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13Feb17


Text of the Plea Agreement entered into by Enrique Marquez Jr.
for conspiring to provide material support to terrorists


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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
EASTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,

v.

ENRIQUE MARQUEZ, JR.,
Defendant.

No. CR 15-93-JGB

PLEA AGREEMENT FOR DEFENDANT
ENRIQUE MARQUEZ, JR.

1. This constitutes the plea agreement between ENRIQUE MARQUEZ, JR. ("defendant") and the United States Attorney's Office for the Central District of California (the "USAO") in the above-captioned case. This agreement is limited to the USAO and cannot bind any other federal, state, local, or foreign prosecuting, enforcement, administrative, or regulatory authorities.

DEFENDANT'S OBLIGATIONS

2. Defendant agrees to:

    a. At the earliest opportunity requested by the USAO and provided by the Court, appear and plead guilty to Counts One and Two of the Indictment in United States v. Enrique Marquez, Jr., CR No. 15-93-JGB, which charge defendant with conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2339A(a) (Count One), and false statements in connection with the acquisition of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(a) (6) (Count Two).

    b. Not contest facts agreed to in this agreement.

    c. Abide by all agreements regarding sentencing contained in this agreement.

    d. Appear for all court appearances, surrender as ordered for service of sentence, obey all conditions of any bond, and obey any other ongoing court order in this matter.

    e. Not commit any crime; however, offenses that would be excluded for sentencing purposes under United States Sentencing Guidelines ("U.S.S.G." or "Sentencing Guidelines") 4A1.2(c) are not within the scope of this agreement.

    f. Be truthful at all times with Pretrial Services, the United States Probation Office, and the Court.

    g. Pay the applicable special assessments at or before the time of sentencing unless defendant lacks the ability to pay and prior to sentencing submits a completed financial statement on a form to be provided by the USAO.

THE USAO'S OBLIGATIONS

3. The USAO agrees to:

    a. Not contest facts agreed to in this agreement.

    b. Abide by all agreements regarding sentencing contained in this agreement.

    c. At the time of sentencing, move to dismiss the remaining counts of the Indictment as against defendant. Defendant agrees, however, that at the time of sentencing the Court may consider any dismissed charges in determining the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range, the propriety and extent of any departure from that range, and the sentence to be imposed.

    d. At the time of sentencing, provided that defendant demonstrates an acceptance of responsibility for the offenses up to and including the time of sentencing, recommend a two-level reduction in the applicable Sentencing Guidelines offense level, pursuant to U.S.S.G. 3E1.1, and recommend and, if necessary, move for an additional one-level reduction if available under that section.

NATURE OF THE OFFENSES

4. Defendant understands that for defendant to be guilty of the crime charged in Count One, that is, conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 2339A(a), the following must be true:

(1) beginning on an unknown date and continuing up to and including at least November 2012, there was an agreement between two or more persons to provide material support or resources, including weapons, explosives, and personnel, including themselves; and (2) defendant became a member of the agreement knowing of its object and intending that such support or resources be used in preparation for or in carrying out one or more of the following offenses: (a) Title 18, United States Code, Section 844(f)(1), which prohibits using fire or an explosive to damage or destroy any institution or organization receiving Federal financial assistance; or (b) Title 18, United States Code, Section 844 (i), which prohibits using fire or an explosive to damage or destroy any building, vehicle, or other real or personal property used in interstate or foreign commerce, or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce.

    a. The elements of Title 18, United States Code, Section 844(f)(1), use of fire or explosive to damage or destroy any institution or organization receiving federal financial assistance, are: (1) defendant damaged or destroyed any institution or organization receiving federal financial assistance by means of fire or an explosive; (2), defendant did so maliciously; and (3) at the time of the fire or explosion, the institution or organization was receiving federal financial assistance.

    b. The elements of Title 18, United States Code, Section 844(i), use of fire or explosive to damage or destroy property, are; (1) defendant damaged or destroyed a building, vehicle, or other real or personal property by means of fire or an explosive; (2) defendant did so maliciously; and (3) at the time of the fire or explosion, the building, vehicle, or other real or personal property was used in an activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce.

5. Defendant understands that for defendant to be guilty of the crime charged in Count Two, that is, false statements in connection with the acquisition of a firearm, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 922(a)(6), the following must be true: (1) the firearms seller was a licensed firearms dealer, importer, or manufacturer; (2) defendant made a material false statement in connection with acquiring or attempting to acquire from the firearms seller a firearm or ammunition (in this case, a Smith and Wesson, model M&P-15 Sport, 5.56 caliber rifle bearing serial number SN77510); (3) defendant knew the statement was false; and (4) the false statement was material, that is, the false statement had a natural tendency to influence, or was capable of influencing, the firearms seller into believing that the Smith and Wesson, model M&P-15 Sport, 5.56 caliber rifle bearing serial number SN77510, could be lawfully sold to defendant.

PENALTIES

6. Defendant understands that the statutory maximum sentence that the Court can impose for a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 2339A(a), is: 15 years' imprisonment; a lifetime period of supervised release; a fine of $250,000 or twice the gross gain or gross loss resulting from the offense, whichever is greatest; and a mandatory special assessment of $100.

7. Defendant understands that the statutory maximum sentence that the Court can impose for a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 922(a)(6), is: 10 years' imprisonment; a three-year period of supervised release; a fine of $250,000 or twice the gross gain or gross loss resulting from the offense, whichever is greatest; and a mandatory special assessment of $100.

8. Defendant understands, therefore, that the total maximum sentence for all offenses to which defendant is pleading guilty is: 25 years' imprisonment; a lifetime period of supervised release; a fine of $500,000 or twice the gross gain or gross loss resulting from the offenses, whichever is greatest; and a mandatory special assessment of $200.

9. Defendant understands that supervised release is a period of time following imprisonment during which defendant will be subject to various restrictions and requirements. Defendant understands that if defendant violates one or more of the conditions of any supervised release imposed, defendant may be returned to prison for all or part of the term of supervised release authorized by statute for the offense that resulted in the term of supervised release, which could result in defendant serving a total term of imprisonment greater than the statutory maximum stated above.

10. Defendant understands that, by pleading guilty, defendant may be giving up valuable government benefits and valuable civic rights, such as the right to vote, the right to possess a firearm, the right to hold office, and the right to serve on a jury. Defendant understands that once the Court accepts defendant's guilty pleas, it will be a federal felony for defendant to possess a firearm or ammunition. Defendant understands that the convictions in this case may also subject defendant to various other collateral consequences, including but not limited to revocation of probation, parole, or supervised release in another case and suspension or revocation of a professional license. Defendant understands that unanticipated collateral consequences will not serve as grounds to withdraw defendant's guilty pleas.

11. Defendant understands that, if defendant is not a United States citizen, the felony convictions in this case may subject defendant to: removal, also known as deportation, which may, under some circumstances, be mandatory; denial of citizenship; and denial of admission to the United States in the future. The court cannot, and defendant's attorney also may not be able to, advise defendant fully regarding the immigration consequences of the felony convictions in this case. Defendant understands that unexpected immigration consequences will not serve as grounds to withdraw defendant's guilty pleas.

FACTUAL BASIS

12. Defendant admits that defendant is, in fact, guilty of the offenses to which defendant is agreeing to plead guilty. Defendant and the USAO agree to the statement of facts provided in Attachment A to this plea agreement. Defendant and the USAO agree that this statement of facts is sufficient to support pleas of guilty to the charges described in this agreement and to support the Sentencing Guidelines factors set forth in paragraph 14 below but is not meant to be a complete recitation of all facts relevant to the underlying criminal conduct or all facts known to either party that relate to that conduct.

SENTENCING FACTORS

13. Defendant understands that in determining defendant's sentence the Court is required to calculate the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range and to consider that range, possible departures under the Sentencing Guidelines, and the other sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). Defendant understands that the Sentencing Guidelines are advisory only, that defendant cannot have any expectation of receiving a sentence within the calculated Sentencing Guidelines range, and that after considering the Sentencing Guidelines and the other 3553(a) factors, the Court will be free to exercise its discretion to impose any sentence it finds appropriate up to the maximum set by statute for the crimes of conviction.

14. Defendant and the USAO agree to the following applicable Sentencing Guidelines factors:

Count One
Base Offense Level:
43 43 [U.S.S.G, 2A1.1(a),
2K1.4(c)(1), 2X1,1, 2X2.1]
Count Two
Base Offense Level:
12 [U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(a)(7)]

Defendant and the USAO reserve the right to argue that additional specific offense characteristics, adjustments, and departures under the Sentencing Guidelines are appropriate. Defendant understands that defendant's offense level could be increased if defendant is a career offender under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1 and 4B1.2. If defendant's offense level is so increased, defendant and the USAO will not be bound by the agreement to Sentencing Guideline factors set forth above.

15. Defendant understands that there is no agreement as to defendant's criminal history or criminal history category.

16. Defendant and the USAO reserve the right to argue for a sentence outside the sentencing range established by the Sentencing Guidelines based on the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(1), (a) (2) , (a) (3) , (a) (6), and (a) (7) .

WAIVER OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

17. Defendant understands that by pleading guilty, defendant gives up the following rights:

    a. The right to persist in a plea of not guilty.

    b. The right to a speedy and public trial by jury.

    c. The right to be represented by counsel -- and if necessary have the Court appoint counsel at trial. Defendant understands, however, that, defendant retains the right to be represented by counsel -- and if necessary have the Court appoint counsel -- at every other stage of the proceeding.

    d. The right to be presumed innocent and to have the burden of proof placed on the government to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

    e. The right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against defendant.

    f. The right to testify and to present evidence in opposition to the charges, including the right to compel the attendance of witnesses to testify.

    g. The right not to be compelled to testify, and, if defendant chose not to testify or present evidence, to have that choice not be used against defendant.

    h. Any and all rights to pursue any affirmative defenses, Fourth Amendment or Fifth Amendment claims, and other pretrial motions that have been filed or could be filed.

WAIVER OF APPEAL OF CONVICTION

18. Defendant understands that, with the exception of an appeal based on a claim that defendant's guilty pleas were involuntary, by pleading guilty defendant is waiving and giving up any right to appeal defendant's'convictions on the offenses to which defendant is pleading guilty.

RESULT OF WITHDRAWAL OF GUILTY PLEA

19. Defendant agrees that if, after entering guilty pleas pursuant to this agreement, defendant seeks to withdraw and succeeds in withdrawing defendant's guilty pleas on any basis other than a claim and finding that entry into this plea agreement was involuntary, then the USAO will be relieved of all of its obligations under this agreement.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF AGREEMENT

20. This agreement is effective upon signature and execution of all required certifications by defendant, defendant's counsel, and an Assistant United States Attorney.

BREACH OF AGREEMENT

21. Defendant agrees that if defendant, at any time after the signature of this agreement and execution of all required certifications by defendant, defendant's counsel, and an Assistant United States Attorney, knowingly violates or fails to perform any of defendant's obligations under this agreement ("a breach"), the USAO may declare this agreement breached. All of defendant's obligations are material, a single breach of this agreement is sufficient for the USAO to declare a breach, and defendant shall not be deemed to have cured a breach without the express agreement of the USAO in writing. If the USAO declares this agreement breached, and the Court finds such a breach to have occurred, then: (a) if defendant has previously entered guilty pleas pursuant to this agreement, defendant will not be able to withdraw the guilty pleas, and (b) the USAO will be relieved of all its obligations under this agreement.

22. Following the Court's finding of a knowing breach of this agreement by defendant, should the USAO choose to pursue any charge that was either dismissed or not filed as a result of this agreement, then:

    a. Defendant agrees that any applicable statute of limitations is tolled between the date of defendant's signing of this agreement and the filing commencing any such action.

    b. Defendant waives and gives up all defenses based on the statute of limitations, any claim of pre-indictment delay, or any speedy trial claim with respect to any such action, except to the extent that such defenses existed as of the date of defendant's signing this agreement.

    c. Defendant agrees that: (i) any statements made by defendant, under oath, at the guilty plea hearing (if such a hearing occurred prior to the breach); (ii) the agreed to factual basis statement in this agreement; and (iii) any evidence derived from such statements, shall be admissible against defendant in any such action against defendant, and defendant waives and gives up any claim under the United States Constitution, any statute, Rule 410 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 11(f) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, or any other federal rule, that the statements or any evidence derived from the statements should be suppressed or are inadmissible.

COURT AND PROBATION OFFICE NOT PARTIES

23. Defendant understands that the Court and the United States Probation Office are not parties to this agreement and need not accept any of the USAO's sentencing recommendations or the parties' agreements to facts or sentencing factors.

24. Defendant understands that both defendant and the USAO are free to: (a) supplement the facts by supplying relevant information to the United States Probation Office and the Court, (b) correct any and all factual misstatements relating to the Court's Sentencing Guidelines calculations and determination of sentence, and (c) argue on appeal and collateral review that the Court's Sentencing Guidelines calculations and the sentence it chooses to impose are not error, although each party agrees to maintain its view that the calculations in paragraph 14 are consistent with the facts of this case. While this paragraph permits both the USAO and defendant to submit full and complete factual information to the United States Probation Office and the Court, even if that factual information may be viewed as inconsistent with the facts agreed to in this agreement,, this paragraph does not affect defendant's and the USAO's obligations not to contest the facts agreed to in this agreement.

25. Defendant understands that even if the Court ignores any sentencing recommendation, finds facts or reaches conclusions different from those agreed to, and/or imposes any sentence up to the maximum established by statute, defendant cannot, for that reason, withdraw defendant's guilty pleas, and defendant will remain bound to fulfill all defendant's obligations under this agreement. Defendant understands that no one -- not the prosecutor, defendant's attorney, or the Court -- can make a binding prediction or promise regarding the sentence defendant will receive, except that it will be within the statutory maximum.

NO ADDITIONAL AGREEMENTS

26. Defendant understands that, except as set forth herein, there are no promises, understandings, or agreements between the USAO and defendant or defendant's attorney, and that no additional promise, understanding, or agreement may be entered into unless in a writing signed by all parties or on the record in court.

PLEA AGREEMENT PART OF THE GUILTY PLEA HEARING

27. The parties agree that this agreement will be considered part of the record of defendant's guilty plea hearing as if the entire agreement had been read into the record of the proceeding.

AGREED AND ACCEPTED

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF
CALIFORNIA

Eileen M. Decker
United States Attorney

[Signature]
Jay H. Robinson
Melanie Sartoris
Deirdre Z. Eliot
Assistant United States Attorneys
2/13/2017
Date
Enrique Marquez, Jr.
Defendant
2/10/2017
Date
Young J. Kim
Angela C. Viramontes
Attorneys for Defendant
Enrique Marquez, Jr.
2/13/2017
Date

CERTIFICATION OF DEFENDANT

I have read this agreement in its entirety. I have had enough time to review and consider this agreement, and I have carefully and thoroughly discussed every part of it with my attorney. I understand the terms of this agreement, and I voluntarily agree to those terms. I have discussed the evidence with my attorney, and my attorney has advised me of my rights, of possible pretrial motions that might be filed, of possible defenses that might be asserted either prior to or at trial, of the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), of relevant Sentencing Guidelines provisions, and of the consequences of entering into this agreement. No promises, inducements, or representations of any kind have been made to me other than those contained in this agreement. No one has threatened or forced me in any way to enter into this agreement. I am satisfied with the representation of my attorney in this matter, and I am pleading guilty because I am guilty of the charges and wish to take advantage of the promises set forth in this agreement, and not for any other reason.

ENRIQUE MARQUEZ, JR.
Defendant
2-10-17
Date

CERTIFICATION OF DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY

I am Enrique Marquez, Jr.'s attorney. I have carefully and thoroughly discussed every part of this agreement with my client. Further, I have fully advised my client of his rights, of possible pretrial motions that might be filed, of possible defenses that might be asserted either prior to or at trial, of the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), of relevant Sentencing Guidelines provisions, and of the consequences of entering into this agreement. To my knowledge: no promises, inducements, or representations of any kind have been made to my client other than those contained in this agreement; no one has threatened or forced my client in any way to enter into this agreement; my client's decision to enter into this agreement is an informed and voluntary one; and the factual basis set forth in this agreement is sufficient to support my client's entry of guilty pleas pursuant to this agreement.

Young J. Kim
Angela C. Viramontes
2/13/17
Date
Attorneys for Defendant
ENRIQUE MARQUEZ, JR.

EXHIBIT A

Unless otherwise noted, all factual statements contained in this "Statement of Facts" apply to the time periods detailed in the Indictment in this case.

In approximately 2 005, defendant ENRIQUE MARQUEZ, JR. ("defendant") moved to a home next door to Syed Rizwan Farook ("Rizwan") in Riverside, California, within the Central District of California. Beginning on an unknown date and continuing up to and including at least November 2012, there was an agreement between Rizwan and defendant to attack Riverside City College ("RCC") and California State Route 91 ("SR-91"). Pursuant to the planned attacks, defendant and Rizwan agreed to provide material support and resources, including weapons, explosives, and themselves, knowing and intending these resources to be used to conduct the attacks. If they had occurred, these attacks would have been violations of Title 18, United States Code, Section 844(f)(1) (RCC attack) and Title 18, United States Code, Section 844 (i) (SR-91 attack). Defendant purchased from separate locations of a licensed firearms dealer (the "firearms seller") located within the Central District of California, two rifles for Rizwan: a Smith and Wesson, model M&P-15 Sport, 5.56 caliber rifle bearing serial number SN77510 ("the Smith and Wesson rifle"); and a DPMS, model A-15, 5.56 caliber rifle bearing serial number FH108002 ("the Oracle rifle"). In connection with the purchase of these rifles, defendant knowingly made material false statements that had a natural tendency to influence, or were capable of influencing the firearms seller into believing that the Smith and Wesson and the Oracle rifles could be lawfully sold to defendant.

Defendant also researched bomb-making and provided Rizwan with explosive powder and other material to create bombs.

A. Defendant and Rizwan Planned an Attack at RCC

With respect to the RCC attack, defendant and Rizwan identified the RCC as a possible location for an attack, in part, because they were familiar with the campus. Defendant and Rizwan were each enrolled as students at RCC; defendant was registered as a student at RCC from 2009 to 2011, and from 2013 to 2015; and Rizwan was registered as a student at RCC from approximately 2004 to 2010. As part of their plot, defendant and Rizwan planned to start an attack by throwing pipe bombs into the cafeteria area from an elevated position on the second floor. Defendant and Rizwan would position themselves prior to the attack to escape the cafeteria area without detection, and then agreed to conduct a follow-up attack at another location at RCC. In 2011 and 2012, RCC was receiving federal financial assistance.

B. Defendant and Rizwan Planned a "Rush Hour" Attack on SR-91

In addition to the RCC plot, defendant and Rizwan schemed to attack SR-91 during "rush hour" traffic. In furtherance of their scheme, defendant and Rizwan chose a particular location on SR-91 with no readily available exits or off-ramps. Prior to the attack, defendant intended to deploy to the hills south of the freeway as an overwatch for Rizwan. Rizwan then would start the attack by throwing pipe bombs into the eastbound lanes of SR-91. Both defendant and Rizwan believed that the exploding pipe bombs would disable and stop traffic. As part of the plan, Rizwan would move among the stopped vehicles, shoot his rifle into them, and kill people. Additionally, defendant planned to shoot into the stopped vehicles from his position on the hills while watching for any approaching law enforcement or emergency responders,. In 2011 and 2012, vehicular traffic on SR-91 affected interstate and foreign commerce.

C. Defendant Purchased Firearms and Explosives and Gave them to Rizwan

In late 2011 and early 2012, defendant purchased firearms for Rizwan, namely, the Smith and Wesson and Oracle rifles, from two separate stores of the firearms seller that were located within the Central District of California. The firearms seller is registered as a Federal Firearms Licensee ("FFL"). Defendant purchased the firearms for Rizwan, rather than Rizwan purchasing them himself, because they believed defendant could purchase them more easily than Rizwan and would receive less scrutiny than Rizwan.

1. Defendant Purchased the Smith and Wesson Rifle for Rizwan

On November 14, 2011, defendant purchased the Smith and Wesson rifle for Rizwan. On the purchase documentation, specifically, an ATF Form 4473, defendant's name, address, and date of birth are handwritten into Section A of this form, which provides the following admonition: "Section A - Must Be Completed Personally By Transferee (Buyer)." In addition, the top of the first page of the form states:

    WARNING: You may not receive a firearm if prohibited by Federal or State law. The information you provide will be used to determine whether you are prohibited under law from receiving a firearm. Certain violations of the Gun Control Act, 18 U.S.C. Section 921 et.seq., are punishable by up to 10 years imprisonment and/or up to $250,000 fine.

The NOTICES, INSTRUCTION AND DEFINITIONS section of the form instructs that the buyer must "personally complete Section A of the form and certify (sign) that the answers are true, correct, and complete."

Question 11(a) of Section A of the same form states as follows:

    Are you the actual transferee/buyer of the firearm(s) listed on this form? Warning: You are not the actual buyer if you are acquiring the firearm(s) on behalf of another person. If you are not the actual buyer, the dealer cannot transfer the firearm(s) to you.

In response to question 11(a), defendant checked the box indicating "Yes."

One of the supporting documents for the Smith and Wesson rifle is a form titled "Firearms Purchase Checklist," which defendant signed on November 25, 2011. Defendant signed this form as an affirmation of the following statement:

    I am purchasing this firearm for my or my immediate family's personal use. The dealer has explained to me that the straw purchase of a firearm is illegal and I affirm that I am not purchasing this firearm for anyone other than myself.

2. Defendant Purchased the Oracle Rifle for Rizwan

On February 22, 2012, defendant purchased the Oracle rifle for Rizwan. On the purchase documentation, specifically, an ATF Form 4473, defendant's name, address, and date of birth are handwritten into Section A of this form, which provides the following admonition: "Section A - Must Be Completed Personally By Transferee (Buyer)."

The top of the first page of the form states:

    WARNING: You may not receive a firearm if prohibited by Federal or State law. The information you provide will be used to determine whether you are prohibited under law from receiving a firearm. Certain violations of the Gun Control Act, 18 U.S.C. Section 921 et.seq., are punishable by up to 10 years imprisonment and/or up to $250,000 fine.

The NOTICES, INSTRUCTION AND DEFINITIONS section of the form instructs that the buyer must "personally complete Section A of the form and certify (sign) that the answers are true, correct, and complete."

Question 11(a) of the same the form states:

    Are you the actual transferee/buyer of the firearm(s) listed on this form? Warning: You are not the actual buyer if you are acquiring the firearm(s) on behalf of another person. If you are not the actual buyer, the dealer cannot transfer the firearm(s) to you.

In response to question 11(a), defendant checked the box indicating "Yes."

One of the supporting documents for the purchase of the Oracle rifle is a form titled "Firearms Purchase Checklist," which defendant signed on February 22, 2012. Defendant signed this form as an affirmation of the following statement:

I am purchasing this firearm for my or my immediate family's personal use. The dealer has explained to me that the straw purchase of a firearm is illegal and I affirm that I am not purchasing this firearm for anyone other than myself.

3. Rizwan Provided Defendant Money to Purchase the Rifles

In November 2011 and in January and February 2012, shortly before defendant purchased the Smith and Wesson and Oracle rifles respectively, Rizwan gave defendant money for the purchase of each rifle, which defendant deposited into defendant's bank account.

4. Defendant Purchased Smokeless Powder to Make Explosives

In connection with the RCC and SR-91 plots, defendant discussed with Rizwan the use of radio-controlled devices, including a radio-controlled car, to activate IEDs, as well as the use of remote-controlled devices to achieve a safe separation distance from the device when it went off. Defendant and Rizwan reviewed Inspire Magazine's instructions on how to make an IED and defendant explained to Rizwan how to build a closed-circuit that would create a "spark." Defendant obtained Christmas tree lightbulbs for the specific purpose of manufacturing an igniter for the IEDs that he and Rizwan intended to use during their planned attacks. In or around 2012, defendant also purchased a container of smokeless powder in furtherance of his and Rizwan's planned attacks.

5. Defendant and Rizwan Continue to Prepare for their Attacks Until in or about November 2012

From February 2012 to mid-2012, defendant and Rizwan made multiple trips to gun ranges, including ranges in the Riverside, San Bernardino, and Los Angeles areas, in order to practice shooting. Defendant also watched online videos produced by a U.S.-based tactical equipment manufacturer on the following topics to prepare for the attacks: pistols and carbines, firearms tactics, and how to use cover to walk around a corner while keeping a clear shooting angle,

Defendant ceased plotting with Rizwan to attack the RCC and SR-91 in or about November 2012.

D. Defendant Participated in an Interview with Law Enforcement Following the December 2, 2015 San Bernardino Terrorist Attack

On the morning of December 2, 2015, two individuals, including Rizwan, shot and killed 14 people and wounded at least 22 other people at the Inland Regional Center ("IRC") in San Bernardino, California before leaving in a black SUV. Later that day, law enforcement encountered Rizwan and his wife, Tashfeen Malik ("Malik"), in the black SUV in Redlands, California. Rizwan and Malik engaged in a firefight with law enforcement officers that ended with Rizwan's and Malik's deaths and the wounding of a law enforcement officer. From the scene of the shootout, law enforcement officers recovered four firearms, including the Smith and Wesson rifle and the Oracle rifle. Subsequent forensic testing of the ammunition casings found at the IRC and near the black SUV determined that the Smith and Wesson rifle and the Oracle rifle were used in the attack at the IRC and the firefight with law enforcement.

Additionally, law enforcement searched the IRC and found on a table a black bag containing an IED, filled with smokeless powder. On December 3, 2015, law enforcement seized a bottle of smokeless powder during a search of Rizwan's residence, which was later determined by an FBI Explosives Chemistry Examiner to be chemically and physically consistent with the bottled powder found at Rizwan's residence. Defendant subsequently identified the bottle of powder seized at Rizwan's residence as the same bottle that he purchased in 2012 and gave to Rizwan.

Defendant was at work on December 2, 2015, during the San Bernardino terrorist attack, and was not one of the shooters at the IRC or involved in the subsequent shootout with police. After news reports of the attack were released, defendant called 911 stating that his firearms were used in the attacks and went to the emergency room at UCLA Harbor Medical Center, where he was referred to the psychiatric ward and placed on an involuntary hold. Upon his release from the hospital on December 6, 2015 and continuing through December 16, 2015, defendant agreed to participate in an interview with FBI Special Agents. During this time, defendant provided information to law enforcement about Rizwan, as well as information about defendant's prior relationship and planning with Rizwan as described herein. During the interview, defendant informed the FBI that he had withdrawn from Rizwan in or around November 2 012 and did not have prior knowledge of the December 2, 2015 attack.


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