out, or where the SLBM will be removed from its launcher, or the front section will be separated from the SLBM. In that case, the submarine shall proceed on the surface to that site, and the inspection team shall have the right to maintain uninterrupted visual contact with that ballistic missile submarine.

5. The inspected Party shall not remove any reentry vehicles from the front section of the ICBM or SLBM to be inspected throughout the entire period of time between the time it is designated for inspection and the completion of the viewing of the front section.

6. If the front section is viewed directly in the ICBM or SLBM launcher, the inspected Party shall prepare the front section for viewing subject to the provisions of paragraph 8 or 11 of this Section and shall give the inspection team an opportunity to view it. Preparation of the front section for viewing may include its partial separation from the missile. Inspectors shall have the right to view the interior of the vehicles and devices used to prepare the front section for viewing, prior to their use and after the completion of viewing of the front section. This viewing shall be carried out to confirm that such vehicles or devices do not contain another front section or other reentry vehicles. For SLBMs, if the inspected Party places over an SLBM launcher a temporary structure specially intended for preparing the front section for viewing and for viewing it, inspectors shall have the right to inspect that temporary structure before it is put in place and after the viewing of the front section is completed. This viewing shall be carried out to confirm that the temporary structure does not contain another front section or other reentry vehicles.

7. For viewing of the front section carried out outside an ICBM or SLBM launcher:

(a) The inspectors shall have the right to view the interior of the vehicles and devices used to remove a missile or front section from an ICBM or SLBM launcher, prior to their use. This viewing shall be carried out to ascertain that such vehicles or devices do not contain another missile, front section, or other reentry vehicles. After the removal of the missile or front section from a vehicle or device, inspectors shall have the right to view it again to ascertain that it contains no reentry vehicles.
(b) The inspected Party shall separate the front section and remove it from the ICBM or SLBM launcher or remove the missile with its front section from the ICBM or SLBM launcher.
(c) If the inspected Party separates the front section in the ICBM or SLBM launcher and then removes it, no more than two inspectors shall have the right to view the interior of the launcher for no more than one minute from a place designated by a member of the in-country escort, to confirm that the front section is completely separated. A member of the in-country escort shall designate this place in such a way as to provide an unobstructed view of the interior of the ICBM or SLBM launcher.
(d) If, in the process of preparing for the demonstration, the front section or missile with its front section is placed into a vehicle, inspectors shall have the right to view the interior of the vehicle before the missile or front section is placed in it, in order to ascertain that it does not contain another missile, front section, or other reentry vehicles.
(e) If the front section is viewed at a specially allocated site, inspectors shall have the right to follow that vehicle during the transportation of the missile with its front section or of the front section in the vehicle to that site in such a way as to maintain uninterrupted visual contact with the vehicle; after the missile with its front section or the front section has been unloaded from that vehicle, inspectors shall have the right to view the vehicle again to ascertain the absence therein of reentry vehicles.

8. Preparation of the front section for viewing shall include full or partial removal of the shroud except for missiles that do not utilize a shroud. The process of preparation of the front section for viewing may be carried out outside the field of view of inspectors in such a way as to permit inspectors to ascertain that no reentry vehicles are removed from the front section.

9. If the front section is viewed in the vehicle, inspectors shall have the right to observe the vehicle throughout the entire period of time between the placement of the front section in the vehicle and the viewing of the front section.

10. If the front section is viewed at a specially allocated site, the following procedures shall apply:

(a) Before the shroud is removed inspectors shall have the right to view the specially allocated site inside a room or within a portion of the site for viewing the front section, to ascertain that the site does not contain another front section or other reentry vehicles.
(b) During the entire process of preparation of the front section for viewing, inspectors shall have the right, at their own choice, either to observe all exits of the site to ascertain that no reentry vehicles are removed from that site, or to seal all the exits with seals. During the process of preparation of the front section for viewing, no vehicle, container, launch canister, or object shall leave the site until inspected or until an inspector declares that he or she does not intend to inspect it.

11. Before the front section is viewed, the inspected Party may cover reentry vehicles and other equipment, including the mounting platform, with covers, in such a manner that the covers shall not hamper inspectors in ascertaining that the front section contains no more reentry vehicles than the number of warheads attributed to missiles of that type. Inspectors shall have the right to view the covers and to measure hard covers prior to their placement on the reentry vehicles.

12. After the process of preparation of the front section for viewing has been completed, inspectors may view the front section continuously for no more than 15 minutes from a place or places designated by a member of the in-country escort no more than five meters from the front section and providing a clear, unobstructed view of the front section, to ascertain that the front section contains no more reentry vehicles than the number of warheads attributed to missiles of that type.

13. If a member of the in-country escort declares that an object contained in the front section is not a reentry vehicle, the inspected Party shall demonstrate to the satisfaction of the inspectors that this object is not a reentry vehicle.

14. If the preparation of the front section for viewing has been carried out outside the field of view of inspectors, the inspectors, upon completion of viewing of the front section and prior to the reinstallation of the shroud, may view the vehicle or specially allocated site where the front section was viewed, including the space under the shroud, to ascertain the absence of reentry vehicles outside the front section.

15. The in-country escort shall provide in the vicinity of the ICBM or SLBM launcher and at the site where the viewing of the front section will be carried out, lighting sufficient for the conduct of the procedures provided for in this Annex.

16. The inspected Party shall transport the inspection team to the location designated by the inspected Party for carrying out post-inspection procedures.

Annex 4
Procedures for inspections of heavy bombers, former heavy bombers, long-range ALCMS, and their facilities

I. For inspections of heavy bombers, former heavy bombers, and long-range nuclear ALCMs conducted during distinguishability exhibitions, and for inspections of long-range non-nuclear ALCMs conducted during exhibitions conducted pursuant to notifications provided in accordance with Section VII of the Notification Protocol:

1. Inspectors shall have the right to view a heavy bomber to confirm the presence of features, specified for the type, category, and, if applicable, variant of such heavy bomber, that make the heavy bomber distinguishable from heavy bombers of other categories of the same type, pursuant to subparagraph 9(e) of Article III of the Treaty. Inspectors shall have the right to make linear measurements, pursuant to paragraph 19 of Section VI of this Protocol, to confirm that the technical data and distinguishing features correspond to the values specified in Annex G to the Memorandum of Understanding, for the type, category, and, if applicable, variant of such heavy bomber, as well as to the values specified in Annex H to the Memorandum of Understanding, to the extent that such data is required to confirm the distinguishing features of such heavy bomber. Inspectors shall not have the right to inspect areas of the interior of a heavy bomber that are not related to specified technical data or distinguishing features.

2. Inspectors shall have the right to view a former heavy bomber to confirm the presence of features, specified for the type of such former heavy bomber, that make it distinguishable from heavy bombers of the same type pursuant to subparagraph 9(e) of Article III of the Treaty. Inspectors shall have the right to make linear measurements to confirm that the distinguishing features correspond to the values specified in Annex G to the Memorandum of Understanding for the type of such former heavy bomber, pursuant to paragraph 19 of Section VI of this Protocol. Inspectors shall not have the right to inspect areas of the interior of a former heavy bomber that are not related to specified distinguishing features.

3. Inspectors shall have the right to view a long-range nuclear ALCM and to make linear measurements to confirm that the technical data correspond to the values specified in Annex H to the Memorandum of Understanding for the type and, if applicable, variant of such long-range nuclear ALCM, pursuant to paragraph 19 of Section VI of this Protocol.

4. Inspectors shall have the right to view a long-range non-nuclear ALCM, to use radiation detection equipment to confirm that the ALCM is non-nuclear, and to make linear measurements to confirm the presence of features, which have been specified in the notification provided in accordance with Section VII of the Notification Protocol, that make such a long-range non-nuclear ALCM distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs, pursuant to subparagraph 9(f) of Article III of the Treaty. For long-range non-nuclear ALCMs stored in containers, prior to the commencement of such procedures, the inspectors shall have the right to make linear measurements of the dimensions of the container, and the in-country escort shall open the container and remove the missile. Inspectors shall not have the right to observe removal of the missile from the container, but removal shall be accomplished so as to provide confidence that the missile and container are the same ones originally exhibited. The radiation detection equipment and a radiation source may also be used to confirm that the container does not conceal the presence of radiation.

5. A member of the in-country escort shall designate locations on an inspected item where linear measurements may be made. The inspected Party may cover the item to be inspected provided that such covering does not preclude confirmation by viewing or linear measurement of specified distinguishing features and technical data, as applicable, of the inspected item. The inspected Party shall ensure sufficient lighting to facilitate inspection. Photographs may be taken to document features of the exhibited items subject to procedures provided for in paragraph 10 of Section XV of this Protocol.

6. Inspectors shall use radiation detection equipment in accordance with the procedures provided for in Section VI of Annex 8 to this Protocol.

II. For inspections of heavy bombers and former heavy bombers during baseline data inspections, data update inspections, new facility inspections, and baseline exhibitions:

1. Inspectors shall have the right to confirm, as provided for in paragraph 14 of Section VII of this Protocol, heavy bomber equipage and that a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments, a training heavy bomber, or a former heavy bomber satisfies the requirements for conversion in accordance with Section VI of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol.

2. Inspectors shall also have the right to view a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber to confirm the presence of features, specified for the type and, if applicable, the category and variant of such airplane, that make the heavy bomber distinguishable from other heavy bombers of the same type, or that make the former heavy bomber distinguishable from heavy bombers of the same type, pursuant to subparagraph 9(e) of Article III of the Treaty. Inspectors shall have the right to make those linear measurements that can be made without changing the configuration of the heavy bomber or former heavy bomber by adding or removing equipment, to confirm that the number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which the heavy bomber is equipped or the distinguishing features correspond to the values specified in Annex G to the Memorandum of Understanding for the type and, if applicable, the category and variant of such airplane, pursuant to paragraph 19 of Section VI of this Protocol. During each inspection of a facility, however, at the request of the inspection team leader, the in-country escort shall remove one pylon from one non-alert heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, of a type specified not to carry long-range nuclear ALCMs on external attachment joints, or one pylon from one heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments. The particular heavy bomber and the particular pylon shall be designated by the inspection team leader. Inspectors shall not have the right to inspect areas of the interior of a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber that are not related to specified distinguishing features.

3. The inspection team leader shall designate prior to the completion of pre-inspection procedures which of the heavy bombers subject to inspection and former heavy bombers located at the facility at the time pre-inspection restrictions went into effect are to be inspected. For a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber that arrives at the facility during the period of inspection and that is subject to inspection, the inspection team leader shall, immediately upon the arrival of the heavy bomber or former heavy bomber, inform the in-country escort whether it is designated to be inspected. During the period of inspection, no heavy bomber or former heavy bomber designated for inspection shall depart the facility until inspected.

4. A member of the in-country escort shall designate locations on an inspected item where linear measurements may be made. The inspected Party may cover the item to be inspected provided that such covering does not preclude confirmation by viewing or linear measurement of specified distinguishing features and technical data, as applicable, of the inspected item. The inspected Party shall ensure sufficient lighting to facilitate inspection.

III. For inspections of alert heavy bombers conducted pursuant to subparagraph 14(d) of Section VII of this Protocol:

1. The procedures provided for in this Section shall apply to heavy bombers designated as alert heavy bombers during inspections of air bases for heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs and air bases for heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs.

2. At air bases referred to in paragraph 1 of this Section, prior to the completion of pre-inspection procedures, a member of the in-country escort shall inform the inspection team leader of the location of alert heavy bombers. The in-country escort shall have the right to prepare such heavy bombers for inspection at a location chosen by the inspected Party that shall permit inspectors to view the preparation. Preparation may involve the use of covering, provided that such covering allows the inspectors to confirm the data provided for in subparagraph 14(a)(i) or 14(a)(ii) of Section VII of this Protocol. The areas where alert heavy bombers are located shall not be subject to inspection except as provided for in this Section.

3. No more than a total of four inspectors shall inspect an alert heavy bomber for a total period of no more than 30 minutes. Measurements shall not be taken during such an inspection, except that closed weapons bay doors may be measured. For heavy bombers of a category, type, and, if applicable, variant, the internal weapons bays of which are specified to be large enough to contain a long-range nuclear ALCM, the weapons bay doors shall be opened, and inspectors may view the contents of the bay from a position external to the bay, designated by a member of the in-country escort, from which inspectors can accomplish the purpose provided for in subparagraph 14(a)(i) or 14(a)(ii) of Section VII of this Protocol.

IV. For inspections of weapons storage areas conducted pursuant to subparagraph 14(f) of Section VII of this Protocol:

1. The procedures provided for in this Section shall apply to air bases for heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, air bases for heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, air bases for former heavy bombers, and training facilities for heavy bombers.

2. A member of the in-country escort shall, prior to the completion of pre-inspection procedures at a facility referred to in paragraph 1 of this Section, inform the inspection team leader of the location of weapons storage areas, and shall provide a site diagram of such areas depicting the structures that are large enough to contain the smallest long-range nuclear ALCM.

3. Inspections of covered or environmentally protected objects, containers, vehicles, and structures that are located within the boundaries of weapons storage areas shall be carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in Annex 1 to this Protocol, except that inspections of containers that are large enough to contain the smallest long-range nuclear ALCM, of a type for which data according to categories of data contained in Annex H to the Memorandum of Understanding have been specified, shall be carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in paragraphs 4, 5, 6, and 7 of this Section. Additionally, except as provided for in paragraph 4 or 5 of this Section, the inspectors may, in carrying out the procedures provided for in Annex 1 to this Protocol, make linear measurements only of covered or environmentally protected objects, containers, vehicles, and structures. No more than a total of four inspectors shall be allowed in a structure.

4. During the inspection of weapons storage areas at each facility, the inspectors may designate for further inspection no more than three containers that are large enough to contain the smallest long-range nuclear ALCM; or no more than three ALCMs stored outside containers; or any combination of no more than three such items:

(a) Inspectors shall have the right to confirm that such a designated container does not contain a long-range nuclear ALCM, subject to the following procedures:

(i) Inspectors shall have the right to make additional linear measurements of the dimensions of such a container, and to use radiation detection equipment on the exterior of the container.
(ii) For containers inside which is a source of radiation that is detected by using radiation detection equipment, the in-country escort shall open the container so that inspectors can confirm by means of viewing its interior that the container does not contain a long-range nuclear ALCM.
(iii) If, by viewing the contents of the container, inspectors confirm that the contents are not a long-range nuclear ALCM, then the container and its contents shall not be subject to further inspection.
(iv) If, by viewing the contents of the container, inspectors are unable to confirm that the contents are not a long-range nuclear ALCM, the in-country escort shall remove the contents from the container. Inspectors shall not have the right to observe the removal of the contents of the container, but removal shall be accomplished so as to provide confidence that the contents and the container are the items chosen by the inspectors. The inspectors shall have the right to view the contents of the container and to make linear measurements to confirm the presence of features that make the contents of the container distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs.
(v) If, by such viewing and making such measurements, inspectors are unable to confirm that the contents are not a long-range nuclear ALCM, they shall record their findings in the inspection report. A member of the in-country escort shall, at the request of the inspectors, photograph the contents of the container subject to the procedures provided for in paragraph 27 of Section VI of this Protocol.

(b) Inspectors shall have the right to confirm that a designated ALCM stored outside a container is not a long-range nuclear ALCM, subject to the following procedures:

(i) Inspectors shall have the right to view such an ALCM to confirm the presence of the features that make the ALCM distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs.
(ii) If, by viewing such an ALCM, inspectors confirm that the ALCM is not a long-range nuclear ALCM, the ALCM shall not be subject to further inspection.
(iii) If, by viewing such an ALCM, inspectors are unable to confirm that the ALCM is not a long-range nuclear ALCM, a member of the in-country escort may allow the inspectors to carry out additional actions, which may include making linear measurements and using radiation detection equipment, to confirm the presence of features that make the ALCM distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs.
(iv) If a member of the in-country escort does not allow such additional actions, or if, by carrying out such additional actions, inspectors are unable to confirm that the ALCM is not a long-range nuclear ALCM, the inspectors shall record their findings in the inspection report. A member of the in-country escort shall, at the request of the inspectors, photograph the ALCM subject to the procedures provided for in paragraph 27 of Section VI of this Protocol.

5. For containers that are declared by a member of the in-country escort to be of types of containers exhibited pursuant to Section VII of the Notification Protocol as containers of long-range non-nuclear ALCMs, and that are large enough to contain the smallest long-range nuclear ALCM, the inspectors shall also have the right to designate for inspection a total of no more than three such containers during each three-year period in order to confirm that a long-range nuclear ALCM is not contained therein, subject to the following procedures:

(a) The in-country escort shall open the container so that inspectors can confirm by means of viewing its interior that the container does not contain a long-range nuclear ALCM.
(b) If, by viewing the contents of the container, inspectors confirm that the contents are not a long-range nuclear ALCM, then the container and its contents shall not be subject to further inspection.
(c) If, by viewing the contents of the container, inspectors are unable to confirm that the contents are not a long-range nuclear ALCM, the in-country escort shall remove the contents from the container. Inspectors shall have the right to use radiation detection equipment to confirm that the contents are non-nuclear, and to make linear measurements to confirm the presence of features, notification of which has been provided in accordance with Section VII of the Notification Protocol, that make the contents of the container distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs. Inspectors shall not have the right to observe removal of the contents from the container, but removal shall be accomplished so as to provide confidence that the contents and container are the same ones originally designated by the inspectors. The radiation detection equipment and a radiation source may also be used to confirm that the container does not conceal the presence of radiation.
(d) If, by making such measurements, inspectors are unable to confirm that the contents of the container are not a long-range nuclear ALCM, or that such a container does not conceal the presence of radiation, they shall record their findings in the inspection report. A member of the in-country escort shall, at the request of the inspectors, photograph the contents of the container or the container, in accordance with the procedures provided for in paragraph 27 of Section VI of this Protocol. |1|

6. A member of the in-country escort shall designate locations on an inspected object where linear measurements may be made. The inspected Party may cover the object to be inspected provided that such covering does not preclude confirmation by viewing or linear measurement of specified distinguishing features and technical data, as applicable. The inspected Party shall ensure sufficient lighting to facilitate inspection.

7. Inspectors shall use radiation detection equipment in accordance with the procedures provided for in Section VI of Annex 8 to this Protocol.

V. Procedures for exhibitions of heavy bombers, former heavy bombers, and long-range ALCMs:

1. During distinguishability exhibitions for heavy bombers, former heavy bombers, and long-range nuclear ALCMs:

(a) For an exhibition conducted subject to the provisions of paragraph 1 of Section XV of this Protocol, the inspected Party shall exhibit, for a type of heavy bomber from any one of which a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested, one heavy bomber of each category and, if applicable, variant of that type in close proximity to one another. In addition, the inspected Party shall exhibit, in close proximity to such heavy bombers, one long-range nuclear ALCM of each type and, if applicable, variant. Different types of heavy bombers from any one of which a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested may be exhibited at separate sites.
(b) For subsequent exhibitions conducted subject to the provisions of paragraph 3 of Section XV of this Protocol:

(i) If notification has been provided in accordance with paragraph 8 of Section VII of the Notification Protocol, the inspected Party shall, at a minimum, exhibit one heavy bomber of the new type, new category of a type, or new variant of a category and type.
(ii) If notification has been provided in accordance with paragraph 10 of Section VII of the Notification Protocol, the inspected Party shall, at a minimum, exhibit, in close proximity to one another, one heavy bomber of the type specified in such notification equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, and one heavy bomber of each variant of the same type of heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs.
(iii) If notification has been provided in accordance with paragraph 11 of Section VII of the Notification Protocol, the inspected Party shall, at a minimum, exhibit one long-range nuclear ALCM of the new type specified in such notification.

2. During pre-inspection procedures for distinguishability exhibitions:

(a) A member of the in-country escort shall identify for inspectors each type, category, and, if applicable, variant of heavy bomber that is to be exhibited, and each type and, if applicable, variant of long-range nuclear ALCM that is to be exhibited.
(b) A member of the in-country escort shall inform inspectors of, and point out in photographs or slides and in drawings, for each type of heavy bomber and former heavy bomber to be exhibited, the differences that make heavy bombers of each category and, if applicable, variant distinguishable from heavy bombers of other categories and variants of that type and from a former heavy bomber of that type. A member of the in-country escort shall provide to the inspection team leader photographs demonstrating such distinguishing features.
(c) A member of the in-country escort shall inform inspectors of, and point out in photographs or slides and in drawings, for each type of long-range nuclear ALCM to be exhibited for which there are variants, the differences that make each variant of long-range nuclear ALCM of that type distinguishable from other variants of that type. A member of the in-country escort shall provide to the inspection team leader photographs demonstrating such distinguishing features. A member of the in-country escort shall also point out all the positions for long-range nuclear ALCMs on heavy bombers, of each type and variant, equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, and inform inspectors of the maximum number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which a heavy bomber of each type and, if applicable, each variant is equipped.

3. For exhibitions of long-range non-nuclear ALCMs conducted pursuant to notifications provided in accordance with Section VII of the Notification Protocol, a member of the in-country escort shall inform inspectors of, and point out in photographs or slides and in drawings, the differences that make long-range non-nuclear ALCMs of the type exhibited distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs of each type. A member of the in-country escort shall provide to the inspection team leader photographs demonstrating such distinguishing features.

4. During baseline exhibitions for heavy bombers and former heavy bombers conducted pursuant to paragraph 13 of Article XI of the Treaty, the inspected Party shall exhibit, at one or more exhibition sites, all heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, all former heavy bombers, and all training heavy bombers specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.

5. During pre-inspection procedures for baseline exhibitions:

(a) A member of the in-country escort shall inform inspectors of the numbers of heavy bombers, of each type, equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs; of heavy bombers, of each type, equipped for non-nuclear armaments; of former heavy bombers of each type; and of training heavy bombers of each type that are to be exhibited.
(b) For exhibitions of heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, a member of the in-country escort shall inform inspectors of, and point out in photographs or slides and in drawings, the distinguishing features that have been given to such heavy bombers during modification pursuant to paragraph 11 of Section VI of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol.
(c) For exhibitions of former heavy bombers and training heavy bombers, a member of the in-country escort shall inform the inspectors of, and point out in photographs or slides and in drawings, the distinguishing features that have been given to such airplanes during modification pursuant to paragraphs 11 and 12 of Section VI of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol, or the recognition features of specified former heavy bombers.
(d) For exhibitions of heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, a member of the in-country escort shall inform inspectors of, and point out in photographs or slides and in drawings, the features that make such heavy bombers distinguishable from heavy bombers, of the same type, equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs.

Annex 5
Procedures for continuous monitoring

1. Monitors shall have the right to confirm the numbers, types, and, if applicable, variants of types of items of continuous monitoring that are declared to exit from the monitored facility, and to confirm that no other items of continuous monitoring exit from the monitored facility. For this purpose, in carrying out the procedures for continuous monitoring provided for in this Annex, the size criteria as defined in paragraph 24 of Section VI of this Protocol shall be used.

2. If any covered or environmentally protected object, container, launch canister, or other object or vehicle exiting from the monitored facility through the portal is large enough to contain or to be an item of continuous monitoring, a member of the in-country escort shall so declare to monitors no less than 30 minutes prior to the arrival of the covered or environmentally protected object, container, launch canister, or other object or vehicle at the portal. The declaration shall state whether or not such an object is an item of continuous monitoring, or whether or not such an object, container, launch canister, or vehicle contains an item of continuous monitoring and the estimated time of its arrival at the portal. If such an object is an item of continuous monitoring or if a container, launch canister, or vehicle contains an item of continuous monitoring, a member of the in-country escort shall specify in writing the numbers, types, and, if applicable, variants of types of items of continuous monitoring. More than one item of continuous monitoring may be transported in a vehicle, but only one item of continuous monitoring may be transported in each container or in each launch canister.

3. Monitors shall have the right to read the data from the unique identifier on each launch canister declared to contain an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs if such ICBMs are maintained, stored, and transported in launch canisters, or on each first stage of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs if such ICBMs are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles without launch canisters or in stages.

4. For a vehicle that is exiting from the monitored facility and that is declared to contain an item of continuous monitoring, a member of the in-country escort shall demonstrate to the satisfaction of monitors that the vehicle contains one or more items of continuous monitoring, of the number, type, and, if applicable, variant of the type declared. For this purpose, monitors shall have the right to view the interior of such a vehicle or the open bed of the vehicle. If, by viewing, monitors confirm that the interior of the vehicle or the open bed of the vehicle contains a covered or environmentally protected object, container, launch canister, or an item of continuous monitoring that is outside a container or launch canister and that is not covered or environmentally protected, monitors shall have the right to carry out procedures provided for in paragraph 5, 6, 7, or 8 of this Annex. If inside such a vehicle there is a partitioned enclosed space that is declared by a member of the in-country escort not to contain an item of continuous monitoring, monitors shall have the right to carry out procedures provided for in subparagraph 9(b) of this Annex. After completion of those procedures, the vehicle may leave the monitored facility.

5. For a covered or environmentally protected object exiting from the monitored facility that is declared to be an item of continuous monitoring, a member of the in-country escort shall demonstrate to the satisfaction of monitors that such an object is an item of continuous monitoring of the declared type, and if applicable, variant of the type. A member of the in-country escort shall partially or, if necessary, completely remove the cover or environmental protection. If after partial or complete removal of such a cover or environmental protection, monitors confirm by viewing that the object is an item of continuous monitoring of the declared type, and if applicable, variant of the type, monitors shall have the right to carry out procedures provided for in paragraph 8 of this Annex. If after partial or complete removal of such a cover or environmental protection, monitors confirm by viewing that the object is a container or launch canister, monitors shall have the right to carry out procedures provided for in paragraph 6 or 7 of this Annex.

6. For a container that is exiting from the monitored facility and that is declared to contain an item of continuous monitoring, a member of the in-country escort shall demonstrate to the satisfaction of monitors that such a container contains the item of continuous monitoring of the declared type and, if applicable, variant of the type. Monitors shall have the right to view the interior of such a container. If by viewing the interior of the container, monitors are unable to confirm the number, type, and, if applicable, variant of the type of the item of continuous monitoring that is contained therein, a member of the in-country escort shall remove such an item from the container. In that event, monitors shall have the right to carry out the procedures provided for in paragraph 8 of this Annex.

7. For a launch canister exiting from the monitored facility that is declared to contain an item of continuous monitoring, a member of the in-country escort shall demonstrate to the satisfaction of monitors that the launch canister is a launch canister for an item of the declared type. Monitors shall have the right to view such a launch canister and, at locations on the launch canister designated by a member of the in-country escort, make measurements of the dimensions of the launch canister to confirm that those dimensions correspond to the dimensions specified for an item of the declared type. Upon completion of the viewing and measurements, the launch canister shall not be subject to further inspection.

8. For an item of continuous monitoring that is exiting from the monitored facility and that is outside a container or launch canister and that is not covered or environmentally protected, monitors shall have the right to confirm the type and, if applicable, variant of the type of the declared item of continuous monitoring by external viewing and by measurement of its dimensions at locations on the item of continuous monitoring designated by a member of the in-country escort. Upon completion of the viewing and measurements, the item of continuous monitoring shall not be subject to further inspection.

9. For a vehicle that is exiting from the monitored facility through the portal and that is not declared to contain an item of continuous monitoring, a member of the in-country escort shall demonstrate to the satisfaction of monitors that the vehicle does not contain an item of continuous monitoring. At the choice of a member of the in-country escort, monitors shall have the right to carry out one or more of the following procedures:

(a) Make measurements of the dimensions of the enclosed space of the vehicle or the dimensions of the accesses into such a space:

(i) If, by making such measurements, monitors confirm that the vehicle, by the dimensions of the enclosed space or the dimensions of the accesses into such a space, is not large enough to contain or is not accessible to an item of continuous monitoring, the vehicle shall not be subject to further inspection.
(ii) If, by making such measurements, monitors confirm that the vehicle, by the dimensions of the enclosed space and the dimensions of the accesses into such a space, is large enough to contain and is accessible to an item of continuous monitoring, monitors shall have the right to carry out procedures provided for in subparagraph (c) or (d) of this paragraph.

(b) Make measurements of the dimensions of a partitioned enclosed space within the vehicle or of the dimensions of the accesses into such a space:

(i) If, by making such measurements, monitors confirm that the partitioned enclosed space within the vehicle, by its dimensions or by the dimensions of the accesses into such a space, is not large enough to contain or is not accessible to an item of continuous monitoring, the partitioned enclosed space within the vehicle shall not be subject to further inspection.
(ii) If, by making such measurements, monitors confirm that the partitioned enclosed space within the vehicle, by its dimensions and by the dimensions of the accesses into such a space, is large enough to contain and is accessible to an item of continuous monitoring, monitors shall have the right to carry out procedures provided for in subparagraph (c) or (d) of this paragraph.

(c) Weigh a vehicle with its contents:

(i) If, by weighing, monitors confirm that the vehicle, by its gross weight, is not heavy enough to contain an item of continuous monitoring, the vehicle shall not be subject to further inspection.
(ii) If, by weighing, monitors confirm that the vehicle, by its gross weight, is heavy enough to contain an item of continuous monitoring, monitors shall have the right to carry out procedures provided for in subparagraph (d) of this paragraph.

(d) View the interior of the vehicle or the partitioned enclosed space within the vehicle, or the open bed of a vehicle, from a place designated by a member of the in-country escort. This place shall be designated in such a way as to allow the monitors to view the entire interior of the vehicle or the partitioned enclosed space within the vehicle, or the open bed of a vehicle:

(i) If, by viewing, monitors confirm that the interior of the vehicle or partitioned enclosed space within the vehicle, or the open bed of a vehicle does not contain an item of continuous monitoring, a container, a launch canister, a covered or environmentally protected object, or an unidentified object, the vehicle or the partitioned enclosed space within the vehicle, or the open bed of a vehicle shall not be subject to further inspection.
(ii) If, by viewing, monitors confirm that the interior of the vehicle or partitioned enclosed space within the vehicle, or the open bed of a vehicle contains a container, a launch canister, a covered or environmentally protected object, or an unidentified object, monitors shall have the right to carry out the procedures provided for in paragraph 10, 11, 12, or 13 of this Annex.

After monitors have completed the procedures to confirm the numbers, types, and if applicable, variants of types of items of continuous monitoring or to confirm the absence of an item of continuous monitoring, the vehicle and the containers, launch canisters, or other objects contained therein may leave the monitored facility.

10. For a container that is exiting from the monitored facility and that is not declared to contain an item of continuous monitoring, a member of the in-country escort shall demonstrate to the satisfaction of monitors that the container does not contain an item of continuous monitoring. At the choice of a member of the in-country escort, monitors shall have the right to carry out one or more of the following procedures:

(a) Make measurements of the dimensions of the container:

(i) If, by making such measurements monitors confirm that, by its dimensions, the container is not large enough to contain an item of continuous monitoring, the container shall not be subject to further inspection.
(ii) If, by making such measurements monitors confirm that, by its dimensions, the container is large enough to contain an item of continuous monitoring, monitors shall have the right to carry out procedures provided for in subparagraph (b), (c), or (d) of this paragraph.

(b) View the interior of the container after a member of the in-country escort has opened the container, and, as necessary, measure the dimensions of its contents:

(i) If, by viewing the interior of the container and measuring the dimensions of its contents, monitors confirm that the container does not contain an item of continuous monitoring, the container shall not be subject to further inspection.
(ii) If, by viewing the interior of the container and measuring the dimensions of its contents, monitors are unable to confirm that the contents of the container are not an item of continuous monitoring, monitors shall have the right to carry out procedures provided for in subparagraph (c) or (d) of this paragraph.

(c) View the contents of the container, after a member of the in-country escort has removed the contents from the container:

(i) If, by viewing the contents of the container, monitors confirm that the contents of the container are not an item of continuous monitoring, the container shall not be subject to further inspection.
(ii) If, by viewing the contents of the container, monitors are unable to confirm that the contents of the container are not an item of continuous monitoring, monitors shall have the right to carry out procedures provided for in paragraph 13 of this Annex.

(d) Image the contents of the container using non-damaging imaging equipment. If non-damaging imaging equipment has not been installed, and the inspected Party prefers that the contents of a container be imaged, the inspected Party shall notify the inspecting Party no less than six months in advance of the planned exit of such a container, of the planned exit thereof.

11. For a launch canister that is exiting from the monitored facility and that is declared not to contain an item of continuous monitoring, a member of the in-country escort shall demonstrate to the satisfaction of monitors that the launch canister does not contain an item of continuous monitoring. At the choice of a member of the in-country escort, monitors shall have the right to carry out one or more of the following procedures:

(a) View the interior of the launch canister after a member of the in-country escort has opened the launch canister by removing at least one of the end caps of the launch canister and, as necessary, measure the dimensions of its contents:

(i) If, by viewing the interior of the launch canister and measuring the dimensions of its contents, monitors confirm that the launch canister does not contain an item of continuous monitoring, the launch canister shall not be subject to further inspection.
(ii) If, by viewing the interior of the launch canister and measuring the dimensions of its contents, monitors are unable to confirm that the contents of the launch canister are not an item of continuous monitoring, monitors shall have the right to carry out procedures provided for in subparagraph (b) or (c) of this paragraph.

(b) View the contents of the launch canister, after a member of the in-country escort has removed the contents from the launch canister:

(i) If, by viewing the contents of the launch canister, monitors confirm that the contents of the launch canister are not an item of continuous monitoring, the launch canister shall not be subject to further inspection.
(ii) If, by viewing the contents of the launch canister, monitors are unable to confirm that the contents of the launch canister are not an item of continuous monitoring, monitors shall have the right to carry out procedures provided for in paragraph 13 of this Annex.

(c) Image the contents of the launch canister using non-damaging imaging equipment. If non-damaging imaging equipment has not been installed, and the inspected Party prefers that the contents of a launch canister be imaged, the inspected Party shall notify the inspecting Party, no less than six months in advance of the planned exit of such a launch canister, of the planned exit thereof.

12. For a covered or environmentally protected object that is exiting from the monitored facility and that is not declared to be an item of continuous monitoring, a member of the in-country escort shall demonstrate to the satisfaction of monitors that the object is not an item of continuous monitoring. At the choice of a member of the in-country escort, monitors shall have the right to carry out one or more of the following procedures:

(a) View the covered or environmentally protected object from a place designated by a member of the in-country escort after a member of the in-country escort has partially or, if necessary, completely removed the cover or environmental protection:

(i) If, by viewing, monitors confirm that the object is not an item of continuous monitoring, a container, or a launch canister, that object shall not be subject to further inspection.
(ii) If, by viewing, monitors are unable to confirm that the object is not an item of continuous monitoring, monitors shall have the right to carry out procedures provided for in paragraph 13 of this Annex.
(iii) If, by viewing, monitors confirm that the object is a container or a launch canister, monitors shall have the right to carry out the procedures provided for in paragraph 10 or 11 of this Annex.

(b) Measure the dimensions of the covered or environmentally protected object:

(i) If, by making such measurements, monitors confirm that the object is not large enough to contain or to be an item of continuous monitoring, that object shall not be subject to further inspection.
(ii) If, by making such measurements, monitors confirm that the object is large enough to contain or to be an item of continuous monitoring, monitors shall have the right to carry out the procedures provided for in subparagraph (a) of this paragraph.

13. For an object that is outside a container or launch canister and that is not covered or environmentally protected, monitors shall have the right to confirm by external viewing and by making measurements of its dimensions, at locations on the object designated by a member of the in-country escort, that the object is not an item of continuous monitoring.

14. For a vehicle that is exiting from the monitored facility through a road exit, monitors shall have the right to make measurements of any such vehicle to determine whether it is large enough to contain an item of continuous monitoring. Those measurements shall be made in such a way as to minimize the delay of vehicles exiting from the facility. Vehicles large enough to contain an item of continuous monitoring shall proceed to the portal. Vehicles that are not large enough to contain an item of continuous monitoring shall not be subject to further inspection and may leave the monitored facility.

15. At monitored facilities where ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles are produced, monitors shall have the right, no more than five times each year, to inspect containers or vehicles to confirm that no solid rocket motors for the first stages of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, with nozzles attached, exit the monitored facility. In such cases, the size criteria as defined in paragraph 25 of Section VI of this Protocol shall be used in carrying out the inspection procedures for containers and vehicles. For the purposes of these inspections, monitors shall have the right to request a member of the in-country escort to direct a vehicle that is large enough to contain a solid rocket motor for the first stage of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs, with a nozzle attached, to proceed to the portal. Monitors shall have the right to carry out the inspection procedures provided for in paragraph 9 or 10 of this Annex.

16. The Parties agree that railcars that would be subject to inspection shall be permitted to leave the monitored facility for the purpose of reversing direction, provided that the following procedures are used:

(a) the inspected Party notifies the monitoring team leader of its intent to move a railcar out through the portal for the purpose of reversing its direction no less than 30 minutes before the railcar arrives at the portal;
(b) two monitors accompany the railcar from the time it arrives at the portal until it returns through the portal after having reversed direction and such monitors are permitted to observe this railcar throughout the entire procedure;
(c) no cargo is removed from the railcar between the time it leaves through the portal until it returns through the portal of the monitored facility.

Provided that the entire procedure for reversing direction is completed without delay, such railcars shall not be subject to inspection pursuant to Section XVI of the Inspection Protocol during the conduct of this procedure. |1|

Annex 6
Procedures relating to unique identifiers

1. A unique identifier is a non-repeating alpha-numeric production number, or a copy thereof, that has been applied by the inspected Party, using its own technology, to an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs, as provided for in paragraph 3 or 4 of this Annex.

2. Each Party shall provide the other Party with unique identifier data for each ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs in accordance with paragraph 3 or 13 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.

3. For ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported in launch canisters, unique identifiers shall be applied:

(a) for ICBMs existing as of Treaty signature, on each launch canister of such ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs;
(b) for ICBMs leaving the production facility after Treaty signature, on each launch canister and on each first stage of such ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs. The data from such unique identifiers shall be provided in a form that establishes the "one-to-one" relationship between the data from the unique identifier applied on the first stage of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs and the data from the unique identifier applied on the launch canister associated with such an ICBM. Such unique identifiers may not be changed.

4. For ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as a unit without launch canisters or in stages, the unique identifiers shall be applied on each first stage of such ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs.

5. During baseline data inspections, data update inspections, new facility inspections, post-dispersal inspections of mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles, and conversion or elimination inspections, as well as during the conduct of continuous monitoring, inspectors or monitors shall have the right to read the data from the unique identifiers on deployed and non-deployed ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs. Exceptions to the right to read the data from such unique identifiers are set forth in paragraph 9 of Section VII and paragraph 11 of Section X of this Protocol. |1| The data from a unique identifier shall be read:

(a) for ICBMs specified in subparagraph 3(a) of this Annex, from the launch canister associated with ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs;
(b) for ICBMs specified in subparagraph 3(b) of this Annex, from the launch canister associated with ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, and if the unique identifier applied on the first stage of such a missile is accessible for external viewing and reading without opening the launch canister, or if during the process of elimination of such an ICBM the missile is removed from its launch canister, from the first stage of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs;
(c) for ICBMs specified in paragraph 4 of this Annex, from the first stage of such ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs.

6. The place from which inspectors or monitors are allowed to read data from the unique identifier applied on each launch canister for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs or each first stage of such an ICBM shall be specified by a member of the in-country escort in such a manner as to ensure an accurate reading of such data. If a unique identifier applied on a launch canister or a first stage of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs is not accessible for reading as provided for in paragraph 5 of this Annex, such a unique identifier shall be duplicated on the portion of the surface of the launch canister or the first stage of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs that is accessible for reading its data by inspectors or monitors during viewing.

7. For a newly-produced ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs, the inspected Party shall inform the monitors of the data from the unique identifier applied to such an ICBM, as provided for in paragraph 3 or 4 of this Annex, before such an item exits through the portal of the monitored facility and shall provide to the inspecting Party such data in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.

Annex 7
Procedures for delivering and examining equipment and supplies transported by inspection airplanes used in accordance with paragraph 4 of section IV of this Protocol

1. Prior to the arrival of an inspection airplane used in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section IV of this Protocol, the inspecting Party, through its embassy, shall provide the inspected Party with an inventory of cargo being delivered that consists of equipment and supplies intended for the conduct of continuous monitoring activities. The inspecting Party shall provide this inventory to the inspected Party no less than ten days prior to the arrival of such an airplane, unless otherwise agreed within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. |1| Such an inventory shall include:

(a) to which facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility a particular palletized or oversize item of cargo, including modular structures, shall be delivered;
(b) the weight and dimensions of each separate palletized or oversize item of cargo, including modular structures, and, if necessary for facilitating transportation of separate items from the point of entry to a facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, black-and-white photographs, or clear facsimile copies of photographs, of each such item;
(c) whether there are modular structures in the cargo that is being delivered;
(d) the contents of each shipping container on a pallet and of each modular structure described in such a way that the inspected Party is able to correlate each item of equipment that is being delivered with the list of equipment provided for in Section V of Annex 8 and in Annex 9 to this Protocol; and
(e) for each major item of equipment specified in that inventory, the part of the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system, as specified in Annex 9 to this Protocol, in which that item of equipment is included.

2. Each shipping container on a pallet, listed in the inventory provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Annex, shall be marked with a freight marking, and shall have a complete packing list. One copy of that packing list shall also be included in the inventory.

3. At the choice of the inspected Party, cargoes consisting of equipment and supplies listed in the inventory provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Annex, may be examined at the point of entry, at the airport associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, or directly at such a facility. If the examination of such cargo is conducted at the point of entry or at the airport associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, such an examination, at the discretion of the inspecting Party, may be conducted in the presence of the aircrew members. Equipment and supplies carried separately from the cargo shall be examined at the point of entry or at the airport associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, subject to the provisions of paragraphs 8, 11, 12 and 13 of Section V of this Protocol.

4. During the examination of the cargo, the contents of each shipping container, and of each modular structure, shall be checked against the list of equipment provided for in Section V of Annex 8 and in Annex 9 to this Protocol and against the inventory of equipment and supplies provided pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Annex. Based on the results of the examination of the cargo, a member of the in-country escort and the monitoring team leader or an authorized representative of such a team shall draw up and sign a joint inventory of the equipment and supplies to reflect items actually delivered. After the joint inventory has been signed, the monitors shall have the right to begin using the cleared equipment, subject to the provisions of paragraph 25 of Section XVI of this Protocol, and the cleared supplies, at the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility.

5. Until the joint inventory referred to in paragraph 4 of this Annex is signed, the inspected Party shall assist the inspecting Party in providing security and protection from inclement weather for the cargo. For that purpose the inspected Party shall provide storage areas for the equipment and supplies. If the examination of cargo is conducted at the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, the inspected Party may conduct that examination in the building for the storage of equipment and supplies provided for in paragraph 23 of Section XVI of this Protocol. A storage method shall be used that requires the presence of representatives of both Parties for access to the equipment or supplies.

6. If the examination of the cargo is carried out at the point of entry or at the airport associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, upon completion of the examination procedures, the inspecting Party shall repack the cargo, unless otherwise agreed within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. The inspected Party, at the request of the inspecting Party, shall assist the inspecting Party in repacking the cargo. |2| If the examination of the cargo is conducted at the point of entry or at the airport associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, the inspected Party at the request of the inspecting Party shall assist the inspecting Party in providing for the security of the equipment and supplies during loading and unloading operations, in fastening the cargo for shipment, and in protecting the cargo from inclement weather. After the cargo has been packed, it shall be sealed with seals of each of the Parties. Upon arrival of the cargo at the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, the monitoring team leader and a member of the in-country escort shall jointly examine the seals. The monitors shall open each shipping container and modular structure in the presence of the in-country escort.

7. The monitors shall have the right to observe palletized or oversize items of cargo, including modular structures, at the point of entry and at each point where they are transferred from one vehicle to another, including: observing the loading of such items of cargo onto the vehicles that will transport them to the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility or to an intermediate transfer point; observing the transfer of such items of cargo at an intermediate transfer point; and observing such items of cargo at the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility after the vehicles carrying such cargo arrive there. In the event of unforeseen delays, the monitors shall have the right to observe such items of cargo that are inside vehicles while such items of cargo are in transit.

8. If during the examination of cargo, or at any time during installation, operation, or maintenance of equipment, the in-country escort concludes that an item of equipment or supplies can perform, or does perform, functions unconnected with the requirements of continuous monitoring activities, such an item of equipment or supplies shall be impounded at the location of the examination. A member of the in-country escort shall explain to the monitoring team leader, or authorized representative of such a team, the reasons for such a conclusion. If the monitoring team leader, or authorized representative of such a team, disagrees with the conclusion of the member of the in-country escort, the monitoring team leader, or authorized representative of such a team, may explain the appropriateness of the item of equipment or supplies to the requirements of continuous monitoring activities. If the member of the in-country escort remains convinced of the original conclusion, that member of the in-country escort and the monitoring team leader, or authorized representative of such a team, shall record their views in a joint document, and each of them shall retain a copy of the document. The Parties may resolve disagreements on the use of impounded equipment or supplies through diplomatic channels, within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, or by other methods agreed by the Parties. Equipment and supplies impounded at the point of entry or at the airport associated with a facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility shall not be brought to such a facility. Equipment impounded at such a facility shall either not be installed or its use shall be discontinued, and supplies impounded at such a facility shall not be used. Unless the inspected Party informs the inspecting Party of a different decision, such equipment or supplies shall be removed from the territory of the inspected Party. If necessary, the inspected Party shall assist the inspecting Party in delivering such equipment or supplies to the point of entry or airport associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility. At the choice of the inspected Party, prior to removal from the territory of the inspected Party, such equipment or supplies shall be stored at the point of entry, at the airport associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, or directly at such a facility. A storage method shall be used that requires the presence of representatives of both Parties for access to the impounded equipment or supplies.

Annex 8
Equipment for inspections and continuous monitoring activities

I. Characteristics of equipment for baseline data inspections, data update inspections, new facility inspections, suspect-site inspections, post-dispersal inspections of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles, conversion or elimination inspections, close-out inspections, and formerly declared facility inspections conducted pursuant to paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, and 10 of Article XI of the Treaty.

A. For the United States of America:

1. Linear Measurement Devices (quantity for each inspection team):

(a) 5 30-meter measuring tapes;
(b) 10 3-meter measuring tapes;
(c) 2 3-meter measuring sticks;
(d) 10 Plumb bobs;
(e) 2 Plumb bob cords;
(f) 10 Plumb bob targets;
(g) 1 Roll of tape; and
(h) 1 Inspection suitcase.

2. Camera Equipment (quantity for each inspection team):

(a) 2 Cameras with flash;
(b) 1 Lens;
(c) 1 Flash;
(d) 1 Exposure meter;
(e) 1 Spare film back for camera;
(f) 1 Tripod;
(g) 1 Cable release;
(h) 8 Packs of photographic film;
(i) 10 Spare batteries for cameras, flash, and exposure meter;
(j) 1 Range rod point;
(k) 1 Camera case;
(l) 1 Package of lens tissue;
(m) 1 Lens brush;
(n) 1 2.5-meter range rod; and
(o) 2 Lens filters--one ultraviolet haze, one amber.

3. Other Portable Equipment (quantity for each inspector):

(a) 1 Flashlight (safety approved), with spare batteries and spare bulb;
(b) 1 Magnetic compass;
(c) 1 Pocket calculator with spare batteries;
(d) 1 Roll of tamper-indicating tape seals;
(e) 1 Thermoluminescent dosimeter; and
(f) 1 Ionization dosimeter.

4. Other Portable Equipment (quantity for each inspection team):

(a) 2 Ionization dosimeter charger units;
(b) 2 Satellite system receiver sets, each provided by the inspected Party and consisting of the following:

(i) 1 Portable receiver;
(ii) 1 Direct current adapter (external);
(iii) 16 Spare batteries;
(iv) 1 Battery holder;
(v) 1 Rechargeable nickel-cadmium battery pack;
(vi) 1 External antenna with cable and antenna installation kit;
(vii) 2 Instruction manuals, one in English and one in Russian;
(viii) 1 Container; and
(ix) 1 Equipment bag.

(c) Set of radiation detection equipment consisting of the following:

(i) 2 Neutron detectors, including preamplifiers with signal/power cables (counting time - 150 seconds);
(ii) 2 Electronic counters with instruction manual;
(iii) 10 Plastic bags for weather protection;
(iv) 1 Americium-241-Lithium neutron source for calibration, emitting approximately 3000 neutrons per second, precalibrated by the inspecting Party;
(v) 1 Tool kit;
(vi) 30 Spare batteries, miscellaneous sizes;
(vii) 1 Stand for neutron detector;
(viii) 1 Measuring tape;
(ix) 2 Battery-powered lights;
(x) 3 Programmable calculators, with instruction manual;
(xi) 2 Thermometers;
(xii) 1 Stand for calibration source; and
(xiii) 4 Instruction manuals, two in English and two in Russian. |1|

B. For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

1. Linear Measurement Devices (quantity for each inspection team):

(a) 5 30-meter measuring tapes;
(b) 5 5-meter measuring tapes;
(c) 2 3-meter measuring sticks;
(d) 4 Plumb bobs;
(e) 2 Plumb bob cords;
(f) 4 Plumb bob targets;
(g) 1 Roll of tape; and
(h) 1 Inspection suitcase.

2. Camera Equipment (quantity for each inspection team):

(a) 2 Cameras with flash;
(b) 1 Tripod;
(c) 1 Exposure meter;
(d) 1 Lens;
(e) 1 Flash;
(f) 1 Spare film back for camera;
(g) 1 Cable release;
(h) 2 Packs of photographic film;
(i) 10 Spare batteries for cameras, flash, and exposure meter;
(j) 1 Range rod point;
(k) 1 Camera case;
(l) 1 Package of lens tissue;
(m) 1 Lens brush;
(n) 1 3-meter range rod; and
(o) 2 Lens filters--one ultraviolet haze, one amber.

3. Other Portable Equipment (quantity for each inspector):

(a) 1 Flashlight (safety approved), with spare batteries and spare bulb;
(b) 1 Magnetic compass;
(c) 1 Pocket calculator with spare batteries;
(d) 1 Roll of tamper-indicating tape seals;
(e) 1 Ruler; and
(f) 1 Thermoluminescent dosimeter.

4. Other Portable Equipment (quantity for each inspection team):

(a) 2 Satellite system receiver sets provided by the inspected Party, each consisting of the following:

(i) 1 Portable receiver;
(ii) 1 Direct current adapter (external);
(iii) 16 Spare batteries;
(iv) 1 Battery holder;
(v) 1 Rechargeable nickel-cadmium battery pack;
(vi) 1 External antenna with cable and antenna installation kit;
(vii) 2 Instruction manuals, one in English and one in Russian;
(viii) 1 Container; and
(ix) 1 Equipment bag.

(b) Set of radiation detection equipment consisting of the following:

(i) 1 Neutron detector, including preamplifier with signal/power cables (counting time - 1000 seconds or 150 seconds);
(ii) 1 Registering device;
(iii) 1 Americium-241-Lithium neutron source for calibration, emitting approximately 3000 neutrons per second, precalibrated by the inspecting Party;
(iv) 1 Charging unit;
(v) 1 Spare rechargeable battery;
(vi) 1 Measuring tape;
(vii) 1 Battery-powered light;
(viii) 1 Stand for neutron detector;
(ix) 1 Calculator;
(x) 1 Stand for calibration source;
(xi) 2 Instruction manuals, one in English and one in Russian. |2|

II. Characteristics of equipment for reentry vehicle inspections conducted pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty.

A. For the United States of America:

1. Portable Equipment (quantity for each inspector):

(a) 1 3-meter measuring tape;
(b) 1 Flashlight (safety approved), with spare batteries and spare bulb;
(c) 1 Pocket calculator with spare batteries;
(d) 1 Magnetic compass;
(e) 1 Roll of tamper-indicating tape seals;
(f) 1 Thermoluminescent dosimeter; and
(g) 1 Ionization dosimeter.

2. Other Portable Equipment (quantity for each inspection team):

(a) 2 Ionization dosimeter charger units;
(b) 2 Satellite system receiver sets, each provided by the inspected Party and consisting of the following:

(i) 1 Portable receiver;
(ii) 1 Direct current adapter (external);
(iii) 16 Spare batteries;
(iv) 1 Battery holder;
(v) 1 Rechargeable nickel-cadmium battery pack;
(vi) 1 External antenna with cable and antenna installation kit;
(vii) 2 Instruction manuals, one in English and one in Russian;
(viii) 1 Container; and
(ix) 1 Equipment bag.

(c) Set of radiation detection equipment consisting of the following:

(i) 2 Neutron detectors, including preamplifiers with signal/power cables (counting time -150 seconds);
(ii) 2 Electronic counters, with instruction manual;
(iii) 10 Plastic bags for weather protection;
(iv) 1 Americium-241-Lithium neutron source for calibration, emitting approximately 3000 neutrons per second, precalibrated by the inspecting Party;
(v) 1 Tool kit;
(vi) 30 Spare batteries, miscellaneous sizes;
(vii) 1 Stand for neutron detector;
(viii) 1 Measuring tape;
(ix) 2 Battery-powered lights;
(x) 3 Programmable calculators, with instruction manual;
(xi) 2 Thermometers;
(xii) 1 Stand for calibration source; and
(xiii) 4 Instruction manuals, two in English and two in Russian. |3|

B. For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

1. Portable Equipment (quantity for each inspector):

(a) 1 5- meter measuring tape;
(b) 1 Flashlight (safety approved), with spare batteries and spare bulb;
(c) 1 Magnetic compass;
(d) 1 Pocket calculator with spare batteries;
(e) 1 Roll of tamper-indicating tape seals;
(f) 1 Ruler;
(g) 1 Thermoluminescent dosimeter;
(h) 1 Curvometer; and
(i) 1 Pair of dividers.

2. Other Portable Equipment (quantity for each inspection team):

(a) 2 Satellite system receiver sets provided by the inspected Party, each consisting of the following:

(i) 1 Portable receiver;
(ii) 1 Direct current adapter (external);
(iii) 16 Spare batteries;
(iv) 1 Battery holder;
(v) 1 Rechargeable nickel-cadmium battery pack;
(vi) 1 External antenna with cable and antenna installation kit;
(vii) 2 Instruction manuals, one in English and one in Russian;
(viii) 1 Container; and
(ix) 1 Equipment bag.

b) Set of radiation detection equipment consisting of the following:

(i) 1 Neutron detector, including preamplifier with signal/power cables (counting time -1000 seconds or 150 seconds);
(ii) 1 Registering device;
(iii) 1 Americium-241-Lithium neutron source for calibration, emitting approximately 3000 neutrons per second, precalibrated by the inspecting Party;
(iv) 1 Charging unit;
(v) 1 Spare rechargeable battery;
(vi) 1 Measuring tape;
(vii) 1 Battery-powered light;
(viii) 1 Stand for neutron detector;
(ix) 1 Calculator;
(x) 1 Stand for calibration source; and
(xi) 2 Instruction manuals, one in English and one in Russian. |4|

III. Characteristics of equipment for inspections during technical characteristics exhibitions conducted pursuant to paragraph 11 of Article XI of the Treaty.

A. For the United States of America:

1. Linear Measurement Devices (quantity for each inspection team):

(a) 3 Measuring tape clamps;
(b) 2 Tape tensioning scales;
(c) 2 Magnifying glasses;
(d) 2 Hand levels;
(e) 2 String line levels;
(f) 2 Calipers with micrometer screw;
(g) 2 Combination squares;
(h) 5 30-meter measuring tapes;
(i) 10 3-meter measuring tapes;
(j) 2 3-meter measuring sticks;
(k) 3 Plumb bobs;
(l) 1 Plumb bob cord;
(m) 10 Plumb bob targets;
(n) 3 Rolls of tape;
(o) 3 Log books;
(p) 2 Rod levels;
(q) 2 2.5-meter range rods; and
(r) 1 Tripod.

2. Camera Equipment (quantity for each inspection team):

(a) 2 Cameras with flash;
(b) 1 Lens;
(c) 1 Flash;
(d) 1 Exposure meter;
(e) 1 Spare film back for camera;
(f) 1 Tripod;
(g) 1 Cable release;
(h) 8 Packs of photographic film;
(i) 10 Spare batteries for cameras, flash, and exposure meter;
(j) 1 Range rod point;
(k) 1 Camera case;
(l) 1 Package of lens tissue;
(m) 1 Lens brush;
(n) 1 2.5-meter range rod; and
(o) 2 Lens filters--one ultraviolet haze, one amber.

3. Other Portable Equipment (quantity for each inspector):

(a) 1 Flashlight (safety approved), with spare batteries and spare bulb;
(b) 1 Magnetic compass;
(c) 1 Pocket calculator with spare batteries;
(d) 1 Roll of tamper-indicating tape seals;
(e) 1 Thermoluminescent dosimeter; and
(f) 1 Ionization dosimeter.

4. Other Portable Equipment (quantity for each inspection team):

(a) 2 Ionization dosimeter charger units.

5. Weighing Devices (as agreed by the Parties within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission for the purpose of confirming the launch weight of an ICBM or SLBM of a new type). |5|

B. For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

1. Linear Measurement Devices (quantity for each inspection team):

(a) 5 30-meter measuring tapes;
(b) 5 5-meter measuring tapes;
(c) 2 3-meter measuring sticks;
(d) 4 Plumb bobs;
(e) 2 Plumb bob cords;
(f) 4 Plumb bob targets;
(g) 1 Roll of tape; and
(h) 1 Inspection suitcase.

2. Camera Equipment (quantity for each inspection team):

(a) 2 Cameras with flash;
(b) 1 Tripod;
(c) 1 Exposure meter;
(d) 1 Lens;
(e) 1 Flash;
(f) 1 Spare film back for camera;
(g) 1 Cable release;
(h) 2 Packs of photographic film;
(i) 10 Spare batteries for cameras, flash, and exposure meter;
(j) 1 Range rod point;
(k) 1 Camera case;
(l) 1 Package of lens tissue;
(m) 1 Lens brush;
(n) 1 3-meter range rod; and
(o) 2 Lens filters--one ultraviolet haze, one amber.

3. Other Portable Equipment (quantity for each inspector):

(a) 1 Flashlight (safety approved), with spare batteries and spare bulb;
(b) 1 Magnetic compass;
(c) 1 Pocket calculator with spare batteries;
(d) 1 Roll of tamper-indicating tape seals;
(e) 1 Ruler; and
(f) 1 Thermoluminescent dosimeter.

4. Weighing device (as agreed by the Parties within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission for the purpose of confirming the launch weight of an ICBM or SLBM of a new type). |6|

IV. Characteristics of equipment for inspections during heavy bomber distinguishability exhibitions and heavy bomber baseline exhibitions conducted pursuant to paragraphs 12 and 13 of Article XI of the Treaty and during exhibitions of long-range non-nuclear ALCMs conducted pursuant to notifications provided in accordance with Section VII of the Notification Protocol. |7|

A. For the United States of America:

1. Linear Measurement Devices (quantity for each inspection team):

(a) 3 Measuring tape clamps;
(b) 2 Tape tensioning scales;
(c) 2 Magnifying glasses;
(d) 2 Hand levels;
(e) 2 String line levels;
(f) 2 Calipers with micrometer screw;
(g) 2 Combination squares;
(h) 5 30-meter measuring tapes;
(i) 10 3-meter measuring tapes;
(j) 2 3-meter measuring sticks;
(k) 3 Plumb bobs;
(l) 1 Plumb bob cord;
(m) 10 Plumb bob targets;
(n) 3 Rolls of tape;
(o) 3 Log books;
(p) 2 Rod levels;
(q) 2 2.5- meter range rods; and
(r) 1 Tripod.

2. Camera Equipment (quantity for each inspection team):

(a) 2 Cameras with flash;
(b) 1 Lens;
(c) 1 Flash;
(d) 1 Exposure meter;
(e) 1 Spare film back for camera;
(f) 1 Tripod;
(g) 1 Cable release;
(h) 8 Packs of photographic film;
(i) 10 Spare batteries for cameras, flash, and exposure meter;
(j) 1 Range rod point;
(k) 1 Camera case;
(l) 1 Package of lens tissue;
(m) 1 Lens brush;
(n) 1 2.5-meter range rod; and
(o) 2 Lens filters--one ultraviolet haze, one amber.

3. Other Portable Equipment (quantity for each inspector):

(a) 1 Flashlight (safety approved), with spare batteries and spare bulb;
(b) 1 Magnetic compass;
(c) 1 Pocket calculator with spare batteries;
(d) 1 Roll of tamper-indicating tape seals;
(e) 1 Thermoluminescent dosimeter; and
(f) 1 Ionization dosimeter.

4. Other Portable Equipment (quantity for each inspection team):

(a) 2 Ionization dosimeter charger units; and
(b) Set of radiation detection equipment consisting of the following:

(i) 2 Neutron detectors, including preamplifiers with signal/power cables (counting time - 150 seconds);
(ii) 2 Electronic counters, with instruction manual;
(iii) 10 Plastic bags for weather protection;
(iv) 1 Americium-241-Lithium neutron source for calibration, emitting approximately 3000 neutrons per second, precalibrated by the inspecting Party;
(v) 1 Tool kit;
(vi) 30 Spare batteries, miscellaneous sizes;
(vii) 1 Stand for neutron detector;
(viii) 1 Measuring tape;
(ix) 2 Battery-powered lights;
(x) 3 Programmable calculators with instruction manual;
(xi) 2 Thermometers;
(xii) 1 Stand for calibration source; and
(xiii) 4 Instruction manuals, two in English and two in Russian. |8|

B. For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

1. Linear Measurement Devices (quantity for each inspection team):

(a) 5 30-meter measuring tapes;
(b) 5 5-meter measuring tapes;
(c) 2 3-meter measuring sticks;
(d) 4 Plumb bobs;
(e) 2 Plumb bob cords;
(f) 4 Plumb bob targets;
(g) 1 Roll of tape; and
(h) 1 Inspection suitcase.

2. Camera Equipment (quantity for each inspection team):

(a) 2 Cameras with flash;
(b) 1 Tripod;
(c) 1 Exposure meter;
(d) 1 Lens;
(e) 1 Flash;
(f) 1 Spare film back for camera;
(g) 1 Cable release;
(h) 2 Packs of photographic film;
(i) 10 Spare batteries for camera, flash, and exposure meter;
(j) 1 Range rod point;
(k) 1 Camera case;
(l) 1 Package of lens tissue;
(m) 1 Lens brush;
(n) 1 3-meter range rod; and
(o) 2 Lens filters--one ultraviolet haze, one amber.

3. Other Portable Equipment (quantity for each inspector):

(a) 1 Flashlight (safety approved), with spare batteries and spare bulb;
(b) 1 Magnetic compass;
(c) 1 Pocket calculator with spare batteries;
(d) 1 Roll of tamper-indicating tape seals;
(e) 1 Ruler; and
(f) 1 Thermoluminescent dosimeter.

4. Other

Portable Equipment (quantity for each inspection team):

(a) Set of radiation detection equipment consisting of the following:

(i) 1 Neutron detector, including preamplifier with signal/power cables (counting time - 1000 seconds or 150 seconds);
(ii) 1 Registering device;
(iii) 1Americium-241-Lithium neutron source for calibration, emitting approximately 3000 neutrons per second, precalibrated by the inspecting Party;
(iv) 1 Charging unit;
(v) 1 Spare rechargeable battery;
(vi) 1 Measuring tape;
(vii) Battery-powered light;
(viii) 1 Stand for neutron detector;
(ix) 1 Calculator;
(x) 1 Stand for calibration source;
(xi) 2 Instruction manuals, one in English and one in Russian. |9|

V. Characteristics of equipment for continuous monitoring activities conducted pursuant to paragraph 14 of Article XI of the Treaty.

A. For the United States of America:

1. Tape measures, measuring sticks, and other devices as agreed between the Parties for measuring dimensions.

2. Camera equipment capable of producing instant development photographic prints, with tripod and measuring sticks as agreed by the Parties.

3. Flashlights.

4. Other equipment as agreed by the Parties.

5. Engineering site survey equipment:

(a) 2 Theodolites, levels, survey chains, survey rods, and stakes;
(b) 2 Light meters;
(c) Engineering tape and stakes, as necessary;
(d) 1 Measuring Wheel;
(e) 6 Measuring tapes, two of each length (3, 30, and 100 meter);
(f) Topographic maps, as necessary;
(g) 2 Water sampling kits;
(h) 2 Portable computers, printers, and accessories;
(i) 1 Portable copier;
(j) 1 Portable facsimile machine;
(k) 2 Video cameras with portable recorders;
(l) 1 Video cassette recorder, with video cassettes, and television monitor;
(m) 2 Cameras with flash; and
(n) Hand tools (hammers, pliers, screwdrivers, etc.) and expendable materials, as required.

B. For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

1. Linear Measurement Devices (quantity for each inspection team):

(a) 5 30-meter measuring tapes;
(b) 5 5-meter measuring tapes;
(c) 2 3-meter measuring sticks;
(d) 4 Plumb bobs;
(e) 2 Plumb bobs cords;
(f) 4 Plumb bob targets;
(g) 1 Roll of tape; and
(h) 1 Inspection suitcase.

2. Camera Equipment (quantity for each inspection team):

(a) 2 Cameras with flash;
(b) 1 Tripod;
(c) 1 Exposure meter;
(d) 1 Lens;
(e) 1 Flash;
(f) 1 Spare film back for camera;
(g) 1 Cable release;
(h) 2 Packs of photographic film;
(i) 10 Spare batteries for cameras, flash, and exposure meter;
(j) 1 Range rod point;
(k) 1 Camera case;
(l) 1 Package of lens tissue;
(m) 1 Lens brush;
(n) 1 3-meter range rod; and
(o) 2 Lens filters--one ultraviolet haze, one amber.

3. Other Portable Equipment (quantity for each inspector):

(a) 1 Flashlight (safety approved), with spare batteries and spare bulb;
(b) 1 Magnetic compass;
(c) 1 Pocket calculator with spare batteries;
(d) 1 Roll of tamper-indicating tape seals;
(e) 1 Ruler; and
(f) 1 Thermoluminescent dosimeter.

4. Engineering Site Survey Equipment:

(a) 2 Theodolites, levels, measuring sticks, and level markers;
(b) 2 Photo-range finders and reflectors;
(c) 10 Measuring tapes or tape measures, two of each length (2, 3, 10, 30, and 100 meter);
(d) 1 Field laboratory (portable) for water sampling;
(e) 1 Digital multimeter;
(f) 2 Avometers;
(g) 1 Photometer;
(h) Topographic maps, as required;
(i) 1 Fence vibration meter;
(j) 1 Magnetograph;
(k) 1 Oscillograph;
(l) 1 Portable computer;
(m) 1 Portable copier;
(n) 2 Cameras with flash; and
(o) Hand Tools (hammers, pliers, screwdrivers, etc.) and expendable materials as required. |10|

VI. Methods of use of equipment.

A. The Parties agree to use linear measurement devices in the following manner:

1. Linear measurement devices shall be used to determine length, width, and height of objects by measuring the straight-line distance between the extreme points of these objects or, if required, between tangents drawn perpendicular to the direction of measurement from the outside points of curved surfaces.

2. The diameter of any cylindrical object shall be determined by measuring the circumference, by directly measuring the diameter, or by measuring the distance between parallel lines that are vertical tangents to the cylindrical surface of the object and that lie in a plane perpendicular to the axis of the object. Such measurements shall be taken at several points along the length of that object.

3. In determining the dimensions of an object, each dimension shall be measured at least two times. If the results of the first two measurements are within one percent of each other, then the results of these two measurements shall be averaged to determine the dimension of the object. If the results of the first two measurements are not within one percent of each other, additional measurements shall be taken until results from two measurements are obtained that are within one percent of each other. The results of these two measurements shall be averaged to determine the dimension of the object.

B. The Parties agree to use cameras in the following manner:

1. Before a member of the in-country escort takes photographs, inspectors shall have the right to determine by observing through the viewfinder, that the object is in the camera's field of view and is in focus. The inspected Party may take test photographs, which shall be the property of the inspected Party.

2. While taking photographs, the inspected Party shall, at the direction of inspectors or monitors place a measuring stick or equivalent measuring device perpendicular to the ground and directly against the object being photographed; the scale or length of such a measuring stick or equivalent measuring device may be verified and recorded in the inspection report or continuous monitoring report, if the inspection team or monitoring team so desires.

3. The Parties understand that the procedures agreed upon with respect to the taking of photographs shall apply at all inspection sites, and at facilities subject to continuous monitoring and monitored facilities.

C. The Parties agree to use engineering site survey equipment in the following manner:

1. The portable facsimile machine shall be stored within a secure structure or room at the facility subject to continuous monitoring and the inspecting Party may provide a container that is locked by locks and sealed by seals belonging to the inspecting Party. The method of storage shall require the presence of representatives of both Parties for access to the portable facsimile machine. The portable facsimile machine shall be operated by a member of the monitoring team in the presence of a member of the in-country escort. The inspected Party shall have the right to examine the information to be transmitted, prior to the use of the portable facsimile machine, in order to ascertain that it does not contain images that are not connected with the purposes of the engineering site survey.

2. At the request of the inspecting Party, the video camera and the portable recorder, and photographic cameras shall be used by a member of the in-country escort.

D. The Parties shall agree within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission on methods of use for weighing devices for the purpose of confirming the launch weight of an ICBM or SLBM of a new type.

E. The Parties agree to use satellite system receivers provided by the inspected Party to confirm the geographic coordinates of silo launchers of ICBMs during reentry vehicle inspections and during the inspection of a silo launcher of ICBMs from which an ICBm has been removed but which continues to be considered to contain an ICBM in accordance with subparagraph 2(b) or 6(d) of Article III of the Treaty during baseline data inspections, data update inspections, and new facility inspections. When providing receivers for receiving signals from the satellite system that are used for determining the coordinates of such a silo launcher of ICBMs, the inspected Party shall ensure that such receivers are capable of providing such coordinate information at any time during the inspection for any silo launcher of ICBMs located on the territory of the inspected Party. The Parties agree to use such receivers in the following manner:

1. At the point of entry, the inspection team leader or an authorized representative of such a team shall have the right to confirm, in accordance with the following procedures, that two satellite system receivers provided by the inspected Party are operable:

(a) The first inspection team arriving at each point of entry for which there is at least one associated facility with silo launchers of ICBMs subject to inspection pursuant to paragraph 2,3,4 or 6 of Article XI of the Treaty shall have the right to bring to that point of entry two satellite system receivers for the purpose of determining the geographic coordinates for four reference points. These reference points shall be proposed by the inspected Party, shall be within 20 kilometers of the airport of the point of entry, and shall be separated from each other by at least two kilometers.
(b) For the purpose of comparing the reading of one satellite system receiver with the reading of another satellite system receiver, the term "agree" shall mean that the reading of one satellite system receiver differs from the reading of the other satellite system receiver by no more than 12 seconds in both latitude and longitude.
(c) For the purpose of confirming the operability of a satellite system receiver at the point of entry, the term "agree" shall mean that the reading of the satellite system receiver differs from the agreed geographic coordinates of the reference point by no more than 12 seconds in both latitude and longitude.
(d) Determination of the agreed geographic coordinates of reference points used at a point of entry for testing the operability of satellite system receivers shall be conducted in accordance with the following procedures:

(i) At each proposed reference point, the inspection team leader or an authorized representative of such a team, and a member of the in-country escort shall use two satellite system receivers of the inspecting Party and two satellite system receivers of the inspected party, respectively, to determine geographic coordinate values. The inspected Party shall have the right to substitute a properly operating satellite system receiver for a malfunctioning satellite system receiver provided by the inspected Party. However, no more than two satellite system receivers of the inspected Party may be used for the determination of agreed geographic coordinates for a reference point as described in subparagraphs (d)(ii) and (d)(iii) below;
(ii) If at least three of the four latitude values thus obtained agree with each other, all of these latitude values that agree with at least two other of the four latitude values, shall be averaged, and that average shall be the agreed latitude value of the reference point;
(iii) If at least three of the four longitude values thus obtained agree with each other, all of these longitude values that agree with at least two other of the four longitude values, shall be averaged, and that average shall be the agreed longitude value of the reference point;
(iv) Agreed latitude values and agreed longitude values of the reference point thus obtained shall be recorded to the nearest second and shall be the agreed geographic coordinates of each reference point for the point of entry. A physical description of the reference point shall also be recorded for each reference point. The inspected Party shall provide notification of the determination of agreed geographic coordinates of reference points in accordance with paragraph 28 of Section III of this Protocol;
(v) If agreed geographic coordinates for four reference points cannot be determined after the procedures provided for in this subparagraph have been attempted at no fewer than six proposed points, all agreed coordinates shall be discarded and the procedures provided for in this subparagraph shall be repeated when an inspection team next arrives at this point of entry to conduct an inspection.

(e) The operability of satellite system receivers shall be tested at each point of entry for which there is at least one associated facility with silo launchers of ICBMs subject to inspection pursuant to paragraph 2, 3, 4 or 6 of Article XI of the Treaty. After the baseline data inspection period, operability of the inspected Party's satellite system receivers may be tested at such points of entry, at the discretion of the inspection team leader, for all inspections, except for inspections conducted pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, prior to the departure of the inspection team for the inspection site, at a time agreed by the inspection team leader, and a member of the in-country escort. The time shall be agreed to as soon as possible following the arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry. Testing shall be conducted in accordance with the procedures contained in subparagraph (g) of this paragraph.
(f) Only for inspections conducted during the baseline data inspection period, testing of the operability of the inspected Party's satellite system receivers shall be conducted in accordance with the procedures contained in subparagraph (g) of this paragraph:

(i) either after the inspection team leader has made the designation, provided for in paragraph 15 of Section V of this Protocol, of the type of inspection and inspection site, provided that the use of satellite system receivers is permitted for the designated type of inspection and inspection site; or
(ii) prior to the designation by the inspection team leader, provided for in paragraph 15 of Section V of this Protocol, of the type of inspection and inspection site, at a time agreed to by the inspection team leader and a member of the in-country escort, provided that the inspection team leader declares the inspecting Party's intent to use the satellite system receivers during the first or a sequential inspection for which satellite system receivers may be used.

(g) The operability of each of the inspected Party's satellite system receivers shall be tested at two reference points. These two reference points shall be selected from the four reference points with agreed geographic coordinates. The first reference point shall be selected by a member of the in-country escort, and the second reference point shall be selected by the inspection team leader or an authorized representative of such a team. A member of the in-country escort shall accompany the inspectors to each reference point and shall bring the inspected Party's satellite system receivers to that reference point:

(i) In order for an inspected Party's satellite system receiver to be confirmed to be operable, at each of the two reference points the reading of the satellite system receiver must agree with the agreed geographic coordinates of that reference point;
(ii) If, at either of the two reference points, the reading of an inspected Party's satellite system receiver does not agree with the agreed geographic coordinates of the reference point, a member of the in-country escort shall take another reading using that satellite system receiver. If, after at least two additional attempts, the reading of the satellite system receiver still does not agree with the agreed geographic coordinates, the inspected Party shall replace the satellite system receiver. The replacement satellite system receiver shall be tested in accordance with the procedures contained in subparagraph (g) of this paragraph. The testing of the inspected Party's satellite system receivers shall continue until the inspected Party has provided two satellite system receivers that are confirmed to be operable or until at least four different satellite system receivers have been tested.
(iii) If the inspected Party is unable to provide two satellite system receivers whose operability has been confirmed in accordance with the procedures contained in subparagraph (g) of this paragraph, this fact shall be recorded in the inspection report and the inspection shall proceed.

(h) The inspected Party shall have the right to change the reference points for use in testing the operability of satellite system receivers. No more than two reference points may be changed at any one time, unless otherwise agreed. Agreed geographic coordinates for the new reference point shall be determined using the procedures in subparagraph 1(d) of this Subsection when an inspection team next arrives at this point of entry to conduct an inspection after the proposed effective date of a change specified in the notification provided by the inspected Party in accordance with paragraph 29 of Section III of this Protocol. The new reference point shall become effective upon determination of its agreed geographic coordinates. |11|

2. After confirming that the two receivers are functioning, a member of the in-country escort, in the presence of the inspection team leader, shall place the receivers in a case or container that shall be sealed by the inspection team leader and provided to a member of the in-country escort.

3. The sealed case or container shall remain in the custody of a member of the in-country escort until the arrival of the inspection team at the silo launcher of ICBMs designated by the inspection team leader.

4. Upon arrival of the inspection team or subgroup of the inspection team at a silo launcher of ICBMs designated for inspection, inspectors shall use satellite system receivers that have been provided by the inspected Party to determine the geographic coordinates of such silo launchers of ICBMs in accordance with the following procedures:

(a) The specific location where the readings of the satellite system receiver are taken shall be selected by a member of the in-country escort in such a way that, if possible, the designated silo launcher of ICBMs can be seen from that location;
(b) While at this location, specified in accordance with subparagraph (a) of this paragraph, the inspectors shall examine the container and the seal placed on the container to determine whether the seal is intact and whether the container has been tampered with. If there is evidence that the seal has been broken or that the container has been tampered with, this fact shall be recorded in the inspection report and the inspection shall continue;
(c) A member of the in-country escort shall open the container and an inspector shall select one of the two satellite system receivers provided by the inspected Party, the operability of which has been confirmed in accordance with the procedures provided for in subparagraph 1(g) of this Subsection;
(d) For the purpose of comparing the reading of a satellite system receiver with the geographic coordinates of a designated silo launcher of ICBMs, listed in the Agreement on Exchange of Geographic Coordinates and Site Diagrams, the term "agree" shall mean that:

(i) if the geographic coordinates are expressed to the nearest second, the reading of the satellite system receiver differs from the geographic coordinates by no more than 12 seconds in both latitude and longitude;
(ii) if the geographic coordinates are expressed to the nearest minute, the reading of the satellite system receiver differs from the geographic coordinates by no more than 60 seconds in both latitude and longitude;

(e) An inspector shall take readings using the selected satellite system receiver. If the satellite system receiver readings and the geographic coordinates for the location of the designated silo launcher of ICBMs, listed in the Agreement on Exchange of Geographic Coordinates and Site Diagrams, agree, then the silo launcher of ICBMs shall be considered to be the designated silo launcher of ICBMs and the coordinates determined by the satellite system receiver shall be recorded in the inspection report despite the fact that the satellite system receiver readings might also agree with geographic coordinates for the locations of other nearby silo launchers of ICBMs, listed in the Agreement on Exchange of Geographic Coordinates and Site Diagrams. If the satellite system receiver readings at the location selected by a member of the in-country escort do not agree with the geographic coordinates for the designated silo launcher of ICBMs, listed in the Agreement on Exchange of Geographic Coordinates and Site Diagrams, then inspectors shall use the second satellite system receiver. If a satisfactory result cannot be obtained with either of the two satellite system receivers, then a member of the in-country escort shall choose another location closer to the silo launcher of ICBMs where an inspector shall take readings using a satellite system receiver.
If, after using both of the satellite system receivers at any of the locations chosen by a member of the in-country escort, inspectors establish that the readings of neither satellite system receiver agree with the geographic coordinates for this designated silo launcher of ICBMs, and the inspectors are thus unable to ascertain that the silo launcher of ICBMs is the designated silo launcher of ICBMs, this fact shall be recorded in the inspection report and the inspection shall continue;
(f) Upon completion of the satellite system receivers' use, a member of the in-country escort, in the presence of inspectors, shall place the satellite system receivers in a container. A representative of the inspection team shall seal the container and provide the container to a member of the in-country escort. |12|

F. The Parties agree to use radiation detection equipment in the following manner:

1. Radiation detection equipment shall be used to measure nuclear radiation levels in order to demonstrate that objects declared to be non-nuclear are non-nuclear.

2. The radiation detection equipment shall be provided by the inspecting Party, unless otherwise agreed by the Parties.

3. For an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 2, 3, 4, 6 or 12 of Article XI of the Treaty, the Parties shall use radiation detection equipment in accordance with the procedures provided for in Annex 15 to this Protocol.

4. During an inspection conducted in accordance with Section III or IV of Annex 15 to this Protocol, measurements of the radiation level shall be taken by the in-country escort in the presence of inspectors. |13|

Annex 9
Characteristics and methods of use of equipment for the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system

I. Equipment

The inspecting Party shall have the right to install the equipment listed in this Section at each facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility. The inspecting Party shall have the right to store such equipment that has not yet been installed and spare parts for such equipment in quantities sufficient for the continuous monitoring activities at the facility where that equipment is to be installed.

A. For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

1. Monitoring Equipment for the Portal:

(a) Television camera surveillance and measurement system mounted on three- and six-meter-high assembled sectional masts.
(b) System of infrared and magnetometric sensors.
(c) Traffic signal and control equipment:

(i) Electromechanical gate position sensors;
(ii) Traffic lights; and
(iii) Semaphore gates.

(d) Equipment for additional lighting of the portal area:

(i) General purpose lights;
(ii) Emergency lights;
(iii) Floodlights for contrast illumination of vehicles;
(iv) Six-meter high metal poles; and
(v) Three- or six-meter-high sectional masts.

(e) Other equipment:

(i) Fixed measuring rods;
(ii) Portable measuring poles;
(iii) Tape measures and other measuring devices;
(iv) Cabling; and
(v) Weight sensors (provided by the inspected Party).

(f) Other equipment, as agreed by the Parties.

2. Monitoring Equipment for Road Exits:

(a) Environmental shelter.
(b) Equipment for monitoring each exit, to be installed in an environmental shelter:

(i) Local control console for independent control of traffic control devices;
(ii) Television monitors for the television surveillance system;
(iii) Connector units for linking equipment at the exit with the operations center;
(iv) Heating control units for infrared sensor protective glass;
(v) Equipment for communications with the operations center; and
(vi) Personal (micro)computers;

(c) Television camera surveillance and measurement system mounted on three- and six-meter-high sectional masts.
(d) System of infrared and magnetometric sensors.
(e) Vehicle dimension screening system:

(i) Vertical receiving and transmitting arrays of infrared sensors; and
(ii) Doppler road sensor.

(f) Traffic signal and control equipment:

(i) Electromechanical gate position sensors;
(ii) Dual-signal traffic lights; and
(iii) Semaphore gates.

(g) Additional lighting equipment for road exit:

(i) General purpose lights;
(ii) Emergency lights;
(iii) Six-meter-high metal poles; and
(iv) Three- and six-meter-high masts.

(h) Other equipment:

(i) Fixed measuring rods;
(ii) Portable measuring poles, tape measures and other measuring devices; and
(iii) Cabling.

(i) Other equipment, as agreed between the Parties.

3. Perimeter Monitoring Equipment:

(a) Perimeter fence integrity monitoring system:

(i) Sensor elements;
(ii) Section boxes;
(iii) Signal cables;
(iv) Equipment for telephone communication with the operations center; and
(v) Cable conduits.

(b) Other equipment, as agreed between the Parties.

4. Operations Center Equipment:

(a) Operations center building;
(b) Main control console;
(c) Video data receiving, switching, and digital processing equipment;
(d) Personal (micro)computers;
(e) Television monitors;
(f) Equipment for recording video data and information from sensors, and for recording the results of computer processing of data;
(g) Equipment for receiving, processing, and storing data from the perimeter fence integrity monitoring system;
(h) Telephone and radio communications equipment and fire alarm equipment;
(i) Satellite communications equipment (if provided by the inspecting Party);
(j) Photocopying equipment;
(k) Facsimile equipment;
(l) Equipment for the power supply system;
(m) Diesel generator with fuel tanks; and
(n) Other equipment, as agreed between the Parties.

B. For the United States of America:

1. Equipment for use at the Portal:

(a) Vehicle dimensional screening equipment:

(i) Infrared breakbeam system; and
(ii) Metal base (for mounting of infrared sensors).

(b) Weight sensors (provided by the inspected Party).
(c) Surveillance system (some items of which will be located inside the Operations Center and Exit Shelters, as appropriate):

(i) Character generators and mounting racks;
(ii) Monochrome television cameras;
(iii) Interconnect cables for the television cameras;
(iv) Adjustable mounting head for television cameras;
(v) Camera towers (in sections);
(vi) Camera junction boxes;
(vii) Video distribution amplifiers and mounting racks;
(viii) Nine-inch (23-centimeters) television monitors and mounting racks;
(ix) Videocassette recorder and mounting shelf;
(x) Fiber-optic transmitter cards;
(xi) Fiber-optic cables;
(xii) Fiber-optic receiver cards;
(xiii) Exterior lighting mounting poles;
(xiv) High-pressure sodium lighting and supports;
(xv) Instrument console and panels;
(xvi) Video loss detectors and closure panel;
(xvii) Video switching devices;
(xviii) Data authentication devices; and
(xix) Video foredrop (fixed measuring rod for video imaging).

(d) Vehicle Sensors and Control Equipment:

(i) Infrared breakbeam system;
(ii) Induction loop-sensors;
(iii) Gate opening sensors;
(iv) Traffic signal lights;
(v) Semaphore gates;
(vi) Traffic control junction box; and
(vii) Metal base (for mounting of sensors, signal lights, and semaphore gates).

(e) Other equipment, as agreed between the Parties.

2. Equipment for use at the Road Exits, consisting of:

(a) Vehicle dimensional screening equipment (equipment as listed in sub-paragraph I.B.1.(a) of this Annex);
(b) Surveillance system (equipment as listed in subparagraph I.B.1.(c) of this Annex);
(c) Vehicle Sensors and Control Equipment (equipment as specified in subparagraph I.B.1.(d) of this Annex);
(d) Communications equipment, to include telephones, intercom and hand-held radios specified in subparagraph I.B.4.(v) of this Annex;
(e) Environmental shelter (modular, with equipment specified in paragraph I.B.4 of this Annex, as necessary, for independent monitoring of a road exit);
(f) Cabling, as required;
(g) Gate Seals;
(h) Data authentication devices; and
(i) Other equipment, as agreed between the Parties.

3. Equipment for use along the Perimeter, consisting of:

(a) Surveillance System (equipment as listed in subparagraph I.B.1.(c) of this Annex);
(b) Video motion-detection equipment;
(c) Video switching equipment;
(d) Data authentication devices;
(e) Cabling, as required; and
(f) Other equipment, as agreed between the Parties.

4. Operations Center Equipment:

(a) Programmable logic controller;
(b) Executive module for logic controller;
(c) Memory module for logic controller;
(d) Interface rack for logic controller;
(e) Output module for logic controller;
(f) Input module for logic controller;
(g) Equipment control panel;
(h) Printers for personal (micro)-computers;
(i) Personal (micro)computers;
(j) Hard and floppy disk, and tape drives for personal (micro)computers;
(k) Keyboards for personal (micro) computers;
(l) Display monitors for personal (micro) computers;
(m) Desktop scanner and interface for personal (micro) computers;
(n) Software for personal (micro)-computers;
(o) Hardware and software for the personal (micro)computers for recording a digitized video image to computer memory;
(p) Videocassette recorders;
(q) Consoles for video, traffic control, and other subsystems;
(r) Photocopying equipment;
(s) Environmental control equipment;
(t) Video equipment as specified for the surveillance system;
(u) Data authentication equipment;
(v) Communications equipment:

(i) Laser facsimile equipment;
(ii) Telephone system, to include wiring connectors, and switching equipment;
(iii) Intercom system;
(iv) Base station radio transceiver;
(v) Hand-held radios;
(vi) Antenna for base radio station;
(vii) Fiber-optic cabling for connecting exit shelters and equipment at the exits to the operations center; and
(viii) Satellite communications equipment (if provided by the inspecting Party);

(w) Operations center building (modular);
(x) Power Supply Equipment:

(i) Back-up power generator;
(ii) Automatic switching equipment for generator;
(iii) Generator fuel storage tank;
(iv) Transformer for generator; and
(v) Distribution panel for generator;

(y) Other equipment, as agreed between the Parties.

II. Methods of Use of Equipment

The Parties agree to use the equipment specified in Section I of this Annex as follows:

A. For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

1. Equipment at the Portal:

(a) Equipment installed at the portal shall be used to screen road and rail vehicles and exposed cargoes to determine whether they are large enough to contain or to be an item of continuous monitoring. If such vehicles and cargoes are not large enough to contain or to be an item of continuous monitoring, as determined by screening, such vehicles and cargoes shall be allowed to proceed without further inspection and without undue delay. If such vehicles and cargoes are large enough to contain or to be an item of continuous monitoring, monitors shall have the right to stop and inspect such vehicles and cargoes in accordance with the procedures provided for in Annex 5 to this Protocol.
(b) The following equipment, which the inspecting Party may install at the portal of a facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, shall function as follows:

(i) The television camera surveillance and measurement system shall permit a monitor in the operations center to observe the situation at the portal, produce a continuous videotape and video snapshots of vehicles proceeding through the portal, and perform remote dimensional screening of vehicles exiting the monitored facility. Television cameras shall be mounted on three- and six-meter-high assembled sectional masts. The fixed field of view of such cameras shall be agreed by the Parties. Television cameras for remote dimensional screening of exiting vehicles shall be located no more than 50 meters from, and perpendicular to the vehicular route through the portal and no more than 30 meters from the middle of the screening area facing in the direction of traffic.
(ii) The system of infrared and magnetometric sensors shall be installed in the screening area on both sides of the route of traffic and used to monitor the direction of movement of vehicles, to identify vehicle locations, and to relay video snapshots of side views and front images of vehicles for the remote dimensional screening of vehicles and exposed cargoes to determine whether a vehicle or exposed cargo is large enough to contain or to be an item of continuous monitoring. Infrared sensors shall be mounted on special supports on both sides of the screening area and shall register beam interruption by exiting vehicles. Magnetometric sensors shall be installed on one side of the screening area and shall be a back-up system that allows vehicles to be distinguished from other objects breaking the sensor beams.
(iii) Traffic signal and control equipment consisting of electromechanical entrance and exit gate position sensors, traffic lights controlling the exit of a vehicle from the monitored facility, as well as a semaphore gate shall be used to control a vehicle in the portal area.
(iv) The equipment for additional lighting of the portal areas shall include general purpose and emergency lights and flood lights for contrast lighting of vehicles while the side and front measurement television cameras are turned on. General purpose and emergency lights shall be mounted on six-meter-high assembled metal poles so as to ensure the lighting of the portal area. Floodlights for contrast lighting of vehicles shall be mounted on three- or six-meter-high sectional masts near the screening area along the vehicular route through the portal.
(v) Weight sensors shall be used to weigh road vehicles in accordance with the procedures provided for in Annex 5 to this Protocol.
(vi) Fixed measuring rods shall be used for visual evaluation of vehicle dimensions.
(vii) Portable measuring poles, tape measures and other measuring devices shall be used for direct dimensional measurement of vehicles, covered and environmentally protected objects, containers, launch canisters, and cargoes.
(viii) Cabling shall link equipment at the portal and the operations center.

2. Monitoring Equipment for Road Exits:

(a) Equipment installed at each road exit shall be used to screen road vehicles and exposed cargoes to determine whether they are large enough to contain or to be an item of continuous monitoring. If such vehicles or cargoes are not large enough to contain or to be an item of continuous monitoring, as determined by screening, such vehicles and cargoes shall be allowed to proceed without undue delay. If such vehicles or cargo are large enough to contain or to be an item of continuous monitoring, monitors shall bring that to the attention of the in-country escort, and the inspected Party shall direct such vehicle or cargo to the portal of the monitored facility.
(b) The following equipment, which the inspecting Party may install at each road exit of the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, shall function as follows:

(i) The television camera surveillance and measurement system shall permit a monitor in the operations center to observe the situation at the road exits and remotely screen the dimensions of exiting vehicles by means of video information from the measurement television cameras. Television cameras shall be installed on three- and six-meter-high sectional masts. Surveillance television cameras shall monitor the entrance and exit gates as well as the area of the road exit. Measurement television cameras shall be installed no more than 50 meters from, and perpendicular to the vehicle route through the road exit and no more than 30 meters from the middle of the screening area facing in the direction of traffic. The fixed field of view of such cameras shall be agreed by the Parties.
(ii) The system of infrared and magnetometric sensors installed on both sides of the screening area of the road exit shall be used to monitor the direction of movement of vehicles and exposed cargoes, relay video snapshots of side and frontal images of vehicles.
(iii) The system for monitoring the dimensions of vehicles, consists of vertical arrays of infrared transmitters and receivers located on both sides of the screening area of the road exit and of a doppler road sensor installed on the shoulder and beamed at the approaching exiting vehicle. The information from the doppler and infrared sensors is received in the operations center in order to produce a profile of the exiting vehicle or exposed cargo to determine whether the vehicle or exposed cargo is large enough to contain or to be an item of continuous monitoring.
(iv) The traffic signal and control equipment, consisting of electromechanical exit and entrance gate position sensors, dual-signal traffic lights and semaphore gates shall be used to control vehicles exiting the monitored facility.
(v) The equipment for additional lighting of the road exit control area, which includes general purpose and emergency lights and floodlights, shall ensure the operation of the television measurement cameras. Such equipment shall be mounted on six-meter-high poles and three-meter-high masts.
(vi) Fixed measuring rods shall be used for visual evaluation of the dimensions of exiting vehicles and exposed cargoes.
(vii) Portable measuring poles, tape measures, and other measuring devices shall be used for direct dimensional measurement of vehicles and exposed cargoes.
(viii) Cabling shall link equipment at the exit with the operations center.

3. Perimeter Monitoring Equipment:

(a) Equipment may be placed by the inspecting Party along the entire perimeter of the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility. Such equipment shall be used by monitors to observe the activity along the perimeter and within the perimeter continuous monitoring area.
(b) The following equipment, which the inspecting Party may install along the perimeter and within the perimeter continuous monitoring area of the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, shall function as follows:

(i) The perimeter fence integrity monitoring system shall consist of sensor elements and section boxes mounted on the perimeter mesh fence. A sensor element shall consist of segments of special cable up to 500 meters long, laid in two parallel "threads" along the fence and connected to a section box that is mounted on fence supports.
(ii) The section boxes shall be connected to one another and to the operations center by a cable for signaling a possible perimeter violation and the location of the violation.
(iii) The section boxes shall have telephone connections to the operations center as well. Conduits for cables connecting portal equipment to equipment at the road exits, shall be fastened onto the perimeter mesh fence supports.

4. Operations Center Equipment:

(a) The operations center for the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system shall serve as the headquarters for the monitoring team. The operations center building shall be located at the portal within the perimeter continuous monitoring area and shall consist of five sections, three of which shall be used to house technical equipment and two shall be used as an off-duty area. The location of the building shall provide for an un-obstructed view of the portal.
(b) The equipment located in the operations center may be used by monitors to:

(i) Observe on television monitor screens the situation in the perimeter continuous monitoring area, at the portal, and at the road exits;
(ii) Operate the traffic lights and semaphore gates;
(iii) Check color graphic displays of measurements of dimensions of exiting vehicles and exposed cargoes obtained using infrared and television systems;
(iv) Remotely control the lighting of the portal areas;
(v) Control the perimeter fence integrity monitoring system;
(vi) Receive, switch, and digitally process video information from surveillance and measurement television cameras;
(vii) Control outside devices, monitor sensors, and determine whether a vehicle or exposed cargo is large enough to contain or to be an item of continuous monitoring;
(viii) Record video data, information from sensors, and computer processed information;
(ix) Provide telephone communications, radio communications and fire alarms; and
(x) Transmit, using the two dedicated telephone lines and satellite communications equipment, unencrypted monitoring-related data including video snapshots and photographs. Such information shall not be transmitted via the non-dedicated commercial telephone line.

(c) Electrical power supply equipment shall be used to transform the voltages and the frequencies of the feeder network to supply uninterrupted power for technical systems in the event of a brief interruption in the electrical power provided by the inspected Party.
(d) A diesel generator with fuel tanks shall be located under an awning near the operations center and shall be used as an independent electrical power supply source for technical systems in the event of a protracted interruption in the electrical power provided by the inspected Party.

B. For the United States of America:

1. Equipment at the Portal:

(a) Equipment installed at the portal shall be used to screen rail vehicles, road vehicles, and exposed cargoes to determine whether they are large enough to contain or to be an item of continuous monitoring. If such vehicles and cargoes are not large enough to contain or to be such an item of continuous monitoring, as determined by screening, such vehicles and cargoes shall be allowed to proceed without further inspection and without undue delay. If such vehicles or cargoes are large enough to contain or to be an item of continuous monitoring, monitors shall have the right to stop and inspect such vehicles and cargoes in accordance with the procedures provided for in Annex 5 to this Protocol.
(b) The following equipment, or part of such equipment, which the inspecting Party may install at the portal of a facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, shall function as follows:

(i) Vehicle sensors shall provide indication of an approaching vehicle to the monitors in the operations center. Such sensors may include in-road induction loop sensors, above-ground induction loop sensors, infrared breakbeams, gate opening sensors placed on gates of the facility, or other sensors.
(ii) Traffic control devices shall be employed to control each vehicle's passage through the portal so that it may be screened by the monitors and the equipment. Traffic control devices may include traffic lights and semaphore gates, or other devices.
(iii) Length screening sensors shall assist monitors in the operations center in determining whether a vehicle or exposed cargo is large enough to contain or to be an item of continuous monitoring. Such sensors may include infrared breakbeams, video cameras with video foredrops (fixed measuring rods for video imaging), or other sensors.
(iv) Weight sensors shall be used to weigh road vehicles in accordance with procedures provided for in Annex 5 to this Protocol.
(v) The surveillance system, which may include video cameras mounted on poles, shall allow the monitors to observe activities in the area of the portal from the operations center, to record video images, and to take, as necessary, video snapshots of vehicles moving through the portal. The fixed field of view of such cameras shall be agreed by the Parties.
(vi) Lights on poles shall provide illumination for observation of the portal area and for the video cameras.
(vii) Data authentication devices may be used to confirm the validity of signals relayed from cameras and sensors to the operations center.

2. Equipment at the Road Exits:

(a) Equipment installed at each road exit shall be used to screen road vehicles and exposed cargoes to determine whether they are large enough to contain or to be an item of continuous monitoring. If such vehicles and cargoes are not large enough to contain or to be such an item of continuous monitoring as determined by screening, such vehicles or cargoes shall be allowed to proceed without undue delay. If such vehicles or cargoes are large enough to contain or to be an item of continuous monitoring, the monitors shall call this to the attention of the in-country escort and the inspected Party shall direct such vehicles or cargoes to the portal of the monitored facility.
(b) The following equipment or part of such equipment, which the inspecting Party may install at each road exit of the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, shall function as follows:

(i) Vehicle sensors shall provide indication of an approaching road vehicle to the monitors in the operations center and exit shelter. Such sensors may include in-road induction loop sensors, above-ground induction loop sensors, infrared breakbeams, gate opening sensors placed on gates of the facility, or other sensors.
(ii) Traffic control devices shall be employed to control the passage of each vehicle or exposed cargo through the road exit so that it may be screened by the monitors and the equipment. Traffic control devices may include traffic lights and semaphore gates, or other devices.
(iii) Length screening sensors shall assist monitors in the operations center and exit shelters in determining whether a vehicle or exposed cargo is large enough to contain or to be an item of continuous monitoring. Such sensors may include infrared breakbeams, video cameras with video foredrops (fixed measuring rods for visual imaging) or other sensors.
(iv) The surveillance system, which may include video cameras mounted on poles, shall allow the monitors to observe activities from the operations center and exit shelter, to record video images, and to take, as necessary, video snapshots of road vehicles and cargoes moving through the exit. The fixed field of view of such cameras shall be agreed by the Parties.
(v) Lights on poles shall provide illumination for observation of the exit area and for the video cameras.
(vi) Environmental shelters for monitors shall contain equipment as specified in paragraph I.B.4 of this Annex, and telephone equipment for communications with the operations center. Such shelters shall be used to receive all data from equipment at the road exits when monitors are present at those exits.
(vii) Gate seals may be used on the gates of a road exit when the exit is not in use. The seals shall be checked by monitors to verify that the gate was not used prior to the opening of the exit by the inspected Party.
(viii) Data authentication devices shall be used to confirm the validity of signals from the sensors and video cameras to the operations center and exit shelter.

3. Perimeter Monitoring Equipment:

(a) Equipment may be placed by the inspecting Party along the entire perimeter of the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility. Such equipment shall be used by monitors to observe the activity along the perimeter and within the perimeter continuous monitoring area.
(b) The following equipment, or part of such equipment that the inspecting Party may install along the perimeter and within the perimeter continuous monitoring area of the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, shall function as follows:

(i) Video cameras shall be located along the perimeter in such a way as to provide for viewing of the perimeter by monitors in the operations center. The distance between such cameras and the height of the cameras above the ground shall allow the cameras to provide for full viewing of corresponding sectors of the perimeter. Such cameras may be placed 50 meters or less apart and no more than eight meters above the ground. The fixed field of view shall be agreed to by the Parties;
(ii) Video switching devices located in the operations center shall be used to select sectors of the perimeter for observation by the monitors;
(iii) The surveillance system may include video motion detectors to signal the presence of a moving object within the field of view of a camera;
(iv) Lights on poles shall provide illumination along the entire perimeter and allow for viewing by video cameras during periods of darkness. Lights may be placed 50 meters or less apart and no more than eight meters above the ground;
(v) Data authentication devices may be used to confirm the validity of the signals transmitted by the video cameras to the operations center or shelters.

4. Operations Center:

(a) The operations center for the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system shall serve as the headquarters for the monitoring team. The building for the operations center shall be located at the portal. The location of the building shall provide for an unobstructed view of the portal.
(b) The equipment located in the operations center shall be used by monitors to:

(i) Receive, review, and authenticate data from all portal, road exit, and perimeter monitoring equipment;
(ii) Process data, display video images, and collect monitoring data;
(iii) Operate all traffic control devices and vehicle sensors when such devices and sensors are not under the control of monitors at the road exits;
(iv) Transmit, using the two dedicated telephone lines and satellite communications equipment unencrypted monitoring-related data including video snapshots and photographs. Such information shall not be transmitted via the non-dedicated commercial telephone line;
(v) Record and store video and sensor data;
(vi) Provide telephone communications with monitors at exit shelters, at any other buildings or structures used for inspection of vehicles or their cargoes, at the storage building, and at the monitors' living quarters; and
(vii) Provide two-way radio communications with monitors in the perimeter continuous monitoring area, including with monitors at the road exits.

(c) A backup power generator shall be located near the operations center and shall be used to provide power to the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system in the event of an interruption in the electrical power provided by the inspected Party.

Annex 10
Types of inspection airplanes

1. Inspection airplanes may include military transport airplanes with standard markings and paint schemes, to include camouflage.

2. The types of inspection airplanes that may be used to transport inspectors and monitors are:

(a) for the United States of America, for flights to the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, or Ukraine, types known as the C-9, C-17, C-130, C-141, KC-10, KC-135, and T-43; and |1|
(b) for the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine, for flights to the United States of America, types known as the IL-62, IL-76, and IL-96.|2|

3. The types of inspection airplanes that may be used for delivery and removal of cargoes consisting of equipment or supplies specified in an inventory provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Annex 7 to this Protocol are:

(a) for the United States of America, for flights to the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, or Ukraine, types known as the C-5, C-17, C-130, C-141, KC-10, and KC-135; and |3|
(b) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, for flights to the United States of America, types known as the IL-76 and An-124.

4. Each Party shall have the right to replace the types of airplanes specified in this Annex with other types of airplanes, as well as to add other types of airplanes after it has informed the other Party of such a replacement or addition. Unless otherwise agreed by the Parties, each such change shall enter into force three months after a Party has so informed the other.

Annex 11
Procedures for confirming the dimensions of ICBMs and SLBMs

1. During confirmation of dimensions of the exhibited items the inspectors shall have the right to make measurements at the locations on the items, designated by a member of the in-country escort.

2. For liquid fuel ICBMs or SLBMs of existing types and new types, assembled missiles and separate first stages for such ICBMs or SLBMs may be exhibited either with fuel or without fuel. For solid propellant ICBMs or SLBMs of existing types, except for the SS-25 ICBM and the Trident II SLBM, assembled missiles shall be exhibited with propellant. Separate first stages for solid propellant ICBMs or SLBMs of existing types shall be exhibited with propellant. For solid propellant ICBMs or SLBMs of new types, the assembled missiles, at the choice of the inspected Party, may be exhibited with propellant, without propellant, or as an inert missile. If a solid propellant ICBm or SLBM of a new type is declared on the basis of a change in missile length, such an ICBM or SLBM shall be exhibited with propellant. For solid propellant ICBMs or SLBMs of new types, separate first stages shall be exhibited with propellant.

3. The self-contained dispensing mechanism shall be exhibited, either separately or with the third stage as a unit, for the purpose of confirming the length of an ICBM or SLBM, which is maintained, stored, and transported in stages. If the self-contained dispensing mechanism is exhibited separately, the inspectors shall have the right to measure its length.

4. For ICBMs that are maintained, stored and transported as assembled missiles in launch canisters, either a launch canister containing an ICBM without front section or, at the choice of the inspected Party, an empty launch canister associated with such an ICBM, shall be exhibited.

5. For the purpose of confirming ICBM or SLBM dimensions, during technical characteristics exhibitions, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall exhibit an ICBM and SLBM of each existing type in accordance with the following procedures:

(a) For the SS-25, SS-24, and SS-18 ICBMs, and each variant thereof, the separate first stage, the assembled missile outside its launch canister, and either a launch canister containing an ICBM without front section or, at the choice of the inspected Party, an empty launch canister associated with such an ICBM shall be exhibited. The assembled SS-25 ICBM outside its launch canister may be exhibited without propellant. The separate first stage of the SS-25 ICBM shall be exhibited with propellant.
(b) For the SS-13 ICBM, the first stage shall be exhibited and measured separately, and the second and third stages shall be exhibited and measured as a unit. The SS-13 ICBM shall not be exhibited as an assembled missile.
(c) For the SS-11, SS-17, and SS-19 ICBMs, the separate first stage, the assembled missile outside its launch canister, and either a launch canister containing an ICBM without front section or, at the choice of the inspected Party, an empty launch canister associated with such an ICBM shall be exhibited. Technical characteristics exhibitions for these ICBMs shall take place no later than one year after Treaty signature during an elimination of an ICBM of such a type.
(d) For SLBMs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, assembled missiles shall be exhibited. Confirmation of the length and diameter of the first stages of such SLBMs shall take place on the assembled missile. The SS-N-17 SLBM has been retired prior to Treaty signature, and it will not be subject to a technical characteristics exhibition. If, after the technical characteristics exhibitions, the United States of America requests, through diplomatic channels, additional confirmation of dimensions of the first stage of any SLBM, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall exhibit such SLBM during the first elimination of an SLBM of that type. In its request for such an exhibition, the United States of America shall designate what it seeks to confirm regarding the dimensions of such a first stage. Procedures for such additional confirmation of the dimensions of the first stages of SLBMs are provided for in Annex 13 to this Protocol, unless otherwise agreed within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. |1| The diameter of the third stage of the SS-N-20 SLBM shall be confirmed during the first elimination of an SLBM of that type.

6. For the purpose of confirming ICBM or SLBM dimensions during technical characteristics exhibitions, the United States of America shall exhibit an ICBM and SLBM of each existing type in accordance with the following procedures:

(a) For an ICBM or an SLBM of each type, except for the Peacekeeper ICBM, the separate first stage and the assembled missile shall be exhibited. For the Minuteman II ICBM, the guidance ring and the forward spacer ring shall be exhibited separately. For the Minuteman III ICBM, the self-contained dispensing mechanism shall be exhibited separately.
(b) For the Peacekeeper ICBM, all stages shall be exhibited and measured separately. The Peacekeeper ICBM shall not be exhibited as an assembled missile.
(c) The assembled Trident II SLBM may be exhibited without propellant or as an inert missile. The separate first stage of the Trident II SLBM shall be exhibited with propellant.

7. For a technical characteristics exhibition for an ICBM or SLBM of a new type, or variant, the separate first stage, assembled missile outside its launch canister, and if applicable, either launch canister containing the assembled missile without front section, or, at the choice of the inspected Party, the empty launch canister associated with such an ICBM or SLBM, shall be exhibited. If an ICBM or SLBM of a new type cannot be exhibited as an assembled missile, separate stages shall be exhibited. The first stage of ICBMs or SLBMs of a new type declared on the basis of a change in the length of the first stage, with or without a difference in throw-weight, shall be exhibited in a configuration that allows confirmation of the length of such first stage as defined in paragraph 15 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding.

Annex 12
Size criteria to be used during inspections and continuous monitoring

1. For each Party, the size criteria to be used by inspectors carrying out the procedures of Annex 1 to this Protocol, as provided for in paragraph 20 and subparagraph 23(a) of Section VI of this Protocol, for baseline data inspections, data update inspections, new facility inspections, close-out inspections, and formerly declared facility inspections at facilities other than air bases for heavy bombers, air bases for former heavy bombers, training facilities for heavy bombers, and storage facilities for heavy bombers and former heavy bombers, and the associated missile types, are as follows:

(a) United States of America

Size Criteria

Length (meters)
Diameter (meters)
Missile Type 4.1
1.88
Trident I/Poseidon

Length (meters)
Diameter (meters)
Missile Type 6.3
1.68
Minuteman II/III

(b) Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Size Criteria

Length (meters)
Diameter (meters)
Missile Type 7.4
1.80
SS-25

Length (meters)
Diameter (meters)
Missile Type 6.9
1.86
RS-12M, Variant 2 |1|

2. For each Party, the size criteria to be used by inspectors carrying out the procedures of Annex 1 to this Protocol, as provided for in paragraph 20 and subparagraph 23(b) of Section VI of this Protocol, for suspect-site inspections, and the associated missile types, are as follows:

(a) United States of America

Size Criteria

Length (meters)
Diameter (meters)
Missile Type 7.4
2.3
Peacekeeper

(b) Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Size Criteria

Length (meters)
Diameter (meters)
Missile Type 7.4
1.80
SS-25

Length (meters)
Diameter (meters)
Missile Type 6.9
1.86
RS-12M, Variant 2 |2|

3. For each Party, the size criteria to be used by monitors carrying out the procedures of paragraphs 1 through 14 of Annex 5 to this Protocol, as provided for in paragraphs 21 and 24 of Section VI of this Protocol, and the associated missile types, are as follows:

(a) United States of America

Size Criteria

Length (meters)
Diameter (meters)
Missile Type 8.4
2.3
Peacekeeper

(b) Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Size Criteria

Length (meters)
Diameter (meters)
Missile Type 17.46
1.76
RS-12M, Variant 2 |3|

4. For each Party, the size criteria to be used by monitors carrying out the procedures of paragraph 15 of Annex 5 to this Protocol, as provided for in paragraph 25 of Section VI of this Protocol, and the associated missile types, are as follows:

(a) United States of America

Size Criteria

Length (meters)
Diameter (meters)
Missile Type 8.2
2.2
Peacekeeper

(b) Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Size Criteria

Length (meters)
Diameter (meters)
Missile Type 8.2
2.3
SS-24

5. The size criteria indicated above are derived using data for ICBMs and SLBMs existing as of Treaty signature. In the event that a new type of ICBM or SLBM is deployed or in the event that a type of ICBM or SLBM is retired, these size criteria shall be changed, if necessary. In addition, these size criteria shall be confirmed based on the results of measurements taken during technical characteristics exhibitions conducted pursuant to paragraph 11 of Article XI of the Treaty. The Parties shall agree on any changes to the size criteria within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

Annex 13
Procedures for additional confirmation of the dimensions of first stages of SLBMs |1|

I. Procedures for Conducting Exhibitions

1. Pursuant to subparagraph 5(d) of Annex 11 to this Protocol, the Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to in this Annex as the exhibiting Party, shall conduct exhibitions of SLBMs of the types designated by the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine as RSM-40, RSM-50, RSM-52, and RSM-54, which are known to the United States of America as SS-N-8, SS-N-18, SS-N-20, and SS-N-23, respectively, for the purpose of additional confirmation of the dimensions of the first stages of such SLBMs. The exhibition of an SLBM of each such type:

(a) shall be considered to be a technical characteristics exhibition pursuant to paragraph 11 of Article XI of the Treaty;
(b) shall be conducted subject to the provisions of this Protocol, including paragraph 5 of Section III; paragraphs 8 and 9 of Section V; paragraphs 15, 19, and 28 of Section VI; and paragraphs 4, 5, and 7 of Section XIV; and using any of the equipment specified in Section III of Annex 8 to this Protocol; and
(c) shall be conducted during the first elimination of an SLBM of each such type.

2. The exhibiting Party shall provide to the United States of America, hereinafter referred to as the inspecting Party, a notification through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center no less than 30 days in advance of each exhibition conducted in accordance with this Annex. Such notification shall include: The type of SLBM to be exhibited, the location at which such exhibition will take place, and the date of such exhibition.

3. The exhibiting Party shall have the right, at its discretion, to either exhibit an SLBM and, simultaneously, a separate first stage of an SLBM of the same type, or to exhibit sequentially an SLBM and then its separated first stage. The SLBm being exhibited for the purpose of additional confirmation of the dimensions of the first stage of an SLBM of that type shall be an SLBM on which the exhibiting Party shall have the right to carry out, before the exhibition, some of the procedures for the elimination of an SLBM, to include removing some assemblies and elements of the SLBM. For sequential exhibitions of the SLBM and its first stage, the exhibiting Party shall separate the first stage from the rest of the exhibited SLBM, subject to the provisions of Section II of this Annex.

4. The inspecting Party shall have the right to confirm by external viewing and by measurement of the dimensions of the SLBM being exhibited that it is an SLBM of the declared type. If inspectors are unable to determine the type of SLBM, representatives of the exhibiting Party shall take steps to resolve the problem. Such steps shall include the opportunity for the inspecting Party to measure those removed assemblies and elements of the SLBM that contribute to the "Length of Assembled Missile Without Front Section" for the type of SLBM being exhibited, specified in Annex F to the Memorandum of Understanding. Upon completion of such viewing and such measurements, the SLBM being exhibited shall not be subject to further inspection.

5. The inspecting Party shall have the right to confirm the length and diameter of the exhibited separate first stage of the SLBM, or first stage of the SLBM separated during the exhibition, by measurement of its dimensions. Such measurements shall be made in accordance with the procedures provided for in paragraph 7 of Section XIV of this Protocol.

6. A member of the in-country escort, at the request of the inspectors, shall photograph the exhibited separate or separated first stage of the SLBM, in order to obtain three photographs of that stage that meet the requirements of paragraph 10 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding. Such photographs shall be produced using a camera system of the exhibiting Party. If an ambiguous situation arises, a member of the in-country escort, at the request of the inspectors, shall take photographs using the camera system of the inspecting Party, subject to the provisions of paragraphs 18 and 27 of Section VI of, and Subsection B of Section VI of Annex 8 to, this Protocol.

7. The exhibiting Party shall provide the inspection team with one photograph of the first stage of the exhibited SLBM. Such photograph shall meet the requirements of the agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concluded on July 31, 1991, through the exchange of letters on the provisions of photographs of items subject to the Treaty.

8. Pursuant to subparagraph 5(d) of Annex 11 to this Protocol, during the exhibition of the first stage of the SS-N-20 SLBM provided for in this Annex, the inspecting Party shall also have the right to confirm the diameter of the third stage of the SS-N-20 SLBM. A member of the in-country escort, at the request of the inspectors, shall photograph the third stage of the SS-N-20 SLBM in order to obtain three photographs of that stage that meet the requirements of paragraph 10 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding. Such photographs shall be produced using a camera system of the exhibiting Party. If an ambiguous situation arises, a member of the In-country escort, at the request of the inspectors, shall take photographs using the camera system of the inspecting Party, subject to the provisions of paragraphs 18 and 27 of Section VI of, and Subsection B of Section VI of Annex 8 to, this Protocol.

II. Procedures for Separating an SLBM First Stage from the SLBM Being Exhibited

1. After the inspectors have confirmed the type of an SLBM pursuant to paragraph 4 of Section I of this Annex, the exhibiting Party shall have the right to separate, outside the field of view of inspectors, the first stage from the rest of the SLBM being exhibited at the location where the first stage separates from an SLBM during its flight, by mechanical severing of the missile's airframe by pyrotechnic devices of the missile, provided that the process of separation is carried out in such a way as to permit inspectors to ascertain that the first stage, the dimensions of which they will confirm, belongs to the SLBM being exhibited, the type of which they had previously confirmed.

2. Before the first stage is separated from the rest of the SLBM being exhibited, inspectors shall have the right to view the room or area in which the first stage will be separated, to ascertain that the room or area does not contain another first stage of an SLBM of that type.

3. During the entire process of first stage separation, the inspectors shall have the right to observe all exits of the room or area where the process of separating the first stage from the SLBM is carried out.

Annex 14
Settlement of accounts |1|

I. Principles and Procedures for Settlement of Accounts

1. The Parties shall use the principles and procedures for the settlement of accounts, specified in this Section, in connection with:

(a) the costs of goods and services borne by the inspecting Party pursuant to paragraph 13 of Section IV, paragraph 19 of Section V, and paragraphs 17, 19, 21, 23, and 35 of Section XVI of the Inspection Protocol; and

(b) The costs of goods and services associated with the purchase of tapes and the copying of telemetric information onto such tapes pursuant to the Thirty-fifth Agreed Statement in the Annex to the Treaty on Agreed Statements, with the providing of training, maintenance, service, spare parts and replacement parts relating to telemetry equipment pursuant to paragraph 7 of Section I and paragraph 8 of Section II of Annex 1 to the Telemetry Protocol, and subparagraphs 4(d) and 4(e) and paragraph 6 of Annex 4 to the Telemetry Protocol, and with the implementation of Section III of Annex 5 to the Telemetry Protocol. |2|

2. The United States of America shall submit to each other Party, and the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine shall each submit to the United States of America, lists of goods and services provided, hereinafter referred to as itemized lists, in the categories contained in Section II of this Annex, except categories contained in paragraph 6, subparagraph 7(b) and paragraph 8 of that Section. These itemized lists shall contain the information specified in Section II of this Annex for the goods and services provided during the period covered by these itemized lists, except that goods and services provided in the category contained in paragraph 14 of Section II of this Annex may be included on the itemized lists covering the period when provision of such goods and services was completed. In addition, each Party shall submit with the itemized lists a summary list of all categories contained in Section II of this Annex for which goods and services have been provided, and the estimated overall total cost of the goods and services provided in each category.

3. Each Party shall submit itemized lists in accordance with the following schedule:

(a) for the period from January 1 through March 31, no later than April 30;
(b) for the period from April 1 through June 30, no later than July 31;
(c) for the period from July 1 through September 30, no later than October 31; and
(d) for the period from October 1 through December 31, no later than January 31.

4. For settlement of accounts for goods and services provided by the Parties pursuant to the Agreement on Early Exhibitions in the categories contained in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Section II of this Annex, for construction activities related to the establishment of the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring facility at Pavlograd in the categories contained in paragraphs 4 and 14 of Section II of this Annex, and for goods and services provided by the Parties pursuant to Annex 4 to the Telemetry Protocol in the categories contained in paragraphs 1, 2 and 17 of Section II of this Annex, and provided by the Parties prior to entry into force of the Treaty, the Parties shall use the following procedures:

(a) itemized lists shall be submitted pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 12 of this Section no later than 90 days after entry into force of the Treaty;
(b) itemized lists shall be reviewed pursuant to paragraph 5 of this Section;
(c) a confirmation of goods and services received or a bill shall be submitted pursuant to paragraphs 6, 8, and 12 of this Section no later than 120 days after entry into force of the Treaty; and
(d) a bill shall be paid pursuant to paragraphs 9 and 12 of this Section.

5. The following procedures shall be used after the submittal of itemized lists pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Section:

(a) each Party shall review the itemized lists to determine for each category, whether the goods and services that it received are comparable in quantity and quality to the goods and services that it provided;
(b) if the United States of America and another Party determine that the goods and services provided by those Parties for a specific category are comparable in quantity and quality, then no exchange of funds shall be required. In this case, those Parties shall submit to each other a confirmation of goods and services received for that category pursuant to paragraphs 6 and 7 of this Section; and
(c) if the United States of America or another Party determines that the goods and services provided by those Parties for a specific category are not comparable in quantity and quality, then an exchange of funds shall be required for payment of the difference in the cost of goods and services provided by those Parties in that category. In this case, such Party that incurred the greater cost shall submit a bill to such other Party for that category pursuant to paragraphs 6, 7, and 8 of this Section.

6. A confirmation of goods and services received shall be in the form specified in paragraph 1 of Section III of this Annex. A bill shall include the information specified in paragraph 2 of Section III of this Annex.

7. A confirmation of goods and services received or a bill shall be submitted:

(a) for the period from January 1 through June 30, no later than August 31; and
(b) for the period from July 1 through December 31, no later than the last day of February.

8. The United States of America shall denominate all bills submitted to the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, or Ukraine in U.S. dollars. The Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine shall make all payments to the United States of America in U.S. dollars for all categories contained in Section II of this Annex. The Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine shall denominate all bills submitted to the United States of America in both U.S. dollars and the local currency. The United States of America shall make all payments to the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine in a freely convertible currency for all categories contained in Section II of this Annex.

9. Bills shall be paid in accordance with the following:

(a) a bill shall be paid within 30 days of its receipt;
(b) each Party shall notify the other Party of a disputed bill within seven days of its receipt; and
(c) if any undisputed bill is not paid within 180 days of its receipt, then the bill shall be subject to interest, from the date specified on the bill, at the current rate in use by the Export-Import Bank of the United States of America.

10. The goods and services provided in the categories contained in paragraph 6, subparagraph 7(b) and paragraph 8 of Section II of this Annex shall be paid for at the time such goods and services are received and shall be paid for at the commonly available tariffs or rates.

11. The costs for the categories specified in this paragraph shall be calculated in accordance with the following:

(a) the costs for the goods and services provided in categories contained in subparagraphs 7(a) and 9(a) of Section II of this Annex shall be calculated by multiplying the number of flights provided by the inspected Party by the agreed rate per flight:

(i) for the category contained in subparagraph 7(a) of Section II of this Annex, the agreed rate per flight shall be U.S. $15,000; and
(ii) for the category contained in subparagraph 9(a) of Section II of this Annex, the agreed rate per flight shall be U.S. $36,000;

(b) the costs for the category contained in paragraph 16 of Section II of this Annex shall be calculated by multiplying the number of flight tests conducted by each Party by the agreed rate for the purchase and copying of each telemetry data tape. This agreed rate shall be U.S. $0.00, unless otherwise agreed in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

12. The designated organizations for settlement of accounts shall be:

(a) for the United States of America, the On-Site Inspection Agency of the United States of America shall submit to and receive from the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine itemized lists, confirmations of goods and services received, and bills, and shall make payments of bills to, and receive payments of bills from, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine;
(b) for the Republic of Belarus, the National Agency for Verification and Inspection shall submit to and receive from the United States of America itemized lists, confirmations of goods and services received, and bills, and shall make payments of bills to, and receive payments of bills from, the United States of America;
(c) for the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Kazakhstan shall submit to and receive from the United States of America itemized lists, confirmations of goods and services received, and bills, and shall make payments of bills to, and receive payments of bills from, the United States of America;
(d) for the Russian Federation, the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center of the Russian Federation shall submit to and receive from the United States of America itemized lists, confirmations of goods and services received, and bills, and shall make payments of bills to, and receive payments of bills from, the United States of America; and
(e) for Ukraine, the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine shall submit to and receive from the United States of America itemized lists, confirmations of goods and services received, and bills, and shall make payments of bills to, and receive payments of bills from, the United States of America.

13. Each Party shall have the right to change the organization designated for settlement of accounts specified in paragraph 12 of this Section by informing all other Parties of the change no less than 90 days prior to the effective date of the change.

14. The organizations specified in paragraph 12 of this Section shall have the right to designate their respective authorized representatives.

II. Categories of Goods and Services and Information to be Included in Itemized Lists

This Section lists the categories of goods and services for settlement of accounts in connection with paragraph 1 of Section I of this Annex. For each category, the subparagraphs specify the data that shall be included in the itemized lists for that category.

1. Fuel for inspection airplanes provided pursuant to paragraph 13 of Section IV of the Inspection Protocol, fuel for dedicated airplanes provided pursuant to paragraph 4 of Annex 4 to the Telemetry Protocol, and fuel for dedicated airplanes provided pursuant to subparagraph 8(c) of Section II and paragraph 4 of Section III of Annex 5 to the Telemetry Protocol: |3|

(a) type of airplane;
(b) tail number or call sign of airplane;
(c) type of fuel and its quantity in metric tons;
(d) dates on which fuel was provided;
(e) location where fuel was provided;
(f) estimated cost of fuel, if available; and
(g) payment, if any, made when the fuel was provided.

2. Services for inspection airplanes provided pursuant to paragraph 13 of Section IV of the Inspection Protocol, services for dedicated airplanes provided pursuant to paragraph 4 of Annex 4 to the Telemetry Protocol, and services for dedicated airplanes provided pursuant to subparagraph 8(c) of Section II and paragraph 4 of Section III of Annex 5 to the Telemetry Protocol: |4|

(a) type of airplane;
(b) tail number or call sign of airplane;
(c) description of services provided;
(d) dates on which services were provided;
(e) location where services were provided;
(f) estimated cost of services, if available; and
(g) payment, if any, made when services were provided.

3. Meals and lodging provided while monitors are at the point of entry pursuant to subparagraph 19(b) of Section V of the Inspection Protocol:

(a) description of services provided;
(b) dates on which services were provided; and
(c) estimated cost of each service, if available.

4. Permanent lodging and work space for monitors, including utilities and maintenance, provided pursuant to subparagraph 19(c) of Section V of the Inspection Protocol:

(a) description of lodging and work space provided;
(b) period for which lodging and work space were provided; and
(c) estimated cost of each service, if available.

5. Temporary lodging and work space for monitors, including utilities and maintenance, provided pursuant to subparagraph 19(c) of Section V of the Inspection Protocol:

(a) description of lodging;
(b) period for which lodging was provided;
(c) description of work space provided;
(d) period for which work space was provided; and
(e) estimated cost of each service, if available.

6. Meals, provided at the request of the inspecting Party, while monitors are at a facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility pursuant to subparagraph 19(d) of Section V of the Inspection Protocol. Provision of documentation is not required.

7. Transportation of monitors and their baggage, and delivery of equipment and supplies, including foodstuffs:

(a) from the point of entry to a facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility and from such facility to the point of entry pursuant to subparagraph 19(e) of Section V of the Inspection Protocol:

(i) date of flight and type of airplane; and
(ii) tail number or call sign of transporting airplane;

(b) from one facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility to another such facility pursuant to subparagraph 19(f) of Section V of the Inspection Protocol. Provision of documentation is not required.

8. Transportation, meals and lodging of monitors travelling from the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility to the embassy or consular post of the inspecting Party on the territory of the inspected Party and back provided pursuant to subparagraph 19(g) of Section V of the Inspection Protocol. Provision of documentation is not required.

9. Delivery of equipment and supplies, including foodstuffs, for continuous monitoring activities and transportation of monitors that arrive on such an airplane:

(a) from the point of entry to the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility and from such facility to the point of entry pursuant to subparagraph 19(h) of Section V and subparagraph 19(d) of Section XVI of the Inspection Protocol:

(i) date of flight and type of airplane; and
(ii) tail number or call sign of transporting airplane;

(b) from the airport associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility to such a facility and from the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility to the airport associated with such a facility pursuant to subparagraph 19(i) of Section V and subparagraph 19(d) of Section XVI of the Inspection Protocol:

(i) dates on which services were provided;
(ii) types of transportation means used; and
(iii) estimated cost of each service, if available.

10. Medical and other urgent services for monitors, including urgent evacuation of monitors from the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility to the point of entry or airport associated with such a facility, provided while the monitors are at the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility pursuant to subparagraphs 19(j) and 19(m) of Section V of the Inspection Protocol:

(a) first and last name of monitor;
(b) dates of treatment, description of treatment, and medications provided;
(c) period of hospitalization;
(d) date of urgent evacuation flight;
(e) type of evacuation airplane, and its tail number or its call sign; and
(f) estimated cost of each service, if available.

11. Utilities and maintenance of the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system, including utilities and engineering support for the building for storage of equipment and supplies, provided pursuant to subparagraph 19(k) of Section V and subparagraph 19(a) and paragraph 35 of Section XVI of the Inspection Protocol:

(a) utilities:

(i) description of utilities provided;
(ii) dates on which utilities were provided; and
(iii) estimated cost for each utility, if available;

(b) maintenance:

(i) location where work was done;
(ii) description of services provided;
(iii) type of engineering support provided;
(iv) dates on which services were provided; and
(v) estimated cost of each service, if available.

12. Installation and use of the non-dedicated commercial telephone line pursuant to paragraph 17 of Section XVI of the Inspection Protocol:

(a) number of lines;
(b) description of installation work performed;
(c) dates on which installation work was performed;
(d) description of maintenance and services provided;
(e) dates on which services were provided; and
(f) estimated cost for each service, if available.

13. Use of the satellite communications system pursuant to paragraph 17 of Section XVI of the Inspection Protocol:

(a) description of maintenance and services provided;
(b) dates on which services were provided; and
(c) estimated cost for each service, if available.

14. Site preparation and construction materials for the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system and for the operations center:

(a) construction of a building for the storage of equipment and supplies pursuant to paragraph 23 of Section XVI of the Inspection Protocol:

(i) engineering description of work performed;
(ii) description and quantity of materials provided;
(iii) dates on which work was performed; and
(iv) estimated cost of work and materials, if available;

(b) all other general construction pursuant to subparagraphs 19(b) and 19(c) and paragraph 35 of Section XVI of the Inspection Protocol:

(i) description and quantity of construction materials provided;
(ii) dates on which construction materials were provided;
(iii) location where site preparation work was done;
(iv) engineering description of site preparation work;
(v) dates on which site preparation work was performed; and
(vi) estimated cost of work and materials, if available.

15. Temporary structures for monitors at the portal or road exits provided pursuant to paragraph 21 of Section XVI of the Inspection Protocol:

(a) description of structures provided;
(b) period for which structures were provided; and
(c) estimated cost of each service, if available.

16. Tapes and the recording of telemetric information onto the tapes pursuant to the Thirty-fifth Agreed Statement in the Annex to the Treaty on Agreed Statements:

(a) dates of flight tests;
(b) type of missile tested;
(c) number of tapes provided; and
(d) estimated cost of the magnetic tapes and of recording the telemetric information, if available.

17. Training and maintenance for telemetry playback equipment, and the provision of spare parts and replacement parts for such equipment pursuant to paragraph 7 of Section I and paragraph 8 of Section II of Annex 1, paragraph 6 of Annex 4 and paragraph 5 of Section I of Annex 5 to the Telemetry Protocol: |5|

(a) type of service provided;
(b) description and quantity of spare and replacement parts provided;
(c) period of time during which services and spare and replacement parts were provided;
(d) estimated cost of services and spare and replacement parts, if available; and
(e) meals, lodging, work space, transportation, and, as necessary, medical and other urgent services for the trainee team members, maintenance team members and aircrew members of the providing or receiving Party.

18. Telemetry playback equipment demonstrated after entry into force of the Treaty and acquired pursuant to subparagraph 4(c) of Section I of the Telemetry Protocol:

(a) description, quantity, make, and model number of the equipment acquired, and the number of equipment sets acquired;
(b) date of provision of the equipment acquired; and
(c) estimated cost of the equipment acquired, and the cost of delivering such equipment to the point of entry. |6|

III. Form of a Confirmation of Goods and Services Received and Information to be Included in a Bill

1. A confirmation of goods and services received shall be in the following form:

CONFIRMATION OF GOODS AND SERVICES RECEIVED BY THE (RECEIVING PARTY) FROM THE (PROVIDING PARTY) DURING THE PERIOD FROM ______ THROUGH ______ (SIX-MONTH PERIOD COVERED)

This is to certify that the goods and services specified in (Reference to the appropriate itemized lists of goods and services submitted pursuant to paragraph 3 of Section I of this Annex) in the categories of goods and services (Reference to the appropriate categories of goods and services contained in Section II of this Annex) were provided and were received and accepted. The quantity and quality of goods and services provided by each Party in these categories are certified to be comparable; therefore, no exchange of funds is required.

____________
Signature

Date ______
Place ______

The confirmation of goods and services received shall be signed by an individual authorized by the Party submitting the confirmation.

2. A bill shall be prepared in the English and Russian languages. A bill shall include the following information:

(a) the Party being billed;
(b) the Party submitting the bill and the name and address of the organization to which payment should be made;
(c) the number and date of the bill;
(d) reference to the category from those contained in Section II of this Annex for which the bill is submitted;
(e) reference to numbers and dates of the itemized lists of goods and services, submitted pursuant to paragraph 4 of Section I of this Annex; and
(f) description and quantity of goods and services provided, the six-month period covered by the bill, and the amount to be paid.

Annex 15
Procedures for the use of radiation detection equipment |1|

I. Examination and Storage of Radiation Detection Equipment at the Point of Entry

1. The inspecting Party, prior to beginning to use its radiation detection equipment during the first inspection conducted with the use of radiation detection equipment, shall deliver to the inspected Party, for purchase or examination by the inspected Party, one of each of the items in the sets of radiation detection equipment specified in Sections I, II, and IV of Annex 8 to this Protocol, for each model, except for the calibration source. No later than 30 days after the inspected Party has received such items of radiation detection equipment, the inspected Party shall inform the inspecting Party whether the inspecting Party is permitted to use during inspections such radiation detection equipment. Until permission for the use of such radiation detection equipment is given by the inspected Party, the inspecting Party shall not bring to a point of entry on the territory of the inspected Party other radiation detection equipment.

2. For points of entry associated with inspection sites at which radiation detection equipment may be used, the inspecting Party shall bring, at times agreed upon with the inspected Party, to each such point of entry on the territory of the inspected Party for use during inspections no less than one set of radiation detection equipment.

(a) Except as provided for in paragraphs 3 and 4 of this Section, each such set of radiation detection equipment shall be subject to examination and stored at the point of entry in accordance with the procedures provided for in this paragraph.
(b) The examination of such sets of radiation detection equipment shall be completed no later than five days after the date when these sets of radiation detection equipment are brought to the point of entry. During the examination of the radiation detection equipment, the inspected Party shall be permitted, in the presence of the inspecting Party, to partially disassemble such equipment and examine it using non-damaging methods. Such examination must not impair the capability of the radiation detection equipment to perform functions connected with the inspection requirements under the Treaty. Upon completion of the examination and prior to departure from the point of entry, the inspecting Party shall have the right to confirm the operability of the radiation detection equipment in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section II of this Annex in order to establish that its capability to perform functions connected with the inspection requirements under the Treaty has not been impaired as a result of the examination of such radiation detection equipment by the inspected Party.
(c) Upon completion of the examination, the sets of radiation detection equipment shall be stored at the point of entry in tamper-proof containers provided by the inspecting Party, and shall be located within a secure structure or room in accordance with paragraph 14 of Section V of this Protocol. No more than three sets of radiation detection equipment shall be stored at each point of entry associated with inspection sites at which radiation detection equipment may be used.
(d) The procedures for delivering radiation detection equipment for examination and storage at points of entry, the transportation and support for the stay of technical experts delivering and supporting the examination of such equipment on the territory of the inspected Party, and the reimbursement of associated costs shall be subject to agreement.

3. An inspection team shall be permitted to bring to a point of entry calibration sources that are part of the sets of radiation detection equipment stored at the point of entry, replacement spare batteries and rechargeable batteries, as well as an additional set of radiation detection equipment. All such equipment brought to the point of entry shall be subject to examination in accordance with paragraph 8 of Section V of this Protocol.

4. An inspection team, upon arrival at the point of entry, shall have the right, in the presence of the in-country escort, to examine the tamper-proof containers in which the radiation detection equipment is stored and the radiation detection equipment in such containers. The inspection team shall have the right, as set forth below, to select one set of radiation detection equipment for use during the inspection from among the sets of such equipment stored at the point of entry in accordance with subparagraph 2(c) of this Section or an additional set of radiation detection equipment brought to the point of entry by the inspection team, and to confirm the operability of the selected set in accordance with the procedures provided for in paragraph 1 of Section II of this Annex, for no more than four hours.

(a) If the inspection team determines that the containers for at least one of the sets of radiation detection equipment have not been tampered with, and that the set of radiation detection equipment in such containers is operable in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section II of this Annex, then such a set of radiation detection equipment shall be used in conducting the inspection.
(b) If either the inspection team or the in-country escort determines that the containers for all the sets of radiation detection equipment have been tampered with, the inspection team shall have the right to use an additional set of radiation detection equipment brought to the point of entry by the inspection team and examined in accordance with paragraph 8 of Section V of this Protocol, the operability of which has been confirmed in accordance with the procedures provided for in paragraph 1 of Section II of this Annex, in conducting the inspection.
(c) For containers that have not been tampered with, if either the inspection team or the in-country escort determines that all the sets of radiation detection equipment stored in such containers are not operable, the inspection team shall have the right to use an additional set of radiation detection equipment brought to the point of entry by the inspection team in conducting the inspection. In this case, the date and time for the designation of the inspection site and the type of inspection pursuant to paragraph 4 of Section III of this Protocol shall be delayed, if necessary, until the in-country escort has completed its examination of such radiation detection equipment using the procedures provided for in paragraph 2 of Section I of this Annex, and the inspection team has confirmed the operability of such radiation detection equipment in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section II of this Annex. In no case shall such delay exceed 12 hours or require the inspection team to delay the date and time for the designation of the inspection site and type of inspection beyond the time limit specified in paragraph 4 of Section III of this Protocol for the type of inspection being conducted.
(d) If there are no signs that the containers have been tampered with and any set of radiation detection equipment stored in such containers is not operable, the inspecting Party shall return such a set or sets of radiation detection equipment and associated containers to the territory of the inspecting Party. The inspecting Party shall inform the inspected Party of the cause of the malfunction and measures taken to preclude such malfunctions in the future.
(e) If an additional set of radiation detection equipment is brought to the point of entry by the inspection team and is not used in conducting the inspection, such radiation detection equipment shall be stored at the point of entry in tamper-proof containers and removed from the territory of the inspected Party by the inspection team when it leaves the territory of the inspected Party.
(f) In all cases, only one set of radiation detection equipment whose operability has been confirmed in accordance with the procedures provided for in paragraph 1 of Section II of this Annex shall be used during an inspection.

II. Regarding the Use of Radiation Detection Equipment Prior to Measuring the Radiation Level of an Object

1. Before conducting measuring procedures using radiation detection equipment, inspectors and the in-country escort shall have the right to confirm the operability of the radiation detection equipment, using the following procedures:

(a) For radiation detection equipment used pursuant to this paragraph, the counting time of each individual measurement shall be the counting time specified in Sections I, II, and IV of Annex 8 to this Protocol for the neutron detectors in the sets of radiation detection equipment of the United States of America or the Russian Federation, respectively.
(b) The operability of each neutron detector in a set of radiation detection equipment shall be confirmed.
(c) The neutron detector shall be placed in a mutually agreed location.
(d) The inspecting Party shall take two background radiation measurements with the calibration source at least three meters from the neutron detector. If the difference between these two measurements is less than or equal to 30 percent of their average, the average of these measurements shall be recorded as the average background radiation value for the operability check. If the difference between these two background radiation measurements is more than 30 percent of their average, a third background radiation measurement shall be taken. The third background radiation measurement shall be compared with the previously taken background radiation measurement that is closest to the third background radiation measurement. If the difference between the third background radiation measurement and the closest previous background radiation measurement is less than or equal to 30 percent of the average of these two measurements, the average of these two measurements shall be recorded as the average background radiation value for the operability check. Otherwise, the results of all three background radiation measurements shall be recorded and the radiation detection equipment shall not be accepted as operable.
(e) With the neutron detector in the same location used for the background radiation measurements taken in accordance with subparagraph (c) of this paragraph, the inspecting Party shall place the calibration source in contact with the neutron detector at the center of the detector's sensitive area as indicated by the markings on the neutron detector.
(f) The inspecting Party shall take two calibration measurements of the radiation level from the calibration source. The average of these two calibration measurements shall be recorded as the average value of the calibration measurement.
(g) The following values shall be calculated:

(i) the calculated calibration value, which is the difference between the average value of the calibration measurement determined in accordance with subparagraph (f) of this paragraph and the average background radiation value determined in accordance with subparagraph (d) of this paragraph;
(ii) the product of the counting time for each measurement and the equivalent flux of the calibration source, which is a fixed value indicated on the calibration source; and
(iii) the sensitivity of the neutron detector, which is the ratio of the values obtained in accordance with subparagraphs (g)(i) and (g)(ii) of this paragraph.

(h) The radiation detection equipment shall be accepted as operable, provided:

(i) the difference between the two calibration measurements taken in accordance with subparagraph (f) of this paragraph is less than or equal to 30 percent of the average value of the calibration measurement; and
(ii) the difference between the value of the sensitivity of the neutron detector, determined in accordance with subparagraph (g)(iii) of this paragraph, and the laboratory value of the sensitivity of the neutron detector, as recorded on the neutron detector, is less than or equal to 15 percent of the average of these two sensitivity values.

(i) The results of the measurements obtained in accordance with subparagraphs (d) and (f) of this paragraph shall be recorded either in the inspection report or in a form, agreed upon by the Parties, used to record the confirmation of the operability of the radiation detection equipment at the point of entry.

2. At the inspection site, radiation detection equipment shall be used in accordance with the following procedures:

(a) The counting time of each individual measurement shall be the counting time specified in Sections I, II, and IV of Annex 8 to this Protocol for the neutron detectors in the sets of radiation detection equipment of the United States of America or the Russian Federation, respectively.
(b) The inspection team shall have the right to observe the use of the radiation detection equipment to confirm that the procedures provided for in this paragraph are followed.
(c) After arrival at the inspection site, prior to conducting radiation measurements the inspection team shall confirm, in accordance with the procedures provided for in paragraph 1 of this Section, that at least one neutron detector in the set of radiation detection equipment is operable. If the inspection team is unable to confirm the operability of at least one neutron detector, this fact shall be recorded in the inspection report and the inspection shall proceed without the use of radiation detection equipment.
(d) Measurements of radiation levels, in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 of Section III of this Annex, of the object designated by the inspection team for radiation measurements shall be taken at the location selected for that purpose by the in-country escort, using a neutron detector whose operability has been confirmed pursuant to subparagraph (c) of this paragraph.
(e) Background radiation measurements shall be taken by the in-country escort no less than ten meters from the object designated by the inspection team for radiation measurements. Such background radiation measurements shall be taken in accordance with the following procedures:

(i) The inspection team shall identify to the in-country escort the front surface of the neutron detector that will be directed toward the object designated for measurement of the radiation level. The front surface of the neutron detector shall be positioned vertically, at approximately the same height at which measurements on the designated object will be taken.
(ii) Two background radiation measurements shall be taken. The average of these two measurements shall be calculated and recorded in the inspection report as the average background radiation value.
(iii) If the average background radiation value is greater than 450 counts, another location for taking the background radiation measurements shall be selected by the in-country escort. Background radiation measurements shall be taken until an average background radiation value is obtained that is less than 450 counts at a selected location.
(iv) The square root of the average background radiation value shall be calculated to two decimal places and the result multiplied by four. This number shall be added to the average background radiation value and the result shall be rounded up to the higher whole number. This number shall be recorded in the inspection report as the comparison number to be used in paragraph 1 of Section III and paragraphs 7 and 8 of Section IV of this Annex.

III. For Inspections Conducted Pursuant to Paragraph 2, 3, 4 or 12 of Article XI of the Treaty with Respect to Long-Range ALCMs and Containers for Long-Range ALCMs

1. For inspecting long-range ALCMs and containers for long-range ALCMs in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section I, or paragraph 4 or subparagraph 5(c) of Section IV of Annex 4 to this Protocol, the following procedures shall be used:

(a) The inspection team shall select no more than four points along the ALCM or container at which measurements of radiation levels will be taken. A description of the ALCM or container shall be recorded as a diagram in the inspection report. The approximate dimensions of the ALCM or container, and the approximate location of each measurement point, shall be indicated on this diagram.
(b) The in-country escort shall position the neutron detector in a location specified by the inspection team, no less than seven centimeters and no more than two meters from the surface of the ALCM or container, with a maximum permissible deviation from these established distances not to exceed 20 percent, so that the neutron detector is at the same level as the point where the measurement will be taken, with the front surface of the neutron detector facing the point on the ALCM or container where the measurement will be taken.
(c) The in-country escort shall take two measurements of the radiation level at each selected point. The average of the two measurements shall be calculated, and if not a whole number, shall be rounded up to the higher whole number. This average shall be recorded in the inspection report as the average measurement at that point.
(d) If the average measurement of the radiation level at each selected point is less than or equal to the comparison number calculated in accordance with subparagraph 2(e)(iv) of Section II of this Annex, the ALCM or container shall not be subject to further inspection.
(e) If the average measurement of the radiation level at any of the four selected points is greater than the comparison number calculated in accordance with subparagraph 2(e)(iv) of Section II of this Annex, this fact shall be recorded in the inspection report and the ALCM or container shall be subject to further inspection in accordance with subparagraph 4(a)(ii) or subparagraph 4(b)(iii) of Section IV of Annex 4 to this Protocol, as applicable.

2. To confirm, pursuant to paragraph 4 of Section I or subparagraph 5(c) of Section IV of Annex 4 to this Protocol, that a container does not conceal the presence of radiation, the following procedures shall be used:

(a) The inspection team shall select no more than four points on the container wall at which measurements of radiation levels will be taken for the purpose of measuring the radiation shielding effect. A description of the container shall be recorded as a diagram in the inspection report. The approximate dimensions of the container and the approximate location of each measurement point shall be indicated on this diagram.
(b) The in-country escort shall open the container and place the calibration source on its stand inside the container on the longitudinal axis of the container. The in-country escort shall position the neutron detector outside the container in a location specified by the inspection team, no less than seven centimeters and no more than two meters from the surface of the container, with a maximum permissible deviation from established distances not to exceed 20 percent. The calibration source and neutron detector shall be placed on a horizontal straight line that passes through the center of the calibration source and the center of the neutron detector, that lies on a plane perpendicular to the longitudinal axis of the container, and that intersects the wall of the container at the selected point on the container. The distance between the center of the calibration source and the center of the neutron detector shall be recorded in the inspection report. The front surface of the neutron detector shall face the selected point.
(c) The in-country escort shall take two measurements of the radiation level at each selected point on the container. The container shall remain closed during measurements of the radiation level. The average of the two measurements shall be calculated. The average background radiation value, calculated in accordance with subparagraph 2(e)(ii) of Section II of this Annex, shall be subtracted from this average. The result shall be recorded in the inspection report as the net average value of radiation obtained when the calibration source is placed inside the container at that point.
(d) The procedures provided for in subparagraphs (b) and (c) of this paragraph shall be repeated until measurements have been taken at all the points on the container selected by the inspection team, and the results have been recorded in the inspection report.
(e) The calibration source shall be removed from the container and the neutron detector repositioned no less than two meters from the container with its front surface no longer facing the container.
(f) The in-country escort shall position the calibration source in front of the front surface of the neutron detector so that the distance between the front surface of the neutron detector and the calibration source is the same distance, within three percent, as that used for one of the measurements taken pursuant to subparagraph (c) of this paragraph. No objects that could interfere with the flow of neutrons to the neutron detector shall be located near the calibration source or the neutron detector.
(g) The in-country escort shall take two measurements of the radiation level with the calibration source and the neutron detector positioned in accordance with subparagraphs (e) and (f) of this paragraph. The average of the two measurements shall be calculated. The average background radiation value calculated in accordance with subparagraph 2(e)(ii) of Section II of this Annex shall be subtracted from this average. The result shall be recorded in the inspection report as the net average value of radiation obtained when the calibration source is placed outside the container at the distance used pursuant to subparagraph (f) of this paragraph.
(h) The procedures provided for in subparagraphs (f) and (g) of this paragraph shall be repeated for each distance between the calibration source and the neutron detector used for the measurements of the radiation level taken pursuant to subparagraph (c) of this paragraph.
(i) For each point on the container, calculations shall be carried out, in which the net average value of the radiation level obtained pursuant to subparagraph (c) of this paragraph when the calibration source is placed inside the container is divided by the corresponding net average value of the radiation level obtained pursuant to subparagraph (g) of this paragraph when the calibration source is placed outside the container. The division shall be carried out to two decimal places. If the result of the division with respect to any point is less than 0.5, this fact shall be recorded in the inspection report.
(j) For containers of long-range non-nuclear ALCMs of a type for which a notification has been provided in accordance with Section VII of the Notification Protocol, if either the width or the diameter of such containers exceeds 190 centimeters, the Parties shall agree, within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, on procedures for the placement of the neutron detector and the calibration source with respect to such containers.

IV. For Inspections Conducted Pursuant to Paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty

1. For an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty, radiation detection equipment shall be used in accordance with the procedures contained in this Section.

2. The in-country escort shall position, for radiation measurements, an object contained in the front section and declared by the in-country escort to be a non-nuclear object, hereinafter referred to as the inspected object, at a location specified by the in-country escort, at a distance of no less than ten meters from the front section, or shall provide for radiation measurements of the inspected object while it is in the front section. If radiation measurements of the inspected object are taken while it is in the front section, the in-country escort shall have the right to use special shields to prevent neutrons from a reentry vehicle or reentry vehicles remaining on the front section from striking the neutron detector, but which do not interfere with the flow of neutrons from the inspected object to the neutron detector, or to remove the reentry vehicle or reentry vehicles from the front section to a distance of no less than ten meters from the front section. Whichever method is used for the placement of the inspected object for radiation measurements, the in-country escort shall ensure that the procedures for the use of radiation detection equipment, as set forth below, are carried out.

3. The process of removing the inspected object from the front section and moving it to a location where radiation measurements will be taken and the process of removing a reentry vehicle or reentry vehicles from the front section, shall be carried out outside the field of view of inspectors in such a manner as to permit inspectors to ascertain that the inspected object is that same inspected object. Before the inspected object or the reentry vehicle or reentry vehicles are removed from the front section, inspectors shall have the right to view the specially allocated site inside a room or within a portion of the site for viewing the front section, to ascertain that the site does not contain other objects similar to the inspected object. During the entire process of removing the inspected object or the reentry vehicle or reentry vehicles from the front section, the inspectors shall have the right, at their own choice, either to observe all exits of the site to ascertain that no objects that are similar to the inspected object are delivered to that site, or to seal all the exits with seals.

4. The inspection team shall select the point on the inspected object where radiation measurements will be taken. A description of the inspected object shall be recorded as a diagram in the inspection report. The approximate dimensions of the inspected object, determined visually without taking linear measurements, and the approximate location of the measurement point, shall be indicated on this diagram.

5. The in-country escort shall position the neutron detector in a location specified by the inspection team, no less than seven centimeters and no more than two meters from the surface of the inspected object, with a maximum permissible deviation from these established distances not to exceed 20 percent, so that the neutron detector is at the same level as the point where the measurement will be taken, with the front surface of the neutron detector facing the point on the inspected object where the measurement will be taken.

6. The in-country escort shall take two measurements of the radiation level at the selected point. The average of the two measurements shall be calculated, and if not a whole number, shall be rounded up to the higher whole number. This average shall be recorded in the inspection report as the average measurement at that point.

7. If the average measurement of the radiation level at the selected point is less than or equal to the comparison number calculated in accordance with subparagraph 2(e)(iv) of Section II of this Annex, the inspected object is, in fact, a non-nuclear object.

8. If the average measurement of the radiation level at the selected point is greater than the comparison number calculated in accordance with subparagraph 2(e)(iv) of Section II of this Annex, this fact shall be recorded in the inspection report.

Protocol on notifications relating to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms

Pursuant to and in implementation of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties hereby agree upon provisions that establish the procedures for, and the content of, the notifications provided for in Article VIII of the Treaty.

I. Notifications Concerning Data With Respect to Items Subject to the Limitations Provided for in the Treaty, According to Categories of Data Contained in the Memorandum of Understanding and Other Agreed Categories of Data

Each Party shall provide to the other Party, pursuant to subparagraph 3(a) of Article VIII of the Treaty, the following notifications concerning data with respect to items subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty, according to categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding and other agreed categories of data:

(1) notification, no later than 30 days after entry into force of the Treaty, providing data current as of the date of entry into force of the Treaty for each category of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding;

(2) notification, no later than 30 days after the expiration of each six-month period following the entry into force of the Treaty, providing updated data for each category of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding. The first of these six-month periods shall begin the first day of the calendar month following the month in which the Treaty enters into force. Such notification shall include, for each Party, all its data for each category of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding, except that, if the data for Annex D, E, F, G, H, or I have not changed during such six-month period, a statement that no change has occurred in such annex since the previous six-month update notification may be substituted for the data for that annex; |1|

(3) notification, no later than five days after it occurs, of each change in data with respect to items subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty, according to categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding or other agreed categories of data, unless notification of such change has been provided in accordance with another paragraph of this Protocol. Such notification shall include: the change in data, by number and, as applicable, type, category, variant, and version of the items; the location of the items; the date on which such a change occurred; and, for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, the data from the unique identifier. Such notification shall also include the geographic coordinates of the location of the following that relate to the change: except for silo launcher groups, each facility, including any eliminated facility, any facility subject to continuous monitoring, and any monitored facility; each silo launcher of ICBMs; each silo used as a launch control center; each other launch control center; each deployment area; each rail garrison entrance/exit; each fixed test launcher; and each heavy bomber or former heavy bomber converted for use as a ground trainer. Such notification shall further include:

(a) for the loss as the result of an accident of an item accountable under the terms of the Treaty: the approximate or assumed location of the accidental loss; the circumstances related to the loss, if such circumstances are known; and the assumed date of the loss;
(b) for disablement beyond repair of an item accountable under the provisions of the Treaty: the circumstances of the disablement;
(c) for elimination of a silo launcher of ICBMs, silo training launcher, silo test launcher, or soft-site launcher, at which grading is not to be performed, a statement that the date specified is the date of completion of the elimination process for such a launcher;
(d) for new facilities, for new kinds of support equipment, and, as applicable, for new types, categories, variants, and versions of items: a statement that site diagrams for new facilities, and photographs of new kinds of support equipment, and, as applicable, for new types, categories, variants, and versions of items that meet the requirements for site diagrams and photographs set forth in Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding will be provided through diplomatic channels no later than 48 hours after the notification provided for in this paragraph;
(e) for new variants of ICBMs and SLBMs and new versions of mobile launchers of ICBMs, the location for the exhibition or exhibitions conducted pursuant to paragraph 11 of Article XI of the Treaty; and the date for such an exhibition or such exhibitions, which shall be no earlier than 15 days and no later than 30 days after this notification has been provided;

(4) notification, no less than 30 days in advance, of a reduction in the number of warheads attributed to ICBMs at an ICBM base or to SLBMs on ballistic missile submarines at submarine bases. Such notification shall include: the type of ICBM or the type of SLBM to which a reduced number of warheads will be attributed; the reduced number of warheads that will be attributed to deployed ICBMs or deployed SLBMs of that type; the planned date on which the reduced number of warheads is to be attributed to such ICBMs or SLBMs; and the ICBM base for the ICBMs to which the reduced number of warheads will be attributed, or the submarine bases for the ballistic missile submarines for the SLBMs to which the reduced number of warheads will be attributed;

(5) notification, no later than February 1 of each year, of planned changes, as of the end of that calendar year, in the number of deployed strategic offensive arms. Such notification shall include: the planned aggregate number as of the end of that calendar year of deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers by type, deployed SLBMs and their associated launchers by type, and deployed heavy bombers by type and category; the planned number of ICBMs and SLBMs to be converted or eliminated by type; the planned number of ICBM launchers to be converted or eliminated by type; the planned number of SLBM launchers to be converted or eliminated by type; and the planned number of heavy bombers, by type and category, to be converted into heavy bombers of another category or into former heavy bombers, and the planned number of heavy bombers to be eliminated. If the expected number of deployed strategic offensive arms of any type will be greater as of the end of that year than the planned number that was specified in accordance with this paragraph, notification of such expected number of deployed strategic offensive arms as of the end of that year shall be provided no less than 30 days in advance of such a change;

(6) notification containing a request regarding locations within one minute of latitude and longitude of each other, the coordinates of which are provided to the nearest minute, that are considered by the Party receiving data on such locations to have the same appearance. Such notification shall include: the name or designator of the locations; their geographic coordinates; and reasons that the Party considers such locations to have the same appearance;

(7) notification, no later than 15 days after receipt of a request pursuant to paragraph 6 of this Section, regarding locations within one minute of latitude and longitude of each other. Such notification shall include: the name or designator of the requested locations; information permitting the other Party to differentiate between the specified locations, or the geographic coordinates of the locations to include seconds of sufficient accuracy to differentiate between the locations;

(8) notification, no later than 48 hours after it has been completed, of the transfer of items to or from a third State in accordance with a pattern of cooperation existing at the time of signature of the Treaty referred to in Article XVI of the Treaty and the First Agreed Statement in the Annex to the Treaty on Agreed Statements. Such notification shall include: the number and type of items transferred; the date of transfer; and the location of transfer;

(9) notification, no less than 30 days in advance of the exit from a newly constructed facility or a facility for which such items have not been specified in the Memorandum of Understanding, or no less than 30 days in advance of the appearance of an ICBM, SLBM, first stage of an ICBM or SLBM, solid rocket motor for the first stage of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs, mobile launcher of ICBMs, or heavy bomber at such a facility, or no less than 30 days in advance of the date to be specified in the notification of a new facility provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Section, or no less than 30 days in advance of the date to be specified in the notification of the change of category of a facility provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Section, of the existence of a new facility or a change of category of a facility. Such notification shall include: the name of the facility; its function according to the categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding; and its geographic coordinates. Such notification shall not be required if notification was provided in accordance with paragraph 10 of this Section; |2|

(10) notification of the location of a production facility, not previously declared, at which production of ICBMs or SLBMs or first stages of ICBMs or SLBMs is planned, no less than 90 days in advance of the exit from such a facility of the first of the items specified in the notification. Such notification shall include: the name of the production facility; the type of items that will be produced at the facility; the planned date of the exit from the facility of the first of the items that will be produced at the facility; the geographic coordinates of the facility; and, if the production facility is a production facility for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs or first stages of such ICBMs or if the ICBMs or SLBMs or first stages of the ICBMs or SLBMs that will be produced at the facility are as large as or larger than the smallest ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs, a statement that the site diagram of the facility, which meets the requirements for site diagrams specified in Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding, will be provided through diplomatic channels no later than 48 hours after the notification provided for in this paragraph;

(11) notification, no later than five days after excavation begins, of the beginning of construction of a new silo launcher of ICBMs. Such notification shall include: the type of ICBM which the silo launcher under construction will contain; the name of the ICBM base; the geographic coordinates of the silo launcher of ICBMs under construction; and the date on which excavation began;

(12) notification, no later than five days after production has ceased, of the cessation of production of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs or first stages of such ICBMs at a monitored facility. Such notification shall include: the monitored facility and the date on which such production ceased;

(13) notification, no later than 30 days after entry into force of the Treaty, providing the data from the unique identifier for each ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs existing as of the date of entry into force of the Treaty. Such notification shall include: the data from the unique identifier; the restricted area, rail garrison, or other facility at which the ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs is located, or, if the ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs is in transit or relocation, its destination;

(14) notification declaring that ICBMs or SLBMs of a type shall be considered to be ICBMs or SLBMs of a retired type. Such notification shall include: the type, number, and location for each such ICBM or SLBM;

(15) notification, beginning three months after the notification that ICBMs of a type for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall be considered to be ICBMs of a retired type in accordance with paragraph 14 of this Section, and at each three-month period thereafter, of the number and location, by facility, of the retired ICBMs of that type. Such notifications shall continue for as long as the Party has such retired types. In the event that a Party has more than one type of such ICBMs of a retired type, it shall provide notification for all such retired ICBMs no later than the last day of each three-month period that follows the notification of the first retired type of such ICBM;

(16) notification, beginning six months after the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 14 of this Section and at each six-month period thereafter, of the type, number, and location of ICBMs and SLBMs of retired types, other than ICBMs of retired types of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs. Such notifications shall continue for as long as the Party has ICBMs or SLBMs of such retired types. In the event that a Party has more than one type of such ICBMs or SLBMs of a retired type, it shall provide notification for all such retired ICBMs and SLBMs no later than the last day of each six-month period that follows the notification of the first retired type of ICBM or SLBM;

(17) notification, no later than 90 days after entry into force of the Treaty, providing data current as of the date of entry into force of the Treaty for ICBMs and SLBMs of former types. Such notification shall include: the type, number, and location for each such ICBM and SLBM;

(18) notification, no later than 30 days after the expiration of each six-month period following entry into force of the Treaty, providing updated data for ICBMs and SLBMs of former types. The first of these six-month periods shall begin the first day of the calendar month following the month in which the Treaty enters into force. Such notification shall include: the type, number, and location for each such ICBM and SLBM.

(19) notification, no later than five days after the effective date of a change, of the change to the boundary of the facility specified on the site diagram. Such notification shall include: the name and function of the facility; the subtitle, if applicable; the geographic coordinates of the facility; the effective date of the change; the reference to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission document; and a statement that a revised site diagram for the facility and a site diagram of excluded portions of the facility will be provided through diplomatic channels no later than 48 hours after the notification provided for in this paragraph. |3|

II. Notifications Concerning Movement of Items Subject to the Limitations Provided for in the Treaty

Each Party shall provide to the other Party, pursuant to subparagraph 3(b) of Article VIII of the Treaty, the following notifications concerning movement of items subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty:

(1) notification, no later than 48 hours after its completion, of the transit of non-deployed ICBMs and non-deployed SLBMs; launch canisters that remain after flight tests of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs; non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs; and mobile training launchers. Such notification shall include: the number and type of items involved; the facility from which the items departed; the date of departure; the facility at which the items have arrived; the date of arrival; the mode of transport; and, for each ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs, the data from the unique identifier;

(2) notification, no later than eight hours after a visit of a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber has exceeded 24 hours in duration, of the visit of such an airplane to a specified facility for heavy bombers or former heavy bombers or to an eliminated facility. Such notification shall include, for each air base; production facility, repair facility, conversion or elimination facility, or storage facility for heavy bombers or former heavy bombers; heavy bomber flight test center; training facility for heavy bombers; or eliminated facility: the number, by type, category, and, if applicable, variant, of the heavy bombers and former heavy bombers that are visiting; the air base, heavy bomber flight test center, production facility for heavy bombers or former heavy bombers, or training facility for heavy bombers, at which such airplanes are based; the facility such airplanes are visiting; and the date and time of arrival;

(3) notification, no later than 24 hours after departure, of the conclusion of the visit of a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber, notification of which has been provided in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Section. Such notification shall include, for each visited facility: the number, by type, category, and, if applicable, variant, of the heavy bombers and former heavy bombers that have concluded the visit; the facility visited by such airplanes; the air base, heavy bomber flight test center, production facility for heavy bombers or former heavy bombers, or training facility for heavy bombers, at which such airplanes are based; and the date and time of departure;

(4) notification, no less than 24 hours in advance, of the departure of each deployed rail-mobile launcher of ICBMs and its associated missile from a rail garrison for routine movement. Such notification shall include, for each rail garrison: the number of deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles departing from the rail garrison; the rail garrison; and the date of departure;

(5) notification, no less than 24 hours in advance, of the departure of each rail-mobile test launcher from a test range. Such notification shall include: the number of rail-mobile test launchers and the number of launch-associated railcars departing the test range; the test range; and the date of departure;

(6) notification, no later than 24 hours after the return of each deployed rail-mobile launcher of ICBMs and its associated missile to the rail garrison from which it departed, of its return from routine movement. Such notification shall include, for each rail garrison: the number of deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles that have returned to the rail garrison; the rail garrison; and the date of return;

(7) notification, no later than 24 hours after the return, of the return of each rail-mobile test launcher to the test range from which it departed. Such notification shall include: the date of return; and the test range;

(8) notification, no later than 24 hours after the return of a train with rail-mobile test launchers to the test range from which it departed, of any variation from the configuration of the train that was specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 5 of this Section during the time the train was outside the test range. Such notification shall include: the dates on which each variation took place; the portions of the route on which each variation took place; the number of launchers and launch-associated railcars contained in the train during each such variation; and the extraordinary circumstances, which must exist for such a variation from the configuration of the train to take place, that required a variation from the configuration of the train;

(9) notification, no less than 24 hours in advance, of the departure of each deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs and its associated missile from a restricted area, rail garrison, or other facility, for a relocation. Such notification shall include, for each ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs, or for each other facility: the number of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles; the point of departure, or the facility of origin; the destination; and the date of departure;

(10) notification, no later than 48 hours after the arrival of each deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs and its associated missile at its destination, of the completion of the relocation. Such notification shall include, for each ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs or other facility: the number of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles that have relocated; the facility of origin and, if applicable, the point of departure; the date of departure; the facility at which each such launcher and its associated missile has arrived; the date of arrival; the data from the unique identifier for each of the ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs involved in the relocation; and for those portions of the route taken by deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles outside the deployment area, the location, date and time at that location at least once every four days during the relocation;

(11) notification, no later than 18 hours after the beginning of an exercise dispersal, of the beginning of an exercise dispersal of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles. Such notification shall include: the ICBM bases for mobile launchers of ICBMs that are involved in such a dispersal; and the date and time of the beginning of the dispersal;

(12) notification, no later than eight hours after the completion of an exercise dispersal, of the completion of an exercise dispersal of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles. Such notification shall include, for each applicable ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs: the ICBM base; the date and time of the completion of the dispersal; and, for each specific restricted area or for each specific rail garrison of the ICBM base, the number of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles that have not returned to the restricted area or rail garrison. Such notification shall also include:

(a) for each deployed road-mobile launcher of ICBMs and its associated missile that has not returned to the restricted area and to which transportation for inspectors is not provided, the specific facility or the geographic coordinates of the location at which each such mobile launcher of ICBMs and its associated missile is located; and the reason for its location there;
(b) for each deployed rail-mobile launcher of ICBMs and its associated missile that has not returned to the rail garrison, the specific facility or the geographic coordinates of the location at which each such mobile launcher of ICBMs and its associated missile is located; and the reason for its location there;

(13) notification, no less than three hours in advance of the date of a variation from standard configuration of a train with deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles, of such a variation, if such variation will be the result of the departure of the train or of a portion of such a train for the maintenance facility associated with the rail garrison and if the return of that train to standard configuration cannot take place within the 12-hour period provided for the preparation for the implementation of a cooperative measure in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Treaty. Such notification shall include: the ICBM base for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs; the date when such variation will take place; the number of launchers and launch-associated railcars contained in the portion of the train that will depart for the maintenance facility associated with the rail garrison; and the parking site of the train with a variation in the standard configuration, if there is a fixed structure for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs at such a parking site;

(14) notification, no later than 24 hours after the completion of the routine movement or no later than 48 hours after the completion of the relocation, of any variation from the standard configuration of trains with deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles during routine movements and relocations. Such notification shall include: the dates on which each variation took place; the portions of the route on which each variation took place; and the number of launchers and launch-associated railcars contained in the train during each such variation;

(15) notification, no later than 24 hours after the return to standard configuration, of the return to standard configuration of a train with deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles, about which a notification has been provided in accordance with paragraph 13 of this Section. Such notification shall include: the ICBM base for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs; the date on which the return to standard configuration took place; and the parking site of the train that has returned to standard configuration, if there is a fixed structure for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs at such a parking site;

(16) notification, no less than 48 hours in advance of the beginning of a major strategic exercise involving heavy bombers, conducted pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article XIII of the Treaty, of the beginning of such an exercise. Such notification shall include: the air bases for heavy bombers and air bases for former heavy bombers that are involved in the exercise; and the date and time of the beginning of the exercise;

(17) notification, no later than eight hours after the completion of a major strategic exercise involving heavy bombers, about which a notification has been provided in accordance with paragraph 16 of this Section, of the completion of that exercise. Such notification shall include the date and time of the completion of the exercise.

III. Notifications Concerning Data on ICBM and SLBM Throw-weight in Connection with the Throw-weight Protocol

Each Party shall provide to the other Party, pursuant to subparagraph 3(c) of Article VIII of the Treaty, the following notifications concerning data on ICBM and SLBM throw-weight in connection with the Throw-weight Protocol:

(1) notification, no less than seven days in advance of the eighth flight test of an ICBM or SLBM of each new type, of data about that ICBM or SLBM. Such notification shall include: the greatest throw-weight demonstrated in the course of the first seven flight tests; data on the maximum calculated throw-weight that an ICBM of a new type could deliver to distances of 8000; 9000; 10,000; 11,000; and 12,000 kilometers, or that an SLBM of a new type could deliver to distances of 6500; 7500; 8500; 9500; and 10,500 kilometers; and data on the residual propellant for each stage and on the descending ballistic flight path angle at an altitude of 100 kilometers that were used in determining each such value of the maximum calculated throw-weight;

(2) notification, no less than 45 days in advance of each flight test conducted to satisfy the requirements of paragraph 2 of Section II of the Throw-weight Protocol, of data about such a flight test. Such notification shall include: the designation of the type of ICBM or SLBM; the planned date of the flight test; and the launch area and the planned reentry vehicle impact area, specified in accordance with the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles of May 31, 1988;

(3) notification, no later than five days after an ICBM or SLBM of a new type first becomes subject to the limitations provided for in Article II of the Treaty, of data about that ICBM or SLBM. Such notification shall include: the accountable throw-weight; the date on which the flight test with the accountable throw-weight was conducted; the data on the maximum calculated throw-weight that an ICBM or SLBM of the new type could deliver to the distances specified in paragraph 1 of this Section; and data on the residual propellant for each stage and on the descending ballistic flight path angle at an altitude of 100 kilometers that were used in determining each such value of the maximum calculated throw-weight;

(4) notification, no later than five days after the flight test of an ICBM or SLBM during which a throw-weight greater than its accountable throw-weight was demonstrated, of data about that ICBM or SLBM. Such notification shall include: the new value of the accountable throw-weight; and the date on which the flight test with the new value of the accountable throw-weight was conducted. For an ICBM or SLBM of a new type, the notification shall also include data on the maximum calculated throw-weight that an ICBM or SLBM of the new type could deliver to the distances specified in paragraph 1 of this Section; and data on the residual propellant for each stage and on the descending ballistic flight path angle at an altitude of 100 kilometers that were used in determining each such value of the maximum calculated throw-weight; however, if such data has not changed with respect to the data previously declared for that type of missile, this data need not be included, but the number of the earlier notification containing such data shall be specified.

IV. Notifications Concerning Conversion or Elimination of Items Subject to the Limitations Provided for in the Treaty and Elimination of Facilities Subject to the Treaty

Each Party shall provide to the other Party, pursuant to subparagraph 3(d) of Article VIII of the Treaty, the following notifications concerning conversion or elimination of items subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty and elimination of facilities subject to the Treaty:

(1) notification, no less than 30 days in advance of the initiation of the respective processes of conversion or elimination of items, including placement of items on static display, of the intention to carry out the procedures for those processes provided for in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol and in paragraph 7 of Article III of the Treaty. Such notification shall include: the number, and, as applicable, type, category, variant, and version of the item to be converted or eliminated, or placed on static display; for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, the data from the unique identifier; the location of such item; the location at which such processes will take place; the procedures to be carried out; and in each case, the scheduled date of the initiation of such processes;

(2) notification, no later than five days after the initiation of a conversion or elimination process, of the date on which that process began. Such notification shall include: the number of items, and, as applicable, the type, category, variant, and version of each item to be converted or eliminated; for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, the data from the unique identifier; the location for such a process; for each item, the date of the initiation of the process; and the procedures being carried out during the process. Such notification shall not be required if such a process was subjected to inspection;

(3) notification, no less than five days in advance, of the intention to install an ICBM of a different type or a training model of a missile of such different type in a silo launcher of ICBMs if, during the conversion of such silo launcher of ICBMs, the silo door was not removed. Such notification shall include: the type of the ICBM or type of the training model of a missile to be installed in that silo launcher of ICBMs; the location of that silo launcher of ICBMs; and the date on which an ICBM of a different type or a training model of a missile of such different type is to be installed in that silo launcher of ICBMs;

(4) notification, no later than five days after completion, of the completion of:

(a) the elimination of a silo launcher of ICBMs, silo training launcher, silo test launcher, or soft-site launcher, if grading was performed during the process of its elimination. Such notification shall include: location of the eliminated launcher; date of completion of elimination; and, in the case of a silo launcher of ICBMs, silo training launcher, or silo test launcher, the type of ICBM it was associated with;
(b) the elimination of SLBM launchers. Such notification shall include: the number of SLBM launchers eliminated; the type of SLBM; the conversion or elimination facility at which such elimination was carried out; the date of completion of elimination; and the elimination procedures that were carried out;
(c) the elimination of heavy bombers or former heavy bombers. Such notification shall include: by type, category, and variant, the number of heavy bombers, or, by type, the number of former heavy bombers; the conversion or elimination facility at which such elimination was carried out; and the date of completion of elimination;
(d) the conversion of a heavy bomber and of its arrival at a viewing site. Such notification shall include: type, category, and variant of the heavy bomber; the conversion or elimination facility at which such conversion was carried out; the conversion procedures that were carried out; and the date of arrival of the heavy bomber at a viewing site;
(e) the elimination of an ICBM or SLBM, other than an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs. Such notification shall include: the number and type of ICBMs or SLBMs eliminated; the location at which such elimination was carried out; the method of elimination; and the date of completion of the elimination;
(f) procedures associated with making an item a static display. Such notification shall include: the type, and, if applicable, the category and variant of the item for static display; for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, the data from the unique identifier; the date of arrival and the location at which inspection of such an item may take place; and the name and coordinates of the location at which such an item is to be on static display;

(5) notification, no later than five days after completion, of the static testing of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs or the first stage of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs, or if such testing involved the removal of propellant segments by dissection, each time a propellant segment is removed from an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs or from the first stage of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs. Such notification shall include: the ICBM type; the data from the unique identifier; the length of the remaining portion of the stage after segment removal, if static testing was accomplished through dissection; and the location and date of the static testing;

(6) notification, no later than 90 days after entry into force of the Treaty, and no less than 90 days prior to the beginning of each of the six subsequent one-year periods after entry into force of the Treaty, of the annual schedule for conversion or elimination of ICBMs, SLBMs, ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, former heavy bombers, and fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs, subject to the provisions of the Treaty. Such notification shall include: the number and types of such items planned for conversion or elimination during that one-year period; and the planned date of the initiation of the conversion or elimination process of each such item;

(7) notification, no less than 30 days in advance of the initiation of the elimination process for the first ICBM of a particular type of ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs, of data to be used to identify the type of such an ICBM within its launch canister. Such notification shall include: the data to be used for the identification of the type of ICBM, including necessary dimensions; and the proposed methods to be used by the inspectors to identify the type of ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs.

V. Notifications Concerning Cooperative Measures to Enhance the Effectiveness of National Technical Means of Verification

Each Party shall provide to the other Party, pursuant to subparagraph 3(e) of Article VIII of the Treaty, the following notifications concerning cooperative measures to enhance the effectiveness of national technical means of verification:

(1) notification containing a request for a display in the open of road-mobile launchers of ICBMs located within specified restricted areas, rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs located at specified parking sites, or all heavy bombers located within a specified air base. Such notification shall include:

(a) for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, the ICBM base and the restricted areas at that ICBM base at which the display is requested;
(b) for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, the rail garrisons and the parking sites at those rail garrisons at which the display is requested;
(c) for heavy bombers, the air base at which the display is requested.

(2) notification, no later than 12 hours after receipt of a request pursuant to subparagraph 1(c) of this Section, concerning heavy bombers that cannot be displayed on request because they are not readily movable due to maintenance or operations. Such notification shall include: the air base; and the number, type, and category of heavy bombers that are not readily movable due to maintenance or operations;

(3) notification, no later than 12 hours after receipt of a request pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Section, of the cancellation due to circumstances brought about by force majeure of the display in the open of mobile launchers of ICBMs located within specified restricted areas or within specified parking sites or of heavy bombers located at a specified air base. Such notification shall include: the reasons for the cancellation of the display; the facility; and, if possible, the approximate date when conditions will permit a new display;

(4) notification, no later than 24 hours after the exit, of the exit of a ballistic missile submarine from a covered facility in which conversion of its SLBM launchers was carried out. Such notification shall include: the date of exit; the facility where such conversion was carried out; the type of the submarine; and the type of SLBM before and after conversion;

(5) notification containing a request for a display in the open of a special purpose submarine located at a specified port. Such notification shall include the name of the port at which the display is to be conducted.

VI. Notifications Concerning Flight Tests of ICBMs or SLBMs and Notifications Concerning Telemetric Information

Each Party shall provide to the other Party, pursuant to subparagraph 3(f) of Article VIII of the Treaty, the following notifications concerning flight tests of ICBMs or SLBMs and notifications concerning telemetric information:

(1) notification of any flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, including any flight test of a prototype ICBM or SLBM and any flight test of an ICBM or SLBM used for delivering objects into the upper atmosphere or space. Such notification shall be provided in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Notifications of Launches of Inter-continental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles of May 31, 1988. Such notification shall also include: telemetry broadcast frequencies to be used expressed in megahertz to the nearest one megahertz; modulation types; and information as to whether the flight test is to employ encapsulation or encryption pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article X of the Treaty;

(2) notification, no less than 30 days in advance of the demonstration pursuant to subparagraph 4(b) of Section I of the Telemetry Protocol, of the proposed date and place of the demonstration of the tapes or appropriate equipment to play back the telemetric information recorded on those tapes;

(3) notification, following the demonstration provided for in subparagraph 4(a) or 4(b) of Section I of the Telemetry Protocol, of the request for the opportunity to acquire playback equipment pursuant to subparagraph 4(c) of Section I of the Telemetry Protocol;

(4) notification pursuant to paragraph 3 of Section I of the Telemetry Protocol, no later than 60 days after receipt of tapes that contain a recording of telemetric information, of the determination by the Party that has received the tapes of the incompleteness or insufficient quality of telemetric information recorded on the tapes that do not allow for the processing of such information. |4| Such notification shall include: type of ICBM or type of SLBM; date of flight test; tape number; time periods during which incomplete or low quality recordings of telemetric information were received; and a description of the difficulties that arose during the processing of such information;

(5) notification, no less than 30 days in advance of the first flight test after entry into force of the Treaty of an ICBM or SLBM of one existing type on which encryption of telemetric information will be carried out pursuant to subparagraph 2(a) of Section III of the Telemetry Protocol, of the type of ICBM or type of SLBM,

(6) notification containing a request regarding maintenance, training, spare parts, and replacement parts. Such notification shall include, as appropriate: the type of training requested, the number of trainee team members, the location of the training and the proposed date the training would begin; the type of maintenance requested, and the location of the maintenance; the manufacturer's name, model number, and part number, if applicable, of the malfunctioning equipment or its component, and a description of the specific equipment operating problems being experienced, including the results of any diagnostic or corrective maintenance procedures that have been attempted; the manufacturer's name, model number, and part number, if applicable, of the spare parts or replacement parts requested;

(7) notification, no later than 20 days after receipt of a request pursuant to paragraph 6 of this Section. Such notification shall include, as appropriate: the proposed point of entry, the proposed date of arrival of the maintenance team or trainee team at the point of entry, the date the training will begin, the length of the training session, the maintenance team size, the estimated delivery date of the requested spare parts or replacement parts; and the estimated cost of the services to be provided;

(8) notification, no later than 10 days after receipt of a response provided pursuant to paragraph 7 of this Section. Such notification shall include, as appropriate:

(a) acceptance of the proposed point of entry and proposed date of arrival of the team or the delivery of requested spare parts or replacement parts at the point of entry; or
(b) a proposal for an alternate point of entry and an alternate date of arrival of the team or the delivery of requested spare parts or replacement parts at the point of entry; or
(c) cancellation of a request regarding maintenance, training, spare parts, and replacement parts as contained in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 6 of this section. |5|

VII. Notifications Concerning Strategic Offensive Arms of New Types and New Kinds

Each Party shall provide to the other Party, pursuant to subparagraph 3(g) of Article VIII of the Treaty, the following notifications concerning strategic offensive arms of new types and new kinds:

(1) notification, no less than 48 hours in advance, of the planned departure from a production facility of the first prototype ICBM or prototype SLBM. Such notification shall include: the type of prototype ICBM or the type of prototype SLBM; the length and diameter of the prototype ICBM or prototype SLBM; the length and diameter of the first stage of such a prototype ICBM or prototype SLBM; the launch weight and maximum calculated throw-weight that the prototype ICBM could deliver to a distance of 11,000 kilometers or that the prototype SLBM could deliver to a distance of 9500 kilometers; and the name and location of the production facility that will produce the prototype ICBM or the prototype SLBM;

(2) notification, no later than five days after the first flight test of a prototype ICBM of a particular type from a mobile launcher of ICBMs, or after the eighth flight test of a prototype ICBM of the same type from a fixed launcher of ICBMs, or after the exit of the twentieth prototype ICBM of the same type from a production facility, whichever is earlier, of whether ICBMs of that type shall be considered ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs. Such notification shall include: the type of the prototype ICBM; the name and location of the production facility; the basing mode of the new type of ICBM; and, if the prototype is declared to be an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs, data on the technical characteristics of the prototype ICBM according to the categories of data specified in Annex F to the Memorandum of Understanding;

(3) notification of a decision to forego deployment of an ICBM of a new type as an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs, for a new type of ICBM that had been considered to be an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs pursuant to a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Section but that had not been flight-tested from a mobile launcher of ICBMs, and that such an ICBM is not subject to the provisions for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs of the Treaty. Such notification shall include: the type of the ICBM; and the name and location of the production facility;

(4) notification, no later than five days after the twentieth flight test of a prototype ICBM or prototype SLBM of a particular type or the declaration by the developing Party that the ICBM or SLBM of such particular type shall be accountable for the purposes of warhead and throw-weight attribution, or no less than 30 days in advance of the deployment of the first ICBM or SLBM of the same particular type, whichever is earlier, that the prototype ICBM or prototype SLBM shall be considered an ICBM or SLBM of a new type. Such notification shall include: the type of ICBM of the new type or the type of SLBM of the new type; the name and location of the production facility; the data for the ICBM or SLBM of a new type by categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding; if used as the basis for the new type, a statement whether the ICBM or SLBM of the new type differs from an ICBM or SLBM, respectively, of each existing type and previously declared new type in terms of the length of the first stage used for confirming the new type or in terms of the launch weight; the location for the exhibition or exhibitions conducted pursuant to paragraph 11 of Article XI of the Treaty; and the date for such an exhibition or such exhibitions, which shall be no earlier than 15 days and no later than 30 days after this notification has been provided;

(5) notification of the cessation of development of an ICBM or SLBM of a new type and of the intention not to deploy such ICBMs or SLBMs. Such notification shall include: the type of the prototype ICBM or prototype SLBM; the name and location of the production facility that produced the prototype ICBMs or prototype SLBMs; the number of prototype ICBMs or prototype SLBMs in existence; and the elimination facility for the prototype ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs;

(6) notification, no less than 48 hours in advance of the departure, of the departure of a mobile launcher of prototype ICBMs from its production facility. Such notification shall include: the type of the prototype ICBm for which the mobile launcher is intended; the name and location of the production facility; and the date of departure;

(7) notification, no later than five days after the exit, of the exit of the first heavy bomber of a new type from the shop, plant, or building where its assembly was performed. Such notification shall include: the type and the category of the heavy bomber; the name and location of the production facility; and the date of exit;

(8) notification, no later than five days after the arrival, of the arrival of the first heavy bomber of a new type, new category of a type, or new variant of a category and type at the first air base at which any such heavy bomber has begun to be based. Such notification shall include: the type, category, and, if applicable, variant of the heavy bomber; the air base at which the heavy bomber has begun to be based; the date of its initial basing at that air base; the technical data for heavy bombers of the new type, new category of a type, or new variant of a category and type provided for in Annex G to the Memorandum of Understanding; the location for the exhibition pursuant to paragraph 12 of Article XI of the Treaty; and the date for such an exhibition, which shall be no earlier than 15 days and no later than 30 days after such notification has been provided;

(9) notification, at the choice of the developing Party, either no later than five days after the exit, of the exit of the first long-range nuclear ALCM of a new type from the production facility; or no less than six months in advance of the arrival, of the arrival of the first long-range nuclear ALCM of a new type at the first air base for heavy bombers at which it is to be located. Such notification shall include: the type of long-range nuclear ALCM; and either the date of exit of that first long-range nuclear ALCM of the new type from the production facility, or the planned date of the arrival of that first long-range nuclear ALCM of the new type at the first air base for heavy bombers, whichever is applicable;

(10) notification, no later than five days after the flight test, of the flight test of a long-range nuclear ALCM from a bomber of a type, from none of which a long-range nuclear ALCM has previously been flight-tested. Such notification shall include: the type of heavy bomber from which the long-range nuclear ALCM has been first flight-tested; the date of the flight test; the heavy bomber technical data provided for in Annex G to the Memorandum of Understanding; the location for the exhibition pursuant to paragraph 12 of Article XI of the Treaty; and the date for such an exhibition, which shall be no earlier than 15 days and no later than 30 days after such notification has been provided;

(11) notification, no later than 48 hours after the arrival, of the arrival of the first long-range nuclear ALCM of a new type at the first air base for heavy bombers. Such notification shall include: the type of long-range nuclear ALCM; the date of arrival; the technical data for a long-range nuclear ALCM of the new type provided for in the Memorandum of Understanding; the location for the exhibition of a long-range nuclear ALCM of the new type; and the date for such an exhibition, which shall be no earlier than 15 days and no later than 30 days after such notification has been provided;

(12) notification, at the choice of the developing Party, either no later than five days after the exit, of the exit of the first long-range non-nuclear ALCM of a new type from the production facility; or, if a long-range non-nuclear ALCM of a new type has not been previously exhibited, no less than six months in advance of the arrival, of the arrival of the first long-range non-nuclear ALCM of the new type at the first air base for heavy bombers at which it is to be located. Such notification shall include: the type of long-range non-nuclear ALCM; either the date of exit of that first long-range non-nuclear ALCM of the new type from the production facility, or the planned date of the arrival of that first long-range non-nuclear ALCM of the new type at the first air base for heavy bombers at which it is to be located, whichever is applicable; and the features that make a long-range non-nuclear ALCM of the new type distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs. No later than 48 hours after such notification has been provided, one photograph of such a long-range non-nuclear ALCM shall be provided through diplomatic channels. The long-range non-nuclear ALCM shown in such photograph may be covered to the extent provided for in paragraph 5 of Section I of Annex 4 to the Inspection Protocol;

(13) notification, if a long-range non-nuclear ALCM of a new type has not been previously exhibited, no less than 60 days in advance of the arrival, of the arrival of the first long-range non-nuclear ALCM of the new type at the first air base for heavy bombers at which it is to be located. Such notification shall include: the type of long-range non-nuclear ALCM; the planned date of the arrival of the first long-range non-nuclear ALCM of the new type at the first air base for heavy bombers at which it is to be located; the location for the exhibition of a long-range non-nuclear ALCM of the new type to demonstrate the features that make such a long-range non-nuclear ALCM distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs; and the date for such an exhibition, which shall be no earlier than 15 days and no later than 30 days after such notification has been provided;

(14) notification, if a long-range non-nuclear ALCM of a new type has not been previously exhibited, no less than 30 days in advance of the flight test, of the first flight test of a long-range non-nuclear ALCM of the new type from an airplane of a type, from none of which a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested. Such notification shall include: the type of long-range non-nuclear ALCM; if a heavy bomber will be used to conduct the flight test, the type of heavy bomber; the planned date of the flight test; the features that make a long-range non-nuclear ALCM of the new type distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs; the location for the exhibition of a long-range non-nuclear ALCM of the new type to demonstrate such features; and the date for such an exhibition, which shall be no earlier than 15 days and no later than 30 days after such notification has been provided. No later than 48 hours after such notification has been provided, one photograph of such a long-range non-nuclear ALCM shall be provided through diplomatic channels. The long-range non-nuclear ALCM shown in such photograph may be covered to the extent provided for in paragraph 5 of Section I of Annex 4 to the Inspection Protocol;

(15) notification, if a long-range non-nuclear ALCM of a new type has not been previously exhibited, no less than 30 days in advance of the flight test, of the first flight test of a long-range non-nuclear ALCM of the new type armed with two or more weapons. Such notification shall include: the type of long-range non-nuclear ALCM; if a heavy bomber will be used to conduct the flight test, the type of heavy bomber; the planned date of the flight test; the features that make such a long-range non-nuclear ALCM of the new type distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs; the location for the exhibition of a long-range non-nuclear ALCM of the new type to demonstrate such features; and the date for such an exhibition, which shall be no earlier than 15 days and no later than 30 days after such notification has been provided. No later than 48 hours after such notification has been provided, one photograph of such a long-range non-nuclear ALCM shall be provided through diplomatic channels. The long-range non-nuclear ALCM shown in such photograph may be covered to the extent provided for in paragraph 5 of Section I of Annex 4 to the Inspection Protocol;

(16) notification of the development of a new kind of strategic offensive arm, no later than 30 days after the first flight test of such an arm, unless issues concerning such an arm have been raised earlier within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. Such notification shall include: a description of the new kind of strategic offensive arm; and the date of its first flight test.

VIII. Notifications Concerning Changes in the Content of Information Provided Pursuant to Article VIII of the Treaty, Including the Rescheduling of Activities

Each Party shall provide to the other Party, pursuant to subparagraph 3(h) of Article VIII of the Treaty, the following notifications concerning changes in the content of information provided pursuant to that Article, including the rescheduling of activities:

(1) notification, no less than 12 hours in advance of the scheduled date of the initiation of the activity, of a change to information specified in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 4, 5, or 9 of Section II of this Protocol. Such notification shall include: the number of the earlier notification; and the changed information. If the change in the scheduled date specified in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 4, 5, or 9 of Section II of this Protocol is more than four days, an additional notification shall be provided specifying the new scheduled date, subject to the same conditions as the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 4, 5, or 9 of Section II of this Protocol;

(2) notification, no less than five days in advance of the scheduled date of the initiation of the activity, of a change in the information specified in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section IV of this Protocol. Such notification shall include: the number of the earlier notification; and the new information. As an exception to the requirement to provide such notification five days in advance, such notification shall be provided no later than 12 hours after the date specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section IV of this Protocol if the following conditions are met: the change in the scheduled date results from a delay in the initiation of the activity, and the inspected Party determines, less than five days before the scheduled date or on that date, that a delay will occur. Regardless of when the delay in the initiation of the activity occurred, if the change in the scheduled date is more than five days, an additional notification shall be provided specifying the new scheduled date, subject to the same conditions as the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section IV of this Protocol. |6|

If there is a delay in an activity specified in an advance notification provided in accordance with a paragraph of this Protocol other than paragraph 4, 5, or 9 of Section II, paragraph 1 of Section IV, or paragraph 1 of Section VI and if that delay exceeds twice the amount of time in advance that is required for such notification, an additional notification shall be provided, subject to the same conditions as the original notification.

IX. Notifications Concerning Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities

Each Party shall provide to the other Party, pursuant to subparagraph 3(i) of Article VIII of the Treaty, notifications concerning inspections and continuous monitoring activities provided for in Section III of the Inspection Protocol.

X. Notifications Concerning Operational Dispersals

Each Party shall provide to the other Party, pursuant to subparagraph 3(j) of Article VIII of the Treaty, the following notifications concerning operational dispersals:

(1) notification, no later than 18 hours after the dispersal begins, of the beginning of the operational dispersal. Such notification shall include: the date and time of the beginning of the operational dispersal; and the reasons for the operational dispersal;

(2) notification of the completion of the operational dispersal. Such notification shall include: the date and time of the completion of the operational dispersal;

(3) notification of the suspension, pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article XIV of the Treaty, of the obligation to provide notifications, to carry out cooperative measures, and to allow inspections during the operational dispersal. Such notification shall include: the notifications, inspections, and cooperative measures that are temporarily suspended; and the date on which such suspension began;

(4) notification, before the time specified in paragraph 2 of this Section, of the resumption of the obligation to provide notifications, to carry out cooperative measures, and to allow inspections that had been suspended in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Section. Such notification shall include: the specific notifications, inspections, and cooperative measures that will resume; and the date of such resumption;

(5) notification, by a Party that suspended notifications during the operational dispersal pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article XIV of the Treaty, no later than three days after the date specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 2 or 4 of this Section, providing either:

(a) that Party's data updated for each category of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding; and the notifications of incomplete movements that would have been provided pursuant to the provisions of this Protocol but for the temporary suspension of the obligation to provide such notifications; or
(b) all the notifications that should have been provided but for the temporary suspension of the obligation to provide such notifications;

(6) notification, by a Party that suspended notifications during the operational dispersal pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article XIV of the Treaty and elected to provide updated data in accordance with subparagraph 5(a) of this Section, no later than three days after the date specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 2 or 4 of this Section, providing all the notifications that would have been provided in accordance with Sections III, VI, and VII of this Protocol but for the temporary suspension of the obligation to provide such notifications;

(7) notification, no later than three days after the date and time specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Section, of the location of all heavy bombers that were not located at their air bases as of such date and time. Such notification shall also include, for each heavy bomber that was not located at its air base: the specific air base to which the heavy bomber had not returned; and the name of the airfield within national territory, or the general location outside national territory, where such a heavy bomber was located.

Done at Moscow on July 31, 1991, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the United States of America:
George Bush
President of the United States of America

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
M. Gorbachev
President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Annex 1
Releasability of information contained in notifications |1|

I. Prohibitions

1. Each Party undertakes not to release to the public the original language texts of any notifications provided pursuant to the Treaty that are transmitted by any other Party.

2. Each Party undertakes not to release to the public the information contained in the notifications provided pursuant to the Treaty except as otherwise provided for in this Annex.

3. Each Party undertakes not to release to the public the information contained in the notifications provided pursuant to the Treaty that are listed in Section III of this Annex for three months after the end of the activities described in such notifications. Thereafter, except as provided for in paragraphs 5 and 6 of this Section, each Party shall have the right to release the information contained in such notifications.

4. Each Party undertakes not to release to the public the information contained in the notifications provided pursuant to the Treaty that are listed in Section IV of this Annex for three months after the end of the activities described in such notifications. Thereafter, except as provided for in paragraphs 5 and 6 of this Section, each Party shall have the right to release the information contained in such notifications unless that Party is notified by the Party that provided the information in fulfilling its obligations provided for in the Treaty that the information contained in such notifications shall not be released to the public for a period of time as the Party that provided the information in fulfilling its obligations provided for in the Treaty may prescribe or until further notice.

5. Each Party undertakes not to release to the public the name or passport number of any person contained in any notification provided pursuant to the Treaty.

6. Each Party undertakes not to release to the public the geographic coordinates of any facility or other location contained in any notification provided pursuant to the Treaty.

7. The provisions of this Annex shall not affect the rights and obligations of the Parties with respect to the communication of certain information contained in notifications provided pursuant to the Treaty to those individuals who, because of their official responsibilities, require such information to carry out activities related to the fulfillment of the obligations provided for in the Treaty.

8. The Parties shall agree within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission on the releasability of information contained in the notifications that may be additionally provided for by the Parties to be used in implementing the Treaty, before such notifications are used.

II. Non-Releasable Information

Release of the information contained in the notifications listed below shall be governed by paragraph 2 of Section I of this Annex:

4. NOTIFICATION OF CHANGE IN DATA IN THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, DUE TO ACCIDENTAL LOSS OF A TREATY ACCOUNTABLE ITEM

5. NOTIFICATION OF CHANGE IN DATA IN THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, DUE TO DISABLEMENT BEYOND REPAIR OF A TREATY ACCOUNTABLE ITEM

20. NOTIFICATION OF DATA FROM UNIQUE IDENTIFIERS FOR ICBMS FOR MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS

36. NOTIFICATION OF VARIATION FROM CONFIGURATION OF TRAIN WITH RAIL-MOBILE TEST LAUNCHERS WHILE TRAIN IS LOCATED OUTSIDE THE TEST RANGE

70. NOTIFICATION CONTAINING A REQUEST FOR DISPLAY IN THE OPEN OF ROAD-MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS

71. NOTIFICATION CONTAINING A REQUEST FOR DISPLAY IN THE OPEN OF RAIL-MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS

72. NOTIFICATION CONTAINING A REQUEST FOR DISPLAY IN THE OPEN OF HEAVY BOMBERS

73. NOTIFICATION OF INABILITY TO DISPLAY HEAVY BOMBERS THAT ARE NOT READILY MOVEABLE DUE TO MAINTENANCE OR OPERATIONS

74. NOTIFICATION OF CANCELLATION OF DISPLAY IN THE OPEN DUE TO FORCE MAJEURE CIRCUMSTANCES

76. NOTIFICATION CONTAINING A REQUEST FOR DISPLAY IN THE OPEN OF SPECIAL PURPOSE SUBMARINE

77. NOTIFICATION OF INABILITY TO DISPLAY SPECIAL PURPOSE SUBMARINE IN THE OPEN BECAUSE THE SUBMARINE IS NOT IN PORT

78. NOTIFICATION OF FLIGHT TEST OF AN ICBM OR SLBM

81. NOTIFICATION OF INCOMPLETENESS OR INSUFFICIENT QUALITY OF TELEMETRIC INFORMATION RECORDED ON TAPES

130. NOTIFICATION OF OBJECTION TO INSPECTORS, MONITORS OR AIRCREW MEMBERS WHO ARE CURRENTLY ON LIST OF INSPECTORS, MONITORS, OR AIRCREW MEMBERS

135. NOTIFICATION OF JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION - REQUEST FOR MEETING

136. NOTIFICATION OF JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION - REPLY TO REQUEST FOR MEETING

137. NOTIFICATION OF JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION - OTHER MESSAGES

138. NOTIFICATION OF JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION - REQUEST TO CONVENE A SPECIAL SESSION

139. NOTIFICATION OF JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION - RESPONSE TO REQUEST TO CONVENE SPECIAL SESSION

140. NOTIFICATION OF JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION - REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RELATED TO SPECIAL SESSION

141. NOTIFICATION OF JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION - RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RELATED TO SPECIAL SESSION

151. NOTIFICATION OF THE DETERMINATION OF AGREED GEOGRAPHIC COORDINATES OF A REFERENCE POINT AT A POINT OF ENTRY

152. NOTIFICATION OF THE INTENTION TO CHANGE A REFERENCE POINT FOR SATELLITE SYSTEM RECEIVERS AT A POINT OF ENTRY |2|

153. NOTIFICATION OF CHANGE TO THE BOUNDARY OF A FACILITY, SPECIFIED ON A SITE DIAGRAM |3|

III. Information Releasable After Three Months

Release of the information contained in the notifications listed below shall be governed by paragraph 3 of Section I of this Annex:

1. NOTIFICATION OF DATA IN THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, CURRENT AS OF ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE TREATY

2. NOTIFICATION OF UPDATED DATA IN THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, AFTER THE EXPIRATION OF EACH SIX-MONTH PERIOD

3. NOTIFICATION OF CHANGE IN DATA IN THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, UNLESS ANOTHER NOTIFICATION OF SUCH CHANGE HAS BEEN PROVIDED

6. NOTIFICATION OF CHANGE IN DATA IN THE MEMORANDUM OF

UNDERSTANDING, RELATED TO ELIMINATION OF SILO LAUNCHER OF ICBMS, SILO TRAINING LAUNCHER, SILO TEST LAUNCHER, OR SOFT-SITE LAUNCHER, AT WHICH GRADING IS NOT TO BE PERFORMED

7. NOTIFICATION OF CHANGE IN DATA IN THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, WITH REGARD TO NEW FACILITIES, FACILITIES WHOSE CATEGORY HAS BEEN CHANGED, NEW KINDS OF SUPPORT EQUIPMENT, AND NEW TYPES, CATEGORIES, VARIANTS, AND VERSIONS OF TREATY ACCOUNTABLE ITEMS |4|

8. NOTIFICATION OF CHANGE IN DATA IN THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING: EXHIBITIONS OF NEW VARIANTS OF ICBMS AND SLBMS, AND NEW VERSIONS OF MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS

9. NOTIFICATION OF CHANGE IN THE DATA IN MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, RELATED TO ELIMINATION OF A DECLARED FACILITY

10. NOTIFICATION OF REDUCTION IN NUMBER OF WARHEADS ATTRIBUTED TO A DEPLOYED ICBM OR SLBM

11. NOTIFICATION OF PLANNED AGGREGATE NUMBER AND CHANGES OF DEPLOYED STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

12. NOTIFICATION OF EXPECTED NUMBER OF DEPLOYED STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IN EXCESS OF PREVIOUSLY NOTIFIED PLANNED NUMBER

13. NOTIFICATION CONTAINING A REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION OF LOCATIONS WITHIN ONE MINUTE OF LATITUDE AND LONGITUDE OF EACH OTHER

14. NOTIFICATION CONTAINING A RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION OF LOCATIONS WITHIN ONE MINUTE OF LATITUDE AND LONGITUDE OF EACH OTHER

16. NOTIFICATION CONTAINING A DECLARATION OF THE EXISTENCE OF A NEW FACILITY OR CHANGE IN CATEGORY OF A FACILITY

17. NOTIFICATION OF LOCATION OF A PRODUCTION FACILITY NOT PREVIOUSLY DECLARED AT WHICH PRODUCTION OF ICBMS OR SLBMS OR FIRST STAGES OF ICBMS OR SLBMS IS PLANNED

18. NOTIFICATION OF BEGINNING OF CONSTRUCTION OF A NEW SILO LAUNCHER OF ICBMS

19. NOTIFICATION OF CESSATION OF PRODUCTION OF ICBMS FOR MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS OR FIRST STAGES OF SUCH ICBMS AT A MONITORED FACILITY

21. NOTIFICATION THAT ICBMS OR SLBMS OF A TYPE ARE CONSIDERED ICBMS OR SLBMS OF A RETIRED TYPE

22. NOTIFICATION OF TYPE, NUMBER AND LOCATION OF ICBMS OF A TYPE FOR MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS, WHICH ARE ICBMS OF A RETIRED TYPE

23. NOTIFICATION OF TYPE, NUMBER AND LOCATION OF ICBMS AND SLBMS OF RETIRED TYPES, OTHER THAN ICBMS FOR MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS

24. NOTIFICATION OF TYPE, NUMBER AND LOCATION OF ICBMS AND SLBMS OF FORMER TYPES

25. NOTIFICATION OF UPDATED DATA CONCERNING TYPE, NUMBER AND LOCATION OF ICBMS AND SLBMS OF FORMER TYPES

26. NOTIFICATION OF COMPLETION OF TRANSIT OF NON-DEPLOYED ICBMS AND SLBMS

27. NOTIFICATION OF COMPLETION OF TRANSIT OF LAUNCH CANISTERS THAT REMAIN AFTER FLIGHT TESTS OF ICBMS FOR MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS

28. NOTIFICATION OF COMPLETION OF TRANSIT OF NON-DEPLOYED MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS

29. NOTIFICATION OF COMPLETION OF TRANSIT OF MOBILE TRAINING LAUNCHERS

30. NOTIFICATION OF VISIT OF HEAVY BOMBER OR FORMER HEAVY BOMBER TO A SPECIFIED FACILITY OR ELIMINATED FACILITY WHEN VISIT EXCEEDS 24 HOURS

31. NOTIFICATION OF CONCLUSION OF VISIT OF HEAVY BOMBER OR FORMER HEAVY BOMBER TO A SPECIFIED FACILITY OR ELIMINATED FACILITY WHEN VISIT EXCEEDS 24 HOURS

46. NOTIFICATION OF THROW-WEIGHT DATA FOR AN ICBM OF A NEW TYPE

47. NOTIFICATION OF THROW-WEIGHT DATA FOR AN SLBM OF A NEW TYPE

49. NOTIFICATION OF THROW-WEIGHT DATA FOR AN ICBM OF A NEW TYPE SUBJECT TO LIMITATIONS PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLE II OF THE TREATY

50. NOTIFICATION OF THROW-WEIGHT DATA FOR AN SLBM OF A NEW TYPE SUBJECT TO LIMITATIONS PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLE II OF THE TREATY

51. NOTIFICATION OF INCREASE IN ACCOUNTABLE THROW-WEIGHT OF AN ICBM

52. NOTIFICATION OF INCREASE IN ACCOUNTABLE THROW-WEIGHT OF AN SLBM

53. NOTIFICATION OF INTENTION TO PERFORM A CONVERSION

54. NOTIFICATION OF INTENTION TO PERFORM AN ELIMINATION

55. NOTIFICATION OF INTENTION TO PLACE AN ITEM ON STATIC DISPLAY

56. NOTIFICATION OF INITIATION OF A CONVERSION PROCESS NOT SUBJECTED TO INSPECTION

57. NOTIFICATION OF INITIATION OF AN ELIMINATION PROCESS NOT SUBJECTED TO INSPECTION

58. NOTIFICATION OF INTENTION TO INSTALL ICBM OF A DIFFERENT TYPE, OR TRAINING MODEL OF A MISSILE OF A DIFFERENT TYPE IN A SILO LAUNCHER OF ICBMS

59. NOTIFICATION OF COMPLETION OF ELIMINATION OF A SILO LAUNCHER OF ICBMS, SILO TRAINING LAUNCHER, SILO TEST LAUNCHER OR A SOFT-SITE LAUNCHER

60. NOTIFICATION OF COMPLETION OF ELIMINATION OF SLBM LAUNCHERS

61. NOTIFICATION OF COMPLETION OF ELIMINATION OF HEAVY BOMBERS OR FORMER HEAVY BOMBERS

62. NOTIFICATION OF PLANNED DATE OF ARRIVAL OF CONVERTED HEAVY BOMBER AT THE VIEWING SITE

63. NOTIFICATION OF COMPLETION OF CONVERSION OF A HEAVY BOMBER AND ITS ARRIVAL AT THE VIEWING SITE

64. NOTIFICATION OF COMPLETION OF ELIMINATION OF ICBM OR SLBM OTHER THAN AN ICBM FOR MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS

65. NOTIFICATION OF COMPLETION OF PROCEDURES ASSOCIATED WITH PLACING AN ITEM ON STATIC DISPLAY

66. NOTIFICATION OF STATIC TESTING OF ICBM FOR MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS OR ITS FIRST STAGE

67. NOTIFICATION OF REMOVAL OF PROPELLANT SEGMENTS FROM ICBM FOR MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS OR ITS FIRST STAGE

68. NOTIFICATION OF ANNUAL SCHEDULE FOR CONVERSION AND ELIMINATION

69. NOTIFICATION OF INITIATION OF ELIMINATION PROCESS FOR THE FIRST ICBM OF A PARTICULAR TYPE OF ICBM FOR MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS

75. NOTIFICATION OF EXIT OF BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINE FROM COVERED FACILITY AFTER COMPLETION OF SLBM LAUNCHER CONVERSION

79. NOTIFICATION OF PROPOSED DATE AND PLACE OF DEMONSTRATION OF TELEMETRY TAPES OR APPROPRIATE EQUIPMENT TO PLAY BACK TELEMETRIC INFORMATION RECORDED ON THOSE TAPES

80. NOTIFICATION CONTAINING REQUEST FOR OPPORTUNITY TO ACQUIRE PLAYBACK EQUIPMENT

83. NOTIFICATION OF PLANNED DEPARTURE FROM A PRODUCTION FACILITY OF THE FIRST PROTOTYPE ICBM OR SLBM

84. NOTIFICATION OF BASING MODE OF NEW TYPE OF ICBM

85. NOTIFICATION OF DECISION TO FORGO DEPLOYMENT OF AN ICBM OF A NEW TYPE AS AN ICBM FOR MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS

86. NOTIFICATION THAT PROTOTYPE ICBM OR SLBM SHALL BE CONSIDERED TO BE A NEW TYPE

87. NOTIFICATION OF CESSATION OF DEVELOPMENT OF AN ICBM OR SLBM OF A NEW TYPE AND INTENTION NOT TO DEPLOY SUCH ICBMS OR SLBMS

88. NOTIFICATION OF DEPARTURE OF MOBILE LAUNCHER OF PROTOTYPE ICBMS FROM ITS PRODUCTION FACILITY

89. NOTIFICATION OF EXIT OF FIRST HEAVY BOMBER OF A NEW TYPE FROM THE SHOP, PLANT OR BUILDING WHERE ITS ASSEMBLY WAS PERFORMED

90. NOTIFICATION OF ARRIVAL OF THE FIRST HEAVY BOMBER OF A NEW TYPE, CATEGORY, OR VARIANT AT THE FIRST AIR BASE AT WHICH ANY SUCH HEAVY BOMBER HAS BEGUN TO BE BASED

91. NOTIFICATION OF EXIT OF FIRST LONG-RANGE NUCLEAR ALCM OF A NEW TYPE FROM A PRODUCTION FACILITY

92. NOTIFICATION OF PLANNED ARRIVAL OF FIRST LONG-RANGE NUCLEAR ALCM OF A NEW TYPE AT THE FIRST AIR BASE FOR HEAVY BOMBERS AT WHICH IT WILL BE LOCATED

93. NOTIFICATION OF FIRST FLIGHT TEST OF A LONG-RANGE NUCLEAR ALCM FROM A BOMBER OF A TYPE FROM NONE OF WHICH A LONG-RANGE NUCLEAR ALCM HAS PREVIOUSLY BEEN FLIGHT-TESTED

94. NOTIFICATION OF ARRIVAL OF FIRST LONG-RANGE NUCLEAR ALCM OF A NEW TYPE AT THE FIRST AIR BASE FOR HEAVY BOMBERS

95. NOTIFICATION OF EXIT OF FIRST LONG-RANGE NON-NUCLEAR ALCM OF A NEW TYPE FROM THE PRODUCTION FACILITY

96. NOTIFICATION OF PLANNED ARRIVAL OF FIRST LONG-RANGE NON-NUCLEAR ALCM OF A NEW TYPE AT THE FIRST AIR BASE FOR HEAVY BOMBERS AT WHICH IT WILL BE LOCATED SIX MONTHS IN ADVANCE OF SUCH ARRIVAL

97. NOTIFICATION OF PLANNED ARRIVAL OF FIRST LONG-RANGE NON-NUCLEAR ALCM OF A NEW TYPE AT THE FIRST AIR BASE FOR HEAVY BOMBERS AT WHICH IT WILL BE LOCATED 60 DAYS IN ADVANCE OF SUCH ARRIVAL

98. NOTIFICATION OF FIRST FLIGHT TEST OF A LONG-RANGE NON-NUCLEAR ALCM OF A NEW TYPE FROM AN AIRPLANE OF A TYPE FROM NONE OF WHICH A LONG-RANGE NUCLEAR ALCM HAS BEEN FLIGHT-TESTED

99. NOTIFICATION OF FIRST FLIGHT TEST OF A LONG-RANGE NON-NUCLEAR ALCM OF A NEW TYPE ARMED WITH TWO OR MORE WEAPONS

104. NOTIFICATION OF CHANGE IN INFORMATION REGARDING THE INTENTION TO PERFORM A CONVERSION

105. NOTIFICATION OF CHANGE IN INFORMATION REGARDING THE INTENTION TO PERFORM AN ELIMINATION

106. NOTIFICATION OF CHANGE IN INFORMATION REGARDING THE INTENTION TO PLACE AN ITEM ON STATIC DISPLAY

111. NOTIFICATION OF UPDATED DATA FOR EACH CATEGORY OF DATA CONTAINED IN THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, AFTER RESUMPTION OF OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE NOTIFICATIONS THAT WERE SUSPENDED RELATED TO AN OPERATIONAL DISPERSAL

112. NOTIFICATION OF THE PROVISION OF ALL NOTIFICATIONS THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN PROVIDED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS III, VI, AND VII OF THE NOTIFICATIONS PROTOCOL IF THERE HAD

NOT BEEN A TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF THE OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE SUCH NOTIFICATIONS

114. NOTIFICATION CONTAINING THE INITIAL LISTS OF INSPECTORS, MONITORS, AND AIRCREW MEMBERS

115. NOTIFICATION OF STANDING DIPLOMATIC CLEARANCE NUMBER FOR INSPECTION AIRPLANES

116. NOTIFICATION OF INTENTION TO CONDUCT INSPECTION PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, OR 10 OF ARTICLE XI OF THE TREATY

117. NOTIFICATION OF INTENTION TO CONDUCT INSPECTION PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 8, 9, 11, 12, OR 13 OF ARTICLE XI OF THE TREATY

118. NOTIFICATION OF INTENTION TO REPLACE INSPECTORS CONDUCTING A CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION INSPECTION

119. NOTIFICATION OF INTENTION TO ESTABLISH A PERIMETER AND PORTAL CONTINUOUS MONITORING SYSTEM AT A FACILITY SUBJECT TO CONTINUOUS MONITORING AND OF INTENTION TO CONDUCT AN ENGINEERING SITE SURVEY AT SUCH A FACILITY

120. NOTIFICATION OF COMMENCEMENT OF CONTINUOUS MONITORING AT A FACILITY AND THE INITIAL ARRIVAL OF MONITORS AT THE FACILITY

121. NOTIFICATION CONTAINING A REQUEST FOR LOGISTIC SUPPORT FOR A FACILITY SUBJECT TO CONTINUOUS MONITORING

122. NOTIFICATION OF INTENTION TO ENTER TERRITORY TO ESTABLISH PERIMETER AND PORTAL CONTINUOUS MONITORING SYSTEM AT A FACILITY

123. NOTIFICATION OF INTENTION TO ENTER TERRITORY TO REPLACE MONITORS

124. NOTIFICATION OF INTENTION TO ENTER TERRITORY TO MAINTAIN PERIMETER AND PORTAL CONTINUOUS MONITORING SYSTEM AT A FACILITY OR FACILITIES

125. NOTIFICATION OF INTENTION TO USE AN INSPECTION AIRPLANE FOR THE TRANSPORTATION OF CARGO

126. NOTIFICATION OF CONFIRMATION OF INTENTION TO USE INSPECTION AIRPLANE FOR TRANSPORTATION OF CARGO

127. NOTIFICATION CONTAINING RESPONSE TO REQUEST TO LAND INSPECTION AIRPLANE AT AIRPORT ASSOCIATED WITH FACILITY SUBJECT TO CONTINUOUS MONITORING

128. NOTIFICATION OF AMENDMENTS TO LISTS OF INSPECTORS, MONITORS, AND AIRCREW MEMBERS

131. NOTIFICATION CONTAINING THE AGREED LIST OF INSPECTORS, MONITORS, AND AIRCREW MEMBERS

132. NOTIFICATION CONTAINING FLIGHT PLAN INFORMATION FOR INSPECTION AIRPLANE

133. NOTIFICATION OF FLIGHT PLAN APPROVAL FOR INSPECTION AIRPLANE

134. NOTIFICATION OF INTENTION TO CONDUCT A SPECIAL START FLIGHT

145. NOTIFICATION OF PLANNED EXIT FROM A MONITORED FACILITY OF THE FIRST ICBM, SLBM, OR FIRST STAGE OF SUCH AN ICBM OR SLBM NOT SUBJECT TO NUMERICAL LIMITS ON NON-DEPLOYED MISSILES

146. NOTIFICATION OF INTENTION TO CONDUCT CARGO EXAMINATION AT LOCATION OTHER THAN A FACILITY SUBJECT TO CONTINUOUS MONITORING OR MONITORED FACILITY

147. NOTIFICATION OF CHANGE TO A FLIGHT ROUTE

148. NOTIFICATION CONTAINING A REQUEST REGARDING TRAINING, MAINTENANCE, SPARE PARTS, AND REPLACEMENT PARTS FOR TELEMETRY EQUIPMENT

149. NOTIFICATION CONTAINING A RESPONSE TO A REQUEST REGARDING TRAINING, MAINTENANCE, SPARE PARTS, AND REPLACEMENT PARTS FOR TELEMETRY EQUIPMENT

150. NOTIFICATION OF ACCEPTANCE OF OR CHANGE TO THE PROPOSED POINT OF ENTRY, AND PROPOSED DATE OF ARRIVAL OF THE TEAM OR OF THE DELIVERY OF SPARE PARTS OR REPLACEMENT PARTS AT THE POINT OF ENTRY, OR CANCELLATION OF A REQUEST REGARDING TELEMETRY EQUIPMENT |5|

IV. Information Releasable After Three Months In Accordance with Paragraph 4 of Section I of this Annex

Release of the information contained in the notifications listed below shall be governed by paragraph 4 of Section I of this Annex:

15. NOTIFICATION OF TRANSFER OF ITEMS TO OR FROM A THIRD STATE

32. NOTIFICATION OF DEPARTURE OF EACH DEPLOYED RAIL-MOBILE LAUNCHER OF ICBMS AND ITS ASSOCIATED MISSILE FROM A RAIL GARRISON FOR ROUTINE MOVEMENT

33. NOTIFICATION OF DEPARTURE OF EACH RAIL-MOBILE TEST LAUNCHER FROM A TEST RANGE

34. NOTIFICATION OF RETURN OF EACH DEPLOYED RAIL-MOBILE LAUNCHER OF ICBMS AND ITS ASSOCIATED MISSILE TO THE RAIL GARRISON FROM WHICH IT DEPARTED AFTER ROUTINE MOVEMENT

35. NOTIFICATION OF RETURN OF EACH RAIL-MOBILE TEST LAUNCHER TO THE TEST RANGE FROM WHICH IT DEPARTED

37. NOTIFICATION OF DEPARTURE OF EACH DEPLOYED MOBILE LAUNCHER OF ICBMS AND ITS ASSOCIATED MISSILE FOR RELOCATION

38. NOTIFICATION OF COMPLETION OF RELOCATION OF A DEPLOYED MOBILE LAUNCHER OF ICBMS AND ITS ASSOCIATED MISSILE

39. NOTIFICATION OF BEGINNING OF EXERCISE DISPERSAL OF DEPLOYED MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS AND THEIR ASSOCIATED MISSILES

40. NOTIFICATION OF COMPLETION OF EXERCISE DISPERSAL OF DEPLOYED MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS AND THEIR ASSOCIATED MISSILES

41. NOTIFICATION OF VARIATION FROM THE STANDARD CONFIGURATION OF A TRAIN UPON DEPARTURE OF DEPLOYED RAIL-MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS AND THEIR ASSOCIATED MISSILES FROM A RAIL GARRISON FOR THE ASSOCIATED MAINTENANCE FACILITY

42. NOTIFICATION OF VARIATION FROM THE STANDARD CONFIGURATION OF TRAINS WITH DEPLOYED RAIL-MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS AND THEIR ASSOCIATED MISSILES DURING ROUTINE MOVEMENTS OR RELOCATIONS

43. NOTIFICATION OF RETURN TO STANDARD CONFIGURATION OF A TRAIN WITH DEPLOYED RAIL-MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS AND THEIR ASSOCIATED MISSILES

44. NOTIFICATION OF BEGINNING OF MAJOR STRATEGIC EXERCISE INVOLVING HEAVY BOMBERS

45. NOTIFICATION OF COMPLETION OF MAJOR STRATEGIC EXERCISE INVOLVING HEAVY BOMBERS

48. NOTIFICATION OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF FLIGHT TEST TO DETERMINE BALLISTIC MISSILE THROW-WEIGHT

82. NOTIFICATION OF FIRST FLIGHT TEST OF AN ICBM OR SLBM OF ONE EXISTING TYPE ON WHICH ENCRYPTION OF TELEMETRIC INFORMATION WILL BE CARRIED OUT

100. NOTIFICATION OF DEVELOPMENT OF NEW KIND OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARM

101. NOTIFICATION OF CHANGE IN INFORMATION REGARDING THE DEPARTURE OF EACH DEPLOYED RAIL-MOBILE LAUNCHER OF ICBMS AND ITS ASSOCIATED MISSILE FROM A RAIL GARRISON FOR ROUTINE MOVEMENT

102. NOTIFICATION OF CHANGE IN INFORMATION REGARDING THE DEPARTURE OF EACH RAIL-MOBILE TEST LAUNCHER FROM A TEST RANGE

103. NOTIFICATION OF CHANGE IN INFORMATION REGARDING THE DEPARTURE OF EACH DEPLOYED MOBILE LAUNCHER OF ICBMS AND ITS ASSOCIATED MISSILE FOR RELOCATION

107. NOTIFICATION OF BEGINNING OF OPERATIONAL DISPERSAL

108. NOTIFICATION OF COMPLETION OF OPERATIONAL DISPERSAL

109. NOTIFICATION OF SUSPENSION OF OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE NOTIFICATIONS, TO CARRY OUT COOPERATIVE MEASURES, AND TO ALLOW INSPECTIONS DURING AN OPERATIONAL DISPERSAL

110. NOTIFICATION OF RESUMPTION OF OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE NOTIFICATIONS, TO CARRY OUT COOPERATIVE MEASURES, AND TO ALLOW INSPECTIONS WHICH HAD BEEN SUSPENDED IN CONNECTION WITH AN OPERATIONAL DISPERSAL

113. NOTIFICATION OF LOCATIONS OF ALL HEAVY BOMBERS THAT WERE NOT LOCATED AT THEIR AIR BASES AT THE COMPLETION OF THE OPERATIONAL DISPERSAL

129. NOTIFICATION OF AGREEMENT WITH OR OBJECTION TO PROPOSED INSPECTORS, MONITORS, OR AIRCREW MEMBERS

142. NOTIFICATION CONTAINING A REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION OF A NOTIFICATION

143. NOTIFICATION CONTAINING CLARIFICATION, CORRECTION, OR MODIFICATION OF A NOTIFICATION

144. NOTIFICATION OF ADDITIONAL START MESSAGE

Protocol on ICBM and SLBM throw-weight relating to the treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms

Pursuant to and in implementation of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties hereby agree upon procedures governing the determination and accountability of ICBM and SLBM throw-weight.

I. Determination and Accountability of ICBM and SLBM Throw-weight

1. The throw-weight demonstrated in a flight test of an ICBM or SLBM shall be:

(a) for an ICBM or SLBM the final stage of which executes a procedure for dispensing reentry vehicles, the aggregate weight of that stage including its propellant and elements not separated from the stage, at the time at which the first release of a reentry vehicle or penetration aid occurs, and its payload;
(b) for an ICBM or SLBM that is not an ICBM or SLBM the final stage of which executes a procedure for dispensing reentry vehicles, the weight of the payload of the final stage or final stages.

2. For each ICBM or SLBM of an existing type, the accountable throw-weight shall be the greatest throw-weight demonstrated in flight tests of an ICBM or SLBM of that type.

3. For each ICBM or SLBM of a new type, the accountable throw-weight shall be the greatest throw-weight demonstrated in flight tests of an ICBM or SLBM of that type, which shall be determined subject to the following provisions:

(a) The greatest throw-weight demonstrated in flight tests of an ICBM or SLBM of a new type shall be no less than the maximum calculated throw-weight that an ICBM or SLBM of that type could deliver to a distance of 11,000 kilometers for ICBMs, or to a distance of 9500 kilometers for SLBMs.
(b) None of the first seven flight tests shall be taken into account in determining the greatest throw-weight demonstrated in flight tests of an ICBM or SLBM of a new type unless the throw-weight demonstrated in such a flight test exceeds the greatest throw-weight demonstrated in subsequent flight tests by more than 20 percent or 250 kilograms, whichever is less, prior to an ICBM or SLBM of that type becoming subject to the limitations provided for in Article II of the Treaty.

4. The maximum calculated throw-weight that an ICBM or SLBM of a new type could deliver to a particular distance shall be calculated by the Party developing such a missile using its own methods of calculation, subject to the following conditions:

(a) the distance to which the throw-weight is delivered shall be measured along the projection of the missile's flight trajectory on the Earth's surface between the launch point and the point that a reentry vehicle that is released immediately after termination of the main engine thrust of the final stage is projected to impact the Earth;
(b) a spherical, non-rotating Earth;
(c) a vacuum ballistic trajectory for the reentry vehicle;
(d) a full propellant load for each stage; and
(e) the residual propellant in each stage shall not be greater than one percent for solid-propellant ICBMs or SLBMs, or two percent for liquid-propellant ICBMs or SLBMs.

5. Each Party undertakes not to increase the accountable throw-weight of an ICBM or SLBM of an existing type, as determined in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Section, by more than 21 percent of its initial accountable throw-weight.

6. Notifications concerning data on throw-weight of ICBMs or SLBMs in connection with this Protocol shall be provided in accordance with Section III of the Notification Protocol. Throw-weight values, measured in kilograms, shall be specified to the nearest value evenly divisible by 50.

7. In the event of a dispute concerning the initial value of accountable throw-weight of an ICBM or SLBM of a new type, or an increased value of accountable throw-weight of an ICBM or SLBM of an existing or new type, specified in a notification provided in accordance with Section III of the Notification Protocol, the accountable throw-weight shall be the value specified in such notification until such dispute is resolved in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

II. Verification

1. Verification of compliance with provisions of this Protocol shall be by national technical means of verification.

2. To facilitate verification, for an ICBM and SLBM of each new type, two preannounced flight tests shall be conducted either in the 12-month period prior to an ICBM or SLBM of that type becoming subject to the limitations provided for in Article II of the Treaty, or from among the last five flight tests prior to an ICBM or SLBM of that type becoming subject to the limitations provided for in Article II of the Treaty.

3. No more than one pre-announced flight test of an ICBM or SLBM shall be conducted pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Section in any 30-day period.

Done at Moscow on July 31, 1991, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the United States of America:
George Bush
President of the United States of America

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
M. Gorbachev
President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Protocol on telemetric information relating to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms

Pursuant to and in implementation of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties hereby agree upon provisions and procedures associated with the fulfillment of obligations concerning telemetric information pursuant to Article X of the Treaty.

I. Provision of Tapes that Contain a Recording of Telemetric Information

1. Pursuant to paragraphs 4 and 6 of Article X of the Treaty, the Party conducting the flight test shall provide through diplomatic channels, no later than 65 days after the flight test of an ICBM or SLBM: |1|

(a) tapes that contain a recording of all telemetric information broadcast during the flight test;
(b) tapes that contain a recording of all telemetric information that is encapsulated, if such tapes are recovered; and
(c) a summary for each tape provided in accordance with subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph, including the following:

(i) type of ICBM or SLBM, date of flight test, tape number, recorder type, and recording speed (meters/second or inches/second);
(ii) information for each track, including track number, record period, record mode, and broadcast frequency (megahertz), except for track numbers for each tape, and each portion of a tape, that contain a recording of telemetric information that has been encrypted |2|;
(iii) digital data encoding methods employed and digital data recording formats, except that the provisions of this subparagraph shall not apply to each tape, and each portion of a tape, that contain a recording of telemetric information that has been encrypted; and |3|
(iv) identifications, and explanations where possible, keyed to a time standard, of the periods during the flight test for which no ape recordings were obtained or for which tape recordings are of inferior quality.

2. The Party conducting the flight test shall determine the method of recording the telemetric information on the tapes.

3. If the Party that receives the tapes that contain a recording of telemetric information determines that such tapes do not contain the complete set of telemetric information or that their quality is insufficient for processing such information, that Party shall provide notification thereof in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section VI of the Notification Protocol. No later than 45 days after its receipt, the Party receiving such notification shall provide through diplomatic channels either a statement explaining the reasons for the incompleteness or insufficient quality of the recording of telemetric information or, if possible, new copies of the tapes. |4|

4. In order to make it possible for the other Party to play back tapes that contain a recording of telemetric information, each Party shall:

(a) conduct, no later than 120 days after signature of the Treaty, an initial demonstration of the tapes being used, and of the appropriate equipment for playing back the telemetric information recorded on such tapes;
(b) conduct a demonstration of tapes or appropriate playback equipment that are different from the tapes or equipment previously demonstrated. Such demonstration shall be conducted no less than 30 days in advance of the first flight test of an ICBM or SLBM during which such tapes or equipment that are different are to be used. Notification of the date and place of such demonstration shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section VI of the Notification Protocol. If the recording format is the only difference in the tape that contains a recording of telemetric information, and this difference does not require different playback equipment, a Party shall provide, through diplomatic channels, only information describing the format, no less than 60 days in advance of the flight test specified in this subparagraph; and
(c) if requested, provide the opportunity to acquire the appropriate equipment to play back the telemetric information that is contained on the tapes no less than 30 days in advance of the receipt of such tapes, unless otherwise agreed. Notification containing such a request shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section VI of the Notification Protocol. Equipment acquired following the initial demonstration, conducted pursuant to subparagraph 4(a) of this Section, shall be acquired in accordance with the provisions of Annex 1 to this Protocol. |5| Equipment acquired following a demonstration, conducted after entry into force of the Treaty pursuant to subparagraph 4(b) of this Section, shall be acquired in accordance with the provisions of Annex 5 to this Protocol. |6|
(d) if requested, in accordance with paragraph 6 of Section VI of the Notification Protocol, ensure the timely provision of training, maintenance, spare parts, and replacement parts for equipment acquired pursuant to this paragraph or pursuant to paragraph 1 or paragraph 2 of Section I of Annex 1 to this Protocol. Provision of training, maintenance, spare parts, and replacement parts shall be in accordance with Annex 4 to this Protocol. |7|

The Parties shall agree within the frame-work of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission on the procedures for the demonstrations provided for in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph.

II. Provision of Data Associated with the Analysis of Telemetric Information

1. Pursuant to paragraph 5 of Article X of the Treaty, the Party conducting the flight test shall provide, through diplomatic channels, no later than 65 days after each flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, the following interpretive data: |8|

(a) for all telemetric information that is broadcast, except for telemetric information that originates in and is broadcast from a reentry vehicle, a description of the format of the telemetry frame and methods of encoding, including but not limited to:

(i) bits per standard word;
(ii) standard words per frame;
(iii) frames per second;
(iv) location of synchronization words or bits;
(v) location of information in the frame describing its formatting;
(vi) designation and location of each data element within the frame throughout the flight and, if a given word location is time-shared by two or more data elements, the structure for such time-sharing;
(vii) method of representing each data element, including the location of each bit in each data element, the order of the bits from least significant to most significant, and the method for representing negative values; and
(viii) all information regarding encoding algorithms, including error detection and correction, data compression, and any conversion processes that are applied in the telemetry equipment to on-board measured parameter values prior to their broadcast; and

(b) names of parameters and their locations in the telemetry frame, as well as conversion factors or analytic expressions for converting telemetric information to physical values of parameters, only for telemetric information necessary to determine:

(i) acceleration of the stages and the self-contained dispensing mechanism of the ICBM or SLBM;
(ii) separation times of the stages and the self-contained dispensing mechanism of the ICBM or SLBM; and
(iii) times of reentry vehicle separation commands and times of reentry vehicle releases.

2. No later than 65 days after each flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, the Party conducting the flight test shall provide, through diplomatic channels, a missile acceleration profile, for all its stages and its self-contained dispensing mechanism, having a precision better than one-tenth of a meter per second squared, with a rate of no less than five times per second, with these data provided relative to an inertial frame of reference in a three-dimensional Cartesian coordinate system. |9| The missile acceleration profile shall be calculated on the basis of all relevant on-board and external measurements made during the flight test. In those cases when it is not possible to ensure the precision provided for in this paragraph, the Party conducting the flight test shall provide such a profile calculated to the greatest possible precision.

3. No later than 120 days after signature of the Treaty, each Party shall provide through diplomatic channels or during demonstrations provided for in paragraph 4 of Section I of this Protocol, an example illustrative of the interpretive data and missile acceleration profile specified in paragraphs 1 and 2, respectively, of this Section for one of the following ICBMs or SLBMs:

(a) for the United States of America: Peacekeeper, Minuteman III, Trident I, or Trident II; and
(b) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: SS-18, SS-24, SS-25, or SS-N-23.

The Parties shall agree within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission on the content of the interpretive data and missile acceleration profile specified in this paragraph.

III. Provisions Concerning Encapsulation and Encryption of Telemetric Information

1. Encapsulation provided for in paragraph 6 of Article X of the Treaty, shall be conducted subject to the following:

(a) Encapsulation shall be applied only to reentry vehicle measurements made during the plasma phase of flight tests of ICBMs or SLBMs. Notwithstanding this provision, reentry vehicle measurements may be encapsulated throughout each flight test of the missile designated by the United States of America as Minuteman II.
(b) When possible, the Party conducting the flight test shall broadcast, from the same reentry vehicle on which data are encapsulated, all measurements made before and after the plasma phase and, when possible, that Party shall broadcast, following the plasma phase, some measurements made and recorded during the plasma phase. The obligation to broadcast measurements made after the plasma phase shall not apply when impact of the reentry vehicle occurs during conditions of plasma formation.

2. Encryption provided for in paragraph 6 of Article X of the Treaty, shall be carried out subject to the following:

(a) Encryption shall be used only during flight tests of ICBMs or SLBMs of former and retired types, as well as during no more than two flight tests each year of an ICBM or SLBM of only one existing type of each Party. The Party that exercises the right to use encryption during flight tests of an ICBM or SLBM of such existing type shall provide the notification in accordance with paragraph 5 of Section VI of the Notification Protocol. Subsequent notifications shall be provided only when the ICBM or SLBM, the notification of which has previously been provided, is retired.
(b) Only telemetric information that pertains to the front section or its elements shall be encrypted, and only after that front section or its elements have separated from either:

(i) the self-contained dispensing mechanism, during a flight test of an ICBM or SLBM; or
(ii) the final stage, during a flight test of an ICBM or SLBM that is not equipped with a self-contained dispensing mechanism.

(c) Each Party undertakes not to encrypt telemetric information that pertains to the functioning of the stages or the self-contained dispensing mechanism of an ICBM or SLBM.

IV. Provisional Application

1. Beginning from the date of signature of the Treaty, the provisions of paragraph 3 of Section VI of the Notification Protocol, subparagraph 4(a) of Section I and paragraph 3 of Section II of this Protocol shall apply provisionally.

2. The provisions specified in paragraph 1 of this Section shall apply provisionally for a 12-month period, unless, before the expiration of this period:

(a) a Party communicates to the other Party its decision to terminate the provisional application of any such provisions; or
(b) the Treaty enters into force.

The Parties may agree to extend the provisional application of these provisions for additional periods, subject to the same conditions specified in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph.

3. The provisions specified in paragraph 1 of this Section shall apply provisionally in light of and in conformity with the other provisions of the Treaty.

Done at Moscow on July 31, 1991, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the United States of America:
George Bush
President of the United States of America

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
M. Gorbachev
President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Annex 1
Provision and installation of equipment necessary for and equipment related to playback of telemetric information that is contained on tapes |1|

I. Provision of Equipment

1. The United States of America and the Russian Federation shall provide to each other the equipment necessary for playback of telemetric information that is contained on tapes provided by the Parties pursuant to paragraphs 4 and 6 of Article X of the Treaty. The quantity, description, make, and model number of such equipment are listed in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Section III of this Annex.

2. In addition to the equipment specified in paragraph 2 of Section III of this Annex, the United States of America shall, as a matter of goodwill, provide to the Russian Federation the equipment related to playback of telemetric information that is contained on tapes provided pursuant to paragraphs 4 and 6 of Article X of the Treaty. The quantity, description, make, and model number of such equipment are listed in paragraph 3 of Section III of this Annex.

3. The United States of America shall, in response to the request by the Russian Federation of September 25, 1992, and pursuant to subparagraph 4(c) of Section I of this Protocol, provide to the Russian Federation the equipment necessary for playback of telemetric information that was demonstrated on August 17, 1992, in Washington, D.C., pursuant to subparagraph 4(b) of Section I of this Protocol. The quantity, description, make, and model number of that equipment are listed in paragraph 4 of Section III of this Annex. The Russian Federation shall, in response to the request by the United States of America on January 28, 1992, and pursuant to subparagraph 4(c) of Section I of this Protocol, provide to the United States of America the equipment necessary for playback of telemetric information that was demonstrated on January 25-27, 1993, in Moscow pursuant to subparagraph 4(b) of Section I of this Protocol. The quantity, description, make, and model number of that equipment are listed in paragraph 5 of Section III of this Annex. The equipment specified in paragraph 4 of Section III of this Annex shall be delivered and installed at the same time as the telemetry playback equipment specified in paragraphs 2 and 3 of Section III of this Annex, and shall be subject to the provisions of Section II of this Annex. The equipment specified in paragraph 5 of Section III of this Annex shall be delivered and installed at the same time as the telemetry playback equipment specified in paragraph 1 of Section III of this Annex, and shall be subject to the provisions of this Annex. |2|

4. For the equipment provided pursuant to paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of this Section, the providing Party shall provide all technical documentation necessary for operating and maintaining such equipment. There shall be no requirement to provide such documentation in a language other than that of the providing Party.

5. For the equipment provided pursuant to paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of this Section, the providing Party shall:

(a) Install such equipment at a site selected, and prepared for installation in accordance with the technical requirements for such equipment, by the receiving Party; and
(b) ensure that the equipment is operating in accordance with the specifications of the technical documentation, exclusive of any warranty obligations noted therein.

6. The providing Party shall bear the cost of fulfilling its obligations pursuant to paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of this Section.

7. The providing Party shall, if requested by the receiving Party, ensure the provision of training, maintenance, service, spare parts, and replacement parts for all equipment provided pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Section. The receiving Party shall bear the cost of such training, maintenance, service, spare parts, and replacement parts.

8. Unless otherwise agreed, each Party undertakes not to transfer equipment, spare parts, or replacement parts, or to release technical documentation, received pursuant to this Section, to states other than the other Parties, or to individuals other than those who, because of their official responsibilities, require access to such equipment, spare parts, replacement parts, or technical documentation to carry out activities related to fulfillment of the obligations provided for in the Treaty.

II. Delivery and Installation of Equipment

1. Regarding dates of delivery and installation:

(a) No later than ten days after the date this Annex begins to be applied, the providing Party shall provide a list of special technical requirements for site selection or preparation to the receiving Party.
(b) No later than 60 days after the date this Annex begins to be applied, the providing Party shall deliver its equipment to the point of entry on the territory of the receiving Party. Specific dates of delivery and installation of such equipment shall be agreed upon by the providing and receiving Parties through diplomatic channels.
(c) No less than 20 days in advance of delivery, the receiving Party shall state to the providing Party, through diplomatic channels, the site where such equipment is to be installed.

2. Regarding delivery from the point of entry, the receiving Party shall bear responsibility for delivery, and safe-keeping during delivery, of provided equipment from the point of entry to the site where such equipment is to be installed. The receiving Party shall bear the cost of such delivery. The providing Party shall have the right to observe the provided equipment during such delivery.

3. Regarding the number and list of installation team members and the provision of visas:

(a) A team for installation of equipment provided pursuant to Section I of this Annex shall include no more than 17 individuals. |3| The installation team shall have the right to bring tools and equipment required for installation. The aircrew for delivery of all such equipment and for transport of the installation team shall include no more than 15 individuals.
(b) The providing Party shall provide a list of installation team members and a list of aircrew members no less than 30 days in advance of their arrival in the territory of the receiving Party. The provisions of paragraph 6 of Section II of the Inspection Protocol on objections to an individual on the list of inspectors shall apply to an objection to an individual installation team member or aircrew member, except that the receiving Party shall notify its objection no later than 15 days after receipt of such lists.
(c) The receiving Party shall provide visas and, where necessary, such other documents to each individual to whom it has not objected, as may be required to ensure that each such team member and each aircrew member may enter and remain in its territory for the duration of the delivery and installation period.
(d) The providing Party shall provide a list of tools and equipment required for installation no less than 30 days in advance of their delivery to the territory of the receiving Party. The provisions of paragraphs 8 and 11 of Section V of the Inspection Protocol on examination of equipment and supplies shall apply to examination of such tools and equipment.

4. Regarding the installation team:

(a) The receiving Party shall provide necessary assistance, including a safety briefing and the appropriate power supply connectors for the provided equipment, to the installation team in connection with the delivery and installation of the equipment.
(b) The provisions of paragraph 11 of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol on movement, travel, and urgent departure or emergency evacuation of inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members shall apply to installation team members and aircrew members.
(c) Throughout the delivery and installation period, the receiving Party shall ensure that the installation team can be in communication with the embassy of the providing Party located on the territory of the receiving Party, using telephonic communications provided by the receiving Party.
(d) The receiving Party shall treat with due respect the installation team and aircrew members of the providing Party in its territory in connection with the delivery and installation of equipment, and shall take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on the person, freedom, and dignity of such persons.

5. Regarding arrangements for air transportation:

(a) Diplomatic clearance numbers for airplanes transporting the equipment, the installation team, and the tools and equipment required for installation, and airplane flight routes to and from the point of entry, shall be provided by the receiving Party no less than ten days prior to delivery.
(b) For the purposes of this paragraph, points of entry shall be: for the United States of America, Washington, D.C.; and for the Russian Federation, Moscow.
(c) The providing Party shall use only airplanes of the types specified in Annex 10 to the Inspection Protocol.
(d) The receiving Party shall provide parking, security protection, fueling, air navigation, airport facility, and ground technical and commercial services, as well as additional services as requested, for the dedicated airplane transporting the telemetry equipment of the providing Party at the point of entry. The cost of parking and security protection for each such airplane shall be borne by the receiving Party. The cost of fueling and air navigation, airport facility, and ground technical and commercial services, as well as additional services as requested, shall be borne by the providing Party.
(e) The providing Party shall state its intention, through diplomatic channels, to transport installation team members and equipment no less than 72 hours in advance of the estimated time of arrival of the installation team members at the point of entry from outside the territory of the receiving Party. Such statement shall include:

(i) the date and estimated time of arrival at the point of entry; and
(ii) the names, dates of birth, and places of birth of the installation team members and aircrew members.

(f) The provisions of paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of Section IV of the Inspection Protocol on flights of inspection airplanes shall apply to flights of airplanes transporting installation team members and equipment.

6. Regarding the installation report and confidentiality requirements:

(a) Before departing the installation site, the installation team leader and a representative of the receiving Party shall confirm in a factual written installation report that all the equipment is installed and is operating in accordance with the specifications of the technical documentation.
(b) Disclosure of information obtained by any Party in connection with the delivery and installation of equipment shall be only in accordance with paragraph 6 of Article VIII of the Treaty.
(c) Installation team members shall not disclose information obtained during delivery or installation except with the express consent of the receiving party.

7. For the United States of America, practical implementation of activities pursuant to this Annex shall be carried out through the On-Site Inspection Agency of the United States of America. For the Russian Federation, practical implementation of activities pursuant to this Annex shall be carried out through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center of the Russian Federation.

8. Regarding additional services, throughout the in-country period, the receiving Party shall provide meals, lodging, work space, transportation, and, as necessary, medical and other urgent services for the installation team and aircrew members of the providing Party. Costs of all such services shall be borne by the receiving Party.

III. Quantity, Description, Make, and Model Number of Equipment

1. Equipment provided by the Russian Federation pursuant to paragraph 1 of Section I of this Annex:

(a) 1 Modulator/Demodulator unit (including synchronization converter, information input unit, demodulator and playback unit, synchronizer and demodulator unit, frequency multiplier, signal imitator, and sound playback unit), BY 3 430 020;
(b) 2 Magnetic tape recorders (including recording heads unit, playback heads unit, playback unit, control unit and tape transport mechanism), BY 3 060 032;
(c) 1 Power supply distributor, BY 3 620 054; and
(d) 1 Set interconnecting cables, BY 4 075 133.

2. Equipment provided by the United States of America pursuant to paragraph 1 of Section 2 of this Annex:

(a) 1 Analog tape recorder/playback unit (including I reproduce card for demodulation of IRIG Time Code at 900 KHz, Metrum 97; and
(b) 1 Time code reader/generator, Datum 9310.

3. Equipment provided by the United States of America pursuant to paragraph 2 of Section I of this Annex:

(a) 1 Telemetry receiver (including 1 Pre-D multi-frequency playback converter, heterodyne, Microdyne 1481-PP*), Microdyne 1400-MR*;
(b) 1 (each) Second IF filter (4, 2, 1 MHz and 300 KHz), Microdyne 1433-I*, 1430-I*, 1428-I*, 1425-I*;
(c) 1 FM demodulator, Microdyne 1444-D*;
(d) 1 Multi-mode telemetry demodulator, Microdyne 1458-D*
(e) 1 Bit syncoronizer, Loral Data Systems 720;
(f) 1 Low pass filter, Reactel 10L5-50KB11; and
(g) 1 Set interconnecting cables.

*This equipment is an updated version of that demonstrated by the United States of America and is fully capable of serving as a substitute.

4. Equipment provided by the United States of America pursuant to paragraph 3 of Section I of this Annex:

(a) 1 Video cassette recorder, Panasonic AG-1960;
(b) 1 Color video monitor/receiver, RCA FX 209002;
(c) 1 Device for decoding and display of time code signals, Datum 9520;
(d) 1 Set cable connectors; and
(e) 1 Set voltage transformers and adaptors.

5. Equipment provided by the Russian Federation pursuant to paragraph 3 of Section I of this Annex:

(a) 17S06/17S07 Magnetic recording unit for the RTS-9 System, consisting of:

(i) 2 Magnetic recorder units (including playback preamplifier unit, 17B73; tape drive mechanism unit, 17B74; and magnetic recorder on/off unit, 17B75), 17B71;
(ii) 2 Recording amplifier units, 17B77;
(iii) 1 Final playback amplifier unit 17B76;
(iv) 1 Magnetic recorder switcher unit, 17B78;
(v) 1 Magnetic recorder testing and control unit, 17B79;
(vi) 1 Power supply unit, 9198M1;
(vii) 1 Poser supply unit, 9187M1;
(viii) 1 Combination unit for reel storage; and
(ix) 1 Set of interconnecting cables.

(b) MR BI1.700.006 Magnetic recorder for the BRS-4LR System, consisting of:

(i) 1 Magnetic accumulator (including recording head unit, playback head unit, tape drive mechanism, control unit for two magnetic accumulators, recording modules for two magnetic accumulators, playback modules, and power modules), MN1-BI3.060.011;
(ii) 1 Magnetic accumulator (including recording head unit, playback head unit, and tape drive mechanism), MN2-BI3.060.012;
(iii) 1 Power distribution panel, BY3.620.054; and
(iv) 1 Set of interconnecting cables. |4|

Annex 2
Provision of tapes and data associated with the analysis of telemetric information, and the use of recording media |1|

1. With respect to subparagraph 1(a) and 1(b) of Section I of the Telemetry Protocol, the Party conducting the flight test shall have the right to provide either original tapes or copies of original tapes. All tapes shall be provided on reels that are compatible with the playback equipment provided.

2. With respect to paragraph 2 of Section I of the Telemetry Protocol, each Party shall have the right to use recording media other than magnetic tapes to record telemetric information. Appropriate changes to Section I of the Telemetry Protocol, if necessary, shall be agreed within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

3. With respect to paragraph 1 of Section II of the Telemetry Protocol, a Party may, in fulfilling its obligation to provide interpretive data for a particular flight test, provide references to interpretive data that have been provided previously pursuant to that paragraph. In the event changes are made to the interpretive data previously provided, the Party that conducted the flight test shall, if requested by the receiving Party, provide a complete set of interpretive data through diplomatic channels no later than 30 days after receipt of such a request.

4. With respect to subparagraph 1(b)(i) of Section II of the Telemetry Protocol, the interpretive data to be provided shall cover the entire period during which the telemetric information is broadcast, including the period after the stages and the self-contained dispensing mechanism of an ICBM or SLBM have completed their functions. In this connection, the Parties understand that such data may not be useful, for the purpose of verifying compliance with the provisions of the Treaty, after the stages or the self-contained dispensing mechanism no longer respond to control signals.

5. With respect to paragraph 2 of Section II of the Telemetry Protocol, the missile acceleration profile to be provided:

(a) shall be terminated no less than ten seconds after completion of the last procedure for dispensing reentry vehicles. For a missile that is not equipped with a self-contained dispensing mechanism and to which only one warhead is attributed, the missile acceleration profile shall be terminated no less than ten seconds after the reentry vehicle is separated from the final stage of the missile;
(b) may be terminated at the time of loss of active control, that is, at the time that the self-contained dispensing mechanism, or, for a missile not equipped with a self-contained dispensing mechanism, the final stage of the missile, no longer responds to control signals. If loss of active control is used as the reason for terminating the acceleration profile, the Party conducting the flight test shall inform the other Party, at the time that the acceleration profile is provided, that loss of active control is the reason for termination of the acceleration profile.

6. With respect to Sections I and II of the Telemetry Protocol, the tapes, tape summaries, interpretive data, and missile acceleration profile for a particular flight test shall be provided at the same time. Written materials may be provided in English or Russian, at the choice of the Party that conducted the flight test.

Annex 3
Releasability of telemetric information |1|

1. The following data provided in fulfilling the obligations provided for in the Treaty shall not be released to the public by any Party other than the Party that provided such data in fulfilling its obligations provided for in the Treaty, unless otherwise agreed:

(a) data and other information contained on tapes provided pursuant to Article X of the Treaty; and
(b) data and other information provided in accordance with the Telemetry Protocol.
2. Additional data and other information may be agreed by the Parties within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission for inclusion in the list set forth in paragraph 1 of this Annex.

3. The provisions of this Annex shall not affect the rights and obligations of the Parties with respect to the communication of such data and other information to those individuals who, because of their official responsibilities, require such data or other information to carry out activities related to the fulfillment of the obligations provided for in the Treaty.

Annex 4
Logistical and administrative procedures for conducting training and maintenance and for providing spare parts and replacement parts for telemetry equipment |1|

1. For purposes of this Annex:

(a) the term "providing Party" means the Party that provided the equipment for which maintenance or training are being conducted or for which spare parts or replacement parts are being provided;
(b) the term "receiving Party" means the Party that received the equipment for which maintenance or training are being conducted or for which spare parts or replacement parts are being provided;
(c) the term "maintenance team" means the group of individuals assigned by the providing Party to conduct maintenance or training on the territory of the receiving Party;
(d) the term "trainee team" means the group of individuals assigned by the receiving Party to receive training on the territory of the providing Party.

2. Regarding the number and list of maintenance team members, the number and list of trainee team members, the number and list of aircrew members, and the provision of visas:

(a) A maintenance team or trainee team shall include no more than 14 individuals. A maintenance team shall have the right to bring tools and equipment required for conducting maintenance or training. The aircrew for transport of team members, and delivery of tools and equipment, shall include no more than 15 individuals.
(b) The providing Party shall provide, through diplomatic channels, a list of maintenance team members and a list of aircrew members no less than 15 days in advance of their arrival in the territory of the receiving Party. The provisions of paragraph 6 of Section II and paragraphs 21 and 22 of Section III of the Inspection Protocol, on an objection to an individual on the list of inspectors shall apply to an objection to a maintenance team member or aircrew member, except that the receiving Party shall notify its objection no later than seven days after receipt of such lists.
(c) The receiving Party shall provide, through diplomatic channels, a list of trainee team members and a list of aircrew members no less than 15 days in advance of their arrival in the territory of the providing Party. The provisions of paragraph 6 of Section II and paragraphs 21 and 22 of Section III of the Inspection Protocol on an objection to an individual on the list of inspectors shall apply to an objection to a trainee team member or aircrew member, except that the providing Party shall notify its objection no later than seven days after receipt of such lists.
(d) The receiving Party shall provide visas and, where necessary, such other documents to each maintenance team member and each aircrew member to whom it has not objected, as may be required to ensure that each such team member and each such aircrew member may enter and remain in its territory for the duration of the maintenance or training period.
(e) The providing Party shall provide visas and, where necessary, such other documents to each trainee team member and each aircrew member to whom it has not objected, as may be required to ensure that each such team member and each such aircrew member may enter and remain in its territory for the duration of the training period.
(f) The providing Party shall provide, through diplomatic channels, a list of tools and equipment required for conducting maintenance or training no less than 15 days in advance of their delivery to the territory of the receiving Party. The provisions of paragraphs 8 and 11 of Section V of the Inspection Protocol on examination of equipment and supplies shall apply to examination of such tools and equipment.

3. Regarding the maintenance team or trainee team:

(a) The receiving Party shall provide necessary assistance, including a safety briefing, to the maintenance team members.
(b) The providing Party shall provide necessary assistance, including a safety briefing, to the trainee team members.
(c) The provisions of paragraph 11 of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol on movement, travel, and urgent departure or emergency evacuation of inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members shall apply to trainee team members, maintenance team members and aircrew members.
(d) Throughout the period of stay on the territory of the receiving Party, the receiving Party shall ensure that the maintenance team members can be in communication with the embassy of the providing Party located on the territory of the receiving Party using telephonic communications provided by the receiving Party.
(e) Throughout the period of stay on the territory of the providing Party, the providing Party shall ensure that the trainee team members can be in communication with the embassy of the receiving Party located on the territory of the providing Party using telephonic communications provided by the providing Party.
(f) The Parties shall treat with due respect the maintenance team members, trainee team members, and aircrew members of each Party in its territory and shall take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on their person, freedom, and dignity.

4. Regarding arrangements for air transportation:

(a) The Parties may use dedicated airplanes, inspection airplanes, airplanes making regularly scheduled commercial flights, or, if possible, other airplanes used for inspections related to arms control agreements, for the purpose of transporting trainee team members, maintenance team members, as well as spare parts, replacement parts, tools and equipment to the point of entry.
(b) Diplomatic clearance numbers for dedicated airplanes transporting maintenance team members, as well as spare parts, replacement parts, tools and equipment, and routes for flights of such airplanes to and from the point of entry shall be provided, through diplomatic channels, by the receiving Party no less than ten days prior to the estimated time of arrival at the point of entry on the territory of the receiving Party.
(c) Diplomatic clearance numbers for dedicated airplanes transporting trainee team members, and routes for flights of such airplanes to and from the point of entry shall be provided, through diplomatic channels, by the providing Party no less than ten days prior to the estimated time of arrival at the point of entry on the territory of the providing Party.
(d) The receiving Party shall provide parking, security protection, fueling, air navigation, airport facility, and ground technical and commercial services, as well as additional services as requested, for the dedicated airplane of the providing Party at the point of entry. The cost of parking and security protection for each such airplane shall be borne by the receiving Party. The cost of fueling and air navigation, airport facility, and ground technical and commercial services, as well as additional services as requested, shall be borne by the providing Party.
(e) The providing Party, if training is conducted on its territory, shall provide parking, security protection, fueling, air navigation, airport facility, and ground technical and commercial services, as well as additional services as requested, for the dedicated airplane of the receiving Party at the point of entry. The cost of parking and security protection for each such airplane shall be borne by the providing Party. The cost of fueling and air navigation, airport facility, and ground technical and commercial services, as well as additional services as requested, shall be borne by the receiving Party.
(f) The providing Party shall state its intention, through diplomatic channels, to transport maintenance team members, spare parts or replacement parts no less than 72 hours prior to the estimated time of arrival of the maintenance team members, or delivery of spare parts or replacement parts at the point of entry on the territory of the receiving Party. The receiving Party shall state its intention, through diplomatic channels, to transport trainee team members no less than 72 hours prior to the estimated time of arrival of the trainee team members at the point of entry on the territory of the providing Party. Such statements shall include:

(i) the date and estimated time of arrival at the point of entry; and
(ii) the names, dates of birth, and places of birth of the trainee team members, maintenance team members and aircrew members.

(g) The provisions of paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of Section IV of the Inspection Protocol on flights of inspection airplanes shall apply to flights of dedicated airplanes transporting trainee team members, maintenance team members, as well as spare parts, replacement parts, tools and equipment.
(h) If the Parties use dedicated airplanes, such airplanes shall be of the types specified in Annex 10 to the Inspection Protocol.

5. Regarding the report and the confidentiality requirements:

(a) Before departing the site where maintenance or training was conducted, the maintenance team leader and a representative of the receiving Party, and if training is conducted on the territory of the Providing Party, the trainee team leader and a representative of the providing Party, shall describe, in a factual, written report, the activity that was carried out pursuant to a request provided for in paragraph 6 of Section VI of the Notification Protocol, and confirm the completion of such activity.
(b) Maintenance team members shall not disclose information obtained during maintenance or training except with the express consent of the receiving Party.
(c) Trainee team members shall not disclose information obtained during training except with the express consent of the providing Party.

6. Throughout the in-country period, the receiving Party shall provide meals, lodging, work space, transportation, and, as necessary, medical and other urgent services for the maintenance team members and aircrew members of the providing Party. Throughout the in-country period, the providing Party, if training is conducted on its territory, shall provide meals, lodging, work space, transportation, and, as necessary, medical and other urgent services for the trainee team members and aircrew members of the receiving Party. The costs of all such services shall be borne by the receiving Party.

7. The receiving Party shall provide to the providing Party, through diplomatic channels, a confirmation of the receipt of spare parts or replacement parts.

8. The receiving Party shall assist the providing Party, if requested, with customs procedures, and in resolving any issues that may arise in connection with the delivery of spare parts, replacement parts, tools, and equipment.

Protocol on the joint compliance and inspection commission relating to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms

Pursuant to and in implementation of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties hereby agree upon provisions governing the operation of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, hereinafter referred to as the Commission, established pursuant to Article XV of the Treaty.

I. Composition of the Commission

1. Each Party shall communicate to the other Party the names of its designated Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner to the Commission. The Parties shall communicate to each other the names of the initially designated Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner to the Commission as soon as practicable, but in any case no later than 30 days after signature of the Treaty.

2. Each Party shall have the right to be represented at a session of the Commission by its Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner as well as by their alternates, and by members, advisors, and experts. A session of the Commission may be convened without the participation of the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner. In such a case, any other individual provided for in this paragraph may be the head representative of a Party to a session of the Commission. The Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, or Ukraine may authorize any other of these Parties to represent its interests at a session of the Commission through the head representative of such other Party. Such authorization shall be provided in diplomatic notes to the representatives of all other Parties prior to the commencement of a session and shall state the subject matter, scope, and duration of the authorization. |1|

3. The head representatives of the United States of America, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine shall alternately preside over meetings during a session of the Commission, unless otherwise agreed during a session. |2|

4. The Commission shall have the right to constitute working groups consisting of any of the individuals provided for in paragraph 2 of this Section for the consideration of specific questions raised in the Commission.

II. Convening a Session of the Commission

1. A session of the Commission shall be convened at the request of either Party. No later than 14 days after receiving such a request, the requested Party shall submit a response. Requests and responses shall include the following:

(a) the questions that the Party intends to raise;
(b) the name of the head representative of the Party; and
(c) the proposed or accepted date and location for the convening of the session.

Each Party may also submit additional questions to the other Party in the period from the submission of the initial response to the initial request until the convening of the session.

2. A session of the Commission shall be convened on the date agreed by at least two Parties, including the United States of America, but not later than 30 days after the date proposed in the request provided for in subparagraph 1(c) of Section II of this Protocol. |3|

3. A session of the Commission shall be convened in Geneva, Switzerland, or, as appropriate, in another place agreed by the Parties.

4. The Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner of each of the Parties may, without the convening of a session of the Commission, communicate with the Commissioner of the other Party in order to clarify any unclear situations or to resolve questions.

III. Convening a Special Session of the Commission

1. A special session of the Commission shall be convened either at the request of the United States of America to address what it considers to be an urgent concern relating to compliance of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, or Ukraine with the obligations assumed under the Treaty, or at the request of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, or Ukraine to address what it considers to be an urgent concern relating to compliance of the United States of America with the obligations assumed under the Treaty. All Parties shall have the right to participate in special sessions. |4| Such a request shall include, at a minimum, the following:

(a) the nature of the concern, including the kind and, if applicable, the type of strategic offensive arms related to the concern;
(b) the name of the head representative of the Party; and
(c) the proposed date and location for the convening of the special session. The requesting Party may also propose in the request a specific method for resolving the concern. Such a method may include, but is not limited to, a visit with special right of access to the facility or location where, in the opinion of the requesting Party, the activity that caused the concern took place.

2. No later than seven days after receiving such a request, the requested Party shall submit a response. Such a response shall include either:

(a) acceptance of the proposed date and location for the convening of the special session; or
(b) a proposal for an alternate date and location for the convening of the special session. The alternate date shall be no later than ten days after the date proposed by the requesting Party.

3. The response of the requested Party may also include:

(a) acceptance of the proposed specific method for resolving the concern, including, if a visit with special right of access is planned, the proposed date, location, and procedures for such a visit; or
(b) a proposal for a specific method for resolving the concern, including, if a visit with special right of access is planned, the proposed date, location, and procedures for such a visit.

If the Parties agree to a visit with special right of access or another method for resolving the concern, the Parties may agree not to convene the special session. Visits with special right of access may be conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Inspection Protocol, as applicable.

4. Either Party may request additional information related to the concern. A response to such a request shall be submitted no later than seven days after receipt of the request, but shall not affect the time for convening the special session of the Commission, if such a session is held.

5. A special session of the Commission shall remain in session for no more than 30 days.

IV. Agenda

1. The agenda for a session of the Commission shall consist of those questions that the Parties have included in the communications provided to each other in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section II of this Protocol.

2. Each Party shall have the right to raise in the Commission questions that arise immediately preceding or during a session of the Commission; provided, however, that consideration of such questions during the current session shall be subject to agreement of the Parties. In case of such agreement, the Parties shall allow sufficient time prior to consideration of such questions for preparation and any changes in the composition of their delegations that are required.

3. Sessions of the Commission shall be convened irrespective of the number of questions on the agenda.

V. Work of the Commission

The work of the Commission shall be confidential, except as otherwise agreed by the Commission. The Commission may record agreements or the results of its work in an appropriate document, which shall be done in five copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic. |5| Such documents shall not be confidential, except as otherwise agreed by the Commission.

The Parties agree that, after at least two Parties, including the United States of America, sign an agreement, the United States of America shall provide the text of the agreement to the Parties that did not sign the agreement. Each Party that has signed the agreement shall have the right to identify the agreement as one to which the provisions of subparagraph (c) of this Section shall not apply. The head representative of each Party that made such an identification shall, during the session of the commission at which the agreement was signed, provide to all Parties that have signed the agreement its reasons for making such identification. These reasons shall be provided by the United States of America to all Parties that have not signed the agreement when it provides the text of the agreement. Each Party that did not sign the agreement:

(a) shall express its consent to be bound by the agreement by providing a diplomatic note of acceptance to all other Parties no later than 30 days after receiving the text of the agreement; or
(b) shall provide the substance of any objections to that agreement to all other Parties in a diplomatic note no later than 30 days after receiving the text of the agreement. If a Party provides an objection, that Party shall attend the next session of the Commission, unless the objection is resolved before the next session convenes; or
(c) shall be considered to have expressed its consent to be bound by the agreement if it does not provide a diplomatic note pursuant to either subparagraph (a) or subparagraph (b) of this Section, provided that no Party that signed the agreement has identified that agreement, as provided for in this Section, as one to which the provisions of this subparagraph shall not apply.

Each agreement shall enter into force on the date when all Parties have consented to be bound by that agreement, unless a later date is agreed by all Parties. The Parties agree that the United States of America shall notify all other Parties by diplomatic note of the date of entry into force of each agreement. |6|

Parties that sign or otherwise consent to be bound by an agreement may, on a case-by-case basis, agree to temporary observance of that agreement, provided that the agreement does not alter the rights and obligations under the Treaty. Temporary observance shall remain in effect for an agreed period or until that agreement enters into force. |7|

VI. Costs

Each Party shall bear the cost of its participation in the work of the Commission.

VII. Communications

Communications pursuant to this Protocol shall be provided through diplomatic channels; or shall be provided through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center of the United States of America, and the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center of the Russian Federation or other equivalent continuous communications centers established by the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, or Ukraine. All requests, responses, and notifications required by this Protocol shall be provided by the pertinent Party to all other Parties. |8|

VIII. Additional Procedures and Provisional Application

1. The Parties shall have the right to agree upon additional procedures governing the operation of the Commission.

2. The provisions of Article XV of the Treaty and the provisions of this Protocol shall apply provisionally from the date of signature of the Treaty for a 12-month period, unless, before the expiration of this period:

(a) a Party communicates to the other Party its decision to terminate the provisional application of the provisions of Article XV of the Treaty and the provisions of this Protocol; or
(b) the Treaty enters into force.

The Parties may agree to extend the provisional application for additional periods, subject to the same conditions specified in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph.

3. The provisions of Article XV of the Treaty and the provisions of this Protocol shall apply provisionally in light of and in conformity with the other provisions of the Treaty.

This Protocol is an integral part of the Treaty and shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force so long as the Treaty remains in force. As provided for in subparagraph (b) of Article XV of the Treaty, the Parties may agree upon such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty. The Parties agree that, if it becomes necessary to make changes in this Protocol that do not affect substantive rights or obligations under the Treaty, they shall use the Commission to reach agreement on such changes, without resorting to the procedure for making amendments set forth in Article XVIII of the Treaty.

Done at Moscow on July 31, 1991, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the United States of America:
George Bush
President of the United States of America

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
M. Gorbachev
President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Annex 1
Additional procedures governing the operation of the joint compliance and inspection commission |1| |2|

1. With respect to paragraph 2 of Section I of this Protocol, the following additional provisions shall apply:

"The Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, or Ukraine may authorize any other of these Parties to represent its interests at a session of the Commission through the head representative of such other Party. Such authorization shall be provided in diplomatic notes to the representatives of all other Parties prior to the commencement of a session and shall state the subject matter, scope, and duration of the authorization."

2. Paragraph 3 of Section I of this Protocol shall be superseded by the following provision:

"The head representatives of the United States of America, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine shall alternately preside over meetings during a session of the Commission, unless otherwise agreed during a session."

3. Paragraph 2 of Section II of this Protocol shall be superseded by the following provision:

"A session of the Commission shall be convened on the date agreed by at least two Parties, including the United States of America, but no later than 30 days after the date proposed in the request provided for in subparagraph 1(c) of Section II of this Protocol."

4. The first sentence of paragraph 1 of Section III of this Protocol shall be superseded by the following provisions:

"A special session of the Commission shall be convened either at the request of the United States of America to address what it considers to be an urgent concern relating to compliance of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, or Ukraine with the obligations assumed under the Treaty, or at the request of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, or Ukraine to address what it considers to be an urgent concern relating to compliance of the United States of America with the obligations assumed under the Treaty. All Parties shall have the right to participate in special sessions."

5. The second sentence of Section V of this Protocol shall be superseded by the following provision:

"The Commission may record agreements or the results of its work in an appropriate document, which shall be done in five copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.'"

6. With Respect to Section V of this Protocol, the following additional provisions shall apply:

"The Parties agree that, after at least two Parties, including the United States of America, sign an agreement, the United States of America shall provide the text of the agreement to the Parties that did not sign the agreement. Each Party that has signed the agreement shall have the right to identify the agreement as one to which the provisions of subparagraph (c) of this Section shall not apply. The head representative of each Party that made such an identification shall, during the session of the Commission at which the agreement was signed, provide to all Parties that have signed the agreement its reasons for making such identification. These reasons shall be provided by the United States of America to all Parties that have not signed the agreement when it provides the text of the agreement. Each Party that did not sign the agreement:

(a) shall express its consent to be bound by the agreement by providing a diplomatic note of acceptance to all other Parties no later than 30 days after receiving the text of the agreement; or
(b) shall provide the substance of any objections to that agreement to all other Parties in a diplomatic note no later than 30 days after receiving the text of the agreement. If a Party provides an objection, that Party shall attend the next session of the Commission, unless the objection is resolved before the next session convenes; or
(c) shall be considered to have expressed its consent to be bound by the agreement if it does not provide a diplomatic note pursuant to either subparagraph (a) or subparagraph (b) of this Section, provided that no Party that signed the agreement has identified that agreement, as provided for in this Section, as one to which the provisions of this subparagraph shall not apply.

Each agreement shall enter into force on the date when all Parties have consented to be bound by that agreement, unless a later date is agreed by all Parties. The Parties agree that the United States of America shall notify all other Parties by diplomatic note of the date of entry into force of each agreement."

7. With respect to Section V of this Protocol, the following additional provisions shall apply:

"Parties that sign or otherwise consent to be bound by an agreement may, on a case-by-case basis, agree to temporary observance of that agreement, provided that the agreement does not alter the rights and obligations under the Treaty. Temporary observance shall remain in effect for an agreed period or until that agreement enters into force."

8. Section VII of this Protocol shall be superseded by the following provisions:

"Communications pursuant to this Protocol shall be provided through diplomatic channels; or shall be provided through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center of the United States of America, and the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center of the Russian Federation or other equivalent continuous communications centers established by the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, or Ukraine. All requests, responses, and notifications required by this Protocol shall be provided by the pertinent Party to all other Parties."

Lisbon Protocol
Protocol to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms

The Republic of Byelarus |1|, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and the United States of America, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Reaffirming their support for the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty,

Recognizing the altered political situation resulting from the replacement of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics with a number of independent states,

Recalling the commitment of the member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States that the nuclear weapons of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will be maintained under the safe, secure, and reliable control of a single unified authority,

Desiring to facilitate implementation of the Treaty in this altered situation,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

The Republic of Byelarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine, as successor states of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in connection with the Treaty, shall assume the obligations of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics under the Treaty.

ARTICLE II

The Republic of Byelarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine shall make such arrangements among themselves as are required to implement the Treaty's limits and restrictions; to allow functioning of the verification provisions of the Treaty equally and consistently throughout the territory of the Republic of Byelarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine; and to allocate costs.

ARTICLE III

1. For purposes of Treaty implementation, the phrase, "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" shall be interpreted to mean the Republic of Byelarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine.

2. For purposes of Treaty implementation, the phrase, "national territory," when used in the Treaty to refer to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, shall be interpreted to mean the combined national territories of the Republic of Byelarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine.

3. For inspections and continuous monitoring activities on the territory of the Republic of Byelarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, or Ukraine, that state shall provide communications from the inspection site or continuous monitoring site to the Embassy of the United States in the respective capital.

4. For purposes of Treaty implementation, the embassy of the Inspecting Party referred to in Section XVI of the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms shall be construed to be the embassy of the respective state in Washington or the embassy of the United States of America in the respective capital.

5. The working languages for Treaty activities shall be English and Russian.

ARTICLE IV

Representatives of the Republic of Byelarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine will participate in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission on a basis to be worked out consistent with Article I of this Protocol.

ARTICLE V

The Republic of Byelarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine shall adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968 as non-nuclear weapon states Parties in the shortest possible time, and shall begin immediately to take all necessary action to this end in accordance with their constitutional practices.

ARTICLE VI

1. Each Party shall ratify the Treaty together with this Protocol in accordance with its own constitutional procedures. The Republic of Byelarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine shall exchange instruments of ratification with the United States of America. The Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the final exchange of instruments of ratification.

2. This Protocol shall be an integral part of the Treaty and shall remain in force throughout the duration of the Treaty.

Done at Lisbon on May 23, 1992, in five copies, each in the Byelarusian, English, Kazakh, Russian, and Ukrainian languages, all texts being equally authentic.

For the Republic of Byelarus:
P. Kravchanka

For the Republic of Kazakhstan:
T. Zhukeyev

For the Russian Federation:
A. Kozyrev

For Ukraine:
A. Zlenko

For the United States of America:
James A. Baker, III

The Supreme Soviet of the Republic Of Belarus

May 20, 1992

Dear Mr. President:

In connection with the impending ratification by the Republic of Belarus of the 1991 Treaty between the United States of America and the USSR on Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, I have the honor to advise you that the Republic of Belarus, in implementing this Treaty, will be able to assume the following obligations.

In accordance with the letter and spirit of the Declaration on the State Sovereignty of the Republic of Belarus, which has been given constitutional status, Belarus will take all the measures to achieve the status of a non-nuclear state. I note with satisfaction, Mr. President, that in its successful progress made in this direction, Belarus as of now has already completely freed itself of the tactical nuclear weapons that were located in its territory.

The Republic of Belarus guarantees the elimination of all nuclear strategic offensive arms located in its territory in accordance with the relevant agreements concluded by Belarus and during the seven-year period as provided by the START Treaty, on condition that the Russian Federation will be prepared to receive the nuclear strategic offensive arms removed from the territory of Belarus during this period of time.

Naturally, Mr. President, the Republic of Belarus will conduct this activity with due account of its national security interests, and when controversial issues arise, the Republic of Belarus will consult with the other Parties to the Treaty.

It is the view of the Republic of Belarus that the process of destruction of nuclear weapons should be carried out under rigorous and effective international control.

Accept, Mr. President, the assurance of my highest consideration.

S. Shushkevich
/s/
Chairman of the Supreme Soviet
of the Republic of Belarus

His Excellency George Bush
President of the United States of America
[Washington, D. C.]

The President of the Republic Of Kazakhstan

May 19, 1992

To the President of the United States
of America
Mr. George Bush

Dear Mr. President:

In connection with the ratification by Kazakhstan of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of 1991, I have the honor to inform you that for the purposes of implementing the above mentioned Treaty, Kazakhstan undertakes the following obligation.

Kazakhstan guarantees the carrying out of the elimination of all kinds of nuclear weapons, including strategic offensive arms, located on its territory, over a period of seven years in accordance with the START Treaty.

Sincerely yours,

/s/
N. Nazarbayev
President of the
Republic of Kazakhstan

President of Ukraine

May 7, 1992
Kiev

Dear Mr. President:

In connection with the ratification by Ukraine of the 1991 Treaty between the United States and the USSR on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Arms, I have the honor to advise you that Ukraine, in implementing this Treaty, shall assume the following obligations.

In accordance with the Declaration on the State Sovereignty of Ukraine adopted by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on July 16, 1990, and with the Statement of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on the Non-Nuclear Status of Ukraine adopted on October 24, 1991, Ukraine shall have a non-nuclear status, will abide by the three non-nuclear principles in the future, and emphasizes its right to control over the non-use of nuclear weapons deployed in its territory.

Ukraine shall guarantee the elimination of all nuclear weapons, including strategic offensive arms, located in its territory in accordance with the relevant agreements and during the seven-year period as provided by the START Treaty and within the context of the Statement of the Non-Nuclear Status of Ukraine. Ukraine will take into account its national security interests in conducting this activity. In this connection, if any questions should arise Ukraine will consult with the other Parties to the Treaty.

In addition, I should like to note that the process of elimination of nuclear weapons in Ukraine should be carried out under reliable international control which should guarantee the non-use of nuclear charge components for repeated production of weapons and should prevent their export to other countries.

Respectfully,

/s/
Leonid Kravchuk
President of Ukraine

His Excellency George Bush
President of the United States of America
Washington, D. C.

Associated Documents
Related Agreements

Agreement between the government of the United States of America and the government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on early exhibitions of strategic offensive arms relating to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Recognizing the advantages of providing each Party the opportunity, prior to the commencement of baseline data inspections, to conduct exhibitions and inspections for the purposes provided for in paragraphs 11 and 12 of Article XI of the Treaty, in accordance with the procedures provided in the Protocol Regarding Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Inspection Protocol,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

Each Party shall conduct exhibitions, and shall have the right during such exhibitions by the other Party to conduct inspections, as provided for in paragraphs 11 and 12 of Article XI of the Treaty.

The exhibiting Party shall provide necessary assistance to the inspectors in the conduct of inspections during such exhibitions.

Article II

The exhibitions and inspections provided for in Article I of this Agreement shall be conducted at locations chosen by the exhibiting Party on dates agreed upon through diplomatic channels. These exhibitions and inspections shall be completed no later than 240 days after signature of the Treaty. Except as provided for in Articles III and IV of this Agreement, such exhibitions and inspections shall be carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Inspection Protocol, including the provisions concerning inspection reports and non-disclosure of information obtained as a result of these exhibitions and inspections.

An inspection team conducting an inspection during exhibitions in accordance with this Agreement shall include no more than 15 inspectors.

Article III

1. No less than 30 days prior to each exhibition, the inspecting Party shall provide to the exhibiting Party, for the purpose of such exhibition, a list of its proposed inspectors, which shall consist of no more than 25 individuals, and a list of its proposed aircrew members, which shall consist of no more than 25 individuals. The list of proposed inspectors and list of proposed aircrew members for each exhibition shall not be considered to be the lists provided in fulfillment of the obligations under the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Early Exchange of Lists of Inspectors, Monitors, and Aircrew Members of July 31, 1991. However, if the exchange of lists of proposed inspectors and aircrew members takes place in accordance with the aforementioned Agreement prior to such exhibitions, inspectors and aircrew members may be chosen from these lists for the purposes of such exhibitions. The lists for each exhibition shall contain first name, patronymic or middle name, and last name; day, month, and year of birth; city, state or oblast, and country of birth; and passport number, if available, for each inspector and aircrew member proposed.

2. For each exhibition, the exhibiting Party shall notify the inspecting Party, no less than 10 days prior to each exhibition, of its agreement with, or objection to, the designation of each inspector and aircrew member proposed in connection with the exhibition. The exhibiting Party may object to an individual on the list only in accordance with paragraph 6 of Section II of the Inspection Protocol. The exhibiting Party shall provide visas and, where necessary, such other documents to each individual to whom it has agreed as may be required to ensure that each such inspector or such aircrew member may enter and remain in its territory throughout the in-country period established for the exhibition.

Article IV

Arrangements for air transportation in connection with each exhibition shall be made in accordance with the provisions provided for in Section IV of the Inspection Protocol, except as provided for below:

(a) Diplomatic clearance numbers for airplanes transporting the inspectors, and airplane routings to and from the point of entry, shall be provided by the exhibiting Party no less than 30 days prior to each exhibition.
(b) Points of entry under this Agreement shall be: for the United States of America, Washington, D.C., and for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Moscow.

Article V

The exhibiting Party shall treat with due respect the inspectors and aircrew members of the inspecting Party in its territory in connection with the conduct of these exhibitions and inspections, and shall take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on the person, freedom, and dignity of such persons.

Article VI

This Agreement shall not be construed to prejudice the rights of the Parties in any way or to impose additional obligations on the Parties under the Treaty.

Article VII

This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of its signature, and shall terminate upon completion of the exhibitions and inspections provided for herein. The termination of this Agreement shall not prejudice the validity of the information obtained as a result of such exhibitions and inspections, and contained in the inspection reports, for the exercise of the rights of the Parties and the fulfillment of the obligations of the Parties under the Treaty after its entry into force.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Moscow, on July 31, 1991, in duplicate, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America:
James A. Baker, III

For the Government of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics:
A. A. Bessmertnykh

Agreement between the government of the United States of America and the government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the early exchange of lists of inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members proposed for inspections and continuous monitoring activities conducted pursuant to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Desiring to facilitate the implementation of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, including the Protocol Regarding Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities, hereinafter referred to as the Protocol,

Recognizing the advantages of providing both Parties ample time to review the lists of proposed inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members in order to inform the other Party of agreement with, or objection to, the names on such lists within the time period provided for in the Treaty,

Considering their common interest in providing a mechanism for an exchange of such lists prior to entry into force of the Treaty,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

On a date agreed upon by the Parties, which shall be no later than 30 days before entry into force of the Treaty, each Party shall provide to the other Party the lists of its proposed inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members as provided for in Section II of the Protocol. The date of exchange of such lists shall be agreed upon by the Parties through diplomatic channels.

Article II

Each Party shall have the right to amend the lists of its proposed inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members, provided that each Party may make a change to these lists no more than one time within any 21-day period commencing from the date of exchange of such lists. With each change, the number of inspectors whose names are entered in the list of inspectors shall not exceed 30, the number of monitors whose names are entered in the list of monitors shall not exceed 25, and the number of aircrew members whose names are entered in the list of aircrew members shall not exceed 25. The lists of proposed inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members shall constitute the initial lists provided for in paragraph 2 of Section II of the Protocol, upon entry into force of the Treaty.

Article III

Each Party shall provide to the other Party the lists required by Article I of this Agreement, and amendments to such lists, through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers established by the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of September 15, 1987.

Article IV

This Agreement shall not be construed to prejudice the rights of the Parties in any way or to impose additional obligations on the Parties under the Treaty except as stated in Articles I and II of this Agreement.

Article V

This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature, and shall terminate upon entry into force of the Treaty.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Moscow, in two copies, on July 31, 1991, in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America:
James A. Baker, III

For the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
A.A. Bessmertnykh

Agreement between the government of the United States of America and the government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on reciprocal advance notification of major strategic exercises

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Affirming their desire to reduce and ultimately eliminate the risk of outbreak of nuclear war, in particular as a result of misinterpretation, miscalculation, or accident,

Believing that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought,

Recognizing the necessity to promote the increase of mutual trust and the strengthening of strategic stability,

Acknowledging the importance of exchanging advance notification of major strategic exercises on the basis of reciprocity,

Reaffirming their obligations under the Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of September 15, 1987,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

On the basis of reciprocity, each Party shall notify the other Party no less than 14 days in advance about the beginning of one major strategic forces exercise which includes the participation of heavy bomber aircraft to be held during each calendar year.

Article II

1. Each Party shall provide to the other Party the notifications required by Article I through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers established by the Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of September 15, 1987.

2. The notifications required by Article I shall be provided no less than 14 days prior to the date in Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) during which the relevant exercise will commence.

Article III

The Parties shall undertake to hold consultations, as mutually agreed, to consider questions relating to implementation of the provisions of this Agreement, as well as to discuss possible amendments thereto aimed at furthering the implementation of the objectives of this Agreement. Amendments shall enter into force in accordance with procedures to be agreed upon.

Article IV

This Agreement shall not affect the obligations of either Party under other agreements.

Article V

1. This Agreement shall be of unlimited duration.

2. This Agreement may be terminated by either Party upon 12 months written notice to the other Party.

Article VI

This Agreement shall enter into force on January 1, 1990, and notifications pursuant to this Agreement shall commence with the calendar year 1990.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, in duplicate, this 23rd day of September, 1989, in the English and Russian languages, each text being equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America:
James A. Baker, III

For the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
E. A. Shevardnadze

Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on notifications of launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles |1|

Signed at Moscow May 31, 1988
Entered into Force May 31, 1988

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Affirming their desire to reduce and ultimately eliminate the risk of outbreak of nuclear war, in particular, as a result of misinterpretation, miscalculation, or accident,

Believing that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought,

Believing that agreement on measures for reducing the risk of outbreak of nuclear war serves the interests of strengthening international peace and security,

Reaffirming their obligations under the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of September 30, 1971, the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas of May 25, 1972, and the Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of September 15, 1987,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

Each Party shall provide the other Party notification, through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, no less than twenty-four hours in advance, of the planned date, launch area, and area of impact for any launch of a strategic ballistic missile: an intercontinental ballistic missile (hereinafter "ICBM") or a submarine-launched ballistic missile (hereinafter "SLBM").

Article II

A notification of a planned launch of an ICBM or an SLBM shall be valid for four days counting from the launch date indicated in such a notification. In case of postponement of the launch date within the indicated four days, or cancellation of the launch, no notification thereof shall be required.

Article III

1 For launches of ICBMs or SLBMs from land, the notification shall indicate the area from which the launch is planned to take place.

2. For launches of SLBMs from submarines, the notification shall indicate the general area from which the missile will be launched. Such notification shall indicate either the quadrant within the ocean (that is, the ninety-degree sector encompassing approximately one-fourth of the area of the ocean) or the body of water (for example, sea or bay) from which the launch is planned to take place.

3. For all launches of ICBMs or SLBMs, the notification shall indicate the geographic coordinates of the planned impact area or areas of the reentry vehicles. Such an area shall be specified either by indicating the geographic coordinates of the boundary points of the area, or by indicating the geographic coordinates of the center of a circle with a radius specified in kilometers or nautical miles. The size of the impact area shall be determined by the notifying Party at its discretion.

Article IV

The Parties undertake to hold consultations, as mutually agreed, to consider questions relating to implementation of the provisions of this Agreement, as well as to discuss possible amendments thereto aimed at furthering the implementation of the objectives of this Agreement. Amendments shall enter into force in accordance with procedures to be agreed upon.

Article V

This Agreement shall not affect the obligations of either Party under other agreements.

Article VI

This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of its signature.

The duration of this Agreement shall not be limited.

This Agreement may be terminated by either Party upon 12 months written notice to the other Party.

DONE at Moscow on May 31, 1988, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America:
James A. Baker, III

For the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
E. A. Shevardnadze

Letters signed by U.S. and Soviet representatives

Phased reductions of heavy ICBMs

July 30, 1991

Ambassador Linton F. Brooks
Head of Delegation of the
United States of America to the
Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

On behalf of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I am instructed to state the following:

In connection with the agreement on the phasing of the reductions of strategic offensive arms reached within the framework of the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, the Soviet Union provides formal assurances to the effect that, in the course of implementing the reductions in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article II of the Treaty, the number of deployed heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall be reduced evenly during all phases. In order to implement this assurance in the most effective manner, it is agreed that deployed heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers shall be reduced by no less than 22 each year until the limits on the aggregate numbers for deployed heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers and for warheads attributed to deployed heavy ICBMs, as provided for in paragraph 1 of Article II of the Treaty, are reached.
Reductions of launchers of heavy ICBMs shall be implemented by means of elimination in accordance with the procedures specified in Section II of the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or Elimination of the Systems Subject to the Treaty.

If this statement is acceptable, I propose that this letter, together with your response, be included in the official records of the negotiations in the form of statements reflecting the official positions of the Soviet Union and United States.

Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

[s]
Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin
Head of Delegation of the
Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics to the Negotiations
on Nuclear and Space Arms

July 30, 1991

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

On behalf of the United States of America, I am authorized to state that the United States accepts the formal assurances set forth in your letter of this date, the substantive portion of which reads as follows:

In connection with the agreement on the phasing of the reductions of strategic offensive arms reached within the framework of the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, the Soviet Union provides formal assurances to the effect that, in the course of implementing the reductions in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article II of the Treaty, the number of deployed heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall be reduced evenly during all phases. In order to implement this assurance in the most effective manner, it is agreed that deployed heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers shall be reduced by no less than 22 each year until the limits on the aggregate numbers for deployed heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers and for warheads attributed to deployed heavy ICBMs, as provided for in paragraph 1 of Article II of the Treaty, are reached.
Reductions of launchers of heavy ICBMs shall be implemented by means of elimination in accordance with the procedures specified in Section II of the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or Elimination of the Systems Subject to the Treaty.

The United States agrees that this response, together with your letter, shall be included in the official records of the negotiations in the form of statements reflecting the official positions of the United States and Soviet Union.

This reply, together with your letter, shall constitute an agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely,

[s]
Ambassador Linton F. Brooks
Head of Delegation of the
United States of America
to the Negotiations on
Nuclear and Space Arms

Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin
Head of Delegation of the
Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics to the Negotiations
on Nuclear and Space Arms

Moscow, July 1991

Dear Mr. Secretary,

On behalf of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I should like to confirm that the provisions set forth in the letter signed on July 30, 1991 by our ambassador concerning the stage-by-stage reduction of deployed heavy ICBMs in connection with the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms are legally binding.

Respectfully,

[s]
Bessmertnykh

His Excellency
James A. Baker, III
Secretary of State of the U.S.
Moscow

Bear D

July 31, 1991

Ambassador Linton F. Brooks
Head of Delegation of the
United States of America to the
Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

On behalf of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in connection with the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, I have the honor to propose an agreement between our Governments on airplanes designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as Tu-95RTs, which are known to the United States of America as Bear D.

I have the honor to inform you of the following. From the outset, Tu-95RTs airplanes were tested, equipped, and configured exclusively for maritime operations.

These airplanes have not been and are not heavy bombers, nor have they been equipped with air-to-surface weapons or undergone conversion. Tu-95RTs airplanes have external features distinguishing them from heavy bombers of the Tu-95 type: they have no bomb bays, no external carrier beams to suspend or carry aerial bombs or missiles, and no equipment necessary for control of such weapons. Other differences characteristic of these airplanes are the additional three-dimensional radomes of the surface situation surveillance equipment under the fuselage and on the sides of the airplane. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics currently has 37 Tu-95RTs airplanes, which are based only at naval air bases.

Under the proposed agreement, our Governments would agree as follows:

(a) No later than 240 days after signature of the Treaty, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall provide photographs for the purpose of aiding in the identification of Tu-95RTs airplanes, and shall conduct, concurrently with a distinguishability exhibition of heavy bombers and long-range nuclear ALCMs, an exhibition of one Tu-95RTs airplane, displaying its distinguishing features. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall bear all costs for the stay of the group of visitors.
(b) The United States of America shall have the right to request the exhibition of all the other 36 Tu-95RTs airplanes. Such exhibition shall be conducted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at two airfields (in the European and Asian parts of the country) no later than 240 days after signature of the Treaty and no later than 60 days after the request. The United States of America shall bear all costs for the transportation and stay of the group of visitors, which shall include no more than 10 persons. The currency of payment shall be agreed between the sides before the visit.
(c) The 37 Tu-95RTs airplanes shall not be based at facilities where heavy bombers or former heavy bombers are based, that is, at air bases for heavy bombers, air bases for former heavy bombers, heavy bomber flight test centers, or training facilities for heavy bombers.
(d) The 37 Tu-95RTs airplanes shall not be considered to be former heavy bombers, and shall not be accountable under the 75 aggregate limit on heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, training heavy bombers, and former heavy bombers pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 3(a) of Article IV of the Treaty.
(e) The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has no plans to continue production of Tu-95RTs airplanes. In case of the production of such airplanes, they would be treated as former heavy bombers under the Treaty. As such, each new airplane would be subject to inspection to confirm that it is not equipped for air-to-surface weapons.

If the foregoing is acceptable, this letter together with your reply shall constitute an agreement between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America. This agreement shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty, except for subparagraphs (a) and (b) which shall enter into force on the date of signature of the Treaty and shall remain in force for 240 days. Upon entry into force of the Treaty, the other subparagraphs of this agreement shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

[s]
Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin
Head of Delegation of the
Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics to the Negotiations
on Nuclear and Space Arms

July 31, 1991

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

I have the honor to acknowledge the information set forth in your letter of this date, the substantive portion of which reads:

From the outset, Tu-95RTs airplanes were tested, equipped, and configured exclusively for maritime operations.

These airplanes have not been and are not heavy bombers, nor have they been equipped with air-to-surface weapons or undergone conversion. Tu-95RTs airplanes have external features distinguishing them from heavy bombers of the TU-95 type: they have no bomb bays, no external carrier beams to suspend or carry aerial bombs or missiles, and no equipment necessary for control of such weapons. Other differences characteristic of these airplanes are the additional three-dimensional radomes of the surface situation surveillance equipment under the fuselage and on the sides of the airplane. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics currently has 37 Tu-95RTs airplanes, which are based only at naval air bases.

Under this Agreement, our Governments shall agree as follows:

(a) No later than 240 days after signature of the Treaty, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall provide photographs for the purpose of aiding in the identification of Tu-95RTs airplanes, and shall conduct, concurrently with a distinguishability exhibition of heavy bombers and long-range nuclear ALCMs, an exhibition of one Tu-95RTs airplane, displaying its distinguishing features. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall bear all costs for the stay of the group of visitors.
(b) The United States of America shall have the right to request the exhibition of all the other 36 Tu-95RTs airplanes. Such exhibition shall be conducted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at two airfields (in the European and Asian parts of the country) no later than 240 days after signature of the Treaty and no later than 60 days after the request. The United States of America shall bear all costs for the transportation and stay of the group of visitors, which shall include no more than 10 persons. The currency of payment shall be agreed between the sides before the visit.
(c) The 37 Tu-95RTs airplanes shall not be based at facilities where heavy bombers or former heavy bombers are based, that is, at air bases for heavy bombers, air bases for former heavy bombers, heavy bomber flight test centers, or training facilities for heavy bombers.
(d) The 37 Tu-95RTs airplanes shall not be considered to be former heavy bombers, and shall not be accountable under the 75 aggregate limit on heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, training heavy bombers, and former heavy bombers pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 3(a) of Article IV of the Treaty.
(e) The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has no plans to continue production of Tu-95RTs airplanes. In case of the production of such airplanes, they would be treated as former heavy bombers under the Treaty. As such, each new airplane would be subject to inspection to confirm that it is not equipped for air-to-surface weapons.

This reply together with your letter shall constitute an agreement between the Governments of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the terms set forth above. This agreement shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty, except for subparagraphs (a) and (b) which shall enter into force on the date of signature of the Treaty and shall remain in force for 240 days. Upon entry into force of the Treaty, the other subparagraphs of this agreement shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely,

[s]
Ambassador Linton F. Brooks
Head of Delegation of the
States of America
to the Negotiations on
Nuclear and Space Arms

Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin
Head of Delegation of the
Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics to the Negotiations
on Nuclear and Space Arms

B-1

July 31, 1991

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

On behalf of the Government of the United States of America, I have the honor to propose an agreement between our Governments on the distinguishability of heavy bombers of the type designated by the United States of America as, and known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as, B-1, pursuant to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty.

Under this agreement, our Governments would agree that upon entry into force of the Treaty:

(a) B-1 heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs are distinguishable from B-1 heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs by a bomb bay configuration involving a bulkhead that, without change, does not permit a long-range nuclear ALCM to be loaded internally.
(b) B-1 heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs shall be made distinguishable from B-1 heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs by the covering, using a process equivalent to welding, of all but the two pylon attachment joints that serve as jacking points for the airplane.
(c) The two extra sets of B-1 heavy bomber attachment joints, for which no unique pylons exist, shall not be considered in determining the number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which a B-1 heavy bomber is actually equipped. These attachment joints have not been used to mount armaments, and the United States of America has no plans for them to be used to mount armaments. These attachment joints shall be covered by a process equivalent to welding, and shall remain covered in the event that a B-1 heavy bomber is later converted into a heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs.
(d) The unique equipment required to move the weapons bay bulkhead in B-1 heavy bombers and the equipment required to load B-1 pylons for long-range nuclear ALCMs onto such heavy bombers shall not be located at air bases for B-1 heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs.
(e) All B-1 heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs shall be subject to inspection during the period provided for baseline data inspections.
(f) B-1 pylons for long-range nuclear ALCMs and B-1 rotary launchers that carry long-range nuclear ALCMs shall not be located at air bases for B-1 heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs or air bases for B-1 heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, except for such items on visiting heavy bombers for which notification is provided in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section II of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty.
(g) Provided that no deployed B-1 heavy bombers are equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, there shall be no requirement for the United States of America to provide technical characteristics for such heavy bombers in the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty. The United States of America shall, however, provide distinguishing features for B-1 heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs. In the event that the United States of America converts B-1 heavy bombers into heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, then technical characteristics for such heavy bombers would be provided. Although the United States of America has no B-1 heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, the United States of America shall exhibit a B-1 test heavy bomber that is equipped with long-range nuclear ALCMs during appropriate distinguishability exhibitions pursuant to paragraph 12 of Article XI of the Treaty.
(h) Similar provisions shall apply, as appropriate, to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for heavy bombers of a type from any of which a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested, but some of which are not equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs.

If the foregoing is acceptable, this letter together with your reply shall constitute an agreement between the Governments of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely,

[s]
Ambassador Linton F. Brooks
Head of Delegation of the
United States of America
to the Negotiations on
Nuclear and Space Arms

Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin
Head of Delegation of the
Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics to the Negotiations
on Nuclear and Space Arms

July 31, 1991

Ambassador Linton F. Brooks
Head of Delegation of the
United States of America to the
Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

On behalf of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I have the honor to accept your proposal, set forth in your letter of this date, that an agreement be concluded between our Governments on the distinguishability of heavy bombers of the type designated by the United States of America as, and known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as, B-1, pursuant to the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty.

Under this agreement, our Governments shall agree that upon entry into force of the Treaty:

(a) B-1 heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs are distinguishable from B-1 heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs by a bomb bay configuration involving a bulkhead that, without change, does not permit a long-range nuclear ALCM to be loaded internally.
(b) B-1 heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs shall be made distinguishable from B-1 heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs by the covering, using a process equivalent to welding, of all but the two pylon attachment joints that serve as jacking points for the airplane.
(c) The two extra sets of B-1 heavy bomber attachment joints, for which no unique pylons exist, shall not be considered in determining the number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which a B-1 heavy bomber is actually equipped. These attachment joints have not been used to mount armaments, and the United States of America has no plans for them to be used to mount armaments. These attachment joints shall be covered by a process equivalent to welding, and shall remain covered in the event that a B-1 heavy bomber is later converted into a heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs.
(d) The unique equipment required to move the weapons bay bulkhead in B-1 heavy bombers and the equipment required to load B-1 pylons for long-range nuclear ALCMs onto such heavy bombers shall not be located at air bases for B-1 heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs.
(e) All B-1 heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs shall be subject to inspection during the period provided for baseline data inspections.
(f) B-1 pylons for long-range nuclear ALCMs and B-1 rotary launchers that carry long-range nuclear ALCMs shall not be located at air bases for B-1 heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs or air bases for B-1 heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, except for such items on visiting heavy bombers for which notification is provided in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section II of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty.
(g) Provided that no deployed B-1 heavy bombers are equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, there shall be no requirement for the United States of America to provide technical characteristics for such heavy bombers in the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty. The United States of America shall, however, provide distinguishing features for B-1 heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs. In the event that the United States of America converts B-1 heavy bombers into heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, then technical characteristics for such heavy bombers would be provided. Although the United States of America has no B-1 heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, the United States of America shall exhibit a B-1 test heavy bomber that is equipped with long-range nuclear ALCMs during appropriate distinguishability exhibitions pursuant to paragraph 12 of Article XI of the Treaty.
(h) Similar provisions shall apply, as appropriate, to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for heavy bombers of a type from any of which a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested, but some of which are not equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs.

This reply together with your letter shall constitute an agreement between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

[s]
Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin
Head of Delegation of the
Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics to the Negotiations
on Nuclear and Space Arms

Silo launch control centers

July 31, 1991

Ambassador Linton F. Brooks
Head of Delegation of the
United States of America to the
Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

On behalf of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I have the honor to propose an agreement between our Governments on conversion and elimination of launch control centers in connection with the obligation of the Parties, pursuant to paragraph 11 of Article V of the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, not to convert silos used as launch control centers into silo launchers of ICBMs.

Under this agreement, our Governments would agree that upon entry into force of the Treaty:

In cases of elimination of a group or groups of silo launchers of ICBMs, each Party shall:

(a) eliminate the launch control centers that are associated with the eliminated silo launchers, including silos used as launch control centers, by any method of its choice;
(b) convert those launch control centers by any method of its choice, for other purposes not inconsistent with the Treaty; or
(c) retain such launch control centers for their original purposes.

If a Party that possesses a silo used as a launch control center decides to convert it for other purposes not inconsistent with the Treaty by a method that involves opening the silo, that Party shall provide a notification to the other Party no less than 30 days in advance of initiation of such conversion through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers or through diplomatic channels.

The Party that receives such a notification shall have the right to conduct a visit to the silo being converted in order to confirm that it is not being converted into a silo launcher of ICBMs pursuant to paragraph 11 of Article V of the Treaty. The Parties shall agree within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, established pursuant to Article XV of the Treaty, on the timing and procedures for conducting such a visit.

Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

[s]
Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin
Head of Delegation of the
Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics to the Negotiations
on Nuclear and Space Arms

July 31, 1991

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

On behalf of the Government of the United States of America, I have the honor to accept the proposal, set forth in your letter of this date, that an agreement be concluded between our Governments on conversion and elimination of launch control centers in connection with the obligation of the Parties, pursuant to paragraph 11 of Article V of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, not to convert silos used as launch control centers into silo launchers of ICBMs.

Under this agreement, our Governments shall agree that upon entry into force of the Treaty:

In cases of elimination of a group or groups of silo launchers of ICBMs, each Party shall:

(a) eliminate the launch control centers that are associated with the eliminated silo launchers, including silos used as launch control centers, by any method of its choice;
(b) convert those launch control centers by any method of its choice, for other purposes not inconsistent with the Treaty; or
(c) retain such launch control centers for their original purposes.

This reply together with your letter shall constitute an agreement between the Governments of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely,

[s]
Ambassador Linton F. Brooks
Head of Delegation of the
United States of America
to the Negotiations on
Nuclear and Space Arms

Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin
Head of Delegation of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the
Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms

Launch canisters

July 31, 1991

Ambassador Linton F. Brooks
Head of Delegation of the
United States of America to the
Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

On behalf of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in connection with the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, I have the honor to propose an agreement between our Governments on launch canisters for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs.

Under this agreement, our Governments would agree that upon entry into force of the Treaty:

(a) In accordance with the existing practice in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, unfinished launch canisters for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, which are empty tubes, shall be transported from locations where they are manufactured only to final assembly facilities for such ICBMs. Launch canisters for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs assembled as a unit with a missile without a front section shall have external differences from such unfinished launch canisters.
(b) With respect to launch canisters for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs remaining after launches, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall proceed as follows. A launch canister remaining after the launch of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall either remain for an indefinite period of time in the open at the launch site, that is, at a test range or an ICBM base, with the front end open, or shall be eliminated. Elimination of such a launch canister shall be carried out in the open either in situ or at a conversion or elimination facility in accordance with the procedures provided for in paragraph 5 of Section I of the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or Elimination of the Systems Subject to the Treaty. Elimination of each such launch canister shall be subject to verification by national technical means of verification. If the elimination is to be carried out at a conversion or elimination facility, then such a launch canister shall be transported to such a facility directly from the relevant test range or ICBm base, and a notification of the movement of the launch canister for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section II of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty. After the elimination of such a launch canister has been completed, the remains of such a launch canister shall remain in the open for no less than 45 days and afterwards may be removed and used for any purpose.
(c) Notifications shall not be provided in connection with the above-mentioned operations involving launch canisters, except for notifications of their movement to conversion or elimination facilities. Data on the number of empty launch canisters shall not be specified in the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty.

Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

[s]
Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin
Head of Delegation of the
Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics to the Negotiations
on Nuclear and Space Arms

July 31, 1991

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

Under this agreement, our Governments shall agree that upon entry into force of the Treaty:

(a) In accordance with the existing practice in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, unfinished launch canisters for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, which are empty tubes, shall be transported from locations where they are manufactured only to final assembly facilities for such ICBMs. Launch canisters for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs assembled as a unit with a missile without a front section shall have external differences from such unfinished launch canisters.
(b) With respect to launch canisters for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs remaining after launches, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall proceed as follows. A launch canister remaining after the launch of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall either remain for an indefinite period of time in the open at the launch site, that is, at a test range or an ICBM base, with the front end open, or shall be eliminated. Elimination of such a launch canister shall be carried out in the open either in situ or at a conversion or elimination facility in accordance with the procedures provided for in paragraph 5 of Section I of the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or Elimination of the Systems Subject to the Treaty. Elimination of each such launch canister shall be subject to verification by national technical means of verification. If the elimination is to be carried out at a conversion or elimination facility, then such a launch canister shall be transported to such a facility directly from the relevant test range or ICBm base, and a notification of the movement of the launch canister for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section II of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty. After the elimination of a launch canister has been completed, the remains of such a launch canister shall remain in the open for no less than 45 days and afterwards may be removed and used for any purpose.
(c) Notifications shall not be provided in connection with the above-mentioned operations involving launch canisters, except for notifications of their movement to conversion or elimination facilities. Data on the number of empty launch canisters shall not be specified in the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty.

This reply together with your letter shall constitute an agreement between the Governments of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely,

[s]
Ambassador Linton F. Brooks
Head of Delegation of the
United States of America
to the Negotiations on
Nuclear and Space Arms

Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin
Head of Delegation of the
Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics to the Negotiations
on Nuclear and Space Arms

Engineering site surveys

July 31, 1991

Ambassador Linton F. Brooks
Head of Delegation of the
United States of America to the
Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

On behalf of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I have the honor to propose an agreement between our Governments to ensure effective engineering site surveys conducted at facilities subject to continuous monitoring under the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter known as the Treaty.

Under this agreement, our Governments would agree as follows:

No later than 60 days after signature of the Treaty, each Party shall provide through diplomatic channels the following information on such facilities, including data on logistical resources and local topography:

(a) a plan of the facility perimeter showing the location of the portal and exits;
(b) diagrams of underground utilities, including cabling, in the proposed perimeter continuous monitoring area;
(c) locations of proposed termination point(s) for water, sewage, and electrical supply lines;
(d) data on power supply fluctuations, including maximum, minimum, and average voltage; data on maximum, minimum, and average kilowatts of power; data on maximum, minimum, and average time (in milliseconds) of electrical power disruptions in the perimeter continuous monitoring area over a period of seven consecutive days;
(e) whether the electrical current to be supplied is one-phase or three-phase;
(f) a short description of the topography of the area in which the facility subject to continuous monitoring is located and of the available logistical resources for the construction and installation of the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system; and
(g) statistical data giving the maximum, minimum, and average number of vehicles exiting the portal and the road exits on an hourly and daily basis.

Each Party shall, whenever possible, provide additional information necessary to establish a perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system, when that Party receives a request for such information.

If the foregoing is acceptable, this letter together with your reply shall constitute an agreement between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which shall enter into force on the date of signature of the Treaty, and shall remain in force for a 12-month period, unless, before the expiration of this period:

(a) a Party communicates to the other Party its decision to terminate this agreement; or
(b) the Treaty enters into force. In such event, this agreement shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

Prior to entry into force of the Treaty, the Parties may agree to extend this agreement for additional periods, subject to the same conditions specified in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph.

Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

[s]
Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin
Head of Delegation of the
Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics to the Negotiations
on Nuclear and Space Arms

July 31, 1991

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

On behalf of the Government of the United States of America, I have the honor to accept the proposal, set forth in your letter of this date, that an agreement be concluded between our Governments to ensure effective engineering site surveys conducted at facilities subject to continuous monitoring under the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter known as the Treaty.

Under this agreement, our Governments shall agree as follows:

(a) a plan of the facility perimeter showing the location of the portal and exits;
(b) diagrams of underground utilities, including cabling, in the proposed perimeter continuous monitoring area;
(c) locations of proposed termination point(s) for water, sewage, and electrical supply lines;
(d) data on power supply fluctuations, including maximum, minimum, and average voltage; data on maximum, minimum, and average kilowatts of power; data on maximum, minimum, and average time (in milliseconds) of electrical power disruptions in the perimeter continuous monitoring area over a period of seven consecutive days;
(e) whether the electrical current to be supplied is one-phase or three-phase;
(f) a short description of the topography of the area in which the facility subject to continuous monitoring is located and of the available logistical resources for the construction and installation of the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system; and
(g) statistical data giving the maximum, minimum, and average number of vehicles exiting the portal and the road exits on an hourly and daily basis.

This reply together with your letter shall constitute an agreement between the Governments of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which shall enter into force on the date of signature of the Treaty, and shall remain in force for a 12-month period, unless, before the expiration of this period:

(a) a Party communicates to the other Party its decision to terminate this agreement; or
(b) the Treaty enters into force. In such event, this agreement shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely,

[s]
Ambassador Linton F. Brooks
Head of Delegation of the
United States of America
to the Negotiations on
Nuclear and Space Arms

Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin
Head of Delegation of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the
Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms

Providing photographs

July 31, 1991

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

On behalf of the Government of the United States of America, I have the honor to propose an agreement between our Governments on the provision of photographs of items subject to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty.

Under this agreement, our Governments would agree that:

(a) Photographs of items listed in Annex 1 to this letter be exchanged prior to signature of the Treaty.
(b) In connection with paragraph 10 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty, photographs of items listed in Annex 2 to this letter be exchanged on the date of signature of the Treaty.
(c) Photographs of items listed in Annex 3 to this letter be provided after signature of the Treaty either during an elimination or during the initial technical exhibitions in the course of confirming technical data and distinguishing features. Such photographs shall be in addition to those required under paragraph 4 of Section XIV and paragraph 10 of Section XV of the Protocol on Inspections Relating to the Treaty.
(d) The criteria for producing the photographs of items on the lists shall be the criteria provided for in paragraph 10 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty.
(e) The Parties shall have the right to raise, within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, questions concerning the provision of photographs pursuant to this agreement.

If the foregoing is acceptable, this letter together with your reply shall constitute an agreement between the Governments of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which shall enter into force on this date and shall remain in force for a 12-month period, unless, before the expiration of this period:

(a) a Party communicates to the other Party its decision to terminate this agreement; or
(b) the Treaty enters into force. In such event, this agreement shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely,

[s]
Ambassador Linton F. Brooks
Head of Delegation of the
United States of America
to the Negotiations on
Nuclear and Space Arms

Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin
Head of Delegation of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the
Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms

Annex 1

List of photographs to be provided prior to signature of the Treaty:

For the United States of America:

ICBM Emplacement Equipment
B-1 unique support equipment, pylons, and rotary launchers

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

ICBM Emplacement Equipment
Driver Training Vehicles
Launch-Associated Support Vehicles
Launch-Associated Railcars

Annex 2

List of photographs to be exchanged on the date of signature of the Treaty:

For the United States of America:

ICBMs and Their Associated Systems:

MMII without front section and without SCDM
MMIII without front section and without SCDM
MMII first stage
MMIII first stage
PK first stage
PK second stage
PK third stage
PK SCDM

SLBMs and Their Associated Systems:

POSEIDON as a unit with front section (inert missile)
TRIDENT I as a unit with front section (inert missile)
TRIDENT II as a unit with front section (inert missile)
POSEIDON first stage
TRIDENT I first stage
TRIDENT II first stage

Heavy Bombers and Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs:

B-52H equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs-AGM-86B
B-52H equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs-AGM-129
B-52G equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs-AGM-86B
B-52G equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs
B-1B equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs
B-2 equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs of a type that does not include the category heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs
Long-range nuclear ALCM AGM-86B
Long-range nuclear ALCM AGM-129

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

ICBMs and their Associated Systems:

SS-11 in launch canister without front section
SS-13 first stage second and third stages as a unit
SS-17 in launch canister without front section
SS-18 in launch canister without front section as a unit without front section and without self- contained dispensing mechanism (outside launch canister) first stage
SS-19 in launch canister without front section
SS-24 (for silo launcher) in launch canister without front section (for silo launcher) first stage
SS-24 (for rail-mobile launcher) in launch canister without front section (for rail-mobile launcher) first stage
SS-25 in launch canister without front section first stage
Road-mobile launcher of SS-25 ICBMs without missile, version "A"
Road-mobile launcher of SS-25 ICBMs without missile, version "B"
Rail-mobile launcher of SS-24 ICBMs
Fixed structure for road-mobile launchers
Fixed structure for rail-mobile launchers

SLBMs and Their Associated Systems:

SS-N-6 as a unit without front section
SS-N-8 as a unit with front section
SS-N-18 as a unit with front section
SS-N-20 as a unit with front section
SS-N-23 as a unit with front section

Heavy Bombers and Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs:

Blackjack equipped for AS-15 Mod B long-range nuclear ALCMs
Bear H6 equipped for AS-15 Mod A long-range nuclear ALCMs
Bear H16 equipped for AS-15 Mod A long-range nuclear ALCMs
Bear G equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs
Bear B equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs
Bear T training heavy bomber
Bison A former heavy bomber

AS-15 Mod A long-range nuclear ALCM
AS-15 Mod B long-range nuclear ALCM

Annex 3

List of photographs to be provided after signature of the Treaty either during an elimination or during the initial exhibitions in the course of confirming technical data and distinguishing features:

For the United States of America:

Heavy Bombers and Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs:

B1-B equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

ICBMs and their Associated Systems:

SS-11* as a unit without front section (outside launch canister) first stage
SS-17* as a unit without front section (outside launch canister) first stage
SS-19* as a unit without front section and without SCDM (outside launch canister) first stage
SS-24** (for silo launcher) as a unit without front section (outside launch canister)
SS-24** (for rail-mobile launcher) as a unit without front section (outside launch canister)
SS-25** as a unit without front section (outside launch canister)

* To be provided as part of the confirmation of dimensions of the missile and first stage during elimination no later than one year after signature of the Treaty.
** To be provided as part of the confirmation of dimensions of the missile during initial exhibitions.

SLBMs and Their Associated Systems: *

SS-N-8 first stage
SS-N-18 first stage
SS-N-20 first stage
SS-N-23 first stage

* To be provided as part of the confirmation of dimensions of the first stage during elimination.

July 31, 1991

Ambassador Linton F. Brooks
Head of Delegation of the
United States of America to the
Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

On behalf of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I have the honor to accept the proposal set forth in your letter of this date, that an agreement be concluded between our Governments on the provision of photographs of items subject to the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty.

Under this agreement, our Governments shall agree that:

(a) Photographs of items listed in Annex 1 to this letter be exchanged prior to signature of the Treaty.
(b) In connection with paragraph 10 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty, photographs of items listed in Annex 2 to this letter be exchanged on the date of signature of the Treaty.
(c) Photographs of items listed in Annex 3 to this letter be provided after signature of the Treaty either during an elimination or during the initial technical exhibitions in the course of confirming technical data and distinguishing features. Such photographs shall be in addition to those required under paragraph 4 of Section XIV and paragraph 10 of Section XV of the Protocol on Inspections Relating to the Treaty.
(d) The criteria for producing the photographs of items on the lists shall be the criteria provided for in paragraph 10 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty.
(e) The Parties shall have the right to raise, within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, questions concerning the provision of photographs pursuant to this agreement.

This reply together with your letter shall constitute an agreement between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which shall enter into force on this date and shall remain in force for a 12-month period, unless before the expiration of this period:

(a) a Party communicates to the other Party its decision to terminate this agreement; or
(b) the Treaty enters into force. In such event, this agreement shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin
Head of Delegation of the
Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics to the
Negotiations on Nuclear and
Space Arms

Annex 1

List of photographs to be provided prior to signature of the Treaty:

For the United States of America:

ICBM Emplacement Equipment
B-1 unique support equipment, pylons, and rotary launchers

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

ICBM Emplacement Equipment
Driver Training Vehicles
Launch-Associated Support Vehicles
Launch-Associated Railcars

Annex 2

List of photographs to be exchanged on the date of signature of the Treaty:

For the United States of America:

ICBMs and Their Associated Systems:

MMII without front section and without SCDM
MMIII without front section and without SCDM
MMII first stage
MMIII first stage
PK first stage
PK second stage
PK third stage
PK SCDM

SLBMs and Their Associated Systems:

Heavy Bombers and Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs:

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

ICBMs and their Associated Systems:

Fixed structure for rail-mobile launchers

SLBMs and Their Associated Systems:

SS-N-6 as a unit without front section
SS-N-8 as a unit with front section
SS-N-18 as a unit with front section
SS-N-20 as a unit with front section
SS-N-23 as a unit with front section

Heavy Bombers and Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs:

AS-15 Mod A long-range nuclear ALCM
AS-15 Mod B long-range nuclear ALCM

Annex 3

List of photographs to be provided after signature of the Treaty either during an elimination or during the initial exhibitions in the course of confirming technical data and distinguishing features:

For the United States of America:

Heavy Bombers and Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs:

B1-B equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

ICBMs and their Associated Systems:

SS-11* as a unit without front section (outside launch canister) first stage
SS-17* as a unit without front section (outside launch canister) first stage
SS-19* as a unit without front section and without SCDM (outside launch canister) first stage
SS-24** (for silo launcher) as a unit without front section (outside launchcanister)
SS-24** (for rail-mobile launcher) as a unit without front section (outside launch canister)
SS-25** as a unit without front section (outside launch canister)

SLBMs and Their Associated Systems: *

SS-N-8 first stage
SS-N-18 first stage
SS-N-20 first stage
SS-N-23 first stage

* To be provided as part of the confirmation of dimensions of the first stage during elimination.

Correspondence related to the Treaty

Third country basing

July 31, 1991

Dear Mr. Minister:

Our strategic arms control negotiators in Geneva have continued the discussions which Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and I began in New York last year on prohibiting the basing of strategic offensive arms in third countries. I believe a solution to this problem is possible, and would like to offer some concrete thoughts on how this issue could be resolved.

Let me remind you of the many steps that we have already taken to meet your concerns:

First, we have agreed to your proposal to ban the basing of strategic offensive arms outside national territory. That ban will take effect immediately upon entry into force of the START Treaty.

Second, while we do not regard our operations in Holy Loch, Scotland as basing, we are prepared to commit that ballistic missile submarines will be withdrawn from Holy Loch within five months after entry into force of the Treaty.

Third, I can reaffirm our commitment, which I gave to Foreign Minister Shevardnadze orally, that no arrangement involving ballistic missile submarines, such as that currently in Holy Loch, will be carried out in the future.

Finally, I can formally reaffirm that the United States does not base strategic offensive arms outside its national territory.

But, as I explained in New York, we cannot accept a Provision in the START Treaty for inspections outside national territory. At the same time, with respect to our Agreed Statement on this subject, incorporated in the Agreed Statement Annex to the Treaty, I can cite the following paragraph thereof:

The Parties agreed that . . . the Parties have the obligation, if concerns arise under this Agreed Statement, to discuss any ambiguity and, if necessary, to provide each other with information to resolve concerns. Such discussions could occur through diplomatic channels, as well as in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. The Parties do not rule out the possibility that clarifications provided in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission might, in certain cases, include inspections or visits.

In this connection, the sides should use, as appropriate, relevant procedures provided for in the Treaty or measures worked out by the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission under provisions of Article XV of the Treaty.

I believe that, with the clarifications and assurances in this letter and your response, the Agreed Statement and the relevant Treaty provisions, all questions associated with third country basing have been resolved to our mutual satisfaction.

Sincerely,

[s]
James A. Baker, III

His Excellency
Aleksandr Bessmertnykh,
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics,
Moscow.

July 31, 1991

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I agree that your letter of this date provides a basis for solving the problem of prohibiting the basing of strategic offensive arms in third countries. I accept the proposals which you made in that letter.

We note that the arrangement which you have in Holy Loch, Scotland will be terminated and that all your ballistic missile submarines will be withdrawn from Holy Loch within five months after entry into force of the Treaty. For our part, I would like to state that, as we have indicated in the past, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics does not base strategic offensive arms outside its national territory, and does not carry out any arrangement involving ballistic missile submarines similar to that currently existing in Holy Loch and commits itself not to carry out such arrangements in the future.

With respect to our Agreed Statement on this subject incorporated in the appropriate Annex to the Treaty, I can cite the following provision:

"The Parties agree that. . . the Parties have the obligation, if concerns arise under this Agreed Statement, to discuss any ambiguity and, if necessary, to provide each other with information to resolve concerns. Such discussions could occur through diplomatic channels, as well as in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. The Parties do not rule out the possibility that clarifications provided in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission might, in certain cases, include inspections or visits."

I agree that, with the clarifications and assurances contained in your letter and this response, the Agreed Statement and the agreed Treaty provisions, all questions associated with third country basing have been resolved to our mutual satisfaction.

Mr. Secretary, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

[s]
Alexander A. Bessmertnykh
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

His Excellency
Mr. James A. Baker, III
Secretary of State of the
United States of America

ALCMs with multiple weapons

December 6, 1990

Dear Eduard,

Our arms control experts have been discussing the subject of long-range air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) with multiple weapons. As you recall, we agreed in May to ban long-range nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons. I understand from my experts that the Soviet side believes such a ban must be extended to include long-range non-nuclear ALCMs as well.

As I have told you in the past, we cannot permit the START Treaty to limit our conventional capabilities. In our view, the recent events in the Gulf underscore the importance of preserving non-nuclear options. At the same time, I would like to address your concerns over the possible circumvention of a ban on long-range nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons. Thus, let me make the following points:

First, under the START Treaty, the United States will comply with its obligation not to produce, test, or deploy long-range nuclear ALCMS with multiple weapons.

Second, in abiding by this obligation, the United States will not produce, test or deploy long-range non-nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons for the purpose of acquiring the capability in the future to deploy long-range nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons. Nor would the United States convert any long-range non-nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons into long-range nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons. Any such action by either side would be inconsistent with its Treaty obligations.

Third, any long-range non-nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons which might be deployed would, of course, be distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs in accordance with the procedures, including appropriate exhibitions and inspections, which are now being worked out in Geneva for distinguishing long-range nuclear ALCMs from long-range non-nuclear ALCMs.

Finally, in accordance with Article XII* of the START Treaty, each side will be obliged to meet within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission to respond to any questions raised by the other side's compliance with its Treaty obligation to ban long-range nuclear ALCM with multiple weapons.

Naturally, these assurances are premised on the assumption that the Soviet side interprets its obligations toward the United States under the Treaty with regard to long-range ALCMs with multiple weapons in the same way.

I believe that these points should alleviate your concerns. You should feel free to share them with your colleagues if you think this would be helpful. Of course, I am ready to meet with you to finalize this or any other issues.

Eduard, with these responses, and with the constructive steps your side took recently in Moscow on ALCMs, we should be able to resolve all remaining ALCM issues. Let's do so now.

Sincerely,

[s]
James A. Baker, III

The Honorable Eduard Shevardnadze,
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
New York

Moscow, December 6, 1990

Dear James,

In response to your letter on long-range ALCMs with multiple weapons, please allow me to inform you that desiring to rapidly reach agreement on the START Treaty, we are ready to accept the solution, which you propose in your letter. For its part the Soviet Union will adhere to the following:

Under the START Treaty, the USSR will comply with the obligation not to produce, test or deploy long-range nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons.

Under this obligation, neither the Soviet Union, nor the United States will produce, test or deploy long-range non-nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons for the purpose of acquiring in the future the capability to deploy long-range nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons. Nor will the Soviet Union convert any long-range non-nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons into long-range nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons. Any such action by either side would be inconsistent with its Treaty obligations.

The START Treaty must contain provisions on how to distinguish long-range nuclear and long-range non-nuclear ALCMs, including appropriate exhibitions and inspections. As I understand it, the two sides agree that those provisions be applied to long-range non-nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons. Thus, each side would be confident that the other side is complying with the ban on long-range nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons.

Finally, I note our common understanding that in accordance with Article XII* of the START Treaty each side will be obliged to meet within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission to respond to questions raised by the other side regarding ambiguity or concerns related to the other sides compliance with its Treaty obligations regarding the ban on long-range nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons.

In conclusion, I would like to express my satisfaction with the solution we have found to this problem. I hope that an equally constructive and mutually acceptable solution will be found for all other outstanding questions related to the preparation of the START Treaty for signature.

There is not much time left until that signing, therefore it is very important that everything necessary be done now to conclude this historic agreement.

Respectfully,

[s]
E. Shevardnadze

His Excellency James A. Baker, III
Secretary of State
United States of America
Washington, D.C.

* As written, should be "XV"

Tacit rainbow

May 19, 1990

Dear Eduard,

I have just finished meeting with my arms control experts, who tell me that we are still some distance from completing an overall agreement on the question of air-launched cruise missiles because of continuing differences over the issue of Tacit Rainbow. In particular, my experts have reported your concerns and the three elements of your proposal.

I have had an opportunity to study your ideas, and am persuaded that Tacit Rainbow need not be an obstacle to resolving the ALCM issue. In this message, I would like to give you a response that I believe offers a constructive means of resolving this matter. Let me make the following points:

First, the December 31, 1988 cutoff date to distinguish between current and future ALCMs is of course acceptable to me. This makes clear (as President Gorbachev agreed) that Tacit Rainbow will be treated as a future non-nuclear ALCM -- which it is -- and will thus be subject to the provisions in the Treaty that will enable both sides to distinguish between nuclear and non-nuclear ALCMs.

Second, I am able to confirm that Tacit Rainbow is a non-nuclear ALCM, and as such would be covered by our proposals of May 12, 1990 on how the START Treaty would identify non-nuclear ALCMs and distinguish them from nuclear ALCMs. In particular, I want to draw your attention to the language we proposed in the Notification Annex* we recently presented in Geneva. (A copy is attached.) Under this provision we would formally notify you at least six months in advance that Tacit Rainbow is a non-nuclear ALCM, would tell you about its distinguishing features and would propose a date on which you could come for an exhibition of this missile.

We have no plans to convert Tacit Rainbow to a nuclear ALCM. But if a non-nuclear ALCM were ever converted to a nuclear ALCM, that missile would then become subject to all of the START Treaty restrictions on nuclear long-range ALCMs.

Third, on your concern about range. I am advised that its range is less than 800 km. As you know Tacit Rainbow only became an issue when we considered accepting your proposal for a 600 km ALCM range threshold. Under our preferred position of 800 km, Tacit Rainbow was not an issue.

I believe that these points are responsive to your questions. You should feel free to share these points with your colleagues if you think this would be helpful. Of course, I am ready to come over to meet with you now to finalize this and any other issues.

Eduard, I would like to conclude by reminding you that you gave me every reason to believe that if I could move to your position on ALCM range, we would finally put the ALCM issue behind us. Let's do so now.

Sincerely,

[s]
James A. Baker, III

The Honorable Eduard Shevardnadze,
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the,
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Moscow.

* As written, should read "Protocol"

Relocation of heavy ICBM silos

[No Date]

Dear Mr. Secretary,

I received information from the head of our START Delegation in Geneva that the US Delegation had been instructed by Washington to suspend work which involves introducing changes into the Treaty in accordance with the agreement on heavy ICBMs reached in New York. In this context, the US side refers to the fact that allegedly I, in my conversation with you, said that the Soviet side did not intend to construct new silo launchers for heavy missiles.

I believe there is a misunderstanding here. In this connection, I would like to once again set forth the Soviet position, on the basis of which agreement was reached in New York. The essence of the matter is that in modernizing its heavy ICBMs the Soviet Union will construct new silo launchers for heavy ICBMs simultaneously with the elimination of such silo launchers, i.e., staying within the 154 limit. Thus, the Soviet side does not have plans of constructing an additional number (in excess of 154) of heavy ICBM silo launchers.

I wish to emphasize that our position is part of the New York agreement on heavy ICBMs, which we reaffirm in its entirety.

In conclusion, I would like once again to assure you, Mr. Secretary, that our meetings and discussions have given me a feeling of profound satisfaction, and express confidence that our useful dialogue and contacts will be continued in the interests of our two countries.

Respectfully,

[s]
D. Yazov
Minister of Defense of the USSR
Marshal of the Soviet Union

The Honorable Richard Cheney
Secretary of Defense of the
United States
Washington, D.C.

Moscow, December 6, 1990

Dear Sirs,

In view of the doubts you had with regard to the issue of constructing new silo launchers for heavy ICBMs - in the context of the broader agreement on heavy ICBMs reached in New York in October 1990 - we deem it expedient to provide the following additional clarifications.

First of all, we would like to reiterate with full clarity that under that agreement new silo launchers for heavy ICBMs would be constructed solely for replacing silo launchers of heavy ICBMs eliminated according to the Protocol on Conversion or Elimination Procedures to the START Treaty, which means that their number will remain within the Treaty limits. As we understand it, you may have a question as to what would require such construction. An answer to this question should be sought in situations which might arise in real life.

We hope you agree with us that such accidents unfortunately cannot be fully ruled out, where - in particular, due to long period of operation of silo launchers -their further operation would be impossible. Incidentally, this has been taken into account in the Protocol on Conversion or Elimination Procedures to the START Treaty, which as the two sides have already agreed upon, provides for a special procedure for notifying and removing from Treaty accountability strategic offensive arms, including ICBM silo launchers, in case of their accidental loss or disablement beyond repair. Naturally each side would have the right in such cases to compensate for the systems removed from accountability - within the appropriate Treaty limits. This of course, applies to heavy ICBMs as well. At least for this reason, the possibility to construct new silo launchers for them should not be precluded.

Also, situations must not be ruled out where it would be necessary to relocate silo launchers, including those for heavy ICBMs, which means that they would be closed in one area of the country and constructed in another, for non-military considerations, particularly in connection with the internal political developments that are taking place in our country. Relocations of silo launchers might be required either during or after the period of reductions under the Treaty. A timely consideration of non-military factors by simply changing our current plans is difficult to realize.

At present we have no plans to relocate silo launchers for heavy ICBMs. Although such relocation, if required in the future, would incur additional great expenses and would be a hard step to take, we cannot, as you may understand, exclude such a possibility.

We hope these additional explanations remove completely the misunderstanding that has arisen and make it possible, at least, to reaffirm the New York agreements on heavy ICBMs and finally close this issue.

Respectfully,

[s]E. Shevardnadze

[s]D. Yazov

His Excellency
James A. Baker, III
Secretary of State
United States of America
Washington, D.C.

His Excellency
Richard B. Cheney
Secretary of Defense
United States of America

Joint statements : exchanged at the final plenary (July 29)

Joint statement on new missile production technology processes

July 29, 1991

The Parties agree that:

(a) Procedures for elimination of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs specified in the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or Elimination of the Systems Subject to the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms have been agreed upon taking into account the fact that, in manufacturing stages for such missiles, both Parties currently use the technology of casting the solid propellant directly in the case of the solid rocket motor so that the cured propellant cannot be removed non-destructively.

(b) If in the future either Party begins to produce stages of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, employing so-called "insertable cartridges" or any other technology that allows non-destructive removal of solid propellant from motor cases, that Party shall inform the other Party thereof at the next session of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. The Parties shall decide within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission what, if any, additional verification and elimination procedures are necessary, taking into account the new technology for manufacturing missiles.

Joint statement regarding data updates with respect to categories of data contained in the memorandum of understanding

July 29, 1991

The Parties agree that, for any facility or item not listed in the Memorandum of Understanding under paragraph 1 of Article VIII of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, a notification, in accordance with paragraph 1, 2, or 3 of Section I of the Notifications Protocol Relating to this Treaty, shall be provided according to the complete list of the appropriate categories of data set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding or in the Agreement on Exchange of Geographic Coordinates and Site Diagrams Relating to the Treaty, regardless of the Party to which such categories pertain. In this connection, due consideration shall be given to those changes that may be made in the above-mentioned categories of data pursuant to the relevant procedure provided for in the Memorandum of Understanding.

United States Department of State.

Joint statement on costs related to the convening of a session of the JCIC on the territory of one of the parties

July 29, 1991

In connection with paragraph 3 of Section II, Section VI, and paragraph 1 of Section VIII of the Protocol on the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Relating to the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, the Parties agree that if they decide to convene a session of the Commission on the territory of one of the Parties, questions that may arise concerning the settlement of costs that may be incurred in connection with such a session shall be resolved prior to the convening of that session.

Joint statement on the ban on support equipment at eliminated facilities

July 29, 1991

The Parties agree that, with respect to the ban on support equipment at eliminated facilities in Paragraph 27 of Article V of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, support equipment includes, but is not limited to, ICBM emplacement equipment, training models of missiles, transporter-loaders of mobile ICBMs, storage cranes, launch-associated support vehicles, and driver training vehicles.

Joint statement on narrow directional beaming

July 29, 1991

The Parties agree that the ban on broadcasting telemetric information from ICBMs or SLBMs using narrow directional beaming, pursuant to subparagraph 2(c) of Article X of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, is established in order to ensure near-omnidirectional radiation of broadcast signals.

Joint statement on the term "ton"

July 29, 1991

The Parties agree that the English words "metric ton" and the Russian word "ton" mean 1,000 kilograms.

Joint statement on charter flights

July 29, 1991

The Parties agree that in order to facilitate the conduct of inspections and continuous monitoring activities pursuant to the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, questions concerning the use of chartered flights, if necessary for the transport of inspectors, monitors, equipment for the conduct of inspections, and equipment and supplies for the conduct of continuous monitoring activities shall be considered in the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

Joint statement concerning currency of payment for costs relating to implementation of the start treaty

July 29, 1991

The Parties note that the issue of currency of payment for costs relating to implementation of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms is not yet resolved and shall be deferred, without prejudice to the position of either Party, for subsequent consideration in a broader context with respect to both the Treaty and to other U.S.- Soviet agreements in the area of arms limitations.

Joint statement concerning interpretive data

July 29, 1991

The Parties understand that the interpretive data specified in subparagraphs 1(a) and 1(b) of Section II of the Telemetry Protocol relating to the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms are necessary to verify compliance with provisions of the Treaty.

The Parties also understand that the interpretive data specified in subparagraph 1(b) of Section II of the Telemetry Protocol shall not apply to parameters not specified in that subparagraph.

Joint statement on weapon storage areas

July 29, 1991

The Parties agree that the formulation "weapon storage area" as used in the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms means a location, shown on a site diagram, for the long-term and short-term storage of nuclear and non-nuclear armaments. Such locations shall be depicted on site diagrams of facilities subject to inspection pursuant to subparagraph 14(f) of Section VII of the Inspection Protocol.

Joint statement on exchange of site diagrams

July 29, 1991

Recognizing the importance of the exchange of site diagrams to guarantee reciprocal rights in respect to suspect site inspections pursuant to Article XI of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, the Parties agree that the site diagrams for facilities listed in Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of a Data Base Relating to this Treaty that are subject to suspect site inspection shall meet the criteria in Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding. The Parties agree that facilities or portions of facilities that are involved in the production of solid rocket motors shall not be subject to inspection. The Parties agree that the site diagrams for facilities subject to suspect site inspection shall be exchanged no later than 30 days after the date of signature of the Treaty.

Joint statement in connection with procedures for confirming launch weight

July 29, 1991

The sides understand that, in accordance with paragraph 10 of Section XIV of the Inspection Protocol, they assume the obligation to agree within the JCIC on procedures for weighing or determining by other means the weight of ICBMs or SLBMs with the purpose of confirming the launch weight of ICBMs or SLBMs of a new type declared on the basis of a change in launch weight before the beginning of deployment of any such new type of ICBM or SLBM. The Parties further understand that they are obligated to negotiate such procedures in good faith, and without efforts to artificially hinder agreement on such procedures so as not to delay the deployment of such an ICBM or SLBM.

Other statements

Unilateral statement by the United States of America concerning the B-2 heavy bomber

The United States of America makes the following statement concerning its plans with respect to the B-2 heavy bomber. This statement will remain in force for the duration of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and will be politically binding.

The United States of America has no plans to equip deployed B-2 heavy bombers for long-range nuclear ALCMs until such an ALCM has been flight-tested from a B-2 heavy bomber.

The United States of America recognizes that the first flight test of a long-range ALCM from a B-2 heavy bomber will require that: B-2 heavy bombers be exhibited pursuant to paragraph 12 of Article XI of the Treaty; B-2 heavy bombers be subject to inspection pursuant to the provisions of the Treaty; and all other provisions of the Treaty that pertain to heavy bombers of a type from any of which a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested apply to B-2 heavy bombers.

The United States of America recognizes that requirements under the Treaty referred to in this statement will also apply with equal force to heavy bombers, both of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, of any new type from none of which a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested.

Statement of policy by the United States of America concerning encryption and jamming

July 29, 1991

The United States of America, as a gesture of its goodwill and recognizing the value of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, declares its intention not to use encryption and not to use jamming during flight tests of ICBMs and SLBMs beginning 120 days after signature of the Treaty. The United States of America declares its intention to continue this goodwill restraint for one year or until entry into force of the Treaty, whichever is sooner.

Statement of policy by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning encryption and jamming

July 29, 1991

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as a gesture of its goodwill and recognizing the value of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, declares its intention not to use encryption and not to use jamming during flight tests of ICBMs and SLBMs beginning 120 days after signature of the Treaty. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics declares its intention to continue this goodwill restraint for one year or until entry into force of the Treaty, whichever is sooner.

U.S. statement on consultations relating to the release to the public of data and other information

July 29, 1991

The U.S. side understands that, pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article VIII of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties shall hold consultations on the release to the public of data and other information provided pursuant to Article VIII of the Treaty or received otherwise in fulfilling the obligations provided for in the Treaty. In this connection, the U.S. side agrees that it intends to follow, on the basis of reciprocity, the precedent established by the Agreement between the Governments of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. through an exchange of notes between the Embassy of the U.S.A. in the U.S.S.R. and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. dated April 20-23, 1990, concerning the release to the public of information which is contained in notifications provided pursuant to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate- Range and Shorter-Range Missiles of December 8, 1987, including data updates with respect to the categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Establishment of the Data Base for the Treaty of December 8, 1987. The U.S. Side further understands that such consultations shall be concluded prior to entry into force of the Treaty.

Soviet statement on consultations relating to the release to the public of data and other information

July 29, 1991

The Soviet side understands that, pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article VIII of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties shall hold consultations on the release to the public of data and other information provided pursuant to Article VIII of the Treaty or received otherwise in fulfilling the obligations provided for in the Treaty. In this connection, the Soviet side agrees that it intends to follow, on the basis of reciprocity, the precedent established by the Agreement between the Governments of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. and through an exchange of notes between the Embassy of the U.S.A. in the U.S.S.R. and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. dated April 20-23, 1990, concerning the release to the public of information which is contained in notifications provided pursuant to the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles of December 8, 1987, including data updates with respect to the categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Establishment of the Data Base for the Treaty of December 8, 1987. The Soviet Side further understands that such consultations shall be concluded prior to entry into force of the Treaty.

U.S. statement on launch-associated support vehicles and driver training vehicles

July 29, 1991

The U.S. side has taken note of the Soviet sides statement and believes that such information would be helpful in discussing compliance concerns when and if such concerns are considered in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

Statement by the Soviet side on launch-associated support vehicles and driver training vehicles

July 29, 1991

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has vehicles in its inventory that resemble launch-associated support vehicles and driver training vehicles. In the event that a compliance concern arises because of the presence of such a vehicle at an eliminated facility, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will either provide information on the features of such vehicles that distinguish them, by national technical means of verification, from launch-associated support vehicles and driver training vehicles, or provide clarification about what the vehicle is and the reason for its presence at the eliminated facility.

U.S. statement on non-circumvention of the start treaty

July 29, 1991

The United States has no existing patterns of cooperation involving the transfer of strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, except with the United Kingdom. The United States attaches great importance to the role played by the United Kingdom's independent nuclear deterrent in helping maintain world peace. As a result, the United States has, for many years, helped maintain and modernize that deterrent. This is what we have referred to as "the existing pattern of cooperation" between the United States and the United Kingdom. It currently includes agreement by the United States to sell the United Kingdom the Trident II weapons system. In this regard, the United States endorses the statement made by U.K. Foreign Secretary Hurd that "the British strategic force will remain a minimum one in no way comparable to the nuclear forces of the Soviet Union and the United States."

Soviet statement on non-circumvention of the start treaty

July 29, 1991

The Soviet side takes note of the statement, made by the United States in connection with the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms concluded between the USSR and the U.S., to the effect that the United States has no existing patterns of cooperation involving the transfer of strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations of the START Treaty, except with the United Kingdom.

It also notes the statement made by the U.S. side to the effect that the existing pattern of cooperation between the United States of America and the United Kingdom in the area of strategic offensive arms currently consists of the provision by the United States of Trident-II SLBMs to the United Kingdom. The Soviet Union also takes into account the fact that the United States of America endorses the statement made by U.K. Foreign Secretary Hurd that "the British strategic force will remain a minimum one in no way comparable to the nuclear forces of the Soviet Union and the United States."

If the United States were to alter its existing pattern of cooperation with the United Kingdom on strategic offensive arms in such a way that the terms and purposes of the START Treaty would be circumvented and the strategic balance altered, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would consider its supreme interests jeopardized. In that case, in accordance with Article XVII of the Treaty, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would consider that it has the right to withdraw from the Treaty.

Statement by the Soviet side concerning patterns of cooperation

July 31, 1991

In connection with the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics hereby confirms that it does not have existing commitments or patterns of cooperation that include the transfer of strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations of the Treaty on the Strategic Offensive Arms.

U.S. statement on the SS-N-23

July 29, 1991

Paragraph 1(a) of Section I of the Throw-weight Protocol describes the method for determining the throw-weight of ICBMs or SLBMs, the final stage of which executes a procedure for dispensing reentry vehicles. The U.S. side understood that this method for determining throw-weight was negotiated specifically to address design characteristics that are unique to the RSM-54 SLBM, known to the U.S. side as the SS-N-23. However, the Soviet side now asserts that the throw-weight of the SS-N-23 should be determined on the basis of the method described in paragraph 1(b) of the Throw-weight Protocol.

The Soviet side also informed the U.S. side that the accountable throw-weight of the SS-N-23, 2800 kg, was determined on the basis of the 1(b) method. While the U.S. side believes the SS-N-23 is of 1(a), not 1(b), design; for purposes of calculating throw-weight, the U.S. side accepts the SS-N-23 as a type 1(b) SLBM. However, the U.S. side stresses that this acceptance is without prejudice to our right to contest in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission the throw-weight values of any new type of ICBM or SLBM or modified existing type of ICBM or SLBM that incorporates a design similar to the SS-N-23, if such throw-weight values are based on the 1(b) method.

Soviet statement on the SLBM SS-N-23

July 29, 1991

In connection with the U.S. Statement on the SLBM SS-N-23 (RSM-54) the Soviet side confirms that the throw-weight of that missile should be determined on the basis of the method described in paragraph 1(b) of Section I of the Throw-weight Protocol to the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, since in terms of its design the SLBM SS-N-23 does not belong to missiles, the final stage of which executes a procedure for dispensing reentry vehicles.

In this connection, the Soviet side states that there is no ground for raising an issue related to determining the throw-weight pursuant to paragraph 1(a) of Section I of the Throw-weight Protocol for any new type of ICBM or SLBM or modified existing type of ICBM or SLBM that incorporated a design similar to the SLBM SS-N-23 (RSM-54).

U.S. statement on attachment joints

July 29, 1991

With respect to the inclusion of the distance between joints for attaching long-range nuclear ALCMs in Annex G and H to the Memorandum of Understanding, the attachment joints used on bombers belonging to the United States of America are of a design that allows the attachment of a variety of nuclear and non-nuclear weapons. In the U.S. view, such armament attachment joints are inappropriate for use as specified features that make heavy bombers belonging to the United States of America equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs distinguishable from heavy bombers belonging to the United States of America not equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. Further, since such armament attachment joints are installed on airplanes belonging to the United States of America other than heavy bombers, their presence is not sufficient to consider an airplane to be a heavy bomber.

Soviet statement concerning the purposes of inclusion in the memorandum of understanding of data on the distance between joints for attaching long-range nuclear ALCMs

July 29, 1991

The Soviet side makes the following statement concerning the purposes of inclusion in the Memorandum of Understanding of data on the distance between joints for attaching long-range nuclear ALCMs. Noting the importance of verification of the provisions of the Treaty relating to counting the number of warheads attributed to heavy bombers, the Soviet side states that the technical data distance between joints for attaching long-range nuclear ALCMs to pylon, measured on pylon and distance between joints for attaching long-range nuclear ALCM to launcher are included in Annexes G and H to the Memorandum of Understanding in order to confirm the number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which a heavy bomber of a type, category, and, if applicable, variant, is equipped. The Soviet side agrees that, since the design of attachment joints used on heavy bombers of the United States of America is such that it permits the suspension of a variety of nuclear and non-nuclear arms, joints for attaching weapons shall be considered as a non-mandatory distinguishing feature for categories of heavy bombers listed in Sections (ii) and (iii) of Annex G to the Memorandum of Understanding.

U.S. statement on underground structures

July 29, 1991

The U.S. side believes that construction of any additional underground structures adjacent to waters in which ballistic missile submarines operate and comparable in size and configuration to the ones located in the immediate vicinity of the Ara Inlet, the Yagelnaya Submarine Base, and the Pavlovskoye Submarine Base, would raise concerns regarding compliance with the obligation provided for in Article V, paragraph 26 of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. For its part, the United States does not have such underground structures, does not plan to construct and will not construct any such underground structures while the START Treaty remains in force. The U.S. side proceeds from the premise that the Soviet side will exercise similar restraint.

Unilateral statement of the Soviet side regarding underground structures adjacent to waters in which ballistic missile submarines operate

July 29, 1991

Since the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has underground structures located in the immediate vicinity of the Ara inlet (Kola peninsula), the Yagelnaya submarine base (Kola peninsula), and the Pavlovskoye submarine base (Primorskiy kray), in connection with the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and in order to settle the issue of these underground structures once and for all, the Soviet side states that these underground structures have no adits that make them accessible to waterborne craft of any displacement from adjacent waters and that the Soviet Union has no plans to construct and will not construct such adits as long as the Treaty remains in force. Effective verification of this shall be ensured by national technical means.

The Soviet side proceeds from the premise that the United States of America does not have and will not construct similar underground structures as long as the Treaty remains in force.

Statements on the relationship of START and ABM read at a meeting between U.S. Ambassador Brooks and Deputy Foreign Minister Obukhov on June 13, 1991.

Statement by the U.S. side at the U.S.-Soviet negotiations on nuclear and space arms

While the United States cannot circumscribe the Soviet right to withdraw from the START Treaty if the Soviet Union believes its supreme interests are jeopardized, the full exercise by the United States of its legal rights under the ABM Treaty, as we have discussed with the Soviet Union in the past, would not constitute a basis for such withdrawal. The United States will be signing the START Treaty and submitting it to the United States Senate for advice and consent to ratification with this view. In addition, the provisions for withdrawal from the START Treaty based on supreme national interests clearly envision that such withdrawal could only be justified by extraordinary events that have jeopardized a Party's supreme interest. Soviet statements that a future, hypothetical U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty could create such conditions are without legal or military foundation. The ABM Treaty, as signed on May 26, 1972, has already been substantially amended and clarified by subsequent agreements between the Parties. Moreover, current and future negotiations, to which the Soviet Union committed in the June 1990 Summit Joint Statement, could lead to significant additional changes in the ABM Treaty, or its replacement. Changes in the ABM Treaty agreed to by the Parties would not be a basis for questioning the effectiveness or viability of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.

Statement by the Soviet side at the U.S.-Soviet negotiations on nuclear and space arms concerning the interrelationship between reductions in strategic offensive arms and compliance with the Treaty between the U.S. and the USSR on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems

In connection with the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, the Soviet side states the following:

This Treaty may be effective and viable only under conditions of compliance with the Treaty between the U.S. and the USSR on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, as signed on May 26, 1972.

The extraordinary events referred to in Article XV |1| of this Treaty also include events related to withdrawal by one of the Parties from the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, or related to its material breach.

Statements exchanged at a meeting between U.S. Ambassador Brooks and Soviet Ambassador Nazarkin on July 27, 1991.

Statement of the U.S. side concerning the statement of the Soviet side on the TSSAM cruise missile

The U.S. side notes the statement of the Soviet side and believes that the concern it expresses about the impact of the new Tri-service Standoff Attack Missile (TSSAM) on the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) is totally unfounded.

The TSSAM is a non-nuclear, short range cruise missile that is not subject to START and that will have no impact on the integrity, stability, or durability of that agreement. The U.S. side stands by the Houston Agreement, which emphasized that the United States of America has no plans to equip deployed B-2 heavy bombers for long range nuclear ALCMs until such an ALCM has been flight tested from a B-2 heavy bomber. The TSSAM is not a long-range nuclear ALCM, and the Treaty is clear that its potential use on a B-2 would in no way imply that a B-2 is equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs or alter the status of the B-2 under START.

The U.S. believes that no START provisions will apply based on the potential equipage of the B-2 with TSSAM.

Statement of the Soviet side concerning the information of the U.S. side about the TSSAM cruise missile for inclusion in the negotiating record

The Soviet side is gravely concerned over the plans to develop and mass produce in the United States of America a new TSSAM cruise missile, which follows from the information about the cruise missile presented by the U.S. side at the START negotiations on June 14, 1991. The concern of the Soviet side is due to the fact that deployment of large numbers of such missiles will have adverse implications for the durability of the START Treaty, confidence in its integrity and stability that it provides.

Among our concerns is the fact that the multi-purpose suspension joints will be used for that missile on B-52 and B-2 heavy bombers, as follows from the explanations provided by the U.S. side. Because of that, in case of testing of TSSAM missiles from a B-2 heavy bomber the bomber might be used as a carrier of long-range nuclear ALCMs. Our concern increases in view of the fact that under certain circumstances B-2 heavy bombers are not subject to exhibitions and inspections.

The Soviet side reserves the right to return to these questions subsequently.

Declarations

Declaration of the United States of America regarding its policy concerning nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles

July 31, 1991

The United States of America, recognizing the value of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, and in the interests of enhancing stability and confidence, will provide the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics with annual declarations concerning the deployments of nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles planned by the United States of America for the duration of the Treaty. This declaration and subsequent annual declarations will be politically binding.

The first such declaration and all subsequent declarations are provided on the understanding that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will make comparable declarations. The first such declaration will be provided on the date of entry into force of the Treaty. Subsequent declarations will be provided annually thereafter.

The United States of America will specify the maximum number of deployed nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles for each of the following five years that the Treaty is in force.

The number of deployed nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles declared during the term of the Treaty will not exceed 880 in any one year.

Cruise missiles other than nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles will not be included in the declarations.

Declarations will apply to nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles of a range greater than 600 kilometers.

The United States of America will provide the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics information on which particular types of surface ships and submarines are capable of carrying deployed nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles. Such information will be confidential and will be provided on the date of entry into force of the Treaty.

The United States of America will not produce or deploy sea-launched cruise missiles armed with two or more nuclear weapons.

The United States of America will make these declarations for the duration of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and invites the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to make comparable declarations. These declarations may be supplemented by any cooperative measures that may be agreed upon by the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the future.

For the duration of the Treaty, the United States of America will also provide the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics annually confidential information on the number of nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles with a range of between 300 and 600 kilometers, deployed on surface ships and submarines. This information will be provided on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and annually thereafter.

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will continue to seek, as stated in the 1987 Washington Summit Joint Statement, mutually acceptable and effective methods of verification.

Declaration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics regarding its policy concerning nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles

July 31, 1991

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, recognizing the value of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, and in the interests of enhancing stability and confidence, will provide the United States of America with annual declarations concerning the deployments of nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles planned by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the duration of the Treaty. This declaration and subsequent annual declarations will be politically binding.

The first such declaration and all subsequent declarations are provided on the understanding that the United States of America will make comparable declarations. The first such declaration will be provided on the date of entry into force of the Treaty. Subsequent declarations will be provided annually thereafter.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will specify the maximum number of deployed nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles for each of the following five years that the Treaty is in force.

The number of deployed nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles declared during the term of the Treaty will not exceed 880 in any one year.

Cruise missiles other than nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles will not be included in the declarations.

Declarations will apply to nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles of a range greater than 600 kilometers.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will provide the United States of America information on which particular types of surface ships and submarines are capable of carrying deployed nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles. Such information will be confidential and will be provided on the date of entry into force of the Treaty.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will not produce or deploy sea-launched cruise missiles armed with two or more nuclear weapons.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will make these declarations for the duration of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and invites the United States of America to make comparable declarations. These declarations may be supplemented by any cooperative measures that may be agreed upon by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America in the future.

For the duration of the Treaty, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will also provide the United States of America annually confidential information on the number of nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles with a range of between 300 and 600 kilometers, deployed on surface ships and submarines. This information will be provided on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and annually thereafter.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America will continue to seek, as stated in the 1987 Washington Summit Joint Statement, mutually acceptable and effective methods of verification.

Declaration by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning the TU-22M medium bomber

July 31, 1991

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, recognizing the importance of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, and acting in the interest of strengthening stability and enhancing confidence, makes the following declaration concerning its plan with respect to the Tu-22M bomber, which is known to the United States as the Backfire. This declaration will remain in force for the duration of the Treaty and will be politically binding.

The Tu-22M airplane is a medium bomber and is not a strategic offensive arm. At the same time, taking into account the need to remove all concerns standing in the way of the agreements, the Soviet side declares that it will not give the Tu-22M airplane the capability of operating at intercontinental distances in any manner, including by in-flight refueling.

The Soviet Union will not have more than 300 Tu-22M airplanes at any one time, not including naval Tu-22M airplanes. The number of naval Tu-22M airplanes will not exceed 200.

In view of the fact that there must be no constraints in the START Treaty on arms that are not strategic offensive arms, Tu-22M airplanes will not be subject to that Treaty.

JCIC Agreements

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Agreement number 1
Relating to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991

Additional procedures governing the operation of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission

The Government of the United States of America, the Government of the Republic of Belarus, the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Government of the Russian Federation, and the Government of Ukraine, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

In accordance with the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty,

Acting pursuant to Articles III and IV of the Protocol to the Treaty, signed on May 23, 1992, in Lisbon,

Acting pursuant to paragraph 1 of Section VIII of the Protocol on the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the JCIC Protocol,

Have agreed as follows:

Article One

The following provisions shall constitute Annex 1 to the JCIC Protocol:

"ANNEX 1
ADDITIONAL PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE OPERATION OF THE JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION
1. With respect to paragraph 2 of Section I of this Protocol, the following additional provisions shall apply:

'The Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, or Ukraine may authorize any other of these Parties to represent its interests at a session of the Commission through the head representative of such other Party. Such authorization shall be provided in diplomatic notes to the representatives of all other Parties prior to the commencement of a session and shall state the subject matter, scope, and duration of the authorization.'

2. Paragraph 3 of Section I of this Protocol shall be superseded by the following provision:

'The head representatives of the United States of America, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine shall alternately preside over meetings during a session of the Commission, unless otherwise agreed during a session.'

3. Paragraph 2 of Section II of this Protocol shall be superseded by the following provision:

'A session of the Commission shall be convened on the date agreed by at least two Parties, including the United States of America, but no later than 30 days after the date proposed in the request provided for in subparagraph 1(c) of Section II of this Protocol.'

4. The first sentence of paragraph 1 of Section III of this Protocol shall be superseded by the following provisions:

'A special session of the Commission shall be convened either at the request of the United States of America to address what it considers to be an urgent concern relating to compliance of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, or Ukraine with the obligations assumed under the Treaty, or at the request of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, or Ukraine to address what it considers to be an urgent concern relating to compliance of the United States of America with the obligations assumed under the Treaty. All Parties shall have the right to participate in special sessions.'

5. The second sentence of Section V of this Protocol shall be superseded by the following provision:

'The Commission may record agreements or the results of its work in an appropriate document, which shall be done in five copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.'

6. With respect to Section V of this Protocol, the following additional provisions shall apply:

'The Parties agree that, after at least two Parties, including the United States of America, sign an agreement, the United States of America shall provide the text of the agreement to the Parties that did not sign the agreement. Each Party that has signed the agreement shall have the right to identify the agreement as one to which the provisions of subparagraph (c) of this Section shall not apply. The head representative of each Party that made such an identification shall, during the session of the Commission at which the agreement was signed, provide to all Parties that have signed the agreement its reasons for making such identification. These reasons shall be provided by the United States of America to all Parties that have not signed the agreement when it provides the text of the agreement. Each Party that did not sign the agreement:

(a) shall express its consent to be bound by the agreement by providing a diplomatic note of acceptance to all other Parties no later than 30 days after receiving the text of the agreement; or
(b) shall provide the substance of any objections to that agreement to all other Parties in a diplomatic note no later than 30 days after receiving the text of the agreement. If a Party provides an objection, that Party shall attend the next session of the Commission, unless the objection is resolved before the next session convenes; or
(c) shall be considered to have expressed its consent to be bound by the agreement if it does not provide a diplomatic note pursuant to either subparagraph (a) or subparagraph (b) of this Section, provided that no Party that signed the agreement has identified that agreement, as provided for in this Section, as one to which the provisions of this subparagraph shall not apply.

Each agreement shall enter into force on the date when all Parties have consented to be bound by that agreement, unless a later date is agreed by all Parties. The Parties agree that the United States of America shall notify all other Parties by diplomatic note of the date of entry into force of each agreement.'

7. With respect to Section V of this Protocol, the following additional provisions shall apply:

'Parties that sign or otherwise consent to be bound by an agreement may, on a case-by-case basis, agree to temporary observance of that agreement, provided that the agreement does not alter the rights and obligations under the Treaty. Temporary observance shall remain in effect for an agreed period or until that agreement enters into force.'

8. Section VII of this Protocol shall be superseded by the following provisions:

'Communications pursuant to this Protocol shall be provided through diplomatic channels; or shall be provided through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center of the United States of America, and the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center of the Russian Federation or other equivalent continuous communications centers established by the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, or Ukraine. All requests, responses, and notifications required by this Protocol shall be provided by the pertinent Party to all other Parties.'"

Article Two |1|

1. The number "1" shall be superscripted at the end of the title of Annex 1. The corresponding footnote shall read:

"This Annex is included in this Protocol pursuant to Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Agreement Number 1 of October 23, 1992."

2. The number "1" shall be used in the JCIC Protocol to refer to the corresponding footnote to that Protocol, which shall read:

"An addition to these provisions is contained in Annex 1 to this Protocol."

The number "1" shall be superscripted at the end of:

(a) paragraph 2 of Section I; and
(b) Section V.

3. The number "2" shall be used in the JCIC Protocol to refer to the corresponding footnote to that Protocol, which shall read:

"A change to this provision is contained in Annex 1 to this Protocol."

The number "2" shall be superscripted at the end of:

(a) paragraph 3 of Section I;
(b) paragraph 2 of Section II;
(c) the first sentence of paragraph 1 of Section III;
(d) the second sentence of Section V; and
(e) Section VII.

Article Three

1. This Agreement shall apply provisionally from the date of its signature until July 31, 1993, unless, before the expiration of this period:

(a) a Party communicates to all other Parties its decision to terminate the provisional application of this Agreement; or
(b) the Treaty enters into force.

The Parties may agree to extend the provisional application of this Agreement for additional periods, subject to the same conditions specified in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph.

2. The provisions of this Agreement shall apply provisionally in light of and in conformity with the other provisions of the Treaty.

3. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty, and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force, unless this Agreement is superseded. This Agreement shall be reviewed, at the request of any Party, upon the removal or elimination of all strategic offensive arms from the territory of a Party, but no later than the end of the period of reductions pursuant to subparagraph 2(c) of Article II of the Treaty. All Parties shall take part in such a review.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Geneva on October 23, 1992, in five copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America:
Steven E. Steiner

For the Government of the Republic of Belarus:
Andrey Sannikov

For the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan:
Kasymzhomart Tokayev

For the Government of the Russian Federation:
Gennadiy Shabannikov

For the Government of Ukraine:
Konstantin Hrishchenko

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Agreement number 2
Relating to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms of July 31, 1991

Corrections to the Inspection Protocol and the Memorandum of Understanding

To improve the viability and effectiveness of the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Inspection Protocol, by making corrections thereto,

To improve the viability and effectiveness of the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Memorandum of Understanding, by making corrections thereto,

Have agreed as follows:

Article One
Corrections to the Inspection Protocol

1. In the Russian of the last sentence of subparagraph 17(b) of Section V of the Inspection Protocol, the word "lyuboye" shall be superseded by the word "kakoye-libo".

2. Subparagraph 6(b) of Section VII of the Inspection Protocol shall be superseded by the following provisions:

"For air bases for heavy bombers, air bases for former heavy bombers, storage facilities for heavy bombers or former heavy bombers, and training facilities for heavy bombers, heavy bombers and former heavy bombers, of types of airplanes based at the inspected facility, shall not leave the inspection site. However, test heavy bombers, information about which has been provided in accordance with subparagraph 17(b) of Section V of this Protocol, and heavy bombers of a type from none of which a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested, may leave the inspection site. For air bases for heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, air bases for heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, air bases for former heavy bombers, and training facilities for heavy bombers, closed vehicles and containers large enough to contain the smallest long-range nuclear ALCM of the inspected Party, covered or environmentally protected objects large enough to contain or to be a long-range nuclear ALCM of the inspected Party, and ALCMs large enough to be long-range nuclear ALCMs of the inspected Party shall not be removed from the weapons storage area."

3. Paragraph 9 of Section VII of the Inspection Protocol shall be superseded by the following provision:

"For baseline data inspections, data update inspections, and new facility inspections, the inspectors shall have the right, subject to the provisions of paragraph 5 of Annex 6 to this Protocol, to read the data from the unique identifiers on all ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs except for such ICBMs deployed in silo launchers of ICBMs and except for such ICBMs deployed on mobile launchers of ICBMs that have not returned to their restricted areas due to circumstances brought about by force majeure and for which a member of the in-country escort has specified geographic coordinates in accordance with subparagraph 12(b) of this Section."

4. Paragraph 10 of Section VII of the Inspection Protocol shall be superseded by the following provision:

"For baseline data inspections, data update inspections, and new facility inspections, the inspection team shall have the right to confirm that ICBMs or SLBMs declared to be training models of missiles, or launch canisters declared to contain training models of missiles, are training models of missiles or contain such training models of missiles, unless such items are located in silo training launchers or in silo test launchers."

5. Paragraph 15 of Section VII of the Inspection Protocol shall be superseded by the following provisions:

"For test ranges, the inspection team shall have the right to inspect the entire inspection site subject to the procedures provided for in Annex 1 to this Protocol, except that for silo launchers of ICBMs located at the test range being inspected, regardless of where they are shown on the site diagram of the test range, the inspection team shall have the right to inspect, at its choice, no more than one silo launcher of ICBMs that the inspected Party declares not to contain an ICBM or a training model of a missile. Inspection of such a launcher of ICBMs shall be conducted subject to the procedures provided for in Annex 2 to this Protocol for the purpose of confirming that it does not contain an ICBM."

6. The following provision shall constitute paragraph 18 of Section VII of the Inspection Protocol:

"Notwithstanding any other provisions of this Protocol, silo training launchers shall not be subject to inspection."

7. The first sentence of paragraph 5 of Annex 6 to the Inspection Protocol shall be superseded by the following provisions:

"During baseline data inspections, data update inspections, new facility inspections, post-dispersal inspections of mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles, and conversion or elimination inspections, as well as during the conduct of continuous monitoring, inspectors or monitors shall have the right to read the data from the unique identifiers on deployed and non-deployed ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs. Exceptions to the right to read the data from such unique identifiers are set forth in paragraph 9 of Section VII and paragraph 11 of Section X of this Protocol."

Article Two
Corrections to the Memorandum of Understanding

1. In the English of Section IV of the Memorandum of Understanding: for the category of data "Non-Deployed ICBMs for Mobile Launchers of ICBMs" under "USSR", the number "60" shall be superseded by the number and symbol "66**"; for the category of data "Non-Deployed ICBMs for Rail-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs" under "USSR", the number "4" shall be superseded by the number and symbol "10**"; the footnote corresponding to the symbol "**" shall read "Six non-deployed SS-24 ICBMs are reflected in these data although these missiles belong to the variant for silo launchers."

2. In the Russian of Section IV of the Memorandum of Understanding: for the category of data "Non-Deployed ICBMs for Mobile Launchers of ICBMs", under "USSR" the number "60" shall be superseded by the number and symbol "66*", and under "USA" the number and symbol "11*" shall be superseded by the number and symbol "11**"; for the category of data "Non-Deployed ICBMs for Rail-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs", under "USSR" the number "4" shall be superseded by the number and symbol "10*", and under "USA" the number and symbol "11*" shall be superseded by the number and symbol "11**"; in the existing footnote at the bottom of the page on which these data appear, "* Non-Deployed Peacekeeper ICBMs are reflected in these data although Peacekeeper has not been deployed in a mobile mode.", the symbol "*" shall be superseded by the symbol "**". The additional footnote corresponding to the symbol "*" shall read "Six non-deployed SS-24 ICBMs are reflected in these data although these missiles belong to the variant for silo launchers."

3. In Section IV of the Memorandum of Understanding: for the category of data "Training Launchers" under "USA", the number "11" shall be superseded by the number "10".

4. In the aggregate data at the beginning of paragraph (a) of Annex A to the Memorandum of Understanding: for the category of data "Training Launchers" under "MM-II", the number "4" shall be superseded by the number "3".

5. In paragraph (a) of Annex A to the Memorandum of Understanding: for the category of data "Maintenance Facility: MALMSTROM AIR FORCE BASE, MONTANA, Silo Training Launchers" under "MM-II", the number "1" shall be superseded by the number "0".

6. In the English and Russian of the aggregate data at the beginning of paragraph (b) of Annex A to the Memorandum of Understanding: for the category of data "Non-Deployed ICBMs for Mobile Launchers of ICBMs" under "SS-24 for Rail-Mobile Launcher", the number "4" shall be superseded by the number and symbol "10*"; for this same category of data under "Total", the number "60" shall be superseded by the number and symbol "66*"; the corresponding footnote shall read "Six non-deployed SS-24 ICBMs are reflected in these data although these missiles belong to the variant for silo launchers."

7. In subparagraph (a)(i) of Annex F to the Memorandum of Understanding: for the category of data "Total Length of Missile as a Unit with Launch Canister: With Front Section (meters)" under "SS-18", the number "1" of the footnote superscripted above the item of data "(38.9)" shall be superseded by the number "5". At the bottom of the page on which this item of data appears: the footnote "1 Depending upon variant of type." shall be superseded by the footnote "1 For variants SS-18A and SS-18C, 28.5 m; for variant SS-18B, 29.1 m."; the additional footnote corresponding to the number "5" shall read "For variants SS-18B and SS-18C, 35.7 m; for variant SS-18A, 38.9 m."

8. Subparagraph 9(b)(iii) of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding shall be superseded by the following provisions:

"At a minimum, all structures used for items declared at that facility, and the structures used to contain the support equipment declared at that facility shall be shown within the boundary of that facility on the site diagram. Additionally, all structures that are intended for, and are large enough to be used for, items or support equipment declared at that facility shall be shown within the boundary of that facility, except those structures the entrances of which are not large enough to permit passage of such items or support equipment. If such structures are below ground, the entrances shall be marked and an outline of the below-ground structure shall be shown on the site diagram. Structures shown on the site diagram shall be in the shape of the area occupied by them or the area covered by the roofs of those structures and shall be accurately shown in proper scale and orientation to other structures and features shown on the site diagram. Notwithstanding the provisions of this subparagraph or of subparagraph 9(b)(i) above, silo training launchers and silo test launchers shall be shown on the site diagram of the facility at which they are declared, either outside or within the boundary of that facility."

Article Three

This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty, and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Geneva on October 23, 1992, in five copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America:
Steven E. Steiner

For the Government of the Republic of Belarus:
Andrey Sannikov

For the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan:
Kasymzhomart Tokayev

For the Government of the Russian Federation:
Gennadiy Shabannikov

For the Government of Ukraine:
Konstantin Hrishchenko

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Agreement number 3
Relating to the Agreement between the government of the United States of America and the government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on exchange of geographic coordinates and site diagrams relating to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms of July 31, 1991

Corrections to coordinate data

(This agreement is confidential and is not included in this publication)

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Agreement number 4
Relating to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms of July 31, 1991

Maximum weight of equipment and supplies

Pursuant to paragraph 14 of Section IV of the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Inspection Protocol,

Have agreed as follows:

Article One

The first sentence of paragraph 14 of Section IV of the Inspection Protocol shall be superseded by the following provision:

"For each facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, the maximum weight of equipment and supplies that may be brought into or taken out by one flight of an airplane transporting monitors through the point of entry in accordance with the provisions of this Section shall be 3,000 kilograms, unless otherwise agreed within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission."

Article Two

This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty, and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Geneva on October 23, 1992, in five copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America:
Steven E. Steiner

For the Government of the Republic of Belarus:
Andrey Sannikov

For the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan:
Kasymzhomart Tokayev

For the Government of the Russian Federation:
Gennadiy Shabannikov

For the Government of Ukraine:
Konstantin Hrishchenko

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Agreement number 5
Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991

Providing inventory of cargo
Repacking of cargo
Notification of location for conducting cargo examination

Pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 6 of Annex 7 to the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Inspection Protocol,

Have agreed as follows:

Article One
Providing Inventory of Cargo

The second sentence of paragraph 1 of Annex 7 to the Inspection Protocol shall be superseded by the following provision:

"The inspecting Party shall provide this inventory to the inspected Party no less than ten days prior to the arrival of such an airplane, unless otherwise agreed within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission."

Article Two
Repacking of Cargo

The first sentence of paragraph 6 of Annex 7 to the Inspection Protocol shall be superseded by the following provisions:

"If the examination of the cargo is carried out at the point of entry or at the airport associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, upon completion of the examination procedures, the inspecting Party shall repack the cargo, unless otherwise agreed within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. The inspected Party, at the request of the inspecting Party, shall assist the inspecting Party in repacking the cargo."

Article Three
Notification of Location for Conducting Cargo Examination

The following provision shall constitute paragraph 26 of Section III of the Inspection Protocol:

"Notification of an intention to conduct the cargo examination at a location other than the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility shall be provided by the inspected Party no less than 120 hours in advance of the estimated time of arrival of an inspection airplane used in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section IV of this Protocol."

Article Four

This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty, and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Geneva on October 23, 1992, in five copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America:
Steven E. Steiner

For the Government of the Republic of Belarus:
Andrey Sannikov

For the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan:
Kasymzhomart Tokayev

For the Government of the Russian Federation:
Gennadiy Shabannikov

For the Government of Ukraine:
Konstantin Hrishchenko

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Agreement number 6
Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991

Provision and installation of equipment necessary for, and equipment related to, playback of telemetric information that is contained on tapes

The Governments of the Parties to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty,

Acting in accordance with the Treaty,

Pursuant to paragraph 4 of the agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concluded on November 26, 1991, through the exchange of letters between their representatives to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission,

Pursuant to paragraph 3 of Section VI of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Notification Protocol,

Pursuant to subparagraph 4(c) of Section I of the Protocol on Telemetric Information Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Telemetry Protocol,

To aid in the preparation for the analysis of telemetric information that is contained on tapes to be exchanged after entry into force of the Treaty,

In the interests of promoting mutual understanding of the Parties' telemetry recording practices,

Have agreed as follows:

Article One

Subparagraph 4(c) of Section I of the Telemetry Protocol shall be superseded by the following provisions:

"if requested, provide the opportunity to acquire the appropriate equipment to play back the telemetric information that is contained on the tapes no less than 30 days in advance of the receipt of such tapes, unless otherwise agreed. Notification containing such a request shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section VI of the Notification Protocol. Equipment acquired following the initial demonstration, conducted pursuant to subparagraph 4(a) of this Section, shall be acquired in accordance with the provisions of Annex 1 to this Protocol."

Article Two

The following provisions shall constitute Annex 1 to the Telemetry Protocol:

"ANNEX 1
PROVISION AND INSTALLATION OF EQUIPMENT NECESSARY FOR, AND EQUIPMENT RELATED TO, PLAYBACK OF TELEMETRIC INFORMATION THAT IS CONTAINED ON TAPES
I. Provision of Equipment
1. The United States of America and the Russian Federation shall provide to each other the equipment necessary for playback of telemetric information that is contained on tapes provided by the Parties pursuant to paragraphs 4 and 6 of Article X of the Treaty. The quantity, description, make, and model number of such equipment are listed in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Section III of this Annex.
2. In addition to the equipment specified in paragraph 2 of Section III of this Annex, the United States of America shall, as a matter of goodwill, provide to the Russian Federation the equipment related to playback of telemetric information that is contained on tapes provided pursuant to paragraphs 4 and 6 of Article X of the Treaty. The quantity, description, make, and model number of such equipment are listed in paragraph 3 of Section III of this Annex.
3. The United States of America shall, in response to the request by the Russian Federation of September 25, 1992, and pursuant to subparagraph 4(c) of Section I of the Telemetry Protocol, provide to the Russian Federation the equipment necessary for playback of telemetric information that was demonstrated on August 17, 1992, in Washington, D.C., pursuant to subparagraph 4(b) of Section I of the Telemetry Protocol. The quantity, description, make, and model number of that equipment are listed in paragraph 4 of Section III of this Annex. Such equipment shall be delivered and installed at the same time as the telemetry playback equipment specified in paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of Section III of this Annex, and shall be subject to the provisions of Section II of this Annex.
4. For the equipment provided pursuant to paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of this Section, the providing Party shall provide all technical documentation necessary for operating and maintaining such equipment. There shall be no requirement to provide such documentation in a language other than that of the providing Party.
5. For the equipment provided pursuant to paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of this Section, the providing Party shall:

(a) install such equipment at a site selected, and prepared for installation in accordance with the technical requirements for such equipment, by the receiving Party; and
(b) ensure that the equipment is operating in accordance with the specifications of the technical documentation, exclusive of any warranty obligations noted therein.

6. The providing Party shall bear the cost of fulfilling its obligations pursuant to paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of this Section.
7. The providing Party shall, if requested by the receiving Party, ensure the provision of training, maintenance, service, spare parts, and replacement parts for all equipment provided pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Section. The receiving Party shall bear the cost of such training, maintenance, service, spare parts, and replacement parts.
8. Unless otherwise agreed, each Party undertakes not to transfer equipment, spare parts, or replacement parts, or to release technical documentation, received pursuant to this Section, to states other than the other Parties, or to individuals other than those who, because of their official responsibilities, require access to such equipment, spare parts, replacement parts, or technical documentation to carry out activities related to fulfillment of the obligations provided for in the Treaty.
II. Delivery and Installation of Equipment
1. Regarding dates of delivery and installation:

(a) No later than ten days after the date this Annex begins to be applied, the providing Party shall provide a list of special technical requirements for site selection or preparation to the receiving Party.
(b) No later than 60 days after the date this Annex begins to be applied, the providing Party shall deliver its equipment to the point of entry on the territory of the receiving Party. Specific dates of delivery and installation of such equipment shall be agreed upon by the providing and receiving Parties through diplomatic channels.
(c) No less than 20 days in advance of delivery, the receiving Party shall state to the providing Party, through diplomatic channels, the site where such equipment is to be installed.

2. Regarding delivery from the point of entry, the receiving Party shall bear responsibility for delivery, and safe-keeping during delivery, of provided equipment from the point of entry to the site where such equipment is to be installed. The receiving Party shall bear the cost of such delivery. The providing Party shall have the right to observe the provided equipment during such delivery.
3. Regarding the number and list of installation team members and the provision of visas:

(a) A team for installation of equipment provided pursuant to Section I of this Annex shall include no more than 14 individuals. The installation team shall have the right to bring tools and equipment required for installation. The aircrew for delivery of all such equipment and for transport of the installation team shall include no more than 15 individuals.
(b) The providing Party shall provide a list of installation team members and a list of aircrew members no less than 30 days in advance of their arrival in the territory of the receiving Party. The provisions of paragraph 6 of Section II of the Inspection Protocol on objections to an individual on the list of inspectors shall apply to an objection to an individual installation team member or aircrew member, except that the receiving Party shall notify its objection no later than 15 days after receipt of such lists.
(c) The receiving Party shall provide visas and, where necessary, such other documents to each individual to whom it has not objected, as may be required to ensure that each such team member and each aircrew member may enter and remain in its territory for the duration of the delivery and installation period.
(d) The providing Party shall provide a list of tools and equipment required for installation no less than 30 days in advance of their delivery to the territory of the receiving Party. The provisions of paragraphs 8 and 11 of Section V of the Inspection Protocol on examination of equipment and supplies shall apply to examination of such tools and equipment.

4. Regarding the installation team:

(a) The receiving Party shall provide necessary assistance, including a safety briefing and the appropriate power supply connectors for the provided equipment, to the installation team in connection with the delivery and installation of the equipment.
(b) The provisions of paragraph 11 of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol on movement, travel, and urgent departure or emergency evacuation of inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members shall apply to installation team members and aircrew members.
(c) Throughout the delivery and installation period, the receiving Party shall ensure that the installation team can be in communication with the embassy of the providing Party located on the territory of the receiving Party, using telephonic communications provided by the receiving Party.
(d) The receiving Party shall treat with due respect the installation team and aircrew members of the providing Party in its territory in connection with the delivery and installation of equipment, and shall take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on the person, freedom, and dignity of such persons.

5. Regarding arrangements for air transportation:

(a) Diplomatic clearance numbers for airplanes transporting the equipment, the installation team, and the tools and equipment required for installation, and airplane flight routes to and from the point of entry, shall be provided by the receiving Party no less than ten days prior to delivery.
(b) For the purposes of this paragraph, points of entry shall be: for the United States of America, Washington, D.C.; and for the Russian Federation, Moscow.
(c) The providing Party shall use only airplanes of the types specified in Annex 10 to the Inspection Protocol.
(d) The receiving Party shall provide parking, security protection, fueling, air navigation, airport facility, and ground technical and commercial services, as well as additional services as requested, for the dedicated airplane transporting the telemetry equipment of the providing Party at the point of entry. The cost of parking and security protection for each such airplane shall be borne by the receiving Party. The cost of fueling and air navigation, airport facility, and ground technical and commercial services, as well as additional services as requested, shall be borne by the providing Party.
(e) The providing Party shall state its intention, through diplomatic channels, to transport installation team members and equipment no less than 72 hours in advance of the estimated time of arrival of the installation team members at the point of entry from outside the territory of the receiving Party. Such statement shall include:

(i) the date and estimated time of arrival at the point of entry; and
(ii) the names, dates of birth, and places of birth of the installation team members and aircrew members.

(f) The provisions of paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of Section IV of the Inspection Protocol on flights of inspection airplanes shall apply to flights of airplanes transporting installation team members and equipment.

6. Regarding the installation report and confidentiality requirements:

(a) Before departing the installation site, the installation team leader and a representative of the receiving Party shall confirm in a factual written installation report that all the equipment is installed and is operating in accordance with the specifications of the technical documentation.
(b) Disclosure of information obtained by any Party in connection with the delivery and installation of equipment shall be only in accordance with paragraph 6 of Article VIII of the Treaty.
(c) Installation team members shall not disclose information obtained during delivery or installation except with the express consent of the receiving Party.

7. For the United States of America, practical implementation of activities pursuant to this Annex shall be carried out through the On-Site Inspection Agency of the United States of America. For the Russian Federation, practical implementation of activities pursuant to this Annex shall be carried out through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center of the Russian Federation.
8. Regarding additional services, throughout the in-country period, the receiving Party shall provide meals, lodging, work space, transportation, and, as necessary, medical and other urgent services for the installation team and aircrew members of the providing Party. Costs of all such services shall be borne by the receiving Party.
III. Quantity, Description, Make, and Model Number of Equipment
1. Equipment provided by the Russian Federation pursuant to paragraph 1 of Section I of this Annex:

(a) 1 Modulator/Demodulator unit (including synchronization converter, information input unit, demodulator and playback unit, synchronizer and demodulator unit, frequency multiplier, signal imitator, and sound playback unit), BY 3 430 020;
(b) 2 Magnetic tape recorders (including recording heads unit, playback heads unit, playback unit, control unit and tape transport mechanism), BY 3 060 032;
(c) 1 Power supply distributor, BY 3 620 054; and
(d) 1 Set interconnecting cables, BY 4 075 133.

2. Equipment provided by the United States of America pursuant to paragraph 1 of Section I of this Annex:

(a) 1 Analog tape recorder/playback unit (including 1 reproduce card for demodulation of IRIG Time Code at 900 KHz), Metrum 97; and
(b) 1 Time code reader/generator, Datum 9310.

3. Equipment provided by the United States of America pursuant to paragraph 2 of Section I of this Annex:

(a) 1 Telemetry receiver (including 1 Pre-D multi-frequency playback converter, heterodyne, Microdyne 1481-PP*), Microdyne 1400-MR*;
(b) 1 (each) Second IF filter (4, 2, 1 MHz and 300 KHz), Microdyne 1433-I*, 1430-I*, 1428-I*, l425-I *;
(c) 1 FM demodulator, Microdyne 1444-D*;
(d) 1 Multi-mode telemetry demodulator, Microdyne 1458-D*;
(e) 1 Bit synchronizer, Loral Data Systems 720;
(f) 1 Low pass filter, Reactel 10L5-50KB11; and
(g) 1 Set interconnecting cables.

* This equipment is an updated version of that demonstrated by the United States of America and is fully capable of serving as a substitute.
4. Equipment provided by the United States of America pursuant to paragraph 3 of Section I of this Annex:

(a) 1 Video cassette recorder, Panasonic AG-1960;
(b) 1 Color video monitor/receiver, RCA FX 209002;
(c) 1 Device for decoding and display of time code signals, Datum 9520;
(d) 1 Set cable connectors; and
(e) 1 Set voltage transformers and adaptors."

Article Three

1. The provision by the United States of America and the Russian Federation of the equipment necessary for the playback of telemetric information that is contained on tapes, pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2 of Section I of Annex 1 to the Telemetry Protocol, as set forth in Article Two of this Agreement, shall be deemed to be fulfillment of the obligations of the Parties, pursuant to subparagraph 4(c) of Section I of the Telemetry Protocol, to provide the opportunity to acquire appropriate equipment to play back telemetric information that is contained on tapes, with respect to equipment demonstrated pursuant to subparagraph 4(a) of Section I of the Telemetry Protocol.

2. The provision and installation by the United States of America of the equipment necessary for the playback of telemetric information that is contained on tapes, pursuant to paragraph 3 of Section I of Annex 1 to the Telemetry Protocol, as set forth in Article Two of this Agreement, shall be deemed to be fulfillment of the obligations of the Parties pursuant to subparagraph 4(c) of Section I of the Telemetry Protocol with respect to the equipment demonstrated in Washington, D.C., on August 17, 1992, pursuant to subparagraph 4(b) of Section I of the Telemetry Protocol.

3. None of the provisions of this Agreement shall apply to the obligations of the Parties provided for in subparagraphs 4(b) and 4(c) of Section I of the Telemetry Protocol with respect to equipment that may be demonstrated and made available after signature of this Agreement.

4. Equipment provided pursuant to paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of Section I of Annex 1 to the Telemetry Protocol, as set forth in Article Two of this Agreement, that is provided prior to entry into force of the Treaty, is provided for purposes of evaluation and preparing it for operation. Title to such equipment shall pass to the receiving Party on the date when all Parties have consented to be bound by this Agreement, or on the date of entry into force of the Treaty, whichever is later.

5. This Agreement shall not be construed to prejudice the rights of the Parties in any way or to impose additional obligations on the Parties except as provided for in Annex 1 to the Telemetry Protocol, as set forth in Article Two of this Agreement.

Article Four

The number "1" shall be superscripted at the end of the title of Annex 1. The corresponding footnote shall read:

"This Annex is included in this Protocol pursuant to Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Agreement Number 6 of November 19, 1992."

Article Five

1. This Agreement shall apply provisionally from the date when all Parties have consented to be bound by this Agreement until July 31, 1993, unless, before the expiration of this period:

(a) a Party communicates to all other Parties its decision to terminate the provisional application of this Agreement; or
(b) the Treaty enters into force.

The Parties may agree to extend the provisional application of this Agreement for additional periods, subject to the same conditions specified in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph.

2. The provisions of this Agreement shall apply provisionally in light of and in conformity with the other provisions of the Treaty.

3. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date when the United States of America, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine have consented to be bound by this Agreement, or on the date of entry into force of the Treaty, whichever is later, and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

4. Signature of this Agreement for the Government of a Party shall express the consent of that Party to be bound by this Agreement. The consent of the Republic of Belarus and the Republic of Kazakhstan to be bound by this Agreement shall be expressed by their Governments in accordance with paragraph 6 of Annex 1 to the Protocol on the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Relating to the Treaty.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Geneva on November 19, 1992, in five copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America:
Steven E. Steiner

For the Government of the Russian Federation:
Gennadiy Shabannikov

For the Government of Ukraine:
Konstantin Hrishchenko

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Agreement number 7
Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991

Procedures for additional confirmation of the dimensions of first stages of SLBMs

Acting in accordance with the Treaty,

Pursuant to subparagraph 5(d) of Annex 11 to the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Inspection Protocol,

Have agreed as follows:

Article One

The penultimate sentence of subparagraph 5(d) of Annex 11 to the Inspection Protocol shall be superseded by the following provision:

"Procedures for such additional confirmation of the dimensions of the first stages of SLBMs are provided for in Annex 13 to this Protocol, unless otherwise agreed within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission."

Article Two

The following provisions shall constitute Annex 13 to the Inspection Protocol:

"ANNEX 13
PROCEDURES FOR ADDITIONAL CONFIRMATION OF THE DIMENSIONS OF FIRST STAGES OF SLBMS
I. Procedures for Conducting Exhibitions
1. Pursuant to subparagraph 5(d) of Annex 11 to this Protocol, the Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to in this Annex as the exhibiting Party, shall conduct exhibitions of SLBMs of the types designated by the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine as RSM-40, RSM-50, RSM-52, and RSM-54, which are known to the United States of America as SS-N-8, SS-N-18, SS-N-20, and SS-N-23, respectively, for the purpose of additional confirmation of the dimensions of the first stages of such SLBMs. The exhibition of an SLBM of each such type:

(a) shall be considered to be a technical characteristics exhibition pursuant to paragraph 11 of Article XI of the Treaty;
(b) shall be conducted subject to the provisions of this Protocol, including paragraph 5 of Section III; paragraphs 8 and 9 of Section V; paragraphs 15, 19, and 28 of Section VI; and paragraphs 4, 5, and 7 of Section XIV; and using any of the equipment specified in Section III of Annex 8 to this Protocol; and
(c) shall be conducted during the first elimination of an SLBM of each such type.

2. The exhibiting Party shall provide to the United States of America, hereinafter referred to as the inspecting Party, a notification through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center no less than 30 days in advance of each exhibition conducted in accordance with this Annex. Such notification shall include: the type of SLBM to be exhibited, the location at which such exhibition will take place, and the date of such exhibition.
3. The exhibiting Party shall have the right, at its discretion, to either exhibit an SLBM and, simultaneously, a separate first stage of an SLBM of the same type, or to exhibit sequentially an SLBM and then its separated first stage. The SLBm being exhibited for the purpose of additional confirmation of the dimensions of the first stage of an SLBM of that type shall be an SLBM on which the exhibiting Party shall have the right to carry out, before the exhibition, some of the procedures for the elimination of an SLBM, to include removing some assemblies and elements of the SLBM. For sequential exhibitions of the SLBM and its first stage, the exhibiting Party shall separate the first stage from the rest of the exhibited SLBM, subject to the provisions of Section II of this Annex.
4. The inspecting Party shall have the right to confirm by external viewing and by measurement of the dimensions of the SLBM being exhibited that it is an SLBM of the declared type. If inspectors are unable to determine the type of SLBM, representatives of the exhibiting Party shall take steps to resolve the problem. Such steps shall include the opportunity for the inspecting Party to measure those removed assemblies and elements of the SLBm that contribute to the "Length of Assembled Missile Without Front Section" for the type of SLBM being exhibited, specified in Annex F to the Memorandum of Understanding. Upon completion of such viewing and such measurements, the SLBM being exhibited shall not be subject to further inspection.
5. The inspecting Party shall have the right to confirm the length and diameter of the exhibited separate first stage of the SLBM, or first stage of the SLBM separated during the exhibition, by measurement of its dimensions. Such measurements shall be made in accordance with the procedures provided for in paragraph 7 of Section XIV of this Protocol.
6. A member of the in-country escort, at the request of the inspectors, shall photograph the exhibited separate or separated first stage of the SLBM, in order to obtain three photographs of that stage that meet the requirements of paragraph 10 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding. Such photographs shall be produced using a camera system of the exhibiting Party. If an ambiguous situation arises, a member of the in-country escort, at the request of the inspectors, shall take photographs using the camera system of the inspecting Party, subject to the provisions of paragraphs 18 and 27 of Section VI of, and Subsection B of Section VI of Annex 8 to, this Protocol.
7. The exhibiting Party shall provide the inspection team with one photograph of the first stage of the exhibited SLBM. Such photograph shall meet the requirements of the agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concluded on July 31, 1991, through the exchange of letters on the provision of photographs of items subject to the Treaty.
8. Pursuant to subparagraph 5(d) of Annex 11 to this Protocol, during the exhibition of the first stage of the SS-N-20 SLBM provided for in this Annex, the inspecting Party shall also have the right to confirm the diameter of the third stage of the SS-N-20 SLBM. A member of the in-country escort, at the request of the inspectors, shall photograph the third stage of the SS-N-20 SLBM in order to obtain three photographs of that stage that meet the requirements of paragraph 10 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding. Such photographs shall be produced using a camera system of the exhibiting Party. If an ambiguous situation arises, a member of the in-country escort, at the request of the inspectors, shall take photographs using the camera system of the inspecting Party, subject to the provisions of paragraphs 18 and 27 of Section VI of, and Subsection B of Section VI of Annex 8 to, this Protocol.
II. Procedures for Separating an SLBM First Stage from the SLBM Being Exhibited
1. After the inspectors have confirmed the type of an SLBM pursuant to paragraph 4 of Section I of this Annex, the exhibiting Party shall have the right to separate, outside the field of view of inspectors, the first stage from the rest of the SLBM being exhibited at the location where the first stage separates from an SLBM during its flight, by mechanical severing of the missile's airframe by pyrotechnic devices of the missile, provided that the process of separation is carried out in such a way as to permit inspectors to ascertain that the first stage, the dimensions of which they will confirm, belongs to the SLBM being exhibited, the type of which they had previously confirmed.
2. Before the first stage is separated from the rest of the SLBM being exhibited, inspectors shall have the right to view the room or area in which the first stage will be separated, to ascertain that the room or area does not contain another first stage of an SLBM of that type.
3. During the entire process of first stage separation, the inspectors shall have the right to observe all exits of the room or area where the process of separating the first stage from the SLBM is carried out."

Article Three

The number "1" shall be superscripted at the end of the title of Annex 13. The corresponding footnote shall read:

"This Annex is included in this Protocol pursuant to Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Agreement Number 7 of April 14, 1993."

Article Four

1. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date when the United States of America, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine have consented to be bound by this Agreement, or on the date of entry into force of the Treaty, whichever is later, and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

2. Signature of this Agreement for the Government of a Party shall express the consent of that Party to be bound by this Agreement. The consent of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to be bound by this Agreement shall be expressed by their Governments in accordance with paragraph 6 of Annex 1 to the Protocol on the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Relating to the Treaty.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Geneva on April 14, 1993, in five copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America:
Steven E. Steiner

For the Government of the Russian Federation:
Gennadiy Shabannikov

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Agreement number 8
Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991

Notification of changes to routes for flights of inspection airplanes

Acting in accordance with the Treaty,

To improve the viability and effectiveness of the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Inspection Protocol,

Have agreed as follows:

Article One

1. The following provision shall constitute paragraph 27 of Section III of the Inspection Protocol:

"Notification of a change of a route for flights of inspection airplanes to and from a point of entry established on the territory of a Party shall be provided by that Party no less than 30 days in advance of the effective date of such change and shall include:

(a) the point of entry;
(b) the changed flight route, and
(c) the effective date of such change."

2. Paragraph 8 of Section IV of the Inspection Protocol shall be superseded by the following provisions:

"Routes for flights of inspection airplanes used in accordance with this Section to and from the points of entry are listed in paragraph 10 of Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding and shall be the basis for issuing standing diplomatic clearance numbers. Each Party shall assign alternate airfields in accordance with the rules of the International Civil Aviation Organization. Each Party may change routes for flights of inspection airplanes to and from points of entry established on its territory by providing a notification of such change to the other Party in accordance with paragraph 27 of Section III of this Protocol."

Article Two

A change of a route for flights of inspection airplanes provided in a notification in accordance with paragraph 27 of Section III of the Inspection Protocol shall be included in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 1 or 2 of Section I of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty only after the effective date of such change.

Article Three

1. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date when the United States of America, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine have consented to be bound by this Agreement, or on the date of entry into force of the Treaty, whichever is later, and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

2. Signature of this Agreement for the Government of a Party shall express the consent of that Party to be bound by this Agreement. The consent of the Republic of Belarus and the Republic of Kazakhstan to be bound by this Agreement shall be expressed by their Governments in accordance with paragraph 6 of Annex 1 to the Protocol on the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Relating to the Treaty.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Geneva on November 19, 1992, in five copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America:
Steven E. Steiner

For the Government of the Russian Federation:
Gennadiy Shabannikov

For the Government of Ukraine:
Konstantin Hrishchenko

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Agreement number 9
Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991

Corrections for technical data on fixed structures for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs

Acting in accordance with the Treaty,

Have agreed as follows:

Article One

In subparagraph (a)(i) of Annex F to the Memorandum of Understanding of July 31, 1991: for the category of data "Fixed Structure for Rail-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs" under "SS-24", the data provided shall be superseded by the following:

"KOSTROMA ICBM Base for
Rail-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs,
Parking Site Number 3

Length (meters) 546.0

Height (meters) 7.4

Width (meters) 6.2

KOSTROMA ICBM Base for
Rail-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs,
Parking Site Number 4

Length (meters) 463.0

Height (meters) 7.2

Width (meters) 6.2

BERSHET' ICBM Base for
Rail-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs
Parking Site Number 4

Length (meters) 615.0

Height (meters) 6.0, 10.0, 6.0

Width (meters) 6.0

KRASNOYARSK ICBM Base for
Rail-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs,
Parking Site Number 4

Length (meters) 606.4

Height (meters) 6.2-6.9, 12.7-13.2, 6.2-6.9

Width (meters) 6.1, 9.2, 6.1"

Article Two

1. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date when the United States of America, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine have consented to be bound by this Agreement, or on the date of entry into force of the Treaty, whichever is later, and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Geneva on November 19, 1992, in five copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America:
Steven E. Steiner

For the Government of the Russian Federation:
Gennadiy Shabannikov

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Agreement number 10
Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991

Provision and installation of equipment necessary for playback of telemetric information that is contained on tapes

Acting in accordance with the Treaty,

Pursuant to paragraph 3 of Section VI of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty,

Pursuant to subparagraph 4(c) of Section I of the Protocol on Telemetric Information Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Telemetry Protocol,

To aid in the preparation for the analysis of telemetric information that is contained on tapes to be exchanged after entry into force of the Treaty,

In the interests of promoting mutual understanding of the Parties' telemetry recording practices,

Have agreed as follows:

Article One

1. Paragraph 3 of Section I of Annex 1 to the Telemetry Protocol shall be superseded by the following provision:

"The United States of America shall, in response to the request by the Russian Federation of September 25, 1992, and pursuant to subparagraph 4(c) of Section I of this Protocol, provide to the Russian Federation the equipment necessary for playback of telemetric information that was demonstrated on August 17, 1992, in Washington, D.C., pursuant to subparagraph 4(b) of Section I of this Protocol. The quantity, description, make, and model number of that equipment are listed in paragraph 4 of Section III of this Annex. The Russian Federation shall, in response to the request by the United States of America of January 28, 1993, and pursuant to subparagraph 4(c) of Section I of this Protocol, provide to the United States of America the equipment necessary for playback of telemetric information that was demonstrated on January 25-27, 1993, in Moscow pursuant to subparagraph 4(b) of Section I of this Protocol. The quantity, description, make, and model number of that equipment are listed in paragraph 5 of Section III of this Annex. The equipment specified in paragraph 4 of Section III of this Annex shall be delivered and installed at the same time as the telemetry playback equipment specified in paragraphs 2 and 3 of Section III of this Annex, and shall be subject to the provisions of Section II of this Annex. The equipment specified in paragraph 5 of Section III of this Annex shall be delivered and installed at the same time as the telemetry playback equipment specified in paragraph 1 of Section III of this Annex, and shall be subject to the provisions of this Annex."

2. The first sentence of subparagraph 3(a) of Section II of Annex 1 to the Telemetry Protocol shall be superseded by the following provision:

"A team for installation of equipment provided pursuant to Section I of this Annex shall include no more than 17 individuals."

3. The following provision shall constitute paragraph 5 of Section III of Annex 1 to the Telemetry Protocol:

"Equipment provided by the Russian Federation pursuant to paragraph 3 of Section I of this Annex:

(a) 17S06/17S07 Magnetic recording unit for the RTS-9 System, consisting of:

(i) 2 Magnetic recorder units (including playback preamplifier unit, 17B73; tape drive mechanism unit, 17B74; and magnetic recorder on/off unit, 17B75), 17B71;
(ii) 2 Recording amplifier units, 17B77;
(iii) Final playback amplifier unit, 17B76;
(iv) Magnetic recorder switcher unit, 17B78;
(v) Magnetic recorder testing and control unit, 17B79;
(vi) Power supply unit, 9198M1;
(vii) Power supply unit, 9187M1;
(viii) Combination unit for reel storage; and
(ix) Set of interconnecting cables.

(b) MR BI1.700.006 Magnetic recorder for the BRS-4LR System, consisting of:

(i) 1 Magnetic accumulator (including recording head unit, playback head unit, tape drive mechanism, control unit for two magnetic accumulators, recording modules for two magnetic accumulators, playback modules, and power modules), MN1-BI3.060.011;
(ii) 1 Magnetic accumulator (including recording head unit, playback head unit, and tape drive mechanism), MN2-BI3.060.012;
(iii) 1 Power distribution panel, BY3.620.054; and
(iv) 1 Set of interconnecting cables."

Article Two

1. The provision and installation by the Russian Federation of the equipment necessary for the playback of telemetric information that is contained on tapes, pursuant to paragraph 3 of Section I of Annex 1 to the Telemetry Protocol, as set forth in Article One of this Agreement, shall be deemed to be fulfillment of the obligations of the Parties pursuant to subparagraph 4(c) of Section I of the Telemetry Protocol with respect to the equipment demonstrated in Moscow on January 25-27, 1993, pursuant to subparagraph 4(b) of Section I of the Telemetry Protocol.

2. None of the provisions of this Agreement shall apply to the obligations of the Parties provided for in subparagraphs 4(b) and 4(c) of Section I of the Telemetry Protocol with respect to equipment that may be demonstrated and made available after signature of this Agreement.

3. Equipment provided pursuant to paragraph 3 of Section I of Annex 1 to the Telemetry Protocol, as set forth in Article One of this Agreement, that is provided prior to entry into force of the Treaty, is provided for purposes of evaluation and preparing it for operation. Title to such equipment shall pass to the receiving Party on the date when all Parties have consented to be bound by this Agreement, or on the date of entry into force of the Treaty, whichever is later.

4. This Agreement shall not be construed to prejudice the rights of the Parties in any way or to impose additional obligations on the Parties except as provided for in Article One of this Agreement.

Article Three

1. This Agreement shall apply provisionally from the date when all Parties have consented to be bound by this Agreement until July 31, 1993, unless, before the expiration of this period:

(a) a Party communicates to all other Parties its decision to terminate the provisional application of this Agreement; or
(b) the Treaty enters into force.

The Parties may agree to extend the provisional application of this Agreement for additional periods, subject to the same conditions specified in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph.

2. The provisions of this Agreement shall apply provisionally in light of and in conformity with the other provisions of the Treaty.

4. Signature of this Agreement for the Government of a Party shall express the consent of that Party to be bound by this Agreement. The consent of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to be bound by this Agreement shall be expressed by their Governments in accordance with paragraph 6 of Annex 1 to the Protocol on the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Relating to the Treaty.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Moscow on January 28, 1993, in five copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America
T. R. Koncher

For the Government of the Russian Federation
Gennadiy Shabannikov

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Agreement number 11
Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991

Provision of tapes and data associated with the analysis of telemetric information, and the use of recording media

Acting in accordance with the Treaty,

To improve the viability and effectiveness of the Protocol on Telemetric Information Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Telemetry Protocol,

Have agreed as follows:

Article One

The following provisions shall constitute Annex 2 to the Telemetry Protocol:

"ANNEX 2
PROVISION OF TAPES AND DATA ASSOCIATED WITH THE ANALYSIS OF TELEMETRIC INFORMATION, AND THE USE OF RECORDING MEDIA
1. With respect to subparagraphs 1(a) and 1(b) of Section I of the Telemetry Protocol, the Party conducting the flight test shall have the right to provide either original tapes or copies of original tapes. All tapes shall be provided on reels that are compatible with the playback equipment provided.
2. With respect to paragraph 2 of Section I of the Telemetry Protocol, each Party shall have the right to use recording media other than magnetic tapes to record telemetric information. Appropriate changes to Section I of the Telemetry Protocol, if necessary, shall be agreed within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.
3. With respect to paragraph 1 of Section II of the Telemetry Protocol, a Party may, in fulfilling its obligation to provide interpretive data for a particular flight test, provide references to interpretive data that have been provided previously pursuant to that paragraph. In the event changes are made to the interpretive data previously provided, the Party that conducted the flight test shall, if requested by the receiving Party, provide a complete set of interpretive data through diplomatic channels no later than 30 days after receipt of such a request.
4. With respect to subparagraph 1(b)(i) of Section II of the Telemetry Protocol, the interpretive data to be provided shall cover the entire period during which telemetric information is broadcast, including the period after the stages and the self-contained dispensing mechanism of an ICBM or SLBM have completed their functions. In this connection, the Parties understand that such data may not be useful, for the purpose of verifying compliance with the provisions of the Treaty, after the stages or the self-contained dispensing mechanism no longer respond to control signals.
5. With respect to paragraph 2 of Section II of the Telemetry Protocol, the missile acceleration profile to be provided:

(a) shall be terminated no less than ten seconds after completion of the last procedure for dispensing reentry vehicles. For a missile that is not equipped with a self-contained dispensing mechanism and to which only one warhead is attributed, the missile acceleration profile shall be terminated no less than ten seconds after the reentry vehicle is separated from the final stage of the missile;
(b) may be terminated at the time of loss of active control, that is, at the time that the self-contained dispensing mechanism, or, for a missile not equipped with a self-contained dispensing mechanism, the final stage of the missile, no longer responds to control signals. If loss of active control is used as the reason for terminating the acceleration profile, the Party conducting the flight test shall inform the other Party, at the time that the acceleration profile is provided, that loss of active control is the reason for termination of the acceleration profile.

6. With respect to Sections I and II of the Telemetry Protocol, the tapes, tape summaries, interpretive data, and missile acceleration profile for a particular flight test shall be provided at the same time. Written materials may be provided in English or Russian, at the choice of the Party that conducted the flight test."

Article Two

The number "1" shall be superscripted at the end of the title of Annex 2. The corresponding footnote shall read:

"This Annex is included in this Protocol pursuant to Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Agreement Number 11 of April 14, 1993."

Article Three

1. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date when the United States of America, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine have consented to be bound by this Agreement, or on the date of entry into force of the Treaty, whichever is later, and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

2. Signature of this Agreement for the Government of a Party shall express the consent of that Party to be bound by this Agreement. The consent of Ukraine to be bound by this Agreement shall be expressed by its Government in accordance with paragraph 6 of Annex 1 to the Protocol on the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Relating to the Treaty.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Geneva on April 14, 1993, in five copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America:
Steven E. Steiner

For the Government of the Republic of Belarus:
Aleksandr Baichorov

For the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan:
Kasymzhomart Tokayev

For the Government of the Russian Federation:
Gennadiy Shabannikov

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Agreement number 12
Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991

IL-76 Inspection Airplanes

Acting in accordance with the Treaty,

To improve the viability and effectiveness of the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Inspection Protocol,

Have agreed as follows:

Article One

Subparagraph 2(b) of Annex 10 to the Inspection Protocol shall be superseded by the following provision:

"for the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine, for flights to the United States of America, types known as the IL-62, IL-76, and IL-96."

Article Two

1. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date when the United States of America, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine have consented to be bound by this Agreement, or on the date of entry into force of the Treaty, whichever is later, and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

2. Signature of this Agreement for the Government of a Party shall express the consent of that Party to be bound by this Agreement. The consent of the Republic of Kazakhstan and Ukraine to be bound by this Agreement shall be expressed by their Governments in accordance with paragraph 6 of Annex 1 to the Protocol on the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Relating to the Treaty.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Geneva on October 14, 1993, in five copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America:
Steven E. Steiner

For the Government of the Republic of Belarus:
Aleksandr Baichorov

For the Government of the Russian Federation:
Mikhail Strel'tsov

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Agreement number 13
Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991

The waters within five kilometers of the coastlines of submarine bases

Acting in accordance with the Treaty,

To improve the viability and effectiveness of the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Inspection Protocol,

To improve the viability and effectiveness of the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Memorandum of Understanding,

Have agreed as follows:

Article One

1. The chapeau of paragraph 4 of Section IX of the Inspection Protocol shall be superseded by the following provision:

"No later than one hour after the time for the designation of the inspection site specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 3 or 8 of Section III of this Protocol, the inspected Party shall implement the following pre-inspection restrictions at the ICBM base or submarine base, including the waters identified on the coastlines and waters diagram provided pursuant to paragraph 17 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding:"

2. Subparagraph 4(h) of Section IX of the Inspection Protocol shall be superseded by the following provision:

"The inspected Party shall not move any ballistic missile submarine from within the waters identified on the coastlines and waters diagram provided pursuant to paragraph 17 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding, and shall not commence dry docking of ballistic missile submarines within such waters."

3. Subparagraph 8(d) of Section IX of the Inspection Protocol shall be superseded by the following provision:

"For submarine bases, inform the inspection team leader of the location and type of each ballistic missile submarine to which pre-inspection restrictions apply, and of the type of SLBM for each such submarine, and provide the inspection team leader with a copy of the coastlines and waters diagram provided pursuant to paragraph 17 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding, annotated to show the location of each ballistic missile submarine within the waters identified pursuant to that paragraph, and the number of launchers on each such submarine."

4. The following provisions shall constitute paragraph 17 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding:

"For each of its submarine bases, each Party shall provide, through diplomatic channels no later than 30 days after entry into force of the Treaty, a coastlines and waters diagram on which shall be identified the coastline of the inspection site, the coastline adjacent to the other piers and wharves at which a ballistic missile submarine that is considered by the inspected Party to be located at the submarine base might be moored, and the waters within arcs with a radius of five kilometers from such coastlines. In the event such coastlines and waters change, a new coastlines and waters diagram reflecting such change shall be provided through diplomatic channels no less than 30 days in advance of the effective date of the change. Coastlines and waters diagrams provided pursuant to this paragraph shall be used only for the purposes of the procedures set forth in paragraph 4 and subparagraph 8(d) of Section IX of the Inspection Protocol."

Article Two

1. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date when the United States of America, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine have consented to be bound by this Agreement, or on the date of entry into force of the Treaty, whichever is later, and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Geneva on October 14, 1993, in five copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America:
Steven E. Steiner

For the Government of the Russian Federation:
Mikhail Strel'tsov

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Agreement number 14
Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991

Points of entry

Acting in accordance with the Treaty,

In order that points of entry be established, at entry into force of the Treaty, to the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine,

To improve the viability and effectiveness of the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Inspection Protocol,

To improve the viability and effectiveness of the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Memorandum of Understanding,

Have agreed as follows:

Article One

1. Paragraph 1 of Section IV of the Inspection Protocol shall be superseded by the following provisions:

"The United States of America and the Russian Federation shall each establish on its territory no more than three and no fewer than two points of entry. The Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine shall each establish one point of entry on its territory. The points of entry and their associated inspection sites shall be listed in Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding. Each Party may change a point of entry to its territory by providing notification of such a change to the other Parties in accordance with paragraph 23 of Section III of this Protocol."

2. Paragraph 8 of Section IV of the Inspection Protocol shall be superseded by the following provisions:

"The following routes for flights of inspection airplanes used in accordance with this Section to and from the points of entry shall be listed in paragraph 10 of Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding:

(a) from the west, directly to and from the points of entry to the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and western points of entry to the Russian Federation and the United States of America;
(b) from the east, directly to and from the point of entry to the Republic of Kazakhstan and eastern points of entry to the Russian Federation and the United States of America;
(c) between the points of entry to the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and western points of entry to the Russian Federation. An inspection airplane of the United States of America shall use such routes only if it has arrived at one of these points of entry from the west;
(d) between the point of entry to the Republic of Kazakhstan and eastern points of entry to the Russian Federation. An inspection airplane of the United States of America shall use such routes only if it has arrived at one of these points of entry from the east.

Such flight routes shall be the basis for issuing standing diplomatic clearance numbers. Each Party shall assign alternate airfields in accordance with the rules of the International Civil Aviation Organization. Each Party may change routes for flights of inspection airplanes to and from points of entry established on its territory by providing a notification of such change to the other Parties in accordance with paragraph 27 of Section III of this Protocol."

Article Two

Subparagraph 9(b) of Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding shall be superseded by the following provisions:

"(b) Republic of Belarus: Inspection sites and facilities subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facilities associated with point of entry Minsk:
ICBM Base for Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs:
Lida, Mozyr'
Storage Facilities:
Kolosovo
Conversion or Elimination Facilities:
Lesnaya
(c) Republic of Kazakhstan: Inspection sites and facilities subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facilities associated with point of entry Almaty:
ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs:
Derzhavinsk, Zhangiz-Tobe
Test Ranges:
Leninsk
Air Base for Heavy Bombers Equipped for Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs
Semipalatinsk
(d) Russian Federation:

(i) Inspection sites and facilities subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facilities associated with point of entry Moscow:
ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs:
Bershet', Teykovo, Yoshkar-Ola, Vypolzovo, Dombarovskiy, Kartaly, Kozel'sk, Tatishchevo
ICBM Base for Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs:
Teykovo, Yoshkar-Ola, Yur'ya, Nizhniy Tagil
ICBM Base for Rail-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs:
Kostroma, Bershet'
Storage Facilities:
Surovatikha, Piban'shur, Khrizolitovyy, Okol'naya, Revda, Nenoksa
Test Ranges:
Plesetsk, Nenoksa
Training Facilities:
Serpukhov, Balabanovo, Goryachiy Klyuch, Rostov, Perm', Plesetsk, Ryazan'
Production Facilities:
Votkinsk
Repair Facilities for Mobile Launchers of ICBMs:
Bataysk
Submarine Base:
Nerpich'ya, Yagel'naya, Olen'ya, Ostrovnoy
SLBM Loading Facilities:
Okol 'naya, Severodvinsk
Air Base for Heavy Bombers Equipped for Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs:
Mozdok
Air Base for Former Heavy Bombers:
Engel's
(ii) Inspection sites and facilities subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facilities associated with point of entry Ulan Ude:
ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs:
Krasnoyarsk, Drovyanaya, Yasnaya, Svobodnyy, Aleysk, Uzhur
ICBM Base for Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs:
Novosibirsk, Kansk, Irkutsk
ICBM Base for Rail-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs:
Krasnoyarsk
Conversion or Elimination Facilities:
Pashino
Submarine Base:
Rybachiy, Pavlovskoye
Air Base for Heavy Bombers Equipped for Nuclear Armaments Other than Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs:
Ukrainka

(e) Ukraine: Inspection sites and facilities subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facilities associated with point of entry Kiev:
ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs:
Khmel'nitskiy, Pervomaysk
Storage Facilities:
Mikhaylenki, Uzin
Training Facilities:
Pomerki
Conversion or Elimination Facilities:
Sarny
Production Facilities:
Pavlograd
Air Base for Heavy Bombers Equipped for Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs:
Uzin, Priluki"

Article Three

Subparagraph 10(a) of Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding shall be superseded by the following provisions:

"a. For flights of inspection airplanes of the United States of America to the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine:

ROUTE TO POINT OF ENTRY ROUTE FROM POINT OF ENTRY

To Minsk (direct):
(to be provided) (to be provided)

To Minsk from Almaty:
(to be provided) –

To Minsk from Moscow:
(to be provided) –

To Minsk from Kiev:
(to be provided) –

To Almaty (direct from the west):
(to be provided) (to be provided)

To Almaty (direct from the east):
(to be provided) (to be provided)

To Almaty from Minsk:
(to be provided) –

To Almaty from Moscow:
(to be provided) –

To Almaty from Ulan Ude:
(to be provided) –

To Almaty from Kiev:
(to be provided) –

To Moscow (direct):
G.T. SORLA, Ventspils, Belyy,
Gagarin, Sheremet'yevo Same as inbound

To Moscow from Minsk:
(to be provided) –

To Moscow from Almaty: _
(to be provided) –

To Moscow from Kiev:
(to be provided) –

To Ulan Ude (direct):
G.T. SQUID, Yedinka, Yekimchan, Bomnak
G.T. LEMUR
G.T. NALIM, Vitim
G.T. RAMIS, Kirensk
G.T. PIKET, Bratsk
G.T. DOMOR, Osa, Irkutsk,
Bol 'shoye Goloustnoye,
Mukhino Same as inbound

To Ulan Ude from Almaty:
(to be provided) –

To Kiev (direct):
(to be provided) (to be provided)

To Kiev from Minsk:
(to be provided) –

To Kiev from Almaty:
(to be provided) –

To Kiev from Moscow:
(to be provided)" –

Article Four

The Parties agree that the routes of flights for inspection airplanes that are to be provided in subparagraph 10(a) of Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding, as set forth in Article Three of this Agreement, shall be provided through diplomatic channels no less than 30 days in advance of entry into force of the Treaty, and shall be effective on the date of entry into force of the Treaty.

Article Five

Paragraph 12 of Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding shall be superseded by the following provisions:

"For each Party, the facilities subject to suspect-site inspection and the points of entry for these facilities are as follows:
(a) United States of America

Point of Entry

OGDEN San Francisco, California

SACRAMENTO San Francisco, California

MAGNA San Francisco, California

(b) Republic of Kazakhstan

Point of Entry

PETROPAVLOVSK Almaty

(c) Russian Federation

Point of Entry

ZLATOUST Moscow

BERSHET' Moscow"

Article Six

1. Article Four of this Agreement shall apply provisionally from the date of signature of this Agreement until the date of entry into force of the Treaty, unless, before the expiration of this period, a Party communicates to all other Parties its decision to terminate the provisional application of Article Four of this Agreement.

2. The provisions of Article Four of this Agreement shall apply provisionally in light of and in conformity with the other provisions of the Treaty.

Article Seven

1. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date when the United States of America, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine have consented to be bound by this Agreement, or on the date of entry into force of the Treaty, whichever is later, and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

2. Signature of this Agreement for the Government of a Party shall express the consent of that Party to be bound by this Agreement. The consent of the Republic of Kazakhstan to be bound by this Agreement shall be expressed by its Government in accordance with paragraph 6 of Annex 1 to the Protocol on the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Relating to the Treaty.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Geneva on October 14, 1993, in five copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America:
Steven E. Steiner

For the Government of the Republic of Belarus:
Aleksandr Baichorov

For the Government of the Russian Federation:
Mikhail Strel'tsov

For the Government of Ukraine:
Konstantin Hrishchenko

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Agreement number 15
Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991

Exhibition of the first stage of the silo-based variant of the SS-24 ICBM

Acting in accordance with the Treaty,

Have agreed as follows:

Article One

1. Pursuant to paragraph 1 of Section XIV of the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Inspection Protocol, an exhibition of the first stage of the silo-based variant of the SS-24 ICBM shall be conducted at the Pavlograd Machine Plant located in Pavlograd, Ukraine, no later than 30 days after entry into force of this Agreement. The Governments of the United States of America and Ukraine shall agree through diplomatic channels on a date when such exhibition shall be conducted.

2. The United States of America shall have the right during such exhibition to conduct an inspection, as provided for in paragraph 11 of Article XI of the Treaty.

3. Except as provided for in this Agreement, such exhibition and such inspection shall be conducted in accordance with the Inspection Protocol, including the procedures provided for in Section XIV of the Inspection Protocol and the provisions concerning inspection reports and non-disclosure of information obtained as a result of these inspections.

4. The United States of America shall have the right during such exhibition to confirm by external viewing and by measurement of the dimensions of the first stage being exhibited that it is the first stage of the silo-based variant of the SS-24 ICBM. Such measurements shall be made in accordance with the procedures of paragraphs 12 and 16, and subparagraph 14(a), of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty.

5. The United States of America shall have the right during such exhibition to measure the exhibited first stage of the silo-based variant of the SS-24 ICBM from the lower edge of the nozzle to the upper point of the forward end dome of the motor case.

6. Upon completion of such exhibition, subparagraph 4(b) of Annex 12 to the Inspection Protocol shall specify, pursuant to paragraph 5 of Annex 12 to the Inspection Protocol, the shorter of the lengths determined in accordance with paragraph 25 of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol for either the variant of the SS-24 ICBM for the silo launcher or the variant of the SS-24 ICBM for the rail-mobile launcher.

7. If such exhibition has not been completed 30 days after the date of entry into force of the Treaty, subparagraph 4(b) of Annex 12 to the Inspection Protocol shall be superseded by the following provision until such time as such exhibition is completed and subparagraph 4(b) of Annex 12 to the Inspection Protocol has been revised pursuant to paragraph 6 of this Article:

"Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Size Criteria

Length (meters) 8.0

Diameter (meters) 2.3

Missile Type SS-24"

8. After completion of such exhibition conducted pursuant to this Agreement, the Government of Ukraine shall submit to the Embassy of the United States of America in Kiev a bill for such exhibition in the amount of US $60,000. The bill shall be prepared in both the English and Russian languages and shall be denominated in both U.S. dollars and local currency. The bill shall include the bank and account number to which payment shall be made. The United States shall pay the amount of US $60,000 no later than 30 days after receipt of such bill.

Article Two

1. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date when the United States of America, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine have consented to be bound by this Agreement, or on the date of entry into force of the Treaty, whichever is later, and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

2. Signature of this Agreement for the Government of a Party shall express the consent of that Party to be bound by this Agreement. The consent of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation to be bound by this Agreement shall be expressed by their Governments in accordance with paragraph 6 of Annex 1 to the Protocol on the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Relating to the Treaty.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Geneva on October 14, 1993, in five copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America:
Steven E. Steiner

For the Government of Ukraine:
Konstantin Hrishchenko

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Agreement number 16
Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991

Exhibition of the RS-12M ICBM, Variant 2, for silo launcher

Acting in accordance with the Treaty,

Recognizing the advantages of providing the opportunity, prior to the commencement of baseline data inspections, to conduct exhibitions and inspections for the purposes provided for in paragraph 11 of Article XI of the Treaty, in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Inspection Protocol,

Have agreed as follows:

Article One

1. The Russian Federation shall conduct an exhibition, as provided for in paragraph 11 of Article XI of the Treaty, of the missile, declared by it on October 18, 1993, to be a variant of the existing type of the RS-12M ICBM, hereinafter referred to as the RS-12M ICBM, Variant 2. The Russian Federation declares its intention to deploy initially the RS-12M ICBMs, Variant 2, in silo launchers.

2. During the exhibition conducted pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article, the United States of America shall be permitted to conduct an inspection as provided for in paragraph 11 of Article XI of the Treaty. The inspection team conducting such inspection shall include no more than 15 inspectors.

3. The exhibition conducted pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions contained in Articles I, III, IV, V, and VI of the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Early Exhibitions of Strategic Offensive Arms Relating to the Treaty. The date of such exhibition shall be agreed upon through diplomatic channels.

4. Except as provided for in this Agreement, the exhibition and inspection conducted pursuant to paragraphs l and 2 of this Article shall be conducted in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Inspection Protocol, including the procedures provided for in Section XIV of the Inspection Protocol and the provisions concerning inspection reports and non-disclosure of information obtained as a result of such exhibition and such inspection.

5. No less than 15 days prior to the exhibition conducted pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article, the Russian Federation shall provide, through diplomatic channels, a notification concerning the RS-12M ICBM, Variant 2, containing information provided for in paragraph 3 of Section I of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty.

6. If as a result of the exhibition conducted pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article, the purpose of technical characteristics exhibitions is met concerning data provided by the Russian Federation for the RS-12M ICBM, Variant 2, the technical characteristics exhibition otherwise required to be conducted in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section XIV of the Inspection Protocol shall not subsequently be required. Technical characteristics exhibitions during the time period set forth in paragraph 1 of Section XIV of the Inspection Protocol shall be required only concerning data on characteristics that have not been demonstrated in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.

7. Upon completion of the exhibition conducted pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article, based on the results of the measurements made during the exhibition, changes or additions shall be made, as appropriate, to:

(a) The size criteria contained in Annex 12 to the Inspection Protocol; and
(b) The data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty.

Article Two

1. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date when the United States of America, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine have consented to be bound by this Agreement and shall terminate upon completion of the exhibition provided for herein. The termination of this Agreement shall not prejudice the validity of the information obtained as a result of such exhibition and such inspection, and contained in the inspection report, for the exercise of the rights of the Parties and the fulfillment of the obligations of the Parties under the Treaty after its entry into force.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Geneva on November 4, 1993, in five copies, each in English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America:
Steven E. Steiner

For the Government of the Russian Federation:
Mikhail Strel'tsov

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Agreement number 17
Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991

Releasability of Start Treaty information

Pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article VIII of the Treaty,

Pursuant to the U.S. and Soviet Statements on Consultations Relating to the Release to the Public of Data and Other Information, exchanged July 29, 1991,

Referring to Article 4 of Protocol I to the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of September 15, 1987,

Have agreed as follows:

Article One

The following provisions shall constitute Annex 3 to the Protocol on Telemetric Information Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Telemetry Protocol:

"ANNEX 3
RELEASABILITY OF TELEMETRIC INFORMATION
1. The following data provided in fulfilling the obligations provided for in the Treaty shall not be released to the public by any Party other than the Party that provided such data in fulfilling its obligations provided for in the Treaty, unless otherwise agreed:

(a) data and other information contained on tapes provided pursuant to Article X of the Treaty; and
(b) data and other information provided in accordance with the Telemetry Protocol.

2. Additional data and other information may be agreed by the Parties within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission for inclusion in the list set forth in paragraph 1 of this Annex.
3. The provisions of this Annex shall not affect the rights and obligations of the Parties with respect to the communication of such data and other information to those individuals who, because of their official responsibilities, require such data or other information to carry out activities related to the fulfillment of the obligations provided for in the Treaty."

Article Two

The following provisions shall constitute paragraph 18 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Memorandum of Understanding:

"Geographic coordinates pertaining to data in the Memorandum of Understanding, and site diagrams provided by the Parties pursuant to the Treaty, and coastlines and waters diagrams provided by the Parties pursuant to the Treaty shall not be released to the public by any Party other than the Party that provided such geographic coordinates and such diagrams in fulfilling its obligations provided for in the Treaty, unless otherwise agreed. Additional data and other information may be agreed by the Parties within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission for inclusion in this paragraph. The provisions of this paragraph shall not affect the rights and obligations of the Parties with respect to the communication of such data and other information to those individuals who, because of their official responsibilities, require such data or other information to carry out activities related to the fulfillment of the obligations provided for in the Treaty."

Article Three

The following provisions shall constitute Annex 1 to the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Notification Protocol:

"ANNEX 1
RELEASABILITY OF INFORMATION CONTAINED IN NOTIFICATIONS
I. Prohibitions
1. Each Party undertakes not to release to the public the original language texts of any notifications provided pursuant to the Treaty that are transmitted by any other Party.
2. Each Party undertakes not to release to the public the information contained in the notifications provided pursuant to the Treaty except as otherwise provided for in this Annex.
3. Each Party undertakes not to release to the public the information contained in the notifications provided pursuant to the Treaty that are listed in Section III of this Annex for three months after the end of the activities described in such notifications. Thereafter, except as provided for in paragraphs 5 and 6 of this Section, each Party shall have the right to release the information contained in such notifications.
4. Each Party undertakes not to release to the public the information contained in the notifications provided pursuant to the Treaty that are listed in Section IV of this Annex for three months after the end of the activities described in such notifications. Thereafter, except as provided for in paragraphs 5 and 6 of this Section, each Party shall have the right to release the information contained in such notifications unless that Party is notified by the Party that provided the information in fulfilling its obligations provided for in the Treaty that the information contained in such notifications shall not be released to the public for a period of time as the Party that provided the information in fulfilling its obligations provided for in the Treaty may prescribe or until further notice.
5. Each Party undertakes not to release to the public the name or passport number of any person contained in any notification provided pursuant to the Treaty.
6. Each Party undertakes not to release to the public the geographic coordinates of any facility or other location contained in any notification provided pursuant to the Treaty.
7. The provisions of this Annex shall not affect the rights and obligations of the Parties with respect to the communication of certain information contained in notifications provided pursuant to the Treaty to those individuals who, because of their official responsibilities, require such information to carry out activities related to the fulfillment of the obligations provided for in the Treaty.
8. The Parties shall agree within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission on the releasability of information contained in the notifications that may be additionally provided for by the Parties to be used in implementing the Treaty, before such notifications are used.
II. Non-Releasable Information
Release of the information contained in the notifications listed below shall be governed by paragraph 2 of Section I of this Annex:
4. NOTIFICATION OF CHANGE IN DATA IN THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, DUE TO ACCIDENTAL LOSS OF A TREATY ACCOUNTABLE ITEM
5. NOTIFICATION OF CHANGE IN DATA IN THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, DUE TO DISABLEMENT BEYOND REPAIR OF A TREATY ACCOUNTABLE ITEM
20. NOTIFICATION OF DATA FROM UNIQUE IDENTIFIERS FOR ICBMS FOR MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS
36. NOTIFICATION OF VARIATION FROM CONFIGURATION OF TRAIN WITH RAIL-MOBILE TEST LAUNCHERS WHILE TRAIN IS LOCATED OUTSIDE THE TEST RANGE
70. NOTIFICATION CONTAINING A REQUEST FOR DISPLAY IN THE OPEN OF ROAD-MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS
71. NOTIFICATION CONTAINING A REQUEST FOR DISPLAY IN THE OPEN OF RAIL-MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS
72. NOTIFICATION CONTAINING A REQUEST FOR DISPLAY IN THE OPEN OF HEAVY BOMBERS
73. NOTIFICATION OF INABILITY TO DISPLAY HEAVY BOMBERS THAT ARE NOT READILY MOVEABLE DUE TO MAINTENANCE OR OPERATIONS
74. NOTIFICATION OF CANCELLATION OF DISPLAY IN THE OPEN DUE TO FORCE MAJEURE CIRCUMSTANCES
76. NOTIFICATION CONTAINING A REQUEST FOR DISPLAY IN THE OPEN OF SPECIAL PURPOSE SUBMARINE
77. NOTIFICATION OF INABILITY TO DISPLAY SPECIAL PURPOSE SUBMARINE IN THE OPEN BECAUSE THE SUBMARINE IS NOT IN PORT
78. NOTIFICATION OF FLIGHT TEST OF AN ICBM OR SLBM
81. NOTIFICATION OF INCOMPLETENESS OR INSUFFICIENT QUALITY OF TELEMETRIC INFORMATION RECORDED ON TAPES
130. NOTIFICATION OF OBJECTION TO INSPECTORS, MONITORS OR AIRCREW MEMBERS WHO ARE CURRENTLY ON LIST OF INSPECTORS, MONITORS, OR AIRCREW MEMBERS
135. NOTIFICATION OF JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION - REQUEST FOR MEETING
136. NOTIFICATION OF JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION - REPLY TO REQUEST FOR MEETING
137. NOTIFICATION OF JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION - OTHER MESSAGES
138. NOTIFICATION OF JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION - REQUEST TO CONVENE A SPECIAL SESSION
139. NOTIFICATION OF JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION - RESPONSE TO REQUEST TO CONVENE SPECIAL SESSION
140. NOTIFICATION OF JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION - REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RELATED TO SPECIAL SESSION
141. NOTIFICATION OF JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION - RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RELATED TO SPECIAL SESSION
III. Information Releasable After Three Months
Release of the information contained in the notifications listed below shall be governed by paragraph 3 of Section I of this Annex:
1. NOTIFICATION OF DATA IN THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, CURRENT AS OF ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE TREATY
2. NOTIFICATION OF UPDATED DATA IN THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, AFTER THE EXPIRATION OF EACH SIX-MONTH PERIOD
3. NOTIFICATION OF CHANGE IN DATA IN THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, UNLESS ANOTHER NOTIFICATION OF SUCH CHANGE HAS BEEN PROVIDED
6. NOTIFICATION OF CHANGE IN DATA IN THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, RELATED TO ELIMINATION OF SILO LAUNCHER OF ICBMS, SILO TRAINING LAUNCHER, SILO TEST LAUNCHER, OR SOFT-SITE LAUNCHER, AT WHICH GRADING IS NOT TO BE PERFORMED
7. NOTIFICATION OF CHANGE IN DATA IN THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, WITH REGARD TO NEW FACILITIES, NEW KINDS OF SUPPORT EQUIPMENT, AND NEW TYPES, CATEGORIES, VARIANTS, AND VERSIONS OF TREATY ACCOUNTABLE ITEMS
8. NOTIFICATION OF CHANGE IN DATA IN THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING: EXHIBITIONS OF NEW VARIANTS OF ICBMS AND SLBMS, AND NEW VERSIONS OF MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS
9. NOTIFICATION OF CHANGE IN DATA IN THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, RELATED TO ELIMINATION OF A DECLARED FACILITY
10. NOTIFICATION OF REDUCTION IN NUMBER OF WARHEADS ATTRIBUTED TO A DEPLOYED ICBM OR SLBM
11. NOTIFICATION OF PLANNED AGGREGATE NUMBER AND CHANGES OF DEPLOYED STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS
12. NOTIFICATION OF EXPECTED NUMBER OF DEPLOYED STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IN EXCESS OF PREVIOUSLY NOTIFIED PLANNED NUMBER
13. NOTIFICATION CONTAINING A REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION OF LOCATIONS WITHIN ONE MINUTE OF LATITUDE AND LONGITUDE OF EACH OTHER
14. NOTIFICATION CONTAINING A RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION OF LOCATIONS WITHIN ONE MINUTE OF LATITUDE AND LONGITUDE OF EACH OTHER
16. NOTIFICATION CONTAINING A DECLARATION OF THE EXISTENCE OF A NEW FACILITY OR CHANGE IN CATEGORY OF A FACILITY
17. NOTIFICATION OF LOCATION OF A PRODUCTION FACILITY NOT PREVIOUSLY DECLARED AT WHICH PRODUCTION OF ICBMS OR SLBMS OR FIRST STAGES OF ICBMS OR SLBMS IS PLANNED
18. NOTIFICATION OF BEGINNING OF CONSTRUCTION OF A NEW SILO LAUNCHER OF ICBMS
19. NOTIFICATION OF CESSATION OF PRODUCTION OF ICBMS FOR MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS OR FIRST STAGES OF SUCH ICBMS AT A MONITORED FACILITY
21. NOTIFICATION THAT ICBMS OR SLBMS OF A TYPE ARE CONSIDERED ICBMS OR SLBMS OF A RETIRED TYPE
22. NOTIFICATION OF TYPE, NUMBER AND LOCATION OF ICBMS OF A TYPE FOR MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS, WHICH ARE ICBMS OF A RETIRED TYPE
23. NOTIFICATION OF TYPE, NUMBER AND LOCATION OF ICBMS AND SLBMS OF RETIRED TYPES, OTHER THAN ICBMS FOR MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS
24. NOTIFICATION OF TYPE, NUMBER AND LOCATION OF ICBMS AND SLBMS OF FORMER TYPES
25. NOTIFICATION OF UPDATED DATA CONCERNING TYPE, NUMBER AND LOCATION OF ICBMS AND SLBMS OF FORMER TYPES
26. NOTIFICATION OF COMPLETION OF TRANSIT OF NON-DEPLOYED ICBMS AND SLBMS
27. NOTIFICATION OF COMPLETION OF TRANSIT OF LAUNCH CANISTERS THAT REMAIN AFTER FLIGHT TESTS OF ICBMS FOR MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS
28. NOTIFICATION OF COMPLETION OF TRANSIT OF NON-DEPLOYED MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS
29. NOTIFICATION OF COMPLETION OF TRANSIT OF MOBILE TRAINING LAUNCHERS
30. NOTIFICATION OF VISIT OF HEAVY BOMBER OR FORMER HEAVY BOMBER TO A SPECIFIED FACILITY OR ELIMINATED FACILITY WHEN VISIT EXCEEDS 24 HOURS
31. NOTIFICATION OF CONCLUSION OF VISIT OF HEAVY BOMBER OR FORMER HEAVY BOMBER TO A SPECIFIED FACILITY OR ELIMINATED FACILITY WHEN VISIT EXCEEDS 24 HOURS
46. NOTIFICATION OF THROW-WEIGHT DATA FOR AN ICBM OF A NEW TYPE
47. NOTIFICATION OF THROW-WEIGHT DATA FOR AN SLBM OF A NEW TYPE
49. NOTIFICATION OF THROW-WEIGHT DATA FOR AN ICBM OF A NEW TYPE SUBJECT TO LIMITATIONS PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLE II OF THE TREATY
50. NOTIFICATION OF THROW-WEIGHT DATA FOR AN SLBM OF A NEW TYPE SUBJECT TO LIMITATIONS PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLE II OF THE TREATY
51. NOTIFICATION OF INCREASE IN ACCOUNTABLE THROW-WEIGHT OF AN ICBM
52. NOTIFICATION OF INCREASE IN ACCOUNTABLE THROW-WEIGHT OF AN SLBM
53. NOTIFICATION OF INTENTION TO PERFORM A CONVERSION
54. NOTIFICATION OF INTENTION TO PERFORM AN ELIMINATION
55. NOTIFICATION OF INTENTION TO PLACE AN ITEM ON STATIC DISPLAY
56. NOTIFICATION OF INITIATION OF A CONVERSION PROCESS NOT SUBJECTED TO INSPECTION
57. NOTIFICATION OF INITIATION OF AN ELIMINATION PROCESS NOT SUBJECTED TO INSPECTION
58. NOTIFICATION OF INTENTION TO INSTALL ICBM OF A DIFFERENT TYPE, OR TRAINING MODEL OF A MISSILE OF A DIFFERENT TYPE IN A SILO LAUNCHER OF ICBMS
59. NOTIFICATION OF COMPLETION OF ELIMINATION OF A SILO LAUNCHER OF ICBMS, SILO TRAINING LAUNCHER, SILO TEST LAUNCHER OR A SOFT-SITE LAUNCHER
60. NOTIFICATION OF COMPLETION OF ELIMINATION OF SLBM LAUNCHERS
61. NOTIFICATION OF COMPLETION OF ELIMINATION OF HEAVY BOMBERS OR FORMER HEAVY BOMBERS
62. NOTIFICATION OF PLANNED DATE OF ARRIVAL OF CONVERTED HEAVY BOMBER AT THE VIEWING SITE
63. NOTIFICATION OF COMPLETION OF CONVERSION OF A HEAVY BOMBER AND ITS ARRIVAL AT THE VIEWING SITE
64. NOTIFICATION OF COMPLETION OF ELIMINATION OF ICBM OR SLBM OTHER THAN AN ICBM FOR MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS
65. NOTIFICATION OF COMPLETION OF PROCEDURES ASSOCIATED WITH PLACING AN ITEM ON STATIC DISPLAY
66. NOTIFICATION OF STATIC TESTING OF ICBM FOR MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS OR ITS FIRST STAGE
67. NOTIFICATION OF REMOVAL OF PROPELLANT SEGMENTS FROM ICBM FOR MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS OR ITS FIRST STAGE
68. NOTIFICATION OF ANNUAL SCHEDULE FOR CONVERSION AND ELIMINATION
69. NOTIFICATION OF INITIATION OF ELIMINATION PROCESS FOR THE FIRST ICBM OF A PARTICULAR TYPE OF ICBM FOR MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS
75. NOTIFICATION OF EXIT OF BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINE FROM COVERED FACILITY AFTER COMPLETION OF SLBM LAUNCHER CONVERSION
79. NOTIFICATION OF PROPOSED DATE AND PLACE OF DEMONSTRATION OF TELEMETRY TAPES OR APPROPRIATE EQUIPMENT TO PLAY BACK TELEMETRIC INFORMATION RECORDED ON THOSE TAPES
80. NOTIFICATION CONTAINING REQUEST FOR OPPORTUNITY TO ACQUIRE PLAYBACK EQUIPMENT
83. NOTIFICATION OF PLANNED DEPARTURE FROM A PRODUCTION FACILITY OF THE FIRST PROTOTYPE ICBM OR SLBM
84. NOTIFICATION OF BASING MODE OF NEW TYPE OF ICBM
85. NOTIFICATION OF DECISION TO FORGO DEPLOYMENT OF AN ICBM OF A NEW TYPE AS AN ICBM FOR MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS
86. NOTIFICATION THAT PROTOTYPE ICBM OR SLBM SHALL BE CONSIDERED TO BE A NEW TYPE
87. NOTIFICATION OF CESSATION OF DEVELOPMENT OF AN ICBM OR SLBM OF A NEW TYPE AND INTENTION NOT TO DEPLOY SUCH ICBMS OR SLBMS
88. NOTIFICATION OF DEPARTURE OF MOBILE LAUNCHER OF PROTOTYPE ICBMS FROM ITS PRODUCTION FACILITY
89. NOTIFICATION OF EXIT OF FIRST HEAVY BOMBER OF A NEW TYPE FROM THE SHOP, PLANT OR BUILDING WHERE ITS ASSEMBLY WAS PERFORMED
90. NOTIFICATION OF ARRIVAL OF THE FIRST HEAVY BOMBER OF A NEW TYPE, CATEGORY, OR VARIANT AT THE FIRST AIR BASE AT WHICH ANY SUCH HEAVY BOMBER HAS BEGUN TO BE BASED
91. NOTIFICATION OF EXIT OF FIRST LONG-RANGE NUCLEAR ALCM OF A NEW TYPE FROM A PRODUCTION FACILITY
92. NOTIFICATION OF PLANNED ARRIVAL OF FIRST LONG-RANGE NUCLEAR ALCM OF A NEW TYPE AT THE FIRST AIR BASE FOR HEAVY BOMBERS AT WHICH IT WILL BE LOCATED
93. NOTIFICATION OF FIRST FLIGHT TEST OF A LONG-RANGE NUCLEAR ALCM FROM A BOMBER OF A TYPE FROM NONE OF WHICH A LONG-RANGE NUCLEAR ALCM HAS PREVIOUSLY BEEN FLIGHT-TESTED
94. NOTIFICATION OF ARRIVAL OF FIRST LONG-RANGE NUCLEAR ALCM OF A NEW TYPE AT THE FIRST AIR BASE FOR HEAVY BOMBERS
95. NOTIFICATION OF EXIT OF FIRST LONG-RANGE NON-NUCLEAR ALCM OF A NEW TYPE FROM THE PRODUCTION FACILITY
96. NOTIFICATION OF PLANNED ARRIVAL OF FIRST LONG-RANGE NON-NUCLEAR ALCM OF A NEW TYPE AT THE FIRST AIR BASE FOR HEAVY BOMBERS AT WHICH IT WILL BE LOCATED SIX MONTHS IN ADVANCE OF SUCH ARRIVAL
97. NOTIFICATION OF PLANNED ARRIVAL OF FIRST LONG-RANGE NON-NUCLEAR ALCM OF A NEW TYPE AT THE FIRST AIR BASE FOR HEAVY BOMBERS AT WHICH IT WILL BE LOCATED 60 DAYS IN ADVANCE OF SUCH ARRIVAL
98. NOTIFICATION OF FIRST FLIGHT TEST OF A LONG-RANGE NON-NUCLEAR ALCM OF A NEW TYPE FROM AN AIRPLANE OF A TYPE FROM NONE OF WHICH A LONG-RANGE NUCLEAR ALCM HAS BEEN FLIGHT-TESTED
99. NOTIFICATION OF FIRST FLIGHT TEST OF A LONG-RANGE NON-NUCLEAR ALCM OF A NEW TYPE ARMED WITH TWO OR MORE WEAPONS
104. NOTIFICATION OF CHANGE IN INFORMATION REGARDING THE INTENTION TO PERFORM A CONVERSION
105. NOTIFICATION OF CHANGE IN INFORMATION REGARDING THE INTENTION TO PERFORM AN ELIMINATION
106. NOTIFICATION OF CHANGE IN INFORMATION REGARDING THE INTENTION TO PLACE AN ITEM ON STATIC DISPLAY
111. NOTIFICATION OF UPDATED DATA FOR EACH CATEGORY OF DATA CONTAINED IN THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, AFTER RESUMPTION OF OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE NOTIFICATIONS THAT WERE SUSPENDED RELATED TO AN OPERATIONAL DISPERSAL
112. NOTIFICATION OF THE PROVISION OF ALL NOTIFICATIONS THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN PROVIDED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS III, VI, AND VII OF THE NOTIFICATIONS PROTOCOL IF THERE HAD NOT BEEN A TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF THE OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE SUCH NOTIFICATIONS
114. NOTIFICATION CONTAINING THE INITIAL LISTS OF INSPECTORS, MONITORS, AND AIRCREW MEMBERS
115. NOTIFICATION OF STANDING DIPLOMATIC CLEARANCE NUMBER FOR INSPECTION AIRPLANES
116. NOTIFICATION OF INTENTION TO CONDUCT INSPECTION PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, OR 10 OF ARTICLE XI OF THE TREATY
117. NOTIFICATION OF INTENTION TO CONDUCT INSPECTION PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 8, 9, 11, 12, OR 13 OF ARTICLE XI OF THE TREATY
118. NOTIFICATION OF INTENTION TO REPLACE INSPECTORS CONDUCTING A CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION INSPECTION
119. NOTIFICATION OF INTENTION TO ESTABLISH A PERIMETER AND PORTAL CONTINUOUS MONITORING SYSTEM AT A FACILITY SUBJECT TO CONTINUOUS MONITORING AND OF INTENTION TO CONDUCT AN ENGINEERING SITE SURVEY AT SUCH A FACILITY
120. NOTIFICATION OF COMMENCEMENT OF CONTINUOUS MONITORING AT A FACILITY AND THE INITIAL ARRIVAL OF MONITORS AT THE FACILITY
121. NOTIFICATION CONTAINING A REQUEST FOR LOGISTIC SUPPORT FOR A FACILITY SUBJECT TO CONTINUOUS MONITORING
122. NOTIFICATION OF INTENTION TO ENTER TERRITORY TO ESTABLISH PERIMETER AND PORTAL CONTINUOUS MONITORING SYSTEM AT A FACILITY
123. NOTIFICATION OF INTENTION TO ENTER TERRITORY TO REPLACE MONITORS
124. NOTIFICATION OF INTENTION TO ENTER TERRITORY TO MAINTAIN PERIMETER AND PORTAL CONTINUOUS MONITORING SYSTEM AT A FACILITY OR FACILITIES
125. NOTIFICATION OF INTENTION TO USE AN INSPECTION AIRPLANE FOR THE TRANSPORTATION OF CARGO
126. NOTIFICATION OF CONFIRMATION OF INTENTION TO USE INSPECTION AIRPLANE FOR TRANSPORTATION OF CARGO
127. NOTIFICATION CONTAINING RESPONSE TO REQUEST TO LAND INSPECTION AIRPLANE AT AIRPORT ASSOCIATED WITH FACILITY SUBJECT TO CONTINUOUS MONITORING
128. NOTIFICATION OF AMENDMENTS TO LISTS OF INSPECTORS, MONITORS, AND AIRCREW MEMBERS
131. NOTIFICATION CONTAINING THE AGREED LIST OF INSPECTORS, MONITORS, AND AIRCREW MEMBERS
132. NOTIFICATION CONTAINING FLIGHT PLAN INFORMATION FOR INSPECTION AIRPLANE
133. NOTIFICATION OF FLIGHT PLAN APPROVAL FOR INSPECTION AIRPLANE
134. NOTIFICATION OF INTENTION TO CONDUCT A SPECIAL START FLIGHT
145. NOTIFICATION OF PLANNED EXIT FROM A MONITORED FACILITY OF THE FIRST ICBM, SLBM, OR FIRST STAGE OF SUCH AN ICBM OR SLBM NOT SUBJECT TO NUMERICAL LIMITS ON NON-DEPLOYED MISSILES
146. NOTIFICATION OF INTENTION TO CONDUCT CARGO EXAMINATION AT LOCATION OTHER THAN A FACILITY SUBJECT TO CONTINUOUS MONITORING OR MONITORED FACILITY
147. NOTIFICATION OF CHANGE TO A FLIGHT ROUTE
IV. Information Releasable After Three Months In Accordance with Paragraph 4 of Section I of This Annex
Release of the information contained in the notifications listed below shall be governed by paragraph 4 of Section I of this Annex:
15. NOTIFICATION OF TRANSFER OF ITEMS TO OR FROM A THIRD STATE
32. NOTIFICATION OF DEPARTURE OF EACH DEPLOYED RAIL-MOBILE LAUNCHER OF ICBMS AND ITS ASSOCIATED MISSILE FROM A RAIL GARRISON FOR ROUTINE MOVEMENT
33. NOTIFICATION OF DEPARTURE OF EACH RAIL-MOBILE TEST LAUNCHER FROM A TEST RANGE
34. NOTIFICATION OF RETURN OF EACH DEPLOYED RAIL-MOBILE LAUNCHER OF ICBMS AND ITS ASSOCIATED MISSILE TO THE RAIL GARRISON FROM WHICH IT DEPARTED AFTER ROUTINE MOVEMENT
35. NOTIFICATION OF RETURN OF EACH RAIL-MOBILE TEST LAUNCHER TO THE TEST RANGE FROM WHICH IT DEPARTED
37. NOTIFICATION OF DEPARTURE OF EACH DEPLOYED MOBILE LAUNCHER OF ICBMS AND ITS ASSOCIATED MISSILE FOR RELOCATION
38. NOTIFICATION OF COMPLETION OF RELOCATION OF A DEPLOYED MOBILE LAUNCHER OF ICBMS AND ITS ASSOCIATED MISSILE
39. NOTIFICATION OF BEGINNING OF EXERCISE DISPERSAL OF DEPLOYED MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS AND THEIR ASSOCIATED MISSILES
40. NOTIFICATION OF COMPLETION OF EXERCISE DISPERSAL OF DEPLOYED MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS AND THEIR ASSOCIATED MISSILES
41. NOTIFICATION OF VARIATION FROM THE STANDARD CONFIGURATION OF A TRAIN UPON DEPARTURE OF DEPLOYED RAIL-MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS AND THEIR ASSOCIATED MISSILES FROM A RAIL GARRISON FOR THE ASSOCIATED MAINTENANCE FACILITY
42. NOTIFICATION OF VARIATION FROM THE STANDARD CONFIGURATION OF TRAINS WITH DEPLOYED RAIL-MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS AND THEIR ASSOCIATED MISSILES DURING ROUTINE MOVEMENTS OR RELOCATIONS
43. NOTIFICATION OF RETURN TO STANDARD CONFIGURATION OF A TRAIN WITH DEPLOYED RAIL-MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS AND THEIR ASSOCIATED MISSILES
44. NOTIFICATION OF BEGINNING OF MAJOR STRATEGIC EXERCISE INVOLVING HEAVY BOMBERS
45. NOTIFICATION OF COMPLETION OF MAJOR STRATEGIC EXERCISE INVOLVING HEAVY BOMBERS
48. NOTIFICATION OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF FLIGHT TEST TO DETERMINE BALLISTIC MISSILE THROW-WEIGHT
82. NOTIFICATION OF FIRST FLIGHT TEST OF AN ICBM OR SLBM OF ONE EXISTING TYPE ON WHICH ENCRYPTION OF TELEMETRIC INFORMATION WILL BE CARRIED OUT
100. NOTIFICATION OF DEVELOPMENT OF NEW KIND OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARM
101. NOTIFICATION OF CHANGE IN INFORMATION REGARDING THE DEPARTURE OF EACH DEPLOYED RAIL-MOBILE LAUNCHER OF ICBMS AND ITS ASSOCIATED MISSILE FROM A RAIL GARRISON FOR ROUTINE MOVEMENT
102. NOTIFICATION OF CHANGE IN INFORMATION REGARDING THE DEPARTURE OF EACH RAIL-MOBILE TEST LAUNCHER FROM A TEST RANGE
103. NOTIFICATION OF CHANGE IN INFORMATION REGARDING THE DEPARTURE OF EACH DEPLOYED MOBILE LAUNCHER OF ICBMS AND ITS ASSOCIATED MISSILE FOR RELOCATION
107. NOTIFICATION OF BEGINNING OF OPERATIONAL DISPERSAL
108. NOTIFICATION OF COMPLETION OF OPERATIONAL DISPERSAL
109. NOTIFICATION OF SUSPENSION OF OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE NOTIFICATIONS, TO CARRY OUT COOPERATIVE MEASURES, AND TO ALLOW INSPECTIONS DURING AN OPERATIONAL DISPERSAL
110. NOTIFICATION OF RESUMPTION OF OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE NOTIFICATIONS, TO CARRY OUT COOPERATIVE MEASURES, AND TO ALLOW INSPECTIONS WHICH HAD BEEN SUSPENDED IN CONNECTION WITH AN OPERATIONAL DISPERSAL
113. NOTIFICATION OF LOCATIONS OF ALL HEAVY BOMBERS THAT WERE NOT LOCATED AT THEIR AIR BASES AT THE COMPLETION OF THE OPERATIONAL DISPERSAL
129. NOTIFICATION OF AGREEMENT WITH OR OBJECTION TO PROPOSED INSPECTORS, MONITORS, OR AIRCREW MEMBERS
142. NOTIFICATION CONTAINING A REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION OF A NOTIFICATION
143. NOTIFICATION CONTAINING CLARIFICATION, CORRECTION, OR MODIFICATION OF A NOTIFICATION
144. NOTIFICATION OF ADDITIONAL START MESSAGE"

Article Four

1. The number "1" shall be superscripted at the end of the title of Annex 3 to the Telemetry Protocol. The corresponding footnote shall read:

"This Annex is included in this Protocol pursuant to Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Agreement Number 17 of May 4, 1994."

2. The number "1" shall be superscripted at the end of the title of Annex 1 to the Notification Protocol. The corresponding footnote shall read:

"This Annex is included in this Protocol pursuant to Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Agreement Number 17 of May 4, 1994."

Article Five

This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty, and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Geneva on May 4, 1994, in five copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America:
Steven E. Steiner

For the Government of the Republic of Belarus:
Andrey Sannikov

For the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan:
Kairtay Zhanbatyrov

For the Government of the Russian Federation:
Mikhail Strel'tsov

For the Government of Ukraine:
Konstantin Hrishchenko

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Agreement number 18
Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991

Logistical and administrative procedures for conducting training and maintenance and for providing spare parts and replacement parts for telemetry equipment

To improve the viability and effectiveness of the Protocol on Telemetric Information Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Telemetry Protocol, and the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Notification Protocol,

Have agreed as follows:

Article One

The following provisions shall constitute subparagraph 4(d) of Section I of the Telemetry Protocol:

"(d) if requested, in accordance with paragraph 6 of Section VI of the Notification Protocol, ensure the timely provision of training, maintenance, spare parts, and replacement parts for equipment acquired pursuant to this paragraph or pursuant to paragraph 1 or paragraph 2 of Section I of Annex 1 to this Protocol. Provision of training, maintenance, spare parts, and replacement parts shall be in accordance with Annex 4 to this Protocol."

Article Two

The following provisions shall constitute Annex 4 to the Telemetry Protocol:

"ANNEX 4
LOGISTICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES FOR CONDUCTING TRAINING AND MAINTENANCE AND FOR PROVIDING SPARE PARTS AND REPLACEMENT PARTS FOR TELEMETRY EQUIPMENT
1. For purposes of this Annex:

(a) the term "providing Party" means the Party that provided the equipment for which maintenance or training are being conducted or for which spare parts or replacement parts are being provided;
(b) the term "receiving Party" means the Party that received the equipment for which maintenance or training are being conducted or for which spare parts or replacement parts are being provided;
(c) the term "maintenance team" means the group of individuals assigned by the providing Party to conduct maintenance or training on the territory of the receiving Party;
(d) the term "trainee team" means the group of individuals assigned by the receiving Party to receive training on the territory of the providing Party.

2. Regarding the number and list of maintenance team members, the number and list of trainee team members, the number and list of aircrew members, and the provision of visas:

(a) A maintenance team or trainee team shall include no more than 14 individuals. A maintenance team shall have the right to bring tools and equipment required for conducting maintenance or training. The aircrew for transport of team members, and delivery of tools and equipment, shall include no more than 15 individuals.
(b) The providing Party shall provide, through diplomatic channels, a list of maintenance team members and a list of aircrew members no less than 15 days in advance of their arrival in the territory of the receiving Party. The provisions of paragraph 6 of Section II and paragraphs 21 and 22 of Section III of the Inspection Protocol, on an objection to an individual on the list of inspectors shall apply to an objection to a maintenance team member or aircrew member, except that the receiving Party shall notify its objection no later than seven days after receipt of such lists.
(c) The receiving Party shall provide, through diplomatic channels, a list of trainee team members and a list of aircrew members no less than 15 days in advance of their arrival in the territory of the providing Party. The provisions of paragraph 6 of Section II and paragraphs 21 and 22 of Section III of the Inspection Protocol on an objection to an individual on the list of inspectors shall apply to an objection to a trainee team member or aircrew member, except that the providing Party shall notify its objection no later than seven days after receipt of such lists.
(d) The receiving Party shall provide visas and, where necessary, such other documents to each maintenance team member and each aircrew member to whom it has not objected, as may be required to ensure that each such team member and each such aircrew member may enter and remain in its territory for the duration of the maintenance or training period.
(e) The providing Party shall provide visas and, where necessary, such other documents to each trainee team member and each aircrew member to whom it has not objected, as may be required to ensure that each such team member and each such aircrew member may enter and remain in its territory for the duration of the training period.
(f) The providing Party shall provide, through diplomatic channels, a list of tools and equipment required for conducting maintenance or training no less than 15 days in advance of their delivery to the territory of the receiving Party. The provisions of paragraphs 8 and 11 of Section V of the Inspection Protocol on examination of equipment and supplies shall apply to examination of such tools and equipment.

3. Regarding the maintenance team or trainee team:

(a) The receiving Party shall provide necessary assistance, including a safety briefing, to the maintenance team members.
(b) The providing Party shall provide necessary assistance, including a safety briefing, to the trainee team members.
(c) The provisions of paragraph 11 of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol on movement, travel, and urgent departure or emergency evacuation of inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members shall apply to trainee team members, maintenance team members and aircrew members.
(d) Throughout the period of stay on the territory of the receiving Party, the receiving Party shall ensure that the maintenance team members can be in communication with the embassy of the providing Party located on the territory of the receiving Party using telephonic communications provided by the receiving Party.
(e) Throughout the period of stay on the territory of the providing Party, the providing Party shall ensure that the trainee team members can be in communication with the embassy of the receiving Party located on the territory of the providing Party using telephonic communications provided by the providing Party.
(f) The Parties shall treat with due respect the maintenance team members, trainee team members, and aircrew members of each Party in its territory and shall take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on their person, freedom, and dignity.

4. Regarding arrangements for air transportation:

(a) The Parties may use dedicated airplanes, inspection airplanes, airplanes making regularly scheduled commercial flights, or, if possible, other airplanes used for inspections related to arms control agreements, for the purpose of transporting trainee team members, maintenance team members, as well as spare parts, replacement parts, tools and equipment to the point of entry.
(b) Diplomatic clearance numbers for dedicated airplanes transporting maintenance team members, as well as spare parts, replacement parts, tools and equipment, and routes for flights of such airplanes to and from the point of entry shall be provided, through diplomatic channels, by the receiving Party no less than ten days prior to the estimated time of arrival at the point of entry on the territory of the receiving Party.
(c) Diplomatic clearance numbers for dedicated airplanes transporting trainee team members, and routes for flights of such airplanes to and from the point of entry shall be provided, through diplomatic channels, by the providing Party no less than ten days prior to the estimated time of arrival at the point of entry on the territory of the providing Party.
(d) The receiving Party shall provide parking, security protection, fueling, air navigation, airport facility, and ground technical and commercial services, as well as additional services as requested, for the dedicated airplane of the providing Party at the point of entry. The cost of parking and security protection for each such airplane shall be borne by the receiving Party. The cost of fueling and air navigation, airport facility, and ground technical and commercial services, as well as additional services as requested, shall be borne by the providing Party.
(e) The providing Party, if training is conducted on its territory, shall provide parking, security protection, fueling, air navigation, airport facility, and ground technical and commercial services, as well as additional services as requested, for the dedicated airplane of the receiving Party at the point of entry. The cost of parking and security protection for each such airplane shall be borne by the providing Party. The cost of fueling and air navigation, airport facility, and ground technical and commercial services, as well as additional services as requested, shall be borne by the receiving Party.
(f) The providing Party shall state its intention, through diplomatic channels, to transport maintenance team members, spare parts, or replacement parts no less than 72 hours prior to the estimated time of arrival of the maintenance team members, or delivery of spare parts or replacement parts at the point of entry on the territory of the receiving Party. The receiving Party shall state its intention, through diplomatic channels, to transport trainee team members no less than 72 hours prior to the estimated time of arrival of the trainee team members at the point of entry on the territory of the providing Party. Such statements shall include:

(i) the date and estimated time of arrival at the point of entry; and
(ii) the names, dates of birth, and places of birth of the trainee team members, maintenance team members and aircrew members.

(g) The provisions of paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of Section IV of the Inspection Protocol on flights of inspection airplanes shall apply to flights of dedicated airplanes transporting trainee team members, maintenance team members, as well as spare parts, replacement parts, tools and equipment.
(h) If the Parties use dedicated airplanes, such airplanes shall be of the types specified in Annex 10 to the Inspection Protocol.

5. Regarding the report and the confidentiality requirements:

(a) Before departing the site where maintenance or training was conducted, the maintenance team leader and a representative of the receiving Party, and if training is conducted on the territory of the providing Party, the trainee team leader and a representative of the providing Party, shall describe, in a factual, written report, the activity that was carried out pursuant to a request provided for in paragraph 6 of Section VI of the Notification Protocol, and confirm the completion of such activity.
(b) Maintenance team members shall not disclose information obtained during maintenance or training except with the express consent of the receiving Party.
(c) Trainee team members shall not disclose information obtained during training except with the express consent of the providing Party.

6. Throughout the in-country period, the receiving Party shall provide meals, lodging, work space, transportation, and, as necessary, medical and other urgent services for the maintenance team members and aircrew members of the providing Party. Throughout the in-country period, the providing Party, if training is conducted on its territory, shall provide meals, lodging, work space, transportation, and, as necessary, medical and other urgent services for the trainee team members and aircrew members. The costs of all such services shall be borne by the receiving Party.
7. The receiving Party shall provide to the providing Party, through diplomatic channels, a confirmation of the receipt of spare parts or replacement parts.
8. The receiving Party shall assist the providing Party, if requested, with customs procedures, and in resolving any issues that may arise in connection with the delivery of spare parts, replacement parts, tools and equipment."

Article Three

1. The following provisions shall constitute paragraph 6, paragraph 7, and paragraph 8 of Section VI of the Notification Protocol:

"(6) notification containing a request regarding maintenance, training, spare parts, and replacement parts. Such notification shall include, as appropriate: the type of training requested, the number of trainee team members, the location of the training, and the proposed date the training would begin; the type of maintenance requested, and the location of the maintenance; the manufacturer's name, model number, and part number, if applicable, of the malfunctioning equipment or its component, and a description of the specific equipment operating problems being experienced, including the results of any diagnostic or corrective maintenance procedures that have been attempted; the manufacturer's name, model number, and part number, if applicable, of the spare parts or replacement parts requested;
(7) notification, no later than 20 days after receipt of a request pursuant to paragraph 6 of this Section. Such notification shall include, as appropriate: the proposed point of entry, the proposed date of arrival of the maintenance team or trainee team at the point of entry, the date the training will begin, the length of the training session, the maintenance team size, the estimated delivery date of the requested spare parts or replacement parts; and the estimated cost of the services to be provided;
(8) notification, no later than 10 days after receipt of a response provided pursuant to paragraph 7 of this Section. Such notification shall include, as appropriate:

(a) acceptance of the proposed point of entry and proposed date of arrival of the team or the delivery of requested spare parts or replacement parts at the point of entry; or
(b) a proposal for an alternate point of entry and an alternate date of arrival of the team or the delivery of requested spare parts or replacement parts at the point of entry; or
(c) cancellation of a request regarding maintenance, training, spare parts, and replacement parts as contained in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 6 of this section."

2. The following provisions shall be added at the end of the list contained in Section III of Annex 1 to the Notification Protocol:

"148. NOTIFICATION CONTAINING A REQUEST REGARDING TRAINING, MAINTENANCE, SPARE PARTS, AND REPLACEMENT PARTS FOR TELEMETRY EQUIPMENT
149. NOTIFICATION CONTAINING A RESPONSE TO A REQUEST REGARDING TRAINING, MAINTENANCE, SPARE PARTS, AND REPLACEMENT PARTS FOR TELEMETRY EQUIPMENT
150. NOTIFICATION OF ACCEPTANCE OF OR CHANGE TO THE PROPOSED POINT OF ENTRY, AND PROPOSED DATE OF ARRIVAL OF THE TEAM OR OF THE DELIVERY OF SPARE PARTS OR REPLACEMENT PARTS AT THE POINT OF ENTRY, OR CANCELLATION OF A REQUEST REGARDING TELEMETRY EQUIPMENT"

Article Four

The number "1" shall be superscripted at the end of the title of Annex 4. The corresponding footnote shall read:

"This Annex is included in this Protocol pursuant to Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Agreement Number 18 of May 4, 1994."

Article Five

1. This Agreement shall apply provisionally from the date when all Parties have consented to be bound by this Agreement until July 31, 1995, unless, before the expiration of this period:

(a) a Party communicates to all other Parties its decision to terminate the provisional application of this Agreement; or
(b) the Treaty enters into force.

The Parties may agree to extend the provisional application of this Agreement for additional periods, subject to the same conditions specified in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph.

2. The provisions of this Agreement shall apply provisionally in light of and in conformity with the other provisions of the Treaty.

3. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Geneva on May 4, 1994 in five copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America:
Steven E. Steiner

For the Government of the Republic of Belarus:
Andrey Sannikov

For the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan:
Kairtay Zhanbatyrov

For the Government of the Russian Federation:
Mikhail Strel'tsov

For the Government of Ukraine:
Konstantin Hrishchenko

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Agreement number 19
Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991

Procedures for the use of satellite system receivers

Have agreed as follows:

Article One

1. Subparagraph 4(b) of Subsection A of Section I, and subparagraph 2(b) of Subsection A of Section II, of Annex 8 to the Inspection Protocol shall be superseded by the following provisions:

"(b) 2 Satellite system receiver sets, Transpack II, each provided by the inspected Party and consisting of the following:

(i) 1 Portable receiver, Trimble Navigation, Model GPS Transpack II with an information input/output port;
(ii) 1 Direct current adapter (external);
(iii) 16 Spare batteries, (nickel-cadmium or alkaline);
(iv) 1 Battery holder;
(v) 1 Rechargeable nickel-cadmium battery pack;
(vi) 1 External antenna with cable and antenna installation kit;
(vii) 2 Instruction manuals, one in English and one in Russian;
(viii) 1 Container;
(ix) 1 Storage and carrying bag."

2. Subparagraph 4(a) of Subsection B of Section I, and subparagraph 2(a) of Subsection B of Section II, of Annex 8 to the Inspection Protocol shall be superseded by the following provisions:

"(a) 2 Satellite system receiver sets, Transpack II or Transpack, each provided by the inspected Party and consisting of the following:

(i) 1 Portable receiver, Trimble Navigation, Model GPS Transpack II with an information input/output port; or, portable receiver, Trimble Navigation, Model GPS Transpack;
(ii) 1 Direct current adapter (external);
(iii) 16 Spare batteries, (nickel-cadmium or alkaline);
(iv) 1 Battery holder;
(v) 1 Rechargeable nickel-cadmium battery pack;
(vi) 1 External antenna with cable and antenna installation kit;
(vii) 2 Instruction manuals, one in English and one in Russian;
(viii) 1 Container;
(ix) 1 Storage and carrying bag."

Article Two

1. Paragraph 1 of Subsection E of Section VI of Annex 8 to the Inspection Protocol shall be superseded by the following provisions:

"1. At the point of entry, the inspection team leader or an authorized representative of such a team shall have the right to confirm, in accordance with the following procedures, that two satellite system receivers provided by the inspected Party are operable:

(a) The first inspection team arriving at each point of entry for which there is at least one associated facility with silo launchers of ICBMs subject to inspection pursuant to paragraph 2, 3, 4, or 6 of Article XI of the Treaty shall have the right to bring to that point of entry two satellite system receivers for the purpose of determining the geographic coordinates of four reference points. These reference points shall be proposed by the inspected Party, shall be within 20 kilometers of the airport of the point of entry, and shall be separated from each other by at least two kilometers.
(b) For the purpose of comparing the reading of one satellite system receiver with the reading of another satellite system receiver, the term "agree" shall mean that the reading of one satellite system receiver differs from the reading of the other satellite system receiver by no more than 12 seconds in both latitude and longitude.
(c) For the purpose of confirming the operability of a satellite system receiver at the point of entry, the term "agree" shall mean that the reading of the satellite system receiver differs from the agreed geographic coordinates of the reference point by no more than 12 seconds in both latitude and longitude.
(d) Determination of the agreed geographic coordinates of reference points used at a point of entry for testing the operability of satellite system receivers shall be conducted in accordance with the following procedures:

(i) At each proposed reference point, the inspection team leader or an authorized representative of such a team, and a member of the in-country escort shall use two satellite system receivers of the inspecting Party and two satellite system receivers of the inspected Party, respectively, to determine geographic coordinate values. The inspected Party shall have the right to substitute a properly operating satellite system receiver for a malfunctioning satellite system receiver provided by the inspected Party. However, no more than two satellite system receivers of the inspected Party may be used for the determination of agreed geographic coordinates for a reference point as described in subparagraphs (d)(ii) and (d)(iii) below;
(ii) If at least three of the four latitude values thus obtained agree with each other, all of these latitude values that agree with at least two other of the four latitude values, shall be averaged, and that average shall be the agreed latitude value of the reference point;
(iii) If at least three of the four longitude values thus obtained agree with each other, all of these longitude values that agree with at least two other of the four longitude values, shall be averaged, and that average shall be the agreed longitude value of the reference point;
(iv) Agreed latitude values and agreed longitude values of the reference point thus obtained shall be recorded to the nearest second and shall be the agreed geographic coordinates of each reference point for the point of entry. A physical description of the reference point shall also be recorded for each reference point. The inspected Party shall provide notification of the determination of agreed geographic coordinates of reference points in accordance with paragraph 28 of Section III of this Protocol;
(v) If agreed geographic coordinates for four reference points cannot be determined after the procedures provided for in this subparagraph have been attempted at no fewer than six proposed points, all agreed coordinates shall be discarded and the procedures provided for in this subparagraph shall be repeated when an inspection team next arrives at this point of entry to conduct an inspection.

(e) The operability of satellite system receivers shall be tested at each point of entry for which there is at least one associated facility with silo launchers of ICBMs subject to inspection pursuant to paragraph 2, 3, 4 or 6 of Article XI of the Treaty. After the baseline data inspection period, operability of the inspected Party's satellite system receivers may be tested at such points of entry, at the discretion of the inspection team leader, for all inspections, except for inspections conducted pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, prior to the departure of the inspection team for the inspection site, at a time agreed by the inspection team leader, and a member of the in-country escort. The time shall be agreed to as soon as possible following the arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry. Testing shall be conducted in accordance with the procedures contained in subparagraph (g) of this paragraph.
(f) Only for inspections conducted during the baseline data inspection period, testing of the operability of the inspected Party's satellite system receivers shall be conducted in accordance with the procedures contained in subparagraph (g) of this paragraph:

(i) either after the inspection team leader has made the designation, provided for in paragraph 15 of Section V of this Protocol, of the type of inspection and inspection site, provided that the use of satellite system receivers is permitted for the designated type of inspection and inspection site; or
(ii) prior to the designation by the inspection team leader, provided for in paragraph 15 of Section V of this Protocol, of the type of inspection and inspection site, at a time agreed to by the inspection team leader and a member of the in-country escort, provided that the inspection team leader declares the inspecting Party's intent to use the satellite system receivers during the first or a sequential inspection for which satellite system receivers may be used.

(g) The operability of each of the inspected Party's satellite system receivers shall be tested at two reference points. These two reference points shall be selected from the four reference points with agreed geographic coordinates. The first reference point shall be selected by a member of the in-country escort, and the second reference point shall be selected by the inspection team leader or an authorized representative of such a team. A member of the in-country escort shall accompany the inspectors to each reference point and shall bring the inspected Party's satellite system receivers to that reference point:

(i) In order for an inspected Party's satellite system receiver to be confirmed to be operable, at each of the two reference points the reading of the satellite system receiver must agree with the agreed geographic coordinates of that reference point;
(ii) If, at either of the two reference points, the reading of an inspected Party's satellite system receiver does not agree with the agreed geographic coordinates of the reference point, a member of the in-country escort shall take another reading using that satellite system receiver. If, after at least two additional attempts, the reading of the satellite system receiver still does not agree with the agreed geographic coordinates, the inspected Party shall replace the satellite system receiver. The replacement satellite system receiver shall be tested in accordance with the procedures contained in subparagraph (g) of this paragraph. The testing of the inspected Party's satellite system receivers shall continue until the inspected Party has provided two satellite system receivers that are confirmed to be operable or until at least four different satellite system receivers have been tested.
(iii) If the inspected Party is unable to provide two satellite system receivers whose operability has been confirmed in accordance with the procedures contained in subparagraph (g) of this paragraph, this fact shall be recorded in the inspection report and the inspection shall proceed.

(h) The inspected Party shall have the right to change the reference points for use in testing the operability of satellite system receivers. No more than two reference points may be changed at any one time, unless otherwise agreed. Agreed geographic coordinates for the new reference point shall be determined using the procedures in subparagraph 1(d) of this subsection when an inspection team next arrives at this point of entry to conduct an inspection after the proposed effective date of a change specified in the notification provided by the inspected Party in accordance with paragraph 29 of Section III of this Protocol. The new reference point shall become effective upon determination of its agreed geographic coordinates."

2. Paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 of Subsection E of Section VI of Annex 8 to the Inspection Protocol shall be superseded by the following provisions:

"4. Upon arrival of the inspection team or subgroup of the inspection team at a silo launcher of ICBMs designated for inspection, inspectors shall use satellite system receivers that have been provided by the inspected Party to determine the geographic coordinates of such silo launcher of ICBMs in accordance with the following procedures:

(a) The specific location where the readings of the satellite system receiver are taken shall be selected by a member of the in-country escort in such a way that, if possible, the designated silo launcher of ICBMs can be seen from that location;
(b) While at this location, specified in accordance with subparagraph (a) of this paragraph, the inspectors shall examine the container and the seal placed on the container to determine whether the seal is intact and whether the container has been tampered with. If there is evidence that the seal has been broken or that the container has been tampered with, this fact shall be recorded in the inspection report and the inspection shall continue;
(c) A member of the in-country escort shall open the container and an inspector shall select one of the two satellite system receivers provided by the inspected Party, the operability of which has been confirmed in accordance with the procedures provided for in subparagraph 1(g) of this Subsection;
(d) For the purpose of comparing the reading of a satellite system receiver with the geographic coordinates of a designated silo launcher of ICBMs, listed in the Agreement on Exchange of Geographic Coordinates and Site Diagrams, the term "agree" shall mean that:

(i) if the geographic coordinates are expressed to the nearest second, the reading of the satellite system receiver differs from the geographic coordinates by no more than 12 seconds in both latitude and longitude;
(ii) if the geographic coordinates are expressed to the nearest minute, the reading of the satellite system receiver differs from the geographic coordinates by no more than 60 seconds in both latitude and longitude;

(e) An inspector shall take readings using the selected satellite system receiver. If the satellite system receiver readings and the geographic coordinates for the location of the designated silo launcher of ICBMs, listed in the Agreement on Exchange of Geographic Coordinates and Site Diagrams, agree, then the silo launcher of ICBMs shall be considered to be the designated silo launcher of ICBMs and the coordinates determined by the satellite system receiver shall be recorded in the inspection report despite the fact that the satellite system receiver readings might also agree with geographic coordinates for the locations of other nearby silo launchers of ICBMs, listed in the Agreement on Exchange of Geographic Coordinates and Site Diagrams. If the satellite system receiver readings at the location selected by a member of the in-country escort do not agree with the geographic coordinates for the designated silo launcher of ICBMs, listed in the Agreement on Exchange of Geographic Coordinates and Site Diagrams, then inspectors shall use the second satellite system receiver. If a satisfactory result cannot be obtained with either of the two satellite system receivers, then a member of the in-country escort shall choose another location closer to the silo launcher of ICBMs where an inspector shall take readings using a satellite system receiver. If, after using both of the satellite system receivers at any of the locations chosen by a member of the in-country escort, inspectors establish that the readings of neither satellite system receiver agree with the geographic coordinates for this designated silo launcher of ICBMs, and the inspectors are thus unable to ascertain that the silo launcher of ICBMs is the designated silo launcher of ICBMs, this fact shall be recorded in the inspection report and the inspection shall continue;
(f) Upon completion of the satellite system receivers' use, a member of the in-country escort, in the presence of inspectors, shall place the satellite system receivers in a container. A representative of the inspection team shall seal the container and provide the container to a member of the in-country escort."

Article Three

1. The following provisions shall constitute paragraph 28 of Section III of the Inspection Protocol:

"28. Notification of the determination, in accordance with subparagraph 1(d) of Subsection E of Section VI of Annex 8 to this Protocol, of agreed geographic coordinates of reference points used at a point of entry for testing the operability of satellite system receivers, shall be provided by the inspected Party no later than 48 hours after such determination and shall include:

(a) the point of entry;
(b) the date of determination of the agreed geographic coordinates;
(c) the agreed geographic coordinates of each of the reference points; and
(d) a physical description of each of the reference points."

2. The following provisions shall constitute paragraph 29 of Section III of the Inspection Protocol:

"29. Notification of the intent to change, in accordance with subparagraph 1(h) of Subsection E of Section VI of Annex 8 to this Protocol, a reference point used at a point of entry for testing the operability of satellite system receivers, shall be provided by the inspected Party no less than seven days in advance of the proposed effective date of the change and shall include:

(a) the point of entry;
(b) the agreed geographic coordinates of the reference point to be changed;
(c) the geographic coordinates of the new reference point; and
(d) the proposed effective date of the change."

3. The following provisions shall be added at the end of the list contained in Section II of Annex 1 to the Notification Protocol:

"151. NOTIFICATION OF THE DETERMINATION OF AGREED GEOGRAPHIC COORDINATES OF A REFERENCE POINT AT A POINT OF ENTRY
152. NOTIFICATION OF THE INTENTION TO CHANGE A REFERENCE POINT FOR SATELLITE SYSTEM RECEIVERS AT A POINT OF ENTRY".

Article Four

This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty, and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Geneva on May 4, 1994, in five copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equal authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America:
Steven E. Steiner

For the Government of the Republic of Belarus:
Andrey Sannikov

For the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan:
Kairtay Zhanbatyrov

For the Government of the Russian Federation:
Mikhail Strel'tsov

For the Government of Ukraine:
Konstantin Hrishchenko

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Agreement number 20
Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991

Notifications concerning rescheduling of activities

To improve the viability and effectiveness of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Notification Protocol,

Have agreed as follows:

Article One

The last sentence of paragraph 2 of Section VIII of the Notification Protocol shall be superseded by the following provisions:

"As an exception to the requirement to provide such notification five days in advance, such notification shall be provided no later than 12 hours after the date specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section IV of this Protocol if the following conditions are met: the change in the scheduled date results from a delay in the initiation of the activity, and the inspected Party determines, less than five days before the scheduled date or on that date, that a delay will occur. Regardless of when the delay in the initiation of the activity occurred, if the change in the scheduled date is more than five days, an additional notification shall be provided specifying the new scheduled date, subject to the same conditions as the notification provided in accordance with paragraph l of Section IV of this Protocol."

Article Two

This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty, and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Geneva on October 13, 1994, in five copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America:
Steven E. Steiner

For the Government of the Republic of Belarus:
Aleksandr Baichorov

For the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan:
Kairtay Zhanbatyrov

For the Government of the Russian Federation:
Mikhail Strel'tsov

For the Government of Ukraine:
Konstantin Hrishchenko

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Agreement number 21
Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991

Inspections of soft-site launchers at test ranges

To improve the viability and effectiveness of the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Inspection Protocol,

Have agreed as follows:

Article One

Paragraph 15 of Section VII of the Inspection Protocol shall be superseded by the following provisions:

"15. For test ranges, the inspection team shall have the right to inspect the entire inspection site subject to the procedures provided for in Annex 1 to this Protocol, with the following exceptions:

(a) In carrying out the procedures provided for in Annex 1 to this Protocol the inspected Party shall not be required to remove ICBMs or SLBMs contained in or located on soft-site launchers from such launchers, and such ICBMs or SLBMs shall not be subject to measurement; and
(b) For silo launchers of ICBMs located at the test range being inspected, regardless of where they are shown on the site diagram of the test range, the inspection team shall have the right to inspect, at its choice, no more than one silo launcher of ICBMs that the inspected Party declares not to contain an ICBM or a training model of a missile. Inspection of such a silo launcher of ICBMs shall be conducted subject to the procedures provided for in Annex 2 to this Protocol for the purpose of confirming that it does not contain an ICBM."

Article Two

This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty, and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Geneva on October 13, 1994, in five copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America:
Steven E. Steiner

For the Government of the Republic of Belarus:
Aleksandr Baichorov

For the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan:
Kairtay Zhanbatyrov

For the Government of the Russian Federation:
Mikhail Strel'tsov

For the Government of Ukraine:
Konstantin Hrishchenko

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Agreement number 22
Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991

Change of size criteria in connection with the RS-12M ICBM, Variant 2, for silo launcher

To improve the viability and effectiveness of the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Inspection Protocol,

In reference to the declaration by the Russian Federation of October 18, 1993, in which an ICBM, hereinafter referred to as the RS-l2M, Variant 2, was declared as a variant of the existing type of RS-12M ICBM, and

Pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article One of Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Agreement Number 16, entitled "Exhibition of the RS-12M ICBM, Variant 2, for Silo Launcher," of November 4, 1993,

Have agreed as follows:

Article One

1. Subparagraph 1(b) of Annex 12 to the Inspection Protocol shall be superseded by the following provisions:

"(b) Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Size Criteria

Length (meters) 7.4

Diameter (meters) 1.80

Missile Type SS-25

Length (meters) 6.9

Diameter (meters) 1.86

Missile Type RS-12M, Variant 2"

2. Subparagraph 2 (b) of Annex 12 to the Inspection Protocol shall be superseded by the following provisions:

"(b) Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Size Criteria

Length (meters) 7.4

Diameter (meters) 1.80

Missile Type SS-25

Length (meters) 6.9

Diameter (meters) 1.86

Missile Type RS-12M, Variant 2"

3. Subparagraph 3(b) of Annex 12 to the Inspection Protocol shall be superseded by the following provisions:

"(b) Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Size Criteria

Length (meters) 17.46

Diameter (meters) 1.76

Missile Type RS-12M, Variant 2"

Article Two

This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty, and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Geneva on October 13, 1994, in five copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America:
Steven E. Steiner

For the Government of the Republic of Belarus:
Aleksandr Baichorov

For the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan:
Kairtay Zhanbatyrov

For the Government of the Russian Federation:
Mikhail Strel'tsov

For the Government of Ukraine:
Konstantin Hrishchenko

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Agreement number 23
Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991

Diplomatic officials meeting and accompanying inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members at points of entry

To improve the viability and effectiveness of the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Inspection Protocol,

Have agreed as follows:

Article One

1. Paragraph 2 of Section V of the Inspection Protocol shall be superseded by the following provisions:

"2. As soon as an airplane lands, diplomatic officials of each Party whose citizens are among the inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members arriving at the point of entry shall meet:

(a) the inspection team or monitors, and aircrew members arriving at the point of entry on an inspection airplane; or
(b) the inspection team or monitors arriving at the point of entry on an airplane making a regularly scheduled commercial flight.

Such diplomatic officials may accompany inspectors and monitors only during the stay of the inspectors and monitors at the point of entry, but may accompany the aircrew members throughout the in-country period."

2. Paragraph 3 of Section V of the Inspection Protocol shall be superseded by the following provisions:

"3. An inspection airplane arriving at the San Francisco point of entry shall land at Travis Air Force Base. No more than two diplomatic officials of the Party that provided the notification of the inspection in accordance with Section III of this Protocol and no more than one diplomatic official of each other Party whose citizens are among the inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members arriving at the point of entry shall be permitted to enter Travis Air Force Base for the purpose of meeting inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members arriving there. For that purpose, no less than four hours prior to the estimated time of arrival of such an airplane at Travis Air Force Base, the embassy or consular post of which such diplomatic officials are members shall transmit to the Department of State of the United States of America in Washington, D.C., by telephone, the names of the diplomatic officials involved and the registration number of the vehicle involved. The diplomatic officials so identified shall be granted access to the base no less than 30 minutes prior to the estimated time of arrival of such airplane."

3. Paragraph 4 of Section V of the Inspection Protocol shall be superseded by the following provisions:

"4. The inspected Party shall provide, or arrange for providing transportation to Travis Air Force Base of inspection teams and monitors that arrive at San Francisco International Airport on airplanes making regularly scheduled commercial flights. In such cases, no more than two diplomatic officials of the Party that provided the notification of the inspection in accordance with Section III of this Protocol and no more than one diplomatic official of each other Party whose citizens are among the inspectors and monitors arriving at the point of entry shall be permitted to accompany such inspection teams or such monitors onto Travis Air Force Base. No less than two hours prior to the estimated time of arrival of the inspection team or monitors at San Francisco International Airport, the embassy or consular post of which such diplomatic officials are members shall transmit to the Department of State of the United States of America in Washington, D.C., by telephone, the names of the diplomatic officials involved and the registration number of the vehicle involved, for the purpose of providing the diplomatic officials so identified access to Travis Air Force Base in order to accompany inspection teams or monitors."

Article Two

This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty, and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Geneva on November 3, 1994, in five copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America:
Steven E. Steiner

For the Government of the Republic of Belarus:
Andrey Sannikov

For the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan:
Kairtay Zhanbatyrov

For the Government of the Russian Federation:
Mikhail Strel'tsov

For the Government of Ukraine:
Konstantin Hrishchenko

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Agreement number 24
Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991

Procedures for the use of radiation detection equipment at weapons storage areas

In accordance with the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty,

To improve the viability and effectiveness of the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Inspection Protocol,

Have agreed as follows:

Article One

1. Subparagraph 4(c) of Subsection A of Section I of Annex 8 to the Inspection Protocol shall be superseded by the following provisions:

"(c) Set of radiation detection equipment consisting of the following:

(i) 2 Neutron detectors, Sandia National Laboratory design, He-3-based, polyethylene-moderated, including preamplifiers with signal/power cables, counting time - 150 seconds;
(ii) 2 Electronic counters, Eberline, Model ESP-2 modified, with instruction manual;
(iii) 10 Plastic bags for weather protection;
(iv) 1 Americium-241-Lithium neutron source for calibration, emitting approximately 3000 neutrons per second, precalibrated by the inspecting Party;
(v) 1 Tool kit, Jensen Tools, Model JTK-6;
(vi) 30 Spare batteries, miscellaneous, sizes C and D;
(vii) 1 Stand for neutron detector;
(viii) 1 Measuring tape;
(ix) 2 Battery-powered lights, Maglight, Model ML-2;
(x) 3 Programmable calculators, Hewlett-Packard, Model HP-27s, with instruction manual;
(xi) 2 Thermometers;
(xii) 1 Stand for calibration source; and
(xiii) 4 Operating instruction manuals, two in English and two in Russian."

2. Subparagraph 4(b) of Subsection B of Section I of Annex 8 to the Inspection Protocol shall be superseded by the following provisions:

"(b) Set of SRPN 3 or SRPN 6 radiation detection equipment of the Russian Federation consisting of the following:

(i) 2 Neutron detectors, including preamplifiers with signal/power cables, manufactured by NIIIT, Model SRPN 3.01.000, counting time - 1000 seconds, or Model SRPN 6.02.000, counting time - 150 seconds;
(ii) 2 Registering devices, manufactured by NIIIT, Model SRPN 3.03.000 or SRPN 6.01.000;
(iii) 1 Americium-241-Lithium neutron source for calibration, emitting approximately 3000 neutrons per second, precalibrated by the inspecting Party;
(iv) 1 Charging unit, manufactured by NIIIT, Model SE-387 or SE-408;
(v) 2 Spare rechargeable batteries, Model 10NKGTs-1D;
(vi) 2 Measuring tapes;
(vii) 2 Battery-powered lights;
(viii) 2 Stands for neutron detectors;
(ix) 2 Calculators, Casio, Model FX-120;
(x) 1 Stand for calibration source; and
(xi) 4 Operating instruction manuals, two in English and two in Russian."

Article Two

l. Paragraphs 3 and 4 of Subsection F of Section VI of Annex 8 to the Inspection Protocol shall be superseded by the following provisions:

"3. Before conducting measuring procedures using radiation detection equipment, inspectors and the in-country escort shall have the right to confirm the operability of the radiation detection equipment, using the following procedures:

(a) For radiation detection equipment used pursuant to this paragraph, the counting time of each individual measurement shall be the counting time specified in subparagraph 4(c) of Subsection A or subparagraph 4(b) of Subsection B of Section I of this Annex for the neutron detectors in the sets of radiation detection equipment of the United States of America or the Russian Federation, respectively.
(b) The operability of each neutron detector in a set of radiation detection equipment shall be confirmed.
(c) The neutron detector shall be placed in a mutually agreed location.
(d) The inspecting Party shall take two background measurements with the calibration source at least three meters from the neutron detector. If the difference between these two measurements is less than or equal to 30 percent of their average, the average of these measurements shall be recorded as the average background value for the operability check. If the difference between these two background measurements is greater than 30 percent of their average, a third background measurement shall be taken. The third background measurement shall be compared with the previously taken background measurement that is closest to the third background measurement. If the difference between the third background measurement and the closest previous background measurement is less than or equal to 30 percent of the average of these two measurements, the average of these two measurements shall be recorded as the average background value for the operability check. Otherwise, the results of all three background measurements shall be recorded and the radiation detection equipment shall not be accepted as operable.
(e) With the neutron detector in the same location used for the background measurements taken in accordance with subparagraph (c) of this paragraph, the inspecting Party shall place the calibration source in contact with the neutron detector at the center of the detector's sensitive area as indicated by the markings on the neutron detector.
(f) The inspecting Party shall take two calibration measurements of the radiation level from the calibration source. The average of these two calibration measurements shall be recorded as the average value of the calibration measurement.
(g) The following values shall be calculated:

(i) the calculated calibration value, which is the difference between the average value of the calibration measurement determined in accordance with subparagraph (f) of this paragraph and the average background value determined in accordance with subparagraph (d) of this paragraph;
(ii) the product of the counting time for each measurement and the equivalent flux of the calibration source, which is a fixed value indicated on the calibration source; and
(iii) the sensitivity of the neutron detector, which is the ratio of the values obtained in accordance with subparagraphs (g)(i) and (g)(ii) of this paragraph.

(h) The radiation detection equipment shall be accepted as operable, provided:

(i) the difference between the two calibration measurements taken in accordance with subparagraph (f) of this paragraph is less than or equal to 30 percent of the average value of the calibration measurement; and
(ii) the difference between the value of the sensitivity of the neutron detector, determined in accordance with subparagraph (g)(iii) of this paragraph, and the laboratory value of the sensitivity of the neutron detector, as recorded on the neutron detector, is less than or equal to 15 percent of the average of these two sensitivity values.

(i) The results of the measurements obtained in accordance with subparagraphs (d) and (f) of this paragraph shall be recorded either in the inspection report or in a form, agreed upon by the Parties, used to record the confirmation of the operability of the radiation detection equipment at the point of entry.

4. The inspecting Party, prior to beginning to use its radiation detection equipment during the first inspection conducted with the use of radiation detection equipment, shall deliver to the inspected Party, for purchase or examination by the inspected Party, one of each of the items in the sets of radiation detection equipment specified in subparagraph 4(c) of Subsection A or subparagraph 4(b) of Subsection B of Section I of this Annex, for each model, except for the calibration source. No later than 30 days after the inspected Party has received such items of radiation detection equipment, the inspected Party shall inform the inspecting Party whether the inspecting Party is permitted to use during inspections such radiation detection equipment. Until permission for the use of such radiation detection equipment is given by the inspected Party, the inspecting Party shall not bring to a point of entry on the territory of the inspected Party other radiation detection equipment."

2. The following provisions shall constitute paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 8 of Subsection F of Section VI of Annex 8 to the Inspection Protocol:

"5. For points of entry associated with inspection sites at which radiation detection equipment may be used, the inspecting Party shall bring to each such point of entry on the territory of the inspected Party for use during inspections, at times agreed upon with the inspected Party, no less than one set of radiation detection equipment.

(a) Except as provided for in paragraphs 6 and 7 of this Subsection, each such set of radiation detection equipment shall be subject to examination and stored at the point of entry in accordance with the procedures provided for in this paragraph.
(b) The examination of such sets of radiation detection equipment shall be completed no later than five days after the date when these sets of radiation detection equipment are brought to the point of entry. During the examination of the radiation detection equipment, the inspected Party shall be permitted, in the presence of the inspecting Party, to partially disassemble such equipment and examine it using non-damaging methods. Such examination must not impair the capability of the radiation detection equipment to perform functions connected with the inspection requirements under the Treaty. Upon completion of the examination and prior to departure from the point of entry, the inspecting Party shall have the right to confirm the operability of the radiation detection equipment in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Subsection in order to establish that its capability to perform functions connected with the inspection requirements under the Treaty has not been impaired as a result of the examination of such radiation detection equipment by the inspected Party.
(c) Upon completion of the examination, the sets of radiation detection equipment shall be stored at the point of entry in tamper-proof containers provided by the inspecting Party, and shall be located within a secure structure or room in accordance with paragraph 14 of Section V of this Protocol. No more than three sets of radiation detection equipment shall be stored at each point of entry associated with inspection sites at which radiation detection equipment may be used.
(d) The procedures for delivering radiation detection equipment for examination and storage at points of entry, transportation and arrangements for the stay of technical experts delivering and supporting the examination of such equipment on the territory of the inspected Party, and reimbursement of associated costs shall be subject to agreement.

6. For an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 2, 3 or 4 of Article XI of the Treaty, an inspection team shall be permitted to bring to a point of entry calibration sources that are part of the sets of radiation detection equipment stored at the point of entry, replacement spare batteries and rechargeable batteries, as well as an additional set of radiation detection equipment. All such equipment brought to the point of entry shall be subject to examination in accordance with paragraph 8 of Section V of this Protocol.
7. For an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 2, 3 or 4 of Article XI of the Treaty, the inspection team, upon arrival at the point of entry, shall have the right, in the presence of the in-country escort, to examine the tamper-proof containers in which the radiation detection equipment is stored and the radiation detection equipment in such containers. The inspection team shall have the right to select one set of radiation detection equipment for use during the inspection from among the sets of such equipment stored at the point of entry in accordance with subparagraph 5(c) of this Subsection or an additional set of radiation detection equipment brought to the point of entry by the inspection team, and to confirm its operability in accordance with the procedures provided for in paragraph 3 of this Subsection, for no more than four hours.

(a) If the inspection team determines that the containers for at least one of the sets of radiation detection equipment have not been tampered with, and that the set of radiation detection equipment contained in such containers is operable in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Subsection, then such a set of radiation detection equipment shall be used in conducting the inspection.
(b) If either the inspection team or the in-country escort determines that the containers for all the sets of radiation detection equipment have been tampered with, the inspection team shall have the right to use an additional set of radiation detection equipment brought to the point of entry by the inspection team and examined in accordance with paragraph 8 of Section V of this Protocol, the operability of which has been confirmed in accordance with the procedures provided for in paragraph 3 of this Subsection, in conducting the inspection.
(c) For containers that have not been tampered with, if either the inspection team or the in-country escort determines that all the sets of radiation detection equipment stored in such containers are not operable, the inspection team shall have the right to use an additional set of radiation detection equipment brought to the point of entry by the inspection team in conducting the inspection. In this case, the date and time for the designation of the inspection site and the type of inspection pursuant to paragraph 4 of Section III of this Protocol shall be delayed, if necessary, until the in-country escort has completed its examination of such radiation detection equipment using the procedures provided for in paragraph 5 of this Subsection, and the inspection team has confirmed the operability of such radiation detection equipment in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Subsection. In no case shall such delay exceed 12 hours or require the inspection team to delay the date and time for the designation of the inspection site and type of inspection beyond the time limit specified in paragraph 4 of Section III of this Protocol for the type of inspection being conducted.
(d) If there are no signs that the containers have been tampered with and any set of radiation detection equipment stored in such containers is not operable, the inspecting Party shall return such a set or sets of radiation detection equipment and associated containers to the territory of the inspecting Party. The inspecting Party shall inform the inspected Party of the cause of the malfunction and measures taken to preclude such malfunctions in the future.
(e) If an additional set of radiation detection equipment is brought to the point of entry by the inspection team and is not used in conducting the inspection, such radiation detection equipment shall be stored at the point of entry in tamper-proof containers and removed from the territory of the inspected Party by the inspection team when it leaves the territory of the inspected Party.
(f) In all cases, only one set of radiation detection equipment whose operability has been confirmed in accordance with the procedures provided for in paragraph 3 of this Subsection shall be used during an inspection.

8. For an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 4 or 5 of Section IV of Annex 4 to this Protocol, radiation detection equipment shall be used in accordance with the following procedures:

(a) The counting time of each individual measurement shall be the counting time specified in subparagraph 4(c) of Subsection A or subparagraph 4(b) of Subsection B of Section I of this Annex for the neutron detectors in the sets of radiation detection equipment of the United States of America or the Russian Federation, respectively.
(b) The inspection team shall have the right to observe the use of the radiation detection equipment to confirm that the procedures set forth in this paragraph are followed.
(c) After arrival at the inspection site, prior to conducting radiation measurements the inspection team shall confirm, in accordance with the procedures provided for in paragraph 3 of this Subsection, that at least one neutron detector in the set of radiation detection equipment is operable. If the inspection team is unable to confirm the operability of at least one neutron detector, this fact shall be recorded in the inspection report and the inspection shall proceed without the use of radiation detection equipment.
(d) Measurements of radiation levels, in accordance with subparagraphs (f) and (g) of this paragraph, of the object designated by the inspection team for radiation measurements shall be taken at the location selected for that purpose by the in-country escort, using a neutron detector whose operability has been confirmed pursuant to subparagraph (c) of this paragraph.
(e) Background measurements shall be taken by the in-country escort no less than ten meters from the object designated by the inspection team for radiation measurements. Such background measurements shall be taken in accordance with the following procedures:

(i) The inspection team shall identify to the in-country escort the front surface of the neutron detector that will be directed toward the object designated for measurement of the radiation level. The front surface of the neutron detector shall be positioned vertically, at approximately the same height at which measurements on the designated object will be taken.
(ii) Two background measurements shall be taken. The average of these two measurements shall be calculated and recorded in the inspection report as the average background value.
(iii) If the average background value is greater than 450 counts, another location for taking the background measurements shall be selected by the in-country escort. Background measurements shall be taken until an average background value is obtained that is less than 450 counts at a selected location.
(iv) The square root of the average background value shall be calculated to two decimal places and the result multiplied by four. This number shall be added to the average background value and the result shall be rounded up to the higher whole number. This number shall be recorded in the inspection report as the comparison number to be used in subparagraph (f) of this paragraph.

(f) For an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 4 or subparagraph 5(c) of Section IV of Annex 4 to this Protocol, the following procedures shall be used:

(i) The inspection team shall select no more than four points along the length of the ALCM or container at which radiation measurements will be taken. A description of the ALCM or container shall be recorded as a diagram in the inspection report. The approximate dimensions of the ALCM or container, and the approximate location of each measurement point, shall be indicated on this diagram.
(ii) The in-country escort shall position the neutron detector in a location specified by the inspection team, no less than seven centimeters and no greater than two meters from the surface of the ALCM or container, with a maximum permissible deviation from these established distances not to exceed 20 percent, so that the neutron detector is at the same level as the point where the measurement will be taken, with the front surface of the neutron detector facing the point on the ALCM or container where the measurement will be taken.
(iii) The in-country escort shall take two measurements of the radiation level at each selected point. The average of the two measurements shall be calculated, and if not a whole number, shall be rounded up to the higher whole number. This average shall be recorded in the inspection report as the average measurement at that point.
(v) If the average measurement of the radiation level at each selected point is less than or equal to the comparison number calculated in accordance with subparagraph (e)(iv) of this paragraph, the ALCM or container shall not be subject to further inspection.
(v) If the average measurement of the radiation level at any of the four selected points is greater than the comparison number calculated in accordance with subparagraph (e)(iv) of this paragraph, this fact shall be recorded in the inspection report and the ALCM or container shall be subject to further inspection in accordance with subparagraph 4(a)(ii) or subparagraph 4(b)(iii) of Section IV of Annex 4 to this Protocol, as applicable.

(g) To confirm, pursuant to subparagraph 5(c) of Section IV of Annex 4 to this Protocol, that a container does not conceal the presence of radiation, the following procedures shall be used:

(i) The inspection team shall select no more than four points on the container wall at which radiation measurements will be taken for the purpose of measuring the radiation shielding effect. A description of the container shall be recorded as a diagram in the inspection report. The approximate dimensions of the container and the approximate location of each measurement point shall be indicated on this diagram.
(ii) The in-country escort shall open the container and place the calibration source on its stand inside the container on the longitudinal axis of the container. The neutron detector shall be placed outside the container in a location specified by the inspection team, no less than seven centimeters and no greater than two meters from the surface of the container, with a maximum permissible deviation from established distances not to exceed 20 percent. The calibration source and neutron detector shall be placed on a horizontal straight line that passes through the center of the calibration source and the center of the neutron detector, that lies on a plane perpendicular to the longitudinal axis of the container, and that intersects the wall of the container at the selected point on the container. The distance between the center of the calibration source and the center of the neutron detector shall be recorded in the inspection report. The front surface of the neutron detector shall face the selected point.
(iii) The in-country escort shall take two measurements of the radiation level at each selected point on the container. The container shall remain closed during measurements of the radiation level. The average of the two measurements shall be calculated. The average background value, calculated in accordance with subparagraph (e)(ii) of this paragraph, shall be subtracted from this average. The result shall be recorded in the inspection report as the net average value of radiation obtained when the calibration source is placed inside the container at that point.
(iv) The procedures provided for in subparagraphs (g)(ii) and (g)(iii) of this paragraph shall be repeated until measurements have been taken at all the points on the container selected by the inspection team, and the results have been recorded in the inspection report.
(v) The calibration source shall be removed from the container and the neutron detector repositioned no less than two meters from the container with its front surface no longer facing the container.
(vi) The in-country escort shall position the calibration source in front of the front surface of the neutron detector so that the distance between the front surface of the neutron detector and the calibration source is the same distance, within three percent, as that used for one of the measurements taken pursuant to subparagraph (g)(iii) of this paragraph. No objects that could interfere with the flow of neutrons to the neutron detector shall be located near the calibration source or the neutron detector.
(vii) The in-country escort shall take two measurements of the radiation level with the calibration source and the neutron detector positioned in accordance with subparagraphs (g)(v) and (g)(vi) of this paragraph. The average of the two measurements shall be calculated. The average background value calculated in accordance with subparagraph (e)(ii) of this paragraph shall be subtracted from this average. The result shall be recorded in the inspection report as the net average value of radiation obtained when the calibration source is placed outside the container at the distance used pursuant to subparagraph (g)(vi) of this paragraph.
(viii) The procedures provided for in subparagraphs (g)(vi) and (g)(vii) of this paragraph shall be repeated for each distance between the calibration source and the neutron detector used for the measurements of the radiation level taken pursuant to subparagraph (g)(iii) of this paragraph.
(ix) For each point on the container, calculations shall be carried out, in which the net average value of the radiation level obtained pursuant to subparagraph (g)(iii) when the calibration source is placed inside the container is divided by the corresponding net average value of the radiation level obtained pursuant to subparagraph (g)(vii) when the calibration source is placed outside the container. The division shall be carried out to two decimal places. If the result of the division with respect to any point is less than 0.5, this fact shall be recorded in the inspection report.
(x) For containers of long-range non-nuclear ALCMs of a type for which a notification has been provided in accordance with Section VII of the Notification Protocol, if either the width or the diameter of such containers exceeds 190 centimeters, the Parties shall agree, within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, on procedures for the placement of the neutron detector and the calibration source with respect to such containers."

Article Three

Subparagraph 5(d) of Section IV of Annex 4 to the Inspection Protocol shall be superseded by the following provision:

"(d) If, by making such measurements, inspectors are unable to confirm that the contents of the container are not a long-range nuclear ALCM, or that such a container does not conceal the presence of radiation, they shall record their findings in the inspection report. A member of the in-country escort shall, at the request of the inspectors, photograph the contents of the container or the container, in accordance with the procedures provided for in paragraph 27 of Section VI of this Protocol."

Article Four

This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty, and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Geneva on November 3, 1994, in five copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America:
Steven E. Steiner

For the Government of the Republic of Belarus:
Andrey Sannikov

For the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan:
Kairtay Zhanbatyrov

For the Government of the Russian Federation:
Mikhail Strel'tsov

For the Government of Ukraine:
Konstantin Hrishchenko

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Agreement number 25
Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991

The use of radiation detection equipment during long-range non-nuclear ALCM distinguishability exhibitions

To improve the viability and effectiveness of the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Inspection Protocol,

Have agreed as follows:

Article One

1. The title of Section IV of Annex 8 to the Inspection Protocol shall be superseded by the following provision:

"IV. Characteristics of equipment for inspections during heavy bomber distinguishability exhibitions and heavy bomber baseline exhibitions conducted pursuant to paragraphs 12 and 13 of Article XI of the Treaty and during exhibitions of long-range non-nuclear ALCMs conducted pursuant to notifications provided in accordance with Section VII of the Notification Protocol."

2. Subparagraph 4(a) of Subsection A of Section IV of Annex 8 to the Inspection Protocol shall be superseded by the following provisions:

"(a) 2 Ionization dosimeter charger units, Victoreen, Model 2000A; and
(b) Set of radiation detection equipment consisting of the following:

(i) 2 Neutron detectors, Sandia National Laboratory design, He-3-based, polyethylene-moderated, including preamplifiers with signal/power cables, counting time - 150 seconds;
(ii) 2 Electronic counters, Eberline, Model ESP-2 modified, with instruction manual;
(iii) 10 Plastic bags for weather protection;
(iv) 1 Americium-24l-Lithium neutron source for calibration, emitting approximately 3000 neutrons per second, precalibrated by the inspecting Party;
(v) 1 Tool kit, Jensen Tools, Model JTK-6;
(vi) 30 Spare batteries, miscellaneous, sizes C and D;
(vii) 1 Stand for neutron detector;
(viii) 1 Measuring tape;
(ix) 2 Battery-powered lights, Maglight, Model ML-2;
(x) 3 Programmable calculators, Hewlett-Packard, Model HP-27s, with instruction manual;
(xi) 2 Thermometers;
(xii) 1 Stand for calibration source; and
(xiii) 4 Operating instruction manuals, two in English and two in Russian."

3. The following provisions shall constitute paragraph 4 of Subsection B of Section IV of Annex 8 to the Inspection Protocol:

"4. Other Portable Equipment (quantity for each inspection team):

(a) Set of SRPN 3 or SRPN 6 radiation detection equipment of the Russian Federation consisting of the following:

(i) 2 Neutron detectors, including preamplifiers with signal/power cables, manufactured by NIIIT, Model SRPN 3.01.000, counting time - 1000 seconds, or Model SRPN 6.02.000, counting time - 150 seconds;
(ii) 2 Registering devices, manufactured by NIIIT, Model SRPN 3.03.000 or SRPN 6.01.000;
(iii) 1 Americium-24l-Lithium neutron source for calibration, emitting approximately 3000 neutrons per second, precalibrated by the inspecting Party;
(iv) 1 Charging unit, manufactured by NIIIT, Model SE-387 or SE-408;
(v) 2 Spare rechargeable batteries, Model 10NKGTs-1D;
(vi) 2 Measuring tapes;
(vii) 2 Battery-powered lights;
(viii) 2 Stands for neutron detectors;
(ix) 2 Calculators, Casio, Model FX-120;
(x) 1 Stand for calibration source; and
(xi) 4 Operating instruction manuals, two in English and two in Russian."

Article Two

This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty, and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Geneva on November 3, 1994, in five copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America:
Steven E. Steiner

For the Government of the Republic of Belarus:
Andrey Sannikov

For the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan:
Kairtay Zhanbatyrov

For the Government of the Russian Federation:
Mikhail Strel'tsov

For the Government of Ukraine:
Konstantin Hrishchenko

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Agreement number 26
Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991

Provision of summaries for tapes that contain a recording of telemetric information

To improve the viability and effectiveness of the Protocol on Telemetric Information Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Telemetry Protocol,

Have agreed as follows:

Article One

1. Subparagraph 1(c)(ii) of Section I of the Telemetry Protocol shall be superseded by the following provision:

"(ii) information for each track, including track number, record period, record mode, and broadcast frequency (megahertz), except for track numbers for each tape, and each portion of a tape, that contain a recording of telemetric information that has been encrypted;"

2. Subparagraph 1(c)(iii) of Section I of the Telemetry Protocol shall be superseded by the following provision:

"(iii) digital data encoding methods employed and digital data recording formats, except that the provisions of this subparagraph shall not apply to each tape, and each portion of a tape, that contain a recording of telemetric information that has been encrypted; and"

Article Two

This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty, and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Geneva on November 3, 1994, in five copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America:
Steven E. Steiner

For the Government of the Republic of Belarus:
Andrey Sannikov

For the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan:
Kairtay Zhanbatyrov

For the Government of the Russian Federation:
Mikhail Strel'tsov

For the Government of Ukraine:
Konstantin Hrishchenko

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Agreement number 27
Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991

Notification prior to the change in function of a facility

To improve the viability and effectiveness of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Notification Protocol,

Have agreed as follows:

Article One

Paragraph 9 of Section I of the Notification Protocol shall be superseded by the following provisions:

"(9) notification, no less than 30 days in advance of the exit from a newly constructed facility or a facility for which such items have not been specified in the Memorandum of Understanding, or no less than 30 days in advance of the appearance of an ICBM, SLBM, first stage of an ICBM or SLBM, solid rocket motor for the first stage of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs, mobile launcher of ICBMs, or heavy bomber at such a facility, or no less than 30 days in advance of the date to be specified in the notification of a new facility provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Section, or no less than 30 days in advance of the date to be specified in the notification of the change of category of a facility provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Section, of the existence of a new facility or of a change of category of a facility. Such notification shall include: the name of the facility; its function according to the categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding; and its geographic coordinates. Such notification shall not be required if notification was provided in accordance with paragraph 10 of this Section;"

Article Two

This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty, and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Geneva on November 3, 1994, in five copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America:
Steven E. Steiner

For the Government of the Republic of Belarus:
Andrey Sannikov

For the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan:
Kairtay Zhanbatyrov

For the Government of the Russian Federation:
Mikhail Strel'tsov

For the Government of Ukraine:
Konstantin Hrishchenko

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Agreement number 28
Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991

Changes to the periods for conducting baseline data inspections, data update inspections and reentry vehicle inspections

Acting in accordance with the Treaty,

To improve the viability and effectiveness of the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Inspection Protocol,

Have agreed as follows:

Article One

I. Paragraph 1 of Section VII of the Inspection Protocol shall be superseded by the following provision:

"1. Each Party shall have the right to conduct baseline data inspections beginning 85 days after entry into force of the Treaty and ending 205 days after entry into force of the Treaty."

2. The first sentence of paragraph 2 of Section VII of the Inspection Protocol shall be superseded by the following provision:

"Except as provided for in paragraph 3 of this Section, each Party shall have the right to conduct data update inspections 205 days after entry into force of the Treaty and thereafter."

3. The first sentence of paragraph 1 of Section IX of the Inspection Protocol shall be superseded by the following provision:

"Each Party shall have the right, 205 days after entry into force of the Treaty and thereafter, to conduct reentry vehicle inspections."

Article Two

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Geneva on February 3, 1995, in five copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America:
Steven E. Steiner

For the Government of the Republic of Belarus:
Aleksandr Baichorov

For the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan:
Kairtay Zhanbatyrov

For the Government of the Russian Federation:
Mikhail Strel'tsov

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Agreement number 29
Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991

Changes to boundaries on site diagrams of facilities

Acting in accordance with the Treaty,

To improve the viability and effectiveness of the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Memorandum of Understanding,

To improve the viability and effectiveness of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Notification Protocol,

Have agreed as follows:

Article One

The following provisions shall constitute paragraphs 19, 20, and 21 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding:

"19. For each change to the boundary of a facility shown on the existing site diagram of the facility provided pursuant to this Memorandum that would result in the exclusion from within such boundary of any structure that was shown within such boundary pursuant to subparagraph 9(b)(iii) of this Annex, the change shall become effective after the following requirements are met:

(a) the provisions of paragraph 2 of Section IX of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol have been met with respect to the portions of the facility to be excluded from within the boundary of the facility;
(b) for all structures that were shown on the existing site diagram pursuant to subparagraph 9(b)(iii) of this Annex and that would be excluded from within the boundary of the facility, information has been provided by the Party changing the boundary of the facility, within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission or through diplomatic channels, on its intent with regard to:

(i) the structures that will remain unchanged but which that Party declares will no longer be used for items of inspection;
(ii) the structures that will be destroyed;
(iii) the structures that will be converted in a manner so that they are not large enough to contain items of inspection or their entrances are not large enough to permit passage of items of inspection; and
(iv) the approximate effective date of the change;

(c) agreement has been reached, within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, on:

(i) the new boundary of the facility; and
(ii) inspections of portions of the facility to be excluded from within the boundary of the facility. The procedures for such inspections shall be agreed taking into account the plans specified pursuant to subparagraph (b) of this paragraph for each structure, including its possible destruction or conversion. Such procedures and plans shall be recorded in the agreement reached pursuant to this subparagraph. Unless otherwise agreed, the procedures for such inspections shall be based on the provisions contained in, as applicable, Sections XII and XIII of the Inspection Protocol; and

(d) a notification has been provided in accordance with paragraph 19 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.

20. For each change to the boundary of a facility shown on the existing site diagram of the facility provided pursuant to this Memorandum that would not result in the exclusion from within such boundary of any structure that was shown within such boundary pursuant to subparagraph 9 (b) (iii) of this Annex, the change shall become effective after the following requirements are met:

(a) agreement has been reached, within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, on:

(i) the new boundary of the facility; and
(ii) inspection of portions of the facility to be excluded from within the boundary of the facility. Unless otherwise agreed, the procedures for such inspection shall be based on the provisions contained in Section XII of the Inspection Protocol;

(b) information has been provided by the Party changing the boundary of the facility on the approximate effective date of the change; and
(c) a notification has been provided in accordance with paragraph 19 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.

21. For each change to the boundary of a facility shown on the existing site diagram of the facility provided pursuant to this Memorandum that would not result in the exclusion of any portion of the existing inspection site from within such boundary, the change shall become effective on the date specified in the notification of the change to such boundary provided in accordance with paragraph 19 of Section I of the Notification Protocol."

Article Two

The following provisions shall constitute paragraph 19 of Section I of the Notification Protocol:

"(19) notification, no later than five days after the effective date of a change, of the change to the boundary of the facility specified on the site diagram. Such notification shall include: the name and function of the facility; the subtitle, if applicable; the geographic coordinates of the facility; the effective date of the change; the reference to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission document; and a statement that a revised site diagram for the facility and a site diagram of excluded portions of the facility will be provided through diplomatic channels no later than 48 hours after the notification provided for in this paragraph."

Article Three

The following categories of data shall be added in Annex E to the Memorandum of Understanding:

"For each Party, the facilities currently or formerly declared in this Memorandum whose portions have been excluded, in accordance with paragraph 19 or 20 of Annex J to this Memorandum, for the purposes of the Treaty from within the boundaries shown on the site diagrams of such facilities, and notification of changes in the boundaries of which have been provided in accordance with paragraph 19 of Section I of the Notification Protocol, are as follows:

(a) United States of America
Function of the facility that incorporated excluded portions:
(_________)
Name of the facility that incorporated excluded portions and subtitle, if applicable/Location of the facility:
(____)/(____)
Date of preparation of the site diagram of excluded portions of the facility:
(_________)
Reference to Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Document on the exclusion of portions of a facility:
(_________)
(b) Republic of Belarus
Function of the facility that incorporated excluded portions:
(_________)
Name of the facility that incorporated excluded portions and subtitle, if applicable/Location of the facility:
(____)/(____)
Date of preparation of the site diagram of excluded portions of the facility:
(_________)
Reference to Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Document on the exclusion of portions of a facility:
(_________)
(c) Republic of Kazakhstan
Function of the facility that incorporated excluded portions:
(_________)
Name of the facility that incorporated excluded portions and subtitle, if applicable/Location of the facility:
(____)/(____)
Date of preparation of the site diagram of excluded portions of the facility:
(_________)
Reference to Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Document on the exclusion of portions of a facility:
(_________)
(d) Russian Federation
Function of the facility that incorporated excluded portions:
(_________)
Name of the facility that incorporated excluded portions and subtitle, if applicable/Location of the facility:
(____)/(____)
Date of preparation of the site diagram of excluded portions of the facility:
(_________)
Reference to Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Document on the exclusion of portions of a facility:
(_________)
(e) Ukraine
Function of the facility that incorporated excluded portions:
(_________)
Name of the facility that incorporated excluded portions and subtitle, if applicable/Location of the facility:
(____)/(____)
Date of preparation of the site diagram of excluded portions of the facility:
(_________)
Reference to Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Document on the exclusion of portions of a facility:
(_________)

Article Four

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Geneva on February 3, 1995, in five copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America:
Steven E. Steiner

For the Government of the Republic of Belarus:
Aleksandr Baichorov

For the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan:
Kairtay Zhanbatyrov

For the Government of the Russian Federation:
Mikhail Strel'tsov

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Agreement number 30
Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991

Settlement of accounts

Acting in accordance with the Treaty,

Pursuant to subparagraph (b) of Article XV of the Treaty,

Pursuant to paragraph 13 of Section IV, paragraph 19 of Section V, and paragraphs 17, 19, 21, 23, and 35 of Section XVI of the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Inspection Protocol; the Thirty-fifth Agreed Statement in the Annex to the Treaty on Agreed Statements; paragraph 7 of Section I of Annex 1 to the Protocol on Telemetric Information Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Telemetry Protocol; and the Joint Statement Concerning Currency of Payment for Costs Relating to Implementation of the Treaty,

Have agreed as follows:

Article One

The following provisions shall constitute Annex 14 to the Inspection Protocol:

"ANNEX 14
Settlement of Accounts
I. Principles and Procedures for Settlement of Accounts
1. The Parties shall use the principles and procedures for the settlement of accounts, specified in this Section, in connection with:

(a) the costs of goods and services borne by the inspecting Party pursuant to paragraph 13 of Section IV, paragraph 19 of Section V, and paragraphs 17, 19, 21, 23, and 35 of Section XVI of the Inspection Protocol; and
(b) the costs of goods and services associated with the purchase of tapes and the copying of telemetric information onto such tapes pursuant to the Thirty-fifth Agreed Statement in the Annex to the Treaty on Agreed Statements, and with the providing of training, maintenance, service, spare parts and replacement parts relating to telemetry equipment pursuant to paragraph 7 of Section I and paragraph 8 of Section II of Annex l to the Telemetry Protocol, and subparagraphs 4(d) and 4(e) and paragraph 6 of Annex 4 to the Telemetry Protocol.

2. The United States of America shall submit to each other Party, and the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine shall each submit to the United States of America, lists of goods and services provided, hereinafter referred to as itemized lists, in the categories contained in Section II of this Annex, except categories contained in paragraph 6, subparagraph 7(b) and paragraph 8 of that Section. These itemized lists shall contain the information specified in Section II of this Annex for the goods and services provided during the period covered by these itemized lists, except that goods and services provided in the category contained in paragraph 14 of Section II of this Annex may be included on the itemized lists covering the period when provision of such goods and services was completed. In addition, each Party shall submit with the itemized lists a summary list of all categories contained in Section II of this Annex for which goods and services have been provided, and the estimated overall total cost of the goods and services provided in each category.
3. Each Party shall submit itemized lists in accordance with the following schedule:

(a) for the period from January 1 through March 31, no later than April 30;
(b) for the period from April 1 through June 30, no later than July 31;
(c) for the period from July 1 through September 30, no later than October 31; and
(d) for the period from October 1 through December 31, no later than January 31.

4. For settlement of accounts for goods and services provided by the Parties pursuant to the Agreement on Early Exhibitions in the categories contained in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Section II of this Annex, for construction activities related to the establishment of the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring facility at Pavlograd in the categories contained in paragraphs 4 and 14 of Section II of this Annex, and for goods and services provided by the Parties pursuant to Annex 4 to the Telemetry Protocol in the categories contained in paragraphs 1, 2 and 17 of Section II of this Annex, and provided by the Parties prior to entry into force of the Treaty, the Parties shall use the following procedures:

(a) itemized lists shall be submitted pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 12 of this Section no later than 90 days after entry into force of the Treaty;
(b) itemized lists shall be reviewed pursuant to paragraph 5 of this Section;
(c) a confirmation of goods and services received or a bill shall be submitted pursuant to paragraphs 6, 8, and 12 of this Section no later than 120 days after entry into force of the Treaty; and
(d) a bill shall be paid pursuant to paragraphs 9 and 12 of this Section.

5. The following procedures shall be used after the submittal of itemized lists pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Section:

(a) each Party shall review the itemized lists to determine for each category, whether the goods and services that it received are comparable in quantity and quality to the goods and services that it provided;
(b) if the United States of America and another Party determine that the goods and services provided by those Parties for a specific category are comparable in quantity and quality, then no exchange of funds shall be required. In this case, those Parties shall submit to each other a confirmation of goods and services received for that category pursuant to paragraphs 6 and 7 of this Section; and
(c) if the United States of America or another Party determines that the goods and services provided by those Parties for a specific category are not comparable in quantity and quality, then an exchange of funds shall be required for payment of the difference in the cost of goods and services provided by those Parties in that category. In this case, such Party that incurred the greater cost shall submit a bill to such other Party for that category pursuant to paragraphs 6, 7, and 8 of this Section.

6. A confirmation of goods and services received shall be in the form specified in paragraph 1 of Section III of this Annex. A bill shall include the information specified in paragraph 2 of Section III of this Annex.
7. A confirmation of goods and services received or a bill shall be submitted:

(a) for the period from January 1 through June 30, no later than August 31; and
(b) for the period from July 1 through December 31, no later than the last day of February.

8. The United States of America shall denominate all bills submitted to the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, or Ukraine in U.S. dollars. The Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine shall make all payments to the United States of America in U.S. dollars for all categories contained in Section II of this Annex. The Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine shall denominate all bills submitted to the United States of America in both U.S. dollars and the local currency. The United States of America shall make all payments to the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine in a freely convertible currency for all categories contained in Section II of this Annex.
9. Bills shall be paid in accordance with the following:

(a) a bill shall be paid within 30 days of its receipt;
(b) each Party shall notify the other Party of a disputed bill within seven days of its receipt; and
(c) if any undisputed bill is not paid within 180 days of its receipt, then the bill shall be subject to interest, from the date specified on the bill, at the current rate in use by the Export-Import Bank of the United States of America.

10. The goods and services provided in the categories contained in paragraph 6, subparagraph 7(b) and paragraph 8 of Section II of this Annex shall be paid for at the time such goods and services are received and shall be paid for at the commonly available tariffs or rates.
11. The costs for the categories specified in this paragraph shall be calculated in accordance with the following:

(a) the costs for the goods and services provided in categories contained in subparagraphs 7(a) and 9(a) of Section II of this Annex shall be calculated by multiplying the number of flights provided by the inspected Party by the agreed rate per flight:

(i) for the category contained in subparagraph 7(a) of Section II of this Annex, the agreed rate per flight shall be U.S. $15,000; and
(ii) for the category contained in subparagraph 9(a) of Section II of this Annex, the agreed rate per flight shall be U.S. $36,000;

(b) the costs for the category contained in paragraph 16 of Section II of this Annex shall be calculated by multiplying the number of flight tests conducted by each Party by the agreed rate for the purchase and copying of each telemetry data tape. This agreed rate shall be U.S. $0.00, unless otherwise agreed in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

12. The designated organizations for settlement of accounts shall be:

(a) for the United States of America, the On-Site Inspection Agency of the United States of America shall submit to and receive from the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine itemized lists, confirmations of goods and services received, and bills, and shall make payments of bills to, and receive payments of bills from, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine;
(b) for the Republic of Belarus, the National Agency for Verification and Inspection shall submit to and receive from the United States of America itemized lists, confirmations of goods and services received, and bills, and shall make payments of bills to, and receive payments of bills from, the United States of America;
(c) for the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Kazakhstan shall submit to and receive from the United States of America itemized lists, confirmations of goods and services received, and bills, and shall make payments of bills to, and receive payments of bills from, the United States of America;
(d) for the Russian Federation, the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center of the Russian Federation shall submit to and receive from the United States of America itemized lists, confirmations of goods and services received, and bills, and shall make payments of bills to, and receive payments of bills from, the United States of America; and
(e) for Ukraine, the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine shall submit to and receive from the United States of America itemized lists, confirmations of goods and services received, and bills, and shall make payments of bills to, and receive payments of bills from, the United States of America.

13. Each Party shall have the right to change the organization designated for settlement of accounts specified in paragraph 12 of this Section by informing all other Parties of the change no less than 90 days prior to the effective date of the change.
14. The organizations specified in paragraph 12 of this Section shall have the right to designate their respective authorized representatives.
II. Categories of Goods and Services and Information to be Included in Itemized Lists
This Section lists the categories of goods and services for settlement of accounts in connection with paragraph 1 of Section I of this Annex. For each category, the subparagraphs specify the data that shall be included in the itemized lists for that category.
1. Fuel for inspection airplanes provided pursuant to paragraph 13 of Section IV of the Inspection Protocol, and fuel for dedicated airplanes provided pursuant to paragraph 4 of Annex 4 to the Telemetry Protocol:

(a) type of airplane;
(b) tail number or call sign of airplane;
(c) type of fuel and its quantity in metric tons;
(d) dates on which fuel was provided;
(e) location where fuel was provided;
(f) estimated cost of fuel, if available; and
(g) payment, if any, made when the fuel was provided.

2. Services for inspection airplanes provided pursuant to paragraph 13 of Section IV of the Inspection Protocol, and services for dedicated airplanes provided pursuant to paragraph 4 of Annex 4 to the Telemetry Protocol:

(a) type of airplane;
(b) tail number or call sign of airplane;
(c) description of services provided;
(d) dates on which services were provided;
(e) location where services were provided;
(f) estimated cost of services, if available; and
(g) payment, if any, made when services were provided.

3. Meals and lodging provided while monitors are at the point of entry pursuant to subparagraph 19(b) of Section V of the Inspection Protocol:

(a) description of services provided;
(b) dates on which services were provided; and
(c) estimated cost of each service, if available.

4. Permanent lodging and work space for monitors, including utilities and maintenance, provided pursuant to subparagraph 19(c) of Section V of the Inspection Protocol:

(a) description of lodging and work space provided;
(b) period for which lodging and work space were provided; and
(c) estimated cost of each service, if available.

5. Temporary lodging and work space for monitors, including utilities and maintenance, provided pursuant to subparagraph 19(c) of Section V of the Inspection Protocol:

(a) description of lodging;
(b) period for which lodging was provided;
(c) description of work space provided;
(d) period for which work space was provided; and
(e) estimated cost of each service, if available.

6. Meals, provided at the request of the inspecting Party, while monitors are at a facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility pursuant to subparagraph 19(d) of Section V of the Inspection Protocol. Provision of documentation is not required.
7. Transportation of monitors and their baggage, and delivery of equipment and supplies, including foodstuffs:

(a) from the point of entry to a facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility and from such facility to the point of entry pursuant to subparagraph 19(e) of Section V of the Inspection Protocol:

(i) date of flight and type of airplane; and
(ii) tail number or call sign of transporting airplane;

(b) from one facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility to another such facility pursuant to subparagraph 19(f) of Section V of the Inspection Protocol. Provision of documentation is not required.

8. Transportation, meals and lodging of monitors travelling from the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility to the embassy or consular post of the inspecting Party on the territory of the inspected Party and back provided pursuant to subparagraph 19(g) of Section V of the Inspection Protocol. Provision of documentation is not required.
9. Delivery of equipment and supplies, including foodstuffs, for continuous monitoring activities and transportation of monitors that arrive on such an airplane:

(a) from the point of entry to the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility and from such facility to the point of entry pursuant to subparagraph 19(h) of Section V and subparagraph 19(d) of Section XVI of the Inspection Protocol:

(i) date of flight and type of airplane; and
(ii) tail number or call sign of transporting airplane;

(b) from the airport associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility to such a facility and from the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility to the airport associated with such a facility pursuant to subparagraph 19(i) of Section V and subparagraph 19(d) of Section XVI of the Inspection Protocol:

(i) dates on which services were provided;
(ii) types of transportation means used; and
(iii) estimated cost of each service, if available.

10. Medical and other urgent services for monitors, including urgent evacuation of monitors from the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility to the point of entry or airport associated with such a facility, provided while the monitors are at the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility pursuant to subparagraphs 19(j) and 19(m) of Section V of the Inspection Protocol:

(a) first and last name of monitor;
(b) dates of treatment, description of treatment, and medications provided;
(c) period of hospitalization;
(d) date of urgent evacuation flight;
(e) type of evacuation airplane, and its tail number or its call sign; and
(f) estimated cost of each service, if available.

11. Utilities and maintenance of the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system, including utilities and engineering support for the building for storage of equipment and supplies, provided pursuant to subparagraph 19(k) of Section V and subparagraph 19(a) and paragraph 35 of Section XVI of the Inspection Protocol:

(a) utilities:

(i) description of utilities provided;
(ii) dates on which utilities were provided; and
(iii) estimated cost for each utility, if available;

(b) maintenance:

(i) location where work was done;
(ii) description of services provided;
(iii) type of engineering support provided;
(iv) dates on which services were provided; and
(v) estimated cost of each service, if available.

12. Installation and use of the non-dedicated commercial telephone line pursuant to paragraph 17 of Section XVI of the Inspection Protocol:

(a) number of lines;
(b) description of installation work performed;
(c) dates on which installation work was performed;
(d) description of maintenance and services provided;
(e) dates on which services were provided; and
(f) estimated cost for each service, if available.

13. Use of the satellite communications system pursuant to paragraph 17 of Section XVI of the Inspection Protocol:

(a) description of maintenance and services provided;
(b) dates on which services were provided; and
(c) estimated cost for each service, if available.

14. Site preparation and construction materials for the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system and for the operations center:

(a) construction of a building for the storage of equipment and supplies pursuant to paragraph 23 of Section XVI of the Inspection Protocol:

(i) engineering description of work performed;
(ii) description and quantity of materials provided;
(iii) dates on which work was performed; and
(iv) estimated cost of work and materials, if available;

(b) all other general construction pursuant to subparagraphs 19(b) and 19(c) and paragraph 35 of Section XVI of the Inspection Protocol:

(i) description and quantity of construction materials provided;
(ii) dates on which construction materials were provided;
(iii) location where site preparation work was done;
(iv) engineering description of site preparation work;
(v) dates on which site preparation work was performed; and
(vi) estimated cost of work and materials, if available.

15. Temporary structures for monitors at the portal or road exits provided pursuant to paragraph 21 of Section XVI of the Inspection Protocol:

(a) description of structures provided;
(b) period for which structures were provided; and
(c) estimated cost of each service, if available.

16. Tapes and the recording of telemetric information onto the tapes pursuant to the Thirty-fifth Agreed Statement in the Annex to the Treaty on Agreed Statements:

(a) dates of flight tests;
(b) type of missile tested;
(c) number of tapes provided; and
(d) estimated cost of the magnetic tapes and of recording the telemetric information, if available.

17. Training and maintenance of telemetric playback equipment, and provision of spare parts and replacement parts for such equipment pursuant to paragraph 7 of Section I and paragraph 8 of Section II of Annex 1, and paragraph 6 of Annex 4 to the Telemetry Protocol:

(a) type of service provided;
(b) description and quantity of spare and replacement parts provided;
(c) period of time during which services and spare and replacement parts were provided;
(d) estimated cost of services and spare and replacement parts, if available; and
(e) meals, lodging, work space, transportation, and, as necessary, medical and other urgent services for the trainee team members, maintenance team members and aircrew members of the providing or receiving Party.

III. Form of a Confirmation of Goods and Services Received and Information to be Included in a Bill
1. A confirmation of goods and services received shall be in the following form:
CONFIRMATION OF GOODS AND SERVICES RECEIVED BY THE (RECEIVING PARTY) FROM THE (PROVIDING PARTY) DURING THE PERIOD FROM __________THROUGH __________ (SIX-MONTH PERIOD COVERED)
This is to certify that the goods and services specified in (Reference to the appropriate itemized lists of goods and services submitted pursuant to paragraph 3 of Section I of this Annex) in the categories of goods and services (Reference to the appropriate categories of goods and services contained in Section II of this Annex) were provided and were received and accepted. The quantity and quality of goods and services provided by each Party in these categories are certified to be comparable; therefore, no exchange of funds is required.
__________
Signature
Date______
Place_____
The confirmation of goods and services received shall be signed by an individual authorized by the Party submitting the confirmation.
2. A bill shall be prepared in the English and Russian languages. A bill shall include the following information:

(a) the Party being billed;
(b) the Party submitting the bill and the name and address of the organization to which payment should be made;
(c) the number and date of the bill;
(d) reference to the category from those contained in Section II of this Annex for which the bill is submitted;
(e) reference to numbers and dates of the itemized lists of goods and services, submitted pursuant to paragraph 4 of Section I of this Annex; and
(f) description and quantity of goods and services provided, the six-month period covered by the bill, and the amount to be paid."

Article Two

The number "1" shall be superscripted at the end of the title of Annex 14. The corresponding footnote shall read:

"This Annex is included in this Protocol pursuant to Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Agreement Number 30 of February 3, 1995."

Article Three

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Geneva on February 3, 1995, in five copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America:
Steven E. Steiner

For the Government of the Republic of Belarus:
Aleksandr Baichorov

For the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan:
Kairtay Zhanbatyrov

For the Government of the Russian Federation:
Mikhail Strel'tsov

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Agreement number 31
Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991

Conduct of inspections and continuous monitoring activities on the territory of the United States of America

Acting in accordance with the Treaty,

To improve the viability and effectiveness of the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Inspection Protocol,

Taking into consideration the statements of policy of the United States of America, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine concerning inspection activities under the Treaty,

Have agreed as follows:

Article One

1. The Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine, as successor states of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in connection with the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Successor States, shall have the right to include in the list of inspectors and monitors provided for in paragraph 2 of Section II of the Inspection Protocol a number of individuals proportionate to the number of facilities subject to inspection on the territory of these States. The number of inspectors and monitors on the lists shall be: for the Republic of Belarus -- no more than 21 inspectors and 16 monitors; for the Republic of Kazakhstan -- no more than 27 inspectors and 20 monitors; for the Russian Federation -- no more than 299 inspectors and 224 monitors; and for Ukraine -- no more than 53 inspectors and 40 monitors.

2. The Successor States shall have the right to make changes to the lists of inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members at the intervals and using the procedures provided for in paragraph 4 of Section II of the Inspection Protocol. In this connection, such changes shall be: for the Republic of Belarus -- no more than two inspectors, no more than one monitor and no more than one aircrew member; for the Republic of Kazakhstan -- no more than two inspectors, no more than two monitors, and no more than two aircrew members; for the Russian Federation -- no more than 22 inspectors, no more than 19 monitors and no more than 19 aircrew members; and for Ukraine -- no more than four inspectors, no more than three monitors and no more than three aircrew members.

Article Two

1. The Russian Federation, when acting as the Party that provides notification of an intention to conduct an inspection on the territory of the United States of America, shall have the right to appoint up to 70 percent of the inspectors on a multiparty inspection team conducting such an inspection. The Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, or Ukraine, when acting as the Party that provides notification of an intention to conduct an inspection on the territory of the United States of America, shall have the right to appoint up to 50 percent of the inspectors on a multiparty inspection team conducting such an inspection, including the inspection team leader and two English-speaking inspectors. The other Successor States participating in the conduct of such an inspection shall have the right to provide the remaining personnel of a multiparty inspection team, bringing it up to the number of inspectors provided for in paragraph 28 of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol, by using their own inspectors in a number proportionate to the number of facilities subject to inspection on the territory of each of these States on the date of entry into force of the Treaty. Should one or more of the Successor States decline to participate in the conduct of an inspection, the quota of inspectors in the multiparty inspection team that becomes available may be apportioned among the remaining Successor States participating in the conduct of such an inspection in proportion to the number of facilities subject to inspection within the territory of these States.

2. The Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, or Ukraine shall inform the other Successor States of its intention to participate in the conduct of an inspection on the territory of the United States of America as the Party that provides notification of an intention to conduct the inspection, no later than 65 days after entry into force of the Treaty or no later than 30 days prior to the beginning of the next six-month period that the Treaty is in effect, and shall specify in such information the planned date of the beginning of the inspection to be conducted during the next six-month period that the Treaty is in effect and the type of such an inspection pursuant to Article XI of the Treaty.

3. Each Successor State that intends to participate in the conduct of an inspection on the territory of the United States of America as part of a multiparty inspection team shall so inform the Russian Federation through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center of the Russian Federation, or the other Successor State that has expressed its intention to participate in the conduct of the inspection as the Party that provides notification of an intention to conduct the inspection through its equivalent continuous communication link used for providing and receiving notifications in connection with the Treaty. Such information shall be provided at the following times:

(a) for an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article XI of the Treaty -- no later than 70 days after entry into force of the Treaty;
(b) for an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 3, 5 or 6 of Article XI of the Treaty -- no later than five days after the receipt of the information about the planned time for conducting the next inspection from the Successor State that provides notification of an intention to conduct such an inspection;
(c) for an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 4, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 or 13 of Article XI of the Treaty -- no later than ten days after receipt of the notifications provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I, paragraph 1 of Section IV, and Section VII of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Notification Protocol;
(d) for an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article XI of the Treaty -- no later than four hours after receipt of a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 12 of Section II of the Notification Protocol.

4. Each Successor State that provides a notification of an intention to conduct an inspection on the territory of the United States of America shall carry out all practical activity to prepare for and conduct the inspections. Each Successor State shall bear the costs associated with the conduct of inspections on the territory of the United States of America, in proportion to the number of its inspectors included in the multiparty inspection team.

5. Each Successor State acting as the Party that provides notification of an intention to conduct an inspection on the territory of the United States of America shall provide, within a ten-day period following the conclusion of such inspection, to the other Successor States through the embassies of these States in its capital a copy of the inspection report, provided for in paragraph l of Section XVIII of the Inspection Protocol.

Article Three

Each Successor State shall have the right to conduct continuous monitoring activities on the territory of the United States of America. If two or more Successor States decide to exercise this right, they shall agree among themselves on the procedures for conducting such activities, including the composition of the monitoring team and reimbursement of the relevant costs of the United States of America.

Article Four

The Successor States shall coordinate their activities to plan and conduct inspections and continuous monitoring activities relating to the Treaty on the territory of the United States of America through their corresponding representatives in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission or through the appropriate agency of each Successor State that supports the conduct of inspections and the conduct of continuous monitoring activities.

Article Five

The Successor States, in order to carry out the objectives provided for in this Agreement, shall arrange among themselves communications through the appropriate agencies that support the conduct of inspections and the conduct of continuous monitoring activities. Each Successor State shall bear the costs for the transmission of notifications and other information provided to the other Successor States in accordance with this Agreement.

Article Six

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Geneva on February 3, 1995, in five copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America:
Steven E. Steiner

For the Government of the Republic of Belarus:
Aleksandr Baichorov

For the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan:
Kairtay Zhanbatyrov

For the Government of the Russian Federation:
Mikhail Strel'tsov

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Agreement number 32
Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991

Changes to the lists of inspection equipment

To improve the viability and effectiveness of the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Inspection Protocol,

Have agreed as follows:

Article One

1. Subparagraph 1(c) of Subsection B of Sections I, III, IV and V of Annex 8 to the Inspection Protocol shall be superseded in each of these Sections by the following provision:

"(c) 2 3-meter measuring sticks, Model R51, with three measuring adapters;"

2. Subparagraph 2(i) of Subsection B of Sections I, III, IV and V of Annex 8 to the Inspection Protocol shall be superseded in each of these Sections by the following provision:

"(i) 8 Eight-packs of photographic film, Polaroid, Types 665, 667, 669 and ten-packs, Type 600 Plus;"

3. Subparagraph 2(k) of Subsection B of Sections I, III, IV and V of Annex 8 to the Inspection Protocol shall be superseded in each of these Sections by the following provision:

"(k) 1 range rod end piece, Model RN-3-3000 SPU 1;"

4. Subparagraph 2(o) of Subsection B of Sections I, III, IV and V of Annex 8 to the Inspection Protocol shall be superseded in each of these Sections by the following provision:

"(o) 1 3-meter range rod, Model RN-3-3000 SPU 1; and"

5. The chapeau of subparagraph 4(b) of Subsection A of Section I and subparagraph 2(b) of Subsection A of Section II of Annex 8 to the Inspection Protocol shall be superseded in each of these Sections by the following provision:

"(b) 2 Satellite system receiver sets, Transpack II or Scout^M, each provided by the inspected Party and consisting of the following:"

6. Subparagraph 4(b)(i) of Subsection A of Section I and subparagraph 2(b)(i) of Subsection A of Section II of Annex 8 to the Inspection Protocol shall be superseded in each of these Sections by the following provision:

"(i) 1 Portable receiver, Trimble Navigation, Model GPS Transpack II with an information input/output port or portable receiver, Trimble Navigation, Model GPS Scout^M;"

7. Subparagraph 4(b)(v) of Subsection A of Section I and subparagraph 2(b)(v) of Subsection A of Section II of Annex 8 to the Inspection Protocol shall be superseded in each of these Sections by the following provision:

"(v) 1 Rechargeable nickel-cadmium battery pack (only for portable receiver, Model GPS Transpack II);"

Article Two

1. Subparagraph 2(g) of Subsection A of Section I of Annex 8 to the Inspection Protocol shall be superseded by the following provision:

"(g) 1 Tripod, Quick Release, Stitz or Bogen;"

2. Subparagraph 2(f) of Subsection A of Sections III and IV of Annex 8 to the Inspection Protocol shall be superseded in each of these Sections by the following provision:

"(f) 1 Tripod, Quick Release, Stitz or Bogen;"

3. Subparagraph 2(e) of Subsection A of Section I of Annex 8 to the Inspection Protocol shall be superseded by the following provision:

"(e) 1 Exposure meter, Pentax, Digital Spotmeter or Minolta, Model Autometer;"

4. Subparagraph 2(d) of Subsection A of Sections III and IV of Annex 8 to the Inspection Protocol shall be superseded in each of these Sections by the following provision:

"(d) 1 Exposure meter, Pentax, Digital Spotmeter or Minolta, Model Autometer;"

5. Subparagraph 4(c)(x) of Subsection A of Section I and subparagraph 4(b)(x) of Subsection A of Section IV of Annex 8 to the Inspection Protocol shall be superseded in each of these Sections by the following provision:

"(x) 3 Programmable calculators, Hewlett-Packard, Model HP-27s or Model HEW-32SII, with instruction manual; and"

6. Subparagraph 4(a) of Subsection B of Section I and subparagraph 2(a) of Subsection B of Section II of Annex 8 to the Inspection Protocol shall be superseded in each of these Sections by the following provision:

"(a) 2 Satellite system receiver sets, Transpack II, Transpack or Scout^M, each provided by the inspected Party and consisting of the following:"

7. Subparagraph 4(a)(i) of Subsection B of Section I and subparagraph 2(a)(i) of Subsection B of Section II of Annex 8 to the Inspection Protocol shall be superseded in each of these Sections by the following provision:

"(i) 1 Portable receiver, Trimble Navigation, Model GPS Transpack II with an information input/output port; portable receiver, Trimble Navigation, Model GPS Transpack; or portable receiver, Trimble Navigation, Model GPS Scout^M;"

8. Subparagraph 3(e) of Subsection A of Sections I, III and IV of Annex 8 to the Inspection Protocol shall be superseded in each of these Sections by the following provision:

"(e) 1 Thermoluminescent dosimeter, Landauer, Model Z1 or Lithium Fluoride thermoluminescent dosimeter, Model DT-648; and"

9. Subparagraph 1(f) of Subsection A of Section II of Annex 8 to the Inspection Protocol shall be superseded by the following provision:

"(f) 1 Thermoluminescent dosimeter, Landauer, Model Z1 or Lithium Fluoride thermoluminescent dosimeter, Model DT-648; and"

Article Three

This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of its signature, and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Geneva on June 23, 1995, in five copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America:
Steven E. Steiner

For the Government of the Republic of Belarus:
Aleksandr Baichorov

For the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan:
Kairtay Zhanbatyrov

For the Government of the Russian Federation:
Mikhail Strel'tsov

For the Government of Ukraine:
Konstantin Hrishchenko

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Agreement number 33
Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991

Changes to Annex 1 to the Notification Protocol

To improve the viability and effectiveness of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Notification Protocol,

Have agreed as follows:

Article One

1. The following provision shall be added at the end of the list contained in Section II of Annex 1 to the Notification Protocol:

"153. NOTIFICATION OF CHANGE TO THE BOUNDARY OF A FACILITY, SPECIFIED ON A SITE DIAGRAM"

2. The title of the notification listed under Number 7 in the list contained in Section III of Annex 1 to the Notification Protocol shall be superseded by the following provision:

"7. NOTIFICATION OF CHANGE IN DATA IN THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, WITH REGARD TO NEW FACILITIES, FACILITIES WHOSE CATEGORY HAS BEEN CHANGED, NEW KINDS OF SUPPORT EQUIPMENT, AND NEW TYPES, CATEGORIES, VARIANTS, AND VERSIONS OF TREATY ACCOUNTABLE ITEMS"

Article Two

This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of its signature, and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Geneva on June 23, 1995, in five copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America:
Steven E. Steiner

For the Government of the Republic of Belarus:
Aleksandr Baichorov

For the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan:
Kairtay Zhanbatyrov

For the Government of the Russian Federation:
Mikhail Strel'tsov

For the Government of Ukraine:
Konstantin Hrishchenko

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Agreement number 34
Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991

Procedures for the use of radiation detection equipment

Acting in accordance with the Treaty,

To improve the viability and effectiveness of the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Inspection Protocol,

Have agreed as follows:

Article One

1. Subparagraph 2(c) of Subsection A of Section II of Annex 8 to the Inspection Protocol shall be superseded by the following provisions:

"(c) Set of radiation detection equipment consisting of the following:

(i) 2 Neutron detectors, Sandia National Laboratory design, He-3-based, polyethylene-moderated, including preamplifiers with signal/power cables, counting time -150 seconds;
(ii) 2 Electronic counters, Eberline, Model ESP-2 modified, with instruction manual;
(iii) 10 Plastic bags for weather protection;
(iv) 1 Americium-241-Lithium neutron source for calibration, emitting approximately 3000 neutrons per second, precalibrated by the inspecting Party;
(v) 1 Tool kit, Jensen Tools, Model JTK-6;
(vi) 30 Spare batteries, miscellaneous, sizes C and D;
(vii) 1 Stand for neutron detector;
(viii) 1 Measuring tape;
(ix) 2 Battery-powered lights, Maglight, Model ML-2;
(x) 3 Programmable calculators, Hewlett-Packard, Model HP-27s or Model HEW-32SII, with instruction manual;
(xi) 2 Thermometers;
(xii) 1 Stand for calibration source; and
(xiii) 4 Operating instruction manuals, two in English and two in Russian."

2. Subparagraph 2(b) of Subsection B of Section II of Annex 8 to the Inspection Protocol shall be superseded by the following provisions:

"(b) Set of SRPN 3 or SRPN 6 radiation detection equipment of the Russian Federation consisting of the following:

(i) 2 Neutron detectors, including preamplifiers with signal/power cables, manufactured by NIIIT, Model SRPN 3.01.000, counting time - 1000 seconds, or Model SRPN 6.02.000, counting time - 150 seconds;
(ii) 2 Registering devices, manufactured by NIIIT, Model SRPN 3.03.000 or SRPN 6.01.000;
(iii) 1 Americium-241-Lithium neutron source for calibration, emitting approximately 3000 neutrons per second, precalibrated by the inspecting Party;
(iv) 1 Charging unit, manufactured by NIIIT, Model SE-387 or SE-408;
(v) 2 Spare rechargeable batteries, Model 10 NKGTs-1D;
(vi) 2 Measuring tapes;
(vii) 2 Battery-powered lights;
(viii) 2 Stands for neutron detectors;
(ix) 2 Calculators, Casio, Model FX-120;
(x) 1 Stand for calibration source; and
(xi) 4 Operating instruction manuals, two in English and two in Russian."

Article Two

1. Paragraphs 3 and 4 of Subsection F of Section VI of Annex 8 to the Inspection Protocol shall be superseded by the following provisions:

"3. For an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 2, 3, 4, 6 or 12 of Article XI of the Treaty, the Parties shall use radiation detection equipment in accordance with the procedures provided for in Annex 15 to this Protocol.
4. During an inspection conducted in accordance with Section III or IV of Annex 15 to this Protocol, measurements of the radiation level shall be taken by the in-country escort in the presence of inspectors."

2. Paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 8 of Subsection F of Section VI of Annex 8 to the Inspection Protocol shall be deleted.

Article Three

The following provisions shall constitute Annex 15 to the Inspection Protocol:

"ANNEX 15
Procedures for the Use of Radiation Detection Equipment
I. Examination and Storage of Radiation Detection Equipment at the Point of Entry
1. The inspecting Party, prior to beginning to use its radiation detection equipment during the first inspection conducted with the use of radiation detection equipment, shall deliver to the inspected Party, for purchase or examination by the inspected Party, one of each of the items in the sets of radiation detection equipment specified in Sections I, II, and IV of Annex 8 to this Protocol, for each model, except for the calibration source. No later than 30 days after the inspected Party has received such items of radiation detection equipment, the inspected Party shall inform the inspecting Party whether the inspecting Party is permitted to use during inspections such radiation detection equipment. Until permission for the use of such radiation detection equipment is given by the inspected Party, the inspecting Party shall not bring to a point of entry on the territory of the inspected Party other radiation detection equipment.
2. For points of entry associated with inspection sites at which radiation detection equipment may be used, the inspecting Party shall bring, at times agreed upon with the inspected Party, to each such point of entry on the territory of the inspected Party for use during inspections no less than one set of radiation detection equipment.

(a) Except as provided for in paragraphs 3 and 4 of this Section, each such set of radiation detection equipment shall be subject to examination and stored at the point of entry in accordance with the procedures provided for in this paragraph.
(b) The examination of such sets of radiation detection equipment shall be completed no later than five days after the date when these sets of radiation detection equipment are brought to the point of entry. During the examination of the radiation detection equipment, the inspected Party shall be permitted, in the presence of the inspecting Party, to partially disassemble such equipment and examine it using non-damaging methods. Such examination must not impair the capability of the radiation detection equipment to perform functions connected with the inspection requirements under the Treaty. Upon completion of the examination and prior to departure from the point of entry, the inspecting Party shall have the right to confirm the operability of the radiation detection equipment in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section II of this Annex in order to establish that its capability to perform functions connected with the inspection requirements under the Treaty has not been impaired as a result of the examination of such radiation detection equipment by the inspected Party.
(c) Upon completion of the examination, the sets of radiation detection equipment shall be stored at the point of entry in tamper-proof containers provided by the inspecting Party, and shall be located within a secure structure or room in accordance with paragraph 14 of Section V of this Protocol. No more than three sets of radiation detection equipment shall be stored at each point of entry associated with inspection sites at which radiation detection equipment may be used.
(d) The procedures for delivering radiation detection equipment for examination and storage at points of entry, the transportation and support for the stay of technical experts delivering and supporting the examination of such equipment on the territory of the inspected Party, and the reimbursement of associated costs shall be subject to agreement.

3. An inspection team shall be permitted to bring to a point of entry calibration sources that are part of the sets of radiation detection equipment stored at the point of entry, replacement spare batteries and rechargeable batteries, as well as an additional set of radiation detection equipment. All such equipment brought to the point of entry shall be subject to examination in accordance with paragraph 8 of Section V of this Protocol.
4. An inspection team, upon arrival at the point of entry, shall have the right, in the presence of the in-country escort, to examine the tamper-proof containers in which the radiation detection equipment is stored and the radiation detection equipment in such containers. The inspection team shall have the right, as set forth below, to select one set of radiation detection equipment for use during the inspection from among the sets of such equipment stored at the point of entry in accordance with subparagraph 2(c) of this Section or an additional set of radiation detection equipment brought to the point of entry by the inspection team, and to confirm the operability of the selected set in accordance with the procedures provided for in paragraph 1 of Section II of this Annex, for no more than four hours.

(a) If the inspection team determines that the containers for at least one of the sets of radiation detection equipment have not been tampered with, and that the set of radiation detection equipment in such containers is operable in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section II of this Annex, then such a set of radiation detection equipment shall be used in conducting the inspection.
(b) If either the inspection team or the in-country escort determines that the containers for all the sets of radiation detection equipment have been tampered with, the inspection team shall have the right to use an additional set of radiation detection equipment brought to the point of entry by the inspection team and examined in accordance with paragraph 8 of Section V of this Protocol, the operability of which has been confirmed in accordance with the procedures provided for in paragraph 1 of Section II of this Annex, in conducting the inspection.
(c) For containers that have not been tampered with, if either the inspection team or the in-country escort determines that all the sets of radiation detection equipment stored in such containers are not operable, the inspection team shall have the right to use an additional set of radiation detection equipment brought to the point of entry by the inspection team in conducting the inspection. In this case, the date and time for the designation of the inspection site and the type of inspection pursuant to paragraph 4 of Section III of this Protocol shall be delayed, if necessary, until the in-country escort has completed its examination of such radiation detection equipment using the procedures provided for in paragraph 2 of Section I of this Annex, and the inspection team has confirmed the operability of such radiation detection equipment in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section II of this Annex. In no case shall such delay exceed 12 hours or require the inspection team to delay the date and time for the designation of the inspection site and type of inspection beyond the time limit specified in paragraph 4 of Section III of this Protocol for the type of inspection being conducted.
(d) If there are no signs that the containers have been tampered with and any set of radiation detection equipment stored in such containers is not operable, the inspecting Party shall return such a set or sets of radiation detection equipment and associated containers to the territory of the inspecting Party. The inspecting Party shall inform the inspected Party of the cause of the malfunction and measures taken to preclude such malfunctions in the future.
(e) If an additional set of radiation detection equipment is brought to the point of entry by the inspection team and is not used in conducting the inspection, such radiation detection equipment shall be stored at the point of entry in tamper-proof containers and removed from the territory of the inspected Party by the inspection team when it leaves the territory of the inspected Party.
(f) In all cases, only one set of radiation detection equipment whose operability has been confirmed in accordance with the procedures provided for in paragraph 1 of Section II of this Annex shall be used during an inspection.

II. Regarding the Use of Radiation Detection Equipment Prior to Measuring the Radiation Level of an Object
1. Before conducting measuring procedures using radiation detection equipment, inspectors and the in-country escort shall have the right to confirm the operability of the radiation detection equipment, using the following procedures:

(a) For radiation detection equipment used pursuant to this paragraph, the counting time of each individual measurement shall be the counting time specified in Sections I, II, and IV of Annex 8 to this Protocol for the neutron detectors in the sets of radiation detection equipment of the United States of America or the Russian Federation, respectively.
(b) The operability of each neutron detector in a set of radiation detection equipment shall be confirmed.
(c) The neutron detector shall be placed in a mutually agreed location.
(d) The inspecting Party shall take two background radiation measurements with the calibration source at least three meters from the neutron detector. If the difference between these two measurements is less than or equal to 30 percent of their average, the average of these measurements shall be recorded as the average background radiation value for the operability check. If the difference between these two background radiation measurements is more than 30 percent of their average, a third background radiation measurement shall be taken. The third background radiation measurement shall be compared with the previously taken background radiation measurement that is closest to the third background radiation measurement. If the difference between the third background radiation measurement and the closest previous background radiation measurement is less than or equal to 30 percent of the average of these two measurements, the average of these two measurements shall be recorded as the average background radiation value for the operability check. Otherwise, the results of all three background radiation measurements shall be recorded and the radiation detection equipment shall not be accepted as operable.
(e) With the neutron detector in the same location used for the background radiation measurements taken in accordance with subparagraph (c) of this paragraph, the inspecting Party shall place the calibration source in contact with the neutron detector at the center of the detector's sensitive area as indicated by the markings on the neutron detector.
(f) The inspecting Party shall take two calibration measurements of the radiation level from the calibration source. The average of these two calibration measurements shall be recorded as the average value of the calibration measurement.
(g) The following values shall be calculated:

(i) the calculated calibration value, which is the difference between the average value of the calibration measurement determined in accordance with subparagraph (f) of this paragraph and the average background radiation value determined in accordance with subparagraph (d) of this paragraph;
(ii) the product of the counting time for each measurement and the equivalent flux of the calibration source, which is a fixed value indicated on the calibration source; and
(iii) the sensitivity of the neutron detector, which is the ratio of the values obtained in accordance with subparagraphs (g)(i) and (g)(ii) of this paragraph.

(h) The radiation detection equipment shall be accepted as operable, provided:

(i) the difference between the two calibration measurements taken in accordance with subparagraph (f) of this paragraph is less than or equal to 30 percent of the average value of the calibration measurement; and
(ii) the difference between the value of the sensitivity of the neutron detector, determined in accordance with subparagraph (g)(iii) of this paragraph, and the laboratory value of the sensitivity of the neutron detector, as recorded on the neutron detector, is less than or equal to 15 percent of the average of these two sensitivity values.

(i) The results of the measurements obtained in accordance with subparagraphs (d) and (f) of this paragraph shall be recorded either in the inspection report or in a form, agreed upon by the Parties, used to record the confirmation of the operability of the radiation detection equipment at the point of entry.

2. At the inspection site, radiation detection equipment shall be used in accordance with the following procedures:

(a) The counting time of each individual measurement shall be the counting time specified in Sections I, II, and IV of Annex 8 to this Protocol for the neutron detectors in the sets of radiation detection equipment of the United States of America or the Russian Federation, respectively.
(b) The inspection team shall have the right to observe the use of the radiation detection equipment to confirm that the procedures provided for in this paragraph are followed.
(c) After arrival at the inspection site, prior to conducting radiation measurements the inspection team shall confirm, in accordance with the procedures provided for in paragraph 1 of this Section, that at least one neutron detector in the set of radiation detection equipment is operable. If the inspection team is unable to confirm the operability of at least one neutron detector, this fact shall be recorded in the inspection report and the inspection shall proceed without the use of radiation detection equipment.
(d) Measurements of radiation levels, in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 of Section III of this Annex, of the object designated by the inspection team for radiation measurements shall be taken at the location selected for that purpose by the in-country escort, using a neutron detector whose operability has been confirmed pursuant to subparagraph (c) of this paragraph.
(e) Background radiation measurements shall be taken by the in-country escort no less than ten meters from the object designated by the inspection team for radiation measurements. Such background radiation measurements shall be taken in accordance with the following procedures:

(i) The inspection team shall identify to the in-country escort the front surface of the neutron detector that will be directed toward the object designated for measurement of the radiation level. The front surface of the neutron detector shall be positioned vertically, at approximately the same height at which measurements on the designated object will be taken.
(ii) Two background radiation measurements shall be taken. The average of these two measurements shall be calculated and recorded in the inspection report as the average background radiation value.
(iii) If the average background radiation value is greater than 450 counts, another location for taking the background radiation measurements shall be selected by the in-country escort. Background radiation measurements shall be taken until an average background radiation value is obtained that is less than 450 counts at a selected location.
(iv) The square root of the average background radiation value shall be calculated to two decimal places and the result multiplied by four. This number shall be added to the average background radiation value and the result shall be rounded up to the higher whole number. This number shall be recorded in the inspection report as the comparison number to be used in paragraph 1 of Section III and paragraphs 7 and 8 of Section IV of this Annex.

III. For Inspections Conducted Pursuant to Paragraph 2, 3, 4 or 12 of Article XI of the Treaty with Respect to Long-Range ALCMs and Containers for Long-Range ALCMs
1. For inspecting long-range ALCMs and containers for long-range ALCMs in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section I, or paragraph 4 or subparagraph 5(c) of Section IV of Annex 4 to this Protocol, the following procedures shall be used:

(a) The inspection team shall select no more than four points along the ALCM or container at which measurements of radiation levels will be taken. A description of the ALCM or container shall be recorded as a diagram in the inspection report. The approximate dimensions of the ALCM or container, and the approximate location of each measurement point, shall be indicated on this diagram.
(b) The in-country escort shall position the neutron detector in a location specified by the inspection team, no less than seven centimeters and no more than two meters from the surface of the ALCM or container, with a maximum permissible deviation from these established distances not to exceed 20 percent, so that the neutron detector is at the same level as the point where the measurement will be taken, with the front surface of the neutron detector facing the point on the ALCM or container where the measurement will be taken.
(c) The in-country escort shall take two measurements of the radiation level at each selected point. The average of the two measurements shall be calculated, and if not a whole number, shall be rounded up to the higher whole number. This average shall be recorded in the inspection report as the average measurement at that point.
(d) If the average measurement of the radiation level at each selected point is less than or equal to the comparison number calculated in accordance with subparagraph 2(e)(iv) of Section II of this Annex, the ALCM or container shall not be subject to further inspection.
(e) If the average measurement of the radiation level at any of the four selected points is greater than the comparison number calculated in accordance with subparagraph 2(e)(iv) of Section II of this Annex, this fact shall be recorded in the inspection report and the ALCM or container shall be subject to further inspection in accordance with subparagraph 4(a)(ii) or subparagraph 4(b)(iii) of Section IV of Annex 4 to this Protocol, as applicable.

2. To confirm, pursuant to paragraph 4 of Section I or subparagraph 5(c) of Section IV of Annex 4 to this Protocol, that a container does not conceal the presence of radiation, the following procedures shall be used:

(a) The inspection team shall select no more than four points on the container wall at which measurements of radiation levels will be taken for the purpose of measuring the radiation shielding effect. A description of the container shall be recorded as a diagram in the inspection report. The approximate dimensions of the container and the approximate location of each measurement point shall be indicated on this diagram.
(b) The in-country escort shall open the container and place the calibration source on its stand inside the container on the longitudinal axis of the container. The in-country escort shall position the neutron detector outside the container in a location specified by the inspection team, no less than seven centimeters and no more than two meters from the surface of the container, with a maximum permissible deviation from established distances not to exceed 20 percent. The calibration source and neutron detector shall be placed on a horizontal straight line that passes through the center of the calibration source and the center of the neutron detector, that lies on a plane perpendicular to the longitudinal axis of the container, and that intersects the wall of the container at the selected point on the container. The distance between the center of the calibration source and the center of the neutron detector shall be recorded in the inspection report. The front surface of the neutron detector shall face the selected point.
(c) The in-country escort shall take two measurements of the radiation level at each selected point on the container. The container shall remain closed during measurements of the radiation level. The average of the two measurements shall be calculated. The average background radiation value, calculated in accordance with subparagraph 2(e)(ii) of Section II of this Annex, shall be subtracted from this average. The result shall be recorded in the inspection report as the net average value of radiation obtained when the calibration source is placed inside the container at that point.
(d) The procedures provided for in subparagraphs (b) and (c) of this paragraph shall be repeated until measurements have been taken at all the points on the container selected by the inspection team, and the results have been recorded in the inspection report.
(e) The calibration source shall be removed from the container and the neutron detector repositioned no less than two meters from the container with its front surface no longer facing the container.
(f) The in-country escort shall position the calibration source in front of the front surface of the neutron detector so that the distance between the front surface of the neutron detector and the calibration source is the same distance, within three percent, as that used for one of the measurements taken pursuant to subparagraph (c) of this paragraph. No objects that could interfere with the flow of neutrons to the neutron detector shall be located near the calibration source or the neutron detector.
(g) The in-country escort shall take two measurements of the radiation level with the calibration source and the neutron detector positioned in accordance with subparagraphs (e) and (f) of this paragraph. The average of the two measurements shall be calculated. The average background radiation value calculated in accordance with subparagraph 2(e)(ii) of Section II of this Annex shall be subtracted from this average. The result shall be recorded in the inspection report as the net average value of radiation obtained when the calibration source is placed outside the container at the distance used pursuant to subparagraph (f) of this paragraph.
(h) The procedures provided for in subparagraphs (f) and (g) of this paragraph shall be repeated for each distance between the calibration source and the neutron detector used for the measurements of the radiation level taken pursuant to subparagraph (c) of this paragraph.
(i) For each point on the container, calculations shall be carried out, in which the net average value of the radiation level obtained pursuant to subparagraph (c) of this paragraph when the calibration source is placed inside the container is divided by the corresponding net average value of the radiation level obtained pursuant to subparagraph (g) of this paragraph when the calibration source is placed outside the container. The division shall be carried out to two decimal places. If the result of the division with respect to any point is less than 0.5, this fact shall be recorded in the inspection report.
(j) For containers of long-range non-nuclear ALCMs of a type for which a notification has been provided in accordance with Section VII of the Notification Protocol, if either the width or the diameter of such containers exceeds 190 centimeters, the Parties shall agree, within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, on procedures for the placement of the neutron detector and the calibration source with respect to such containers.

IV. For Inspections Conducted Pursuant to Paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty
1. For an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty, radiation detection equipment shall be used in accordance with the procedures contained in this Section.
2. The in-country escort shall position, for radiation measurements, an object contained in the front section and declared by the in-country escort to be a non-nuclear object, hereinafter referred to as the inspected object, at a location specified by the in-country escort, at a distance of no less than ten meters from the front section, or shall provide for radiation measurements of the inspected object while it is in the front section. If radiation measurements of the inspected object are taken while it is in the front section, the in-country escort shall have the right to use special shields to prevent neutrons from a reentry vehicle or reentry vehicles remaining on the front section from striking the neutron detector, but which do not interfere with the flow of neutrons from the inspected object to the neutron detector, or to remove the reentry vehicle or reentry vehicles from the front section to a distance of no less than ten meters from the front section. Whichever method is used for the placement of the inspected object for radiation measurements, the in-country escort shall ensure that the procedures for the use of radiation detection equipment, as set forth below, are carried out.
3. The process of removing the inspected object from the front section and moving it to a location where radiation measurements will be taken and the process of removing a reentry vehicle or reentry vehicles from the front section, shall be carried out outside the field of view of inspectors in such a manner as to permit inspectors to ascertain that the inspected object is that same inspected object. Before the inspected object or the reentry vehicle or reentry vehicles are removed from the front section, inspectors shall have the right to view the specially allocated site inside a room or within a portion of the site for viewing the front section, to ascertain that the site does not contain other objects similar to the inspected object. During the entire process of removing the inspected object or the reentry vehicle or reentry vehicles from the front section, the inspectors shall have the right, at their own choice, either to observe all exits of the site to ascertain that no objects that are similar to the inspected object are delivered to that site, or to seal all the exits with seals.
4. The inspection team shall select the point on the inspected object where radiation measurements will be taken. A description of the inspected object shall be recorded as a diagram in the inspection report. The approximate dimensions of the inspected object, determined visually without taking linear measurements, and the approximate location of the measurement point, shall be indicated on this diagram.
5. The in-country escort shall position the neutron detector in a location specified by the inspection team, no less than seven centimeters and no more than two meters from the surface of the inspected object, with a maximum permissible deviation from these established distances not to exceed 20 percent, so that the neutron detector is at the same level as the point where the measurement will be taken, with the front surface of the neutron detector facing the point on the inspected object where the measurement will be taken.
6. The in-country escort shall take two measurements of the radiation level at the selected point. The average of the two measurements shall be calculated, and if not a whole number, shall be rounded up to the higher whole number. This average shall be recorded in the inspection report as the average measurement at that point.
7. If the average measurement of the radiation level at the selected point is less than or equal to the comparison number calculated in accordance with subparagraph 2(e)(iv) of Section II of this Annex, the inspected object is, in fact, a non-nuclear object.
8. If the average measurement of the radiation level at the selected point is greater than the comparison number calculated in accordance with subparagraph 2(e)(iv) of Section II of this Annex, this fact shall be recorded in the inspection report."

Article Four

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Geneva on September 28, 1995, in five copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America:
Steven Steiner

For the Government of the Republic of Belarus:
Aleksandr Baichorov

Fof the Government of the Republic of Kazakstan: |1|
Kairtay Zhanbatyrov

For the Government of the Russian Federation:
Viktor Trifonov

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Agreement number 35
Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991

Changes in Section VI of the Notification Protocol and Sections I and II of the Telemetry Protocol

Acting in accordance with the Treaty,

To improve the viability and effectiveness of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Notification Protocol, and the Protocol on Telemetric Information Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Telemetry Protocol,

Have agreed as follows:

Article One

The first sentence of paragraph 4 of Section VI of the Notification Protocol shall be superseded by the following provision:

"notification pursuant to paragraph 3 of Section I of the Telemetry Protocol, no later than 60 days after receipt of tapes that contain a recording of telemetric information, of the determination by the Party that has received the tapes of the incompleteness or insufficient quality of telemetric information recorded on the tapes that do not allow for the processing of such information."

Article Two

1. The chapeau of paragraph 1 of Section I of the Telemetry Protocol shall be superseded by the following provision:

"Pursuant to paragraphs 4 and 6 of Article X of the Treaty, the Party conducting the flight test shall provide through diplomatic channels, no later than 65 days after the flight test of an ICBM or SLBM:"

2. The chapeau of paragraph 1 of Section II of the Telemetry Protocol shall be superseded by the following provision:

"Pursuant to paragraph 5 of Article X of the Treaty, the Party conducting the flight test shall provide, through diplomatic channels, no later than 65 days after each flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, the following interpretive data:"

3. The first sentence of paragraph 2 of Section II of the Telemetry Protocol shall be superseded by the following provision:

"No later than 65 days after each flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, the Party conducting the flight test shall provide, through diplomatic channels, a missile acceleration profile, for all its stages and its self-contained dispensing mechanism, having a precision better than one-tenth of a meter per second squared, with a rate of no less than five times per second, with these data provided relative to an inertial frame of reference in a three-dimensional Cartesian coordinate system."

Article Three

2. Signature of this Agreement for the Government of a Party shall express the consent of that Party to be bound by this Agreement. The consent of the Republic of Belarus and Ukraine to be bound by this Agreement shall be expressed by their Governments in accordance with paragraph 6 of Annex 1 to the Protocol on the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Relating to the Treaty.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Geneva on December 12, 1995, in five copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America:
Steven E. Steiner

For the Government of the Republic of Kazakstan:
Kairtay Zhanbatyrov

For the Government of the Russian Federation:
Viktor Trifonov

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Agreement number 36
Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991

Changes to Section I of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol

To improve the viability and effectiveness of the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or Elimination of the Items Subject to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Conversion or Elimination Protocol,

Have agreed as follows:

Article One

1. Subparagraph 2(c) of Section I of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol shall be superseded by the following provision:

"(c) may remove the missile from its launch canister, remove the missile attachment devices from the launch canister, disassemble the missile into stages and the self-contained dispensing mechanism, and detach rocket motor nozzles and interstage skirts of the missile from stages;"

2. Subparagraph 4(b) of Section I of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol shall be superseded by the following provision:

"(b) Rocket motor nozzles and cases, as well as the interstage skirts of a missile remaining after completion of the procedures provided for in subparagraphs 2(c), 2(d), and 4(a) of this Section, or after the completion of static testing provided for in paragraph 3 of Section VII of this Protocol, shall be crushed, flattened, cut into two pieces of approximately equal size, or destroyed by explosion; and"

Article Two

This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of its signature, and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Geneva on May 8, 1996, in five copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America:
Steven E. Steiner

For the Government of the Republic of Belarus:
Andrey Sannikov

For the Government of the Republic of Kazakstan:
Kairtay Zhanbatyrov

For the Government of the Russian Federation:
Viktor Trifonov

For the Government of Ukraine:
Konstantin Hrishchenko

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Agreement number 37
Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991

Changes to Section I of the Notification Protocol

To improve the viability and effectiveness of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Notification Protocol,

Have agreed as follows:

Article One

The third sentence of paragraph 2 of Section I of the Notification Protocol shall be superseded by the following provision:

"Such notification shall include, for each Party, all its data for each category of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding, except that, if the data for Annex D, E, F, G, H, or I have not changed during such six-month period, a statement that no change has occurred in such Annex since the previous six-month update notification may be substituted for the data for that Annex;"

Article Two

This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of its signature, and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Geneva on October 30, 1996, in five copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America:
Steven E. Steiner

For the Government of the Republic of Belarus:
Andrey Sannikov

For the Government of the Republic of Kazakstan:
Kairtay Zhanbatyrov

For the Government of the Russian Federation:
Viktor Trifonov

For the Government of Ukraine:
Anatoliy Shevtsov

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Agreement number 38
Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991

Agreeing on procedures for weighing or for other means of determining the weight of ICBMs or SLBMs

To improve the viability and effectiveness of the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Inspection Protocol,

Have agreed as follows:

Article One

Paragraph 12 of Section XIV of the Inspection Protocol shall be superseded by the following provision:

"12. Procedures for weighing or for other means of determining the weight of ICBMs or SLBMs shall be agreed within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission no later than one year after a Party has proposed procedures for weighing or for other means of determining the weight of ICBMs or SLBMs."

Article Two

This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of its signature, and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Geneva on October 30, 1996, in five copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America:
Steven E. Steiner

For the Government of the Republic of Belarus:
Andrey Sannikov

For the Government of the Republic of Kazakstan:
Kairtay Zhanbatyrov

For the Government of the Russian Federation:
Viktor Trifonov

For the Government of Ukraine:
Anatoliy Shevtsov

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Agreement number 39
Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991

Changes in Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding

To improve the viability and effectiveness of the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Memorandum of Understanding,

Have agreed as follows:

Article One

1. The second sentence of subparagraph 9(b)(iv) of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding shall be superseded by the following provision:

"During pre-inspection procedures, a member of the in-country escort shall provide the inspectors a copy of the site diagram, updated to show changes in such structures and, at a minimum, showing all other structures that are intended for, and are large enough to be used for, items or support equipment declared at that facility, except those structures the entrance of which are too small to permit passage of such items or support equipment."

2. The chapeau of paragraph 19 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding shall be superseded by the following provision:

"For each change to the boundary of a facility shown on the existing site diagram of the facility provided pursuant to this Memorandum that would result in the exclusion from within such boundary of any structure that was ever shown within such boundary pursuant to subparagraph 9(b)(iii) or 9(b)(iv) of this Annex, the change shall become effective after the following requirements are met:"

3. The chapeau of subparagraph 19(b) of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding shall be superseded by the following provision:

"for all structures that were ever shown within the boundary shown on the existing site diagram pursuant to subparagraph 9(b)(iii) or 9(b)(iv) of this Annex and that would be excluded from within the boundary of the facility, information has been provided by the Party changing the boundary of the facility, within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission or through diplomatic channels, on its intent with regard to:"

4. The chapeau of paragraph 20 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding shall be superseded by the following provision:

"For each change to the boundary of a facility shown on the existing site diagram of the facility provided pursuant to this Memorandum that would not result in the exclusion from within such boundary of any structure that was ever shown within such boundary pursuant to subparagraph 9(b)(iii) or 9(b)(iv) of this Annex, the change shall become effective after the following requirements are met:"

Article Two

This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of its signature, and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Geneva on October 30, 1996, in five copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America:
Steven E. Steiner

For the Government of the Republic of Belarus:
Andrey Sannikov

For the Government of the Republic of Kazakstan:
Kairtay Zhanbatyrov

For the Government of the Russian Federation:
Viktor Trifonov

For the Government of Ukraine:
Anatoliy Shevtsov

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Agreement number 40
Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991

Changes to Annex 8 to the Inspection Protocol

To improve the viability and effectiveness of the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Inspection Protocol,

Have agreed as follows:

Article One

1. Subsection A of Section I of Annex 8 to the Inspection Protocol shall be superseded by the following provisions:

"A. For the United States of America:

1. Linear Measurement Devices (quantity for each inspection team):

(a) 5 30-meter measuring tapes;
(b) 10 3-meter measuring tapes;
(c) 2 3-meter measuring sticks;
(d) 10 Plumb bobs;
(e) 2 Plumb bob cords;
(f) 10 Plumb bob targets;
(g) 1 Roll of tape; and
(h) 1 Inspection suitcase.

2. Camera Equipment (quantity for each inspection team):

(a) 2 Cameras with flash;
(b) 1 Lens;
(c) 1 Flash;
(d) 1 Exposure meter;
(e) 1 Spare film back for camera;
(f) 1 Tripod;
(g) 1 Cable release;
(h) 8 Packs of photographic film;
(i) 10 Spare batteries for cameras, flash, and exposure meter;
(j) 1 Range rod point;
(k) 1 Camera case;
(l) 1 Package of lens tissue;
(m) 1 Lens brush;
(n) 1 2.5-meter range rod; and
(o) 2 Lens filters--one ultraviolet haze, one amber.

3. Other Portable Equipment (quantity for each inspector):

(a) 1 Flashlight (safety approved), with spare batteries and spare bulb;
(b) 1 Magnetic compass;
(c) 1 Pocket calculator with spare batteries;
(d) 1 Roll of tamper-indicating tape seals;
(e) 1 Thermoluminescent dosimeter; and
(f) 1 Ionization dosimeter.

4. Other Portable Equipment (quantity for each inspection team):

(a) 2 Ionization dosimeter charger units;
(b) 2 Satellite system receiver sets, each provided by the inspected Party and consisting of the following:

(i) 1 Portable receiver;
(ii) 1 Direct current adapter (external);
(iii) 16 Spare batteries;
(iv) 1 Battery holder;
(v) 1 Rechargeable nickel-cadmium battery pack;
(vi) 1 External antenna with cable and antenna installation kit;
(vii) 2 Instruction manuals, one in English and one in Russian;
(viii) 1 Container; and
(ix) 1 Equipment bag.

(c) Set of radiation detection equipment consisting of the following:

(i) 2 Neutron detectors, including preamplifiers with signal/power cables (counting time - 150 seconds);
(ii) 2 Electronic counters with instruction manual;
(iii) 10 Plastic bags for weather protection;
(iv) 1 Americium-241-Lithium neutron source for calibration, emitting approximately 3000 neutrons per second, precalibrated by the inspecting Party;
(v) 1 Tool kit;
(vi) 30 Spare batteries, miscellaneous sizes;
(vii) 1 Stand for neutron detector;
(viii) 1 Measuring tape;
(ix) 2 Battery-powered lights;
(x) 3 Programmable calculators with instruction manual;
(xi) 2 Thermometers;
(xii) 1 Stand for calibration source; and
(xiii) 4 Instruction manuals, two in English and two in Russian."

2. Subsection A of Section II of Annex 8 to the Inspection Protocol shall be superseded by the following provisions:

"A. For the United States of America:

1. Portable Equipment (quantity for each inspector):

(a) 1 3-meter measuring tape;
(b) 1 Flashlight (safety approved), with spare batteries and spare bulb;
(c) 1 Pocket calculator with spare batteries;
(d) 1 Magnetic compass;
(e) 1 Roll of tamper-indicating tape seals;
(f) 1 Thermoluminescent dosimeter; and
(g) 1 Ionization dosimeter.

2. Other Portable Equipment (quantity for each inspection team):

(a) 2 Ionization dosimeter charger units;
(b) 2 Satellite system receiver sets, each provided by the inspected Party and consisting of the following:

(i) 1 Portable receiver;
(ii) 1 Direct current adapter (external);
(iii) 16 Spare batteries;
(iv) 1 Battery holder;
(v) 1 Rechargeable nickel-cadmium battery pack;
(vi) 1 External antenna with cable and antenna installation kit;
(vii) 1 Instruction manuals, one in English and one in Russian;
(viii) 1 Container; and
(ix) 1 Equipment bag.

(c) Set of radiation detection equipment consisting of the following:

(i) 2 Neutron detectors, including preamplifiers with signal/power cables (counting time -150 seconds);
(ii) 2 Electronic counters, with instruction manual;
(iii) 10 Plastic bags for weather protection;
(iv) 1 Americium-241-Lithium neutron source for calibration, emitting approximately 3000 neutrons per second, precalibrated by the inspecting Party;
(v) 1 Tool kit;
(vi) 30 Spare batteries, miscellaneous sizes;
(vii) 1 Stand for neutron detector;
(viii) 1 Measuring tape;
(ix) 2 Battery-powered lights;
(x) 3 Programmable calculators, with instruction manual;
(xi) 2 Thermometers;
(xii) 1 Stand for calibration source; and
(xiii) 4 Instruction manuals, two in English and two in Russian."

3. Subsection A of Section III of Annex 8 to the Inspection Protocol shall be superseded by the following provisions:

"A. For the United States of America:

1. Linear Measurement Devices (quantity for each inspection team):

(a) 3 Measuring tape clamps;
(b) 2 Tape tensioning scales;
(c) 2 Magnifying glasses;
(d) 2 Hand levels;
(e) 2 String line levels;
(f) 2 Calipers with micrometer screw;
(g) 2 Combination squares;
(h) 5 30-meter measuring tapes;
(i) 10 3-meter measuring tapes;
(j) 2 3-meter measuring sticks;
(k) 3 Plumb bobs;
(l) 1 Plumb bob cord;
(m) 10 Plumb bob targets;
(n) 3 Rolls of tape;
(o) 3 Log books;
(p) 2 Rod levels;
(q) 2 2.5-meter range rods; and
(r) 1 Tripod.

2. Camera Equipment (quantity for each inspection team):

(a) 2 Cameras with flash;
(b) 1 Lens;
(c) 1 Flash;
(d) 1 Exposure meter;
(e) 1 Spare film back for camera;
(f) 1 Tripod
(g) 1 Cable release;
(h) 8 Packs of photographic film;
(1) 10 Spare batteries for cameras, flash, and exposure meter;
(j) 1 Range rod point;
(k) 1 Camera case;
(l) 1 Package of lens tissue;
(m) 1 Lens brush;
(n) 1 2.5-meter range rod; and
(o) 2 Lens filters--one ultraviolet haze, one amber.

3. Other Portable Equipment (quantity for each inspector):

(a) 1 Flashlight (safety approved), with spare batteries and spare bulb;
(b) 1 Magnetic compass;
(c) 1 Pocket calculator with spare batteries;
(d) 1 Roll of tamper-indicating tape seals;
(e) 1 Thermoluminescent dosimeter; and
(f) 1 Ionization dosimeter.

4. Other Portable Equipment (quantity for each inspection team):

(a) 2 Ionization dosimeter charger units.

5. Weighing Devices (as agreed by the Parties within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission for the purpose of confirming the launch weight of an ICBM or SLBM of a new type)."

4. Subsection A of Section IV of Annex 8 to the Inspection Protocol shall be superseded by the following provisions:

"A. For the United States of America:

1. Linear Measurement Devices (quantity for each inspection team):

(a) 3 Measuring tape clamps;
(b) 2 Tape tensioning scales;
(c) 2 Magnifying glasses;
(d) 2 Hand levels;
(e) 2 String line levels;
(f) 2 Calipers with micrometer screw;
(g) 2 Combination squares;
(h) 5 30-meter measuring tapes;
(i) 10 3-meter measuring tapes;
(j) 2 3-meter measuring sticks;
(k) 3 Plumb bobs;
(l) 1 Plumb bob cord;
(m) 10 Plumb bob targets;
(n) 3 Rolls of tape;
(o) 3 Log books;
(p) 2 Rod levels;
(q) 2 2.5- meter range rods; and
(r) 1 Tripod.

2. Camera Equipment (quantity for each inspection team):

(a) 2 Cameras with flash;
(b) 1 Lens;
(c) 1 Flash;
(d) 1 Exposure meter;
(e) 1 Spare film back for camera;
(f) 1 Tripod;
(g) 1 Cable release;
(h) 8 Packs of photographic film;
(i) 10 Spare batteries for cameras, flash, and exposure meter;
(j) 1 Range rod point;
(k) 1 Camera case;
(l) 1 Package of lens tissue;
(m) 1 Lens brush;
(n) 1 2.5-meter range rod; and
(o) 2 Lens filters--one ultraviolet haze, one amber.

3. Other Portable Equipment (quantity for each inspector):

(a) 1 Flashlight (safety approved), with spare batteries and spare bulb;
(b) 1 Magnetic compass;
(c) 1 Pocket calculator with spare batteries;
(d) 1 Roll of tamper-indicating tape seals;
(e) 1 Thermoluminescent dosimeter; and
(f) 1 Ionization dosimeter.

4. Other Portable Equipment (quantity for each inspection team):

(a) 2 Ionization dosimeter charger units; and
(b) Set of radiation detection equipment consisting of the following:

(i) 2 Neutron detectors, including preamplifiers with signal/power cables, (counting time - 150 seconds);
(ii) 2 Electronic counters, with instruction manual;
(iii) 10 Plastic bags for weather protection;
(iv) 1 Americium-241-Lithium neutron source for calibration, emitting approximately 3000 neutrons per second, precalibrated by the inspecting Party;
(v) 1 Tool kit;
(vi) 30 Spare batteries, miscellaneous sizes;
(vii) 1 Stand for neutron detector;
(viii) 1 Measuring tape;
(ix) 2 Battery-powered lights;
(x) 3 Programmable calculators with instruction manual;
(xi) 2 Thermometers;
(xii) 1 Stand for calibration source; and
(xiii) 4 Instruction manuals, two in English and two in Russian."

Article Two

1. Subsection B of Section I of Annex 8 to the Inspection Protocol shall be superseded by the following provisions:

"B. For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

1. Linear Measurement Devices (quantity for each inspection team):

(a) 5 30-meter measuring tapes;
(b) 5 5-meter measuring tapes;
(c) 2 3-meter measuring sticks;
(d) 4 Plumb bobs;
(e) 2 Plumb bob cords;
(f) 4 Plumb bob targets;
(g) 1 Roll of tape; and
(h) 1 Inspection suitcase.

2. Camera Equipment (quantity for each inspection team):

(a) 2 Cameras with flash;
(b) 1 Tripod;
(c) 1 Exposure meter;
(d) 1 Lens;
(e) 1 Flash;
(f) 1 Spare film back for camera;
(g) 1 Cable release;
(h) 2 Packs of photographic film;
(i) 10 Spare batteries for cameras, flash, and exposure meter;
(j) 1 Range rod point;
(k) 1 Camera case;
(l) 1 Package of lens tissue;
(m) 1 Lens brush;
(n) 1 3-meter range rod; and
(o) 2 Lens filters--one ultraviolet haze, one amber.

3. Other Portable Equipment (quantity for each inspector):

(a) 1 Flashlight (safety approved), with spare batteries and spare bulb;
(b) 1 Magnetic compass;
(c) 1 Pocket calculator with spare batteries;
(d) 1 Roll of tamper-indicating tape seals;
(e) 1 Ruler; and
(f) 1 Thermoluminescent dosimeter.

4. Other Portable Equipment (quantity for each inspection team):

(a) 2 Satellite system receiver sets provided by the inspected Party, each consisting of the following:

(i) 1 Portable receiver;
(ii) 1 Direct current adapter (external);
(iii) 16 Spare batteries;
(iv) 1 Battery holder;
(v) 1 Rechargeable nickel-cadmium battery pack;
(vi) 1 External antenna with cable and antenna installation kit;
(vii) 2 Instruction manuals, one in English and one in Russian;
(viii) 1 Container; and
(ix) 1 Equipment bag.

(b) Set of radiation detection equipment consisting of the following:

(i) 1 Neutron detector, including preamplifier with signal/power cables (counting time - 1000 seconds or 150 seconds);
(ii) 1 Registering device;
(iii) 1 Americium-241-Lithium neutron source for calibration, emitting approximately 3000 neutrons per second, precalibrated by the inspecting Party;
(iv) 1 Charging unit;
(v) 1 Spare rechargeable battery;
(vi) 1 Measuring tape;
(vii) 1 Battery-powered light;
(viii) 1 Stand for neutron detector;
(ix) 1 Calculator;
(x) 1 Stand for calibration source;
(xi) 2 Instruction manuals, one in English and one in Russian."

2. Subsection B of Section II of Annex 8 to the Inspection Protocol shall be superseded by the following provisions:

"B. For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

1. Portable Equipment (quantity for each inspector):

(a) 1 5- meter measuring tape;
(b) 1 Flashlight (safety approved), with spare batteries and spare bulb;
(c) 1 Magnetic compass;
(d) 1 Pocket calculator with spare batteries;
(e) 1 Roll of tamper-indicating tape seals;
(f) 1 Ruler;
(g) 1 Thermoluminescent dosimeter;
(h) 1 Curvometer; and
(i) 1 Pair of dividers.

2. Other Portable Equipment (quantity for each inspection team):

(a) 2 Satellite system receiver sets provided by the inspected Party, each consisting of the following:

(i) 1 Portable receiver;
(ii) 1 Direct current adapter (external);
(iii) 16 Spare batteries;
(iv) 1 Battery holder;
(v) 1 Rechargeable nickel-cadmium battery pack;
(vi) 1 External antenna with cable and antenna installation kit;
(vii) 2 Instruction manuals, one in English and one in Russian;
(viii) 1 Container; and
(ix) 1 Equipment bag.

(b) Set of radiation detection equipment consisting of the following:

(i) 1 Neutron detector, including preamplifier with signal/power cables (counting time - 1000 seconds or 150 seconds);
(ii) 1 Registering device;
(iii) 1 Americium-241-Lithium neutron source for calibration, emitting approximately 3000 neutrons per second precalibrated by the inspecting Party;
(iv) 1 Charging unit;
(v) 1 Spare rechargeable battery;
(vi) 1 Measuring tape;
(vii) 1 Battery-powered light;
(viii) 1 Stand for neutron detector;
(ix) 1 Calculator;
(x) 1 Stand for calibration source;
(xi) 2 Instruction manuals, one in English and one in Russian."

3. Subsection B of Section III of Annex 8 to the Inspection Protocol shall be superseded by the following provisions:

"B. For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

1. Linear Measurement Devices (quantity for each inspection team):

(a) 5 30-meter measuring tapes;
(b) 5 5-meter measuring tapes;
(c) 2 3-meter measuring sticks;
(d) 4 Plumb bobs;
(e) 2 Plumb bob cords;
(f) 4 Plumb bob targets;
(g) 1 Roll of tape; and
(h) 1 Inspection suitcase.

2. Camera Equipment (quantity for each inspection team):

(a) 2 Cameras with flash;
(b) 1 Tripod;
(c) 1 Exposure meter;
(d) 1 Lens;
(e) 1 Flash;
(f) 1 Spare film back for camera;
(g) 1 Cable release;
(h) 2 Packs of photographic film;
(i) 10 Spare batteries for cameras, flash, and exposure meter;
(j) 1 Range rod point;
(k) 1 Camera case;
(l) 1 Package of lens tissue;
(m) 1 Lens brush;
(n) 1 3-meter range rod; and
(o) 2 Lens filters--one ultraviolet haze, one amber.

3. Other Portable Equipment (quantity for each inspector):

(a) 1 Flashlight (safety approved), with spare batteries and spare bulb;
(b) 1 Magnetic compass;
(c) 1 Pocket calculator with spare batteries;
(d) 1 Roll of tamper-indicating tape seals;
(e) 1 Ruler; and
(f) 1 Thermoluminescent dosimeter.

4. Weighing device (as agreed by the Parties within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission for the purpose of confirming the launch weight of an ICBM or SLBM of a new type)."

4. Subsection B of Section IV of Annex 8 to the Inspection Protocol shall be superseded by the following provisions:

"B. For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

1. Linear Measurement Devices (quantity for each inspection team):

(a) 5 30-meter measuring tapes;
(b) 5 5-meter measuring tapes;
(c) 2 3-meter measuring sticks;
(d) 4 Plumb bobs;
(e) 2 Plumb bob cords;
(f) 4 Plumb bob targets;
(g) 1 Roll of tape; and
(h) 1 Inspection suitcase.

2. Camera Equipment (quantity for each inspection team):

(a) 2 Cameras with flash;
(b) Tripod;
(c) Exposure meter;
(d) Lens;
(e) Flash;
(f) Spare film back for camera;
(g) Cable release;
(h) Packs of photographic film;
(i) 10 Spare batteries for cameras, flash, and exposure meter;
(j) Range rod point;
(k) Camera case;
(l) Package of lens tissue;
(m) 1 Lens brush;
(n) 1 3-meter range rod; and
(o) 2 Lens filters--one ultraviolet haze, one amber.

3. Other Portable Equipment (quantity for each inspector):

(a) 1 Flashlight (safety approved), with spare batteries and spare bulb;
(b) 1 Magnetic compass;
(c) 1 Pocket calculator with spare batteries;
(d) 1 Roll of tamper-indicating tape seals;
(e) 1 Ruler; and
(f) 1 Thermoluminescent dosimeter.

4. Other Portable Equipment (quantity for each inspection team):

(a) Set of radiation detection equipment consisting of the following:

(i) 1 Neutron detector, including preamplifier with signal/power cables (counting time - 1000 seconds or 150 seconds);
(ii) 1 Registering device;
(iii) 1 Americium-241-Lithium neutron source for calibration, emitting approximately 3000 neutrons per second, precalibrated by the inspecting Party;
(iv) 1 Charging unit;
(v) 1 Spare rechargeable battery;
(vi) 1 Measuring tape;
(vii) 1 Battery-powered light;
(viii) 1 Stand for neutron detector;
(ix) 1 Calculator;
(x) 1 Stand for calibration source;
(xi) 2 Instruction manuals, one in English and one in Russian."

5. Subsection B of Section V of Annex 8 to the Inspection Protocol shall be superseded by the following provisions:

"B. For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

1. Linear Measurement Devices (quantity for each inspection team):

(a) 5 30-meter measuring tapes;
(b) 5 5-meter measuring tapes;
(c) 2 3-meter measuring sticks;
(d) 4 Plumb bobs;
(e) 2 Plumb bobs cords;
(f) 4 Plumb bob targets;
(g) 1 Roll of tape; and
(h) 1 Inspection suitcase.

2. Camera Equipment (quantity for each inspection team):

(a) 2 Cameras with flash;
(b) 1 Tripod;
(c) 1 Exposure meter;
(d) 1 Lens;
(e) 1 Flash;
(f) 1 Spare film pack for camera;
(g) 1 Cable release;
(h) 2 Packs of photographic film;
(i) 10 Spare batteries for cameras, flash, and exposure meter;
(j) 1 Range rod point;
(k) 1 Camera case;
(l) 1 Package of lens tissue;
(m) 1 Lens brush;
(n) 1 3-meter range rod; and
(o) 2 Lens filters--one ultraviolet haze, one amber.

3. Other Portable Equipment (quantity for each inspector):

(a) 1 Flashlight (safety approved), with spare batteries and spare bulb;
(b) 1 Magnetic compass;
(c) 1 Pocket calculator with spare batteries;
(d) 1 Roll of tamper-indicating tape seals;
(e) 1 Ruler; and
(f) 1 Thermoluminescent dosimeter.

4. Engineering Site Survey Equipment:

(a) 2 Theodolites, levels, measuring sticks, and level markers;
(b) 2 Photo-range finders and reflectors;
(c) 10 Measuring tapes or tape measures, two of each length (2, 3, 10, 30, and 100 meter);
(d) 1 Field laboratory (portable) for water sampling;
(e) 1 Digital multimeter;
(f) 2 Avometers;
(g) 1 Photometer;
(h) Topographic maps, as required;
(i) 1 Fence vibration meter;
(j) 1 Magnetograph;
(k) 1 Oscillograph;
(l) 1 Portable computer;
(m) 1 Portable copier;
(n) 2 Cameras with flash; and
(o) Hand tools (hammers, pliers, screwdrivers, etc.) and expendable materials as required."

Article Three

This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of its signature and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Geneva on June 17, 1997, in five copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America:
Steven E. Steiner

For the Government of the Republic of Belarus:
Stanislav Ogurtsov

For the Government of the Republic of Kazakstan:
Kairtay Zhanbatyrov

For the Government of the Russian Federation:
Anton Vasil'yev

For the Government of Ukraine:
Konstantin Krishchenko

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Agreement number 41
Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991

Changes Section I of the Telemetry Protocol

To improve the viability and effectiveness of the Protocol on Telemetric Information Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Telemetry Protocol,

Have agreed as follows:

Article One

The second sentence of paragraph 3 of Section I of the Telemetry Protocol shall be superseded by the following provision:

"No later than 45 days after its receipt, the Party receiving such notification shall provide through diplomatic channels either a statement explaining the reasons for the incompleteness or insufficient quality of the recording of telemetric information or, if possible, new copies of the tapes."

Article Two

This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of its signature, and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Geneva on July 29, 1998, in five copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America:
Steven E. Steiner

For the Government of the Republic of Belarus:
Stanislav Ogurtsov

For the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan: |1|
Kairtay Zhanbatyrov

For the Government of the Russian Federation:
Anton Vasil'yev

For the Government of Ukraine:
Aleksey Rybak

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Agreement number 42
Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991

KC-10 and KC-135 Inspection Airplanes

To improve the viability and effectiveness of the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Inspection Protocol,

Have agreed as follows:

Article One

Subparagraph 2(a) of Annex 10 to the Inspection Protocol shall be superseded by the following provision:

"for the United States of America, for flights to the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, or Ukraine, types known as the C-9, C-130, C-141, KC-10, KC-135, and T-43; and"

Article Two

Subparagraph 3(a) of Annex 10 to the Inspection Protocol shall be superseded by the following provision:

"for the United States of America, for flights to the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, or Ukraine, types known as the C-5, C-130, C-141, KC-10, and KC-135; and"

Article Three

This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of its signature, and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Geneva on July 29,1998, in five copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America:
Steven E. Steiner

For the Government of the Republic of Belarus:
Stanislav Ogurtsov

For the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan:
Kairtay Zhanbatyrov

For the Government of the Russian Federation:
Anton Vasil'yev

For the Government of Ukraine:
Aleksey Rybak

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Agreement number 43
Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991

Concurrent continuous monitoring activities and continuous monitoring at the Votkinsk machine building plant in accordance with the Start Treaty and the INF Treaty

To improve the viability and effectiveness of the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Inspection Protocol,

Recognizing that the Twenty-second Agreed Statement in the Agreed Statements Annex to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Twenty-second Agreed Statement, requires that certain actions be taken with respect to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles of December 8, 1987, hereinafter referred to as the INF Treaty,

Recognizing that the Parties to the INF Treaty have agreed, within the framework of the Special Verification Commission, on measures to implement the Twenty-second Agreed Statement,

Have agreed as follows:

Article One

The provisions of Annex 14 to the Inspection Protocol shall be suspended with respect to the settlement of accounts for goods and services provided by the Russian Federation for support of continuous monitoring at the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant, except for paragraphs 3 and 7 of Section I of that Annex, and for goods and services in the categories contained in paragraph 1 (as it pertains to the airport associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility), paragraph 2 (as it pertains to the airport associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, including as it pertains to the escort crew of the inspected Party), subparagraph 7(b), paragraph 8, subparagraph 9(b), paragraph 10 (as it pertains to the airport associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility), paragraph 12 and paragraph 13 of Section II of that Annex.

Article Two

Except as set forth in Article One of this Agreement, the United States of America shall settle accounts for goods and services provided by the Russian Federation in support of continuous monitoring at the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant in accordance with the INF Treaty.

Article Three

The requirements contained in the Twenty-second Agreed Statement regarding agreements being reached within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission shall be considered to have been fulfilled.

Article Four

This Agreement shall enter into force simultaneously with entry into force of Amendment XI to the Memorandum of Agreement Regarding the Implementation of the Verification Provisions of the INF Treaty, of November 9, 1998, and the Agreement on the Application of Specific Administrative and Logistical Provisions for the Conduct of Inspection Activities at the Continuous Monitoring Inspection Site at Votkinsk of November 9, 1998, and shall remain in force until termination of inspections conducted at the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the INF Treaty.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Geneva on November 9, 1998, in five copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America:
Steven E. Steiner

For the Government of the Republic of Belarus:
Stanislav Ogurtsov

For the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan:
Kairtay Zhanbatyrov

For the Government of the Russian Federation:
Mikhail Strel'tsov

For the Government of Ukraine:
Aleksey Rybak

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Agreement number 44
Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991

Phased elimination of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs

Have agreed as follows:

Article One

The following provision shall be added at the end of paragraph 1 of Section I of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol:

"The Parties may agree, upon request of the possessing Party, on procedures for the phased elimination of existing types and variants of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs by the elimination in phases of the missile elements subject to elimination for such ICBMs and their launch canisters. Upon such agreement, such elimination shall be carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in this Section, except as otherwise provided for in such agreement."

Article Two

This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of its signature, and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Geneva on December 11, 2000, in five copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America:
Steven E. Steiner

For the Government of the Republic of Belarus:
Valentin Rybakov

For the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan:
Kairtay Zhanbatyrov

For the Government of the Russian Federation:
Mikhail Strel'tsov

For the Government of Ukraine:
Oleg Semenets

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Agreement number 45
Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991

Changes in the aggregate number of silo and mobile launchers of ICBMs at space launch facilities

Acting pursuant to the authority to agree otherwise, as provided for in the second sentence of subparagraph 4(b) of Article IV of the Treaty,

Have agreed as follows:

Article One

Within the limit specified in the first sentence of subparagraph 4(b) of Article IV of the Treaty, the aggregate number of silo launchers of ICBMs and mobile launchers of ICBMs located at space launch facilities shall not exceed 12. Within this limit, the number of mobile launchers of ICBMs located at space launch facilities shall not exceed ten.

Article Two

This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of its signature, and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Geneva on July 17, 2001, in five copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America:
Steven E. Steiner

For the Government of the Republic of Belarus:
Valeriy Kolesnik

For the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan:
Nurlan Danenov

For the Government of the Russian Federation:
Anton Vasil'yev

For the Government of Ukraine:
Anatoliy Shcherba

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Agreement number 46
Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991

C-17 Inspection Airplane

To improve the viability and effectiveness of the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Inspection Protocol,

Have agreed as follows:

Article One

Subparagraph 2(a) of Annex 10 to the Inspection Protocol shall be superseded by the following provision:

"for the United States of America, for flights to the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, or Ukraine, types known as the C-9, C-17, C-130, C-141, KC-10, KC-135, and T-43; and".

Article Two

Subparagraph 3(a) of Annex 10 to the Inspection Protocol shall be superseded by the following provision:

"for the United States of America, for flights to the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, or Ukraine, types known as the C-5, C-17, C-130, C-141, KC-10, and KC-135; and".

Article Three

This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of its signature, and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Geneva on July 17, 2001, in five copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America:
Steven E. Steiner

For the Government of the Republic of Belarus:
Valeriy Kolesnik

For the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan:
Nurlan Danenov

For the Government of the Russian Federation:
Anton Vasil'yev

For the Government of Ukraine:
Anatoliy Shcherba

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Agreement number 47
Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991

Addition to Annex 5 to the Inspection Protocol regarding procedures for reversing direction of railcars at a monitored facility

To improve the viability and effectiveness of the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Inspection Protocol,

Have agreed as follows:

Article One

The following provisions shall constitute paragraph 16 of Annex 5 to the Inspection Protocol:

"16. The Parties agree that railcars that would be subject to inspection shall be permitted to leave the monitored facility for the purpose of reversing direction, provided that the following procedures are used:
(a) the inspected Party notifies the monitoring team leader of its intent to move a railcar out through the portal for the purpose of reversing its direction no less than 30 minutes before the railcar arrives at the portal;
(b) two monitors accompany the railcar from the time it arrives at the portal until it returns through the portal after having reversed direction and such monitors are permitted to observe this railcar throughout the entire procedure;
(c) no cargo is removed from the railcar between the time it leaves through the portal until it returns through the portal of the monitored facility.
Provided that the entire procedure for reversing direction is completed without delay, such railcars shall not be subject to inspection pursuant to Section XVI of the Inspection Protocol during the conduct of this procedure."

Article Two

This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of its signature and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Geneva on July 17, 2001, in five copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America:
Steven E. Steiner

For the Government of the Republic of Belarus:
Valeriy Kolesnik

For the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan:
Nurlan Danenov

For the Government of the Russian Federation:
Anton Vasil'yev

For the Government of Ukraine:
Anatoliy Shcherba

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Agreement number 48
Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991

Logistical and administrative procedures for providing and transferring telemetry playback equipment demonstrated after entry into force of the Treaty

To improve the viability and effectiveness of the Protocol on Telemetric Information Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Telemetry Protocol,

Have agreed as follows:

Article One

The following provision shall be added at the end of subparagraph 4(c) of Section I of the Telemetry Protocol:

"Equipment acquired following a demonstration, conducted after entry into force of the Treaty pursuant to subparagraph 4(b) of this Section, shall be acquired in accordance with the provisions of Annex 5 to this Protocol."

Article Two

The following provisions shall constitute Annex 5 to the Telemetry Protocol:

"ANNEX 5
LOGISTICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES FOR PROVIDING AND TRANSFERRING TELEMETRY PLAYBACK EQUIPMENT DEMONSTRATED AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE TREATY
I. Provision of Equipment
1. For purposes of this Annex:

(a) the term "providing Party" means the Party that, following entry into force of the Treaty, conducted a demonstration of appropriate equipment for playing back the telemetric information recorded on tapes pursuant to subparagraph 4(b) of Section I of this Protocol.
(b) the term "receiving Party" means the Party receiving such equipment in accordance with subparagraph 4(c) of Section I of this Protocol.

2. The providing Party, pursuant to subparagraph 4(c) of Section I of this Protocol, shall provide to the receiving Party the requested items of appropriate equipment for playing back telemetric information that was demonstrated pursuant to subparagraph 4(b) of Section I of this Protocol.
3. For the equipment being provided pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Section, the providing Party shall provide all technical documentation necessary for operating and maintaining such equipment. There shall be no requirement to provide such documentation in a language other than that of the providing Party.
4. For the equipment being provided pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Section, the providing Party shall:

(a) deliver such equipment to the point of entry located nearest to the receiving Party's capital and transfer it to representatives of the receiving Party; and
(b) ensure that the equipment is operating in accordance with the specifications in the technical documentation, exclusive of any warranty obligations noted therein.

5. The providing Party shall, if requested by the receiving Party, ensure the provision of training, maintenance, service, spare parts, and replacement parts for all equipment being provided pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Section, following the procedures set forth in Annex 4 to this Protocol. The receiving Party shall bear the costs of such training, maintenance, service, spare parts, and replacement parts.
6. Unless otherwise agreed, each Party undertakes not to transfer equipment, spare parts, or replacement parts, or to release technical documentation, received pursuant to this Section, to states not party to the Treaty, or to individuals other than those who, because of their official responsibilities, require access to such equipment, spare parts, replacement parts, or technical documentation to carry out activities related to fulfillment of the obligations provided for in the Treaty.
II. Delivery and Transfer of Equipment
1. Specific dates of delivery and transfer of the equipment being provided pursuant to paragraph 2 of Section I of this Annex shall be agreed by the providing Party and the receiving Party through diplomatic channels.
2. Regarding delivery from the point of entry, the receiving Party shall bear responsibility for delivery and safe-keeping of the equipment being provided pursuant to paragraph 2 of Section I of this Annex during delivery from the point of entry to the location where such equipment is to be transferred to the receiving Party. The providing Party shall have the right to observe the equipment being provided from the time of its delivery to the point of entry of the receiving Party until the time the equipment is transferred to the receiving Party.
3. No later than two days after the date the equipment being provided pursuant to paragraph 2 of Section I of this Annex is delivered, unless otherwise agreed, an operability check of the equipment being provided shall be performed jointly by representatives of the providing Party and the receiving Party. After completion of the operability check, the Parties shall confirm in a factual written report whether the telemetry playback equipment being provided is operating in accordance with the specifications in the technical documentation. Each Party shall retain one copy of the report.
4. If the equipment being provided pursuant to paragraph 2 of Section I of this Annex is operating in accordance with the specifications in the technical documentation, such equipment shall be considered to have been transferred to the receiving Party when the operability check of the equipment is completed.
5. If during the operability check the receiving Party determines that the equipment being provided is defective, or that its characteristics are inconsistent with the specifications in the technical documentation, the receiving Party shall include in the report a detailed description of the defect or the characteristics that are inconsistent with the specifications.

(a) If, however, all repairs are completed during the operability check, or if the representatives of the providing Party and the receiving Party agree that the existing minor defects do not prevent completion of the operability check, this shall be noted in the report, the operability check shall be deemed completed, and the providing Party shall transfer the equipment to the receiving Party.
(b) If the representatives of the providing Party and the receiving Party are unable to sufficiently repair or adjust the equipment within an agreed time period, the operability check shall be deemed completed and the equipment shall not be transferred to the receiving Party. Additionally, a sufficiently detailed description of the situation shall be included in the report, and the providing Party shall return the equipment to its territory for additional repairs or analysis. Upon completion of all necessary repairs, the providing Party shall transfer the equipment to the receiving Party in accordance with the procedures specified in this Annex.

6. Regarding the number and list of delivery and transfer team members and the provision of visas:

(a) A team for delivery and transfer of equipment being provided pursuant to paragraph 2 of Section I of this Annex, hereinafter referred to as the team, shall include no more than 14 individuals. The team shall have the right to bring tools and equipment required to carry out the transfer. If a dedicated airplane or an inspection airplane is used, the aircrew for delivery of all such equipment and for transport of the team shall include no more than 15 individuals.
(b) The providing Party shall provide a list of the team members and a list of the aircrew members no less than 15 days in advance of their arrival on the territory of the receiving Party. The provisions of paragraph 6 of Section II of the Inspection Protocol on objections to an individual on the list of inspectors shall apply to an objection to an individual team member or aircrew member, except that the receiving Party shall notify the providing Party of its objection no later than seven days after receipt of such lists.
(c) The receiving Party shall provide visas and, where necessary, such other documents to each individual to whom it has not objected as may be required to ensure that each team member and each aircrew member may enter and remain in its territory for the duration of the delivery and transfer period.
(d) The providing Party shall provide a list of tools and equipment required to carry out the transfer no less than 15 days in advance of their delivery to the territory of the receiving Party. The provisions of paragraphs 8 and 11 of Section V of the Inspection Protocol on examination of equipment and supplies shall apply to examination of such tools and equipment.

7. Regarding the team:

(a) The receiving Party shall provide necessary assistance, including a safety briefing and the appropriate power supply connectors for the equipment being provided, to the team in connection with the delivery and transfer of the equipment.
(b) The receiving Party shall bear the responsibility for the delivery, and safe-keeping during delivery, of the tools and equipment referred to in subparagraph 6(a) of this Section from the point of entry to the location where the operability check will be performed.
(c) The provisions of paragraph 11 of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol on movement, travel, and urgent departure or emergency evacuation of inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members shall apply to team members and aircrew members.
(d) Throughout the delivery and transfer period, the receiving Party shall ensure that the team can be in communication with the embassy of the providing Party located on the territory of the receiving Party, using telephonic communications provided by the receiving Party.
(e) The receiving Party shall treat with due respect the team members and aircrew members of the providing Party in its territory in connection with the delivery and transfer of equipment, and shall take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on the person, freedom, and dignity of such persons.

8. Regarding arrangements for air transportation:

(a) The providing Party may use dedicated airplanes, inspection airplanes, airplanes making regularly scheduled commercial flights, or, if possible, other airplanes used for inspections related to arms control agreements, for the purpose of transporting the team members, as well as spare parts, replacement parts, tools and equipment to the point of entry.
(b) Diplomatic clearance numbers for dedicated airplanes transporting team members, as well as spare parts, replacement parts, tools and equipment, and airplane flight routes to and from the point of entry, shall be provided by the receiving Party no less than ten days prior to the arrival of the dedicated airplane at the point of entry on the territory of the receiving Party.
(c) The receiving Party shall provide parking, security protection, fueling, air navigation, airport facility, and ground technical and commercial services, as well as additional services as requested, for the dedicated airplane of the providing Party at the point of entry.
(d) The providing Party shall state its intention, through diplomatic channels, to transport team members, spare parts, replacement parts, tools or equipment no less than 72 hours in advance of the estimated time of arrival of the team members at the point of entry of the receiving Party. Such a statement shall include:

(i) the date and estimated time of arrival at the point of entry; and
(ii) the surname, gender, date of birth, and place of birth of each team member and aircrew member.

(e) The provisions of paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of Section IV of the Inspection Protocol on flights of inspection airplanes shall apply to flights of dedicated airplanes transporting team members, as well as spare parts, replacement parts, tools and equipment.

9. Regarding the delivery and transfer report and confidentiality requirements:

(a) Before departing the location where the equipment was transferred, the team leader and a representative of the receiving Party shall confirm in a factual written report in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Section that all the equipment has been transferred to the receiving Party and is operating in accordance with the specifications in the technical documentation. If all or part of the equipment to be transferred is determined to be defective during the operability check, or to have characteristics inconsistent with the specifications in the technical documentation, the providing Party and the receiving Party shall prepare a factual written report in accordance with paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of this Section.
(b) Disclosure of information obtained by any Party in connection with the delivery and transfer of equipment shall be only in accordance with paragraph 6 of Article VIII of the Treaty.
(c) Team members shall not disclose information obtained during the delivery or transfer except with the express consent of the receiving Party.

10. For the United States of America, practical implementation of activities pursuant to this Annex shall be carried out through the Defense Threat Reduction Agency of the United States of America. For the Russian Federation, practical implementation of activities pursuant to this Annex shall be carried out through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center of the Russian Federation.
11. Regarding additional services, throughout the in-country period, the receiving Party shall provide meals, lodging, work space, transportation, and, as necessary, medical and other urgent services for the team and aircrew members of the providing Party.
III. Principles for the Settlement of Accounts
1. The providing Party shall bear the cost of fulfilling its obligations pursuant to subparagraph 4(b) of Section I of this Annex. If necessary, pursuant to subparagraph 5(b) of Section II of this Annex, the providing Party shall bear the cost of returning to its territory equipment not transferred to the receiving Party and the subsequent delivery of such equipment for transfer to the receiving Party in accordance with the procedures specified in this Annex.
2. The receiving Party shall bear the cost related to implementation by the providing Party of paragraphs 2 and 3, and subparagraph 4(a) of Section I of this Annex.
3. The receiving Party shall bear the cost of the delivery provided for in paragraph 2 of Section II of this Annex.
4. The cost of parking and security protection provided by the receiving Party for each dedicated airplane used in accordance with paragraph 8 of Section II of this Annex shall be borne by the receiving Party. The cost of additional services provided by the receiving Party, to include refueling and air navigation, airport facility, and ground technical and commercial services, as well as additional services as requested, shall be borne by the providing Party.
5. The cost for all services provided in accordance with paragraph 11 of Section II of this Annex shall be borne by the receiving Party.
IV. Quantity, Description, Make and Model Number of Equipment
Equipment being provided by the United States of America subsequent to the demonstration of such equipment on June 17, 1999, in Washington, D.C.:

(a) 1 METRUM Met64 Rotary Digital Tape Recorder, model MET64SCNA (includes one 8-bit Parallel TTL Interface plus clock, 110/220VAC 5060Hz Power supply, 64Megabyte Buffer, Technical Manual, T160 Certified Cassette, and 12 month warranty);
(b) 1 ARMOR Demultiplexing System (with mouse and standard keyboard), model 1682368-001, which includes the following:

(i) 1 15-slot Chassis, with Internal Computer (with software installed on its internal hard drive) and Touch Screen LCD Front Panel, CTS-2191SL-3;
(ii) 1 BVLDS/Met64 Controller, model CTS-2182AL-5 (NOTE: CTS-2182AL-5 supersedes CTS-2182AL-1);
(iii) 1 Demultiplexer Module, CTS-2141CL;
(iv) 1 Four-channel PCM Output Module, 20 Megabits per second, CTS-2151CL;
(v) 1 Four-channel Analog Output Module, CTS-2171CL;
(vi) 1 Met64-ARMOR Control Cable, 1.5m, 16828624-205;
(vii) 1 Met64-ARMOR Data Cable, 1.5m, 16828624-005; and

(c) 1 Set of 12 interconnect cables."

Article Three

Notwithstanding Article Four of this Agreement, the Parties shall apply the provisions of this Agreement when providing and transferring the telemetry playback equipment demonstrated by the United States of America on June 17, 1999, in Washington, D.C.

Article Four

This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of its signature, and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Geneva on March 20, 2002, in five copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America:
Steven E. Steiner

For the Government of the Republic of Belarus:
Aleksandr Baychorov

For the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan:
Nurlan Danenov

For the Government of the Russian Federation:
Anton Vasil'yev

For the Government of Ukraine:
Anatoliy Shcherba

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Agreement number 49
Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991

Settlement of accounts for the provision of telemetry playback equipment

To improve the viability and effectiveness of the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Inspection Protocol,

Have agreed as follows:

Article One

Subparagraph 1(b) of Section I of Annex 14 to the Inspection Protocol shall be superseded by the following provision:

"(b) The costs of goods and services associated with the purchase of tapes and the copying of telemetric information onto such tapes pursuant to the Thirty-fifth Agreed Statement in the Annex to the Treaty on Agreed Statements, with the providing of training, maintenance, service, spare parts and replacement parts relating to telemetry equipment pursuant to paragraph 7 of Section I and paragraph 8 of Section II of Annex 1 to the Telemetry Protocol, and subparagraphs 4(d) and 4(e) and paragraph 6 of Annex 4 to the Telemetry Protocol, and with the implementation of Section III of Annex 5 to the Telemetry Protocol."

Article Two

1. The chapeau of paragraph 1 of Section II of Annex 14 to the Inspection Protocol shall be superseded by the following provision:

"Fuel for inspection airplanes provided pursuant to paragraph 13 of Section IV of the Inspection Protocol, fuel for dedicated airplanes provided pursuant to paragraph 4 of Annex 4 to the Telemetry Protocol, and fuel for dedicated airplanes provided pursuant to subparagraph 8(c) of Section II and paragraph 4 of Section III of Annex 5 to the Telemetry Protocol:"

2. The chapeau of paragraph 2 of Section II of Annex 14 to the Inspection Protocol shall be superseded by the following provision:

"Services for inspection airplanes provided pursuant to paragraph 13 of Section IV of the Inspection Protocol, services for dedicated airplanes provided pursuant to paragraph 4 of Annex 4 to the Telemetry Protocol, and services for dedicated airplanes provided pursuant to subparagraph 8(c) of Section II and paragraph 4 of Section III of Annex 5 to the Telemetry Protocol:"

3. The chapeau of paragraph 17 of Section II of Annex 14 to the Inspection Protocol shall be superseded by the following provision:

"Training and maintenance for telemetry playback equipment, and the provision of spare parts and replacement parts for such equipment pursuant to paragraph 7 of Section I and paragraph 8 of Section II of Annex 1, paragraph 6 of Annex 4 and paragraph 5 of Section I of Annex 5 to the Telemetry Protocol:"

Article Three

The following provision shall constitute paragraph 18 of Section II of Annex 14 to the Inspection Protocol:

"18. Telemetry playback equipment demonstrated after entry into force of the Treaty and acquired pursuant to subparagraph 4(c) of Section I of the Telemetry Protocol:
(a) description, quantity, make, and model number of the equipment acquired, and the number of equipment sets acquired;
(b) date of provision of the equipment acquired; and
(c) estimated cost of the equipment acquired, and the cost of delivering such equipment to the point of entry."

Article Four

This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of its signature, and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Geneva on March 20, 2002, in five copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America:
Steven E. Steiner

For the Government of the Republic of Belarus:
Aleksandr Baychorov

For the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan:
Nurlan Danenov

For the Government of the Russian Federation:
Anton Vasil'yev

For the Government of Ukraine:
Anatoliy Shcherba

JCIC Joint Statements

United States Delegation to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Washington, DC 20451

Geneva, Switzerland
December 19, 1991

Joint statement on designations for parking sites |1|

The Parties note that subparagraph 1(b) of Article XII of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, refers to designations for parking sites that are provided for in Annex A to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Memorandum of Understanding. The Parties agree that, in the first data update of the Memorandum of Understanding after entry into force of the Treaty, the format for the category of data for parking sites at ICBM bases for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs in Annex A to the Memorandum of Understanding shall be changed by introducing the designation for each parking site.

Soviet Component
of the Joint Compliance
and Inspection Commission

Geneva, Switzerland
December 19, 1991

Joint statement on designations for parking sites

The Parties note that subparagraph 1(b) of Article XII of the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, refers to designations for parking sites that are provided for in Annex A to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Memorandum of Understanding. The Parties agree that, in the first data update of the Memorandum of Understanding after entry into force of the Treaty, the format for the category of data for parking sites at ICBM bases for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs in Annex A to the Memorandum of Understanding shall be changed by introducing the designation of each parking site.

Geneva, Switzerland
October 23, 1992

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Joint statement number 2

On consent to be bound by JCIC Agreements

The Parties understand the provisions of subparagraph 6(c) of Annex 1 to the Protocol on the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, as set forth in Article One of Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Agreement Number 1, concerning the consent of a Party that did not sign an agreement to be bound by that agreement, to mean that, in the circumstances existing at the time of signature of that agreement, the practical activities provided for by that agreement need not be performed by that Party and that Party shall not be held responsible for any failure by Parties that signed the agreement, to fulfill the obligations under that agreement.

[Initialed]
(United States of America)___Steven Steiner
(Republic of Belarus)___Andrey Sannikov
(Republic of Kazakhstan)___Kasymzhomart Tokayev
(Russian Federation)___Gennadiy Shabannikov
(Ukraine)___Konstantin Hrishchenko

Geneva, Switzerland
October 23, 1992

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Joint statement number 3

On the inspectability of silo training launchers

The Parties note that, in having agreed that silo training launchers may be shown on site diagrams within the boundaries of the inspection site, and in having agreed that silo training launchers nonetheless shall not be subject to inspection, they have done so as one of the few exceptions to the general rule that everything within the boundary shown on a site diagram is inspectable, as provided for in the Inspection Protocol.

Geneva, Switzerland
October 23, 1992

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Joint statement number 4

On normal practice for cargo examination

The Parties note that, pursuant to paragraph 3 of Annex 7 to the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Inspection Protocol, cargoes consisting of equipment and supplies listed in the inventory provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Annex 7 to the Inspection Protocol may, at the choice of the inspected Party, be examined at the point of entry, at the airport associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, or directly at such a facility.

The Parties understand that the normal practice of the Parties will be to examine such cargoes at the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility.

Geneva, Switzerland
November 19, 1992

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Joint statement number 5

On the agreed form for JCIC Agreements

The Parties to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, namely, the United States of America, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine, agree that the form of Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission agreements that are not signed by all Parties to the Treaty shall follow the form of Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Agreement Number 6 and shall include the following:

(a) In the preamble:

"The Governments of the Parties to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty,"
"Acting in accordance with the Treaty,"
"Have agreed as follows:"

(b) In the final article:

"This Agreement shall enter into force on the date when the United States of America, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine have consented to be bound by this Agreement, and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force."
"Signature of this Agreement for the Government of a Party shall express the consent of that Party to be bound by this Agreement. The consent of ___ and ___(the non-signatories) to be bound by this Agreement shall be expressed by their Governments in accordance with paragraph 6 of Annex 1 to the Protocol on the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Relating to the Treaty."

In addition, such agreements shall include signature blocks only for those Parties that sign the agreement.

The Parties further agree that, for Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission joint statements that record agreements, the initialing of such a joint statement for the Government of a Party shall express the consent of that Party to be bound by the joint statement. In the event that the joint statement is not initialed by all the Parties to the Treaty, the following paragraph shall be included in the joint statement: "The consent of ___and ___(Parties not initialing) to be bound by this Joint Statement shall be expressed by their Governments in accordance with paragraph 6 of Annex 1 to the Protocol on the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Relating to the Treaty."

The Parties may agree to use other forms of documents for recording agreements, as provided for in Section V of the Protocol on the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the JCIC Protocol.

The consent of the Republic of Belarus and the Republic of Kazakhstan to be bound by this Joint Statement shall be expressed by their Governments in accordance with paragraph 6 of Annex 1 to the JCIC Protocol.

[Initialed]
(United States of America)___Steven Steiner
(Russian Federation)___Gennadiy Shabannikov
(Ukraine)___Konstantin Hrishchenko

Geneva, Switzerland
November 19, 1992

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Joint statement number 6

On the commencement of the application of rights and obligations

The Parties understand that, when, pursuant to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, certain rights and obligations under the Treaty begin to apply a specific number of days after an event, those rights and obligations shall begin to apply at 00:00 hours, Greenwich Mean Time, after the expiration of the specific number of days specified in the Treaty. Such specific number of days shall be counted from the day following the day of the event specified in the Treaty.

[Initialed]
(United States of America)___Steven Steiner
(Russian Federation)___Gennadiy Shabannikov
(Ukraine)___Konstantin Hrishchenko

Geneva, Switzerland
November 19, 1992

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Joint statement number 7

On the inspectability of ICBM emplacement equipment

The Parties understand that information about ICBM emplacement equipment that is specified for an inspection site, but that is absent from the inspection site at the time of the arrival of the inspection team at the inspection site, shall be provided during the pre-inspection briefing, along with the reason for its absence, pursuant to subparagraph 8(d) of Section VII of the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991.

The Parties further understand that, pursuant to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty:

(a) ICBM emplacement equipment that is specified for an inspection site is not required to be located within the inspection site;
(b) ICBM emplacement equipment that is specified for an inspection site, but that is absent from the inspection site at the time of the arrival of the inspection team at the inspection site, is not required to return to the inspection site during the period of inspection; and
(c) ICBM emplacement equipment is not subject to inspection while it is located outside the inspection site.

[Initialed]
(United States of America)___Steven Steiner
(Russian Federation)___Gennadiy Shabannikov
(Ukraine)___Konstantin Hrishchenko

Geneva, Switzerland
April 14, 1993

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Joint statement number 8

On training models of missiles

The Parties understand that training models of missiles differ from ICBMs or SLBMs of corresponding types on the basis of the following declared external and functional differences that are visible during inspections conducted pursuant to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty:

(a) for training models of Peacekeeper, Poseidon, Trident I, and Trident II types of missiles, one hole, no less than 25 millimeters in diameter, drilled through the casing of the first stage rocket motor and into the inert propellant;
(b) for training models of Minuteman II and Minuteman III types of missiles, a triangular notch, no less than ten centimeters in height, as measured from the edge of the nozzle, in one of the nozzles of the first stage rocket motor;
(c) for training models of SS-24 and SS-25 types of missiles, two holes, each no less than 15 millimeters in diameter, drilled through the launch canister, in the region of the first stage rocket motor; and, coaxial with one of these two holes, one hole, no less than ten millimeters in diameter, drilled through the casing of the first stage rocket motor and into the inert propellant;
(d) for training models of SS-11 and SS-19 types of missiles, one hole, no less than ten millimeters in diameter, drilled through each nozzle of the first stage rocket motor, near the edge of the nozzle;
(e) for training models of SS-17 and SS-18 types of missiles, one hole in the launch canister, no less than 15 millimeters in diameter, and one hole, no less than ten millimeters in diameter, drilled through the first stage propellant section through the hole in the launch canister;
(f) for training models of SS-N-6, SS-N-8, SS-N-18 and SS-N-23 types of missiles:

(i) the absence of the nozzle on the first stage rocket motor; or
(ii) if the training model has the nozzle on the first stage rocket motor, two holes, each no less than ten millimeters in diameter, drilled through the nozzle near its edge;

(g) for training models of SS-N-20 type of missiles, one hole, no less than ten millimeters in diameter, drilled through the casing of the first stage rocket motor and into the inert propellant, or one of the differences provided for in subparagraph (f) of this paragraph.

Nothing in this Joint Statement shall be deemed to prejudice the right of each Party to declare other external and functional differences to differentiate training models of missiles from ICBMs or SLBMs of the corresponding type.

The Parties agree that, for existing and new types of ICBMs and SLBMs, all declarations of differences between training models of missiles and ICBMs or SLBMs of the corresponding types shall be subject to discussion in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

To assist inspectors, the Parties shall either provide a photograph of each of the differences of training models of missiles or, if a photograph of any of such differences has not been provided prior to the first inspection of an item declared to be a training model of a missile on the basis of such a difference, the inspected Party shall provide to the inspecting Party, during that inspection, a photograph of the difference, taken in accordance with paragraph 18 of Section VI of, and Subsection B of Section VI of Annex 8 to, the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty.

The consent of Ukraine to be bound by this Joint Statement shall be expressed by its Government in accordance with paragraph 6 of Annex 1 to the Protocol on the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Relating to the Treaty.

[Initialed]
(United States of America)___Steven Steiner
(Republic of Belarus)___Andrey Sannikov
(Republic of Kazakhstan)___Kasymzhomart Tokayev
(Russian Federation)___Gennadiy Shabannikov

Geneva, Switzerland
April 14, 1993

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Joint statement number 9

On additional confirmation of the dimensions of first stages of SLBMs

The Parties understand that each exhibition conducted pursuant to Annex 13 to the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Inspection Protocol, shall be a one-time exhibition, provided that, as a result of each such exhibition, the United States of America confirms, in accordance with the procedures provided for in Annex 13 to the Inspection Protocol, that the SLBM being exhibited is an SLBM of the declared type and that the dimensions of the SLBM stages being confirmed pursuant to Annex 13 to the Inspection Protocol correspond to the data specified for those items in the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991.

[Initialed]
(United States of America)___Steven Steiner
(Russian Federation)___Gennadiy Shabannikov

Geneva, Switzerland
April 14, 1993

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Joint statement number 10

On the agreement of the technical specifications of U.S. equipment for the conduct of continuous monitoring activities at the Votkinsk machine building plant, Votkinsk, Russian Federation

The Parties understand that the list of equipment provided to the Parties by the United States of America in the document titled "U.S. Equipment for Use at the Votkinsk Continuous Monitoring Facility at the Beginning of Continuous Monitoring Activity" on October 15, 1992, fulfills the obligation of the United States of America pursuant to paragraph 17 of Section VI of the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Inspection Protocol, to provide to the inspected Party through diplomatic channels a list of items of equipment provided for in Annex 8 or 9 to the Inspection Protocol indicating the manufacturer's name and the model.

Pursuant to paragraph 17 of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol, the Parties agree that the technical specifications for the U.S. equipment listed in Annexes 8 and 9 to the Inspection Protocol, provided to the Parties by the United States of America in the document titled "Technical Specifications of U.S. Equipment for the Conduct of Continuous Monitoring Activities" on October 15, 1992, shall be the technical specifications for the equipment specified on the list provided to the Parties by the United States of America in the document titled "U.S. Equipment for Use at the Votkinsk Continuous Monitoring Facility at the Beginning of Continuous Monitoring Activity" on October 15, 1992.

The Parties further understand that this Joint Statement does not relieve the inspecting Party from the obligation to provide documentation pursuant to paragraph 25 of Section XVI of the Inspection Protocol, and does not require the United States of America to bring to the territory of the inspected Party all the items of equipment.

The consent of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to be bound by this Joint Statement shall be expressed by their Governments in accordance with paragraph 6 of Annex 1 to the Protocol on the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.

[Initialed]
(United States of America)___Steven Steiner
(Russian Federation)___Gennadiy Shabannikov

Geneva, Switzerland
October 14, 1993

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Joint statement number 11

On the pre-inspection restrictions at Yagel'naya and Olen'ya submarine bases

The Parties agree that, as an exception to the provisions in Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Agreement Number 13, the pre-inspection restriction zones for the Yagel'naya and Olen'ya submarine bases shall be separated as follows: The five-kilometer pre-inspection restriction zone for the Yagel'naya submarine base shall not extend to the entrance of the Olen'ya inlet beyond the intersection of the five-kilometer arc associated with this zone with the five-kilometer arc that is associated with the pre-inspection restriction zone for the Olen'ya submarine base and that abuts on the peninsula between the entrances to the Sayda inlet and the Olen'ya inlet; and the five-kilometer pre-inspection restriction zone for the Olen'ya submarine base shall not extend beyond the intersection of the five-kilometer arc associated with this zone with the peninsula between the entrances to the Sayda inlet and the Olen'ya inlet.

The Parties therefore understand that the provisions of paragraph 4 and subparagraph 8(d) of Section IX of the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, regarding pre-inspection restrictions and procedures for reentry vehicle inspections, do not apply to ballistic missile submarines at the Yagel'naya Submarine Base when the Olen'ya Submarine Base has been designated as the inspection site subject to a reentry vehicle inspection, and vice-versa.

[Initialed]
(United States of America)___Steven Steiner
(Russian Federation)___Mikhail Strel'tsov

Geneva, Switzerland
October 14, 1993

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Joint statement number 12

On procedures for refueling IL-76 Inspection Airplanes at Anchorage International Airport, Anchorage, Alaska

With respect to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties agree that routes to San Francisco, California, via Anchorage, Alaska, specified by the United States of America in subparagraph 10(b) of Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty, shall be used only for flights of IL-76 inspection airplanes. The Parties further agree that, when the IL-76 airplane used pursuant to paragraph 3 or 4 of Section IV of the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Inspection Protocol, lands to refuel at Anchorage International Airport, Anchorage, Alaska:

(a) The inspecting Party shall specify in the notifications provided in accordance with paragraphs 3, 5, 6, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, and 24 of Section III of the Inspection Protocol, and in the notification, agreed by the Parties, of the intention to conduct a special START flight, its intent to use an IL-76 airplane and the estimated time of arrival at Anchorage International Airport.
(b) Anchorage shall not be considered a point of entry under the Treaty.
(c) Refueling shall be routinely conducted at the remote refueling station at the Anchorage International Airport. Inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members shall not deplane.
(d) If refueling is required at a terminal gate, inspectors and monitors shall deplane and remain in the United States Customs holding room until refueling is complete. Baggage shall remain on the airplane throughout the layover of the airplane at Anchorage International Airport.
(e) All costs associated with the refueling at Anchorage International Airport shall be paid by the inspecting Party directly to the commercial entity that provided such goods and services, as is done for regularly scheduled commercial flights.
(f) If a mechanical breakdown occurs, the inspecting Party shall arrange and pay for necessary repairs.
(g) If a delay occurs due to mechanical breakdown or circumstances brought about by force majeure that would require the United States of America to provide escorts, meals, lodging, and transportation for inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members, the costs of these services shall be paid by the inspecting Party. The United States of America shall submit to the inspecting Party separate bills for these costs, since they will fall outside the obligations contained in the Treaty.

The consent of the Republic of Kazakhstan and Ukraine to be bound by this Joint Statement shall be expressed by their Governments in accordance with paragraph 6 of Annex 1 to the Protocol on the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Relating to the Treaty.

[Initialed]
(United States of America)___Steven Steiner
(Republic of Belarus)___Alexandr Baichorov
(Russian Federation)___Mikhail Strel'tsov

Geneva, Switzerland
October 14, 1993

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Joint statement number 13

On the agreement of the technical specifications of U.S. equipment for the conduct of continuous monitoring activities at the Pavlograd machine plant, Pavlograd, Ukraine

The Parties understand that the list of equipment provided to the Parties by the United States of America in the document titled "U.S. Equipment for Use at the Pavlograd Continuous Monitoring Facility" on October 15, 1992, fulfills the obligation of the United States of America pursuant to paragraph 17 of Section VI of the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Inspection Protocol, to provide to the inspected Party through diplomatic channels a list of items of equipment provided for in Annex 8 or 9 to the Inspection Protocol indicating the manufacturer's name and the model.

Pursuant to paragraph 17 of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol, the Parties agree that the technical specifications for the U.S. equipment listed in Annexes 8 and 9 to the Inspection Protocol, provided to the Parties by the United States of America in the document titled "Technical Specifications of U.S. Equipment for the Conduct of Continuous Monitoring Activities" on October 15, 1992, shall be the technical specifications for the equipment specified on the list provided to the Parties by the United States of America in the document titled "U.S. Equipment for Use at the Pavlograd Continuous Monitoring Facility" on October 15, 1992.

The consent of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and the Russian Federation to be bound by this Joint Statement shall be expressed by their Governments in accordance with paragraph 6 of Annex 1 to the Protocol on the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.

[Initialed]
(United States of America)___Steven Steiner
(Ukraine)___Konstantin Hrishchenko

Geneva, Switzerland
May 4, 1994

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Joint statement number 14

On the capabilities of satellite system receivers to provide information on the coordinates of silo launchers of ICBMs

With respect to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties understand that, for Subsection E of Section VI of Annex 8 to the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty, the inspected Party shall ensure that the satellite system receivers are capable of providing information on the coordinates of the silo launchers of ICBMs located on its territory, at any time when a satellite signal necessary for use by such satellite system receivers is available.

[Initialed]
(United States of America)___Steven Steiner
(Republic of Belarus)___Andrey Sannikov
(Republic of Kazakhstan)___Kairtay Zhanbatyrov
(Russian Federation)___Mikhail Strel'tsov
(Ukraine)___Konstantin Hrishchenko

Geneva, Switzerland
May 4, 1994

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Joint statement number 15

On the issue of the SS-N-8 SLBM at SLBM storage facilities

With respect to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties understand that during baseline data inspections, data update inspections, or new facility inspections, assembled SS-N-8 SLBMs without front sections may be located at declared facilities without the detachable front portion of the missile, in which the missile's guidance and control system instruments are located, and that the inspecting Party will not require the attachment of such front portion to the missile in order to confirm the type of such SLBMs during an inspection.

The Parties understand that the photographs of the SS-N-8 SLBM without the detachable front portion of the missile and the declared data on the length of the missile in this configuration, which is 12.1 meters, which were transmitted by the Russian Federation to the United States of America on December 21, 1993, may be used by the United States of America during baseline data inspections, data update inspections, or new facility inspections only for the purpose of confirming this type of SLBM.

The Parties understand that the following length measurement was used to obtain the 12.1 meter length declared for this missile in such configuration: the distance from the edge of the main engine nozzle of the first stage to the place where the missile joins the detachable front portion of the missile.

The Parties agree that when an SS-N-8 SLBM without the detachable front portion of the missile is first encountered during an inspection conducted by the United States of America, the United States of America shall have the right to confirm the declared 12.1 meter length.

The Parties understand that along with the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section I of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty, the Russian Federation will provide the text of a footnote specifying the 12.1 meter length declared for the missile in such configuration. In subparagraph (a)(ii) of Annex F to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty, the number of such footnote will be superscripted after the first mention of the SLBM type designation "SS-N-8".

[Initialed]
(United States of America)___Steven Steiner
(Russian Federation)___Mikhail Strel'stov

Geneva, Switzerland
October 13, 1994

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Joint statement number 16

On information to be provided to inspectors upon their arrival at the inspection site

With respect to paragraph 3 of Section VI of the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Inspection Protocol, the Parties understand that the requirement to annotate a copy of the site diagram to indicate the location at the inspection site of the items specified in paragraph 8 of Section VII of the Inspection Protocol, applies only to such items that are located within the boundaries of the inspection site.

In this regard, and for the purposes of paragraphs 6, 8, and 16 of Section VII of the Inspection Protocol, the Parties agree that ballistic missile submarines, missile tenders, storage cranes, and SLBM launchers located in the waters of a submarine base:

(a) shall not be considered to be within the boundaries of the inspection site;
(b) shall not be subject to pre-inspection restrictions;
(c) shall not be indicated on the annotated site diagram provided to the inspection team leader; and
(d) shall not be subject to inspection.

[Initialed]
(United States of America)___Steven Steiner
(Republic of Belarus)___Aleksandr Baichorov
(Republic of Kazakhstan)___Kairtay Zhanbatyrov
(Russian Federation)___Mikhail Strel'tsov
(Ukraine)___Konstantin Hrishchenko

Geneva, Switzerland
October 13, 1994

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Joint statement number 17

On changes in the functions of facilities

With respect to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties understand that each Party shall have the right to change the functions of facilities, specified by that Party in the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Memorandum of Understanding.

The Parties understand that, for facilities, the functions of which are changed in the period between signature and entry into force of the Treaty, the changed functions of such facilities shall be included in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section I of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Notification Protocol. Revised site diagrams for such facilities shall be provided through diplomatic channels no later than 48 hours after such notification.

The Parties understand that, for facilities, the functions of which are changed after entry into force of the Treaty, the changed functions of such facilities shall be included in notifications provided in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 9 of Section I of the Notification Protocol. Such facilities shall be considered to be new facilities.

The Parties agree that changing the function of a facility shall not be considered to be its elimination and that a close-out inspection shall not be conducted at such a facility until its elimination.

The Parties understand that if, as a result of a change in the function of a facility, the size criteria used during the inspection of the facility in its new function increase, a Party shall not change the function of such a facility until procedures for the inspection of such a facility are agreed within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

Geneva, Switzerland
October 13, 1994

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Joint statement number 18

On exchange of site diagrams of facilities

With respect to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties understand that, for facilities which were not specified in the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty but which were specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section I of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty, the site diagrams for such facilities will be provided through diplomatic channels no later than 48 hours after such notification is provided.

Geneva, Switzerland
February 3, 1995

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Joint statement number 19

On provision of notifications through continuous communication channels

The Parties, referring to paragraph 4 of Article VIII of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, understand that, for providing and receiving notifications relating to the Treaty:

(a) the United States of America shall use the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center of the United States of America and the Russian Federation shall use the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center of the Russian Federation;
(b) the Republic of Belarus shall use the equivalent Continuous Communications Link of the Republic of Belarus;
(c) the Republic of Kazakhstan shall use the equivalent Government-to-Government Communications Link of the Republic of Kazakhstan; and
(d) Ukraine shall use the equivalent Government-to-Government Communications Link of Ukraine.

The Parties understand that the United States of America shall provide all of its notifications relating to the Treaty to the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine. The Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine shall each provide all of its notifications relating to the Treaty to the United States of America.

The Parties understand that the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine shall exchange, by agreement among themselves, the notifications they have provided to the United States of America. The Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine agree that the provisions concerning releasability of information, set forth in Annex 1 to the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Notification Protocol, shall apply to the information contained in the notifications received from each other.

The Parties understand that the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine, by agreement among themselves, may use the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center, Continuous Communication Link, or Government-to-Government Communications Links, referred to in this Joint Statement for transmitting to the United States of America notifications relating to the Treaty on behalf of any or all of these Parties.

The Parties understand that the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine may, by agreement among themselves, transmit as a single notification, the data on aggregate numbers by the categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty, provided in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 of Section I of the Notification Protocol. The Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine shall be responsible for the timely provision of accurate and complete data to each other in order to ensure the provision of the relevant notifications to the United States of America.

The Parties agree that, in transmitting such notifications, paragraph 1 of each such notification shall specify the designator of the Party providing the notification in fulfilling its obligations provided for in the Treaty. In this connection, the following designators shall be specified: for the United States of America -- ANC/STR; for the Republic of Belarus -- BNC/STR; for the Republic of Kazakhstan -- KNC/STR; for the Russian Federation -- RNC/STR; and for Ukraine -- UNC/STR.

[Initialed]
(United States of America)___Steven Steiner
(Republic of Belarus)___Aleksandr Baichorov
(Republic of Kazakhstan)___Kairtay Zhanbatyrov
(Russian Federation)___Mikhail Strel'tsov

Geneva, Switzerland
September 28, 1995

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Joint statement number 20

On the use of radiation detection equipment during reentry vehicle inspections

The Parties, referring to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, understand that during reentry vehicle inspections conducted pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty the radiation detection equipment provided for in Section II of Annex 8 to the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty may be used, at the discretion of the inspected Party, to demonstrate to the inspectors that an object contained in the front section and declared by the in-country escort to be a non-nuclear object is, in fact, non-nuclear.

[Initialed]
(United States of America)___Steven Steiner
(Republic of Belarus)___Aleksandr Baichorov
(Republic of Kazakstan) |1|___Kairtay Zhanbatyrov (Russian Federation)_Viktor Trifonov

Geneva, Switzerland
September 28, 1995

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Joint statement number 21

On space launch vehicles that incorporate first stages of ICBMs or SLBMs

The Parties, referring to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, confirm that the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM of a type specified in Annex F to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Memorandum of Understanding, that is incorporated into a space launch vehicle is subject to the provisions of the Treaty, and that, for the purposes of the Treaty, such a space launch vehicle is subject to the provisions of the Treaty relating to ICBMs or SLBMs as an ICBM or SLBM of that type.

Pursuant to the authority to agree otherwise, as provided for in the Twenty-eighth Agreed Statement of the Agreed Statements Annex to the Treaty, the Parties shall agree, as appropriate and on a case-by-case basis, within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, that the existence of a first stage of an ICBM or SLBm that is incorporated into a space launch vehicle, during such a space launch vehicle's maintenance, storage, and transportation, including maintenance, storage, and transportation of such a first stage that is incorporated into a space launch vehicle, located separately from other stages of an ICBM or SLBM, does not result in ICBMs or SLBMs of that type being considered, for the purposes of the Treaty, to be ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported in stages.

On the above basis, the Parties agree that the existence of the first stage of an SS-25 ICBM that is incorporated into a space launch vehicle, designated by the Russian Federation as the "Start" space launch vehicle, in a configuration in which the first and second stages of an SS-25 ICBM, together with a new stage, are contained in one section of the launch canister of such a space launch vehicle, and the third stage of an SS-25 ICBM, together with another new stage, is contained in another section of the launch canister of such a space launch vehicle, and its exit as part of the "Start" space launch vehicle from the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant after March 1, 1995, do not result in SS-25 ICBMs thereafter being considered, for the purposes of the Treaty, to be ICBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported in stages, provided that the sections of the launch canister of the "Start" space launch vehicle are maintained, stored, and transported together, solely in this configuration, until the "Start" space launch vehicle is prepared at a space launch facility or test range for launch. The Parties understand that the process of connecting two portions of the "Start" space launch vehicle in final preparation for its launch shall not be considered assembly for the purposes of the Treaty.

The Parties understand that an ICBM or SLBM used to deliver objects into the upper atmosphere or space, including a space launch vehicle that incorporates the first stage of an ICBM or SLBm, but which differs from such a type of ICBM or SLBM in terms of the number of stages, dimensions, type of propellant, launch weight or throw-weight, shall not be considered to be a variant of such a type of ICBM or SLBM or a new type of ICBM or SLBM, provided that such an ICBm or SLBM used for delivering objects into the upper atmosphere or space, including such a space launch vehicle that incorporates the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM, is not flight-tested with a reentry vehicle.

The Parties understand that technical data on space launch vehicles that incorporate the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM shall not be required in Annex F to the Memorandum of Understanding, and that exhibitions of such space launch vehicles shall not be required.

The Parties agree on the provision, in advance, of information on ICBMs or SLBMs used to deliver objects into the upper atmosphere or space, including space launch vehicles that incorporate the first stage of an ICBm or SLBM. Such information shall include technical data, development plans, and photographs or, until such ICBMs and SLBMs, including such space launch vehicles, are available to be photographed, schematic drawings.

The Parties understand that any proposed changes to the telemetry requirements associated with an ICBM or SLBM used for delivering objects into the upper atmosphere or space, including a space launch vehicle that incorporates the first stage of an ICBM or SLBm, will be discussed and, where appropriate, agreed within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, taking into account the provisions of the Treaty, including the Thirty-first Agreed Statement of the Agreed Statements Annex to the Treaty.

The Parties understand that the Treaty does not prohibit a Party from moving ICBMs or SLBMs used for delivering objects into the upper atmosphere or space, including space launch vehicles that incorporate the first stages of ICBMs or SLBMs, to a space launch facility outside its national territory. ICBMs or SLBMs used for delivering objects into the upper atmosphere or space, including space launch vehicles that incorporate the first stages of ICBMs or SLBMs, located at a space launch facility outside a Party's national territory, shall not be considered to be based at such a facility. The Party conducting such movement shall retain ownership and control of such ICBMs or SLBMs, including such space launch vehicles, as well as their launchers and support equipment.

The Parties further understand that a space launch vehicle that incorporates any stage of an ICBM or SLBM that is not a first stage of an ICBM or SLBM, and does not incorporate the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM, is not subject to the provisions of the Treaty.

The Parties shall discuss and, where appropriate, agree on, within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, questions relating to ICBMs and SLBMs used for delivering objects into the upper atmosphere or space, including space launch vehicles that incorporate the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM.

Geneva, Switzerland
May 8, 1996

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Joint statement number 22

On additional differences between training models of the SS-19 type of missile and ICBMs of the corresponding type

The Parties, referring to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, understand that, in addition to the differences between training models of missiles and ICBMs or SLBMs of the corresponding type that are set forth in Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Joint Statement Number 8, training models of the SS-19 type of missile differ from ICBMs of the corresponding type on the basis of the following declared external and functional differences that are visible during inspections conducted pursuant to the Treaty:

(a) the absence of one or more nozzles on the first stage rocket motor, and the presence of one hole, no less than ten millimeters in diameter, drilled through each nozzle present on the first stage rocket motor, near the edge of the nozzle; or
(b) the absence of the first stage rocket motor.

To assist inspectors, the Parties shall either provide a photograph of each of the additional differences of training models of the SS-19 type of missile, including each configuration provided for in subparagraph (a) of this Joint Statement, or, if a photograph of any of such differences, including any of the configurations provided for in subparagraph (a) of this Joint Statement, has not been provided prior to the first inspection of an item declared to be a training model of a missile on the basis of such a difference, the inspected Party shall provide to the inspecting Party, during that inspection, a photograph of the difference, including the configuration, if applicable, taken in accordance with paragraph 18 of Section VI of, and Subsection B of Section VI of Annex 8 to, the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty.

[Initialed]
(United States of America)___Steven Steiner
(Republic of Belarus)___Andrey Sannikov
(Republic of Kazakstan)___Kairtay Zhanbatyrov
(Russian Federation)___Viktor Trifonov
(Ukraine)___Konstantin Hrishchenko

Geneva, Switzerland
May 8, 1996

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Joint statement number 23

On first stages without nozzles attached of U.S. ICBMs and SLBMs

The Parties, referring to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, understand that, during data update inspections, new facility inspections, or conversion or elimination inspections, first stages without nozzles attached of Minuteman II, Minuteman III, and Peacekeeper ICBMs and first stages without nozzles attached of Trident I and Trident II SLBMs may be located at declared facilities.

The Parties understand that a photograph of the first stage, in such configuration, of each of these missiles, and declared data on the length of the first stage without nozzles attached of each of these missiles, which will be provided by the United States of America to the other Parties, may be used by the inspecting Party during data update inspections, new facility inspections, or conversion or elimination inspections only for the purpose of confirming these types of ICBMs and SLBMs at declared facilities.

The Parties understand that the 6.5 meter length of the Minuteman II and Minuteman III ICBM first stages, the 7.4 meter length of the Peacekeeper ICBM first stage, the 4.4 meter length of the Trident I SLBM first stage, and the 6.8 meter length of the Trident II SLBM first stage, declared for first stages, in such configuration, of these missiles, is the distance from the extreme point of the aft end dome of the motor case to the extreme point of the forward end dome of the motor case, without taking into account protruding elements attached to such end domes of the motor case.

The Parties understand that no later than five days after entry into force of this Joint Statement the United States of America will provide texts of footnotes specifying the length declared for the first stage without nozzles attached of each of these missiles in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty. In this connection, the respective numbers of the footnotes will be superscripted after the first mention of the first stage length of the corresponding ICBM or SLBM type in subparagraph (b)(i) or (b)(ii) of Annex F to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Memorandum of Understanding. The United States of America will also provide a photograph of the first stage, in such configuration, of each of these missiles, that meets the criteria provided for in paragraph 10 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding, either on the date when this Joint Statement is initialed, or through diplomatic channels no later than 48 hours after the notification specified in this paragraph is provided, or during the first inspection at which a first stage, in such configuration, of each of these missiles is encountered.

The Parties agree that, during the first inspection at which a first stage, in such configuration, of each of these missiles is encountered, the inspecting Party shall have the right to confirm that the length of such a first stage corresponds to the length declared for the first stage without nozzles attached of an ICBM or SLBM of that type in Annex F to the Memorandum of Understanding, using procedures provided for in Annexes 8 and 11 to the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty applicable to measuring the distance from the extreme point of the aft end dome of the motor case to the extreme point of the forward end dome of the motor case, without taking into account protruding elements attached to such end domes of the motor case. The inspecting Party shall also have the right during such inspection and subsequent inspections to confirm the type of ICBM or SLBM by external viewing and by measurement of the dimensions of such a first stage without nozzles attached of an ICBM or SLBM.

Geneva, Switzerland
May 8, 1996

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Joint statement number 24

On first stages without nozzles attached of SS-24 ICBMs

The Parties, referring to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, understand that, during data update inspections, new facility inspections, or conversion or elimination inspections, first stages without nozzles attached of SS-24 ICBMs may be located at conversion or elimination facilities.

The Parties understand that a photograph of the first stage, in such configuration, of each variant of the SS-24 ICBM and declared data on the length of the first stage without nozzle attached of each variant of the SS-24 ICBM, which will be provided to the United States of America, may be used by the inspecting Party during data update inspections, new facility inspections, or conversion or elimination inspections only for the purpose of confirming this type and variant of ICBM at conversion or elimination facilities.

The Parties understand that the 7.3 meter length of the first stage of the SS-24 ICBM for rail mobile launcher and the 7.1 meter length of the first stage of the SS-24 ICBM for silo launcher, declared for first stages, in such configuration, of these variants of the SS-24 ICBM, is the distance from the extreme point of the aft end dome of the motor case to the extreme point of the forward end dome of the motor case, without taking into account protruding elements attached to such end domes of the motor case.

The Parties understand that no later than five days after entry into force of this Joint Statement Ukraine will provide texts of footnotes specifying the length declared for the first stage without nozzle attached of each variant of the SS-24 ICBM in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty. In this connection, the respective numbers of the footnotes will be superscripted after the first mention of the first stage length of the corresponding variant of this ICBM type in subparagraph (a)(i) of Annex F to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Memorandum of Understanding. Except as provided below, Ukraine will also provide a photograph of the first stage, in such configuration, of each variant of the SS-24 ICBM, that meets the criteria provided for in paragraph 10 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding, either on the date when this Joint Statement is initialed, or through diplomatic channels no later than 48 hours after the notification specified in this paragraph is provided, or during the first inspection on the territory of Ukraine at which a first stage, in such configuration, of that variant of the SS-24 ICBM is encountered. If the first stage, in such configuration, of a variant of the SS-24 ICBM is first encountered during an inspection on the territory of the Russian Federation, the Russian Federation will, during that inspection, provide a photograph of the first stage, in such configuration, of that variant of the SS-24 ICBM, unless Ukraine provided a photograph of that variant earlier.

The Parties agree that, during the first inspection at which a first stage, in such configuration, of each variant of the SS-24 ICBM is encountered, the inspecting Party shall have the right to confirm that the length of such a first stage corresponds to the length declared for the first stage without nozzle attached of that variant of the SS-24 ICBM in Annex F to the Memorandum of Understanding, using procedures provided for in Annexes 8 and 11 to the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty applicable to measuring the distance from the extreme point of the aft end dome of the motor case to the extreme point of the forward end dome of the motor case, without taking into account protruding elements attached to such end domes of the motor case. The inspecting Party shall also have the right during such inspection and subsequent inspections to confirm the type and variant of ICBM by external viewing and by measurement of the dimensions of such a first stage without nozzle attached of a variant of the SS-24 ICBM.

[Initialed]
(United States of America)___ Steven Steiner
(Republic of Belarus)___Andrey Sannikov
(Republic of Kazakstan)___Kairtay Zhanbatyrov
(Russian Federation)___Viktor Trifonov
(Ukraine)___Konstantin Hrishchenko

Geneva, Switzerland
October 30, 1996

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Joint statement number 25

On measuring items of inspection in containers, vehicles, or ICBM emplacement equipment

The Parties, referring to Annex 1 to the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, understand that when an item of inspection is encountered in a container, vehicle, or ICBM emplacement equipment during any inspection, inspectors may use indirect measurement procedures to measure the dimensions of the item of inspection. The indirect measurement procedures shall include making measurements of the distance between locations designated by a member of the in-country escort on the item of inspection and on the container, vehicle, or ICBM emplacement equipment. The results of such measurements shall be added or subtracted, as appropriate, to determine the dimensions of the item of inspection.

The Parties understand that measurements of an item of inspection in a container, vehicle, or ICBM emplacement equipment may be taken with the use of additional equipment provided by the inspected Party.

The Parties understand that, for the purposes of confirming the type of an item of inspection contained in ICBM emplacement equipment, or the absence of an item of inspection therefrom, the procedures provided for in paragraph 9 of Annex 1 to the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty shall be used.

Geneva, Switzerland
October 30, 1996

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Joint statement number 26

On confirming types of ICBMs and SLBMs

The Parties, referring to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, understand that when, during data update inspections or new facility inspections, first stages of ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported in stages are located at declared facilities attached to other stages of such ICBMs or SLBMs, the type of an ICBM or SLBM in such a configuration may be confirmed by viewing and measuring the dimensions of the first stage of such an ICBM or SLBM using the procedures provided for in Annex 1 to the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Inspection Protocol. The length of such a first stage is the distance set forth in subparagraph 14(b) of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Memorandum of Understanding.

The Parties understand that when ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, transported, as assembled missile in launch canisters or without launch canisters are located for the purpose of elimination at conversion or elimination facilities, or when such ICBMs, other than ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, or such SLBMs are located for the purpose of elimination at another declared facility disassembled into stages or in a state in which one or more assemblies or elements constituting the assembled missile without front section have been removed, the type of ICBM or SLBM in such a configuration may be confirmed during data update inspections or new facility inspections by viewing and measuring the dimensions of the first stage of such an ICBM or SLBM using the procedures provided for in paragraph 2 of Annex 1 to the Inspection Protocol. |1| The length of such a first stage is the distance set forth in subparagraph 14(a) of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding.

The Parties understand that for the purposes of paragraph 1 of Subsection A of Section VI of Annex 8 to the Inspection Protocol, the places set forth in subparagraph 14(a) or 14(b) of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding, as applicable, that are used for measuring the length of the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM, are the extreme points of the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM.

Geneva, Switzerland
June 17, 1997

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Joint statement number 27

On changes to Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Joint statement number S-1

The Parties, referring to paragraph 20 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, agree that paragraph (2) of Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Joint Statement Number S-1 shall be superseded by the following provision:

"(2) The portions of the Teykovo ICBM Base for Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs to be excluded, pursuant to this Joint Statement, from within the boundary shown on the site diagram of the facility dated March 20, 1995, shall not be subject to inspection unless such portions are included within the boundary of any inspection site."

[Initialed]
(United States of America)___Steven Steiner
(Republic of Belarus)___Stanislav Ogurtsov
(Republic of Kazakstan)___Kairtay Zhanbatyrov
(Russian Federation)___Anton Vasil'yev
(Ukraine)___Konstantin Hrishchenko

Geneva, Switzerland
November 12, 1997

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Joint statement number 28

On the use of tamper detection equipment

The Parties, referring to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, understand that the inspecting Party shall be permitted to bring to points of entry at which radiation detection equipment is stored equipment for determining whether the containers in which radiation detection equipment is stored have been tampered with, hereinafter referred to as tamper detection equipment. The inspecting Party shall provide through diplomatic channels to the inspected Party a list of such tamper detection equipment, indicating the manufacturer's name and the model, prior to the first time such tamper detection equipment is brought to the territory of the inspected Party after the entry into force of this Joint Statement. The inspecting Party shall be permitted to substitute tamper detection equipment of a different manufacturer or model. The inspecting Party shall provide an updated list of such tamper detection equipment prior to substitution.

The Parties understand that tamper detection equipment that is brought to a point of entry shall be subject to examination by the inspected Party to confirm that the manufacturer's name and the model of such tamper detection equipment correspond to those specified on the list provided by the inspected Party.

The Parties understand that tamper detection equipment may be used only at the point of entry and only for the purpose of determining whether the containers have been tampered with, as provided for in paragraph 4 of Section I of Annex 15 to the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Inspection Protocol, and may not be taken to any inspection site. A member of the in-country escort shall have the right to be present when tamper detection equipment is used.

The Parties understand that the provisions of subparagraph 7(c) of Section II of the Inspection Protocol shall apply to the recordings of data generated by tamper detection equipment.

The Parties understand that tamper detection equipment shall be removed from the point of entry at the end of the in-country period of the inspection team that brought such tamper detection equipment to the point of entry. However, if another inspection team that could use such tamper detection equipment is within the territory of the inspected Party at the end of such period, the tamper detection equipment shall be removed at the end of the in-country period of that inspection team.

[Initialed]
(United States of America)___Steven Steiner
(Republic of Belarus)___Stanislav Ogurtsov
(Republic of Kazahkstan) |1|___Kairtay Zhanbatyrov
(Russian Federation)___Anton Vasil'yev
(Ukraine)___Konstantin Hrishchenko

Geneva, Switzerland
March 17, 1998

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Joint statement number 29

On SS-24 ICBMs and their first stages with coupling device attached

The Parties, referring to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, understand that the SS-24 ICBM uses a device that connects the missile with its launch canister, hereinafter referred to as the coupling device, which is attached to the first stage motor and covers the main engine nozzle. The Parties understand that, during data update inspections or new facility inspections, SS-24 ICBMs and their first stages may be located at conversion or elimination facilities in the following configurations: as assembled missiles without front sections with the coupling device attached; and as separate first stages with the coupling device attached.

The Parties understand that photographs of the missile and the first stage, in such configurations, of each variant of the SS-24 ICBM and declared data on the length of the missile and the first stage, in such configurations, of each variant of the SS-24 ICBM, which will be provided to the United States of America, may be used by the inspecting Party during data update inspections or new facility inspections only for the purpose of confirming this type and variant of ICBM at conversion or elimination facilities.

The Parties understand that the 19.3 meter length of the SS-24 ICBM for rail-mobile launcher and the 19.3 meter length of the SS-24 ICBM for silo launcher, declared for assembled missiles without front sections, in such configuration, of these variants of the SS-24 ICBM, is the distance from the extreme point of the coupling device to the place where the missile joins the front section.

The Parties understand that the 8.7 meter length of the first stage of the SS-24 ICBM for rail-mobile launcher and the 8.8 meter length of the first stage of the SS-24 ICBM for silo launcher, declared for first stages, in such configuration, of these variants of the SS-24 ICBM, is the distance from the extreme point of the coupling device to the extreme point of the forward end dome of the motor case.

The Parties understand that no later than five days after entry into force of this Joint Statement Ukraine will provide texts of footnotes specifying the length declared for the missile and its first stage, in such configurations, of each variant of the SS-24 ICBM in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty. In this connection, the respective numbers of the footnotes will be superscripted after the first mention of the length of the assembled missile without front section and of the length of the first stage of the corresponding variant of this ICBM type in subparagraph (a)(i) of Annex F to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Memorandum of Understanding.

Except as provided below, Ukraine will also provide photographs of the missile and its first stage, in such configurations, of each variant of the SS-24 ICBM, that meet the criteria provided for in paragraph 10 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding, either on the date when this Joint Statement is initialed, or through diplomatic channels no later than 48 hours after the notification specified in the preceding paragraph is provided, or during the first inspection on the territory of Ukraine during which the missile or its first stage, in such configuration, of that variant of the SS-24 ICBM is encountered, unless such photographs have been provided previously. If the missile or its first stage, in such configuration, or a variant of the SS-24 ICBM is first encountered during an inspection on the territory of the Russian Federation, the Russian Federation will, during that inspection, provide a photograph of the missile or its first stage, in such configuration, of that variant of the SS-24 ICBM, as applicable, unless Ukraine has provided a photograph of that variant earlier.

The Parties agree that, during the first inspection at which a missile or its first stage, in such configuration, of each variant of the SS-24 ICBM is encountered, the inspecting Party shall have the right to confirm that the length of such a missile or its first stage corresponds to the length declared for the missile or its first stage, in such configuration, of that variant of the SS-24 ICBM in Annex F to the Memorandum of Understanding, using procedures provided for in Annexes 8 and 11 to the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty applicable to measuring the distance from the extreme point of the coupling device to the place where the missile joins the front section or from the extreme point of the coupling device to the extreme point of the forward end dome of the motor case of the first stage, as applicable.

The inspecting Party shall also have the right during such inspection and subsequent inspections to confirm the type and variant of ICBM by external viewing and by measurement of the dimensions of the missile or first stage, in such configuration, of a variant of the SS-24 ICBM.

[Initialed]
(United States of America)___Steven Steiner
(Republic of Belarus)___Stanislav Ogurtsov
(Republic of Kazahkstan)___Kairtay Zhanbatyrov
(Russian Federation)___Anton Vasil'yev
(Ukraine)___Anatoliy Shevtsov

Geneva, Switzerland
July 29, 1998

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Joint statement number 30

On changes to Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Joint statement number 26

The Parties, referring to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, agree that the first sentence of the second paragraph of Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Joint Statement Number 26 shall be superseded by the following provision:

"The Parties understand that when ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles in launch canisters or without launch canisters are located for the purpose of elimination at conversion or elimination facilities, or when such ICBMs, other than ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, or such SLBMs are located for the purpose of elimination at another declared facility disassembled into stages or in a state in which one or more assemblies or elements constituting the assembled missile without front section have been removed, the type of ICBM or SLBM in such a configuration may be confirmed during data update inspections or new facility inspections by viewing and measuring the dimensions of the first stage of such an ICBM or SLBM using the procedures provided for in paragraph 2 of Annex 1 to the Inspection Protocol."

Geneva, Switzerland
March 3, 1999

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Joint statement number 31

On provision in advance of data on space launch vehicles

The Parties, referring to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, and Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Joint Statement Number 21 on Space Launch Vehicles that Incorporate First Stages of ICBMs or SLBMs, hereinafter referred to as Joint Statement Number 21, understand that the technical data required by Joint Statement Number 21 to be provided in advance regarding ICBMs or SLBMs used to deliver objects into the upper atmosphere or space, including space launch vehicles that incorporate the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM, hereinafter referred to as space launch vehicles, shall include, at a minimum, the following categories of data:

(a) Name or designation of the space launch vehicle;
(b) Type of ICBM or SLBM whose first stage is incorporated into the space launch vehicle;
(c) Total number of stages;
(d) For an upper stage of the space launch vehicle that is an ICBM or SLBM stage, the type and stage of that ICBM or SLBM;
(e) For space launch vehicles not contained in launch canisters, length of assembled space launch vehicle with or without payload fairing;
(f) For space launch vehicles contained in launch canisters, total length of space launch vehicle as a unit with launch canister with or without payload fairing;
(g) For space launch vehicles that are transported in separate launch canister sections, length of launch canister sections;
(h) Length and diameter of launch canister, if applicable;
(i) Description of launcher type/launch method; and
(j) Calculated value, for reference purposes, of the weight of the fully-fueled space launch vehicle without payload.

Notwithstanding the above provisions, technical data in the aforementioned categories shall not be required to be provided unless it differs from the data for that type of ICBM or SLBM already set forth in Annex F to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty.

The Parties understand that, if not provided earlier, the technical data, development plans and photographs or schematic drawings required by Joint Statement 21 shall be provided through diplomatic channels in a format determined by the Party providing such information, with a cover letter signed by a representative of that Party, no later than:

(a) Ten days prior to the first exit of that space launch vehicle from a production facility for ICBMs or SLBMs;
(b) Ten days prior to the first time that space launch vehicle is assembled at a facility other than a production facility, including a space launch facility; or
(c) 30 days after the entry into force of this Joint Statement, whichever is latest.

Geneva, Switzerland
July 28, 1999

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Joint statement number 32

On launchers, support equipment, and launch canisters at space launch facilities declared outside national territory

(a) Each Party shall return to its national territory launchers, support equipment, and launch canisters belonging to it and moved by it to a space launch facility declared outside its national territory prior to the elimination of that space launch facility in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section IX of the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or Elimination of the Items Subject to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Conversion or Elimination Protocol.
(b) The Party which conducted the launch or launches may refurbish and reuse launch canisters that have been returned from such a space launch facility.
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subparagraph (a), each Party may, when necessary, eliminate support equipment and launch canisters belonging to it, and moved by it, to such a space launch facility prior to the elimination of that facility. Support equipment shall be eliminated in situ in the open using procedures at the discretion of the Party which conducted the launch or launches. Launch canisters remaining after the launch or launches that are not returned to the national territory of that Party shall be eliminated in situ in the open using the procedures set forth in paragraph 5 of Section I of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol, except for the process of elimination by explosion. Devices, specified in subparagraphs 2(b), 2(c), and 2(e) of Section I of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol, which are located on or in such launch canisters, may be removed before the elimination process for these launch canisters begins. Such launch canisters shall remain visible to national technical means of verification during the entire elimination process and the remains of such launch canisters shall remain visible to national technical means of verification until removed from such space launch facility for return by the Party to its national territory.
(d) Elimination of support equipment and launch canisters and removal of devices in accordance with subparagraph (c) shall be carried out by the personnel of the Party that conducted the launch or launches.
(e) Prior to the elimination of such a space launch facility, the remains of eliminated support equipment and launch canisters, as well as devices removed from launch canisters in accordance with subparagraph (c), shall be returned to the territory of the Party that conducted the launch or launches.
(f) A Party shall retain ownership and control of each launch canister moved by it to such a space launch facility during its movement to such a space launch facility, as well as each launch canister and the remains of such a launch canister eliminated in situ while they are located at such a space launch facility and during their return to its national territory.

Each Party, in addition to those notifications provided for in paragraph 1 of Section II of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty, will provide the other Parties through diplomatic channels, or through their respective continuous communication centers, no less than five days in advance of the scheduled date of departure from such a space launch facility of launchers, launch canisters, and support equipment, or the remains of such launch canisters and support equipment, the following information: the number and type of items involved; the facility from which the items are to depart; the anticipated date of departure; the mode of transport; for those items subject to the provisions of paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty, the declared facility to which such items are to be transported, and the anticipated date of their arrival at such a facility; and for items that are not subject to the provisions of paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty, the anticipated date of their arrival in the national territory of the Party.

[Initialed]
(United States of America)___Steven Steiner
(Republic of Belarus)___Valentin Rybakov
(Republic of Kazakhstan)___Kairtay Zhanbatyrov
(Russian Federation)___Anton Vasil'yev
(Ukraine)___Aleksey Rybak

Geneva, Switzerland
March 8, 2000

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Joint statement number 33

On heavy bombers and former heavy bombers disabled beyond repair

The Parties, referring to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, understand that, for a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber, the expression "disabled beyond repair" in paragraph 3 of Section VIII of the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or Elimination of the Items Subject to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Conversion or Elimination Protocol, refers to any condition of a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber that, in the judgment of the possessing Party, precludes its repair and prevents it from flying safely to a conversion or elimination facility for its elimination.

The Parties understand that, pursuant to subparagraph 3(b) of Section VIII of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol, a heavy bomber or a former heavy bomber that is declared to be disabled beyond repair remains accountable as a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber until such time as it is eliminated, at the site of disablement or at a conversion or elimination facility, in accordance with the applicable procedures provided for in Section VI of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol, including inspection.

The Parties agree that, when a Party determines that a heavy bomber or a former heavy bomber is disabled beyond repair, the Party shall provide notification thereof in accordance with subparagraph 3(a) of Section VIII of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol prior to notifying the intent to eliminate it at the site of disablement or at a conversion or elimination facility. Such notification shall specify the number of items that are disabled beyond repair at such site or facility.

The Parties agree that, in its notifications of updated data in each of the data categories contained in the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Memorandum of Understanding, a Party shall identify heavy bombers and former heavy bombers declared to be disabled beyond repair by use of an asterisk after the total number of such heavy bombers and former heavy bombers listed and a footnote at the end of the Memorandum of Understanding entry for the facility at which such heavy bombers and former heavy bombers are declared, indicating that such heavy bombers and former heavy bombers have been declared disabled beyond repair. This footnote shall indicate the locations of such heavy bombers and former heavy bombers and where they will be eliminated.

[Initialed]
(United States of America)___Steven Steiner
(Republic of Belarus)___Valentin Rybakov
(Republic of Kazakstan)___Kairtay Zhanbatyrov
(Russian Federation)___Anton Vasil'yev
(Ukraine)___Oleg Semenets

Geneva, Switzerland
December 11, 2000

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Joint statement number 34

On phased elimination of SS-24 ICBMs located in Ukraine

The Parties, referring to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, pursuant to paragraph 1 of Section I of the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or Elimination of the Items Subject to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Conversion or Elimination Protocol,

Have agreed as follows:

1. The elimination of SS-24 ICBMs and their launch canisters may be carried out in two phases. Each such elimination phase shall be carried out at the Pavlograd Conversion or Elimination Facility for ICBMs and shall be subject to inspection.

(a) During the first elimination phase the launch canisters and all missile elements subject to elimination from no less than five and no more than eight missiles, except for the missile stages without nozzles attached, shall be eliminated during a single inspection, unless fewer than five missiles to be eliminated in phases remain.
(b) During the second elimination phase, after the propellant has been removed from the rocket motor cases without nozzles attached, such rocket motor cases from no less than five and no more than eight missiles shall be eliminated during a single inspection, unless rocket motor cases from fewer than five missiles to be eliminated in phases remain.

2. For the phased elimination of the SS-24 ICBMs and their launch canisters, inspectors shall make the observations and measurements necessary to confirm the type and, if applicable, variant of the type, of the missiles to be eliminated, subject to the provisions of this Joint Statement and paragraphs 3 and 6 of Section I of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol.

3. The Annex to this Joint Statement provides a list of the missile elements subject to elimination, and their dimensions to be confirmed during a phased elimination inspection, including the individual lengths of the portions of such missile elements that, when their lengths are added together, constitute the length of the assembled missile without front section, declared in the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Memorandum of Understanding.

4. The inspected Party shall provide information that will enable each missile element subject to elimination to be associated with the missile's unique identifier. Such information for each missile shall be provided prior to the first inspection conducted with respect to the phased elimination of that missile and shall be subject to confirmation by the inspecting Party during conversion or elimination inspections conducted with respect to the phased elimination of that missile.

5. For the first elimination phase:

(a) The inspecting Party, immediately prior to the initiation of the elimination of the missile elements subject to elimination, shall have the right to:

(i) Confirm the number and the type, and if applicable, variant of the type, of the missiles to be eliminated, by external viewing and by measurement, at locations specified by a member of the in-country escort, of the diameter of each stage, and the length of the portions of all such missile elements, that together constitute the length of the assembled missile without front section. Rocket motors of missile stages shall not be required to be located in the immediate vicinity of the missile elements being eliminated during that inspection, but shall be subject to viewing and measuring in the areas in which they are stored.
(ii) Confirm missile elements subject to elimination that do not contribute to the length of the assembled missile without front section individually by external viewing from a location specified by a member of the in-country escort.
(iii) Confirm the association of the missile elements subject to elimination with the unique identifier of the missile to be eliminated.

(b) For rocket motor nozzles, the inspected Party shall have the right prior to the initiation of viewing to cover the nozzles with covers in such a manner that these covers shall not hamper inspectors in the viewing and measuring of the nozzle of the first stage, and that they shall not hamper the viewing of the nozzles of the second and third stages. During the demonstration provided for in paragraph 7 of this Joint Statement, the inspected Party shall demonstrate the placement of such covers to the satisfaction of the inspecting Party.
(c) If inspectors are unable to determine the type of the missile to be eliminated or the missile elements subject to elimination, by viewing and measuring the missile elements, representatives of the inspected Party shall take steps to resolve the problem.

6. For the second phase of elimination:

(a) The inspecting Party, immediately prior to the initiation of the elimination of the rocket motor cases of missile stages without nozzles attached, shall have the right to:

(i) Confirm individually the dimensions of such rocket motor cases by external viewing and by measurement, at locations specified by a member of the in-country escort, of the diameter and of the length that contributes to the length of the assembled missile without front section for the first and second stages and the length and diameter of the rocket motor case of the third stage at its extreme points.
(ii) Confirm the association of such rocket motor cases with the unique identifier of the missile to be eliminated.

(b) If inspectors are unable to identify the rocket motor cases by viewing and measuring them, representatives of the inspected Party shall take steps to resolve the problem.

7. The inspected Party, immediately prior to the initiation of the first inspection conducted with respect to the phased elimination of SS-24 ICBMs, shall conduct a demonstration of all missile elements subject to elimination for each variant of the SS-24 ICBM and its launch canister. During such a demonstration, the inspecting Party shall have the right to confirm that the length of each such missile element corresponds to the length declared for that missile element for that variant of the SS-24 ICBM in the Annex to this Joint Statement, using equipment and procedures provided for in Annexes 8 and 11 to the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Inspection Protocol. The inspecting Party shall also have the right to compare the unique identifiers on the launch canister and the first stage of each such missile.

8. The inspected Party shall provide to the inspecting Party, for each variant of the SS-24 ICBM, photographs of the missile elements subject to elimination, the lengths of which do not contribute to the length of the assembled missile without front section. Such photographs shall meet the criteria provided for in paragraph 10 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding, and shall be provided no later than the beginning of the demonstration conducted in accordance with paragraph 7 of this Joint Statement.

9. The inspecting Party shall have the right to use the data provided in the Annex to this Joint Statement and the photographs of the missile elements subject to elimination for each variant of the SS-24 ICBM provided in accordance with this Joint Statement during conversion or elimination inspections for the purpose of confirming the type of ICBM and the missile elements subject to elimination. The results of each measurement of the dimensions that deviate by no more than three percent from the relevant data provided in the Annex to this Joint Statement shall be considered acceptable.

10. For an inspection conducted in accordance with this Joint Statement, the word "item" in subparagraph 4(c) of Section XI of the Inspection Protocol refers to the missile elements subject to elimination.

11. For an inspection conducted in accordance with this Joint Statement, the provisions of paragraph 1 of Section XVIII of the Inspection Protocol shall apply to the missile elements subject to elimination. The inspection report shall include the number of items subject to inspection which were observed during the inspection period, information that was used to associate the missile elements with the missile's unique identifier, and all measurements taken to confirm the dimensions of the missile elements provided in the Annex to this Joint Statement.

12. The Parties understand that the provisions of paragraph 7 of Section I of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol shall be considered to have been fulfilled and the missile shall cease to be subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty, once all the elements of the missile subject to elimination and its launch canister have been confirmed in accordance with this Joint Statement, the elimination processes for such missile elements and the launch canister in subparagraphs 4(b) and 4(c) and paragraph 5 of Section I of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol have been completed and observed by the inspecting Party, and the inspection report has been completed in accordance with paragraph 6 of Section I of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol for the second phase of the elimination for that missile.

Annex
List of Elements of the SS-24 ICBM and Its Launch Canister Subject to Elimination During Phased Elimination

I. Elements to be eliminated during the first phase of elimination.

(a) Elements that shall be measured for the confirmation of ICBM type:

1. First stage interstage skirt

length (meters) 0.26
diameter (meters) 2.4

2. Second stage interstage skirt

length (meters) 1.61
diameter (meters) 2.4

3. Third stage interstage skirt

length (meters) 3.1
diameter (meters) 2.4

4. Self-contained dispensing mechanism (without propulsion unit)

length (meters) 2.2

5. First stage nozzle

length (meters) 1.06/1.01*

6. Launch canister (upper section)

length (meters) 10.6
diameter (meters) 2.7

7. Launch canister (lower section)

length (meters) 8.3
diameter (meters) 2.7

(b) Elements that shall be viewed externally for the purpose of their identification:

1. Second stage nozzle
2. Third stage nozzle
3. Front section shroud
4. Re-entry vehicle platform
5. Tail section of first stage

II. Elements to be eliminated during the second phase of elimination that shall be measured:

1. First stage rocket motor case without nozzle attached

length (meters) 6.7/6.9*
diameter (meters) 2.4

2. Second stage rocket motor case without nozzle attached

length (meters) 3.9
diameter (meters) 2.4

3. Third stage rocket motor case without nozzle attached

length (meters) 2.4**
diameter (meters) 2.3

* Dimensional measurements of elements of the SS-24 ICBM for rail-mobile launcher.

** Length of the third stage rocket motor case is the distance from the extreme point of the aft end dome of the case to the extreme point of the forward end dome of the case, not counting protruding elements attached to such motor case end domes.

Geneva, Switzerland
July 17, 2001

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Joint statement number 35

On confirming that covert assembly of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs or covert assembly of first stages of such ICBMs is not occurring at facilities subject to suspect-site inspections

The Parties, referring to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, understand that a Party has the right to locate ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs or first stages of such ICBMs within any portion of a facility subject to suspect-site inspections that is within a facility where that Party has the right to locate such ICBMs or first stages of such ICBMs. To assist inspectors in ascertaining that covert assembly of such ICBMs or covert assembly of first stages of such ICBMs is not occurring at such facilities subject to suspect-site inspections, the Parties agree that, in addition to the right to use the procedures set forth in Annex 1 to the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Inspection Protocol, inspectors shall have the right to read and record the data from the unique identifiers on all such ICBMs or first stages of such ICBMs, using the procedures set forth in Annex 6 to the Inspection Protocol, and the right to confirm that items declared to be training models of missiles are training models of missiles.

In order to facilitate the conduct of suspect-site inspections at such facilities, upon arrival of the inspection team at the inspection site, a member of the in-country escort shall inform the inspection team leader of the number and types of such ICBMs and first stages of such ICBMs at the inspection site. At the same time, a member of the in-country escort shall provide the inspection team leader with a copy of the site diagram of the inspection site, annotated to indicate the location at the inspection site of such items and the structures or vehicles in which they are located.

The Parties understand that the location of previously declared ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs or first stages of such ICBMs within any portion of a facility subject to suspect-site inspections that is within a facility where that Party has the right to locate such ICBMs or first stages of such ICBMs is not evidence that covert assembly of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs or covert assembly of first stages of such ICBMs is occurring.

[Initialed]
(United States of America)___Steven Steiner
(Republic of Belarus)___Valeriy Kolesnik
(Republic of Kazakhstan)___Nurlan Danenov
(Russian Federation)___Anton Vasil'yev
(Ukraine)___Anatoliy Shcherba

JCIC Joint Statements ("S" Series)

Geneva, Switzerland
May 8, 1996

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Joint statement number S-1

On changes to the boundary of the Teykovo ICBM base for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs

The Parties, referring to paragraph 20 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, agree on the following:

(1) The new boundary of the Maintenance Facility of the Teykovo ICBM Base for Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs shall be that shown on the site diagram attached to this Joint Statement. |1|
(2) The portions of the Teykovo ICBM Base for Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs to be excluded, pursuant to this Joint Statement, from within the boundary shown on the site diagram of the facility dated March 20, 1995, shall not be subject to inspection unless such portions are included within the boundary of any inspection site. |2|
(3) The change to the boundary of the Teykovo ICBM Base for Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs shall become effective on the date specified in the notification provided by the Russian Federation in accordance with paragraph 19 of Section I of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty, or the date such notification is provided by the Russian Federation, or the date of entry into force of this Joint Statement, whichever is latest.

[Initialed]
(United States of America)___ Steven Steiner
(Republic of Belarus)___ Andrey Sannikov
(Republic of Kazakstan)___ Kairtay Zhanbatyrov
(Russian Federation)___ Viktor Trifonov
(Ukraine)___ Konstantin Hrishchenko

Geneva, Switzerland
June 17, 1997

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Joint statement number S-2

On changes to the boundary of the Ryazan' air base for heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs

The Parties, referring to paragraph 20 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, agree on the following:

(1) The new boundary of the Ryazan' Air Base for Heavy Bombers Equipped for Nuclear Armaments Other than Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs shall be the boundary shown on the site diagram of the facility dated October 2, 1995, which is attached to this Joint Statement. |1|
(2) The portions of the Ryazan' Air Base for Heavy Bombers Equipped for Nuclear Armaments Other than Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs to be excluded, pursuant to this Joint Statement, from within the boundary shown on the site diagram of the facility dated January 5, 1995, shall not be subject to inspection unless such portions are included within the boundary of any inspection site.
(3) The changes to the boundary of the Ryazan' Air Base for Heavy Bombers Equipped for Nuclear Armaments Other than Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs shall become effective on the date specified in the notification provided by the Russian Federation in accordance with paragraph 19 of Section I of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty, or the date such notification is provided by the Russian Federation, or the date of entry into force of this Joint Statement, whichever is latest.

[Initialed]
(United States of America)___ Steven Steiner
(Republic of Belarus)___ Stanislav Ogurtsov
(Republic of Kazakstan)___ Kairtay Zhanbatyrov
(Russian Federation)___ Anton Vasil'yev
(Ukraine)___ Konstantin Hrishchenko

Geneva, Switzerland
June 17, 1997

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Joint statement number S-3

ON CHANGES TO THE BOUNDARY OF THE Sacramento facility subject to suspect-site inspections

The Parties, referring to paragraph 20 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, agree on the following:

(1) The new boundary of the Sacramento facility subject to suspect-site inspections shall be the boundary shown on the site diagram of the facility dated March 1, 1996, which is attached to this Joint Statement. |1|
(2) The portions of the Sacramento facility subject to suspect-site inspections to be excluded, pursuant to this Joint Statement, from within the boundary shown on the site diagram of the facility dated April 1, 1992, shall not be subject to inspection unless such portions are included within the boundary of any inspection site.
(3) The changes to the boundary of the Sacramento facility subject to suspect-site inspections shall become effective on the date specified in the notification provided by the United States of America in accordance with paragraph 19 of Section I of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty, or the date such notification is provided by the United States of America, or the date of entry into force of this Joint Statement, whichever is latest.

[Initialed]
(United States of America)___ Steven Steiner
(Republic of Belarus)___ Stanislav Ogurtsov
(Republic of Kazakstan)___ Kairtay Zhanbatyrov
(Russian Federation)___ Anton Vasil'yev
(Ukraine)___ Konstantin Hrishchenko

Geneva, Switzerland
June 17, 1997

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Joint statement number S-4

On changes to the boundary of the Hill Repair Facility for ICBMs

The Parties, referring to paragraph 20 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, agree on the following:

(1) The new boundary of the Hill Repair Facility for ICBMs shall be the boundaries shown on the site diagrams of the repair facility dated March 1, 1996, Area 2 of the repair facility dated March 1, 1996, and Area 3 of the repair facility dated March 1, 1996, which are attached to this Joint Statement, and the boundary shown on the site diagram of Area 1 of the repair facility, which is unchanged. |1|
(2) The portions of the Hill Repair Facility for ICBMs to be excluded, pursuant to this Joint Statement, from within the boundaries shown on the site diagrams of the facility dated December 6, 1991, Area 2 of the repair facility dated December 6, 1991, and Area 3 of the repair facility dated December 6, 1991, shall not be subject to inspection unless such portions are included within the boundary of any inspection site.
(3) The changes to the boundary of the Hill Repair Facility for ICBMs shall become effective on the date specified in the notification provided by the United States of America in accordance with paragraph 19 of Section I of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty, or the date such notification is provided by the United States of America, or the date of entry into force of this Joint Statement, whichever is latest.

[Initialed]
(United States of America)___ Steven Steiner
(Republic of Belarus)___ Stanislav Ogurtsov
(Republic of Kazakstan)___ Kairtay Zhanbatyrov
(Russian Federation)___ Anton Vasil'yev
(Ukraine)___ Konstantin Hrishchenko

Geneva, Switzerland
June 17, 1997

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Joint statement number S-5

On changes to the boundary of the Malmstrom ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs

The Parties, referring to paragraph 20 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, agree on the following:

(1) The new boundary of the Malmstrom ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs shall be the boundaries shown on the site diagrams of the maintenance facility of the base dated March 1, 1996, and Area 2 of the maintenance facility dated March 1, 1996, which are attached to this Joint Statement, and the boundaries shown on the site diagrams of Area 1, Area 3, and Area 4 of the maintenance facility, which are unchanged. |1|
(2) The portions of the Malmstrom ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs to be excluded, pursuant to this Joint Statement, from within the boundaries shown on the site diagrams of the maintenance facility of the base dated January 1, 1994, and Area 2 of the maintenance facility dated June 30, 1991, shall not be subject to inspection unless such portions are included within the boundary of any inspection site.
(3) The changes to the boundary of the Malmstrom ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs shall become effective on the date specified in the notification provided by the United States of America in accordance with paragraph 19 of Section I of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty, or the date such notification is provided by the United States of America, or the date of entry into force of this Joint Statement, whichever is latest.

[Initialed]
(United States of America)___ Steven Steiner
(Republic of Belarus)___ Stanislav Ogurtsov
(Republic of Kazakstan)___ Kairtay Zhanbatyrov
(Russian Federation)___ Anton Vasil'yev
(Ukraine)___ Konstantin Hrishchenko

Geneva, Switzerland
June 17, 1997

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Joint statement number S-6

On changes to the boundary of the Oasis Conversion or Elimination Facility

The Parties, referring to paragraph 20 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, agree on the following:

(1) The new boundary of the Oasis Conversion or Elimination Facility shall be the boundaries shown on the site diagrams of the conversion or elimination facility dated March 1, 1996, Area 2 of the conversion or elimination facility dated March 1, 1996, Area 3 of the conversion or elimination facility dated March 1, 1996, and Area 4 of the conversion or elimination facility dated March 1, 1996, which are attached to this Joint Statement, and the boundary shown on the site diagram of Area 1 of the conversion or elimination facility, which is unchanged. |1|
(2) The portions of the Oasis Conversion or Elimination Facility to be excluded, pursuant to this Joint Statement, from within the boundaries shown on the site diagrams of the conversion or elimination facility dated April 30, 1995, Area 2 of the conversion or elimination facility dated April 30, 1995, and Area 3 of the conversion or elimination facility dated April 30, 1995, shall not be subject to inspection unless such portions are included within the boundary of any inspection site.
(3) The changes to the boundary of the Oasis Conversion or Elimination Facility shall become effective on the date specified in the notification provided by the United States of America in accordance with paragraph 19 of Section I of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty, or the date such notification is provided by the United States of America, or the date of entry into force of this Joint Statement, whichever is latest.

[Initialed]
(United States of America)___ Steven Steiner
(Republic of Belarus)___ Stanislav Ogurtsov
(Republic of Kazakstan)___ Kairtay Zhanbatyrov
(Russian Federation)___ Anton Vasil'yev
(Ukraine)___ Konstantin Hrishchenko

Geneva, Switzerland
June 17, 1997

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Joint statement number S-7

On changes to the boundary of the Grand Forks ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs

The Parties, referring to paragraph 20 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, agree on the following:

(1) The new boundary of the Grand Forks ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs shall be the boundaries shown on the site diagrams of the maintenance facility of the base dated March 1, 1996, and Area 4 of the maintenance facility dated March 1, 1996, which are attached to this Joint Statement, and the boundaries shown on the site diagrams of Area 1, Area 2, and Area 3 of the maintenance facility, which are unchanged. |1|
(2) The portions of the Grand Forks ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs to be excluded, pursuant to this Joint Statement, from within the boundaries shown on the site diagrams of the maintenance facility of the base dated January 1, 1994, and Area 4 of the maintenance facility dated June 30, 1991, shall not be subject to inspection unless such portions are included within the boundary of any inspection site.
(3) The changes to the boundary of the Grand Forks ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs shall become effective on the date specified in the notification provided by the United States of America in accordance with paragraph 19 of Section I of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty, or the date such notification is provided by the United States of America, or the date of entry into force of this Joint Statement, whichever is latest.

[Initialed]
(United States of America)___ Steven Steiner
(Republic of Belarus)___ Stanislav Ogurtsov
(Republic of Kazakstan)___ Kairtay Zhanbatyrov
(Russian Federation)___ Anton Vasil'yev
(Ukraine)___ Konstantin Hrishchenko

Geneva, Switzerland
June 17, 1997

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Joint statement number S-8

on changes to the boundary of the Ellsworth ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs

The Parties, referring to paragraph 20 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, agree on the following:

(1) The new boundary of the Ellsworth ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs shall be the boundaries shown on the site diagrams of the maintenance facility of the base dated March 1, 1996, Area 1 of the maintenance facility dated March 1, 1996, Area 2 of the maintenance facility dated March 1, 1996, and Area 4 of the maintenance facility dated March 1, 1996, which are attached to this Joint Statement, and the boundary shown on the site diagram of Area 3 of the maintenance facility, which is unchanged. |1|
(2) The portions of the Ellsworth ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs to be excluded, pursuant to this Joint Statement, from within the boundaries shown on the site diagrams of the maintenance facility of the base dated January 1, 1994, Area 1 of the maintenance facility dated June 30, 1991, Area 2 of the maintenance facility dated January 1, 1994, and Area 4 of the maintenance facility dated June 30, 1991, shall not be subject to inspection unless such portions are included within the boundary of any inspection site.
(3) The changes to the boundary of the Ellsworth ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs shall become effective on the date specified in the notification provided by the United States of America in accordance with paragraph 19 of Section I of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty, or the date such notification is provided by the United States of America, or the date of entry into force of this Joint Statement, whichever is latest.

[Initialed]
(United States of America)___ Steven Steiner
(Republic of Belarus)___ Stanislav Ogurtsov
(Republic of Kazakstan)___ Kairtay Zhanbatyrov
(Russian Federation)___ Anton Vasil'yev
(Ukraine)___ Konstantin Hrishchenko

Geneva, Switzerland
June 17, 1997

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Joint statement number S-9

On changes to the boundary of the Pavlograd facility subject to suspect-site inspections

The Parties, referring to paragraph 19 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, taking into account the information with respect to the Pavlograd facility subject to suspect-site inspections provided in Annex A to this Joint Statement, agree on the following:

(1) The new boundary of the Pavlograd facility subject to suspect-site inspections shall be the boundary shown on the site diagram of the Pavlograd facility subject to suspect-site inspections dated July 31, 1996, which is attached as Annex B to this Joint Statement. |1|
(2) The portions of the Pavlograd facility subject to suspect-site inspections to be excluded, pursuant to this Joint Statement, from within the boundary shown on the existing site diagram of the facility dated January 25, 1996, shall not be subject to inspection unless such portions are included within the boundary of any inspection site.
(3) The changes to the boundary of the Pavlograd facility subject to suspect-site inspections shall become effective on the date specified in the notification provided by the Ukraine in accordance with paragraph 19 of Section I of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty, or the date such notification is provided by Ukraine, or the date of entry into force of this Joint Statement, whichever is latest.

[Initialed]
(United States of America)___ Steven Steiner
(Republic of Belarus)___ Stanislav Ogurtsov
(Republic of Kazakstan)___ Kairtay Zhanbatyrov
(Russian Federation)___ Anton Vasil'yev
(Ukraine)___ Konstantin Hrishchenko

Annex A
Information provided by Ukraine on changes to the boundary of the Pavlograd facility subject to suspect-site inspections

Ukraine:

(1) pursuant to subparagraph 19(a) of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Memorandum of Understanding, declares that the requirements set forth in the first sentence of paragraph 2 of Section IX of the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or Elimination of the Items Subject to the Treaty have been met with respect to the portions of the Pavlograd facility subject to suspect-site inspections to be excluded from within the boundary shown on the existing site diagram of the facility;

(2) pursuant to subparagraph 19(b) of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding, states that all structures that were ever shown within the boundary shown on the existing site diagram of the Pavlograd facility subject to suspect-site inspections, dated January 25, 1996, pursuant to subparagraph 9(b)(iii) or 9(b) (iv) of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding and that will be excluded from within the boundary of this facility pursuant to this Joint Statement, shall remain part of the Pavlograd Conversion or Elimination Facility declared as of April 19, 1996, and shall be subject to all applicable inspections conducted at the Pavlograd Conversion or Elimination Facility.

Geneva, Switzerland
June 17, 1997

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Joint statement number S-10

On changes to the boundary of the Pavlograd Conversion or Elimination Facility

The Parties, referring to paragraph 20 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, agree on the following:

(1) The new boundary of the Pavlograd Conversion or Elimination Facility shall be the boundaries shown on the site diagrams of the facility dated July 31, 1996, Area 1 of the facility dated July 31, 1996, Area 2 of the facility dated July 31, 1996, and Area 3 of the facility dated July 31, 1996, which are attached to this Joint Statement. |1|
(2) The portions of the Pavlograd Conversion or Elimination Facility to be excluded, pursuant to this Joint Statement, from within the boundaries shown on the site diagrams of the facility dated March 4, 1996, Area 1 of the facility dated March 4, 1996, Area 2 of the facility dated March 4, 1996, and Area 3 of the facility dated March 4, 1996, shall not be subject to inspection unless such portions are included within the boundary of any inspection site.
(3) The changes to the boundary of the Pavlograd Conversion or Elimination Facility shall become effective on the date specified in the notification provided by Ukraine in accordance with paragraph 19 of Section I of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty, or the date such notification is provided by Ukraine, or the date of entry into force of this Joint Statement, whichever is latest.

Geneva, Switzerland
June 17, 1997

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Joint statement number S-11

On changes to the boundary of the F.E. Warren ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs

The Parties, referring to paragraph 19 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, taking into account the information with respect to the F.E. Warren ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs provided in Annex A to this Joint Statement, agree on the following:

(1) Area 4 of the maintenance facility shall be excluded from within the boundaries of the maintenance facility of the base, and the site diagram of Area 4 of the maintenance facility dated May 17, 1995, shall be canceled. Area 5 of the maintenance facility and the existing site diagram of Area 5 of the maintenance facility dated December 4, 1994, shall be redesignated as Area 4 of the maintenance facility and the site diagram of Area 4 of the maintenance facility, respectively.
(2) The new boundary of the F.E. Warren ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs shall be the boundaries shown on the site diagrams of the maintenance facility of the base dated March 1, 1996, and Area 4 of the maintenance facility dated March 1, 1996, which are attached as Annex B to this Joint Statement, and the boundaries shown on the site diagrams of Area 1, Area 2, and Area 3 of the maintenance facility, which are unchanged. |1|
(3) The portions of the F.E. Warren ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs to be excluded, pursuant to this Joint Statement, from within the boundaries shown on the existing site diagrams of the maintenance facility of the base dated December 4, 1994, and Area 4 of the maintenance facility dated May 17, 1995, shall not be subject to inspection unless such portions are included within the boundary of any inspection site.
(4) The changes to the boundary of the F.E. Warren ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs shall become effective on the date specified in the notification provided by the United States of America in accordance with paragraph 19 of Section I of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty, or the date such notification is provided by the United States of America, or the date of entry into force of this Joint Statement, whichever is latest.

Annex A
Information provided by the United States of America on changes to the boundary of the F.E. Warren ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs

The United States of America:

(1) pursuant to subparagraph 19(a) of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Memorandum of Understanding, declares that the requirements set forth in the first sentence of paragraph 2 of Section IX of the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or Elimination of the Items Subject to the Treaty have been met with respect to the portions of the F.E. Warren ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs to be excluded from within the boundary shown on the existing site diagram of the facility;
(2) pursuant to subparagraph 19(b) of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding, states that all structures that were ever shown within the boundaries shown on the existing site diagrams of the maintenance facility of the base dated December 4, 1994, and Area 4 of the maintenance facility dated May 17, 1995, pursuant to subparagraph 9(b)(iii) or 9(b) (iv) of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding and that will be excluded from within the boundary of this facility pursuant to this Joint Statement, have been destroyed as of March 1, 1996.

Geneva, Switzerland
June 17, 1997

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Joint statement number S-12

On changes to the boundary of the Vandenberg test range

The Parties, referring to paragraph 19 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, taking into account the information with respect to the Vandenberg Test Range provided in Annex A to this Joint Statement, agree on the following:

(1) Area 4 of the test range shall be excluded from within the boundaries of the test range, and the site diagram of Area 4 of the test range dated January 1, 1994, shall be used only for the inspections provided for in paragraph 4 of this Joint Statement. Area 13 of the test range and the existing site diagram of Area 13 of the test range dated January 1, 1994, shall be redesignated as Area 4 of the test range and the site diagram of Area 4 of the test range, respectively.
(2) Area 12 of the test range shall be excluded from within the boundaries of the test range, and the site diagram of Area 12 of the test range dated January 1, 1994, shall be used only for the inspections provided for in paragraph 4 of this Joint Statement. Area 14 of the test range and the existing site diagram of Area 14 of the test range dated January 1, 1994, shall be redesignated as Area 12 of the test range and the site diagram of Area 12 of the test range, respectively.
(3) The new boundary of the Vandenberg Test Range shall be the boundaries shown on the site diagrams of the test range dated March 1, 1996, Area 4 of the test range dated March 1, 1996, Area 8 of the test range dated March 1, 1996, and Area 12 of the test range dated March 1, 1996, which are attached as Annex B to this Joint Statement, and the boundaries shown on the site diagrams of Area 1, Area 2, Area 3, Area 5, Area 6, Area 7, Area 9, Area 10, and Area 11 of the test range, which are unchanged. |1|
(4) The portions of the Vandenberg Test Range to be excluded, pursuant to this Joint Statement, from within the boundaries shown on the existing site diagrams of the test range dated January 1, 1994, Area 4 of the test range dated January 1, 1994, Area 8 of the test range dated January 1, 1994, and Area 12 of the test range dated January 1, 1994, shall be subject to inspection using the procedures of Section XII of the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Inspection Protocol. Any such inspection shall be conducted within 60 days after the date this change of boundary becomes effective. Such portions shall also be subject to inspection using the procedures of Section XIII of the Inspection Protocol beginning after an inspection has been conducted using the procedures of Section XII of the Inspection Protocol or, if such an inspection was not conducted, beginning 60 days after the date this change of boundary becomes effective.
(5) The changes to the boundary of the Vandenberg Test Range shall become effective on the date specified in the notification provided by the United States of America in accordance with paragraph 19 of Section I of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty, or the date such notification is provided by the United States of America, or the date of entry into force of this Joint Statement, whichever is latest.

Annex A
Information provided by the United States of America on changes to the boundary of the Vandenberg test range

The United States of America:

(1) pursuant to subparagraph 19(a) of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Memorandum of Understanding, declares that the requirements set forth in the first sentence of paragraph 2 of Section IX of the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or Elimination of the Items Subject to the Treaty have been met with respect to the portions of the Vandenberg Test Range to be excluded from within the boundary shown on the existing site diagram of the facility;
(2) pursuant to subparagraph 19(b) of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding, states that all structures that were ever shown within the boundaries shown on the existing site diagrams of the test range dated January 1, 1994, Area 4 of the test range dated January 1, 1994, and Area 12 of the test range dated January 1, 1994, pursuant to subparagraph 9(b)(iii) or 9(b)(iv) of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding and that will be excluded from within the boundary of this facility pursuant to this Joint Statement, are unchanged but will no longer be used for items of inspection as of March 1, 1996.

Geneva, Switzerland
November 12, 1997

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Joint statement number S-13

On changes to the boundary of the Silverdale submarine base

The Parties, referring to paragraph 20 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, agree on the following:

(1) The new boundary of the Silverdale Submarine Base shall be the boundaries shown on map A of the site diagram of the facility dated March 1, 1997, map B of the site diagram of the facility dated March 1, 1997, and map C of the site diagram of the facility dated March 1, 1997, which are attached to this Joint Statement. |1|
(2) The portions of the Silverdale Submarine Base to be excluded, pursuant to this Joint Statement, from within the boundaries shown on map A of the site diagram of the facility dated June 30, 1991, map B of the site diagram of the facility dated June 30, 1991, and map C of the site diagram of the facility dated June 30, 1991, shall not be subject to inspection unless such portions are included within the boundary of any inspection site.
(3) The changes to the boundary of the Silverdale Submarine Base shall become effective on the date specified in the notification provided by the United States of America in accordance with paragraph 19 of Section I of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty, or the date such notification is provided by the United States of America, or the date of entry into force of this Joint Statement, whichever is latest.

[Initialed]
(United States of America)_Steven Steiner
(Republic of Belarus)___ Stanislav Ogurtsov
(Republic of Kazakhstan) |2| ___ Kairtay Zhanbatyrov
(Russian Federation)___ Anton Vasil'yev
(Ukraine)___ Konstantin Hrishchenko

Geneva, Switzerland
November 12, 1997

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Joint statement number S-14

On changes to the boundary of the Charleston storage facility for SLBMs

The Parties, referring to paragraph 20 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, agree on the following:

(1) The new boundary of the Charleston Storage Facility for SLBMs shall be the boundaries shown on map A of the site diagram of the facility dated March 1, 1997, map B of the site diagram of the facility dated March 1, 1997, and map C of the site diagram of the facility dated March 1, 1997, which are attached to this Joint Statement. |1|
(2) The portions of the Charleston Storage Facility for SLBMs to be excluded, pursuant to this Joint Statement, from within the boundaries shown on map A of the site diagram of the facility dated December 5, 1994, map B of the site diagram of the facility dated December 5, 1994, and map C of the site diagram of the facility dated December 5, 1994, shall not be subject to inspection unless such portions are included within the boundary of any inspection site.
(3) The changes to the boundary of the Charleston Storage Facility for SLBMs shall become effective on the date specified in the notification provided by the United States of America in accordance with paragraph 19 of Section I of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty, or the date such notification is provided by the United States of America, or the date of entry into force of this Joint Statement, whichever is latest.

[Initialed]
(United States of America)___ Steven Steiner
(Republic of Belarus)___ Stanislav Ogurtsov
(Republic of Kazakhstan)___ Kairtay Zhanbatyrov
(Russian Federation)___ Anton Vasil'yev
(Ukraine)___ Konstantin Hrishchenko

Geneva, Switzerland
March 17, 1998

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Joint statement number S-15

On changes to the boundary of the Perm' training facility

The Parties, referring to paragraph 20 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, agree on the following:

(1) Area 3 of the training facility shall be excluded from within the boundaries of the training facility and the site diagram of Area 3 of the training facility dated September 1, 1990, shall be used only for the inspection provided for in paragraph 5 of this Joint Statement. Area 1 of the training facility and the existing site diagram of Area 1 of the training facility dated September 1, 1990, shall be redesignated as Area 3 of the training facility and the site diagram of Area 3 of the training facility, respectively.
(2) Area 2 of the training facility and the existing site diagram of Area 2 of the training facility dated September 1, 1990, shall be redesignated as Area 1 of the training facility and the site diagram of Area 1 of the training facility, respectively.
(3) The site diagram of the unnumbered area (the boundary of which is indicated by a dashed line on the site diagram) of the training facility dated September 1, 1990, shall be used only for the inspection provided for in paragraph 5 of this Joint Statement. The unnumbered area (the boundary of which is indicated by a dashed line on the site diagram) of the training facility and the existing site diagram of the unnumbered area (the boundary of which is indicated by a dashed line on the site diagram) of the training facility dated September 1, 1990, shall be redesignated as Area 2 of the training facility and the site diagram of Area 2 of the training facility, respectively.
(4) The new boundary of the Perm' Training Facility shall be the boundaries shown on the site diagrams of the training facility dated October 15, 1997, Area 1 of the training facility dated October 15, 1997, Area 2 of the training facility dated October 15, 1997, and Area 3 of the training facility dated October 15, 1997, which are attached to this Joint Statement. |1|
(5) The portions of the Perm' Training Facility to be excluded, pursuant to this Joint Statement, from within the boundaries shown on the existing site diagrams of the training facility dated September 1, 1990, Area 2 of the training facility dated September 1, 1990, Area 3 of the training facility dated September 1, 1990, and the unnumbered area (the boundary of which is indicated by a dashed line on the site diagram) of the training facility dated September 1, 1990, shall be subject to inspection using the procedures of Section XII of the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty. The inspecting Party shall have the right to conduct such an inspection during the first data update inspection at the Perm' Training Facility after the date this change of boundary becomes effective.
(6) The changes to the boundary of the Perm' Training Facility shall become effective on the date specified in the notification provided by the Russian Federation in accordance with paragraph 19 of Section I of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty, or the date such notification is provided by the Russian Federation, or the date of entry into force of this Joint Statement, whichever is latest.

Geneva, Switzerland
March 17, 1998

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Joint statement number S-16

on changes to the boundary of the Priluki air base for heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs

The Parties, referring to paragraph 20 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, agree on the following:

(1) The new boundary of the Priluki Air Base for Heavy Bombers Equipped for Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs shall be the boundary shown on the site diagram of the facility dated January 20, 1998, which is attached to this Joint Statement. |1|
(2) The portions of the Priluki Air Base for Heavy Bombers Equipped for Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs to be excluded, pursuant to this Joint Statement, from within the boundary shown on the site diagram of the facility dated September 1, 1990, shall not be subject to inspection unless such portions are included within the boundary of any inspection site.
(3) The changes to the boundary of the Priluki Air Base for Heavy Bombers Equipped for Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs shall become effective on the date specified in the notification provided by Ukraine in accordance with paragraph 19 of Section I of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty, or the date such notification is provided by Ukraine, or the date of entry into force of this Joint Statement, whichever is latest.

Geneva, Switzerland
March 8, 2000

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Joint statement number S-17

On changes to the boundary of the Strategic Weapons Facility Pacific, Silverdale, Washington

The Parties, referring to paragraph 20 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, agree on the following:

(1) The new boundary of the Strategic Weapons Facility Pacific, Silverdale, Washington shall be the boundaries shown on map A of the site diagram of the facility dated March 8, 2000 and map B of the site diagram of the facility dated March 8, 2000, which are attached to this Joint Statement. |1|
(2) The portions of the Strategic Weapons Facility Pacific, Silverdale, Washington to be excluded, pursuant to this Joint Statement, from within the boundaries shown on map A of the site diagram of the facility dated March 1, 1997 and map B of the site diagram of the facility dated March 1, 1997, shall not be subject to inspection unless such portions are included within the boundary of any inspection site.
(3) The changes to the boundary of the Strategic Weapons Facility Pacific, Silverdale, Washington shall become effective after entry into force of this Joint Statement on the date the notification is provided by the United States of America in accordance with paragraph 19 of Section I of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty.
(4) This Joint Statement shall enter into force 30 days after the completion by the observation team of the Parties of the one-time observation visit to the structures located within the portion of the facility to be excluded pursuant to this Joint Statement. However, this Joint Statement shall not enter into force if any Party raises, through diplomatic channels, questions that address the presence, within the aforementioned structures, of one or more items of inspection as defined in subparagraph 20(a) of Section VI of the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty or objects large enough to contain such items of inspection, from the written factual report completed upon the conclusion of the visit and that were not resolved on-site during that visit. In the event the Parties choose not to conduct the visit, this Joint Statement shall enter into force 130 days after the date of its signature.

[Initialed]
(United States of America)___Steven Steiner
(Republic of Belarus)___ Valentin Rybakov
(Republic of Kazakhstan)___ Kairtay Zhanbatyrov
(Russian Federation)___ Anton Vasil'yev
(Ukraine)___ Oleg Semenets

Geneva, Switzerland
July 17, 2001

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Joint statement number S-18

On changes to the boundary of the McConnell air base for heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs

The Parties, referring to paragraph 20 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, agree on the following:

(1) The new boundary of the McConnell Air Base for Heavy Bombers Equipped for Nuclear Armaments Other than Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs shall be the boundary shown on the site diagram of the facility dated December 24, 1999, which is attached to this Joint Statement. |1|
(2) The portions of the McConnell Air Base for Heavy Bombers Equipped for Nuclear Armaments Other than Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs to be excluded, pursuant to this Joint Statement, from within the boundary shown on the site diagram of the facility dated August 25, 1998, shall not be subject to inspection unless such portions are included within the boundary of any inspection site.
(3) The changes to the boundary of the McConnell Air Base for Heavy Bombers Equipped for Nuclear Armaments Other than Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs shall become effective on the date specified in the notification provided by the United States of America in accordance with paragraph 19 of Section I of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty, or the date such notification is provided by the United States of America, or the date of entry into force of this Joint Statement, whichever is latest.

[Initialed]
(United States of America)___ Steven Steiner
(Republic of Belarus)___ Valeriy Kolesnik
(Republic of Kazakhstan)___ Nurlan Danenov
(Russian Federation)___ Anton Vasil'yev
(Ukraine)___ Anatoliy Shcherba

Geneva, Switzerland
July 17, 2001

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Joint statement number S-19

On changes to the boundary of the Minot ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs

The Parties, referring to paragraph 20 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, agree on the following:

(1) The new boundary of the Minot ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs shall be the boundary shown on the site diagram of the maintenance facility of the base dated February 24, 2000, which is attached to this Joint Statement. |1|
(2) The portions of the Minot ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs to be excluded, pursuant to this Joint Statement, from within the boundary shown on the site diagram of the maintenance facility of the base dated December 1, 1996, shall not be subject to inspection unless such portions are included within the boundary of any inspection site.
(3) The changes to the boundary of the Minot ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs shall become effective on the date specified in the notification provided by the United States of America in accordance with paragraph 19 of Section I of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty, or the date such notification is provided by the United States of America, or the date of entry into force of this Joint Statement, whichever is latest.

[Initialed]
(United States of America)___ Steven Steiner
(Republic of Belarus)___ Valeriy Kolesnik
(Republic of Kazakhstan)___ Nurlan Danenov
(Russian Federation)___ Anton Vasil'yev
(Ukraine)___ Anatoliy Shcherba

JCIC Correspondence

Telemetric playback demonstration

Geneva, Switzerland
November 26, 1991

Mr. Gennadiy Shabannikov
Representative of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the
Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission

Dear Mr. Representative:

On behalf of the United States of America, I have the honor to accept your proposal that an agreement be concluded pursuant to paragraph 4 of Section I and paragraph 3 of Section II of the Protocol on Telemetric Information (hereinafter referred to as the Telemetry Protocol) Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991 (hereinafter referred to as the Treaty). The substantive portion of this agreement follows:

The purpose of this agreement is to:

(a) make it possible to play back the tapes to be provided after entry into force of the Treaty in accordance with the Telemetry Protocol; and
(b) provide confidence that the interpretive data and acceleration profiles to be provided after entry into force of the Treaty will contain all the information necessary to meet the requirements of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Section II of the Telemetry Protocol.

Under this agreement, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, agree to conduct the initial demonstrations, provided for in paragraph 4(a) of Section I and paragraph 3 of Section II of the Telemetry Protocol, in accordance with the following:

1. During the demonstration, the demonstrating Party shall:

(a) Demonstrate each type of tape to be provided to the other Party after entry into force of the Treaty in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section I of the Telemetry Protocol. Each such demonstrated tape shall contain a recording of telemetric information that either:

(i) is broadcast during a flight test of an ICBM or SLBM. Such a recording shall contain: actual telemetric information representative of an entire flight test from launch to impact of the reentry vehicles; or telemetric information containing characteristic features that fully represent all telemetric information that is obtained during an actual flight test from launch to impact of the reentry vehicles; or
(ii) was encapsulated during an actual flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, for an entire encapsulation period.

(b) Describe each type of tape, as well as the recording methods and formats for each type of tape. The demonstrating Party shall also describe the telemetry signal conversion process from reception to recording.
(c) Demonstrate all equipment used to play back telemetric information recorded on tapes. Such equipment shall be demonstrated in operation using all the types of tapes demonstrated in accordance with subparagraph 1(a) of this agreement.
(d) Answer all questions of the observing Party pertaining to its ability to play back the telemetric information recorded on the demonstrated tapes.
(e) Provide an example of interpretive data illustrative of the information necessary to meet the requirements specified in paragraph 3 of Section II of the Telemetry Protocol. Such an example need not be related to the tapes being demonstrated. The demonstrating Party shall have the right to select the specific parameters to be provided pursuant to subparagraph 1(b) of Section II of the Telemetry Protocol.
(f) Provide an example of an acceleration profile illustrative of the information necessary to meet the requirements specified in paragraph 3 of Section II of the Telemetry Protocol. Such an example shall be presented in table form and need not be related to the tapes being demonstrated.

2. Prior to conclusion of the demonstration, the demonstrating Party shall provide all the demonstrated tapes to the observing Party.

3. The demonstration shall be sufficient for the observing Party to fully understand all technical requirements that are necessary for playing back the demonstrated tapes. Ambiguities and unresolved questions in connection with the demonstration shall be considered within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

4. Any demonstrated playback equipment that the observing Party requests, and all technical documentation necessary to play back the tapes using such equipment, shall be provided by the demonstrating Party. The date of delivery and method of payment for such equipment and documentation shall be agreed upon within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission as soon as possible following conclusion of both Parties' demonstrations.

5. The demonstration shall be conducted in accordance with the Telemetry Protocol and the arrangements and procedures used to implement the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Early Exhibitions of Strategic Offensive Arms Relating to the Treaty, including the provisions on inspection reports, non-disclosure of information, and status of inspectors and aircrew members. The following exceptions shall apply:

(a) Both Parties' demonstrations shall be completed as soon as possible following entry into force of this agreement. The dates of such demonstrations shall be agreed upon through diplomatic channels.
(b) The observing Party shall have the right to have no more than 17 observers take part in the demonstration.
(c) The observing Party shall provide the list of its observers no less than three days prior to their arrival in the territory of the demonstrating Party. There shall be no requirement to provide notification of the demonstrating Party's agreement with the designation of each individual on the list.

For the purposes of the demonstration, the Parties shall have the right to agree on additional specific exceptions to the provisions of the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Early Exhibitions of Strategic Offensive Arms Relating to the Treaty.

This reply, together with your letter, shall constitute an agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. This agreement shall enter into force upon the date of this reply and shall terminate upon completion of all activities provided for herein.

Sincerely,

[S]
Ambassador Steven E. Steiner
Representative of the
United States of America
to the Joint Compliance and
Inspection Commission

Telemetric playback demonstration

Geneva, Switzerland
November 26, 1991

Ambassador Steven E. Steiner
Representative of the United States of America
to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

On behalf of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I have the honor to propose an agreement pursuant to paragraph 4 of Section I and paragraph 3 of Section II of the Protocol on Telemetric Information (hereinafter referred to as the Telemetry Protocol) Relating to the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991 (hereinafter referred to as the Treaty). The substantive portion of this proposed agreement follows:

The purpose of this agreement is to:

(a) make it possible to play back the tapes to be provided after entry into force of the Treaty in accordance with the Telemetry Protocol; and
(b) provide confidence that the interpretive data and acceleration profiles to be provided after entry into force of the Treaty will contain all the information necessary to meet the requirements of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Section II of the Telemetry Protocol.

Under this agreement, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, agree to conduct the initial demonstrations, provided for in subparagraph 4(a) of Section I and paragraph 3 of Section II of the Telemetry Protocol, in accordance with the following:

1. During the demonstration, the demonstrating Party shall:

(a) Demonstrate each type of tape to be provided to the other Party after entry into force of the Treaty in accordance with paragraph l of Section I of the Telemetry Protocol. Each such demonstrated tape shall contain a recording of telemetric information that either:

(i) is broadcast during a flight test of an ICBM or SLBM. Such a recording shall contain: actual telemetric information representative of an entire flight test from launch to impact of the reentry vehicles; or telemetric information containing characteristic features that fully represent all telemetric information that is obtained during an actual flight test from launch to impact of the reentry vehicles; or
(ii) was encapsulated during an actual flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, for an entire encapsulation period.

(b) Describe each type of tape, as well as the recording methods and formats for each type of tape. The demonstrating Party shall also describe the telemetry signal conversion process from reception to recording.
(c) Demonstrate all equipment used to play back telemetric information recorded on tapes. Such equipment shall be demonstrated in operation using all the types of tapes demonstrated in accordance with subparagraph 1(a) of this agreement.
(d) Answer all questions of the observing Party pertaining to its ability to play back the telemetric information recorded on the demonstrated tapes.
(e) Provide an example of interpretive data illustrative of the information necessary to meet the requirements specified in paragraph 3 of Section II of the Telemetry Protocol. Such an example need not be related to the tapes being demonstrated. The demonstrating Party shall have the right to select the specific parameters to be provided pursuant to subparagraph 1(b) of Section II of the Telemetry Protocol.
(f) Provide an example of an acceleration profile illustrative of the information necessary to meet the requirements specified in paragraph 3 of Section II of the Telemetry Protocol. Such an example shall be presented in table form and need not be related to the tapes being demonstrated.

2. Prior to conclusion of the demonstration, the demonstrating Party shall provide all the demonstrated tapes to the observing Party.

5. The demonstration shall be conducted in accordance with the Telemetry Protocol and the arrangements and procedures used to implement the Agreement Between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the United States of America on Early Exhibitions of Strategic Offensive Arms Relating to the Treaty, including the provisions on inspection reports, non-disclosure of information, and status of inspectors and aircrew members. The following exceptions shall apply:

(a) Both Parties' demonstrations shall be completed as soon as possible following entry into force of this agreement. The dates of such demonstrations shall be agreed upon through diplomatic channels.
(b) The observing Party shall have the right to have no more than 17 observers take part in the demonstration.
(c) The observing Party shall provide the list of its observers no less than three days prior to their arrival in the territory of the demonstrating Party. There shall be no requirement to provide notification of the demonstrating Party's agreement with the designation of each individual on the list.

For the purposes of the demonstration, the Parties shall have the right to agree on additional specific exceptions to the provisions of the Agreement Between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the United States of America on Early Exhibitions of Strategic Offensive Arms Relating to the Treaty.

If the foregoing is acceptable, this letter, together with your reply, shall constitute an agreement between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America. This agreement shall enter into force on the date of your reply and shall terminate upon completion of all activities provided for herein.

Sincerely,

Gennadiy Shabannikov
Representative of the
Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics to the
Joint Compliance and
Inspection Commission

Letters on corrigenda

Geneva, Switzerland
December 19, 1991

Mr. Gennadiy I. Shabannikov
Representative of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the
Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission

Dear Mr. Representative:

I have the honor to refer to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, signed in Moscow on July 31, 1991.

I have the honor to propose that the corrections set forth in the Corrigenda attached to this letter be made in the texts of the Agreed Statements Annex to the Treaty, the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty, and the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty. I have the further honor to propose that this letter, and your letter in reply accepting the Corrigenda attached to this letter, shall constitute corrections to the texts of the above-mentioned documents.

Sincerely yours,

[s]
Steven E. Steiner
Ambassador

Attachment: As stated.

CORRIGENDA

I. Agreed Statements Annex
To the Treaty
Between the United States of America
And the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
On the Reduction and Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms,
Hereinafter Referred to as
The Agreed Statements Annex

In the Russian of paragraph (b) of the Tenth Agreed Statement in the Agreed Statements Annex, the words "notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 4 of Section VII of the Inspection Protocol" shall be deleted and replaced by the words "Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 5 of Section VII of the Inspection Protocol".

II. Protocol on Inspections
And Continuous Monitoring Activities
Relating to the Treaty
Between the United States of America
And the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
On the Reduction and Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms,
Hereinafter Referred to as
The Inspection Protocol

Subparagraph 23(a)(iii) of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol shall read as follows:

"(iii) for ICBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles in launch canisters or without launch canisters, and for SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles: the diameter and length of an ICBM or SLBM of each type in the shipment configuration that is the shortest configuration specified that holds an assembled ICBM or SLBM of that type without the front section, except for such ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs."

III. The Memorandum of Understanding
On the Establishment of the Data Base
Relating to the Treaty
Between the United States of America
And the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
On the Reduction and Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms,
Hereinafter Referred to as
The Memorandum of Understanding

1. In the English of paragraph (b) of Annex C to the Memorandum of Understanding, under the category of data "Bomber Type and Variant of a Type" for the air base for former heavy bombers at Engel's, the designator "Bison A" in the left column shall be deleted and replaced by the designator "Bison B"; and the designator "Bison B" in the right column shall be deleted and replaced by the designator "Bison A".

2. In the English of paragraph (b) of Annex C to the Memorandum of Understanding, under the repair facility for heavy bombers and former heavy bombers at Ryazan' for the category of data "Types of Heavy Bombers and Former Heavy Bombers Normally Repaired at this Facility", the designator "Bison A" shall be deleted and replaced by the designator "Bison B".

3. In the English and Russian of subparagraph (a)(i) of Annex F to the Memorandum of Understanding, for the category of data "Total Length of Missile as a Unit with Launch Canister Without Front Section³ (meters)" under "SS-24 for Silo Launcher" and "SS-24 for Rail-Mobile Launcher", the numbers "19.4" and "19.6" shall be deleted and replaced by the numbers "20.4" and "20.6", respectively.

4. In the English and Russian of subparagraph (b)(i) of Annex F to the Memorandum of Understanding, for the category of data "Rail-Mobile Launcher of ICBMs* (in Transport Position, Without Missile): Width (meters)" under "PK for Rail-Mobile Launcher", the number "2.8" shall be deleted and replaced by the number "2.9".

5. In the English and Russian of subparagraph (b)(ii) of Annex F to the Memorandum of Understanding, for the category of data "Length of Assembled Missile Without Front Section (meters)" under "Poseidon", "Trident I", and "Trident II", the numbers "10.4", "10.4", and "13.6" shall be deleted and replaced by the numbers "8.1", "10.3", and "13.4", respectively; for the category of data "First Stage Length (meters)" under "Trident II", the number "7.1" shall be deleted and replaced by the number "7.0".

6. In the English of subparagraph (b)(vi)(2) of Annex G to the Memorandum of Understanding, the words "Recognition features of Bison A former heavy bombers" shall be deleted and replaced by the words "Recognition features of Bison¹ former heavy bombers"; the words "Features making it possible to identify Bison A former heavy bomber" shall be deleted and replaced by the words "Features making it possible to identify Bison B former heavy bomber"; under the category of data "External Observable Features", the words "The Bison A former heavy bomber is a modification of the Bison¹ heavy bomber" shall be deleted and replaced by the words "The Bison B former heavy bomber is an airplane converted from the Bison¹ heavy bomber".

7. In the Russian of subparagraph (b)(vi)(2) of Annex G to the Memorandum of Understanding, under the category of data "External Observable Features", the words "The 3MS-2 former heavy bomber is a modification of the 3M¹ heavy bomber" shall be deleted and replaced by the words "The 3MS-2 former heavy bomber is an airplane converted from the 3M¹ heavy bomber".

8. In the English of subparagraph 1(b) of Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding, under the category of data "Heavy Bomber and Former Heavy Bomber Static Displays: Bomber Type", in all four places the designator "Bison B" shall be deleted and replaced by the designator "Bison A".

9. In the English and Russian of paragraph 8 of Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding, under the category of data "Former Heavy Bombers", the designator "Bison A", which corresponds to the designator "3MS-2", shall be deleted and replaced by the designator "Bison B"; and the designator "Bison B", which corresponds to the designator "M-4", shall be deleted and replaced by the designator "Bison A".

10. In the English and Russian of paragraph 3 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding, the words "in accordance with paragraph 7 of Section I of the Notification Protocol" shall be deleted and replaced by the words "in accordance with paragraph 6 of Section I of the Notification Protocol."

Soviet Component
of the Joint Compliance
and Inspection Commission

Geneva, Switzerland
December 19, 1991

Ambassador Steven E. Steiner
Representative of the United States of America
to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your letter of December 18, 1991, in which you refer to the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, signed in Moscow on July 31, 1991.

I have the honor to accept your proposal that the corrections set forth in the Corrigenda attached to this letter be made in the texts of the Agreed Statements Annex to the Treaty, the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty, and the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty. I have the further honor to accept your proposal that this letter, accepting the Corrigenda attached hereto, and your letter shall constitute corrections to the texts of the above-mentioned documents.

Sincerely yours,

Gennadiy I. Shabannikov
Representative of the
Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics to the
Joint Compliance and
Inspection Commission

Attachment: As stated.

CORRIGENDA

I. Agreed Statements Annex
To the Treaty
Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
And the United States of America
On the Reduction and Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms,
Hereinafter Referred to as
The Agreed Statements Annex

In the Russian of paragraph (b) of the Tenth Agreed Statement in the Agreed Statements Annex, the words "Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 4 of Section VII of the Inspection Protocol" shall be deleted and replaced by the words "Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 5 of Section VII of the Inspection Protocol".

II. Protocol on Inspections
And Continuous Monitoring Activities
Relating to the Treaty
Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
And the United States of America
On the Reduction and Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms,
Hereinafter Referred to as
The Inspection Protocol

Subparagraph 23(a)(iii) of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol shall read as follows:

"(iii) for ICBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles in launch canisters or without launch canisters, and for SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles: the diameter and length of an ICBM or SLBM of each type in the shipment configuration that is the shortest configuration specified that holds an assembled ICBM or SLBM of that type without the front section, except for such ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs."

III. The Memorandum of Understanding On the Establishment of the Data Base
Relating to the Treaty
Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
And the United States of America
On the Reduction and Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms,
Hereinafter Referred to as
The Memorandum of Understanding

2. In the English of paragraph (b) of Annex C to the Memorandum of Understanding, under the repair facility for heavy bombers and former heavy bombers at Ryazan, for the category of data "Types of Heavy Bombers and Former Heavy Bombers Normally Repaired at this Facility", the designator "Bison A" shall be deleted and replaced by the designator "Bison B".

3. In the Russian and English of subparagraph (a)(i) of Annex F to the Memorandum of Understanding, for the category of data "Total Length of Missile as a Unit with Launch Canister Without Front Section³ (meters)" under "SS-24 for Silo Launcher" and "SS-24 for Rail-Mobile Launcher", the numbers "19.4" and "19.6" shall be deleted and replaced by the numbers "20.4" and "20.6", respectively.

4. In the Russian and English of subparagraph (b)(i) of Annex F to the Memorandum of Understanding, for the category of data "Rail-Mobile Launcher of ICBMs* (in Transport Position, Without Missile): Width (meters)" under "PK for Rail-Mobile Launcher", the number "2.8" shall be deleted and replaced by the number "2.9".

5. In the Russian and English of subparagraph (b)(ii) of Annex F of the Memorandum of Understanding, for the category of data "Length of Assembled Missile Without Front Section (meters)" under "Poseidon", "Trident I", and "Trident II", the numbers "l0.4", "10.4", and "13.6" shall be deleted and replaced by the numbers "8.1", "10.3", and "13.4", respectively; for the category of data "First Stage Length (meters)" under "Trident II", the number "7.1" shall be deleted and replaced by the number "7.0".

6. In the English of subparagraph (b)(vi)(2) of Annex G to the Memorandum of Understanding, the words "Recognition features of Bison A former heavy bombers" shall be deleted and replaced by the words "Recognition features of Bison B former heavy bombers"; the words "Features making it possible to identify Bison A former heavy bomber" shall be deleted and replaced by the words "Features making it possible to identify Bison B former heavy bomber"; under the category of data "External Observable Features", the words "The Bison A former heavy bomber is a modification of the Bison¹ heavy bomber" shall be deleted and replaced by the words "The Bison B former heavy bomber is an airplane converted from the Bison¹ heavy bomber".

7. In the Russian of subparagraph (b)(vi)(2) of Annex G to the Memorandum of Understanding, under the category of data "External Observable Features", the words "The 3MS-2 former heavy bomber is a modification of the 3M1 heavy bomber" shall be deleted and replaced by the words "The 3MS-2 former heavy bomber is an airplane converted from the 3M1 heavy bomber".

9. In the Russian and English of paragraph 8 of Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding, under the category of data "Former Heavy Bombers", the designator "Bison A", which corresponds to the designator "3MS-2", shall be deleted and replaced by the designator "Bison B"; and the designator "Bison B", which corresponds to the designator "M-4", shall be deleted and replaced by the designator "Bison A".

10. In the Russian and English of paragraph 3 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding, the words "in accordance with paragraph 7 of Section I of the Notification Protocol" shall be deleted and replaced by the words "in accordance with paragraph 6 of Section 1 of the Notification Protocol".

Geneva, Switzerland
February 3, 1995

Statement of policy by the Republic of Belarus concerning inspection activities under the Start Treaty

The Republic of Belarus, in exercising its rights and fulfilling its obligations concerning inspection activities under the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, intends to adhere to the following:

The Republic of Belarus understands that inspections on the territory of the United States of America may be conducted by multiparty inspection teams, with the inclusion in such teams of inspectors from the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine, in a number proportionate to the number of facilities subject to inspection within the territory of each of these states on the date of entry into force of the Treaty.

The Republic of Belarus understands that the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine have the right to carry out inspection activities on the territory of the United States of America during the entire term of the Treaty, with the understanding that:

(a) The Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, for seven years following entry into force of the Treaty, or until completion of the elimination of the strategic offensive arms located on the territory of these States, or until the withdrawal of strategic offensive arms from the territory of these States, whichever is earlier in the case of each of these States, may participate in all inspections on the territory of the United States of America as part of multiparty inspection teams, for which notification is provided by the Russian Federation, and shall each have the right to conduct one inspection each year on the territory of the United States of America, using a multiparty inspection team with the participation of inspectors of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine as the Party that provides notification of the intention to conduct an inspection. In this connection, if during the first nine months of each year, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine do not exercise this right, then the Russian Federation may conduct all the inspections remaining until the end of that year as the Party that provides notification of the intention to conduct an inspection.
(b) The Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, seven years after entry into force of the Treaty, or after completion of the elimination of the strategic offensive arms located on the territory of these States, or after the withdrawal of strategic offensive arms from the territory of these States, whichever is earlier in the case of each of these States, may participate in one inspection each year on the territory of the United States of America as part of a multiparty inspection team, for which notification is provided by the Russian Federation. If the United States of America conducts more than one inspection each year on the territory of one of these States, during the following year that State shall have the right to participate in an additional number of inspections on the territory of the United States of America, for which notification is provided by the Russian Federation, with the understanding that the total number of inspections in which the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, or Ukraine may participate must not exceed the total number of inspections conducted by the United States of America on the territory of that State during the previous year.

The Republic of Belarus understands that the apportionment of personnel among the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine in the lists of inspectors and monitors, the procedures governing the composition and activities of multiparty inspection teams, as well as the procedure for reimbursement of the relevant costs shall be subject to agreement among the Parties to the Treaty.

The Republic of Belarus understands that the United States of America, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine have agreed on statements of policy regarding the reimbursement of costs for inspections conducted by the United States of America on the territories of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine.

[Initialed]
Aleksandr Baichorov

Geneva, Switzerland
February 3, 1995

Statement of policy by the Republic of Kazakhstan concerning inspection activities under the Start Treaty

The Republic of Kazakhstan, in exercising its rights and fulfilling its obligations concerning inspection activities under the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, intends to adhere to the following:

The Republic of Kazakhstan understands that inspections on the territory of the United States of America may be conducted by multiparty inspection teams, with the inclusion in such teams of inspectors from the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine, in a number proportionate to the number of facilities subject to inspection within the territory of each of these states on the date of entry into force of the Treaty.

The Republic of Kazakhstan understands that the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine have the right to carry out inspection activities on the territory of the United States of America during the entire term of the Treaty, with the understanding that:

(a) The Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, for seven years following entry into force of the Treaty, or until completion of the elimination of the strategic offensive arms located on the territory of these States, or until the withdrawal of strategic offensive arms from the territory of these States, whichever is earlier in the case of each of these States, may participate in all inspections on the territory of the United States of America as part of multiparty inspection teams, for which notification is provided by the Russian Federation, and shall each have the right to conduct one inspection each year on the territory of the United States of America, using a multiparty inspection team with the participation of inspectors of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine as the Party that provides notification of the intention to conduct an inspection. In this connection, if during the first nine months of each year, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine do not exercise this right, then the Russian Federation may conduct all the inspections remaining until the end of that year as the Party that provides notification of the intention to conduct an inspection.
(b) The Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, seven years after entry into force of the Treaty, or after completion of the elimination of the strategic offensive arms located on the territory of these States, or after the withdrawal of strategic offensive arms from the territory of these States, whichever is earlier in the case of each of these States, may participate in one inspection each year on the territory of the United States of America as part of a multiparty inspection team, for which notification is provided by the Russian Federation. If the United States of America conducts more than one inspection each year on the territory of one of these States, during the following year that State shall have the right to participate in an additional number of inspections on the territory of the United States of America, for which notification is provided by the Russian Federation, with the understanding that the total number of inspections in which the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, or Ukraine may participate must not exceed the total number of inspections conducted by the United States of America on the territory of that State during the previous year.

The Republic of Kazakhstan understands that the apportionment of personnel among the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine in the lists of inspectors and monitors, the procedures governing the composition and activities of multiparty inspection teams, as well as the procedure for reimbursement of the relevant costs shall be subject to agreement among the Parties to the Treaty.

The Republic of Kazakhstan understands that the United States of America, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine have agreed on statements of policy regarding the reimbursement of costs for inspections conducted by the United States of America on the territories of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine.

[Initialed]
Kairtay Zhabatyrov

Geneva, Switzerland
February 3, 1995

Statement of policy by the Russian Federation concerning inspection activities under the Start Treaty

The Russian Federation, in exercising its rights and fulfilling its obligations concerning inspection activities under the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, intends to adhere to the following:

The Russian Federation understands that inspections on the territory of the United States of America may be conducted by multiparty inspection teams, with the inclusion in such teams of inspectors from the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine, in a number proportionate to the number of facilities subject to inspection within the territory of each of these states on the date of entry into force of the Treaty.

The Russian Federation understands that the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine have the right to carry out inspection activities on the territory of the United States of America during the entire term of the Treaty, with the understanding that:

(a) The Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, for seven years following entry into force of the Treaty, or until completion of the elimination of the strategic offensive arms located on the territory of these States, or until the withdrawal of strategic offensive arms from the territory of these States, whichever is earlier in the case of each of these States, may participate in all inspections on the territory of the United States of America as part of multiparty inspection teams, for which notification is provided by the Russian Federation, and shall each have the right to conduct one inspection each year on the territory of the United States of America, using a multiparty inspection team with the participation of inspectors of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine as the Party that provides notification of the intention to conduct an inspection. In this connection, if during the first nine months of each year, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine do not exercise this right, then the Russian Federation may conduct all the inspections remaining until the end of that year as the Party that provides notification of the intention to conduct an inspection.
(b) The Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, seven years after entry into force of the Treaty, or after completion of the elimination of the strategic offensive arms located on the territory of these States, or after the withdrawal of strategic offensive arms from the territory of these States, whichever is earlier in the case of each of these States, may participate in one inspection each year on the territory of the United States of America as part of a multiparty inspection team, for which notification is provided by the Russian Federation. If the United States of America conducts more than one inspection each year on the territory of one of these States, during the following year that State shall have the right to participate in an additional number of inspections on the territory of the United States of America, for which notification is provided by the Russian Federation, with the understanding that the total number of inspections in which the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, or Ukraine may participate must not exceed the total number of inspections conducted by the United States of America on the territory of that State during the previous year.

The Russian Federation understands that the apportionment of personnel among the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine in the lists of inspectors and monitors, the procedures governing the composition and activities of multiparty inspection teams, as well as the procedure for reimbursement of the relevant costs shall be subject to agreement among the Parties to the Treaty.

[Initialed]
Mikhail Strel'tsov

Geneva, Switzerland
February 3, 1995

Statement of policy by Ukraine concerning inspection activities under the Start Treaty

Ukraine, in exercising its rights and fulfilling its obligations concerning inspection activities under the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, intends to adhere to the following:

Ukraine understands that inspections on the territory of the United States of America may be conducted by multiparty inspection teams, with the inclusion in such teams of inspectors from the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine, in a number proportionate to the number of facilities subject to inspection within the territory of each of these states on the date of entry into force of the Treaty.

Ukraine understands that the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine have the right to carry out inspection activities on the territory of the United States of America during the entire term of the Treaty, with the understanding that:

(a) The Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, for seven years following entry into force of the Treaty, or until completion of the elimination of the strategic offensive arms located on the territory of these States, or until the withdrawal of strategic offensive arms from the territory of these States, whichever is earlier in the case of each of these States, may participate in all inspections on the territory of the United States of America as part of multiparty inspection teams, for which notification is provided by the Russian Federation, and shall each have the right to conduct one inspection each year on the territory of the United States of America, using a multiparty inspection team with the participation of inspectors of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine as the Party that provides notification of the intention to conduct an inspection. In this connection, if during the first nine months of each year, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine do not exercise this right, then the Russian Federation may conduct all the inspections remaining until the end of that year as the Party that provides notification of the intention to conduct an inspection.
(b) The Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, seven years after entry into force of the Treaty, or after completion of the elimination of the strategic offensive arms located on the territory of these States, or after the withdrawal of strategic offensive arms from the territory of these States, whichever is earlier in the case of each of these States, may participate in one inspection each year on the territory of the United States of America as part of a multiparty inspection team, for which notification is provided by the Russian Federation. If the United States of America conducts more than one inspection each year on the territory of one of these States, during the following year that State shall have the right to participate in an additional number of inspections on the territory of the United States of America, for which notification is provided by the Russian Federation, with the understanding that the total number of inspections in which the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine may participate must not exceed the total number of inspections conducted by the United States of America on the territory of that State during the previous year.

Ukraine understands that the apportionment of personnel among the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine in the lists of inspectors and monitors, the procedures governing the composition and activities of multiparty inspection teams, as well as the procedure for reimbursement of the relevant costs shall be subject to agreement among the Parties to the Treaty.

Ukraine understands that the United States of America, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine have agreed on statements of policy regarding the reimbursement of costs for inspections conducted by the United States of America on the territories of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine.

[Initialed]
Anatoliy Shevtsov

Geneva, Switzerland
February 3, 1995

Statement of policy by the United States of America concerning inspection activities under the Start Treaty

The United States of America, in exercising its rights and fulfilling its obligations concerning inspection activities under the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, intends to adhere to the following:

The United States of America understands that inspections on the territory of the United States of America may be conducted by multiparty inspection teams, with the inclusion in such teams of inspectors from the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine, in a number proportionate to the number of facilities subject to inspection within the territory of each of these States on the date of entry into force of the Treaty.

The United States of America understands that, for the duration of the Treaty, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine each has the right to conduct inspections on the territory of the United States of America with the understanding having been reached among these Parties that:

(a) The Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, for seven years following entry into force of the Treaty, or until completion of the elimination of strategic offensive arms located on the territory of these States, or until the withdrawal of strategic offensive arms from the territory of these States, whichever is earlier in the case of each of these States, may participate in all inspections on the territory of the United States of America as part of multiparty inspection teams, for which notification is provided by the Russian Federation, and shall each have the right to conduct one inspection each year on the territory of the United States of America using a multiparty inspection team with the participation of inspectors of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine as the Party that provides notification of the intention to conduct an inspection. In this connection, if during the first nine months of each year, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine do not exercise this right, then the Russian Federation may conduct all the inspections remaining until the end of that year as the Party that provides notification of the intention to conduct an inspection.
(b) The Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, seven years after entry into force of the Treaty, or after completion of the elimination of the strategic offensive arms located on the territory of these States, or after strategic offensive arms have been removed from the territory of these States, whichever is earlier in the case of each of these States, may participate in one inspection each year on the territory of the United States of America as part of a multiparty inspection team, for which notification is provided by the Russian Federation. If the United States of America conducts more than one inspection each year on the territory of one of these States, during the following year that State shall have the right to participate in an additional number of inspections on the territory of the United States of America, for which notification is provided by the Russian Federation, with the understanding that the total number of inspections in which the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, or Ukraine may participate must not exceed the total number of inspections conducted by the United States of America on the territory of that State during the previous year.

The United States of America understands that the apportionment of personnel between the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine in the lists of inspectors and monitors, the composition and activities of multiparty inspection teams, as well as the procedure for reimbursement of the relevant costs shall be subject to agreement among the Parties to the Treaty.

The United States of America understands that the United States of America, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine have agreed on statements of policy regarding the reimbursement of costs for inspections conducted by the United States of America on the territories of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine.

[Initialed]
Steven Steiner

Geneva, Switzerland
February 3, 1995

Statement of policy by the Republic of Belarus concerning reimbursement of inspection costs

The Republic of Belarus makes the following statement concerning its understanding of the plans of the United States of America with respect to costs of inspections conducted by the United States of America on its territory under the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty.

If the Republic of Belarus does not conduct inspections, except as provided below, on the territory of the United States of America during a six-month period beginning from the date of entry into force of the Treaty and for each subsequent six-month period, the Republic of Belarus understands that the United States of America intends to reimburse the Republic of Belarus the inspected Party costs for inspections conducted by the United States of America during that six-month period in the following cost categories: meals, lodging, work space, transportation, and as necessary, medical care for the inspection team and aircrew members of the United States of America, parking and security protection for the inspection airplanes at the point of entry, and transportation of monitors at the point of entry. To reimburse such costs, the Republic of Belarus understands that the United States of America plans to use the procedures for settlement of accounts contained in the Treaty and agreements reached within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

The Republic of Belarus understands that the United States of America will consider inspections conducted on the territory of the United States of America, notified by the Parties that have exchanged statements of policy concerning reimbursement of inspection costs with the United States, by a multiparty inspection team composed of inspectors from states that have exchanged statements of policy concerning reimbursement of inspection costs, and up to one inspector from each state that has not exchanged statements of policy concerning reimbursement of inspection costs, to be conducted by the Party that provided the notification of inspection to the United States of America in fulfilling its obligations provided for in the Treaty.

The Republic of Belarus understands that the United States of America does not plan to assign cost responsibilities as specified above to any of the states that have exchanged statements of policy concerning reimbursement of inspection costs for one inspection on U.S. territory during the baseline inspection period provided for by the Treaty that is conducted by a multiparty inspection team.

[Initialed]
Aleksandr Baichorov

Geneva, Switzerland
February 3, 1995

Statement of policy by the Republic of Kazakhstan concerning reimbursement of inspection costs

The Republic of Kazakhstan makes the following statement concerning its understanding of the plans of the United States of America with respect to costs of inspections conducted by the United States of America on its territory under the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty.

If the Republic of Kazakhstan does not conduct inspections, except as provided below, on the territory of the United States of America during a six-month period beginning from the date of entry into force of the Treaty and for each subsequent six-month period, the Republic of Kazakhstan understands that the United States of America intends to reimburse the Republic of Kazakhstan the inspected Party costs for inspections conducted by the United States of America during that six-month period in the following cost categories: meals, lodging, work space, transportation, and as necessary, medical care for the inspection team and aircrew members of the United States of America, parking and security protection for the inspection airplanes at the point of entry, and transportation of monitors at the point of entry. To reimburse such costs, the Republic of Kazakhstan understands that the United States of America plans to use the procedures for settlement of accounts contained in the Treaty and agreements reached within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

The Republic of Kazakhstan understands that the United States of America will consider inspections conducted on the territory of the United States of America, notified by the Parties that have exchanged statements of policy concerning reimbursement of inspection costs with the United States, by a multiparty inspection team composed of inspectors from states that have exchanged statements of policy concerning reimbursement of inspection costs, and up to one inspector from each state that has not exchanged statements of policy concerning reimbursement of inspection costs, to be conducted by the Party that provided the notification of inspection to the United States of America in fulfilling its obligations provided for in the Treaty.

The Republic of Kazakhstan understands that the United States of America does not plan to assign cost responsibilities as specified above to any of the states that have exchanged statements of policy concerning reimbursement of inspection costs for one inspection on U.S. territory during the baseline inspection period provided for by the Treaty that is conducted by a multiparty inspection team.

[Initialed]
Kairtay Zhanbatyrov

Geneva, Switzerland
February 3, 1995

Statement of policy by Ukraine concerning reimbursement of inspection costs under the Start Treaty

Ukraine makes the following statement concerning its understanding of the plans of the United States of America with respect to costs of inspections conducted by the United States of America on its territory under the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty.

If Ukraine does not conduct inspections, except as provided below, on the territory of the United States of America during a six-month period beginning from the date of entry into force of the Treaty and for each subsequent six-month period, Ukraine understands that the United States of America intends to reimburse Ukraine the inspected Party costs for inspections conducted by the United States of America during that six-month period in the following cost categories: meals, lodging, work space, transportation, and as necessary, medical care for the inspection team and aircrew members of the United States of America, parking and security protection for the inspection airplanes at the point of entry, and transportation of monitors at the point of entry. To reimburse such costs, Ukraine understands that the United States of America plans to use the procedures for settlement of accounts contained in the Treaty and agreements reached within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

Ukraine understands that the United States of America will consider inspections conducted on the territory of the United States of America, notified by the Parties that have exchanged statements of policy concerning reimbursement of inspection costs with the United States, by a multiparty inspection team composed of inspectors from states that have exchanged statements of policy concerning reimbursement of inspection costs, and up to one inspector from each state that has not exchanged statements of policy concerning reimbursement of inspection costs, to be conducted by the Party that provided the notification of inspection to the United States of America in fulfilling its obligations provided for in the Treaty.

Ukraine understands that the United States of America does not plan to assign cost responsibilities as specified above to any of the states that have exchanged statements of policy concerning reimbursement of inspection costs for one inspection on U.S. territory during the baseline inspection period provided for by the Treaty that is conducted by a multiparty inspection team.

[Initialed]
Anatoliy Shevtsov

Geneva, Switzerland
February 3, 1995

Statement of policy by the United States of America concerning reimbursement of inspection costs

The United States of America makes the following statement concerning its plans with respect to costs of START Treaty inspections conducted on the territory of the Republic of Belarus:

If the Republic of Belarus does not conduct inspections on the territory of the United States of America, except as provided below, during a six-month period beginning from the date of entry into force of the Treaty and for each subsequent six-month period, the United States of America intends to reimburse the Republic of Belarus the inspected Party costs for inspections conducted by the United States of America for that six-month period in the following cost categories: meals, lodging, work space, transportation, and as necessary, medical care for the inspection team and aircrew members of the United States of America, parking and security protection for the inspection aircraft at the point of entry, and transportation of monitors at the point of entry. To reimburse such costs, the United States of America plans to use the procedures for settlement of accounts contained in the Treaty and agreements reached within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

With regard to inspections notified by Parties that have exchanged statements of policy concerning reimbursement of inspection costs with the United States of America, the United States of America plans to consider inspections on the territory of the United States of America by a multiparty inspection team composed of inspectors from states that have exchanged statements of policy concerning reimbursement of inspection costs, and up to one inspector from each state that has not exchanged statements of policy concerning reimbursement of inspection costs, to be conducted by the Party that provided the notification of inspection to the United States of America in fulfilling its obligation provided for in the Treaty.

The United States of America does not plan to assign cost responsibilities as specified above to any of the states that have exchanged statements of policy concerning reimbursement of inspection costs for one inspection on the territory of the United States of America during the baseline inspection period provided for by the Treaty that is conducted by a multiparty inspection team.

[Initialed]
Steven Steiner

Geneva, Switzerland
February 3, 1995

Statement of policy by the United States of America concerning reimbursement of inspection costs

The United States of America makes the following statement concerning its plans with respect to costs of START Treaty inspections conducted on the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan:

If the Republic of Kazakhstan does not conduct inspections on the territory of the United States of America, except as provided below, during a six-month period beginning from the date of entry into force of the Treaty and for each subsequent six-month period, the United States of America intends to reimburse the Republic of Kazakhstan the inspected Party costs for inspections conducted by the United States of America for that six-month period in the following cost categories: meals, lodging, work space, transportation, and as necessary, medical care for the inspection team and aircrew members of the United States of America, parking and security protection for the inspection aircraft at the point of entry, and transportation of monitors at the point of entry. To reimburse such costs, the United States of America plans to use the procedures for settlement of accounts contained in the Treaty and agreements reached within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

[Initialed]
Steven Steiner

Geneva, Switzerland
February 3, 1995

Statement of policy by the United States of America concerning reimbursement of inspection costs

The United States of America makes the following statement concerning its plans with respect to costs of START Treaty inspections conducted on the territory of Ukraine:

If Ukraine does not conduct inspections on the territory of the United States of America, except as provided below, during a six-month period beginning from the date of entry into force of the Treaty and for each subsequent six-month period, the United States of America intends to reimburse Ukraine the inspected Party costs for inspections conducted by the United States of America for that six-month period in the following cost categories: meals, lodging, work space, transportation, and as necessary, medical care for the inspection team and aircrew members of the United States of America, parking and security protection for the inspection aircraft at the point of entry, and transportation of monitors at the point of entry. To reimburse such costs, the United States of America plans to use the procedures for settlement of accounts contained in the Treaty and agreements reached within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

[Initialed]
Steven Steiner

Geneva, Switzerland
October 30, 1996

Statement of policy by the United States of America on not locating silo launchers outside national territory

Ambassador V. I. Trifonov
Representative of the Russian Federation
to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission

Dear Mr. Representative:

On behalf of the United States of America, in connection with the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, I have the honor to make the following statement concerning the plans of the United States of America with respect to silo launchers of ICBMs at space launch facilities.

The United States of America notes that the Parties to the Treaty share a common interest in promoting effective verification of Treaty obligations and in ensuring non-proliferation of ballistic missile technology.

In this connection, I have the honor to declare that the United States of America does not intend to locate silo launchers of ICBMs at space launch facilities outside its national territory.

Sincerely,

[S]
Steven E. Steiner,
Ambassador

Geneva, Switzerland
October 30, 1996

Dr. K. K. Zhanbatyrov
Deputy Representative of the Republic of Kazakstan
to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission

Dear Mr. Deputy Representative:

In this connection, I have the honor to declare that the United States of America does not intend to locate silo launchers of ICBMs at space launch facilities outside its national territory.

Sincerely,

[S]
Steven E. Steiner,
Ambassador

Geneva, Switzerland
October 30, 1996

Mr. A. O. Sannikov
Representative of the Republic of Belarus
to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission

Dear Mr. Representative:

In this connection, I have the honor to declare that the United States of America does not intend to locate silo launchers of ICBMs at space launch facilities outside its national territory.

Sincerely,

[S]
Steven E. Steiner,
Ambassador

Geneva, Switzerland
October 30, 1996

Mr. K. I. Hrishchenko
Representative of Ukraine
to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission

Dear Mr. Representative:

In this connection, I have the honor to declare that the United States of America does not intend to locate silo launchers of ICBMs at space launch facilities outside its national territory.

Sincerely,

[S]
Steven E. Steiner,
Ambassador

Statements of policy by Belarus, Kazakstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine on not locating silo launchers outside national territory

Geneva, Switzerland
October 30, 1996

Representative of the Republic of Belarus
to the Joint Compliance and
Inspection Commission

Minsk, Republic of Belarus

Dear Mr. Deputy Representative:

On behalf of the Republic of Belarus, in connection with the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, I have the honor to make the following statement concerning the plans of the Republic of Belarus with respect to silo launchers of ICBMs at space launch facilities.

The Republic of Belarus notes that the Parties to the Treaty share a common interest in promoting effective verification of Treaty obligations and in ensuring non-proliferation of ballistic missile technology.

In this connection, I have the honor to declare that the Republic of Belarus does not intend to locate silo launchers of ICBMs at space launch facilities outside the national territories of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine.

Sincerely,

[S]
Andrey O. Sannikov
Head of Delegation

To Ambassador Steven Steiner,
Representative of the
United States of America
to the Joint Compliance
and Inspection Commission

Geneva, Switzerland
October 30, 1996

Representative of the Republic of Kazakstan
to the Joint Compliance and
Inspection Commission

Almaty, Republic of Kazakstan

Dear Mr. Representative:

On behalf of the Republic of Kazakstan, in connection with the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, I have the honor to make the following statement concerning the plans of the Republic of Kazakstan with respect to silo launchers of ICBMs at space launch facilities.

The Republic of Kazakstan notes that the Parties to the Treaty share a common interest in promoting effective verification of Treaty obligations and in ensuring non-proliferation of ballistic missile technology.

In this connection, I have the honor to declare that the Republic of Kazakstan does not intend to locate silo launchers of ICBMs at space launch facilities outside the national territories of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine.

Sincerely,

[S]
Kairtay K. Zhanbatyrov

To Ambassador Steven Steiner,
Representative of the
United States of America
to the Joint Compliance
and Inspection Commission

Geneva, Switzerland
October 30, 1996

Representative of the Russian Federation
to the Joint Compliance and
Inspection Commission

Moscow, Russian Federation

Dear Mr. Representative:

On behalf of the Russian Federation, in connection with the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, I have the honor to make the following statement concerning the plans of the Russian Federation with respect to silo launchers of ICBMs at space launch facilities.

The Russian Federation notes that the Parties to the Treaty share a common interest in promoting effective verification of Treaty obligations and in ensuring non-proliferation of ballistic missile technology.

In this connection, I have the honor to declare that the Russian Federation does not intend to locate silo launchers of ICBMs at space launch facilities outside the national territories of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine.

Sincerely,

[S]
Ambassador Viktor I. Trifonov

To Ambassador Steven Steiner,
Representative of the
United States of America
to the Joint Compliance
and Inspection Commission

Geneva, Switzerland
October 30, 1996

Representative of Ukraine
to the Joint Compliance and
Inspection Commission

Kiev, Ukraine

Dear Mr. Representative:

On behalf of Ukraine, in connection with the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, I have the honor to make the following statement concerning the plans of Ukraine with respect to silo launchers of ICBMs at space launch facilities.

Ukraine notes that the Parties to the Treaty share a common interest in promoting effective verification of Treaty obligations and in ensuring non-proliferation of ballistic missile technology.

In this connection, I have the honor to declare that Ukraine does not intend to locate silo launchers of ICBMs at space launch facilities outside the national territories of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine.

Sincerely,

[S]
Ambassador Konstantin I. Hrishchenko

To Ambassador Steven Steiner,
Representative of the
United States of America
to the Joint Compliance
and Inspection Commission

Withdrawal of radiation detection equipment from Ukraine

Geneva, Switzerland
June 17, 1997

Mr. Konstantin I. Hryschchenko
Representative of Ukraine
to the Joint Compliance and
Inspection Commission

Dear Mr. Representative:

On behalf of the Government of the United States of America, in connection with the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, I have the honor to inform the Government of Ukraine that the United States of America understands that Ukraine, having fulfilled its obligations under the Trilateral Statement of the Presidents of the United States of America, Ukraine, and the Russian Federation of January 14, 1994, and the provisions of Article V of the Lisbon Protocol to the Treaty, and having acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968, as a non-nuclear-weapon State Party, does not have on its territory nuclear warheads for strategic offensive arms.

In this connection, the United States of America, as a matter of policy, will withdraw from Ukraine the radiation detection equipment (RDE), which is listed in subparagraph 2(c) of subsection A of Section II of Annex 8 to the Inspection Protocol to the Treaty, stored at the Kiev point of entry.

The United States of America retains the right to conduct inspections on the territory of Ukraine using RDE for the duration of the Treaty.

The United States of America agrees that should it in the future decide to bring RDE to the Kiev point of entry, such RDE will be examined and will undergo an operability check, and if necessary, the date and time for the designation of the inspection site and type of inspection will be delayed pending completion of such examination and operability check in accordance with the procedures provided for in subparagraph 4(c) of Section I of Annex 15 to the Inspection Protocol.

Sincerely,

[S]
Steven E. Steiner
Ambassador

Withdrawal of radiation detection equipment from Ukraine

Geneva, Switzerland
June 17, 1997

Ambassador Steven E. Steiner
Representative of the United States of America
to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission

Dear Mr. Representative:

On behalf of the Government of Ukraine, in connection with the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to at the Treaty, I have the honor to inform the Government of the United States of America that Ukraine, having fulfilled its obligations under the Trilateral Statement of the Presidents of Ukraine, the United States of America, and the Russian Federation of January 14, 1994, and the provisions of Article V of the Lisbon Protocol to the Treaty, and having acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968 as a non-nuclear-weapon State Party, does not have on its territory nuclear warheads for strategic offensive arms.

In this connection, Ukraine understands that the United States of America will, as a matter of policy, remove the radiation detection equipment (RDE), which is listed in subparagraph 2(c) of Subsection A of Section II of Annex 8 to the Inspection Protocol to the Treaty, stored at the Kiev point of entry.

Ukraine confirms that the United States of America retains the right to conduct inspections on the territory of Ukraine using RDE for the duration of the Treaty.

Ukraine agrees that should the United States of America decide in the future to bring RDE to the Kiev point of entry, such RDE will be examined and will undergo an operability check, and if necessary, the date and time for the designation of the inspection site and type of inspection will be delayed pending completion of such examination and operability check in accordance with the procedures provided for in subparagraph 4(c) of Section I of Annex 15 to the Inspection Protocol.

Respectfully,

[S]
Konstantin Hrishchenko
Representative of Ukraine
to the Joint Compliance and
Inspection Commission

Statement of policy by the United States of America on assisting inspectors in confirming the maximum number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which the B-52H heavy bomber is equipped

Geneva, Switzerland
November 12, 1997

Mr. Anton V. Vasil'yev
Representative of the Russian Federation
to the Joint Compliance and
Inspection Commission

Dear Mr. Representative:

On behalf of the Government of the United States of America, in connection with the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, I have the honor to inform you that the United States of America will as a matter of policy, in order to assist inspectors in confirming that the maximum number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which the B-52H heavy bomber is equipped is not more than the number provided for in paragraph 20 of Article V of the Treaty, at the request of the inspecting Party, once each year, present for viewing, during a data update inspection at a B-52H heavy bomber air base, one uncovered rotary launcher fully equipped with mockups of AGM-86B long-range ALCMs and one uncovered pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs fully equipped with mockups of AGM-129 or AGM-86B long-range nuclear ALCMs.

The United States of America notes that the Russian Federation will as a matter of policy, in order to assist inspectors in confirming that the maximum number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which the Bear H-6, Bear H-16, or Blackjack heavy bomber is equipped is not more than the number provided for in paragraph 21 of Article V of the Treaty, at the request of the inspecting Party, once each year, present for viewing, during a data update inspection at a Bear H-6, Bear H-16, or Blackjack heavy bomber air base, one uncovered rotary launcher and one uncovered pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs, if applicable, and if during that year such viewing has not been conducted on the territory of Ukraine.

The following additional procedures will apply during such inspections.

(a) The request to view the rotary launcher and pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs will be provided by the inspection team leader during pre-inspection procedures.
(b) Inspectors will be permitted to view the rotary launcher and pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs.
(c) The amount of time used to view the rotary launcher and pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs will be at the discretion of the inspection team leader within the period of inspection provided for data update inspections.
(d) Inspectors will not be permitted to make measurements of the displayed rotary launcher or pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs.

If inspectors encounter B-52H heavy bombers equipped with pylons for conventional armaments during a data update inspection at a B-52H heavy bomber air base, the in-country escort will demonstrate that, even if it were possible to attach a long-range nuclear ALCM to the conventional pylon, the relationship between the length of the long-range nuclear ALCM and the distance between conventional weapons attachment joints on that pylon together with the position of the attachment joints will not permit attaching more than six long-range nuclear ALCMs to such a pylon. To accomplish this, the in-country escort will place a measuring tape extended to a length equivalent to that of each long-range nuclear ALCM listed in Section (a) of Annex G to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty, directly beneath the conventional pylon.

In addition to the above, I have the honor to inform you that the United States of America could not and would not equip B-52H pylons for conventional armaments with long-range nuclear ALCMs because these pylons were not designed nor intended to carry or launch long-range nuclear ALCMs.

[S]
Steven E. Steiner
Ambassador

Geneva, Switzerland
November 12, 1997

Mr. Konstantin I. Hrishchenko
Representative of Ukraine
to the Joint Compliance and
Inspection Commission

Dear Mr. Representative:

On behalf of the Government of the United States of America, in connection with the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, I have the honor to inform you that the United States of America will as a matter of policy, in order to assist inspectors in confirming that the maximum number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which the B-52H heavy bomber is equipped is not more than the number provided for in paragraph 20 of Article V of the Treaty, at the request of the inspecting Party, once each year, present for viewing, during a data update inspection at a B-52H heavy bomber air base, one uncovered rotary launcher fully equipped with mockups of AGM-86B long-range nuclear ALCMs and one uncovered pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs fully equipped with mockups of AGM-129 or AGM-86B long-range nuclear ALCMs.

The United States of America notes that Ukraine will as a matter of policy, in order to assist inspectors in confirming that the maximum number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which the Bear H-6, Bear H-16, or Blackjack heavy bomber is equipped is not more than the number provided for in paragraph 21 of Article V of the Treaty, at the request of the inspecting Party, once each year, present for viewing, during a data update inspection at a Bear H-6, Bear H-16, or Blackjack heavy bomber air base, one uncovered rotary launcher and one uncovered pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs, if applicable, and if during that year such viewing has not been conducted on the territory of the Russian Federation.

The following additional procedures will apply during such inspections:

(a) The request to view the rotary launcher and pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs will be provided by the inspection team leader during pre-inspection procedures.
(b) Inspectors will be permitted to view the rotary launcher and pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs.
(c) The amount of time used to view the rotary launcher and pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs will be at the discretion of the inspection team leader within the period of inspection provided for data update inspections.
(d) Inspectors will not be permitted to make measurements of the displayed rotary launcher or pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs.

[S]
Steven E. Steiner
Ambassador

Geneva, Switzerland
November 12, 1997

Ambassador Stanislav S. Ogurtsov
Representative of the Republic of Belarus
to the Joint Compliance and
Inspection Commission

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

On behalf of the Government of the United States of America, in connection with the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, I have the honor to inform you that the United States of America will as a matter of policy, in order to assist inspectors in confirming that the maximum number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which the B-52H heavy bomber is equipped is not more than the number provided for in paragraph 20 of Article V of the Treaty, at the request of the inspecting Party, once each year, present for viewing, during a data update inspection at a B-52H heavy bomber air base, one uncovered rotary launcher fully equipped with mockups of AGM-86B long-range nuclear ALCMs and one uncovered pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs fully equipped with mockups of AGM-129 or AGM-86B long-range nuclear ALCMs.

The following additional procedures will apply during such inspections:

(a) The request to view the rotary launcher and pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs will be provided by the inspection team leader during pre-inspection procedures.
(b) Inspectors will be permitted to view the rotary launcher and pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs.
(c) The amount of time used to view the rotary launcher and pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs will be at the discretion of the inspection team leader within the period of inspection provided for data update inspections.
(d) Inspectors will not be permitted to make measurements of the displayed rotary launcher or pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs.

[S]
Steven E. Steiner
Ambassador

Geneva, Switzerland
November 12, 1997

Dr. Kairtay K. Zhanbatyrov
Deputy Representative of the Republic of Kazakhstan
to the Joint Compliance and
Inspection Commission

Dear Mr. Representative:

On behalf of the Government of the United States of America, in connection with the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, I have the honor to inform you that the United States of America will as a matter of policy, in order to assist inspectors in confirming that the maximum number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which the B-52H heavy bomber is equipped is not more than the number provided for in paragraph 20 of Article V of the Treaty, at the request of the inspecting Party, once each year, present for viewing, during a data update inspection at a B-52H heavy bomber air base, one uncovered rotary launcher fully equipped with mockups of AGM-86B long-range nuclear ALCMs and one uncovered pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs fully equipped with mockups of AGM-129 or AGM-86B long-range nuclear ALCMs.

The following additional procedures will apply during such inspections:

(a) The request to view the rotary launcher and pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs will be provided by the inspection team leader during pre-inspection procedures.
(b) Inspectors will be permitted to view the rotary launcher and pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs.
(c) The amount of time used to view the rotary launcher and pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs will be at the discretion of the inspection team leader within the period of inspection provided for data update inspections.
(d) Inspectors will not be permitted to make measurements of the displayed rotary launcher or pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs.

[S]
Steven E. Steiner
Ambassador

Statements of policy by Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine on assisting inspectors in confirming the maximum number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which the Bear H-6, Bear H-16, Or Blackjack heavy bomber is equipped

Geneva, Switzerland
November 12, 1997

Ambassador Steven E. Steiner
Representative of the United States of America
to the Joint Compliance and
Inspection Commission

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

On behalf of the Government of the Republic of Belarus, in connection with the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, I have the honor to inform you that the Republic of Belarus notes that the United States of America will as a matter of policy, in order to assist inspectors in confirming that the maximum number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which the B-52H heavy bomber is equipped is not more than the number provided for in paragraph 20 of Article V of the Treaty, at the request of the inspecting Party, once each year, present for viewing, during a data update inspection at a B-52H heavy bomber air base, one uncovered rotary launcher fully equipped with mockups of AGM-86B long-range nuclear ALCMs and one uncovered pylon for long-range ALCMs fully equipped with mockups of AGM-129 or AGM-86B long-range nuclear ALCMs.

The following additional procedures will apply during such inspections:

(a) The request to view the rotary launcher and pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs will be provided by the inspection team leader during pre-inspection procedures.
(b) Inspectors will be permitted to view the rotary launcher and pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs.
(c) The amount of time used to view the rotary launcher and pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs will be at the discretion of the inspection team leader within the period of inspection provided for data update inspections.
(d) Inspectors will not be permitted to make measurements of the displayed rotary launcher or pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs.

The Republic of Belarus notes that if inspectors encounter B-52H heavy bombers equipped with pylons for conventional armaments during a data update inspection at a B-52H heavy bomber air base, the in-country escort will demonstrate that, even if it were possible to attach a long-range nuclear ALCM to the conventional pylon, the relationship between the length of the long-range nuclear ALCM and the distance between conventional weapons attachment joints on that pylon together with the position of the attachment joints will not permit attaching more than six long-range nuclear ALCMs to such a pylon. To accomplish this, the in-country escort will place a measuring tape extended to a length equivalent to that of each long-range nuclear ALCM listed in Section (a) of Annex G to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty, directly beneath the conventional pylon.

In addition to the above, the Republic of Belarus notes your assurance that the United States of America could not and would not equip B-52H pylons for conventional armaments with long-range nuclear ALCMs because these pylons were not designed nor intended to carry or launch long-range nuclear ALCMs.

[S]
Ambassador Stanislav S. Ogurtsov
Representative of the
Republic of Belarus
to the Joint Compliance and
Inspection Commission

Geneva, Switzerland
November 12, 1997

Ambassador Steven E. Steiner
Representative of the United States of America
to the Joint Compliance and
Inspection Commission

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

On behalf of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan, in connection with the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, I have the honor to inform you that the Republic of Kazakhstan notes that the United States of America will as a matter of policy, in order to assist inspectors in confirming that the maximum number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which the B-52H heavy bomber is equipped is not more than the number provided for in paragraph 20 of Article V of the Treaty, at the request of the inspecting Party, once each year, present for viewing, during a data update inspection at a B-52H heavy bomber air base, one uncovered pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs fully equipped with mockups of AGM-129 or AGM-86B long-range nuclear ALCMs.

The following additional procedures will apply during such inspections:

(a) The request to view the rotary launcher and pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs will be provided by the inspection team leader during pre-inspection procedures.
(b) Inspectors will be permitted to view the rotary launcher and pylons for long-range nuclear ALCMs.
(c) The amount of time used to view the rotary launcher and pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs will be at the discretion of the inspection team leader within the period of inspection provided for data update inspections.
(d) Inspectors will not be permitted to make measurements of the displayed rotary launcher or pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs.

The Republic of Kazakhstan notes that if inspectors encounter B-52H heavy bombers equipped with pylons for conventional armaments during a data update inspection at a B-52H heavy bomber air base, the in-country escort will demonstrate that, even if it were possible to attach a long-range nuclear ALCM to the conventional pylon, the relationship between the length of the long-range nuclear ALCM and the distance between conventional weapons attachment joints on that pylon together with the position of the attachment joints will not permit attaching more than six long-range nuclear ALCMs to such a pylon. To accomplish this, the in-country escort will place a measuring tape extended to a length equivalent to that of each long-range nuclear ALCM listed in Section (a) of Annex G to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty, directly beneath the conventional pylon.

In addition to the above, the Republic of Kazakhstan notes your assurance that the United States of America could not and would not equip B-52H pylons for conventional armaments with long-range nuclear ALCMs because these pylons were not designed nor intended to carry or launch long-range nuclear ALCMs.

[S]
Kairtay K. Zhanbatyrov
Representative of the
Republic of Kazakhstan
to the Joint Compliance and
Inspection Commission

Geneva, Switzerland
November 12, 1997

Ambassador Steven E. Steiner
Representative of the United States of America
to the Joint Compliance and
Inspection Commission

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

On behalf of the Government of the Russian Federation, in connection with the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, I have the honor to inform you that the Russian Federation will as a matter of policy, in order to assist inspectors in confirming that the maximum number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which the Bear H-6, Bear H-16, or Blackjack heavy bomber is equipped is not more than the number provided for in paragraph 21 of Article V of the Treaty, at the request of the inspecting Party, once each year, present for viewing, during a data update inspection at a Bear H-6, Bear H-16, or Blackjack heavy bomber air base, one uncovered rotary launcher and one uncovered pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs, if applicable, and if during that year such viewing has not been conducted on the territory of Ukraine.

The Russian Federation notes that the United States of America will as a matter of policy, in order to assist inspectors in confirming that the maximum number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which the B-52H heavy bomber is equipped is not more than the number provided for in paragraph 20 of Article V of the Treaty, at the request of the inspecting Party, once each year, present for viewing, during a data update inspection at a B-52H heavy bomber air base, one uncovered rotary launcher fully equipped with mockups of AGM-86B long-range nuclear ALCMs and one uncovered pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs fully equipped with mockups of AGM-129 or AGM-86B long-range nuclear ALCMs.

The following additional procedures will apply during such inspections:

(a) The request to view the rotary launcher and pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs will be provided by the inspection team leader during pre-inspection procedures.
(b) Inspectors will be permitted to view the rotary launcher and pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs.
(c) The amount of time used to view the rotary launcher and pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs will be at the discretion of the inspection team leader within the period of inspection provided for data update inspections.
(d) Inspectors will not be permitted to make measurements of the displayed rotary launcher or pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs.

The Russian Federation notes that if inspectors encounter B-52H heavy bombers equipped with pylons for conventional armaments during a data update inspection at a B-52H heavy bomber air base, the in-country escort will demonstrate that, even if it were possible to attach a long-range nuclear ALCM to the conventional pylon, the relationship between the length of the long-range nuclear ALCM and the distance between conventional weapons attachment joints on that pylon together with the position of the attachment joints will not permit attaching more than six long-range nuclear ALCMs to such a pylon. To accomplish this, the in-country escort will place a measuring tape extended to a length equivalent to that of each long-range nuclear ALCM listed in Section (a) of Annex G to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty, directly beneath the conventional pylon.

In addition to the above, the Russian Federation notes your assurance that the United States of America could not and would not equip B-52H pylons for conventional armaments with long-range nuclear ALCMs because these pylons were not designed nor intended to carry or launch long-range nuclear ALCMs.

[S]
Anton V. Vasil'yev
Representative of the
Russian Federation
to the Joint Compliance and
Inspection Commission

Geneva, Switzerland
November 12, 1997

Ambassador Steven E. Steiner
Representative of the United States of America
to the Joint Compliance and
Inspection Commission

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

On behalf of the Government of Ukraine, in connection with the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, I have the honor to inform you that Ukraine will as a matter of policy, in order to assist inspectors in confirming that the maximum number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which the Bear H-6, Bear H-16, or Blackjack heavy bomber is equipped is not more than the number provided for in paragraph 21 of Article V of the Treaty, at the request of the inspecting Party, once each year, present for viewing, during a data update inspection at a Bear H-6, Bear H-16, or Blackjack heavy bomber air base, one uncovered rotary launcher and one uncovered pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs, if applicable, and if during that year such viewing has not been conducted on the territory of the Russian Federation.

Ukraine notes that the United States of America will as a matter of policy, in order to assist inspectors in confirming that the maximum number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which the B-52H heavy bomber is equipped is not more than the number provided for in paragraph 20 of Article V of the Treaty, at the request of the inspecting Party, once each year, present for viewing, during a data update inspection at a B-52H heavy bomber air base, one uncovered rotary launcher fully equipped with mockups of AGM-86B long-range nuclear ALCMs and one uncovered pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs fully equipped with mockups of AGM-129 or AGM-86B long-range nuclear ALCMs.

The following additional procedures will apply during such inspections:

(a) The request to view the rotary launcher and pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs will be provided by the inspection team leader during pre-inspection procedures.
(b) Inspectors will be permitted to view the rotary launcher and pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs.
(c) The amount of time used to view the rotary launcher and pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs will be at the discretion of the inspection team leader within the period of inspection provided for data update inspections.
(d) Inspectors will not be permitted to make measurements of the displayed rotary launcher or pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs.

Ukraine notes that if inspectors encounter B-52H heavy bombers equipped with pylons for conventional armaments during a data update inspection at a B-52H heavy bomber air base, the in-country escort will demonstrate that, even if it were possible to attach a long-range nuclear ALCM to the conventional pylon, the relationship between the length of the long-range nuclear ALCM and the distance between conventional weapons attachment joints on that pylon together with the position of the attachment joints will not permit attaching more than six long-range nuclear ALCMs to such a pylon. To accomplish this, the in-country escort will place a measuring tape extended to a length equivalent to that of each long-range nuclear ALCM listed in Section (a) of Annex G to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty, directly beneath the conventional pylon.

In addition to the above, Ukraine notes your assurance that the United States of America could not and would not equip B-52H pylons for conventional armaments with long-range nuclear ALCMs because these pylons were not designed nor intended to carry or launch long-range nuclear ALCMs.

[S]
Ambassador Konstantin I. Hrishchenko
Representative of Ukraine
to the Joint Compliance and
Inspection Commission

Signed letters and procedures for the use of ground transportation for the resupply of Votkinsk, March 20, 2002 |1|

Letter from the U.S. Representative to the Belarusian Representative

Geneva, Switzerland
March 20, 2002

Mr. Aleksandr M. Baichorov
Representative of the Government of the
Republic of Belarus to the
Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission

Dear Mr. Representative:

In connection with the discussions held in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission regarding the use of ground transportation vehicles to transport cargo consisting of equipment and supplies to or from the monitored facility at Votkinsk, Udmurt Republic, Russian Federation, I have the honor to propose the following.

The Russian Federation, acting in a spirit of good will and cooperation, and without prejudice to its legal position regarding the provisions on transportation of cargo to a monitored facility under the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the START Treaty, shall provide the United States of America with support and assistance in using ground transportation vehicles to transport cargo consisting of equipment and supplies intended for continuous monitoring activities to the monitored facility at Votkinsk, Udmurt Republic, Russian Federation, or to remove such cargo from that facility to locations outside the territory of the Russian Federation.

Such support and assistance shall include the provision, at the request of the United States of America, of ground transportation vehicles and related services necessary for transport of the cargo provided for in the START Treaty, by a cargo carrier selected by the Russian Federation. Procedures regarding payment of costs, and other issues related to the provision of vehicles for transporting the aforementioned cargo and of related services shall be specified in a contract concluded between the cargo carrier and an authorized representative of the United States Government.

The Republic of Belarus, the Russian Federation, and the United States of America agree, within the framework of the document attached to the letters of exchange, on the specific procedures to be applied during the use of ground transportation vehicles to transport cargo consisting of equipment and supplies intended for continuous monitoring activities to or from the monitored facility at Votkinsk. The aforementioned attachment to the letters of exchange shall be an integral part of this agreement.

The transportation of such cargo to or from the monitored facility at Votkinsk by ground transportation vehicles shall not affect the provisions of paragraph 4 of Section IV of the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the START Treaty.

If the foregoing is acceptable, this letter together with your reply shall constitute an agreement between our Governments, which shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of our letters, and shall remain in force until cessation of continuous monitoring activities at the monitored facility at Votkinsk under Section XVI of the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the START Treaty. This agreement may be terminated 12 months after notification to that effect by one of the Parties to the agreement.

Please accept, Mr. Representative, the assurances of my highest consideration.

[S]
Ambassador Steven E. Steiner
Representative of the
United States of America
to the Joint Compliance and
Inspection Commission

Attachment:

"Procedures for Using Ground Transportation Vehicles for the Transportation of Cargo Consisting of Equipment and Supplies to or from the Monitored Facility at Votkinsk"

Letter from the Belarusian Representative to the U.S. Representative

Geneva, Switzerland
March 20, 2002

Ambassador Steven E. Steiner
Representative of the United States of America to the
Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

The Russian Federation, acting in a spirit of good will and cooperation, and without prejudice to its legal position regarding the provisions on transportation of cargo to a monitored facility under the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the START Treaty, shall provide the United States of America with support and assistance in using ground transportation vehicles to transport cargo consisting of equipment and supplies intended for continuous monitoring activities to the monitored facility at Votkinsk, Udmurt Republic, Russian Federation, or to remove such cargo from that facility to locations outside the territory of the Russian Federation.

This reply, together with your letter, shall constitute an agreement between our Governments, which shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of our letters, and shall remain in force until cessation of continuous monitoring activities at the monitored facility at Votkinsk under Section XVI of the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the START Treaty. This agreement may be terminated 12 months after notification to that effect by one of the Parties to the agreement.

Please accept, Mr. Ambassador, the assurances of my highest consideration.

[S]
Aleksandr M. Baichorov
Representative of Government of the
Republic of Belarus to the
Joint Compliance and
Inspection Commission

Attachment:

"Procedures for Using Ground Transportation Vehicles for the Transportation of Cargo Consisting of Equipment and Supplies to or from the Monitored Facility at Votkinsk"

Letter from the U.S. Representative to the Russian Representative

Geneva, Switzerland
March 20, 2002

Mr. Anton V. Vasil'yev
Representative of the Russian Federation to the
Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission

Dear Mr. Representative:

Please accept, Mr. Representative, the assurances of my highest consideration.

[S]
Ambassador Steven E. Steiner
Representative of the
United States of America
to the Joint Compliance and
Inspection Commission

Attachment:

"Procedures for Using Ground Transportation Vehicles for the Transportation of Cargo Consisting of Equipment and Supplies to or from the Monitored Facility at Votkinsk"

Letter from the Representative of the Russian Federation to the U.S. Representative

Geneva, Switzerland
March 20, 2002

Ambassador Steven E. Steiner
Representative of the United States of America to the
Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

The Russian Federation, acting in a spirit of good will and cooperation, and without prejudice to its legal position regarding the provisions on transportation of cargo to a monitored facility under the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the START Treaty, shall provide the United States of America with support and assistance in using ground transportation vehicles to transport cargo consisting of equipment and supplies intended for continuous monitoring activities to the monitored facility at Votkinsk, Udmurt Republic, Russian Federation, or to remove such cargo from that facility to locations outside the territory of the Russian Federation.

This reply together with your letter shall constitute an agreement between our Governments, which shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of our letters, and shall remain in force until cessation of continuous monitoring activities at the monitored facility at Votkinsk under Section XVI of the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the START Treaty. This agreement may be terminated 12 months after notification to that effect by one of the Parties to the agreement.

Please accept, Mr. Ambassador, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Anton V. Vasil'yev
Representative of the
Russian Federation
to the Joint Compliance and
Inspection Commission

Attachment:

"Procedures for Using Ground Transportation Vehicles for the Transportation of Cargo Consisting of Equipment and Supplies to or from the Monitored Facility at Votkinsk"

Attachment to the Letter Dated March 20, 2002

Procedures for Using Ground Transportation Vehicles for the Transportation of Cargo Consisting of Equipment and Supplies to or from the Monitored Facility at Votkinsk

In connection with the exchange of letters of March 20, 2002, the representatives of the Republic of Belarus, the Russian Federation and the United States of America have agreed on the following procedures for the use of ground transportation vehicles by the United States of America for the transportation of cargo consisting of equipment and supplies to or from the monitored facility at Votkinsk, Udmurt Republic, Russian Federation.

1. Ground transportation vehicles and related services necessary for transporting cargo consisting of equipment and supplies to the monitored facility at Votkinsk or removing such cargo from that facility to locations outside the territory of the Russian Federation shall be provided by the Russian Federation at the request of the United States of America. Such vehicles may transport only equipment, only supplies, or both at one and the same time.

2. The Votkinsk Plant State Production Association, a Federal State Unitary Enterprise, or other cargo carrier selected by the Russian Federation, and the authorized representative of the United States of America will conclude a contract for the provision of ground transportation vehicles and related services necessary for the cargo transportation referred to in paragraph 1 of these Procedures. This contract shall specify, inter alia:

(i) the vehicles and services requested of the cargo carrier;
(ii) procedures used by the cargo carrier, the leader of the monitoring team and the leader of the in-country escorts to coordinate the transportation of cargo consisting of equipment and supplies to or from the monitored facility at Votkinsk; and
(iii) procedures for settlement of accounts for all vehicles and services provided, including any mutually-agreed services provided as a result of unforeseen circumstances.

3. The United States of America shall provide a notification to the Russian Federation of its intention to use ground transportation vehicles. Such notification shall be provided no less than 40 days in advance of the estimated date of provision of the vehicles at the monitored facility or at the point of departure of the cargo at Frankfurt am Main, or Darmstadt, Federal Republic of Germany, and shall include the following information:

(i) the type of ground transportation vehicles requested and the number of vehicles of each type;
(ii) the estimated date of arrival of the ground transportation vehicles at the monitored facility or point of departure of the cargo;
(iii) the point of departure of the cargo;
(iv) the approximate number of separate palletized or oversize units of cargo, including modular structures, and the approximate weight and dimensions of each such unit of cargo;
(v) the type and approximate amount of any hazardous materials to be carried by the ground transportation vehicles that require special safety measures during transportation and handling; and
(vi) services requested of the Russian Federation.

4. The United States of America shall provide a notification to the Russian Federation confirming its intention to use ground transportation vehicles and services in accordance with paragraph 3 of these Procedures. Such notification shall be provided no less than 20 days in advance of the estimated date of provision of the ground transportation vehicles at the monitored facility or at the point of departure of the cargo at Frankfurt am Main or Darmstadt, and shall include the following information:

(i) the number, time and date of the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of these Procedures; and
(ii) any changes to the information contained in such notification.

5. The Russian Federation shall provide a notification to the United States of America confirming that the ground transportation vehicles and services requested by the United States of America in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 4 of these Procedures will be provided. Such notification shall be provided no less than ten days in advance of the estimated date of provision of the ground transportation vehicles at the monitored facility or at the point of departure of the cargo at Frankfurt am Main or Darmstadt, and shall include the following information:

(i) the type of ground transportation vehicles and the number of vehicles of each type that will be provided;
(ii) the estimated date of provision of the ground transportation vehicles at the monitored facility or at the point of departure of the cargo;
(iii) the estimated date of arrival of the ground transportation vehicles with cargo at the monitored facility or at the point of departure of the cargo;
(iv) the services that will be provided by the Russian Federation; and
(v) passport information for the drivers of the ground transportation vehicles and other individuals accompanying such vehicles.

6. The Russian Federation shall provide a notification to the Republic of Belarus, whose territory the ground transportation vehicles traveling from Votkinsk will transit, no less than ten days in advance of the estimated date of their arrival on the territory of the Republic of Belarus. Such notification shall include the following information:

(i) the type of transiting ground transportation vehicles and the number of vehicles of each type;
(ii) the estimated date of arrival of the ground transportation vehicles on the territory of the Republic of Belarus and of their departure from the territory of the Republic of Belarus;
(iii) the type and approximate amount of any hazardous materials to be carried by the ground transportation vehicles that require special safety measures during transportation and handling; and
(iv) passport information for the drivers of the ground transportation vehicles and other individuals accompanying such vehicles.

7. The United States of America shall provide a notification to the Republic of Belarus, whose territory the ground transportation vehicles traveling to Votkinsk will transit, no less than ten days in advance of the estimated date of their arrival on the territory of the Republic of Belarus. Such notification shall include the following information:

(i) the type of transiting ground transportation vehicles and the number of vehicles of each type;
(ii) the estimated date of arrival of the ground transportation vehicles on the territory of the Republic of Belarus and of their departure from the territory of the Republic of Belarus; and
(iii) the type and approximate amount of any hazardous materials to be carried by the ground transportation vehicles that require special safety measures during transportation and handling.

8. The notifications referred to in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 of these Procedures shall be provided through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of the Russian Federation and the United States of America, and through the National Agency for Verification and Inspection - Department of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Belarus, using START Treaty message Format number 144 (additional START message).

9. The United States of America shall provide the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation with an inventory of the cargo consisting of equipment and supplies to be delivered to the monitored facility at Votkinsk or removed from that facility, using the procedures set forth in Annex 7 to the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the START Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Inspection Protocol. The United States of America shall provide such inventory through its embassy no less than ten days prior to the arrival of the vehicles on the territory of the Republic of Belarus and prior to their arrival on (or departure from) the territory of the Russian Federation.

10. Cargo consisting of equipment and supplies shall be transported to and from the monitored facility at Votkinsk using ground transportation vehicles no more than five times a year.

11. The following route will be used for transporting cargo consisting of equipment and supplies to or from the monitored facility at Votkinsk using ground transportation vehicles: Frankfurt am Main or Darmstadt (Federal Republic of Germany) - Minsk (Republic of Belarus) - Izhevsk - Votkinsk (Russian Federation). Such cargo shall be examined by the Russian Federation at the monitored facility at Votkinsk using the relevant provisions set forth in Annex 7 to the Inspection Protocol.

12. The Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation shall ensure that equipment and supplies delivered to or removed from the monitored facility at Votkinsk are exempt from all customs duties and are expeditiously processed as provided for in paragraph 7 of Section V of the Inspection Protocol.

13. Changes and additions may be made to these Procedures by agreement among the Republic of Belarus, the Russian Federation and the United States of America.

Geneva, Switzerland
March 20, 2002

Unilateral statement by the United States of America at the signing of the agreement regarding the use of ground transportation vehicles to transport equipment and supplies to or from the monitored facility at Votkinsk

Barring unforeseen circumstances, the United States of America does not intend, under routine circumstances, to exercise its START Treaty right to use inspection airplanes for the transportation of equipment and supplies to and from the monitored facility at Votkinsk.

The United States of America proceeds from the premise that the overall weight of equipment and supplies transported annually to and from the monitored facility at Votkinsk using ground transportation vehicles will be approximately the same as the overall weight of equipment and supplies that have been previously transported annually to and from such facility by the United States of America using inspection airplanes.

Supplemental Documents

Attachment to the statement by the United States representative to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission at the closing plenary of the twelfth session, December 12, 1995 |1| |2|

I. Unilateral Plenary Statements

The U.S. side appreciates the Russian Federation's timely response to U.S. concerns regarding inspector safety when certain AN-12 inspection airplanes were used that were not equipped to carry passengers to and from Russian inspection sites. The United States recently received assurances through diplomatic channels that measures were being taken to end the use of AN-12 aircraft for the transport of U.S. inspectors. The United States Delegation considers this matter satisfactorily resolved on the basis of these assurances.

The U.S. side was pleased to learn during this session that the Russian Federation confirms that the height dimension of fixed structures for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, which is declared in the MOU, should properly be measured to the extreme point. The U.S. side has concurred with the Russian Federation's proposal for inspectors and in-country escorts to determine on-site the most appropriate methods for measuring to the extreme point of such structures. We will now prepare instructions to our inspectors regarding conducting such measurements at the Kostroma and Bershet' rail garrisons in cooperation with the in-country escort.

The U.S. side is pleased to have received during this session an affirmation from the Russian Federation of the obligation of the in-country escort to demonstrate to the satisfaction of inspectors that an object contained in the front section that is declared not to be a reentry vehicle is not, in fact, a reentry vehicle, pursuant to paragraph 13 of Annex 3 to the Inspection Protocol. The U.S. side notes that specific Treaty procedures are not necessary in order for the inspected party to comply with this obligation.

With regard to B-1B heavy bombers, the United States has met its obligation as called for in the letters exchanged at Treaty signature and has made available for inspection all deployed B-1B heavy bombers. All B-1B heavy bombers will continue to be subject to inspection during future data update inspections in accordance with the provisions of the Inspection Protocol. The United States believes this issue is resolved.

With regard to the soft-site launcher at Vandenberg Test Range, the United States has determined that, in addition to national technical means of verification, the soft-site launcher can be inspected. A new site diagram has been provided that includes the soft-site launcher within the inspectable area. As a result, the United States believes this issue can be closed.

The item observed by Russian Federation inspectors at the Washington Naval Yard Museum is a static display of an inert mock-up of a Poseidon SLBM that has been in place since 1980. This static display was inadvertently omitted from the list of static displays in existence at the time of signature of the Treaty, and contained in paragraph 1 of Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). The United States will include this inert mock-up in Annex I to the MOU during the next MOU data update.

The device found at the training facility, King's Bay, has not been used for, and was not designed to be used as, a launcher of SLBMs or as a training launcher. It is incapable of storing an SLBM and incapable of being used as an SLBM launcher or as a treaty-defined "training launcher." The United States regards this statement as having resolved this issue.

For structures within the boundary of the inspected facility that are large enough to contain or to be used for items or support equipment subject to inspection or declared for that facility, and the entrances of which are large enough to permit passage of such items or support equipment, but that are not intended for such items or support equipment, such structures need not be depicted on the site diagram for that facility. Not depicting such structures on a site diagram, however, does not affect the rights of the Parties with regard to the inspection of such structures within the boundaries of the inspected facility.

With regard to the Minuteman I ICBM, the United States acknowledges that it is a missile maintained, stored, and transported in stages, and has the same first stage dimensions as the U.S. existing types of ICBMs, the Minuteman II and III. In accordance with paragraph 18 of Section I of the Notification Protocol, the United States declares the number and location of the limited number of Minuteman I ICBMs every six months. As appropriate during pre-inspection briefings, the United States indicates the number of Minuteman I ICBMs located at the inspected facility. The United States believes that the declarations and notifications for the Minuteman I ICBM should be guided by the Treaty provisions, especially the Thirty-Seventh Agreed Statement, concerning former types. In order to facilitate the inspectors' ability to identify the Minuteman I ICBM, the United States has placed decals on the first stages of the Minuteman I ICBM, similar to the type and location of the decals used to identify the first stages of the Minuteman II and III ICBMs.

II. Coordinated Plenary Statements

The United States notes that the Minuteman II and Minuteman III ICBMs use the same first stage, and hence by their appearance and dimensions are indistinguishable. To facilitate counting the number of Minuteman II and III ICBMs by inspectors, the United States has affixed a permanent decal to the aft end dome of the motor case of the first stages of Minuteman II and Minuteman III ICBMs, using roman numerals II or III, thus identifying the missile as a Minuteman II or Minuteman III ICBMs, respectively. The United States further notes that, for the purpose of counting first stages of Minuteman II and Minuteman III ICBMs to determine whether the number of first stages of Minuteman II and Minuteman III ICBMs present at an inspected facility corresponds to the number declared by the inspected party, inspectors may use these decals to identify the missile type.

The Parties will record agreements on changes to the boundaries of facilities on site diagrams, provided for in paragraphs 19 and 20 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), as JCIC Joint Statements with a separate number sequence prefaced by S- (Number of Joint Statement).

The United States has no further questions regarding the Bershet' ICBM Base for Rail-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs, based on the understanding that the rail spurs not depicted on the site diagram of the rail garrison that are located north of the exit/entrance of the facility and are connected to the main rail line, will not be used to base, store or maintain items of inspection or support equipment that are declared for this facility. |3|

Unclassified attachment to the U.S. closing plenary statement for JCIC-XIII, May 15, 1996

I. Coordinated Plenary Statements

On Heavy Bomber Attachment Joints

The third attachment joint at the inboard pylon position under each wing of the TU-95MS16 Russian heavy bomber known to the United States as the Bear-H16, and attachment joints on the 3MS-2 Russian former heavy bomber known to the United States as the Bison-B, are not now, and are not intended to be used in the future for attaching long-range nuclear ALCMs or pylons for long-range nuclear ALCMs.

Two attachment joints for an additional pylon on selected B-52H heavy bombers, described by the United States to support an electronic instrumentation package, are not now and are not intended to be used in the future for attaching long-range nuclear ALCMs or pylons for long-range nuclear ALCMs. To show that these attachment joints cannot be used to attach long-range nuclear ALCMs or pylons for long-range nuclear ALCMs, the United States will provide inspectors the opportunity to make linear measurements of the distance between attachment joints for this pylon on the wing if such attachment joints are present and if questions are raised about them during future inspections of these heavy bombers.

Weapon pylons used for carrying non-nuclear weapons may be attached to the attachment joints for pylons for long-range nuclear ALCMs on B-52H heavy bombers.

On Procedures for Elimination of Russian Liquid-Propellant SLBMs

The United States understands that Russian liquid-propellant SLBMs shall be considered to have been rendered inoperable, precluding their use for their original purpose, after carrying out the procedures listed below at START-declared facilities:

- Guidance system elements have been removed;

- Fuel tanks have been depressurized by cutting out the plugs in fuel and drain ports;

- Propellant components have been drained and fuel tanks neutralized;

- Two holes of no less than 10-15 millimeters in diameter have been drilled (pressed) through the main engine nozzle;

- SLBM airframes with drained propellant components have been placed in open areas visible to NTM for no less than 60 days.

On Procedures for the Elimination of First Stages without Nozzles Attached of U.S. ICBMs and SLBMs

The Parties note that the Joint Statement on First Stages without Nozzles Attached of U.S. ICBMs and SLBMs does not affect the procedures for elimination of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs provided for in paragraph 4 of Section I of the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or Elimination of the Items Subject to the START Treaty.

II. U.S. Unilateral Plenary Statements

On Confirming Types of Partially-Assembled Missiles

Inspectors are likely to encounter first stages in both partially-assembled and separated configurations during data update inspections at U.S. ICBM repair facilities and submarine bases. The United States invites its Treaty Partners to take advantage of opportunities during inspections in the coming months to reconfirm and compare the lengths of first stages in partially-assembled and separated configurations.

Barring unforeseen circumstances, the United States will have available for measurement both partially-assembled missiles and separate first stages for comparison during the next data update inspections at the following facilities: Hill ICBM Repair Facility for Minuteman II and III ICBMs, Silverdale Submarine Base for Trident I SLBMs; and at the Kings Bay Submarine Base for Trident II SLBMs. All three locations routinely have on hand their respective missiles in such configurations, which would allow the necessary measurements and confirmation of first stage attachment points.

On Measuring the First Stages without Nozzles Attached of SS-24 ICBMs

As the U.S. indicated prior to initialling of the Joint Statement on First Stages without Nozzles Attached of SS-24 ICBMs, nothing in this Joint Statement affects the right of the U.S. during inspections of SS-24 ICBMs at conversion or elimination facilities to measure all elements and assemblies of SS-24 ICBMs that constitute the length of the missile without front sections.

On Minutemen I Missile Distinguishability

The U.S. Minuteman I ICBM, a former type of ICBM, has the same first stage dimension as the U.S. existing types of ICBMs, the Minuteman II and Minuteman III. In accordance with paragraph 18 of Section I of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty, the United States declares the number and location of the limited number of Minuteman I ICBMs every six months. There are currently 26 Minuteman I first stages in the United States inventory. This number will either remain static or decline. As appropriate during pre-inspection briefings, the United States indicates the number of Minuteman I ICBMs located at the inspected facility. Additionally, the United States has placed decals on the first stages of the Minuteman I ICBM, identical to the type of decal placed on the first stages of the Minuteman II and Minuteman III ICBMs, in order to facilitate the inspectors' ability to identify the Minuteman I ICBM.

The United States is pleased that the Russian Federation has accepted that the Minuteman I is subject to the provisions of the 37th Agreed Statement as a former type of ICBM, including the six month locational notifications. However, having done so, it is not logical for Russia to assert that a Minuteman I is a Minuteman III. There are no practical consequences to this disagreement because neither non-deployed Minuteman I or Minuteman III ICBMs are numerically limited under the Treaty. It is the oldest, least capable ICBM in the U.S. inventory and suitable for no other purpose than certain research and development testing.

On Solid Rocket Eliminations at Perm'

The U.S. Delegation was pleased to receive, during discussions at JCIC-XIII, assurances from the Russian Federation that the eliminations of ICBMs and SLBMs at the proposed Perm' Conversion or Elimination Facility would be consistent with obligations under the START Treaty, and that the U.S. and Russia will continue to consult with each other as this process proceeds. The U.S. Delegation will report these assurances to the Department of Defense's Cooperative Threat Reduction personnel. We look forward to the successful accomplishment of our mutual objectives in this area. We note that the presence of even a limited number of mobile ICBMs at Perm', without observing the locational restrictions of the Treaty, would be inconsistent with such assurances.

On Procedures for Elimination of Russian Liquid-Propellant ICBMs

The United States appreciates the clarification provided by the Russian Delegation pertaining to the Russian liquid-propellant ICBM elimination process referred to as "rendered inoperable by cutting" in START Notification Format 59 to mean cutting through the missile's fuel tank, and understands that SS-11, SS-13, SS-17, and SS-18 ICBMs, rendered inoperable by cutting, will be considered to have been eliminated, thereby precluding their use for their original purpose.

On Modifications to B-1B Pylon Attachment Joint Covers

The United States, in connection with the requirements set forth in the START Treaty letters exchanged on July 31, 1991, declares its intention to modify the pylon attachment joint covers on all operational B-1B heavy bombers. This modification will include an enhancement to the bonding process and removal of the pliable aerofairing sealant. The U.S. is forced to make this modification to resolve safety concerns brought on by engineering design deficiencies recently discovered in the current attachment joint covering process.

For inspection purposes, there is a minor change to the outward appearance of the pylon attachment joint covers. Pliable aerofairing sealant will be removed from around the edge of the replacement covers, and a drain hole in the circular replacement cover will not be filled with bonding material. These alterations will be clearly visible to future inspection teams.

The U.S. is in the process of retrofitting the entire operational B-1B fleet with this modification. This process will take approximately 6 months. This modification would normally take place at the B-1B Repair Facility. However, because of overriding safety concerns, this modification will take place at both the repair facility and the operational B-1B bases, in order to expedite its completion.

This modification will not alter the warhead attribution, nor the START Treaty status of the B-1B as a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs.

On Additional Differences Between Training Models of the SS-N-8 and SS-N-18 Types of Missiles and SLBMs of the Corresponding Type

The United States recognizes that any training nozzle or nozzle-like component attached to SS-N-8 and SS-N-18 training models of missiles at the place where a nozzle of the first stage rocket motor would normally be located on the corresponding type of SLBM, will have two holes, each no less than ten millimeters in diameter, drilled through such a training nozzle or nozzle-like component.

On Site Diagrams for Bershet' Silo ICBM Base, Engel's Air Base, and Ukrainka Air Base

The United States has no objections with the site diagrams for the Bershet' Silo ICBM Base dated November 1, 1995; the Engel's Air Base dated January 22, 1996; and the Ukrainka Air Base dated January 22, 1996.

Coordinated plenary statements by the United States representative to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission at the closing plenary of the fourteenth session, October 30, 1996

Regarding Relocation of Items Placed on Static Display Prior to Treaty Signature

The Parties have reviewed their practice regarding relocation of items placed on static display prior to START Treaty signature and concluded that such static display items are not subject to the limitations of the Treaty but are listed in Annex I of the Memorandum of Understanding to avoid ambiguity with items placed on static display after the Treaty was signed. In order to avoid ambiguities, the Parties intend to provide goodwill notifications of such relocations to their Treaty Partners. Such notifications will be provided through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers or other equivalent continuous communications channels using Format 144.

The notification will include the type of static display item, the location from which the static display item will be moved, the planned date of the initiation of dismantling of such an item, the name and coordinates of the location where such item will be placed on static display or eliminated, and whether such item will be placed on static display or eliminated. In addition, the change in Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding will be reflected in the next six-month update of the Annexes to the Memorandum of Understanding.

Regarding Channels for Asking and Answering Telemetry Questions

The Parties have reviewed the practices of asking and answering questions regarding telemetric information and confirm their intention to continue the practice of asking questions relating to the incompleteness or insufficient quality of telemetric information recorded on the tapes that do not allow processing of such information, by providing notifications in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section VI of the Notification Protocol through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers or other equivalent continuous communications channels using Format 81.

The Parties will provide answers to questions contained in such a notification through diplomatic channels in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Telemetry Protocol. Diplomatic channels will also be used for asking and answering questions relating to the incompleteness or insufficient quality of telemetry interpretive data or acceleration profiles.

The Parties note that questions and answers on interpretive data and acceleration profiles must be provided as quickly a possible. Consideration of proposals for establishing time limits for asking and answering such questions will be continued later, taking into account the experience gained.

On Telemetry Tape Costs

The Parties have reviewed the practices relating to telemetry tape costs and have concluded that the rate for telemetry tapes should remain as reflected in the Treaty, that is, zero U.S. dollars per tape. The Parties have reached an understanding that bills which have already been drawn up and paid should not be changed, but that all future bills, including current unpaid bills, should be drawn up using zero U.S. dollars as the rate per tape, unless otherwise agreed.

Unilateral statements delivered with the U.S. plenary statement at the closing plenary meeting of the fifteenth JCIC session, held at the U.S. mission, June 18, 1997

Unilateral Statements

The U.S. Delegation urges Ukraine to permit U.S. inspectors to perform the measurements provided for in the Joint Draft Text on Measuring SS-24 ICBMs with Coupling Device Attached, should they encounter an SS-24 ICBM or its first stage in the configurations provided for in that document during inspections at conversion or elimination facilities, pending the finalization of that document at the next session of the JCIC. This will facilitate inspections and the completion of the document.

During the fifteenth session of the JCIC, we have engaged in useful discussions on the issue of Minuteman III RVOSI. The United States continues to believe that its practices are Treaty-compliant; however, since the conduct of RV inspections began, the United States has instituted additional confidence-building measures in response to concerns expressed by Russian inspectors about RVOSI of Minuteman III ICBMs.

These measures have included viewing the lower portion of the Minuteman III front section through the view ports in the vehicle's environmental flaps while the front section is suspended inside the vehicle and lifting portions of the maintenance safety screen around the base of the front section to permit inspectors to view the length of the entire front section. In addition, at the request of an inspection team, escort personnel loosened the RV cover lanyards to allow the soft Rv covers to drape over the top of the RVs in order to demonstrate the approximate size and shape of the reentry vehicles and that the covers were not suspended over empty space.

Continued implementation of these additional measures assure that the Russian Federation can confirm that the Minuteman III ICBM carries no more reentry vehicles than the three with which it is attributed in the Treaty. The United States believes this should fully resolve Russian concerns.

The U.S. has reviewed the concerns expressed by the Russian Federation with regard to the preparation for viewing of the Peacekeeper front section during the April 14, 1997, RVOSI conducted at F.E. Warren Air Force Base. The United States regards this method of presentation for the Peacekeeper front section as complying with the requirements of Annex 3 of the Inspection Protocol. To alleviate the concerns expressed by the Russian Federation, the U.S. Delegation has provided its Treaty Partners with a photograph of the configuration in which the front section was viewed. The United States assures its Treaty Partners that it will continue to prepare the Peacekeeper front section for viewing during RVOSI in the manner illustrated in that photograph.

Annex to the U.S. closing plenary statement for JCIC-XVI, November 12, 1997

JCIC-XVI Coordinated Plenary Language on Data Associated with the Analysis of Telemetric Information

For telemetric information that is broadcast during a flight test, except for telemetric information that is broadcast from a reentry vehicle, the United States notes that it will include, inter alia, the interpretive data specified in subparagraphs 1(a) (vi) and 1 (a) (vii) of Section II of the Telemetry Protocol for all data elements occupying more than one standard telemetry word.

Unclassified attachment to the statement by the United States representative to the Joint Compliance And Inspection Commission at the closing plenary of the seventeenth session, March 18, 1998

Coordinated Statement on the Beginning of Acceleration Profiles

The United States notes that a missile acceleration profile to be provided pursuant to paragraph 2 of Section II of the Telemetry Protocol will begin no later than the time of ignition of the first stage motor of the missile and will cover the periods during which the stages or self-contained dispensing mechanism are imparting acceleration to the missile. It also notes that the provisions of paragraph 5 of Annex 2 to the Telemetry Protocol are used in determining the point in time when such a profile terminates.

If due to any circumstances the United States is unable to provide telemetric information containing data necessary to determine missile acceleration, the calculated missile acceleration profile to be provided may begin from the point in time when the missile begins its movement relative to its launching device.

Unclassified attachment to the statement by the United States representative to the Joint Compliance And Inspection Commission at the closing plenary of the seventeenth session, March 18, 1998

Unilateral Statement by the United States of America

Missile acceleration profiles, derived from either estimated or measured data, will begin no later than the time of ignition of the first stage motor. The United States has no plans to change its current practice of providing either measured or estimated missile acceleration profiles for Trident SLBMs beginning at a point in time not later than first stage motor ignition. The United States notes that the formulation in today's plenary statements regarding providing acceleration profiles allows, but does not require, the testing Party to provide a missile acceleration profile beginning when the missile begins its movement relative to its launching device.

Unclassified attachments to U.S. closing plenary statement for JCIC-XVIII, July 29, 1998

Unilateral U.S. Statement In Connection with Joint Statement Number 30

In connection with initialing Joint Statement Number 30, the United States confirms its understanding of the locations where Russia and Ukraine are currently eliminating non-mobile ICBMs and SLBMs.

It is the U.S. understanding that Russian SS-11 and SS-19 ICBMs are eliminated only at the Piban'shur Storage Facility, SS-17 and SS-18 ICBMs are eliminated only at the Surovatikha Storage Facility, and Russian SLBMs are eliminated only at the Pashino Conversion or Elimination Facility, the Revda Storage Facility, and the Krasnoyarsk Machine Building Plant.

It is the U.S. understanding that Ukraine eliminates non-mobile ICBMs at the Mikhaylenki Storage Facility and the Southern Machine Building Plant at Dnepropetrovsk.

Unilateral U.S. Statement Related to Reimbursement of Early Exhibition Costs

The United States understands that the question of reimbursement by the United States of costs relating to the conduct of early exhibitions under the START Treaty for the amount of USD $57,205.20 has been resolved to the mutual satisfaction of the Parties. Pursuant to the agreement among the successor States to the former Soviet Union, the United States will reimburse the sum to the Russian Federation.

Coordinated Plenary Statement on Providing Calculated Missile Acceleration Profiles

The Russian non-paper of June 30, 1998, provided in the Telemetry Working Group during JCIC-XVIII, contains examples of how a missile acceleration profile would be supplemented with data calculated on the basis of engineering estimates for periods during which no relevant on-board or external measurements were obtained.

For ICBM and SLBM flight tests conducted beginning as of the date of this statement, the United States of America intends to supplement the missile acceleration profiles which are to be provided pursuant to paragraph 2 of Section II of the Telemetry Protocol with missile acceleration data calculated on the basis of engineering estimates using as a model the data set forth in the Russian non-paper of June 30, 1998, for all or any portion of a flight test for which a missile acceleration profile is required, but no relevant on-board or external measurements were obtained. All periods for which missile acceleration data calculated on the basis of engineering estimates are provided will be indicated on the missile acceleration profiles.

Unclassified annex to the statement by the United States representative to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission at the closing plenary of the twentieth session, July 28, 1999

Coordinated Statement On the Return of Space Launch Vehicles to National Territory

In conjunction with JCIC Joint Statement Number 32, should it be necessary to return an ICBM or SLBM used to deliver objects into the upper atmosphere or space, including a space launch vehicle that incorporates the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM, from a space launch facility declared outside national territory to its national territory, the United States will provide the other Parties through diplomatic channels, or through their respective continuous communication centers, no less than five days in advance of the scheduled date of departure of such a space launch vehicle from that space launch facility, the following information: the type of space launch vehicle involved; the space launch facility from which the space launch vehicle is to depart; the anticipated date of departure; the mode of transport; the facility to which such a space launch vehicle is to be transported; and the anticipated date of its arrival at this facility.

Coordinated Statement On Blackjack Heavy Bomber Elimination |1|

The United States notes that the procedures conducted pursuant to subparagraphs 5(a), 5(b) and 5(c) respectively of Section VI of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol, at the locations used in the elimination of Ukrainian Blackjack Heavy Bomber Number 24, were consistent with the provisions of Section VI of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol.

The United States notes that the procedures conducted pursuant to subparagraphs 5(a), 5(b) and 5(c) respectively of Section VI of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol, at the locations used in the elimination of Ukrainian Blackjack Heavy Bomber Number 14, were consistent with the provisions of Section VI of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol.

The United States will accept as Treaty compliant the use of these same sets of elimination procedures for future eliminations of Blackjack type heavy bombers.

Coordinated Statement On Providing Tail Numbers of Heavy Bombers During Conversion or Elimination Inspections |1|

During pre-inspection procedures, the United States will, as a matter of goodwill, provide to the inspection team that has arrived to conduct an elimination inspection the tail number of each heavy bomber that is to be inspected during that inspection. This information will be confirmed during that inspection and will be specified in the inspection report.

Unilateral Statement On Mobile Launchers Containing Training Models of Missiles at Plesetsk |1|

The United States of America notes the intention of the Russian Federation to include, within the boundaries of the Plesetsk Test Range, the area that is currently declared as the Plesetsk Training Facility for ICBMs. With regard to non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs containing training models of missiles, the United States of America notes that the position of the Russian Federation is that the Treaty does not prohibit the location of such launchers at any declared facility. The position of the United States of America is that subparagraph 2(c) of Article IV prohibits locating non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs that contain training models of missiles outside a training facility. However, recognizing the unique status of the Plesetsk Test Range as reflected in the Fifteenth Agreed Statement, the United States of America, as a matter of policy and without prejudice to its legal position, will not object to the continued location of no more than 20 such mobile launchers of ICBMs at the Plesetsk Test Range.

Unclassified addendum to the unclassified annex to the statement by the United States representative to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission at the closing plenary of the twentieth session, July 28, 1999

U.S. Unilateral Statement On Reducing the Timeframe for Heavy Bomber Elimination Inspections

The United States appreciates Ukraine's interest in disposing of the remains of airframes of heavy bombers in a prompt manner. The United States will expedite its inspections of these heavy bombers to confirm their elimination pursuant to the START Treaty. The exact scheduling of such inspections can only be determined as eliminations occur. The United States notes that it intends to inspect the bombers in batches of no less than five (5) per inspection. The United States plans to inspect the remains of batches of eliminated bombers within fourteen (14) days of notification of elimination of the fifth eliminated bomber not previously inspected. After completion of such inspections, Ukraine could immediately move the remains of the airframes to another site, pursuant to paragraph 7 of section VI of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol.

Unclassified annex to the statement by the United States representative to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission at the closing plenary of the twenty-first session, March 8, 2000

Coordinated Statement on the Nenoksa Space Launch Facility |1|

The United States of America accepts the revised site diagram for the Nenoksa SLBM Test Range dated December 5, 1994. The United States of America understands that the Russian Federation will allow inspectors of the United States of America a one-time entry onto the territory removed from the area of the Nenoksa SLBM Test Range and declared as the Nenoksa Space Launch Facility, as part of the next data update inspection at the Nenoksa SLBM Test Range.

Coordinated Statement on Changes in the Function of a Facility

The United States of America understands that the provisions of JCIC Joint Statement Number 17 on Changes in the Functions of Facilities apply only to a change in the function of an entire facility. Joint Statement Number 17 does not provide for a change in the function of a portion of a facility or for a change in the boundaries of a facility. A change in the function of a portion of a facility would be accomplished by using the provisions of either paragraph 19 or paragraph 20 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding to exclude that portion from within the boundary of the site diagram of the old facility and by declaring, either prior to or coincident with such exclusion, that such excluded portion of the old facility is a new facility or incorporated into another existing facility.

Coordinated Statement on Consultations Related to Declaring Space Launch Facilities Outside National Territory

The United States of America, noting that the Parties to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, share a common commitment to promoting effective verification of Treaty obligations and to ensuring non-proliferation of ballistic missile technology, intends to engage in consultations with other Parties to the Treaty within the framework of the JCIC or through diplomatic channels at least 120 days prior to providing a notification containing a declaration of the existence of a new space launch facility outside its national territory. The objective of these consultations will be to inform the other Parties in advance concerning such notifications.

The United States of America intends to provide to the other Parties during the course of such consultations information on the name and location of the space launch facility being declared, including a geographic reference point or points, not to exceed four, for each such space launch facility. Geographic coordinates will be specified using the criteria of paragraph 1 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty.

The United States of America also intends to provide information on the planned date of declaration of the facility, the expected duration of its use, and the type or types of ICBMs or SLBMs used to deliver objects into the upper atmosphere or space, including space launch vehicles that incorporate the first stages of ICBMs or SLBMs, hereinafter referred to as space launch vehicles, that are planned to be moved to that space launch facility.

The United States of America acknowledges that there is no requirement under the Treaty to agree in advance within the framework of the JCIC or through diplomatic channels on plans pertaining to the declaration of a space launch facility outside its national territory. Such consultations will not affect the Party's right to declare space launch facilities in accordance with the Treaty, or in any way impede legitimate activities in rendering commercial space launch services.

The United States of America intends to locate space launch vehicles, launchers, launch canisters and support equipment, as well as the remains of eliminated launch canisters, within five kilometers of a geographic reference point specified above, or, if located further than this distance from any geographic reference point, provide the geographic coordinates for such items specified in minutes of latitude and longitude.

The United States of America, pursuant to Joint Statement Number 21, intends, if it declares a space launch facility outside it national territory, to take all appropriate measures, including reaching agreement with the government of the State on whose territory the space launch facility being declared will be located, to retain ownership and control of its space launch vehicles, as well as their launchers, support equipment, and launch canisters, while they are in transit and while they are located at that space launch facility. The United States of America also intends to ensure that space launch vehicles, their launchers and support equipment are operated by its personnel at that space launch facility.

Unclassified attachment unilateral plenary statement by the United States of America concerning reentry vehicle inspections and cooperative measures for SS-25 ICBMs based at Drovyanaya and Yoshkar-Ola, August 2, 2000

Taking into account the temporary fiscal constraints that have delayed the completion of fixed structures at Drovyanaya Restricted Area Number 2 (RA-2) and Yoshkar-Ola Restricted Area Number 4 (RA-4), the United States, as a matter of policy, will utilize, as a practical measure during this temporary situation, the procedures proposed by the Russian Federation in Variant II of its non-paper of June 28, 1999, to provide access for reentry vehicle inspections (RVOSIs) and to apply cooperative measures to the nine deployed road-mobile launchers and their associated SS-25 ICBMs at the Drovyanaya ICBM Base for Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs and the nine deployed road-mobile launchers and their associated SS-25 ICBMs at the Yoshkar-Ola ICBM Base for Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs, that are currently declared to be at such restricted areas (RAs) pursuant to Article VI of the Treaty but are temporarily housed in the maintenance facilities for those ICBM bases.

During the period in which this practical measure is used, any RVOSI or cooperative measures requested for the relevant portion of one of these maintenance facilities will also be applied, simultaneously, to any fixed structures existing of under construction in the corresponding RA, the boundaries of which are defined in the January 1, 1999, site diagrams for those RAs.

Consistent with the temporary nature of this practical arrangement, the United States of America intends to conduct a review within the framework of the JCIC of the progress made toward construction of fixed structures at these two RAs approximately two years from this date. Based on the results of that review, the United States would assess the suitability of continuing this arrangement.

The United States of America notes that that practical measure does not set a precedent for addressing its concerns regarding any future activities. Any extension by the Russian Federation of the practice of temporarily housing road-mobile launchers at locations other than their declared RAs for other RAs or other deployed mobile ICBMs, or to allow less than the full exercise of the proposed procedures for the inspection and cooperative measures for these ICBMs would cause the United States of America to cease implementing this practical measure.

Unilateral statement by the United States on the occasion of the entry into force of JCIC Agreement number 44 and JCIC Joint statement number 34, December 11, 2000

The United States interprets JCIC Agreement Number 44 on "Phased Elimination of ICBMs for Mobile Launchers of ICBMs," as providing the Treaty basis for the Parties to agree on phased elimination procedures for the mobile ICBMs of a Party if that Party requests to use phased elimination for its mobile ICBMs. The United States has signed this Agreement without prejudice to its position that the provisions of the Treaty's Conversion or Elimination Protocol apply only to the first stage of the Peacekeeper ICBM, which is considered to be an ICBM pursuant to subparagraph 3(a) of Article III of the Treaty.

At this time, Ukraine has requested to use phased elimination for its SS-24 ICBMs and the Parties have agreed on such procedures for these ICBMs. For its part, the United States has no intention of using, nor could it be obligated to use, phased elimination for its Peacekeeper ICBMs.

Unilateral statement by the Russian side in connection with the statement by Steven Steiner, U.S. representative to the JCIC, at the signing of the JCIC documents on December 11, 2000

In connection with the unilateral statement by Steven Steiner, U.S. Representative to the JCIC, regarding the U.S. position with respect to the elimination of Peacekeeper ICBMs, made at today's signing of the JCIC Agreement on "Phased Elimination of ICBMs for Mobile Launchers of ICBMs" and the JCIC Joint Statement on "Phased Elimination of SS-24 ICBMs Located in Ukraine," I have been instructed to confirm the Russian Federation's position of principle concerning elimination of U.S. Peacekeeper ICBMs, which was set forth in detail in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission in connection with the START Treaty.

Specifically, according to this position of the Russian Federation, mobile ICBMs must be eliminated as provided for in Section I of the Protocol on Conversion or Elimination of the Items subject to the START Treaty, that is, completely and with verification, regardless of the classification of these missiles.

Unilateral statement by the Ukrainian side in connection with the signing of JCIC documents, December 11, 2000

Today, the JCIC has finalized the documents that constitute the legal basis for the implementation of phased elimination of SS-24 ICBMs in Ukraine.

The signature of the JCIC Agreement on "Phased Elimination of ICBMs for Mobile Launchers of ICBMs," and the initialing of the JCIC Joint Statement "On Phased Elimination of SS-24 ICBMs Located in Ukraine" mark the culmination of a lengthy and intensive negotiating process during which all the Parties were extremely constructive and flexible. In this connection, I have been instructed to convey the Ukrainian side's gratitude to the Parties for their understanding of the important issues before them, and for their readiness to assist in seeking solutions.

Unilateral statement by the United States on the occasion of the entry into force of JCIC Agreement number 44 and JCIC joint statement number 34, December 11, 2000

The United States emphasizes that agreements and procedures for Phased Elimination will deviate from the requirements of Section I of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol only in terms of timing or sequencing, and that all substantive rights and obligations in the START Treaty, including all elimination, inspection and attribution requirements, will continue to apply.

Unclassified attachments to U.S. closing plenary statement for JCIC-XXIV, March 20, 2002

Coordinated Plenary Statement on Disablement Beyond Repair of an SLBM or ICBM Other than an ICBM for Mobile Launchers of ICBMs

The United States of America understands that in the event that an SLBM or an ICBM other than an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs is disabled beyond repair, the United States of America may provide a START Format 5 notification that will include a statement of the circumstances related to the disablement. The United States of America understands that such an SLBM or such an ICBM remains accountable as an SLBM or ICBM until such time as it is eliminated pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article VII of the Treaty. Upon elimination of such an SLBM or such an ICBM, the United States of America will provide a START Format 64 notification in accordance with paragraph 4(e) of Section IV of the Notification Protocol. The United States of America further understands that if a Format 5 notification has been provided with respect to that missile and until the elimination of such a missile in accordance with paragraph 3 of Article VII of the Treaty, the United States of America, in its Notifications of Updated Data in each of the categories contained in the Memorandum of Understanding, will identify such a missile as being disabled beyond repair by use of an asterisk after the total number of such missiles and by a footnote at the end of the Memorandum of Understanding entry for the facility for which the missile is declared. This footnote will indicate that such missile has been declared disabled beyond repair and will include the location of such missile.

Coordinated Statement by the Representative of the United States of America at JCIC-XXIV on Measuring Launch Canisters Contained in or Located on a Mobile Launcher |1|

As a matter of policy and without prejudice to the U.S. legal position concerning paragraph 6 of Annex 1 to the START Treaty's Inspection Protocol, the United States will make one annual measurement of an SS-25 launch canister located on a road-mobile launcher; one annual measurement of the launch canister of each variant of the SS-25 ICBM, including the RS-12M Variant 2, located on a mobile launcher; and one annual measurement of the launch canister of each new type of mobile ICBM contained in or located on a mobile launcher. The United States understands that the Russian Federation will permit these annual measurements to be made during data update inspections on launch canisters contained in or located on deployed or non-deployed mobile launchers, as designated by the inspecting Party. In addition, the United States understands that the Russian Federation will provide photographs of assemblies and components that uniquely associate the launch canister and launcher for each variant of the SS-25 ICBM, including the RS-12M Variant 2, and for each new type of mobile ICBM.

Annex J
Other requirements

1. The Parties shall provide, as a category of data, geographic coordinates relating to the data contained in this Memorandum. All geographic coordinates provided for in this Memorandum shall be expressed in latitude and longitude to the nearest minute, except in cases where two or more locations are within one minute of latitude and longitude of each other, and are of the same type or have the same appearance; in such cases, the latitude and longitude shall be expressed to include seconds. Geographic coordinates for silos used as launch control centers, other launch control centers, and silo launchers of ICBMs located in a silo launcher group at an ICBM base shall be expressed to the nearest minute. In specifying geographic coordinates, each Party shall use the system of coordinates commonly employed by it.

2. The geographic coordinates for training facilities specified in Annex A to this Memorandum and for test ranges shall be specified as follows:

(a) If such a training facility or a test range comprises a single area of less than ten square kilometers, the geographic coordinates of its reference point shall be provided pursuant to this Memorandum and shall be specified on the site diagram, but if such an area is ten square kilometers or greater, the geographic coordinates of points on its perimeter, connected by straight or curved lines to delineate boundaries, shall be specified using, where possible, man-made or natural features such as roads, fences, railroad tracks, or rivers.
(b) If such a training facility or a test range comprises a number of non-contiguous areas, the geographic coordinates of the reference point for the entire training facility or test range shall be provided pursuant to this Memorandum and shall be specified on the site diagram. In addition, for each of its separate areas of less than ten square kilometers, the geographic coordinates of its reference point shall be specified on the site diagram, but if such an area is ten square kilometers or greater, the geographic coordinates of points on its perimeter, connected as described in subparagraph (a) of this paragraph, shall be specified.

3. If coordinates of two or more locations are specified as provided for in paragraph 1 of this Annex, but the other Party considers that these locations have the same appearance, notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 6 of Section I of the Notification Protocol. In this case, the Party providing the coordinates shall, within 15 days, provide clarifying information permitting the other Party to differentiate between the locations within one minute of latitude and longitude of each other, or provide their coordinates to include seconds of sufficient accuracy to differentiate between the locations.

4. The Parties shall provide site diagrams for each facility at which baseline data inspections, data update inspections, new facility and suspect-site inspections may be conducted; and for each facility subject to continuous monitoring, in accordance with the following:

(a) No later than 30 days after signature of the Treaty, each Party shall provide site diagrams for each facility listed in this Memorandum at which baseline data inspections and data update inspections may be conducted, and at which suspect-site inspections may be conducted, and for each facility subject to continuous monitoring.
(b) Thereafter, for each new facility provided for in this paragraph, each Party shall provide site diagrams.

All such site diagrams shall be drawn to scale and shall include boundaries of the facility, road and rail entrances/exits, facility reference points with geographic coordinates, and scale of the site diagram.

5. For ICBM bases, the following site diagrams shall be provided:

ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs -- a site diagram of the entire ICBM base and a site diagram of the maintenance facility.

ICBM base for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs -- a site diagram of the entire ICBM base, a site diagram of the maintenance facility, and a site diagram of each restricted area.

ICBM base for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs -- a site diagram of the entire ICBM base, a site diagram of the rail garrison and a site diagram of the maintenance facility if the maintenance facility is located outside the rail garrison. If the maintenance facility is within the rail garrison, the site diagram of the entire ICBM base shall not be required, and in this case the maintenance facility shall be shown on the site diagram for the rail garrison, and a separate site diagram of the maintenance facility shall not be required.

Each site diagram of the entire ICBM base shall be drawn in a simplified form. Such a simplified site diagram shall consist of the following:

For each group of silo launchers of ICBMs, only its name or designation shall be required to be specified, and the location of each silo launcher of ICBMs shall be depicted;
For each restricted area, its name or designation shall be specified, and the reference point and approximate boundary of each such restricted area shall be depicted;
For each rail garrison, its name shall be specified, and the reference point, location and designation of each parking site, each rail entrance/exit, and connecting rail lines shall be depicted.
For each maintenance facility, its name shall be specified, and the reference point and approximate boundary of the maintenance facility shall be depicted.

In addition, the name of the entire ICBM base, reference point with geographic coordinates for the entire ICBM base, and the network of major roads that connect the maintenance facility with the groups of silo launchers of ICBMs, the restricted areas, or the rail garrisons shall be depicted on a simplified site diagram. In all other respects, each simplified site diagram of the entire ICBM base shall meet all requirements set forth in subparagraphs 9(a) and 9(b)(i) of this Annex.

6. Site diagrams of deployment areas shall not be required. The boundaries of deployment areas shall be defined by straight lines connecting points on the terrain, the geographic coordinates of which shall be provided pursuant to this Memorandum. Site diagrams of restricted areas shall show the road network connecting fixed structures for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs. Site diagrams for rail garrisons shall show all rail lines, rail entrances/exits, and parking sites within the rail garrison, and the maintenance facility if the maintenance facility is within the rail garrison. Site diagrams of rail garrisons need not have boundaries shown. If the boundaries of a rail garrison are not shown, the site diagram of such a rail garrison shall be drawn to include all parking sites and rail entrances/exits, as well as all rail lines and associated structures that are large enough to contain items of inspection, except for those structures where reentry vehicles are stored.

7. The site diagrams of facilities associated with SLBM launchers shall show the fixed piers and wharves at these facilities.

8. Site diagrams for air bases for heavy bombers and former heavy bombers shall depict runways and taxiways. Additionally, parking areas, revetments, shelters, hangars, and all locations where heavy bombers are parked or maintained shall be depicted on the site diagram.

9. For site diagrams of facilities provided pursuant to this Memorandum, the following requirements are established:

(a) All site diagrams shall meet the following requirements:

(i) The title of a site diagram shall provide the name and function of the facility depicted on the site diagram as it appears in this Memorandum, reference point geographic coordinates of this facility provided pursuant to this Memorandum, and the day, month, and year that the diagram was prepared. A site diagram that does not depict the entire facility, but only a portion of that facility, shall include the above-mentioned title for the entire facility and an additional subtitle with similar information for that portion of the facility. The information shall be provided in both English and Russian.
(ii) The facility reference point, as specified by geographic coordinates provided pursuant to this Memorandum or on the facility site diagram, shall be indicated on the site diagram by a "+" sign and by the letters "RP" (Reference Point) near that sign.
(iii) An arrow indicating the orientation of the facility relative to geographic (true) north shall be included on the site diagram.
(iv) The cartographic projection method used as the basis for a site diagram shall provide an undistorted view of the facility.
(v) The site diagram shall be drawn so that the depicted facility fills approximately 80 percent of either the vertical or horizontal dimension of a page. At a minimum, a page must be 21 x 27.9 centimeters. The site diagram shall include a bar scale, showing the scale of the site diagram in meters or kilometers, and a numerical ratio 1:S, where "S" is the number indicating the factor of reduction used in depicting on the site diagram the actual measurements taken in the field.
(vi) Symbols shall be used to draw site diagrams to represent, for example, the boundaries of the facility, road and rail entrances and exits, structures, and roads. A list of the symbols used, with a clear explanation of what is represented by them, shall be included by the Parties on the front or reverse side of each site diagram, or one copy of such a list shall be included with each exchange of site diagrams between the Parties.

(b) Site diagrams of facilities, except those required for continuous monitoring activities, shall meet the following additional requirements:

(i) Facility boundaries shall be shown on the site diagram that, at a minimum, enclose the structures used for, and the area associated with, items declared at that facility, as well as the structures used to contain the support equipment declared at that facility. The boundaries shall be clearly delineated by using, where possible, man-made or natural features such as roads, fences, railroad tracks, or rivers.
(ii) The network of major roads within the facility shall be shown on the site diagram, but if the facility consists of two or more non-contiguous areas, the network of major roads connecting these separate areas shall also be shown.
(iii) At a minimum, all structures used for items declared at that facility, and the structures used to contain the support equipment declared at that facility shall be shown within the boundary of that facility on the site diagram. Additionally, all structures that are intended for, and are large enough to be used for, items or support equipment declared at that facility shall be shown within the boundary of that facility, except those structures the entrances of which are not large enough to permit passage of such items or support equipment. If such structures are below ground, the entrances shall be marked and an outline of the below-ground structure shall be shown on the site diagram. Structures shown on the site diagram shall be in the shape of the area occupied by them or the area covered by the roofs of those structures and shall be accurately shown in proper scale and orientation to other structures and features shown on the site diagram. Notwithstanding the provisions of this subparagraph or of subparagraph 9(b)(i) above, silo training launchers and silo test launchers shall be shown on the site diagram of the facility at which they are declared, either outside or within the boundary of that facility. |1|
(iv) In case of construction of additional structures at facilities or elimination of the existing structures specified in subparagraph (b) (iii) of this paragraph, no updating of site diagrams provided pursuant to this Memorandum shall be required. During pre-inspection procedures, a member of the in-country escort shall provide the inspectors a copy of the site diagram, updated to show changes in such structures and, at a minimum, showing all other structures that are intended for, and are large enough to be used for, items or support equipment declared at that facility, except those structures the entrances of which are too small to permit passage of such items or support equipment. |2| This process shall constitute an official update of site diagrams.

(c) Site diagrams for facilities subject to continuous monitoring shall meet the following additional requirements:

(i) The outer perimeter of such a facility shall be delineated by a single, continuous line drawn on the site diagram.
(ii) The proposed boundary of the perimeter continuous monitoring area shall be delineated by a dashed line.
(iii) Additionally, the portal and all road exits and personnel exits shall be depicted.
(iv) Finalized site diagrams of such a facility shall be prepared following completion of the engineering survey.

10. Photographs of assembled ICBMs; assembled SLBMs; first stages of ICBMs; first stages of SLBMs; launch canisters for assembled ICBMs; mobile launchers of ICBMs; fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs; support equipment; long-range nuclear ALCMs; and heavy bombers and former heavy bombers subject to inspection of, as applicable, all types, categories, variants, and versions that are specified in this Memorandum shall be appended to this Memorandum. In addition, photographs of the distinguishing features of heavy bombers and former heavy bombers, specified in Annex G to this Memorandum, shall be provided during distinguishability exhibitions. All photographs shall meet the following requirements:

(a) All photographs shall be taken using black and white film.
(b) All photographs shall be taken with adequate lighting. The use of flash and lighting equipment shall be allowed.
(c) The object being photographed shall contrast with the background in the photograph.
(d) All photographs shall be of high definition and in focus.
(e) For each object, one photograph, at least 18 by 24 centimeters, including 1 .5 centimeter borders, shall be provided. For objects other than heavy bombers, all photographs shall be taken at the same level as the object being photographed with the camera placed perpendicular to the longitudinal axis of the object. Road-mobile launchers of ICBMs shall be photographed without tarpaulins or covers. In this connection, ICBM launchers mounted on a trailer or semi-trailer shall be photographed both with and without prime movers. A road-mobile launcher of ICBMs shall be photographed both with and without a missile, in a transport position. For rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, photographs of railcars (flatcars) shall be provided. For heavy bombers and former heavy bombers subject to inspection, the photographs shall be taken from the front right-hand side, at an angle of 30-45� to the longitudinal axis of the heavy bomber. These photographs shall show the heavy bomber with the maximum number of nuclear armaments for which it is externally equipped.
(f) The object that is being photographed shall fill at least 80 percent of the photograph (not including borders) in either horizontal or vertical aspect.
(g) A reference gauge shall be included in each photograph together with the object. The gauge shall have alternating half-meter sections in black and white. It must be long enough to provide accurate scaling and must be placed against the object or in close proximity to it. If a reference gauge with sections of a different length is used, the length of these sections (increments) shall be specified on the label on the photograph.
(h) Each photograph shall be labeled in both English and Russian to include the type and variant of a type of object photographed, as they are specified in this Memorandum.

11. For each base or facility specified in Annexes A, B, and C to this Memorandum, each Party shall provide data on each ICBM, SLBM, and heavy bomber of a type and variant of a type based or stored at that base or facility, according to paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.

12. Each Party shall:

(a) For each measurement of the dimensions of items specified in Annexes F, G, and H to this Memorandum, specify all values to the nearest 0.01 meter if the value of the dimension being measured is less than two meters and to the nearest 0.1 meter if the value of the dimension being measured is two or more meters.
(b) For variants, specify separately technical data for all variants of a type specified in Annexes F, G, and H to this Memorandum.

13. For the purposes of confirming the type of ICBM or SLBM, the length of an assembled ICBM or SLBM without its front section shall be the distance from the edge of the main engine nozzle of the first stage to:

(a) the place where the missile joins the front section, or
(b) the forward point of the missile if the front section is inside the missile airframe or its reentry vehicles are inside the missile airframe.

14. For the purposes of the Treaty that are unrelated to confirming a new type of ICBM or SLBM, first stage length shall be:

(a) For ICBMs or SLBMs maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles in launch canisters or without launch canisters, the distance from the edge of the main engine nozzle to the edge of the ICBM or SLBM airframe where the first stage separates during flight.
(b) For ICBMs or SLBMs maintained, stored, and transported as stages, the distance from the lower edge of the main engine nozzle to the place where the first stage, in the form in which it exits the production facility, joins the rest of the missile airframe.

15. For purposes of confirming a new type of ICBM or SLBM on the basis of a change in the length of the first stage (with or without a change in throw-weight), the length of the first stage shall be:

(a) For solid-propellant first stages, the distance from the point where the aft end dome of the motor case joins with the nozzle to the upper point of the forward end dome of the motor case.
(b) For liquid propellant first stages, the distance from the aft end of the propellant tank nearest the main engine nozzle to the forward end of the propellant tank farthest from the main engine nozzle.

16. For purposes of measuring the diameter of stages of ICBMs and SLBMs, the diameter shall be the maximum external diameter of the stage excluding protruding elements.

17. For each of its submarine bases, each Party shall provide, through diplomatic channels no later than 30 days after entry into force of the Treaty, a coastlines and waters diagram on which shall be identified the coastline of the inspection site, the coastline adjacent to the other piers and wharves at which a ballistic missile submarine that is considered by the inspected Party to be located at the submarine base might be moored, and the waters within arcs with a radius of five kilometers from such coastlines. In the event such coastlines and waters change, a new coastlines and waters diagram reflecting such change shall be provided through diplomatic channels no less than 30 days in advance of the effective date of the change. Coastlines and waters diagrams provided pursuant to this paragraph shall be used only for the purposes of the procedures set forth in paragraph 4 and subparagraph 8(d) of Section IX of the Inspection Protocol. |3|

18. Geographic coordinates pertaining to data in the Memorandum of Understanding, and site diagrams provided by the Parties pursuant to the Treaty, and coastlines and waters diagrams provided by the Parties pursuant to the Treaty shall not be released to the public by any Party other than the Party that provided such geographic coordinates and such diagrams in fulfilling its obligations provided for in the Treaty, unless otherwise agreed. Additional data and other information may be agreed by the Parties within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission for inclusion in this paragraph. The provisions of this paragraph shall not affect the rights and obligations of the Parties with respect to the communication of such data and other information to those individuals who, because of their official responsibilities, require such data or other information to carry out activities related to the fulfillment of the obligations provided for in the Treaty. |4|

19. For each change to the boundary of a facility shown on the existing site diagram of the facility provided pursuant to this Memorandum that would result in the exclusion from within such boundary of any structure that was shown within such boundary pursuant to subparagraph 9(b)(iii) or 9(b)(iv) of this Annex, the change shall become effective after the following requirements are met: |5|

(a) the provisions of paragraph 2 of Section IX of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol have been met with respect to the portions of the facility to be excluded from within the boundary of the facility;
(b) for all structures that were ever shown within the boundary shown on the existing site diagram pursuant to subparagraph 9(b)(iii) or 9(b)(iv) of this Annex and that would be excluded from within the boundary of the facility, information has been provided by the Party changing the boundary of the facility, within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission or through diplomatic channels, on its intent with regard to: |6|

(i) the structures that will remain unchanged but which that Party declares will no longer be used for items of inspection;
(ii) the structures that will be destroyed;
(iii) the structures that will be converted in a manner so that they are not large enough to contain items of inspection or their entrances are not large enough to permit passage of items of inspection; and
(iv) the approximate effective date of the change;

(c) agreement has been reached, within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, on:

(i) the new boundary of the facility; and
(ii) inspections of portions of the facility to be excluded from within the boundary of the facility. The procedures for such inspections shall be agreed taking into account the plans specified pursuant to subparagraph (b) of this paragraph for each structure, including its possible destruction or conversion. Such procedures and plans shall be recorded in the agreement reached pursuant to this subparagraph. Unless otherwise agreed, the procedures for such inspections shall be based on the provisions contained in, as applicable, Sections XII and XIII of the Inspection Protocol; and

(d) a notification has been provided in accordance with paragraph 19 of Section I of the Notification Protocol. |7|

20. For each change to the boundary of a facility shown on the existing site diagram of the facility provided pursuant to this Memorandum that would not result in the exclusion from within such boundary of any structure that was ever shown within such boundary pursuant to subparagraph 9(b)(iii) or 9(b)(iv) of this Annex, the change shall become effective after the following requirements are met: |8|

(a) agreement has been reached, within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, on:

(i) the new boundary of the facility; and
(ii) inspection of portions of the facility to be excluded from within the boundary of the facility. Unless otherwise agreed, the procedures for such inspection shall be based on the provisions contained in Section XII of the Inspection Protocol;

(b) information has been provided by the Party changing the boundary of the facility on the approximate effective date of the change; and
(c) a notification has been provided in accordance with paragraph 19 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.

21. For each change to the boundary of a facility shown on the existing site diagram of the facility provided pursuant to this Memorandum that would not result in the exclusion of any portion of the existing inspection site from within such boundary, the change shall become effective on the date specified in the notification of the change to such boundary provided in accordance with paragraph 19 of Section I of the Notification Protocol. |9|

[Source: U.S. Department of State]

Notes:

Treaty Articles

1. Modified by JCIC Agreement No. 45 [Back]

Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or Elimination of the Items Subject to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms

1. JCIC Agreement No. 44, Article One, Paragraph 1. [Back]

2. JCIC Agreement No. 36, Article One, Paragraph 1. [Back]

3. JCIC Agreement No. 36, Article One, Paragraph 2. [Back]

Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms

1. JCIC Agreement No. 5, Article Three. [Back]

2. JCIC Agreement No. 8, Article One, Paragraph 1. [Back]

3. JCIC Agreement No. 19, Article Three, Paragraph 1. [Back]

4. JCIC Agreement No. 19, Article Three, Paragraph 2. [Back]

5. JCIC Agreement No. 14, Article One, Paragraph 1. [Back]

6. JCIC Agreement No. 14, Article One, Paragraph 2. [Back]

7. JCIC Agreement No. 4, Article One. [Back]

8. JCIC Agreement No. 23, Article One, Paragraph 1. [Back]

9. JCIC Agreement No. 23, Article One, Paragraph 2. [Back]

10. JCIC Agreement No. 23, Article One, Paragraph 3. [Back]

11. Corrigenda, December 19, 1991, Section II. [Back]

12. JCIC Agreement No. 28, Article One, Paragraph 1. [Back]

13. JCIC Agreement No. 28, Article One, Paragraph 2. [Back]

14. JCIC Agreement No. 2, Article One, Paragraph 2. [Back]

15. JCIC Agreement No. 2, Article One, Paragraph 3. [Back]

16. JCIC Agreement No. 2, Article One, Paragraph 4. [Back]

17. JCIC Agreement No. 21, Article One. [Back]

18. JCIC Agreement No. 2, Article One, Paragraph 6. [Back]

19. JCIC Agreement No. 28, Article One, Paragraph 3. [Back]

20. JCIC Agreement No. 13, Article One, Paragraph 1. [Back]

21. JCIC Agreement No. 13, Article One, Paragraph 2. [Back]

22. JCIC Agreement No. 13, Article One, Paragraph 3. [Back]

23. JCIC Agreement No. 38, Article One. [Back]

Annex 4 of Inspection Protocol: Procedures for inspections of heavy bombers, former heavy bombers, long-range ALCMS, and their facilities

1. JCIC Agreement No. 24, Article Three. [Back]

Annex 5 of Inspection Protocol: Procedures for continuous monitoring

1. JCIC Agreement No. 47, Article One. [Back]

Annex 6 of Inspection Protocol: Procedures relating to unique identifiers

1. JCIC Agreement No. 2, Article One, Paragraph 7. [Back]

Annex 7 of Inspection Protocol: Procedures for delivering and examining equipment and supplies transported by inspection airplanes used in accordance with paragraph 4 of section IV of this Protocol

1. JCIC Agreement No. 5, Article One. [Back]

2. JCIC Agreement No. 5, Article Two. [Back]

Annex 8 of Inspection Protocol: Equipment for inspections and continuous monitoring activities

1. JCIC Agreement No. 40, Article One, Paragraph 1. [Back]

2. JCIC Agreement No. 40, Article Two, Paragraph 1. [Back]

3. JCIC Agreement No. 40, Article One, Paragraph 2. [Back]

4. JCIC Agreement No. 40, Article Two, Paragraph 2. [Back]

5. JCIC Agreement No. 40, Article One, Paragraph 3. [Back]

6. JCIC Agreement No. 40, Article Two, Paragraph 3. [Back]

7. JCIC Agreement No. 25, Article One, Paragraph 1. [Back]

8. JCIC Agreement No. 40, Article One, Paragraph 4. [Back]

9. JCIC Agreement No. 40, Article Two, Paragraph 4. [Back]

10. JCIC Agreement No. 40, Article Two, Paragraph 5. [Back]

11. JCIC Agreement No. 19, Article Two, Paragraph 1. [Back]

12. JCIC Agreement No. 19, Article Two, Paragraph 2. [Back]

13. JCIC Agreement No. 34, Article Two, Paragraph 1. [Back]

Annex 10 of Inspection Protocol: Types of inspection airplanes

1. JCIC Agreement No. 46, Article One. [Back]

2. JCIC Agreement No. 12, Article One. [Back]

3. JCIC Agreement No. 46, Article Two. [Back]

Annex 11 of Inspection Protocol: Procedures for confirming the dimensions of ICBMs and SLBMs

1. JCIC Agreement No. 7, Article One. [Back]

Annex 12 of Inspection Protocol: Size criteria to be used during inspections and continuous monitoring

1. JCIC Agreement No. 22, Article One, Paragraph 1. [Back]

2. JCIC Agreement No. 22, Article One, Paragraph 2. [Back]

3. JCIC Agreement No. 22, Article One, Paragraph 3. [Back]

Annex 13 of Inspection Protocol: Procedures for additional confirmation of the dimensions of first stages of SLBMs

1. JCIC Agreement No. 7, Article Two. [Back]

Annex 14 of Inspection Protocol: Settlement of accounts

1. This Annex is included in this Protocol pursuant to Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Agreement Number 30 of February 3, 1995. [Back]

2. JCIC Agreement No. 49, Article One. [Back]

3. JCIC Agreement No. 49, Article Two. [Back]

4. JCIC Agreement No. 49, Article Two. [Back]

5. JCIC Agreement No. 49, Article Two. [Back]

6. JCIC Agreement No. 49, Article Three. [Back]

Annex 15 of Inspection Protocol: Procedures for the use of radiation detection equipment

1. JCIC Agreement No. 34, Article Three. [Back]

the Protocol on notifications relating to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms

1. JCIC Agreement No. 37, Article One. [Back]

2. JCIC Agreement No. 27, Article One. [Back]

3. JCIC Agreement No. 29, Article Two. [Back]

4. JCIC Agreement No. 35, Article One. [Back]

5. JCIC Agreement No. 18, Article Three, Paragraph 1. [Back]

6. JCIC Agreement No. 20, Article One. [Back]

Annex 1 of the Notifications Protocol: Releasability of information contained in notifications

1. This Annex is included in this Protocol pursuant to Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Agreement Number 17 of May 4, 1994. [Back]

2. JCIC Agreement No. 19, Article Three, Paragraph 3. [Back]

3. JCIC Agreement No. 33, Article One, Paragraph 1. [Back]

4. JCIC Agreement No. 33, Article One, Paragraph 2. [Back]

5. JCIC Agreement No. 18, Article Three, Paragraph 2. [Back]

Protocol on telemetric information

1. JCIC Agreement No. 35, Article Two, Paragraph 1. [Back]

2. JCIC Agreement No. 26, Article One, Paragraph 1. [Back]

3. JCIC Agreement No. 26, Article One, Paragraph 2. [Back]

4. JCIC Agreement No. 41, Article One. [Back]

5. JCIC Agreement No. 6, Article One. [Back]

6. JCIC Agreement No. 48, Article One. [Back]

7. JCIC Agreement No. 18, Article One. [Back]

8. JCIC Agreement No. 35, Article Two, Paragraph 2 [Back]

9. JCIC Agreement No. 35, Article Two, Paragraph 3. [Back]

Annex 1 of the Protocol on telemetric information: Provision and installation of equipment necessary for and equipment related to playback of telemetric information that is contained on tapes

1. JCIC Agreement No. 6, Article Two. [Back]

2. JCIC Agreement No. 10, Article One, Paragraph 1. [Back]

3. JCIC Agreement No. 10, Article One, Paragraph 2. [Back]

4. JCIC Agreement No. 10, Article One, Paragraph 3. [Back]

Annex 2 of the Protocol on telemetric information: Provision of tapes and data associated with the analysis of telemetric information, and the use of recording media

1. JCIC Agreement No. 11, Article One. [Back]

Annex 3 of the Protocol on telemetric information: Releasability of telemetric information

1. JCIC Agreement No. 17, Article One. [Back]

Annex 4 of the Protocol on telemetric information: Logistical and administrative procedures for conducting training and maintenance and for providing spare parts and replacement parts for telemetry equipment

1. JCIC Agreement No. 18, Article Two. [Back]

Protocol on the joint compliance and inspection commission

1. Annex 1, Paragraph 1. [Back]

2. Annex 1, Paragraph 2. [Back]

3. Annex 1, Paragraph 3. [Back]

4. Annex 1, Paragraph 4. [Back]

5. Annex 1, Paragraph 5. [Back]

6. Annex 1, Paragraph 6. [Back]

7. Annex 1, Paragraph 7. [Back]

8. Annex 1, Paragraph 8. [Back]

Annex 1 of the Protocol on the joint compliance and inspection commission: Additional procedures governing the operation of the joint compliance and inspection commission

1. This Annex is included in this Protocol pursuant to Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Agreement Number 1 of October 23, 1992. [Back]

2. For simplicity, the contents of this Annex have been incorporated into the JCIC Protocol consistent with the methodology for incorporating viability and effectiveness changes throughout the remainder of the Treaty. [Back]

Lisbon Protocol

1. Spelling as appears in the original English Text of Protocol. In other documents, the revised official spelling "Belarus" is used.

Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on notifications of launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles

1. This agreement was not included in original publication of the Treaty. It is included here for completeness. [Back]

1. As written, understood to mean "Article XVII". Two Treaty Articles were included after the statement was made, but before the Treaty was signed. [Back]

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Agreement number 1

1. The footnotes and numbers specified in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article have not been incorporated into this publication of the Treaty. Rather, the methodology for indicating viability and effectiveness changes has been kept consistent with that used in the remainder of this publication. [Back]

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Agreement number 34

1. Revised official spelling. [Back]

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Agreement number 41

1. Revised official spelling. [Back]

JCIC Joint Statements on designations for parking sites

1. This statement and the accompanying statement by the USSR jointly comprise Joint Statement Number 1. [Back]

JCIC Joint Statement number 20

1. Revised official spelling. [Back]

JCIC Joint Statement number 26

1. JCIC Joint Statement No. 30, July 29, 1998 [Back]

JCIC Joint Statement number 28

1. Revised official spelling. [Back]

JCIC Joint Statement ("S" Series) number 1

1. Attachment is classified and therefore is not included in this publication. [Back]

2. JCIC Joint Statement Number 27. [Back]

JCIC Joint Statement ("S" Series) number 2

1. Attachment is classified and therefore is not included in this publication. [Back]

JCIC Joint Statement ("S" Series) number 3

1. Attachment is classified and therefore is not included in this publication. [Back]

JCIC Joint Statement ("S" Series) number 4

1. Attachments are classified and therefore are not included in this publication. [Back]

JCIC Joint Statement ("S" Series) number 5

1. Attachments are classified and therefore are not included in this publication. [Back]

JCIC Joint Statement ("S" Series) number 6

1. Attachments are classified and therefore are not included in this publication. [Back]

JCIC Joint Statement ("S" Series) number 7

1. Attachments are classified and therefore are not included in this publication. [Back]

JCIC Joint Statement ("S" Series) number 8

1. Attachments are classified and therefore are not included in the publication. [Back]

JCIC Joint Statement ("S" Series) number 9

1. Attachment is classified and therefore is not included in the publication. [Back]

JCIC Joint Statement ("S" Series) number 10

1. Attachments are classified and therefore are not included in the publication. [Back]

JCIC Joint Statement ("S" Series) number 11

1. Attachments are classified and therefore are not included in this publication. [Back]

JCIC Joint Statement ("S" Series) number 12

1. Attachments are classified and therefore are not included in this publication. [Back]

JCIC Joint Statement ("S" Series) number 13

1. Attachments are classified and therefore are not included in the publication. [Back]

2. Revised official spelling. [Back]

JCIC Joint Statement ("S" Series) number 14

1. Attachments are classified and therefore are not included in the publication. [Back]

JCIC Joint Statement ("S" Series) number 15

1. Attachments are classified and therefore are not included in this publication. [Back]

JCIC Joint Statement ("S" Series) number 16

1. Attachment is classified and therefore is not included in the publication. [Back]

JCIC Joint Statement ("S" Series) number 17

1. Attachments are classified and therefore are not included in this publication. [Back]

JCIC Joint Statement ("S" Series) number 18

1. Attachment is classified and therefore is not included in the publication. [Back]

JCIC Joint Statement ("S" Series) number 19

1. Attachment is classified and therefore is not included in the publication. [Back]

JCIC Correspondence

1. For brevity, the attachment to the letters of exchange on the "Use of Ground Transportation for the Resupply of Votkinsk" is printed only at the end of the letter from the Representative of the Russian Federation to the U.S. Representative. [Back]

Attachment to the statement by the United States representative to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission at the closing plenary of the twelfth session, December 12, 1995

1. The titles of these sections are not part of the official plenary, but are included for reader convenience. [Back]

2. Unless otherwise footnoted, all coordinated plenary statements have been issued by all Parties to the Treaty. For security classification reasons, the coordinated statements appearing here represent the U.S. version only. [Back]

3. The coordinated plenary statement on the Bershet' ICBM Base was issued by the United States and the Russian Federation. [Back]

Coordinated Statement On Blackjack Heavy Bomber Elimination

1. Issued by the United States and Ukraine. [Back]

Coordinated Statement On Providing Tail Numbers of Heavy Bombers During Conversion or Elimination Inspections

1. Issued by the United States, the Russian Federation and Ukraine. [Back]

Unilateral Statement On Mobile Launchers Containing Training Models of Missiles at Plesetsk

1. The United States withdrew this statement at JCIC-XXII on July 26, 2000. [Back]

Coordinated Statement on the Nenoksa Space Launch Facility

1. Issued by the United States and the Russian Federation. [Back]

Notes - Coordinated Statement by the Representative of the United States of America at JCIC-XXIV on Measuring Launch Canisters Contained in or Located on a Mobile Launcher

1. Issued by the United States and the Russian Federation. [Back]

Annex J

1. JCIC Agreement No. 2, Article Two, Paragraph 8. [Back]

2. JCIC Agreement No. 39, Article One, Paragraph 1. [Back]

3. JCIC Agreement No. 13, Article One, Paragraph 4. [Back]

4. JCIC Agreement No. 17, Article Two. [Back]

5. JCIC Agreement No. 39, Article One, Paragraph 2. [Back]

6. JCIC Agreement No. 39, Article One, Paragraph 3. [Back]

7. JCIC Agreement No. 29, Article One. [Back]

8. JCIC Agreement No. 39, Article One, Paragraph 4. [Back]

9. JCIC Agreement No. 29, Article One. [Back]

Treaties
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Size Criteria
Length (meters) Diameter (meters) Missile Type	4.1 1.88 Trident I/Poseidon
Length (meters) Diameter (meters) Missile Type	6.3 1.68 Minuteman II/III

Size Criteria
Length (meters) Diameter (meters) Missile Type	7.4 1.80 SS-25
Length (meters) Diameter (meters) Missile Type	6.9 1.86 RS-12M, Variant 2 \|1\|

Size Criteria
Length (meters) Diameter (meters) Missile Type	7.4 2.3 Peacekeeper

Size Criteria
Length (meters) Diameter (meters) Missile Type	8.4 2.3 Peacekeeper

Size Criteria
Length (meters) Diameter (meters) Missile Type	17.46 1.76 RS-12M, Variant 2 \|3\|

Size Criteria
Length (meters) Diameter (meters) Missile Type	8.2 2.2 Peacekeeper

Size Criteria
Length (meters) Diameter (meters) Missile Type	8.2 2.3 SS-24

Length (meters)	615.0
Height (meters)	6.0, 10.0, 6.0
Width (meters)	6.0

Length (meters)	606.4
Height (meters)	6.2-6.9, 12.7-13.2, 6.2-6.9
Width (meters)	6.1, 9.2, 6.1"

ROUTE TO POINT OF ENTRY	ROUTE FROM POINT OF ENTRY
To Minsk (direct): (to be provided)	(to be provided)
To Minsk from Almaty: (to be provided)	–
To Minsk from Moscow: (to be provided)	–
To Minsk from Kiev: (to be provided)	–
To Almaty (direct from the west): (to be provided)	(to be provided)
To Almaty (direct from the east): (to be provided)	(to be provided)
To Almaty from Minsk: (to be provided)	–
To Almaty from Moscow: (to be provided)	–
To Almaty from Ulan Ude: (to be provided)	–
To Almaty from Kiev: (to be provided)	–
To Moscow (direct): G.T. SORLA, Ventspils, Belyy, Gagarin, Sheremet'yevo	Same as inbound
To Moscow from Minsk: (to be provided)	–
To Moscow from Almaty: _ (to be provided)	–
To Moscow from Kiev: (to be provided)	–
To Ulan Ude (direct): G.T. SQUID, Yedinka, Yekimchan, Bomnak G.T. LEMUR G.T. NALIM, Vitim G.T. RAMIS, Kirensk G.T. PIKET, Bratsk G.T. DOMOR, Osa, Irkutsk, Bol 'shoye Goloustnoye, Mukhino	Same as inbound
To Ulan Ude from Almaty: (to be provided)	–
To Kiev (direct): (to be provided)	(to be provided)
To Kiev from Minsk: (to be provided)	–
To Kiev from Almaty: (to be provided)	–
To Kiev from Moscow: (to be provided)"	–

	Point of Entry
OGDEN	San Francisco, California
SACRAMENTO	San Francisco, California
MAGNA	San Francisco, California

Size Criteria
Length (meters)	7.4
Diameter (meters)	1.80
Missile Type	SS-25

Length (meters)	6.9
Diameter (meters)	1.86
Missile Type	RS-12M, Variant 2"

Size Criteria
Length (meters)	17.46
Diameter (meters)	1.76
Missile Type	RS-12M, Variant 2"

31Jul1991

Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I)

Treaty Articles

AnnexAgreed Statements

Annex Terms and their definitions

Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or Elimination of the Items Subject to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms

Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms

Protocol on notifications relating to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms

Protocol on ICBM and SLBM throw-weight relating to the treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms

Protocol on telemetric information relating to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms

Protocol on the joint compliance and inspection commission relating to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms

Lisbon Protocol Protocol to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms

Associated Documents Related Agreements

JCIC Agreements

JCIC Joint Statements

JCIC Joint Statements ("S" Series)

JCIC Correspondence

Supplemental Documents

Annex JOther requirements

[Source: U.S. Department of State]

Annex
Agreed Statements

Annex
Terms and their definitions

Lisbon Protocol
Protocol to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms

Associated Documents
Related Agreements

Annex J
Other requirements