The Search for World Peace
DOCUMENT A/7402 |1|
Report of the Sixth Committee
[Original text: French]
[13 December 1968]
Paragraphs I. INTRODUCTION 1-4 II. CONSIDERATION OF PART V OF THE REPORX OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE
ON THE QUESTION OF DEFINING AGGRESSION
5-6 III. CONSIDERATION OF PARTS I-IV OF THE REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE
ON THE QUESTION OF DEFINING AGGRESSION
RECOMMENDATION OF THE SIXTH COMMITTEE 31
1. At its 1676th plenary meeting, on 27 September 1968, the General Assembly decided to include in the agenda for the twenty-third session the item entitled "Report of the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression" and allocated it to the Sixth Committee for consideration and report.
2. At its 1028th meeting, on 2 October 1968, the Sixth Committee began by considering part V of the report of the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression (A/7185/Rev.1). The Committee's 1073rd to 1082nd meetings, held from 18 to 27 November 1968, were devoted to consideration of parts I-IV of the report.
3. At the 1073rd meeting, on 18 November 1968, Mr. Lamptey, the representative of Ghana and Rapporteur of the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression, introduced the Special Committee's report. He said that the remarkably constructive attitude of delegations had made the 1968 session one of the best held on that question since the matter had first been examined in the League of Nations in 1923. He added that a reading of the report revealed the justification for the Special Committee's optimism in recommending to the General Assembly the extension of its mandate.
4. At the 1080th meeting on 25 November 1968, Mr. Secarin, the Rapporteur of the Sixth Committee, raised the question whether the Committee intended to include in its report to the General Assembly a summary of the views expressed in the course of the discussions on the question of defining aggression. After referring to paragraph (f) of the annex to General Assembly resolution 2292 (XXII), he informed the Committee of the financial implications of such a summary. The Committee decided that its report on the important question of defining aggression should contain a summary reflecting the broad trends in legal thinking which had emerged during the debate.
II. CONSIDERATION OF PART V OF THE REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE QUESTION OF DEFINING AGGRESSION
5. Part V of the report of the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression contains the text of a draft resolution recommended by the Committee for adoption by the General Assembly; under the terms of the resolution, the Assembly would decide:
"That the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression shall resume its work as soon as possible before the end of 1968 in New York or at Geneva, so that it can complete its work by submitting a report containing a generally accepted draft definition of aggression to the General Assembly at its twenty-third session."
6. In the course of a brief discussion on the draft resolution, many representatives observed that it would be difficult to schedule meetings of the Special Committee in 1968 during the annual session of the General Assembly. The Sixth Committee therefore decided, on an oral proposal by the representative of Ghana, not to recommend that the General Assembly should schedule meetings of the Special Committee in 1968.
III. CONSIDERATION OF PARTS I-IV OF THE REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE QUESTION OF DEFINING AGGRESSION
7. Parts I-IV of the report of the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression deal with the work done by the Committee. During the discussion of those parts of the report, opinions were expressed on various aspects of the question of defining aggression and on the draft proposals submitted to the Special Committee. The Sixth Committee also had before it a draft resolution calling for the extension of the Special Committee's mandate.
A. Draft resolution submitted to the Sixth Committee
8. The draft resolution reproduced below was submitted by the following countries: Algeria, Congo (Democratic Republic of), Cyprus, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, India, Jamaica, Kenya, Liberia, Mexico, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Romania, Sudan, Spain, Syria, Uganda, the United Arab Republic, the United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Zambia (A/C.6/L733/Rev.1 and Add. 1-3).
"The General Assembly,
"Having considered the Report of the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression (A/7185/Rev.1),
"Taking note of the progress in the Special Committee in its consideration of the question of defining aggression and on the draft definition reflected in the report of the Special Committee,
"Considering that it was not possible for the Special Committee to complete its consideration on the question of defining aggression and of the draft definition before the end of 1968,
"Considering that in its resolution 2330 (XXII) of 18 December 1967, the General Assembly recognized the widespread conviction of the need to expedite the definition of aggression,
"1. Decides that the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression shall resume its work, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2330 (XXII), as early as possible in 1969;
"2. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the Special Committee with the necessary facilities and services;
"3. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its twenty-fourth session an item entitled 'Report of the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression'."
B. General debate
9. As to the preliminary question whether it was possible and desirable to define the notion of aggression, several representatives expressed the opinion that it was. A number of General Assembly resolutions were cited in that connexion, particularly resolution 599 (VI) of 31 January 1952 and resolution 2330 (XXII) of 18 December 1967. It was also argued that a definition of aggression, besides being of paramount importance to the maintenance of international peace and security, would facilitate the implementation of the system of collective security provided for in the Charter of the United Nations, while at the same time promoting the development of international law. Such a definition would enable the Security Council to take more vigorous and effective action, thus significantly strengthening the activities of the United Nations and the means of applying the Charter. It would have a preventive effect by deterring possible aggressors. The point was also made that it was absurd to contend that a definition of aggression would be of no value because it would not prevent all cases of aggression. Those who advanced that argument, it was asserted, had a mistaken view of the role and function of legal definitions, which were not designed to prevent or encourage a given type of behaviour but rather to demarcate the area within which States could carry on their activities. Miraculous results could not, of course, be expected from the existence of a definition; however, no reasonable man would suggest that, because murders and other crimes continued to be committed, the legal rules defining those crimes should be abolished. In point of fact, the existence or absence of aggression would depend on the effectiveness of the enforcement machinery which provided the foundation for whatever definition was adopted. It was also pointed out that, while it was true that a definition of aggression would serve primarily to guide the political organs of the United Nations, the fact remained that such a definition would be directed at world public opinion, which decisively influenced the course of international relations. To the extent that a definition created an enlightened public opinion and enabled people to form clearer judgements of the behaviour of Governments, it could serve to restrain possible aggressors. In any case, there was no question that the main purpose of the definition would be to provide legal safeguards within the framework of the Charter, since it would make it possible to break out of the indecision and subjectivism which characterized political judgements that were not limited by law. In specific cases, of course, it might be desirable, in the interest of maintaining world peace, for the competent United Nations organs to be able to exercise their discretionary powers, even if it was done in an arbitrary manner. It must be recognized, however, that widespread and continuing recourse to arbitrary methods would ultimately produce a complete absence of security and a complete separation between United Nations political activities and international law. It was also pointed out that, at the present time at least, no one was suggesting that a definition of aggression should be incorporated into the Charter through an amendment. Hence, the definition would not apply automatically. It would not be a question of replacing one rule of the Charter by another but of giving a legal interpretation to the rule, i.e., defining its scope and content; the Security Council would remain completely free at all times to evaluate the facts of a case and decide, in discharging its responsibility for the maintenance of peace, that the most appropriate course of action might be to refrain from declaring a State an aggressor and take a different approach to the problem.
10. In the view of those representatives who were in favour of formulating a definition of aggression, the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression should hold further meetings in an effort to carry out the mandate entrusted to it. They observed that it was, in their view, apparent from the Special Committee's report that it had been lack of time rather than any lack of co-operation and understanding that had prevented agreement on a draft definition. It was significant that, for the first time since consideration of the question had begun, States situated in four different continents and representing different schools of thought in the matter of international law had joined in proposing a draft definition of aggression; that was an encouraging fact which served as an argument for permitting the Special Committee to resume its work in 1969, so that it could formulate an adequate definition of aggression.
11. Some representatives, on the other hand, expressed doubts as to whether it was possible or useful to define the concept of aggression. It was argued that the concept was essentially vague and that it would not be easy to arrive at a practical definition of it in legal terms that were acceptable. In any case, however aggression was defined, the definition would be superfluous. In this connexion, it was pointed out that in the Charter of the United Nations, as opposed to the Covenant of the League of Nations, the definition of the notion of aggression was not indispensable to the security system. There were, it was said, certain general principles of international law which made it possible to identify aggression fairly easily in any particular case. Those principles were stated in the Charter of the United Nations, which every Member State had undertaken to respect. Since its foundation, the United Nations, acting through the General Assembly and the Security Council, had frequently applied those fundamental principles, sometimes calling upon Member States to respect them and sometimes taking measures to reduce the risk of violation, or even to halt aggression which had been started. On some occasions, the General Assembly or the Security Council had tried to interpret the principles in question or had cited them in connexion with particular resolutions. The view was also expressed that to think that a definition of aggression would have been enough to prevent certain disputes and violations of international law would be to delude oneself about political reality in the modern world. Reference was made to existing bilateral and multilateral conventions including a definition, which, however, was not followed. It was not the lack of a definition as such which prevented the Security Council from acting effectively. The problem was not the lack of legal criteria on which the Security Council could base a decision on a case of aggression, but the fact that the Council had not been able at the political level to agree whether or not a particular act had constituted aggression or whether it was desirable to label it as such. In point of fact, the Security Council was not obliged to determine the existence of an act of aggression before it could exercise the powers conferred on it in Chapter VII of the Charter. When situations had been brought before it, rather than identify the guilty party and inflict the punishment that the idea of aggression called for, the Council had always sought to play the part of a mediator or conciliator in order to re-establish international peace. The point was also made that it was doubtful whether a definition of aggression could really help to improve the security machinery established by the Charter. While the development of legal rules should be continued, even if the possibility of their violation still remained, it was open to question whether a definition, which would be used principally by the Security Council, would represent, at the present stage in international relations, a means of making the Council's work more effective. It would not give the Council any more authority; only when the Council, and the United Nations, had more authority would it be possible to identify and punish cases of aggression more effectively.
12. In the opinion of some of the representatives who expressed doubts about the possibility and desirability of defining aggression, there would be no point in reconvening the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression. Issue was taken with the assertion that significant progress such as to justify continuation of its work had been made by the Special Committee. Indeed, some representatives asserted that the report disclosed deep cleavages of opinion on matters of fundamental importance, making it difficult to come to optimistic conclusions regarding the possibility of arriving at a definition. They pointed in particular to the fact that the great Powers were a long way from agreement and for that reason alone it was difficult to avoid the conclusion that any further consideration of the question of defining aggression would have little value. It was pointed out that, even among those delegations which believed most firmly in the necessity and possibility of defining aggression, there were differences of opinion on several important aspects of the question. What was more, the debates on elements of a definition of aggression duplicated the work of the Special Committee on the Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States. In the circumstances, it was said, it would be better to refer the question to that Committee and await the results of its work before trying to put forward a definition of aggression.
13. Some representatives, while expressing reservations as to whether it was useful and desirable, at least in the present circumstances, to define the concept of aggression, stated that they would not oppose the drawing up of a definition, on condition that it was satisfactory. In their opinion, an inadequate and incomplete definition would encourage rather than discourage acts of aggression and would be far worse than no definition at all. To be satisfactory, a definition should, essentially, have the following characteristics: it should safeguard the discretionary power of the Security Council and give it a flexible rather than rigid framework to work in; it should avoid using terminology incompatible with the provisions of the Charter, but should, on the contrary, base itself on the Charter; it should recognize the primary role of the Security Council with regard to the maintenance of international peace and security; it should include the idea of felonious intent and not be either so general as to be merely a repetition of the terms of the Charter or so precise as to give the impression of being exhaustive; it should apply both to direct and to indirect aggression; it should recognize the exceptions to the prohibition of the use of force made in the Charter; and it should be acceptable to the majority of Members of the General Assembly and to all the permanent members of the Security Council.
14. Some representatives expressed their views on the form and content of a definition of aggression. The great majority of them were in favour of a mixed type of definition, which would begin with a text in general terms stating the characteristics of acts of aggression; this would be followed by a list of specific instances, which would be neither restrictive nor complete but would be designed to provide a series of examples. This type of definition, however, was criticized by one representative as having all the drawbacks of an enumerative definition.
15. Several representatives considered that the proposed definition should confine itself solely to what constituted aggression resulting from the use of armed force in its direct form. It was said in that connexion that it would be dangerous to try to make the definition cover all the forms of pressure to which a State could be subjected that would extend the scope of Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter; such an extension would result in legitimizing acts of individual or collective defence specifically prohibited by Article 51, which expressly stated that self-defence was only justified in the event of armed attack. Forms of coercion other than armed force, it was added, were covered by other principles of modern international law, and, in particular, the principle of non-interference in the internal or external affairs of States.
16. In the opinion of some representatives, on the other hand, the idea of the indirect form of aggression ought to be included in the definition. It was argued that no analysis of the concept of aggression would be acceptable if it did not deal with the use of force in such forms as infiltration by armed bands, terrorism and subversion. Of the two forms of aggression, direct and indirect, the definition should not stress one at the expense of the other, since international peace and security were endangered both by the various forms of direct armed aggression and by indirect aggression. It was recognized that there would be difficulty in reaching general agreement on the description of the various forms that indirect aggression could take, but the matter was one of considerable practical interest, in view of the fact that the problem of indirect aggression lay behind many serious states of tension or possible states of tension. In addition, according to some representatives, the definition should cover all methods of using force, including economic and political aggression. It was necessary, they said, to take into account such forms of aggression as apartheid, colonialism and racism. It was also said that any definition should recognize the principle that it was legitimate for peoples under colonial domination to use force in their struggle for liberation and independence.
17. Opinions were expressed on the question whether the definition should include the threat of the use of force and whether the threat of the use of armed force could give rise to the right of self-defence. In the view of some representatives, Article 51 of the Charter only recognized the right of self-defence in so far as the State using force was the subject of an armed attack; that meant that any other act, whether serious threats or a violation of international obligations, would not constitute the necessary condition for exercising the right of self-defence. It was said, however, that in some cases the threat of the use of force was equivalent to the use of it; any problem of that kind would have to be solved by the bodies applying the definition, which would have to interpret it in a reasonable and flexible way and take into account the conditions prevailing at the time. It was also pointed out that Article 51 of the Charter had been drawn up at a time when the situation resulting from the threat or use of nuclear weapons had not been foreseen. Since the use of such weapons would have such disastrous effects that the victim would in no case be in a position to exercise the right of self-defence, it was essential to recognize that the threat to use them would by itself entitle the intended victim to the full exercise of that right.
18. In the opinion of some representatives, measures which were not reasonably proportionate to the armed attack could not be justified on grounds of self-defence. There were customary rules which established the conditions applicable in areas where the Charter was silent, to the effect that there should be a direct link and a certain proportion between the illicit act which was the basis for acting in self-defence and the defensive reaction.
19. The principle of priority was also raised. Some representatives maintained that it should be included in the definition. That was an unavoidable necessity and to try to do otherwise would lead to other important problems. If it was necessary to determine not who had attacked first or crossed a frontier, but who had prepared for the war, the situation would be hopeless, since at the present time preparations for war were too closely identified with the arms race. In the view of some representatives, the principle of priority was altogether too simplistic; a State wishing to avoid being labelled an aggressor would engage in feinting tactics and in those circumstances the definition might prove a trap for the innocent.
20. Some representatives considered that the definition should be expressly applicable to entities which were not generally recognized as States or whose status in international law could be contested on some other grounds, but which were required to respect the fundamental obligations imposed by international law with regard to the use of force.
21. Regarding the procedure for the adoption of a definition of aggression, the opinion was expressed by some representatives favouring a definition that it should take the form of a declaration included in a General Assembly resolution, in order to show the special importance the Assembly attached to the question and to give the definition a greater influence on the progressive development of international law. While it was true, they said, that such a resolution would not be strictly binding either on States or on the Security Council, it could not be categorically stated that it would be without any legal force. Considering that the idea of the illegality of aggression was established by many international treaties, it was not possible to rule out a priori the possibility that with the passage of time a definition of aggression solemnly approved by an overwhelming majority of the General Assembly would take on a binding character and become a permanent part of international law.
22. Several representatives referred to a new doctrine which, if they understood it well, seemed to assert that mutual relations of certain groups of States were regulated exclusively by their own arrangements among themselves. These representatives pointed out that such a doctrine would run directly contrary to the fundamental concepts of the Charter and could not be made consistent with any definition of the term aggression in the Charter. On the other hand, the view was expressed that all the allegations regarding some sort of doctrines had the purpose of diverting attention from the aggressive policies of certain States aimed against various countries in various parts and continents of the world. These representatives emphasized that such aggressive policies trampled on the principles and norms of international law and the Charter of the United Nations and necessitated the adoption of corresponding measures to oppose such aggressive policies.
C. Discussion of draft proposals submitted to the Special Committee
23. The draft proposals submitted to the Special Committee were the subject of various comments by representatives in the Sixth Committee. With regard to the twelve-Power draft proposal (A/7185/Rev.1, para. 7), one representative felt that operative paragraph 1 should not include both the definition of aggression and the right of self-defence and would have preferred the latter to be dealt with in a separate paragraph. Another representative considered that neither that draft proposal nor the thirteen-Power draft proposal (ibid., para. 9) approached the question from a strictly legal standpoint. The chief defect in both was the saving clause, which introduced a subjective criterion; in addition, both contained vague and imprecise terms and phrases.
24. Various views were expressed especially on the thirteen-Power draft proposal, which was supported in principle by many representatives.
25. Some representatives observed that the draft did not mention the violation of the Charter which consisted of the use of force to prevent dependent peoples from exercising their inherent right of self-determination. According to those representatives, the Sixth Committee should approve the addition to the draft proposal of a paragraph concerning the guaranteeing of the right of self-determination.
26. One representative said it was most important that the specific acts enumerated should not in any way prejudice the general character of the definition or preclude the possibility of other acts being considered as acts of aggression by the United Nations in the future. It would therefore be appropriate to include a provision dn the lines of the opening words of operative paragraph 2 of the twelve-Power draft proposal.
27. Some representatives were opposed to the words "direct or indirect" qualifying the expression "the use of force" in operative paragraph 1 of the thirteen-Power draft proposal, because they introduced the idea of indirect aggression, discussion of which had been postponed by the Special Committee because of its special complexity.
28. According to one representative, the maintenance of operative paragraph 1 in the proposed form might result in a dangerous extension of the scope of self-defence. That danger was even greater since there was no indication in the fifth preambular paragraph of who would decide, in the circumstances of each particular case, whether armed aggression had occurred. Furthermore, operative paragraph 2 did not indicate which body would be empowered to use force in accordance with the provisions of the Charter; the paragraph seemed to reinforce the idea that other bodies than the Security Council were empowered to use force under the Charter. If operative paragraph 3 was considered in the general context of the preambular part of the draft proposal, and particularly in relation to operative paragraph 5, the concept of self-defence could be extended to other acts of aggression than those mentioned in paragraph 5, since the list in that paragraph was not exhaustive. Although operative paragraph 4 was based on the provisions of Article 53 of the Charter, it nevertheless allowed the possibility that a regional agency could invoke the right to collective self-defence without referring the matter to the Security Council. It was true that operative paragraph 10 provided that no act other than those enumerated in paragraph 5 could be deemed to constitute aggression unless the Security Council so decided, but if a group of States resorted to force under the pretext of self-defence, that use of force could remain unpunished if the Security Council failed to reach a conclusion.
29. The view was expressed that operative paragraph 8 of the thirteen-Power draft proposal was contradictory; it prohibited recourse to individual or collective self-defence while at the same time authorizing "reasonable and adequate steps". Those terms were subjective and might lead to abuse by permitting States to take disproportionate measures with regard to the States accused. It was also said that operative paragraph 8 was highly ambiguous. The theoretical effect of any definition along those lines, based upon an utterly unreal and unviable distinction between direct and indirect aggression, could be to allow the victim of aggression to defend itself against a dramatic and violent attack from the outside, while on the other hand the same victim would presumably find itself on the wrong side of the law if it took appropriate action, in exercise of its right of self-defence, to protect itself from being throttled or from succumbing to slow poisoning. It was enough to state the proposition to see how unreal it was and how far it was in contradiction to the established law of nations and the law of the Charter according to which, when the territorial integrity or political independence of a State was endangered by threats or acts of aggression, appropriate measures of self-defence were admissible irrespective of whether a purely doctrinal classification would assign such threats or acts to the category of direct or indirect aggression. The view was expressed that operative paragraph 8 should be deleted, since it was out of place in the definition of aggression and was more relevant to the field dealt with by the Special Committee on the Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States.
30. At its 1081st meeting, on 26 November 1968, the Sixth Committee, at the request of the Mexican representative, took a roll-call vote on the draft resolution before it (A/C.6/L.733/Rev.1 and Add.1-3). The draft resolution was adopted by 74 votes to none, with 16 alistentions. The voting was as follows:
In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Bulgaria. Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Canada, Ceylon, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo (Democratic Republic of), Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gabon, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mexico, Mongolia, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Rwanda, Southern Yemen, Spain. Sudan, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zambia.
Abstaining: Australia, Belgium, China, Denmark, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.
Recommendation of the Sixth Committee
31. The Sixth Committee therefore recommends that the General Assembly adopt the following draft resolution:
REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE QUESTION OF DEFINING AGGRESSION
[Text adopted by the General Assembly, without change. See "Action taken by the General Assembly" below.]
Administrative and financial implications of the draft resolution submitted by the Sixth Committee in document A/7402
Report of the Fifth Committee
[Original text: English and Spanish]
[17 December 1968]
1. At its 1288th meeting, held on 16 December 1968, the Fifth Committee, in compliance with rule 154 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, considered a note by the Secretary-General (A/C.5/1212) on the administrative and financial implications of the draft resolution submitted by the Sixth Committee (see A/7402, para. 31). The Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions made an oral statement.
2. Under the draft resolution, the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression would resume its work in 1969, in accordance with General Assembly resplution 2330 (XXII). The Secretary-General estimated at $25,600 the additional costs of a five-week session in New York during the period 24 February to 28 March 1969. The Advisory Committee agreed that an additional provision in this amount would be required.
3. Accordingly, the Fifth Committee decided to advise the General Assembly that the adoption of the draft resolution would necessitate an additional appropriation in the amount of $25,600 under section 2 (Special meetings and conferences) of the budget for the financial year 1969.
ACTION TAKEN BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
At its 1746th plenary meeting, on 18 December 1968, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution submitted by the Sixth Committee (A/7402, para. 31) by a vote of 71 to none, with 16 abstentions. For the final text, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-third Session, Supplement No. 18, resolution 2420 (XXIII).
CHECK LIST OF DOCUMENTS
NOTE. This check list includes the documents mentioned during the consideration of agenda item 86 which are not reproduced in the present fascicle.
Document No. Title or description Observations and references A/7185 Report of the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression Replaced by A/7185/Rev.1 A/7185/Rev.1 Report of the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression See Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-third Session, agenda item 86 A/C.6/L.733/Rev.1 and Add.l-3 Algeria, Congo (Democratic Republic of), Cyprus, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, India, Jamaica, Kenya, Liberia, Mexico, Panama, Pakistan, Peru, Romania, Spain, Sudan, Syria, Uganda, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Zambia: draft resolution Adopted without change. See A/7042, para. 8.
Source: Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-Third Session, Agenda Item 86, Report of the Sixth Committee, Doc. A/7402, Dec. 13, 1968, pp. 3-8.
Editorial Note: This is a true copy of the above-referenced original document. This document is reproduced in Benjamin B. Ferencz's work "Defining International Aggression - The Search for World Peace", Vol. 2, as Document No. 15.
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