Equipo Nizkor - Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program.

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program

Foreword by Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Chairman Dianne Feinstein
Findings and Conclusions
Executive Summary

Approved December 13, 2012
Updated for Release April 3, 2014
Declassification Revisions December 3, 2014

Foreword

On April 3, 2014, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence voted to send the Findings and Conclusions and the Executive Summary of its final Study on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program to the President for declassification and subsequent public release.

This action marked the culmination of a monumental effort that officially began with the Committee's decision to initiate the Study in March 2009, but which had its roots in an investigation into the CIA's destruction of videotapes of CIA detainee interrogations that began in December 2007.

The full Committee Study, which totals more than 6,700 pages, remains classified but is now an official Senate report. The full report has been provided to the White House, the CIA, the Department of Justice, the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence in the hopes that it will prevent future coercive interrogation practices and inform the management of other covert action programs.

As the Chairman of the Committee since 2009, I write to offer some additional views, context, and history.

I began my service on the Senate Intelligence Committee in January 2001. I remember testimony that summer from George Tenet, the Director of Central Intelligence, that warned of a possible major terrorist event against the United States, but without specifics on the time, location, or method of attack. On September 11,2001, the world learned the answers to those questions that had consumed the CIA and other parts of the U.S. Intelligence Community. |1|

I recall vividly watching the horror of that day, to include the television footage of innocent men and women jumping out of the World Trade Center towers to escape the fire. The images, and the sounds as their bodies hit the pavement far below, will remain with me for the rest of my life.

It is against that backdrop - the largest attack against the American homeland in our history - that the events described in this report were undertaken.

Nearly 13 years later, the Executive Summary and Findings and Conclusions of this report are being released. They are highly critical of the CIA's actions, and rightfully so. Reading them, it is easy to forget the context in which the program began - not that the context should serve as an excuse, but rather as a warning for the future.

It is worth remembering the pervasive fear in late 2001 and how immediate the threat felt. Just a week after the September 11 attacks, powdered anthrax was sent to various news organizations and to two U.S. Senators. The American public was shocked by news of new terrorist plots and elevations of the color-coded threat level of the Homeland Security Advisory System. We expected further attacks against the nation.

I have attempted throughout to remember the impact on the nation and to the CIA workforce from the attacks of September 11, 2001. I can understand the CIA's impulse to consider the use of every possible tool to gather intelligence and remove terrorists from the battlefield, |2| and CIA was encouraged by political leaders and the public to do whatever it could to prevent another attack.

The Intelligence Committee as well often pushes intelligence agencies to act quickly in response to threats and world events.

Nevertheless, such pressure, fear, and expectation of further terrorist plots do not justify, temper, or excuse improper actions taken by individuals or organizations in the name of national security. The major lesson of this report is that regardless of the pressures and the need to act, the Intelligence Community's actions must always reflect who we are as a nation, and adhere to our laws and standards. It is precisely at these times of national crisis that our government must be guided by the lessons of our history and subject decisions to internal and external review.

Instead, CIA personnel, aided by two outside contractors, decided to initiate a program of indefinite secret detention and the use of brutal interrogation techniques in violation of U.S. law, treaty obligations, and our values.

This Committee Study documents the abuses and countless mistakes made between late 2001 and early 2009. The Executive Summary of the Study provides a significant amount of new information, based on CIA and other documents, to what has already been made public by the Bush and Obama Administrations, as well as non-governmental organizations and the press.

The Committee's full Study is more than ten times the length of the Executive Summary and includes comprehensive and excruciating detail. The Study describes the history of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program from its inception to its termination, including a review of each of the 119 known individuals who were held in CIA custody.

The full Committee Study also provides substantially more detail than what is included in the Executive Summary on the CIA's justification and defense of its interrogation program on the basis that it was necessary and critical to the disruption of specific terrorist plots and the capture of specific terrorists. While the Executive Summary provides sufficient detail to demonstrate the inaccuracies of each of these claims, the information in the full Committee Study is far more extensive.

I chose not to seek declassification of the full Committee Study at this time. I believe that the Executive Summary includes enough information to adequately describe the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, and the Committee's Findings and Conclusions cover the entirety of the program. Seeking declassification of the more than six thousand page report would have significantly delayed the release of the Executive Summary. Decisions will be made later on the declassification and release of the full 6,700 page Study.

In 2009, when this effort began, I stated (in a press release co-authored with the Vice Chairman of the Committee, Senator Kit Bond) that "the purpose is to review the program and to shape detention and interrogation policies in the future." The review is now done. It is my sincere and deep hope that through the release of these Findings and Conclusions and Executive Summary that U.S. policy will never again allow for secret indefinite detention and the use of coercive interrogations. As the Study describes, prior to the attacks of September 2001, the CIA itself determined from its own experience with coercive interrogations, that such techniques "do not produce intelligence," "will probably result in false answers," and had historically proven to be ineffective. Yet these conclusions were ignored. We cannot again allow history to be forgotten and grievous past mistakes to be repeated.

President Obama signed Executive Order 13491 in January 2009 to prohibit the CIA from holding detainees other than on a "short-term, transitory basis" and to limit interrogation techniques to those included in the Army Field Manual. However, these limitations are not part of U.S. law and could be overturned by a future president with the stroke of a pen. They should be enshrined in legislation.

Even so, existing U.S. law and treaty obligations should have prevented many of the abuses and mistakes made during this program. While the Office of Legal Counsel found otherwise between 2002 and 2007, it is my personal conclusion that, under any common meaning of the term, CIA detainees were tortured. I also believe that the conditions of confinement and the use of authorized and unauthorized interrogation and conditioning techniques were cruel, inhuman, and degrading. I believe the evidence of this is overwhelming and incontrovertible.

While the Committee did not make specific recommendations, several emerge from the Committee's review. The CIA, in its June 2013 response to the Committee's Study from December 2012, has also already made and begun to implement its own recommendations. I intend to work with Senate colleagues to produce recommendations and to solicit views from the readers of the Committee Study.

I would also like to take this opportunity to describe the process of this study.

As noted previously, the Committee approved the Terms of Reference for the Study in March 2009 and began requesting information from the CIA and other federal departments. The Committee, through its staff, had already reviewed in 2008 thousands of CIA cables describing the interrogations of the CIA detainees Abu Zubaydah and 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, whose interrogations were the subject of videotapes that were destroyed by the CIA in 2005.

The 2008 review was complicated by the existence of a Department of Justice investigation, opened by Attorney General Michael Mukasey, into the destruction of the videotapes and expanded by Attorney General Holder in August 2009. In particular, CIA employees and contractors who would otherwise have been interviewed by the Committee staff were under potential legal jeopardy, and therefore the CIA would not compel its workforce to appear before the Committee. This constraint lasted until the Committee's research and documentary review were completed and the Committee Study had largely been finalized.

Furthermore, given the volume and internal nature of relevant CIA documents, the CIA insisted that the Committee enter into an arrangement where our staff would review documents and conduct research at a CIA-leased facility [XXX] rather than at the Committee's offices on Capitol Hill.

From early 2009 to late 2012, a small group of Committee staff reviewed the more than six million pages of CIA materials, to include operational cables, intelligence reports, internal memoranda and emails, briefing materials, interview transcripts, contracts, and other records. Draft sections of the Study were prepared and distributed to the full Committee membership beginning in October 2011 and this process continued through to the Committee's vote to approve the full Committee Study on December 13, 2012.

The breadth of documentary material on which the Study relied and which the Committee Study cites is unprecedented. While the Committee did not interview CIA officials in the context of the Committee Study, it had access to and drew from the interviews of numerous CIA officials conducted by the CIA's Inspector General and the CIA Oral History program on subjects that lie at the heart of the Committee Study, as well as past testimony to the Committee.

Following the December 2012 vote, the Committee Study was sent to the President and appropriate parts of the Executive Branch for comments by February 15, 2013. The CIA responded in late June 2013 with extensive comments on the Findings and Conclusions, based in part on the responses of CIA officials involved in the program. At my direction, the Committee staff met with CIA representatives in order to fully understand the CIA's comments, and then incorporated suggested edits or comments as appropriate.

The Committee Study, including the now-declassified Executive Summary and Findings and Conclusions, as updated is now final and represents the official views of the Committee. This and future Administrations should use this Study to guide future programs, correct past mistakes, increase oversight of CIA representations to policymakers, and ensure coercive interrogation practices are not used by our government again.

Finally, I want to recognize the members of the staff who have endured years of long hours poring through the difficult details of one of the lowest points in our nation's history. They have produced the most significant and comprehensive oversight report in the Committee's history, and perhaps in that of the U.S. Senate, and their contributions should be recognized and praised.

Daniel Jones has managed and led the Committee's review effort from its inception. Dan has devoted more than six years to this effort, has personally written thousands of its pages, and has been integrally involved in every Study decision. Evan Gottesman, Chad Tanner, and Alissa Starzak have also played integral roles in the Committee Study and have spent considerable years researching and drafting specific sections of the Committee Study.

Other Committee staff members have also assisted in the review and provided valuable contributions at the direction of our Committee Members. They include, among others, Jennifer Barrett, Nick Basciano, Michael Buchwald, Jim Catella, Eric Chapman, John Dickas, Lorenzo Goco, Andrew Grotto, Tressa Guenov, Clete Johnson, Michael Nobiet, Michael Pevzner, Tommy Ross, Caroline Tess, and James Wolfe. The Committee's Staff Director throughout the review, David Grannis, has played a central role in assisting me and guiding the Committee through this entire process. Without the expertise, patience, and work ethic of our able staff, our Members would not have been able to complete this most important work.

Dianne Feinstein
Chairman
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

Notes:

1. For information on the events at the CIA prior to September 11, 2001, see the Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (9/11 Commission) and Office of the Inspector General Report on CIA Accountability With Respect to the 9/11 Attacks. [Back]

2. It is worth repeating that the covert action authorities approved by the President in September 2001 did not provide any authorization or contemplate coercive interrogations. [Back]

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Committee Study of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program
Findings and Conclusions

Approved December 13, 2012
Updated for Release April 3, 2014
Declassification Revisions December 3, 2014

The Committee makes the following findings and conclusions:

#1: The CIA's use of its enhanced interrogation techniques was not an effective means of acquiring intelligence or gaining cooperation from detainees.

The Committee finds, based on a review of CIA interrogation records, that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was not an effective means of obtaining accurate information or gaining detainee cooperation.

For example, according to CIA records, seven of the 39 CIA detainees known to have been subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques produced no intelligence while in CIA custody. |1| CIA detainees who were subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were usually subjected to the techniques immediately after being rendered to CIA custody. Other detainees provided significant accurate intelligence prior to, or without having been subjected to these techniques.

While being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques and afterwards, multiple CIA detainees fabricated information, resulting in faulty intelligence. Detainees provided fabricated information on critical intelligence issues, including the terrorist threats which the CIA identified as its highest priorities.

At numerous times throughout the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, CIA personnel assessed that the most effective method for acquiring intelligence from detainees, including from detainees the CIA considered to be the most "high-value," was to confront the detainees with information already acquired by the Intelligence Community. CIA officers regularly called into question whether the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were effective, assessing that the use of the techniques failed to elicit detainee cooperation or produce accurate intelligence.

#2: The CIA's justification for the use of its enhanced interrogation techniques rested on inaccurate claims of their effectiveness.

The CIA represented to the White House, the National Security Council, the Department of Justice, the CIA Office of Inspector General, the Congress, and the public that the best measure of effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was examples of specific terrorist plots "thwarted" and specific terrorists captured as a result of the use of the techniques. The CIA used these examples to claim that its enhanced interrogation techniques were not only effective, but also necessary to acquire "otherwise unavailable" actionable intelligence that "saved lives."

The Committee reviewed 20 of the most frequent and prominent examples of purported counterterrorism successes that the CIA has attributed to the use of its enhanced interrogation techniques, and found them to be wrong in fundamental respects. In some cases, there was no relationship between the cited counterterrorism success and any information provided by detainees during or after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. In the remaining cases, the CIA inaccurately claimed that specific, otherwise unavailable information was acquired from a CIA detainee "as a result" of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, when in fact the information was either: (1) corroborative of information already available to the CIA or other elements of the U.S. Intelligence Community from sources other than the CIA detainee, and was therefore not "otherwise unavailable"; or (2) acquired from the CIA detainee prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. The examples provided by the CIA included numerous factual inaccuracies.

In providing the "effectiveness" examples to policymakers, the Department of Justice, and others, the CIA consistently omitted the significant amount of relevant intelligence obtained from sources other than CIA detainees who had been subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques–leaving the false impression the CIA was acquiring unique information from the use of the techniques.

Some of the plots that the CIA claimed to have "disrupted" as a result of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were assessed by intelligence and law enforcement officials as being infeasible or ideas that were never operationalized.

#3: The interrogations of CIA detainees were brutal and far worse than the CIA represented to policymakers and others.

Beginning with the CIA's first detainee, Abu Zubaydah, and continuing with numerous others, the CIA applied its enhanced interrogation techniques with significant repetition for days or weeks at a time. Interrogation techniques such as slaps and "wallings" (slamming detainees against a wall) were used in combination, frequently concurrent with sleep deprivation and nudity. Records do not support CIA representations that the CIA initially used an "an open, non-threatening approach," |2| or that interrogations began with the "least coercive technique possible" |3| and escalated to more coercive techniques only as necessary.

The waterboarding technique was physically harmful, inducing convulsions and vomiting. Abu Zubaydah, for example, became "completely unresponsive, with bubbles rising through his open, full mouth." |4| Internal CIA records describe the waterboarding of Khalid Shaykh Mohammad as evolving into a "series of near drownings." |5|

Sleep deprivation involved keeping detainees awake for up to 180 hours, usually standing or in stress positions, at times with their hands shackled above their heads. At least five detainees experienced disturbing hallucinations during prolonged sleep deprivation and, in at least two of those cases, the CIA nonetheless continued the sleep deprivation.

Contrary to CIA representations to the Department of Justice, the CIA instructed personnel that the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah would take "precedence" over his medical care, |6| resulting in the deterioration of a bullet wound Abu Zubaydah incurred during his capture. In at least two other cases, the CIA used its enhanced interrogation techniques despite warnings from CIA medical personnel that the techniques could exacerbate physical injuries. CIA medical personnel treated at least one detainee for swelling in order to allow the continued use of standing sleep deprivation.

At least five CIA detainees were subjected to "rectal rehydration" or rectal feeding without documented medical necessity. The CIA placed detainees in ice water "baths." The CIA led several detainees to believe they would never be allowed to leave CIA custody alive, suggesting to one detainee that he would only leave in a coffin-shaped box. |7| One interrogator told another detainee that he would never go to court, because "we can never let the world know what I have done to you," |8| CIA officers also threatened at least three detainees with harm to their families– to include threats to harm the children of a detainee, threats to sexually abuse the mother of a detainee, and a threat to "cut [a detainee's] mother's throat." |9|

#4: The conditions of confinement for CIA detainees were harsher than the CIA had represented to policymakers and others.

Conditions at CIA detention sites were poor, and were especially bleak early in the program. CIA detainees at the COBALT detention facility were kept in complete darkness and constantly shackled in isolated cells with loud noise or music and only a bucket to use for human waste. |10| Lack of heat at the facility likely contributed to the death of a detainee. The chief of interrogations described COBALT as a "dungeon." |11| Another senior CIA officer stated that COBALT was itself an enhanced interrogation technique. |12|

At times, the detainees at COBALT were walked around naked or were shackled with their hands above their heads for extended periods of time. Other times, the detainees at COBALT were subjected to what was described as a "rough takedown," in which approximately five CIA officers would scream at a detainee, drag him outside of his cell, cut his clothes off, and secure him with Mylar tape. The detainee would then be hooded and dragged up and down a long corridor while being slapped and punched.

Even after the conditions of confinement improved with the construction of new detention facilities, detainees were held in total isolation except when being interrogated or debriefed by CIA personnel

Throughout the program, multiple CIA detainees who were subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques and extended isolation exhibited psychological and behavioral issues, including hallucinations, paranoia, insomnia, and attempts at self-harm and self-mutilation. Multiple psychologists identified the lack of human contact experienced by detainees as a cause of psychiatric problems.

#5: The CIA repeatedly provided inaccurate information to the Department of Justice, impeding a proper legal analysis of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program.

From 2002 to 2007, the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) within the Department of Justice relied on CIA representations regarding: (1) the conditions of confinement for detainees, (2) the application of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, (3) the physical effects of the techniques on detainees, and (4) the effectiveness of the techniques. Those representations were inaccurate in material respects.

The Department of Justice did not conduct independent analysis or verification of the information it received from the CIA. The department warned, however, that if the facts provided by the CIA were to change, its legal conclusions might not apply. When the CIA determined that information it had provided to the Department of Justice was incorrect, the CIA rarely informed the department.

Prior to the initiation of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program and throughout the life of the program, the legal justifications for the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques relied on the CIA's claim that the techniques were necessary to save lives. In late 2001 and early 2002, senior attorneys at the CIA Office of General Counsel first examined the legal implications of using coercive interrogation techniques. CIA attorneys stated that "a novel application of the necessity defense" could be used "to avoid prosecution of U.S. officials who tortured to obtain information that saved many lives." |13|

Having reviewed information provided by the CIA, the OLC included the "necessity defense" in its August 1, 2002, memorandum to the White House counsel on Standards of Conduct for Interrogation. The OLC determined that "under the current circumstances, necessity or self-defense may justify interrogation methods that might violate" the criminal prohibition against torture.

On the same day, a second OLC opinion approved, for the first time, the use of 10 specific coercive interrogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah–subsequently referred to as the CIA's "enhanced interrogation techniques." The OLC relied on inaccurate CIA representations about Abu Zubaydah's status in al-Qa'ida and the interrogation team's "certain[ty]" that Abu Zubaydah was withholding information about planned terrorist attacks. The CIA's representations to the OLC about the techniques were also inconsistent with how the techniques would later be applied.

In March 2005, the CIA submitted to the Department of Justice various examples of the "effectiveness" of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques that were inaccurate. OLC memoranda signed on May 30, 2005, and July 20, 2007, relied on these representations, determining that the techniques were legal in part because they produced "specific, actionable intelligence" and "substantial quantities of otherwise unavailable intelligence" that saved lives. |14|

#6: The CIA has actively avoided or impeded congressional oversight of the program.

The CIA did not brief the leadership of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques until September 2002, after the techniques had been approved and used. The CIA did not respond to Chairman Bob Graham's requests for additional information in 2002, noting in its own internal communications that he would be leaving the Committee in January 2003. The CIA subsequently resisted efforts by Vice Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV, to investigate the program, including by refusing in 2006 to provide requested documents to the full Committee.

The CIA restricted access to information about the program from members of the Committee beyond the chairman and vice chairman until September 6, 2006, the day the president publicly acknowledged the program, by which time 117 of the 119 known detainees had already entered CIA custody. Until then, the CIA had declined to answer questions from other Committee members that related to CIA interrogation activities. |15|

Prior to September 6, 2006, the CIA provided inaccurate information to the leadership of the Committee. Briefings to the full Committee beginning on September 6, 2006, also contained numerous inaccuracies, including inaccurate descriptions of how interrogation techniques were applied and what information was obtained from CIA detainees. The CIA misrepresented the views of members of Congress on a number of occasions. After multiple senators had been critical of the program and written letters expressing concerns to CIA Director Michael Hayden, Director Hayden nonetheless told a meeting of foreign ambassadors to the United States that every Committee member was "fully briefed," and that "[t]his is not CIA's program. This is not the President's program. This is America's program." |16| The CIA also provided inaccurate information describing the views of U.S. senators about the program to the Department of Justice.

A year after being briefed on the program, the House and Senate Conference Committee considering the Fiscal Year 2008 Intelligence Authorization bill voted to limit the CIA to using only interrogation techniques authorized by trie Army Field Manual. That legislation was approved by the Senate and the House of Representatives in February 2008, and was vetoed by President Bush on March 8, 2008.

#7: The CIA impeded effective White House oversight and decision-making.

The CIA provided extensive amounts of inaccurate and incomplete information related to the operation and effectiveness of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program to the White House, the National Security Council principals, and their staffs. This prevented an accurate and complete understanding of the program by Executive Branch officials, thereby impeding oversight and decision-making.

According to CIA records, no CIA officer, up to and including CIA Directors George Tenet and Porter Goss, briefed the president on the specific CIA enhanced interrogation techniques before April 2006. By that time, 38 of the 39 detainees identified as having been subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques had already been subjected to the techniques. |17| The CIA did not inform the president or vice president of the location of CIA detention facilities other than Country [XXX]. |18|

At the direction of the White House, the secretaries of state and defense - both principals on the National Security Council - were not briefed on program specifics until September 2003. An internal CIA email from July 2003 noted that "... the WH [White House] is extremely concerned [Secretary] Powell would blow his stack if he were to be briefed on what's been going on." |19| Deputy Secretary of State Armitage complained that he and Secretary Powell were "cut out" of the National Security Council coordination process. |20|

The CIA repeatedly provided incomplete and inaccurate information to White House personnel regarding the operation and effectiveness of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. This includes the provision of inaccurate statements similar to those provided to other elements of the U.S. Government and later to the public, as well as instances in which specific questions from White House officials were not answered truthfully or fully. In briefings for the National Security Council principals and White House officials, the CIA advocated for the continued use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, warning that "[t]ermination of this program will result in loss of life, possibly extensive." |21|

#8: The CIA's operation and management of the program complicated, and in some cases impeded, the national security missions of other Executive Branch agencies.

The CIA, in the conduct of its Detention and Interrogation Program, complicated, and in some cases impeded, the national security missions of other Executive Branch agencies, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the State Department, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). The CIA withheld or restricted information relevant to these agencies' missions and responsibilities, denied access to detainees, and provided inaccurate information on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program to these agencies.

The use of coercive interrogation techniques and covert detention facilities that did not meet traditional U.S. standards resulted in the FBI and the Department of Defense limiting their involvement in CIA interrogation and detention activities. This reduced the ability of the U.S. Government to deploy available resources and expert personnel to interrogate detainees and operate detention facilities. The CIA denied specific requests from FBI Director Robert Mueller III for FBI access to CIA detainees that the FBI believed was necessary to understand CIA detainee reporting on threats to the U.S. Homeland. Information obtained from CIA detainees was restricted within the Intelligence Community, leading to concerns among senior CIA officers that limitations on sharing information undermined government-wide counterterrorism analysis.

The CIA blocked State Department leadership from access to information crucial to foreign policy decision-making and diplomatic activities. The CIA did not inform two secretaries of state of locations of CIA detention facilities, despite the significant foreign policy implications related to the hosting of clandestine CIA detention sites and the fact that the political leaders of host countries were generally informed of their existence. Moreover, CIA officers told U.S. ambassadors not to discuss the CIA program with State Department officials, preventing the ambassadors from seeking guidance on the policy implications of establishing CIA detention facilities in the countries in which they served.

In two countries, U.S. ambassadors were informed of plans to establish a CIA detention site in the countries where they were serving after the CIA had already entered into agreements with the countries to host the detention sites, In two other countries where negotiations on hosting new CIA detention facilities were taking place, |22| the CIA told local government officials not to inform the U.S. ambassadors. |23|

The ODNI was provided with inaccurate and incomplete information about the program, preventing the director of national intelligence from effectively carrying out the director's statutory responsibility to serve as the principal advisor to the president on intelligence matters. The inaccurate information provided to the ODNI by the CIA resulted in the ODNI releasing inaccurate information to the public in September 2006.

#9: The CIA impeded oversight by the CIA's Office of Inspector General.

The CIA avoided, resisted, and otherwise impeded oversight of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program by the CIA's Office of Inspector General (OIG). The CIA did not brief the OIG on the program until after the death of a detainee, by which time the CIA had held at least 22 detainees at two different CIA detention sites. Once notified, the OIG reviewed the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program and issued several reports, including an important May 2004 "Special Review" of the program that identified significant concerns and deficiencies.

During the OIG reviews, CIA personnel provided OIG with inaccurate information on the operation and management of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, as well as on the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. The inaccurate information was included in the final May 2004 Special Review, which was later declassified and released publicly, and remains uncorrected.

In 2005, CIA Director Goss requested in writing that the inspector general not initiate further reviews of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program until reviews already underway were completed. In 2007, Director Hayden ordered an unprecedented review of the OIG itself in response to the OIG's inquiries into the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program.

#10: The CIA coordinated the release of classified information to the media, including inaccurate information concerning the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.

The CIA's Office of Public Affairs and senior CIA officials coordinated to share classified information on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program to select members of the media to counter public criticism, shape public opinion, and avoid potential congressional action to restrict the CIA's detention and interrogation authorities and budget. These disclosures occurred when the program was a classified covert action program, and before the CIA had briefed the full Committee membership on the program.

The deputy director of the CIA's Counterterrorism Center wrote to a colleague in 2005, shortly before being interviewed by a media outlet, that "we either get out and sell, or we get hammered, which has implications beyond the media. [C]ongress reads it, cuts our authorities, messes up our budget... we either put out our story or we get eaten. [T]here is no middle ground." |24| The same CIA officer explained to a colleague that "when the [Washington Post]/[New York T]imes quotes 'senior intelligence official,' it's us... authorized and directed by opa [CIA's Office of Public Affairs]." |25|

Much of the information the CIA provided to the media on the operation of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program and the effectiveness of its enhanced interrogation techniques was inaccurate and was similar to the inaccurate information provided by the CIA to the Congress, the Department of Justice, and the White House.

#11: The CIA was unprepared as it began operating its Detention and Interrogation Program more than six months after being granted detention authorities.

On September 17, 2001, the President signed a covert action Memorandum of Notification (MON) granting the CIA unprecedented counterterrorism authorities, including the authority to covertly capture and detain individuals "posing a continuing, serious threat of violence or death to U.S. persons and interests or planning ten'orist activities." The MON made no reference to interrogations or coercive interrogation techniques.

The CIA was not prepared to take custody of its first detainee. In the fall of 2001, the CIA explored the possibility of establishing clandestine detention facilities in several countries. The CIA's review identified risks associated with clandestine detention that led it to conclude that U.S. military bases were the best option for the CIA to detain individuals under the MON authorities. In late March 2002, the imminent capture of Abu Zubaydah prompted the CIA to again consider various detention options. In part to avoid declaring Abu Zubaydah to the International Committee of the Red Cross, which would be required if he were detained at a U.S. military base, the CIA decided to seek authorization to clandestinely detain Abu Zubaydah at a facility in Country [XXX]–a country that had not previously been considered as a potential host for a CIA detention site. A senior CIA officer indicated that the CIA "will have to acknowledge certain gaps in our planning/preparations," |26| but stated that this plan would be presented to the president. At a Presidential Daily Briefing session that day, the president approved CIA's proposal to detain Abu Zubaydah in Country [XXX].

The CIA lacked a plan for the eventual disposition of its detainees. After taking custody of Abu Zubaydah, CIA officers concluded that he "should remain incommunicado for the remainder of his life," which "may preclude [Abu Zubaydah] from being turned over to another country." |27|

The CIA did not review its past experience with coercive interrogations, or its previous statement to Congress that "inhumane physical or psychological techniques are counterproductive because they do not produce intelligence and will probably result in false answers." |28| The CIA also did not contact other elements of the U.S. Government with interrogation expertise.

In July 2002, on the basis of consultations with contract psychologists, and with very limited internal deliberation, the CIA requested approval from the Department of Justice to use a set of coercive interrogation techniques. The techniques were adapted from the training of U.S. military personnel at the U.S. Air Force Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape (SERE) school, which was designed to prepare U.S. military personnel for the conditions and treatment to which they might be subjected if taken prisoner by countries that do not adhere to the Geneva Conventions.

As it began detention and interrogation operations, the CIA deployed personnel who lacked relevant training and experience. The CIA began interrogation training more than seven months after taking custody of Abu Zubaydah, and more than three months after the CIA began using its "enhanced interrogation techniques." CIA Director George Tenet issued formal guidelines for interrogations and conditions of confinement at detention sites in January 2003, by which time 40 of the 119 known detainees had been detained by the CIA.

#12: The CIA's management and operation of its Detention and Interrogation Program was deeply flawed throughout the program's duration, particularly so in 2002 and early 2003.

The CIA's COBALT detention facility in Country [XXX]> began operations in September 2002 and ultimately housed more than half of the 119 CIA detainees identified in this Study. The CIA kept few formal records of the detainees in its custody at COBALT. Untrained CIA officers at the facility conducted frequent, unauthorized, and unsupervised interrogations of detainees using harsh physical interrogation techniques that were not–and never became–part of the CIA's formal "enhanced" interrogation program. The CIA placed a junior officer with no relevant experience in charge of COBALT. On November [XXX], 2002, a detainee who had been held partially nude and chained to a concrete floor died from suspected hypothermia at the facility. At the time, no single unit at CIA Headquarters had clear responsibility for CIA detention and interrogation operations. In interviews conducted in 2003 with the Office of Inspector General, CIA's leadership and senior attorneys acknowledged that they had little or no awareness of operations at COBALT, and some believed that enhanced interrogation techniques were not used there.

Although CIA Director Tenet in January 2003 issued guidance for detention and interrogation activities, serious management problems persisted. For example, in December 2003, CIA personnel reported that they had made the "unsettling discovery" that the CIA had been "holding a number of detainees about whom" the CIA knew "very little" at multiple detention sites in Country [XXX]. |29|

Divergent lines of authority for interrogation activities persisted through at least 2003. Tensions among interrogators extended to complaints about the safety and effectiveness of each other's interrogation practices.

The CIA placed individuals with no applicable experience or training in senior detention and interrogation roles, and provided inadequate linguistic and analytical support to conduct effective questioning of CIA detainees, resulting in diminished intelligence. The lack of CIA personnel available to question detainees, which the CIA inspector general referred to as "an ongoing problem," |30| persisted throughout the program.

In 2005, the chief of the CIA's BLACK detention site, where many of the detainees the CIA assessed as "high-value" were held, complained that CIA Headquarters "managers seem to be selecting either problem, underperforming officers, new, totally inexperienced officers or whomever seems to be willing and able to deploy at any given time," resulting in "the production of mediocre or, I dare say, useless intelligence...." |31|

Numerous CIA officers had serious documented personal and professional problems–including histories of violence and records of abusive treatment of others–that should have called into question their suitability to participate in the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, their employment with the CIA, and their continued access to classified information. In nearly all cases, these problems were known to the CIA prior to the assignment of these officers to detention and interrogation positions.

#13: Two contract psychologists devised the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques and played a central role in the operation, assessments, and management of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. By 2005, the CIA had overwhelmingly outsourced operations related to the program.

The CIA contracted with two psychologists to develop, operate, and assess its interrogation operations. The psychologists' prior experience was at the U.S. Air Force Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape (SERE) school. Neither psychologist had any experience as an interrogator, nor did either have specialized knowledge of al-Qa'ida, a background in counterterrorism, or any relevant cultural or linguistic expertise.

On the CIA's behalf, the contract psychologists developed theories of interrogation based on "learned helplessness," |32| and developed the list of enhanced interrogation techniques that was approved for use against Abu Zubaydah and subsequent CIA detainees. The psychologists personally conducted interrogations of some of the CIA's most significant detainees using these techniques. They also evaluated whether detainees' psychological state allowed for the continued use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, including some detainees whom they were themselves interrogating or had interrogated. The psychologists carried out inherently governmental functions, such as acting as liaison between the CIA and foreign intelligence services, assessing the effectiveness of the interrogation program, and participating in the interrogation of detainees in held in foreign government custody.

In 2005, the psychologists formed a company specifically for the purpose of conducting their work with the CIA. Shortly thereafter, the CIA outsourced virtually all aspects of the program.

In 2006, the value of the CIA's base contract with the company formed by the psychologists with all options exercised was in excess of $180 million; the contractors received $81 million prior to the contract's termination in 2009. In 2007, the CIA provided a multi-year indemnification agreement to protect the company and its employees from legal liability arising out of the program. The CIA has since paid out more than $1 million pursuant to the agreement.

In 2008, the CIA's Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation Group, the lead unit for detention and interrogation operations at the CIA, had a total of [XXX] positions, which were filled with [XXX] CIA staff officers and [XXX] contractors, meaning that contractors made up 85% of the workforce for detention and interrogation operations.

#14: CIA detainees were subjected to coercive interrogation techniques that had not been approved by the Department of Justice or had not been authorized by CIA Headquarters.

Prior to mid-2004, the CIA routinely subjected detainees to nudity and dietary manipulation. The CIA also used abdominal slaps and cold water dousing on several detainees during that period. None of these techniques had been approved by the Department of Justice.

At least 17 detainees were subjected to CIA enhanced interrogation techniques without authorization from CIA Headquarters. Additionally, multiple detainees were subjected to techniques that were applied in ways that diverged from the specific authorization, or were subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques by interrogators who had not been authorized to use them. Although these incidents were recorded in CIA cables and, in at least some cases were identified at the time by supervisors at CIA Headquarters as being inappropriate, corrective action was rarely taken against the interrogators involved.

#15: The CIA did not conduct a comprehensive or accurate accounting of the number of individuals it detained, and held individuals who did not meet the legal standard for detention. The CIA's claims about the number of detainees held and subjected to its enhanced interrogation techniques were inaccurate.

The CIA never conducted a comprehensive audit or developed a complete and accurate list of the individuals it had detained or subjected to its enhanced interrogation techniques, CIA statements to the Committee and later to the public that the CIA detained fewer than 100 individuals, and that less than a third of those 100 detainees were subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, were inaccurate. The Committee's review of CIA records determined that the CIA detained at least 119 individuals, of whom at least 39 were subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.

Of the 119 known detainees, at least 26 were wrongfully held and did not meet the detention standard in the September 2001 Memorandum of Notification (MON). These included an "intellectually challenged" man whose CIA detention was used solely as leverage to get a family member to provide information, two individuals who were intelligence sources for foreign liaison services and were former CIA sources, and two individuals whom the CIA assessed to be connected to al~Qa'ida based solely on information fabricated by a CIA detainee subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. Detainees often remained in custody for months after the CIA determined that they did not meet the MON standard. CIA records provide insufficient information to justify the detention of many other detainees.

CIA Headquarters instructed that at least four CIA detainees be placed in host country detention facilities because the individuals did not meet the MON standard for CIA detention. The host country had no independent reason to hold the detainees.

A full accounting of CIA detentions and interrogations may be impossible, as records in some cases are non-existent, and, in many other cases, are sparse and insufficient. There were almost no detailed records of the detentions and interrogations at the CIA's COBALT detention facility in 2002, and almost no such records for the CIA's GRAY detention site, also in Country [XXX]. At CIA detention facilities outside of Country [XXX], the CIA kept increasingly less-detailed records of its interrogation activities over the course of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program.

#16: The CIA failed to adequately evaluate the effectiveness of its enhanced interrogation techniques.

The CIA never conducted a credible, comprehensive analysis of the effectiveness of its enhanced interrogation techniques, despite a recommendation by the CIA inspector general and similar requests by the national security advisor and the leadership of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

Internal assessments of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program were conducted by CIA personnel who participated in the development and management of the program, as well as by CIA contractors who had a financial interest in its continuation and expansion. An "informal operational assessment" of the program, led by two senior CIA officers who were not part of the CIA's Counterterrorism Center, determined that it would not be possible to assess the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques without violating "Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects" regarding human experimentation. The CIA officers, whose review relied on briefings with CIA officers and contractors running the program, concluded only that the "CIA Detainee Program" was a "success" without addressing the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. |33|

In 2005, in response to the recommendation by the inspector general for a review of the effectiveness of each of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, the CIA asked two individuals not employed by the CIA to conduct a broader review of "the entirety of the "rendition, detention and interrogation program." |34| According to one individual, the review was "heavily reliant on the willingness of [CIA Counterterrorism Center] staff to provide us with the factual material that forms the basis of our conclusions." That individual acknowledged lacking the requisite expertise to review the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, and concluded only that "the program," meaning all CIA detainee reporting regardless of whether it was connected to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, was a "great success." |35| The second reviewer concluded that "there is no objective way to answer the question of efficacy" of the techniques. |36|

There are no CIA records to indicate that any of the reviews independently validated the "effectiveness" claims presented by the CIA, to include basic confirmation that the intelligence cited by the CIA was acquired from CIA detainees during or after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. Nor did the reviews seek to confirm whether the intelligence cited by the CIA as being obtained "as a result" of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was unique and "otherwise unavailable," as claimed by the CIA, and not previously obtained from other sources.

#17: The CIA rarely reprimanded or held personnel accountable for serious and significant violations, inappropriate activities, and systemic and individual management failures.

CIA officers and CIA contractors who were found to have violated CIA policies or performed poorly were rarely held accountable or removed from positions of responsibility.

Significant events, to include the death and injury of CIA detainees, the detention of individuals who did not meet the legal standard to be held, the use of unauthorized interrogation techniques against CIA detainees, and the provision of inaccurate information on the CIA program did not result in appropriate, effective, or in many cases, any corrective actions. CIA managers who were aware of failings and shortcomings in the program but did not intervene, or who failed to provide proper leadership and management, were also not held to account.

On two occasions in which the CIA inspector general identified wrongdoing, accountability recommendations were overruled by senior CIA leadership. In one instance, involving the death of a CIA detainee at COBALT, CIA Headquarters decided not to take disciplinary action against an officer involved because, at the time, CIA Headquarters had been "motivated to extract any and all operational information" from the detainee. |37| In another instance related to a wrongful detention, no action was taken against a CIA officer because, "[t]he Director strongly believes that mistakes should be expected in a business filled with uncertainty," and "the Director believes the scale tips decisively in favor of accepting mistakes that over connect the dots against those that under connect them." |38| In neither case was administrative action taken against CIA management personnel.

#18: The CIA marginalized and ignored numerous internal critiques, criticisms, and objections concerning the operation and management of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program.

Critiques, criticisms, and objections were expressed by numerous CIA officers, including senior personnel overseeing and managing the program, as well as analysts, interrogators, and medical officers involved in or supporting CIA detention and interrogation operations.

Examples of these concerns include CIA officers questioning the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, interrogators disagreeing with the use of such techniques against detainees whom they determined were not withholding information, psychologists recommending less isolated conditions, and Office of Medical Services personnel questioning both the effectiveness and safety of the techniques. These concerns were regularly overridden by CIA management, and the CIA made few corrective changes to its policies governing the program. At times, CIA officers were instructed by supervisors not to put their concerns or observations in written communications.

In several instances, CIA officers identified inaccuracies in CIA representations about the program and its effectiveness to the Office of Inspector General, the White House, the Department of Justice, the Congress, and the American public. The CIA nonetheless failed to take action to correct these representations, and allowed inaccurate information to remain as the CIA's official position.

The CIA was also resistant to, and highly critical of more formal critiques. The deputy director for operations stated that the CIA inspector general's draft Special Review should have come to the "conclusion that our efforts have thwarted attacks and saved lives," |39| while the CIA general counsel accused the inspector general of presenting "an imbalanced and inaccurate picture" of the program. |40| A February 2007 report from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which the CIA acting general counsel initially stated "actually does not sound that far removed from the reality," |41| was also criticized. CIA officers prepared documents indicating that "critical portions of the Report are patently false or misleading, especially certain key factual claims... ," |42| CIA Director Hayden testified to the Committee that "numerous false allegations of physical and threatened abuse and faulty legal assumptions and analysis in the [ICRC] report undermine its overall credibility." |43|

#19: The CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program was inherently unsustainable and had effectively ended by 2006 due to unauthorized press disclosures, reduced cooperation from other nations, and legal and oversight concerns.

The CIA required secrecy and cooperation from other nations in order to operate clandestine detention facilities, and both had eroded significantly before President Bush publicly disclosed the program on September 6, 2006. From the beginning of the program, the CIA faced significant challenges in finding nations willing to host CIA clandestine detention sites. These challenges became increasingly difficult over time. With the exception of Country [XXX], the CIA was forced to relocate detainees out of every country in which it established a detention facility because of pressure from the host government or public revelations about the program. Beginning in early 2005, the CIA sought unsuccessfully to convince the U.S. Department of Defense to allow the transfer of numerous CIA detainees to U.S. military custody. By 2006, the CIA admitted in its own talking points for CIA Director Porter Goss that, absent an Administration decision on an "endgame" for detainees, the CIA was "stymied" and "the program could collapse of its own weight." |44|

Lack of access to adequate medical care for detainees in countries hosting the CIA's detention facilities caused recurring problems. The refusal of one host country to admit a severely ill detainee into a local hospital due to security concerns contributed to the closing of the CIA's detention facility in that country. The U.S. Department of Defense also declined to provide medical care to detainees upon CIA request.

In mid-2003, a statement by the president for the United Nations International Day in Support of Victims of Torture and a public statement by the White House that prisoners in U.S. custody are treated "humanely" caused the CIA to question whether there was continued policy support for the program and seek reauthorization from the White House. In mid-2004, the CIA temporarily suspended the use of its enhanced interrogation techniques after the CIA inspector general recommended that the CIA seek an updated legal opinion from the Office of Legal Counsel. In early 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court decision to grant certiorari in the case of Rasul v. Bush prompted the CIA to move detainees out of a CIA detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. In late 2005 and in 2006, the Detainee Treatment Act and then the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld caused the CIA to again temporarily suspend the use of its enhanced interrogation techniques.

By 2006, press disclosures, the unwillingness of other countries to host existing or new detention sites, and legal and oversight concerns had largely ended the CIA's ability to operate clandestine detention facilities.

After detaining at least 113 individuals through 2004, the CIA brought only six additional detainees into its custody; four in 2005, one in 2006, and one in 2007. By March 2006, the program was operating in only one country. The CIA last used its enhanced interrogation techniques on November 8, 2007. The CIA did not hold any detainees after April 2008.

#20: The CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program damaged the United States' standing in the world, and resulted in other significant monetary and non-monetary costs.

The CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program created tensions with U.S. partners and allies, leading to formal demarches to the United States, and damaging and complicating bilateral intelligence relationships.

In one example, in June 2004, the secretary of state ordered the U.S. ambassador in Country [XXX] to deliver a demarche to Country [XXX], "in essence demanding [Country [XXX] Government] provide full access to all [Country [XXX]] detainees" to the International Committee of the Red Cross. At the time, however, the detainees Country [XXX] was holding included detainees being held in secret at the CIA's behest. |45|

More broadly, the program caused immeasurable damage to the United States' public standing, as well as to the United States' longstanding global leadership on human rights in general and the prevention of torture in particular.

CIA records indicate that the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program cost well over $300 million in non-personnel costs. This included funding for the CIA to construct and maintain detention facilities, including two facilities costing nearly $[XXX] million that were never used, in part due to host country political concerns.

To encourage governments to clandestinely host CIA detention sites, or to increase support for existing sites, the CIA provided millions of dollars in cash payments to foreign government officials. CIA Headquarters encouraged CIA Stations to construct "wish lists" of proposed financial assistance to [XXX] [entities of foreign governments], and to "think big" in terms of that assistance. |46|

Notes:

1. As measured by the number of disseminated intelligence reports, Therefore, zero intelligence reports were disseminated based on information provided by seven of the 39 detainees known to have been subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. [Back]

2. May 30,2005, Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, re: Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May Be Used in the Interrogation of High Value aL Qaeda Detainees. [Back]

3. Transcript of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence briefing, September 6, 2006. [Back]

4. This episode was not described in CIA cables, but was described in internal emails sent by personnel in the CIA Office of Medical Services and the CIA Office of General Counsel. A review of the videotapes of the interrogations of Abu Zubaydah by the CIA Office of Inspector General (OIG) did not note the incident. A review of the catalog of videotapes, however, found that recordings of a 21-hour period, which included two waterboarding sessions, were missing. [Back]

5. April 10, 2003, email from [XXX]; to [XXX]; cc: [XXX]; re More. Throughout the Committee Study, last names in all capitalized letters are pseudonyms. [Back]

6. ALEC [XXX] (182321Z JUL 02) [Back]

7. At the time, confining a detainee in a box with the dimensions of a coffin was an approved CIA enhanced interrogation technique. [Back]

8. [REDACTED] 1324 (161750Z SEP 03), referring to Hambali. [Back]

9. Interview of [XXX], by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, June 17, 2003 [Back]

10. In one case, interrogators informed a detainee that he could earn a bucket if he cooperated. [Back]

11. Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of Interrogations for Counterterrorism Purposes, [XXX], April 7, 2003, p. 12. [Back]

12. Interview Report, 2003-7123TG, Review of Interrogations for Counterterrorism Purposes, [XXX], May 8, 2003, p. 9. [Back]

13. November 26, 2001, Draft of Legal Appendix, Paragraph 5, "Hostile Interrogations: Legal Considerations for CIA Officers," at 1. [Back]

14. May 30, 2005, Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, re: Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May Be Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees. July 20,2007, Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, re: Application of War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that May be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees. [Back]

15. The CIA's June 27, 2013, Response to the Committee Study of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program states that these limitations were dictated by the White House. The CIA's June 2013 Response then acknowledges that the CIA was "comfortable" with this decision. [Back]

16. DIRECTOR [XXX] (152227Z MAR 07) [Back]

17. The Committee's conclusion is based on CIA records, including statements from CIA Directors George Tenet and Porter Goss to the CIA inspector general, that the directors had not briefed the president on the CIA's interrogation program. According to CIA records, when briefed in April 2006, the president expressed discomfort with the "image of a detainee, chained to the ceiling, clothed in a diaper, and forced to go to the bathroom on himself." The CIA's June 2013 Response does not dispute the CIA records, but states that "[w]hile Agency records on the subject are admittedly incomplete, former President Bush has stated in his autobiography that he discussed the program, including the use of enhanced techniques, with then-DCIA Tenet in 2002, prior to application of the techniques on Abu Zubaydah, and personally approved the techniques." A memoir by former Acting CIA General Counsel John Rizzo disputes this account. [Back]

18. CIA records indicate that the CIA had not informed policymakers of the presence of CIA detention facilities in Countries [XXX], [XXX], [XXX] and [XXX]. It is less clear whether policymakers were aware of the detention facilities in Country [XXX] and at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The CIA requested that country names and information directly or indirectly identifying countries be redacted. The Study therefore lists the countries by letter. The Study uses the same designations consistently, so "Country J," for example, refers to the same country throughout the Study. [Back]

19. July 31, 2003, email from John Rizzo to [XXX] re Rump PC on interrogations. [Back]

20. Lotus Notes message from Chief of the CIA Station in Country [XXX] to D/CTC, COPS; copied in: email from [XXX], to [REDACTED], [REDACTED], cc: [REDACTED], [XXX], [XXX], [XXX], subj: ADCI Talking Points for Call to DepSec Armitage, date 9/23/2004, at 7:40:43 PM [Back]

21. Briefing slides, CIA Interrogation Program, July 29. 2003 [Back]

22. No CIA detention facilities were established in these two countries. [Back]

23. U.S. law (22 U.S.C. � 3927) requires that chiefs of mission "shall be kept fully and currently informed with respect to all activities and operations of the Government within that country," including the activities and operations of the CIA. [Back]

24. Sametime communication, between John P. Mudd and [XXX], April 13, 2005. [Back]

25. Sametime communication, between John P. Mudd and [XXX], April 13, 2005. [Back]

26. March 29, 2002, email from [XXX] to [XXX], re A-Z Interrogation Plan. [Back]

27. ALEC [XXX] (182321Z JUL 02) [Back]

28. January 8, 1989, Letter from John L. Helgerson, Director of Congressional Affairs, to Vice Chairman William S. Cohen, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, re: SSCI Questions on [XXX] at 7-8. [Back]

29. [REDACTED] 1528 (191903Z DEC 03) [Back]

30. Report of Audit, CIA-controlled Detention Facilities Operated Under the 17 September 2001 Memorandum of Notification, Report No. 2005-0017-AS, June 14, 2006. [Back]

31. April 15, 2005, email from [REDACTED] (Chief of Base of DETENTION SITE BLACK), to [XXX], [XXX], [XXX], re General Comments. [Back]

32. "Learned helplessness" in this context was the theory that detainees might become passive and depressed in response to adverse or uncontrollable events, and would thus cooperate and provide information. Memo from Grayson SWIGERT, Ph.D., February 1, 2003, "Qualifications to provide special mission interrogation consultation." [Back]

33. They also concluded that the CIA "should not be in the business of running prisons or 'temporary detention facilities.'" May 12, 2004, Memorandum for Deputy Director for Operations from [XXX], Chief, Information Operations Center, and Henry Crumpton, Chief, National Resources Division via Associate Deputy Director for Operations, with the subject line, "Operational Review of CIA Detainee Program." [Back]

34. March 21, 2005, Memorandum for Deputy Director for Operations from Robert L. Grenier, Director DCI Counterterrorism Center, re Proposal for Full-Scope Independent Study of the CTC Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation Programs. [Back]

35. September 2,2005, Memorandum from [XXX] to Director Porter Goss, CIA, "Assessment of EITs Effectiveness." [Back]

36. September 23, 2005, Memorandum from [XXX] to The Honorable Porter Goss, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, "Response to request from Director for Assessment of EIT effectiveness." [Back]

37. February 10, 2006, Memorandum for [[XXX] CIA OFFICER 1], Counter-Terrorist Center, National Clandestine Service, from Executive Director re: Accountability Decision. [Back]

38. Congressional notification, CIA Response to OIG Investigation Regarding the Rendition and Detention of German Citizen Khahd al-Masri, October 9, 2007. [Back]

39. Memorandum for Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program" (2003-7123-IG); date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum re Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities. [Back]

40. February 24, 2004, Memorandum from Scott W. Muller, General Counsel, to Inspector General re Interrogation Program Special Review (2003-7123-IG). [Back]

41. November 9, 2006, email from John A. Rizzo, to Michael V. Hayden, Stephen R. Kappes. cc: Michael Morell, [XXX], [XXX], [XXX], Subject: Fw: 5 December 2006 Meeting with ICRC Rep. [Back]

42. CIA Comments on the February 2007 ICRC Report on die Treatment of Fourteen "High Value Detainees" in CIA Custody." [Back]

43. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing transcript for April 12, 2007. [Back]

44. DCIA Talking Points for 12 January 2006 Meeting with the President, re: Way Forward on Counter terrorist Rendition, Detention and Interrogation Program. [Back]

45. HEADQUARTERS [XXX] (071742Z JUN 04) [Back]

46. [REDACTED] 5759 ([XXX] 03); ALEC [XXX] ([XXX] 03); ALEC [XXX] ([XXX] 03) [Back]

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Committee Study of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program

Executive Summary

Approved December 13, 2012
Updated for Release April 3, 2014
Declassification Revisions December 3, 2014

Table of Contents

I. Background on the Committee Study

II. Overall History and Operation of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program

A. September 17, 2001, Memorandum of Notification (MON) Authorizes the CIA to Capture and Detain a Specific Category of Individuals

1. After Considering Various Clandestine Detention Locations, the CIA Determines That a U.S. Military Base Is the "Best Option "; the CIA Delegates "Blanket" Detention Approvals to CIA Officers in [XXX]

2. The CIA Holds at Least 21 More Detainees Than It Has Represented; At Least 26 CIA Detainees Wrongly Detained

B. The Detention of Abu Zubaydah and the Development and Authorization of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques

1. Past Experience Led the CIA to Assess that Coercive Interrogation Techniques Were "Counterproductive" and "Ineffective"; After Issuance of the MON, CIA Attorneys Research Possible Legal Defense for Using Techniques Considered Torture; the CIA Conducts No Research on Effective Interrogations, Relies on Contractors with No Relevant Experience

2. The CIA Renders Abu Zubaydah to a Covert Facility, Obtains Presidential Approval Without Inter-Agency Deliberation

3. Tensions with Host Country Leadership and Media Attention Foreshadow Future Challenges

4. FBI Officers Are the First to Question Abu Zubaydah, Who States He Intends to Cooperate; Abu Zubaydah is Taken to a Hospital Where He Provides Information the CIA Later Describes as "Important" and "Vital"

5. While Abu Zubaydah is Hospitalized, CIA Headquarters Discusses the Use of Coercive Interrogation Techniques Against Abu Zubaydah

6. New CIA Interrogation Plan Focuses on Abu Zubaydah's "Most Important Secret"; FBI Temporarily Barred from the Questioning of Abu Zubaydah; Abu Zubaydah then Placed in Isolation for 47 Days Without Questioning

7. Proposal by CIA Contract Personnel to Use SERE-Based Interrogation Techniques Leads to the Development of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques; The CIA Determines that "the Interrogation Process Takes Precedence Over Preventative Medical Procedures"

8. The CIA Obtains Legal and Policy Approval for Its Enhanced Interrogation Techniques; The CIA Does Not Brief the President

9. The CIA Uses the Waterboard and Other Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Against Abu Zubaydah

10. A CIA Presidential Daily Brief Provides Inaccurate Information on the Interrogation of Abu Zubaydah

11. The CIA Does Not Brief the Committee on the Interrogation of Abu Zubaydah

C. Interrogation in Country [XXX] and the January 2003 Guidelines

1. The CIA Establishes DETENTION SITE COBALT, Places Inexperienced First-Tour Officer in Charge

2. CIA Records Lack Information on CIA Detainees and Details of Interrogations in Country [XXX]

3. CIA Headquarters Recommends That Untrained Interrogators in Country [XXX] Use the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques on Ridha al-Najjar

4. Death of Gul Rahman Leads CIA Headquarters to Learn of Unreported Coercive Interrogation Techniques at DETENTION SITE COBALT; CIA Inspector General Review Reveals Lack of Oversight of the Detention Site

5. The CIA Begins Training New Interrogators; Interrogation Techniques Not Reviewed by the Department of Justice Included in the Training Syllabus

6. Despite Recommendation from CIA Attorneys, the CIA Fails to Adequately Screen Potential Interrogators in 2002 and 2003

7. Bureau of Prisons "WOW'ed" by Level of Deprivation at CIA's COBALT Detention Site

8. The CIA Places CIA Detainees in Country [XXX] Facilities Because They Did Not Meet the MON Standard for Detention

9. DCI Tenet Establishes First Guidelines on Detention Conditions and Interrogation; Formal Consolidation of Program Administration at CIA Headquarters Does Not Resolve Disagreements Among CIA Personnel

D. The Detention and Interrogation of 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri

1. CIA Interrogators Disagree with CIA Headquarters About Al-Nashiri's Level of Cooperation; Interrogators Oppose Continued Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques

2. CIA Headquarters Sends Untrained Interrogator to Resume Al-Nashiri's Interrogations; Interrogator Threatens al-Nashiri with a Gun and a Drill

3. CIA Contractor Recommends Continued Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Against Al-Nashiri; Chief Interrogator Threatens to Quit Because Additional Techniques Might "Push [Al-Nashiri] Over The Edge Psychologically," Refers to the CIA Program As a "Train Wreak [sic] Waiting to Happen"

E. Tensions with Country [XXX] Relating to the CIA Detention Facility and the Arrival of New Detainees

F. The Detention and Interrogation of Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh

1. Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh Provides Information While in Foreign Government Custody, Prior to Rendition to CIA Custody

2. Interrogation Plan for Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh Proposes Immediate Use of Nudity and Shackling with Hands Above the Head; Plan Becomes Template for Future Detainees

3. CIA Headquarters Urges Continued Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques, Despite Interrogators' Assessment That Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh Was Cooperative

4. Information Already Provided by Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh in the Custody of a Foreign Government Inaccurately Attributed to CIA Interrogations; Interrogators Apply the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques to Bin Al-Shibh When Not Addressed As "Sir" and When Bin Al-Shibh Complains of Stomach Pain

G. The Detention and Interrogation of Khalid Shaykh Muhammad

1. KSM Held in Pakistani Custody, Provides Limited Information; Rendered to CIA Custody at DETENTION SITE COBALT, KSM Is Immediately Subjected to the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques

2. The CIA Transfers KSM to DETENTION SITE BLUE, Anticipates Use of the Waterboard Prior to His Arrival

3. The CIA Waterboards KSM at Least 183 Times; KSM's Reporting Includes Significant Fabricated Information

4. After the Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Against KSM Ends, the CIA Continues to Assess That KSM Is Withholding and Fabricating Information

H. The Growth of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program

1. Fifty-Three CIA Detainees Enter the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program in 2003

2. The CIA Establishes DETENTION SITE BLACK in Country [XXX] and DETENTION SITE VIOLET in Country [XXX]

3. At Least 17 CIA Detainees Subjected to the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Without CIA Headquarters Authorization

4. CIA Headquarters Authorizes Water Dousing Without Department of Justice Approval; Application of Technique Reported as Approximating Waterboarding

5. Hambali Fabricates Information While Being Subjected to the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques

6. After the Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques, CIA Headquarters Questions Detention of Detainee and Recommends Release; Detainee Transferred to U.S. Military Custody and Held for An Additional Four Years

7. A Year After DETENTION SITE COBALT Opens, the CIA Reports "Unsettling Discovery That We Are Holding a Number of Detainees About Whom We Know Very Little"

8. CIA Detention Sites in Country [XXX] Lack Sufficient Personnel and Translators to Support the Interrogations of Detainees

I. Other Medical, Psychological, and Behavioral Issues

1. CIA Interrogations Take Precedence Over Medical Care

2. CIA Detainees Exhibit Psychological and Behavioral Issues

J. The CIA Seeks Reaffinnation of the CIA's Detention aud Interrogation Program in 2003

1. Administration Statements About the Humane Treatment of Detainees Raise Concerns at the CIA About Possible Lack of Policy Support for CIA Interrogation Activities

2. The CIA Provides Inaccurate Information to Select Members of the National Security Council, Represents that "Termination of This Program Will Result in Loss of Life. Possibly Extensive"; Policymakers Reauthorize Program

K. Additional Oversight and Outside Pressure in 2004: ICRC, Inspector General, Congress, and the U.S. Supreme Court

1. ICRC Pressure Leads to Detainee Transfers; Department of Defense Official Informs the CIA that the U.S. Government "Should Not Be in the Position of Causing People to Disappear"; the CIA Provides Inaccurate Information on CIA Detainee to the Department of Defense

2. CIA Leadership Calls Draft Inspector General Special Review of the Program "Unbalanced and Inaccurate," Responds with Inaccurate Information; CIA Seeks to Limit Further Review of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program by the Inspector General

3. The CIA Does Not Satisfy Inspector General Special Review Recommendation to Assess the Effectiveness of the CIA's Enhanced In terrogation Techniques

4. The CIA Wrongfully Detains Khalid Al-Masri; CIA Director Rejects Accountability for Officer Involved

5. Hassan Ghul Provides Substantial Information–Including Information on a Key UBL Facilitator– Prior to the CIA's Use of Enhanced Interrogation Techniques

6. Other Detainees Wrongfully Held in 2004; CIA Sources Subjected to the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques; CIA Officer Testifies that the CIA Is "Not Authorized" "to Do Anything Like What You Have Seen" in Abu Ghraib Photographs

7. The CIA Suspends the Use of its Enhanced Interrogation Techniques, Resumes Use of the Techniques on an Individual Basis; Interrogations are Based on Fabricated, Single Source Information

8. Country [XXX] detains Individuals on the CIA's Behalf

9. U.S. Supreme Court Action in the Case of Rasul v. Bush Forces Transfer of CIA Detainees from Guantanamo Bay to Country [XXX]

L. The Pace of CIA Operations Slows; Chief of Base Concerned About "Inexperienced, Marginal, Underperforming" CIA Personnel; Inspector General Describes Lack of Debriefers As "Ongoing Problem"

M. Legal and Operational Challenges in 2005

1. Department of Justice Renews Approval for the Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques in May 2005

2. Abu Faraj Al-Libi Subjected to the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Prior to Department of Justice. Memorandum on U.S. Obligations Under the Convention Against Torture; CIA Subjects Abu Faraj Al-Libi to the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques When He Complains of Hearing Problems

3. CIA Acquires Two Detainees from the U.S. Military

4. The CIA Seeks "End Game" for Detainees in Early 2005 Due to Limited Support From Liaison Partners

5. Press Stories and the CIA's Inability to Provide Emergency Medical Care to Detainees Result in the Closing of CIA Detention Facilities in Countries [XXX] and [XXX]

6. The CIA Considers Changes to the CIA Detention and Interrogation Program Following the Detainee Treatment Act, Hamclan v. Rumsfeld

N. The Final Disposition of CIA Detainees and the End of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program

1. President Bush Publicly Acknowledges the Existence of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program

2. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Gains Access to CIA Detainees After Their Transfer to U.S. Military Custody in September 2006

3. The CIA Considers Future of the Program Following the Military Commissions Act

4. The CIA Develops Modified Enhanced Interrogation Program After Passage of the Military Commissions Act

5. Muhammad Rahim. the CIA's Last Detainee, is Subjected to Extensive Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques, Provides No Intelligence

6. CIA After-Action Review of Rahim Interrogation Calls for Study of Effectiveness of Interrogation Techniques and Recommends Greater Use of Rapport-Building Techniques in Future CIA Interrogations

7. CIA Contracting Expenses Related to Company Formed by SWIGERT and DUNBAR

8. The CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program Ends

III. Intelligence Acquired and CIA Representations on the Effectiveness of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques to Multiple Constituencies

A. Background on CIA Effectiveness Representations

B. Past Efforts to Review the Effectiveness of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques

C. The Origins of CIA Representations Regarding the Effectiveness of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques As Having "Saved Lives," "Thwarted Plots," and "Captured Terrorists"

D. CIA Representations About the Effectiveness of Its Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Against Specific CIA Detainees

1. Abu Zubaydah

2. Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM)

E. CIA Effectiveness Claims Regarding a "High Volume of Critical Intelligence"

F. The Eight Primary CIA Effectiveness Representations–the Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques "Enabled the CIA to Disrupt Terrorist Plots" and "Capture Additional Terrorists"

1. The Thwarting of the Dirty Bomb/Tall Buildings Plot and the Capture of Jose Padilla

2. The Thwarting of the Karachi Plots

3. The Thwarting of the Second Wave Plot and the Discovery of the Al-Ghuraba Group

4. The Thwarting of the United Kingdom Urban Targets Plot and the Capture of Dhiren Barot, aka Issa al-Hindi

5. The Identification, Capture, and Arrest of Iyman Faris

6. The Identification, Capture, and Arrest of Sajid Badat

7. The Thwarting of the Heathrow Airport and Canary Wharf Plotting

8. The Capture of Hambali

G. CIA Secondary Effectiveness Representations–Less Frequently Cited Disrupted Plots, Captures, and Intelligence that the CIA Has Provided As Evidence for the Effectiveness of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques.

1. The Identification of Khalid Shaykh Mohammad (KSM) as the Mastermind of the September II. 2001,

2. The Identification of KSM's "Mukhtar" Alias

3. The Capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh

4. The Capture of Khalid Shaykh Mohammad (KSM)

5. The Capture of Majid Khan

6. The Thwarting of the Camp Lemonier Plotting

7. The Assertion that CIA Detainees Subjected to Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Help Validate CIA Sources

8. The Identification and Arrests of Uzhair and Saifullah Paracha

9. Critical Intelligence Alerting the CIA to Jaffar al-Tayyar

10. The Identification and Arrest of Saleh al-Marri

11. The Collection of Critical Tactical Intelligence on Shkai, Pakistan

12. Information on the Facilitator that Led to the UBL Operation

IV. Overview of CIA Representations to the Media While the Program Was Classified

A. The CIA Provides Information on the Still-Classified Detention and Interrogation Program to Journalists Who then Publish Classified Information; CIA Does Not File Crimes Reports in Connection with the Stories

B. Senior CIA Officials Discuss Need to "Put Out Our Story" to Shape Public and Congressional Opinion Prior to the Full Committee Being Briefed

C. CIA Attorneys Caution that Classified Information Provided to the Media Should Not Be Attributed to the CIA

D. The CIA Engages with Journalists and Conveys an Inaccurate Account of the Interrogation of Abu Zubaydah

V. Review of CIA Representations to the Department of Justice

A. August 1, 2002, OLC Memorandum Relies on Inaccurate Information Regarding Abu Zubaydah

B. The CIA Interprets the August 1,2002, Memorandum to Apply to Other Detainees, Despite Language of the Memorandum; Interrogations of Abu Zubaydah and Other Detainees Diverge from the CIA's Representations to the OLC

C. Following Suspension of the Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques, the CIA Obtains Approval from the OLC for the Interrogation of Three Individual Detainees

D. May 2005 OLC Memoranda Rely on Inaccurate Representations from the CIA Regarding the Interrogation Process, the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques, and the Effectiveness of the Techniques

E. After Passage of the Detainee Treatment Act, OLC Issues Opinion on CIA Conditions of Confinement, Withdraws Draft Opinion on the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques After the U.S. Supreme Court Case of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.

F. July 2007 OLC Memorandum Relies on Inaccurate CIA Representations Regarding CIA Interrogations and the Effectiveness of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques; CIA Misrepresents Congressional Views to the Department of Justice

VI. Review of CIA Representations to the Congress

A. After Memorandum of Notification, the CIA Disavows Torture and Assures the Committee Will Be Notified of Every Individual Detained by the CIA

B. The CIA Notifies Committee of the Detention of Abu Zubaydah, but Makes No Reference to Coercive Interrogation Techniques; the CIA Briefs Chairman and Vice Chairman After the Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques; the CIA Discusses Strategy to Avoid the Chairman's Request for More Information

C. No Detailed Records Exist of CIA Briefings of Committee Leadership; the CIA Declines to Answer Questions from Committee Members or Provide Requested Materials

D. Vice Chairman Rockefeller Seeks Committee Investigation

E. In Response to Detainee Treatment Act, the CIA Briefs Senators Not on the Committee; Proposal from Senator Levin for an Independent Commission Prompts Renewed Calls Within the CIA to Destroy Interrogation Videotapes

F. CIA Director Goss Seeks Committee Support for the Program After the Detainee Treatment Act; CIA Declines to Answer Questions for the Record

G. Full Committee First Briefed on the CIA's Interrogation Program Hours Before It Is Publicly Acknowledged on September 6, 2006

H. The CIA Provides Additional Information to the Full Committee and Staff, Much of It Inaccurate; Intelligence Authorization Act Passes Limiting CIA Interrogations to Techniques Authorized by the Army Field Manual

I. President Vetoes Legislation Based on Effectiveness Claims Provided by the CIA; CIA Declines to Answer Committee Questions for the Record About the CIA Interrogation Program

VII. CIA Destruction of Interrogation Videotapes Leads to Committee Investigation; Committee Votes 14-1 for Expansive Terms of Reference to Study the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program

VIII. Appendix 1: Terms of Reference

IX. Appendix 2: CIA Detainees from 2002 - 2008

X. Appendix 3: Example of Inaccurate CIA Testimony to the Committee- April 12, 2007

I. Background on the Committee Study

(U) On December 11, 2007, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence ("the Committee") initiated a review of the destruction of videotapes related to the interrogations of CIA detainees Abu Zubaydah and 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri after receiving a briefing that day on the matter by CIA Director Michael Hayden. At that briefing, Director Hayden stated that contemporaneous CIA operational cables were "a more than adequate representation of the tapes," and he agreed to provide the Committee with limited access to these cables at CIA Headquarters.

(U) On February 11, 2009, after the Committee was presented with a staff-prepared summary of the operational cables detailing the interrogations of Abu Zubaydah and al-Nashiri, the Committee began considering a broader review of the CIA's detention and interrogation practices. On March 5, 2009, in a vote of 14 to 1, the Committee approved Terms of Reference for a study of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. |1|

(U) The Committee Study of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program is a lengthy, highly detailed report exceeding 6,700 pages, including approximately 38,000 footnotes. It is divided into three volumes:

I. History and Operation of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. This volume is divided chronologically into sections addressing the establishment, development, and evolution of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. It includes an addendum on CIA Clandestine Detention Sites and the Arrangements Made with Foreign Entities in Relation to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program.

II. Intelligence Acquired and CIA Representations on the Effectiveness of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques. This volume addresses the intelligence the CIA attributed to CIA detainees and the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, specifically focusing on CIA representations regarding the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, as well as how the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program was operated and managed. It includes sections on CIA representations to the media, the Department of Justice, and the Congress.

III. Detention and Interrogation of CIA Detainees. This volume addresses the detention and interrogation of 119 CIA detainees, from the program's authorization on September 17, 2001, to its official end on January 22, 2009, to include information on their capture, detention, interrogation, and conditions of confinement. It also includes extensive information on the CIA's management, oversight, and day-to-day operation of its Detention and Interrogation Program.

(U) On December 13, 2012, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence approved the Committee Study of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program ("Committee Study") by a bipartisan vote of 9-6. The Committee Study included 20 findings and conclusions. The Committee requested that specific executive branch agencies review and provide comment on the Committee Study prior to Committee action to seek declassification and public release of the Committee Study. On June 27, 2013, the CIA provided a written response, which was followed by a series of meetings between the CIA and the Committee that concluded in September 2013. Following these meetings and the receipt of Minority views, the Committee revised the findings and conclusions and updated the Committee Study. On April 3, 2014, by a bipartisan vote of 11-3, the Committee agreed to send the revised findings and conclusions, and the updated Executive Summary of the Committee Study, to the president for declassification and public release.

(U) The Committee's Study is the most comprehensive review ever conducted of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. The CIA has informed the Committee that it has provided the Committee with all CIA records related to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. |2| The document production phase lasted more than three years, produced more than six million pages of material, and was completed in July 2012. The Committee Study is based primarily on a review of these documents, |3| which include CIA operational cables, reports, memoranda, intelligence products, and numerous interviews conducted of CIA personnel by various entities within the CIA, in particular the CIA's Office of Inspector General and the CIA's Oral History Program, as well as internal email |4| and other communications. |5|

(U) The Executive Summary is divided into two parts. The first describes the establishment, development, operation, and evolution of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. The second part provides information on the effectiveness of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, to include information acquired from CIA detainees, before, during, and after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques; as well as CIA representations on the effectiveness and operation of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program to the media, the Department of Justice, and the Congress. The Executive Summary does not include a description of the detention and interrogations of all 119 known CIA detainees. Details on each of these detainees are included in Volume III.

(U) Throughout this summary and the entire report, non-supervisory CIA personnel have been listed by pseudonym. The pseudonyms for these officers are used throughout the report. To distinguish CIA officers in pseudonym from those in true name, pseudonyms in this report are denoted by last names in upper case letters. Additionally, the CIA requested that the names of countries that hosted CIA detention sites, or with which the CIA negotiated the hosting of sites, as well as information directly or indirectly identifying such countries, be redacted from the classified version provided to Committee members. The report therefore lists these countries by letter. The report uses the same designations consistently, so "Country J," for example, refers to the same country throughout the Committee Study. Further, the CIA requested that the Committee replace the original code names for CIA detention sites with new identifiers. |6|

II. Overall History and Operation of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program

A. September 17, 2001, Memorandum of Notification (MON) Authorizes the CIA to Capture and Detain a Specific Category of Individuals

1. After Considering Various Clandestine Detention Locations, the CIA Determines That a U.S. Military Base Is the "Best Option"; the CIA Delegates "Blanket" Detention Approvals to CIA Officers in [XXX]

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On September 17, 2001, six days after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush signed a covert action Memorandum of Notification (MON) to authorize the director of central intelligence (DCI) to "undertake operations designed to capture and detain persons who pose a continuing, serious threat of violence or death to U.S. persons and interests or who are planning terrorist activities." |7| Although the CIA had previously been provided limited authorities to detain specific, named individuals pending the issuance of formal criminal charges, the MON provided unprecedented authorities, granting the CIA significant discretion in determining whom to detain, the factual basis for the detention, and the length of the detention. |8| The MON made no reference to interrogations or interrogation techniques. |9|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On September 14, 2001, three days before the issuance of the MON, the chief of operations of the CIA's [XXX] based on an urgent requirement from the chief of the Counterterrorism Center (CTC), sent an email to CIA Stations in [XXX] seeking input on appropriate locations for potential CIA detention facilities. |10| Over the course of the next month, CIA officers considered at least four countries in [XXX] and one in [XXX] as possible hosts for detention facilities and [XXX] at least three proposed site locations. |11|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On September 26, 2001, senior CTC personnel met to discuss the capture and detain authorities in the MON. On September 28, 2001, [XXX] CTC Legal, [XXX], sent an email describing the meeting and a number of policy decisions. The email stated that covert facilities would be operated "in a manner consistent with, but not pursuant to, the formal provision of appropriately comparable Federal instructions for the operation of prison facilities and the incarceration of inmates held under the maximum lawful security mechanisms." [XXX]'s email recognized the CIA's lack of experience in running detention facilities, and stated that the CIA would consider acquiring cleared personnel from the Department of Defense or the Bureau of Prisons with specialized expertise to assist the CIA in operating the facilities. |12| On September 27, 2001, CIA Headquarters informed CIA Stations that any future CIA detention facility would have to meet "U.S. POW Standards." |13|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In early November 2001, CIA Headquarters further determined that any future CIA detention facility would have to meet U.S. prison standards and that CIA detention and interrogation operations should be tailored to "meet the requirements of U.S. law and the federal rules of criminal procedure," adding that "[s]pecific methods of interrogation w[ould] be permissible so long as they generally comport with commonly accepted practices deemed lawful by U.S. courts." |14| The CIA's search for detention site locations was then put on hold and an internal memorandum from senior CIA officials explained that detention at a U.S. military base outside of the United States was the ''best option." |15| The memorandum thus urged the DCI to "[p]ress DOD and the US military, at highest levels, to have the US Military agree to host a long-term facility, and have them identify an agreeable location," specifically requesting that the DCI "[s]eek to have the US Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay designated as a long-term detention facility." |16|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Addressing the risks associated with the CIA maintaining a detention facility, the CIA memorandum warned that "[a]s captured terrorists may be held days, months, or years, the likelihood of exposure will grow over time," and that "[mjedia exposure could inflame public opinion against a host government and the U.S., thereby threatening the continued operation of the facility." The memorandum also anticipated that, "[i]n a foreign country, close cooperation with the host government will entail intensive negotiations." |17| The CIA memorandum warned that "any foreign country poses uncontrollable risks that could create incidents, vulnerability to the security of the facility, bilateral problems, and uncertainty over maintaining the facility." |18| The memorandum recommended the establishment of a "short-term" facility in which the CIA's role would be limited to "oversight, funding and responsibility." The CIA would "contract out all other requirements to other US Government organizations, commercial companies, and, as appropriate, foreign governments." |19|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On October 8, 2001, DCI George Tenet delegated the management and oversight of the capture and detention authorities provided by the MON to the CIA's deputy director for operations (DDO), James Pavitt, and the CIA's chief of the Counterterrorism Center, Cofer Black. |20| The DCI also directed that all requests and approvals for capture and detention be documented in writing. On December 17, 2001, however, the DDO rescinded these requirements and issued via a CIA cable "blanket approval" for CIA officers in [XXX] to "determine [who poses] the requisite 'continuing serious threat of violence or death to US persons and interests or who are planning terrorist activities.'" |21| By March 2002, CIA Headquarters had expanded the authority beyond the language of the MON and instructed CIA personnel that it would be appropriate to detain individuals who might not be high-value targets in their own right, but could provide information on high-value targets. |22|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On April 7, 2003, [XXX] CTC Legal, [XXX] sent a cable to CIA Stations and Bases stating that "at this stage in the war [we] believe there is sufficient opportunity in advance to document the key aspects of many, if not most, of our capture and detain operations." |23| [XXX]'S cable also provided guidance as to who could be detained under the MON, stating:

"there must be an articulable basis on which to conclude that the actions of a specific person whom we propose to capture and/or detain pose a 'continuing serious threat' of violence or death to U.S. persons or interests or that the person is planning a terrorist activity.

...We are not permitted to detain someone merely upon a suspicion that he or she has valuable information about terrorists or planned acts of terrorism.... Similarly, the mere membership in a particular group, or the mere existence of a particular familial tie, does not necessarily connote that the threshold of 'continuing, serious threat' has been satisfied." |24|

2. The CIA Holds at Least 21 More Detainees Than It Has Represented; At Least 26 CIA Detainees Wrongly Detained

(TS//[XXX]//NF) While the CIA has represented in public and classified settings that it detained "fewer than one hundred" individuals, |25| the Committee's review of CIA records indicates that the total number of CIA detainees was at least 119. |26| Internal CIA documents indicate that inadequate record keeping made it impossible for the CIA to determine how many individuals it had detained. In December 2003, a CIA Station overseeing CIA detention operations in Country [XXX] informed CIA Headquarters that it had made the "unsettling discovery" that the CIA was "holding a number of detainees about whom" it knew "very little." |27| Nearly five years later, in late 2008, the CIA attempted to determine how many individuals the CIA had detained. At the completion of the review, CIA leaders, including CIA Director Michael Hayden, were informed that the review found that the CIA had detained at least 112 individuals, and possibly more. |28| According to an email summarizing the meeting, CIA Director Hayden instructed a CIA officer to devise a way to keep the number of CIA detainees at the same number the CIA had previously briefed to Congress. The email, which the briefer sent only to himself, stated:

"I briefed the additional CIA detainees that could be included in RDI |29| numbers. DCIA instructed me to keep the detainee number at 98 – pick whatever date i [sic] needed to make that happen but the number is 98." |30|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) While the CIA acknowledged to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) in February 2006 that it had wrongly detained five individuals throughout the course of its detention program, |31| a review of CIA records indicates that at least 21 additional individuals, or a total of 26 of the 119 (22 percent) CIA detainees identified in this Study, did not meet the MON standard for detention. |32| This is a conservative calculation and includes only CIA detainees whom the CIA itself determined did not meet the standard for detention. It does not include individuals about whom there was internal disagreement within the CIA over whether the detainee met the standard or not, or the numerous detainees who, following their detention and interrogation, were found not to "pose a continuing threat of violence or death to U.S. persons and interests" or to be "planning terrorist activities" as required by the September 17, 2001, MON. |33| With one known exception, there are no CIA records to indicate that the CIA held personnel accountable for the detention of individuals the CIA itself determined were wrongfully detained. |34|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On at least four occasions, the CIA used host country detention sites in Country [XXX] to detain individuals on behalf of the CIA who did not meet the MON standard for capture and detention. ALEC Station officers at CIA Headquarters explicitly acknowledged that these detainees did not meet the MON standard for detention, and recommended placing the individuals in host country detention facilities because they did not meet the standard. The host country had no independent reason to detain these individuals and held them solely at the behest of the CIA. |35|

B. The Detention of Abu Zubaydah and the Development and Authorization of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques

1. Past Experience Led the CIA to Assess that Coercive Interrogation Techniques Were "Counterproductive " and "Ineffective "; After Issuance of the MON, CIA Attorneys Research Possible Legal Defense for Using Techniques Considered Torture; the CIA Conducts No Research on Effective Interrogations, Relies on Contractors with No Relevant Experience

(TS//[XXX]//NF) At the time of the issuance of the September 17, 2001, MON– which, as noted, did not reference interrogation techniques–the CIA had in place long-standing formal standards for conducting interrogations. The CIA had shared these standards with the Committee. In January 1989, the CIA informed the Committee that "inhumane physical or psychological techniques are counterproductive because they do not produce intelligence and will probably result in false answers." |36| Testimony of the CIA deputy director of operations in 1988 denounced coercive interrogation techniques, stating, "[p]hysical abuse or other degrading treatment was rejected not only because it is wrong, but because it has historically proven to be ineffective." |37| By October 2001, CIA policy was to comply with the Department of the Army Field Manual "Intelligence Interrogation." |38| A CIA Directorate of Operations Handbook from October 2001 states that the CIA does not engage in "human rights violations," which it defined as: "Torture, cruel, inhuman, degrading treatment or punishment, or prolonged detention without charges or trial." The handbook further stated that "[i]t is CIA policy to neither participate directly in nor encourage interrogation which involves the use of force, mental or physical torture, extremely demeaning indignities or exposure to inhumane treatment of any kind as an aid to interrogation." |39|

(U) The CIA did, however, have historical experience using coercive forms of interrogation. In 1963, the CIA produced the KUBARK Counterintelligence Interrogation Manual, intended as a manual for Cold War interrogations, which included the "principal coercive techniques of interrogation: arrest, detention, deprivation of sensory stimuli through solitary confinement or similar methods, threats and fear, debility, pain, heightened suggestibility and hypnosis, narcosis and induced regression." |40| In 1978, DCI Stansfield Turner asked former CIA officer John Limond Hart to investigate the CIA interrogation of Soviet KGB officer Yuri Nosenko |41| using the KUBARK methods–to include sensory deprivation techniques and forced standing. |42| In Hart's testimony before the House Select Committee on Assassinations on September 15, 1978, he noted that in his 31 years of government service:

"It has never fallen to my lot to be involved with any experience as unpleasant in every possible way as, first, the investigation of this case, and, second, the necessity of lecturing upon it and testifying. To me it is an abomination, and I am happy to say that... it is not in my memory typical of what my colleagues and I did in the agency during the time I was connected with it." |43|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Notwithstanding the Hart investigation findings, just five years later, in 1983, a CIA officer incorporated significant portions of the KUBARK manual into the Human Resource Exploitation (HRE) Training Manual, which the same officer used to provide interrogation training in Latin America in the early 1980s, and which was used to provide interrogation training to the [XXX] in 198[XXX]. |44| CIA officer [XXX] was involved in the HRE training and conducted interrogations. The CIA inspector general later recommended that he be orally admonished for inappropriate use of interrogation techniques. |45| In the fall of 2002, [XXX] became the CIA's chief of interrogations in the CIA's Renditions Group, |46| the officer in charge of CIA interrogations. |47|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Despite the CIA's previous statements that coercive physical and psychological interrogation techniques "result in false answers" |48| and have "proven to be ineffective," |49| as well as the aforementioned early November 2001 determination that "[s]pecific methods of interrogation w[ould] be permissible so long as they generally comport with commonly accepted practices deemed lawful by U.S. courts," |50| by the end of November 2001, CIA officers had begun researching potential legal defenses for using interrogation techniques that were considered torture by foreign governments and a non-governmental organization. On November 26, 2001, attorneys in the CIA's Office of General Counsel circulated a draft legal memorandum describing the criminal prohibition on torture and a potential "novel" legal defense for CIA officers who engaged in torture. The memorandum stated that the "CIA could argue that the torture was necessary to prevent imminent, significant, physical harm to persons, where there is no other available means to prevent the harm," adding that "states may be very unwilling to call the U.S. to task for torture when it resulted in saving thousands of lives." |51| An August 1, 2002, OLC memorandum to the White House Counsel includes a similar analysis of the "necessity defense" in response to potential charges of torture. |52|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In January 2002, the National Security Council principals began to debate whether to apply the protections of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949 ("Geneva") to the conflict with al-Qa'ida and the Taliban. A letter drafted for DCI Tenet to the president urged that the CIA be exempt from any application of these protections, arguing that application of Geneva would "significantly hamper the ability of CIA to obtain critical threat information necessary to save American lives." |53| On February 1, 2002–approximately two months prior to the detention of the CIA's first detainee– a CIA attorney wrote that if CIA detainees were covered by Geneva there would be "few alternatives to simply asking questions." The attorney concluded that, if that were the case, "then the optic becomes how legally defensible is a particular act that probably violates the convention, but ultimately saves lives." |54|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On February 7, 2002, President Bush issued a memorandum stating that neither al-Qa'ida nor Taliban detainees qualified as prisoners of war under Geneva, and that Common Article 3 of Geneva, requiring humane treatment of individuals in a conflict, did not apply to al-Qa'ida or Taliban detainees. |55|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) From the issuance of the MON to early 2002, there are no indications in CIA records that the CIA conducted significant research to identify effective interrogation practices, such as conferring with experienced U.S. military or law enforcement interrogators, or with the intelligence, military, or law enforcement services of other countries with experience in counterterrorism and the interrogation of terrorist suspects. |56| Nor are there CIA records referencing any review of the CIA's past use of coercive interrogation techniques and associated lessons learned. The only research documented in CIA records during this time on the issue of interrogation was the preparation of a report on an al-Qa'ida manual that was initially assessed by the CIA to include strategies to resist interrogation. This report was commissioned by the CIA's Office of Technical Services (OTS) and drafted by two CIA contractors, Dr. Grayson SWIGERT and Dr. Hammond DUNBAR. |57|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Both SWIGERT and DUNBAR had been psychologists with the U.S. Air Force Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape (SERE) school, which exposes select U.S. military personnel to, among other things, coercive interrogation techniques that they might be subjected to if taken prisoner by countries that did not adhere to Geneva protections. Neither psychologist had experience as an interrogator, nor did either have specialized knowledge of al-Qa'ida, a background in terrorism, or any relevant regional, cultural, or linguistic expertise. SWIGERT had reviewed research on "learned helplessness," in which individuals might become passive and depressed in response to adverse or uncontrollable events. |58| He theorized that inducing such a state could encourage a detainee to cooperate and provide information. |59|

2. The CIA Renders Abu Zubaydah to a Covert Facility, Obtains Presidential Approval Without Inter-Agency Deliberation

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In late March 2002, Pakistani government authorities, working with the CIA, captured al-Qa'ida facilitator Abu Zubaydah in a raid during which Abu Zubaydah suffered bullet wounds. At that time, Abu Zubaydah was assessed by CIA officers in ALEC Station, the office within the CIA with specific responsibility for al-Qa'ida, to possess detailed knowledge of al-Qa'ida terrorist attack plans. However, as is described in greater detail in the full Committee Study, this assessment significantly overstated Abu Zubaydah's role in al-Qa'ida and the information he was likely to possess. |60|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On the day that Abu Zubaydah was captured, CIA attorneys discussed interpretations of the criminal prohibition on torture that might permit CIA officers to engage in certain interrogation activities. |61| An attorney in CTC also sent an email with the subject line "Torture Update" to [XXX] CTC Legal [XXX], listing, without commentary, the restrictions on interrogation in the Geneva Conventions, the Convention Against Torture, and the criminal prohibition on torture. |62|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In late March 2002, anticipating its eventual custody of Abu Zubaydah, the CIA began considering options for his transfer to CIA custody and detention under the MON. The CIA rejected U.S. military custody [XXX], in large part because of the lack of security and the fact that Abu Zubaydah would have to be declared to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). |63| The CIA's concerns about custody at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, included the general lack of secrecy and the "possible loss of control to US military and/or FBI." |64| Rendition to Country [XXX] was rejected because of the perception that the results of that country's recent interrogations had been disappointing, as well as the intense interest in Abu Zubaydah from CIA leadership. As ALEC Station wrote, the CIA needed to participate directly in the interrogation, "[n]ot because we believe necessarily we can improve on [Country [XXX]] performance, but because the reasons for the lack of progress will be transparent and reportable up the line." |65|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Over the course of four days, the CIA settled on a detention site in Country [XXX] because country's "[XXX]," and the lack of U.S. court jurisdiction. The only disadvantages identified by the CIA with detention in Country [XXX] were that it would not be a "USG-controlled facility" and that "diplomatic/policy decisions" would be required. |66| As a March 28, 2002, CIA document acknowledged, the proposal to render Abu Zubaydah to Country [XXX] had not yet been broached with that country's officials. The document also warned: "[w]e can't guarantee security. If AZ's presence does become known, not clear what the impact would be." |67|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The decision to detain Abu Zubaydah at a covert detention facility in Country [XXX] did not involve the input of the National Security Council Principals Committee, the Department of State, the U.S. ambassador, or the CIA chief of Station in Country [XXX]. |68| On March 29, 2002, an email from the Office of the Deputy DCI stated that "[w]e will have to acknowledge certain gaps in our planning/preparations, but this is the option the DDCI will lead with for POTUS consideration." |69| That morning, the president approved moving forward with the plan to transfer Abu Zubaydah to Country [XXX]. |70| During the same Presidential Daily Brief (PDB) session, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld suggested exploring the option of putting Abu Zubaydah on a ship; however, CIA records do not indicate any further input from the mncipals. |71| That day, the CIA Station in Country [XXX] obtained the approval of Country [XXX]'s [XXX] officials for the CIA detention site. |72| The U.S. deputy chief of mission in Country [XXX], who was notified by the CIA Station after Country [XXX]'s leadership, concurred in the absence of the ambassador, [XXX]. |73| Shortly thereafter, Abu Zubaydah was rendered from Pakistan to Country [XXX] where he was held at the first CIA detention site, referred to in this summary as "DETENTION SITE GREEN." |74| CIA records indicate that Country [XXX] was the last location of a CIA detention facility known to the president or the vice president, as subsequent locations were kept from the principals as a matter of White House policy to avoid inadvertent disclosures of the location of the CIA detention sites. |75|

3. Tensions with Host Country Leadership and Media Attention Foreshadow Future Challenges

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The day after the rendition of Abu Zubaydah to DETENTION SITE GREEN, the [XXX], which was responsible for the security of the detention facility, linked its support for the CIA's detention site to a request for [XXX] support from the CIA [XXX]. The CIA eventually provided the requested [XXX] support, [XXX]. |76| According to CIA cables and internal documents, [XXX] prompted [XXX] to replace [XXX] individuals responsible for supporting the CIA's detention facility. |77| Those officials were replaced by different officials whom the CIA believed were not supportive of the CIA's detention site. |78| Despite considerable effort by the CIA's station in Country [XXX] to retain support for DETENTION SITE GREEN from its new [XXX] partners, [XXX] called for the closing of the CIA detention facility within three weeks. |79| Continued lobbying by the chief of Station, however, eventually led Country [XXX] to reverse this decision, allowing DETENTION SITE GREEN to remain operational. |80|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On April [XXX], 2002, the CIA Station in Country [XXX] attempted to list the number of Country [XXX] officers who, "[t]o the best of Station's knowledge," had "knowledge of the presence of Abu Zubaydah" in a specific city in Country [XXX]. The list included eight individuals, references to "various" personnel [XXX] and the "staff" of [XXX], and concluded "[d]oubtless many others." |81| By April [XXX], 2002, a media organization had learned that Abu Zubaydah was in Country [XXX], prompting the CIA to explain to the media organization the "security implications" of revealing the information. |82| The CIA Station in Country [XXX] also expressed concern that press inquiries "would do nothing for our liaison and bilateral relations, possibly diminishing chances that [the [XXX] of Country [XXX]] will permit [Abu Zubaydah] to remain in country or that he would accept other [Abu Zubaydah]-like renderees in the future." |83| In November 2002, after the CIA learned that a major U.S. newspaper knew that Abu Zubaydah was in Country [XXX], senior CIA officials, as well as Vice President Cheney, urged the newspaper not to publish the information. |84| While the U.S. newspaper did not reveal Country [XXX] as the location of Abu Zubaydah, the fact that it had the information, combined with previous media interest, resulted in the decision to close DETENTION SITE GREEN. |85|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) After Abu Zubaydah was rendered to DETENTION SITE GREEN on March [XXX], 2002, he was questioned by special agents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) who spoke Arabic and had experience interrogating members of al-Qa'ida. Abu Zubaydah confirmed his identity to the FBI officers, informed the FBI officers he wanted to cooperate, and provided background information on his activities. That evening, Abu Zubaydah's medical condition deteriorated rapidly and he required immediate hospitalization. Although Abu Zubaydah was largely unable to communicate because of a breathing tube, he continued to provide information to FBI and CIA officials at the hospital using an Arabic alphabet chart. According to records, the FBI officers remained at Abu Zubaydah's bedside throughout this ordeal and assisted in his medical care. When Abu Zubaydah's breathing tube was removed on April 8, 2002, Abu Zubaydah provided additional intelligence and reiterated his intention to cooperate. |86|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) During an April 10, 2002, debriefing session, conducted in the hospital's intensive care unit, Abu Zubaydah revealed to the FBI officers that an individual named "Mukhtar" was the al-Qa'ida "mastermind" of the 9/11 attacks. Abu Zubaydah identified a picture of Mukhtar provided by the FBI from the FBI's Most Wanted list. The picture was of Khalid Shaykh Mohammad (KSM), who had been indicted in 1996 for his role in Ramzi Yousef s terrorist plotting to detonate explosives on 12 United States-flagged aircraft and destroy them mid-flight over the Pacific Ocean. |87| Abu Zubaydah told the interrogators that "Mukhtar" was related to Ramzi Yousef, whom Abu Zubaydah said was in an American jail (Yousef had been convicted for the aforementioned terrorist plotting and was involved in the 1993 World Trade Center terrorist attack). |88|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Abu Zubaydah told the FBI officers that "Mukhtar" trained the 9/11 hijackers and also provided additional information on KSM's background, to include that KSM spoke fluent English, was approximately 34 years old, and was responsible for al-Qa'ida operations outside of Afghanistan. |89| Subsequent representations on the success of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program consistently describe Abu Zubaydah's identification of KSM's role in the September 11, 2001, attacks, as well as his identification of KSM's alias ("Mukhtar"), as being "important" and "vital" information. |90| A review of CIA records found that this information was corroborative of information already in CIA databases. |91|

5. While Abu Zubaydah is Hospitalized, CIA Headquarters Discusses the Use of Coercive Interrogation Techniques Against Abu Zubaydah

(TS//[XXX]//NF) While Abu Zubaydah was still hospitalized, personnel at CIA Headquarters began discussing how CIA officers would interrogate Abu Zubaydah upon his return to DETENTION SITE GREEN. The initial CIA interrogation proposal recommended that the interrogators engage with Abu Zubaydah to get him to provide information, and suggested that a "hard approach," involving foreign government personnel, be taken "only as a last resort." |92| At a meeting about this proposal, [XXX] CTC Legal, [XXX], recommended that a psychologist working on contract in the CIA's Office of Technical Services (OTS), Grayson SWIGERT, be used by CTC to "provide real-time recommendations to overcome Abu Zubaydah's resistance to interrogation." |93| SWIGERT had come to [XXX]'s attention through [XXX], who worked in OTS. Shortly thereafter, CIA Headquarters formally proposed that Abu Zubaydah be kept in an all-white room that was lit 24 hours a day, that Abu Zubaydah not be provided any amenities, that his sleep be disrupted, that loud noise be constantly fed into his cell, and that only a small number of people interact with him. CIA records indicate that these proposals were based on the idea that such conditions would lead Abu Zubaydah to develop a sense of "learned helplessness." |94| CIA Headquarters then sent an interrogation team to Country [XXX], including SWIGERT, whose initial role was to consult on the psychological aspects of the interrogation. |95|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) DCI Tenet was provided an update on the Abu Zubaydah interrogation plans on April 12, 2002. The update stated that the CIA team was preparing for Abu Zubaydah's transfer back to DETENTION SITE GREEN, and noted the CIA interrogation team intended to "set the stage" and increase control over Abu Zubaydah. |96| The update stated:

"Our [CIA] lead interrogator will require Abu Zubaydah to reveal the most sensitive secret he knows we are seeking; if he dissembles or diverts the conversation, the interview will stop and resume at a later time.... In accordance with the strategy, and with concurrence from FBI Headquarters, the two on-site FBI agents will no longer directly participate in the interview/debriefing sessions." |97|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The FBI special agents questioning Abu Zubaydah at the hospital objected to the CIA's plans. In a message to FBI Headquarters, an FBI special agent wrote that the CIA psychologists had acquired "tremendous influence." |98| The message further stated:

"AZ's health has improved over the last two days and Agency[CIA] is ready to move [Abu Zubaydah] out of the hospital and back to [XXX] on [XXX] in an elaborate plan to change AZ's environment. Agency [CIA] advised this day that they will be immediately changing tactics in all future AZ interviews by having only there [sic] [CIA officer] interact with AZ (there will be no FBI presence in interview room). This change contradicts all conversations had to date.... They believe AZ is offering, 'throw away information' and holding back from providing threat information (It should be note [sic] that we have obtained critical information regarding AZ thus far and have now got him speaking about threat information, albeit from his hospital bed and not [an] appropriate interview environment for full follow-up (due to his health). Suddenly the psychiatric team here wants AZ to only interact with their [CIA officer, and the CIA sees this] as being the best way to get the threat information.... We offered several compromise solutions... all suggestions were immediately declined without further discussion. .. .This again is quite odd as all information obtained from AZ has come from FBI lead interviewers and questioning.... I have spent an un-calculable amount of hours at [Abu Zubaydah's] bedside assisting with medical help, holding his hand and comforting him through various medical procedures, even assisting him in going [to] the bathroom.... We have built tremendous report [sic] with AZ and now that we are on the eve of 'regular' interviews to get threat information, we have been 'written out' of future interviews." |99|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On April 13, 2002, while Abu Zubaydah was still at the hospital, the CIA implemented the "new interrogation program." |100| This initial meeting was held with just one interrogator in the room and lasted 11 minutes. A cable stated that the CIA interrogator was coached by the "psychological team." |101| The CIA interrogator advised Abu Zubaydah that he (Abu Zubaydah) "had a most important secret that [the interrogator] needed to know." According to the cable, Abu Zubaydah "amazingly" nodded in agreement about the secret, but "did not divulge any information, as [the interrogation team] expected." |102| A cable further explained that Abu Zubaydah indicated that he understood that the key question was about "impending future terrorist plans against the United States," |103| and that the CIA officer told Abu Zubaydah to signal for him "when he decides to discuss that 'one key item he knows he is keeping from the [interrogator].'" |104| The FBI officers provided a similar account to FBI Headquarters, adding that: "We spent the rest of the day in the adjoining room with [the CIA officer] and one of the psychiatrists [REDACTED] waiting for [Abu Zubaydah] to signal he was ready to talk. [Abu Zubaydah] apparently went to sleep... they did not approach [Abu Zubaydah] the rest of the day." |105| In their communications with FBI Headquarters, the FBI officers wrote that they explained their rapport-building approaches to the CIA interrogation team and "tried to explain that we have used this approach before on other Al-Qaeda members with much success (al-Owhali, |106| KKM, Jandal, Badawi etc.). We tried to politely suggest that valuable time was passing where we could attempt to solicit threat information...." |107|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On April 15, 2002, per a scripted plan, the same CIA interrogator delivered what a CIA cable described as "the prc-move message" to Abu Zubaydah: that "time is running out," that his situation had changed, and that the interrogator was disappointed that Abu Zubaydah did not signal "to discuss the one thing he was hiding." |108| Abu Zubaydah was sedated and moved from the hospital to DETENTION SITE GREEN. When Abu Zubaydah awoke at 11:00 PM, four hours after his arrival, he was described as surprised and disturbed by his new situation. An April 16, 2002, cable states the "objective is to ensure that [Abu Zubaydah] is at his most vulnerable state." |109|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) A cable described Abu Zubaydah's cell as white with no natural lighting or windows, but with four halogen lights pointed into the cell. |110| An air conditioner was also in the room. A white curtain separated the interrogation room from the cell. The interrogation cell had three padlocks. Abu Zubaydah was also provided with one of two chairs that were rotated based on his level of cooperation (one described as more comfortable than the other). Security officers wore all black uniforms, including boots, gloves, balaclavas, and goggles to keep Abu Zubaydah from identifying the officers, as well as to prevent Abu Zubaydah "from seeing the security guards as individuals who he may attempt to establish a relationship or dialogue with." |111| The security officers communicated by hand signals when they were with Abu Zubaydah and used hand-cuffs and leg shackles to maintain control. In addition, either loud rock music was played or noise generators were used to enhance Abu Zubaydah's "sense of hopelessness." |112| Abu Zubaydah was typically kept naked and sleep deprived. |113|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) An April 16, 2002, cable explained that the interrogation strategy had shifted since Abu Zubaydah's medical condition prevented "total isolation as originally planned." According to the cable, a 24-hour interrogation strategy was now "deemed to be the best approach" for acquiring information. As a result, the FBI officers were once again allowed to question Abu Zubaydah. |114| On April 17, 2002, an FBI officer met with Abu Zubaydah for six hours. |115| FBI records state that Abu Zubaydah had "not seen the interviewing (FBI) agent" since April 11, 2002, but that Abu Zubaydah greeted the agent by name. |116| During the questioning Abu Zubaydah denied any knowledge related to specific targets for a pending attack and "advised that many of the brothers on the front lines (nfi) [no further information] talked about all types of attacks against America but that for the most part this was usually just talk and that [the United States] should not be concerned about this type of talk." |117| Abu Zubaydah provided information on al-Qa'ida, KSM, his past travel to the United States, as well as general information on extremists in Pakistan. |118|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Abu Zubaydah continued to provide information to interrogators throughout April 2002, but not information on pending attacks against the United States. On the evening of April 20, 2002, Abu Zubaydah told the FBI officers about two men who approached him with a plan to detonate a uranium-based explosive device in the United States. Abu Zubaydah stated he did not believe the plan was viable and did not know the names of the two individuals, but provided physical descriptions of the pair. |119| This information was acquired after Abu Zubaydah was confronted with emails indicating that he had sent the two individuals to KSM. |120| The CIA would later represent that this information was acquired "as a result" of the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, and that the information acquired resulted in the thwarting of the "Dirty Bomb Plot" and the capture of Jose Padilla. |121| However, the chief of the Abu Zubaydah Task Force stated that "AZ's info alone would never have allowed us to find them," while another CIA officer stated that the CIA was already "alert" to the threat posed by Jose Padilla, and that the CIA's "suspicion" was only "enhanced during the debriefings of Abu Zubaydah." |122| Additional information on the "Dirty Bomb Plot" and the capture of Jose Padilla is provided later in this summary.

(TS//[XXX]//NF) During the month of April 2002, which included a period during which Abu Zubaydah was hospitalized, on life support, and unable to speak, the CIA disseminated 39 intelligence reports based on his interrogations. |123| At the end of April 2002, the DETENTION SITE GREEN interrogation team provided CIA Headquarters with three interrogation strategies. CIA Headquarters chose the most coercive interrogation option, which was proposed and supported by CIA contractor SWIGERT. |124| This coercive interrogation option–which included sensory deprivation–was again opposed by the FBI special agents at the detention site. |125| The interrogation proposal was to engage in "only a single-minded, consistent, totally focused questioning of current threat information." |126| Once implemented, this approach failed to produce the information CIA Headquarters believed Abu Zubaydah possessed: threats to the United States and information about al-Qa'ida operatives located in the United States. Nonetheless, Abu Zubaydah continued to provide other intelligence. In May 2002, the CIA disseminated 56 intelligence reports based on the interrogations. |127|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In early June 2002, the CIA interrogation team recommended that Abu Zubaydah spend several weeks in isolation while the interrogation team members departed the facility "as a means of keeping [Abu Zubaydah] off-balance and to allow the team needed time off for a break and to attend to personal matters [XXX]," as well as to discuss "the endgame" of Abu Zubaydah [XXX] with officers from CIA Headquarters. |128| As a result, from June 18, 2002, through August 4, 2002, Abu Zubaydah spent 47 days in isolation without being asked any questions. Despite the fact that Abu Zubaydah was in isolation for nearly half of the month, the CIA disseminated 37 intelligence reports based on the interrogations of Abu Zubaydah in June 2002. |129| The CIA would later represent publicly–as well as in classified settings–that during the use of "established US Government interrogation techniques," Abu Zubaydah "stopped all cooperation" in June 2002, requiring the development of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. |130| CIA records do not support this assertion.

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Prior to Abu Zubaydah's 47-day isolation period, Abu Zubaydah provided information on al-Qa'ida activities, plans, capabilities, and relationships, in addition to information on its leadership structure, including personalities, decision-making processes, training, and tactics. |131| As described in more detail in the full Committee Study, Abu Zubaydah's inability to provide information on the next attack in the United States and operatives in the United States served as the basis for CIA representations that Abu Zubaydah was "uncooperative," as well as for the CIA's determination that Abu Zubaydah required the use of what would later be known as the CIA's "enhanced interrogation techniques" to become "compliant" and reveal the information the CIA believed he was withholding. Abu Zubaydah never provided this information, and CIA officers later concluded this was information Abu Zubaydah did not possess. |132|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) After Abu Zubaydah was placed in isolation, the Abu Zubaydah interrogation team [XXX] [departed Country [XXX]]. Security and medical personnel remained at the detention site. The FBI special agents did not return to DETENTION SITE GREEN. |133|

7. Proposal by CIA Contract Personnel to Use SERE-Based Interrogation Techniques Leads to the Development of the CIA 's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques; The CIA Determines that "the Interrogation Process Takes Precedence Over Preventative Medical Procedures"

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In early July 2002, CIA officers held several meetings at CIA Headquarters to discuss the possible use of "novel interrogation methods" on Abu Zubaydah. |134| During the course of those meetings SWIGERT proposed using techniques derived from the U.S. military's SERE (Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape) school. |135| SWIGERT provided a list of 12 SERE techniques for possible use by the CIA: (1) the attention grasp, (2) walling, (3) facial hold, (4) facial slap, (5) cramped confinement, (6) wall standing, (7) stress positions, (8) sleep deprivation, (9) waterboard, (10) use of diapers, (11) use of insects, and (12) mock burial. |136| SWIGERT also recommended that the CIA enter into a contract with Hammond DUNBAR, his co-author of the CIA report on potential al-Qa'ida interrogation resistance training, to aid in the CIA interrogation process. |137| Like SWIGERT, DUNBAR had never participated in a real-world interrogation. His interrogation experience was limited to the paper he authored with SWIGERT and his work with U.S. Air Force personnel at the SERE school. |138|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In May 2003, a senior CIA interrogator would tell personnel from the CIA's Office of Inspector General that SWIGERT and DUNBAR's SERE school model was based on resisting North Vietnamese "physical torture" and was designed to extract "confessions for propaganda purposes" from U.S. airmen "who possessed little actionable intelligence." The CIA, he believed, "need[ed] a different working model for interrogating terrorists where confessions are not the ultimate goal." |139|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) After the July 2002 meetings, the CIA's [XXX] Legal, [XXX] drafted a letter to Attorney General John Ashcroft asking the Department of Justice for "a formal declination of prosecution, in advance, for any employees of the United States, as well as any other personnel acting on behalf of the United States, who may employ methods in the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah that otherwise might subject those individuals to prosecution." |140| The letter further indicated that "the interrogation team had concluded" that "the use of more aggressive methods is required to persuade Abu Zubaydah to provide the critical information we need to safeguard the lives of innumerable innocent men, women and children within the United States and abroad." The letter added that these "aggressive methods" would otherwise be prohibited by the torture statute, "apart from potential reliance upon the doctrines of necessity or of self-defense." |141| This letter was circulated internally at the CIA, including to SWIGERT; however, there are no records to indicate it was provided to the attorney general. |142|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On July 13, 2002, [XXX] CTC Legal, [XXX], and the CIA's acting general counsel, John Rizzo, met with attorneys from the National Security Council and the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), as well as with Michael Chertoff, the head of the Department of Justice Criminal Division, and Daniel Levin, the chief of staff to the FBI director, to provide an overview of the CIA's proposed interrogation techniques and to ask for a formal, definitive DOJ opinion regarding the lawfulness of employing the specific CIA interrogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah. |143|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The CIA attorneys described the 12 proposed interrogation techniques and told the Department of Justice and National Security Council attorneys that Abu Zubaydah continued to withhold critical intelligence on the identities of al-Qa'ida personnel in the United States and planned al-Qa'ida attacks. The CIA attorneys also told the group that CIA officers were complemented by:

"expert personnel retained on contract who possess extensive experience, gained within the Department of Defense, on the psychological and physical methods of interrogation and the resistance techniques employed as countermeasures to such interrogation." |144|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) According to the CIA cable describing the meeting, the representatives from the OLC, including Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Yoo, advised that the criminal prohibition on torture would not prohibit the methods proposed by the interrogation team because of the absence of any specific intent to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering. |145| On July 13,2002, Yoo sent an unclassified letter to the CIA's acting general counsel describing his interpretation of the statute. |146|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Despite the initial view expressed by Yoo that the use of the proposed CIA interrogation techniques would be lawful, on July 17, 2002, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice requested a delay in the approval of the interrogation techniques for Abu Zubaydah's interrogation until the attorney general issued an opinion. |147| The following day, Rice and Deputy National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley requested that the Department of Justice "delay the approval of the memo detailing the next phase of interrogations" until the CIA provided specific details on its proposed interrogation techniques and "an explanation of why the CIA is confident these techniques will not cause lasting and irreparable harm to Abu Zubaydah." |148| Rice asked the CIA to provide the OLC with a description of each of the planned interrogation techniques, and to "gather and provide any available empirical data on the reactions and likelihood of prolonged mental harm from the use of the 'water board' and the staged burial." |149|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On July 15, 2002, a cable providing details on the proposed interrogation phase stated that only the DETENTION SITE GREEN chief of Base would be allowed to interrupt or stop an interrogation in process, and that the chief of Base would be the final decision-making authority as to whether the CIA's interrogation techniques applied to Abu Zubaydah would be discontinued. |150| The CIA officers at the detention site added:

"If [Abu Zubaydah] develops a serious medical condition which may involve a host of conditions including a heart attack or another catastrophic type of condition, all efforts will be made to ensure that proper medical care will be provided to [him]. In the event [Abu Zubaydah] dies, we need to be prepared to act accordingly, keeping in mind the liaison equities involving our hosts." |151|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) To address these issues, the cable stated that if Abu Zubaydah were to die during the interrogation, he would be cremated. |152| The interrogation team closed the cable by stating:

"regardless which [disposition] option we follow however, and especially in light of the planned psychological pressure techniques to be implemented, we need to get reasonable assurances that [Abu Zubaydah] will remain in isolation and incommunicado for the remainder of his life." |153|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Officers from the CIA's ALEC Station responded to the interrogation team's comments several days later. Their cable noted that the interrogation team was correct in its "understanding that the interrogation process takes precedence over preventative medical procedures." |154| ALEC Station further observed:

"There is a fairly unanimous sentiment within HQS that [Abu Zubaydah] will never be placed in a situation where he has any significant contact with others and/or has the opportunity to be released. While it is difficult to discuss specifics at this point, all major players are in concurrence that [Abu Zubaydah] should remain incommunicado for the remainder of his life. This may preclude [Abu Zubaydah] from being turned over to another country, but a final decision regarding his future incarceration condition has yet to be made." |155|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) As a result of the request by National Security Advisor Rice for additional research on the CIA's proposed interrogation techniques, CIA and DOJ personnel contacted individuals at the Department of Defense's Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA), the agency that administers the SERE school, to gather information about the effects of using the techniques in training exercises. |156| According to CIA officer [XXX], who had [XXX] joined the CIA's OTS after [XXX] years at JPRA, an individual with SERE school experience commented that "information gleaned via harsh treatment may not be accurate, as the prisoner may say anything to avoid further pain," and that "[c]urrent doctrine for interrogations conducted in the permanent phase of capture may lean towards 'soft' or 'indirect' rounds of questioning." |157|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Pursuant to National Security Advisor Rice's request, CIA Headquarters personnel also requested information from the interrogation team–particularly SWIGERT and DUNBAR–about the psychological effects of the use of the waterboard and mock burial. The chief of Base at DETENTION SITE GREEN responded by cable noting that:

"We are a nation of laws and we do not wish to parse words. A bottom line in considering the new measures proposed is that [Abu Zubaydah] is being held in solitary confinement, against his will, without legal representation, as an enemy of our country, our society and our people. Therefore, while the techniques described in Headquarters meetings and below are administered to student volunteers in the U.S. in a harmless way, with no measurable impact on the psyche of the volunteer, we do not believe we can assure the same here for a man forced through these processes and who will be made to believe this is the future course of the remainder of his life. Station, [DETENTION SITE GREEN chief of Base] and [DETENTION SITE GREEN] personnel will make every effort possible to insure [sic] that subject is not permanently physically or mental harmed but we should not say at the outset of this process that there is no risk." |158|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) As former psychologists for the United States Air Force, SWIGERT and DUNBAR had no direct experience with the waterboard, as it was not used in Air Force SERE training. Nonetheless, they indicated that the waterboard–which they described as an "absolutely convincing technique"–was necessary to overwhelm Abu Zubaydah's ability to resist. |159| They also responded that they were aware that the Navy–which used the waterboard technique in training–had not reported any significant long-term consequences on individuals from its use. Unlike the CIA's subsequent use of the waterboard, however, the Navy's use of the technique was a single training exercise and did not extend to multiple sessions. SWIGERT and DUNBAR wrote:

"any physical pressure applied to extremes can cause severe mental pain or suffering. Hooding, the use of loud music, sleep deprivation, controlling darkness and light, slapping, walling, or the use of stress positions taken to extreme can have the same outcome. The safety of any technique lies primarily in how it is applied and monitored." |160|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On July 24, 2002, the attorney general verbally approved the use of 10 interrogation techniques, which included: the attention grasp, walling, the facial hold, the facial slap (insult slap), cramped confinement, wall standing, stress positions, sleep deprivation, use of diapers, and use of insects. |161| The interrogation team, however, indicated that they intended to wait for the approval to use the waterboard before proceeding with their interrogation of Abu Zubaydah. On July 26, 2002, the attorney general verbally approved the use of the waterboard. |162| The OLC finalized its classified written legal opinion on August 1, 2002. The earlier CIA request to conduct a mock burial was not formally considered by the OLC. The approved interrogation techniques, along with other CIA interrogation techniques that were subsequently identified and used by the CIA, are referred to as the CIA's "enhanced interrogation techniques," or more commonly by the CIA as "EITs."

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In the course of seeking approval to use the techniques, CIA Headquarters advised the Department of Justice and the national security advisor that "countless more Americans may die unless we can persuade AZ to tell us what he knows." CIA Headquarters further represented that the DETENTION SITE GREEN interrogation team believed "Abu Zubaydah continues to withhold critical threat information," and "that in order to persuade him to provide" that information, "the use of more aggressive techniques is required." |163| The cable to DETENTION SITE GREEN from CIA Headquarters documenting the information CIA Headquarters had provided to the Department of Justice warned that "[t]he legal conclusions are predicated upon the determinations by the interrogation team that Abu Zubaydah continues to withhold critical threat information." |164| According to cables, however, the CIA interrogators at the detention site had not determined that "the use of more aggressive techniques was required" to "persuade" Abu Zubaydah to provide threat information. Rather, the interrogation team believed the objective of the coercive interrogation techniques was to confirm Abu Zubaydah did not have additional information on threats to the United States, writing:

"Our assumption is the objective of this operation is to achieve a high degree of confidence that [Abu Zubaydah] is not holding back actionable information concerning threats to the United States beyond that which [Abu Zubaydah] has already provided." |165|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) As is described in this summary, and in more detail in the full Committee Study, the interrogation team later deemed the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques a success, not because it resulted in critical threat information, but because it provided further evidence that Abu Zubaydah had not been withholding the aforementioned information from the interrogators. |166|

8. The CIA Obtains Legal and Policy Approval for Its Enhanced Interrogation Techniques; The CIA Does Not Brief the President

(TS//[XXX]//NF) As described, CIA officers represented to National Security Advisor Rice that Abu Zubaydah was withholding information on pending attacks and operatives in the United States. On July 31, 2002, Rice informed Deputy DCI John McLaughlin that, in balancing the application of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against the possible loss of American lives, she would not object to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques if the attorney general determined them to be legal. |167|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) During the month of July 2002, the CIA anticipated that the president would need to approve the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques before they could be used. Therefore, in late July 2002, the CIA prepared talking points for a briefing of the president. These draft talking points indicated that the CIA was planning to use inteiTogation techniques beyond what was normally permitted by law enforcement, and included a brief description of the waterboard interrogation technique. On August 1, 2002, based on comments from White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, the talking points were revised to eliminate references to the waterboard. |168| CIA records indicate, however, that the talking points were not used to brief the president. On August 2, 2002, the National Security Council legal advisor informed the DCI's chief of staff that "Dr. Rice had been informed that there would be no briefing of the President on this matter," |169| but that the DCI had policy approval to employ the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. |170|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) CIA records state that prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Abu Zubaydah in 2002, the CIA did not brief Secretary of State Colin Powell or Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, two members of the National Security Council, on the techniques. |171| The Committee, including the chairman and vice chairman, was also not briefed on the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques prior to their use. |172|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Approximately a year later, on July 31, 2003, senior CIA personnel believed the president had still not been briefed on the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. |173| In August 2003, DCI Tenet told the CIA Office of Inspector General that "he had never spoken to the President regarding the detention and interrogation program or EITs, nor was he aware of whether the President had been briefed by his staff." |174| The May 2004 CIA Inspector General Special Review included a recommendation for the DCI to:

"Brief the President regarding the implementation of the Agency's detention and interrogation activities pursuant to the MON of 17 September 2001 or any other authorities, including the use of EITs and the fact that detainees have died. This Recommendation is significant." |175|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In transmitting the Special Review to the Committee, DCI Tenet responded to the recommendation, noting only that "[t]he DCI will determine whether and to what extent the President requires a briefing on the Program." |176| On April 6, 2006, CIA Inspector General Helgerson responded to a request from Committee Vice Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV on the status of corrective actions taken in response to the Special Review recommendations. With regard to a briefing for the president, Helgerson wrote: "Consistent with this recommendation, DCI Tenet, before he left office, and Director Goss, shortly after taking office, both advised me that they had made requests to brief the President." |177| Prepared "Questions and Answers" for the National Security Council principals in connection with the disclosure of the program in September 2006 and subsequent media outreach also suggest that the president was not briefed at the outset about the CIA's interrogation techniques. In response to the potential question: "What role did the President play.. .Was he briefed on the interrogation techniques, and if so when?" the proposed answer did not assert that the president was briefed, but rather that the "President was not of course involved in CIA's day to day operations -including who should be held by CIA and how they should be questioned - these decisions are made or overseen by CIA Directors." |178|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) CIA records indicate that the first CIA briefing for the president on the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques occurred on April 8, 2006. |179| CIA records state that when the president was briefed, he expressed discomfort with the "image of a detainee, chained to the ceiling, clothed in a diaper, and forced to go to the bathroom on himself." |180|

9. The CIA Uses the Waterboard and Other Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Against Abu Zubaydah

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On August 3, 2002, CIA Headquarters informed the interrogation team at DETENTION SITE GREEN that it had formal approval to apply the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, including the waterboard, against Abu Zubaydah. According to CIA records, only the two CIA contractors, SWIGERT and DUNBAR, were to have contact with Abu Zubaydah. Other CIA personnel at DETENTION SITE GREEN - including CIA medical personnel and other CIA "interrogators with whom he is familiar" - were only to observe. |181|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) From August 4, 2002, through August 23, 2002, the CIA subjected Abu Zubaydah to its enhanced interrogation techniques on a near 24-hour-per-day basis. After Abu Zubaydah had been in complete isolation for 47 days, the most aggressive interrogation phase began at approximately 11:50 AM on August 4, 2002. |182| Security personnel entered the cell, shackled and hooded Abu Zubaydah, and removed his towel (Abu Zubaydah was then naked). Without asking any questions, the interrogators placed a rolled towel around his neck as a collar, and backed him up into the cell wall (an interrogator later acknowledged the collar was used to slam Abu Zubaydah against a concrete wall). |183| The interrogators then removed the hood, performed an attention grab, and had Abu Zubaydah watch while a large confinement box was brought into the cell and laid on the floor. |184| A cable states Abu Zubaydah "was unhooded and the large confinement box was carried into the interrogation room and paced [sic] on the floor so as to appear as a coffin." |185| The interrogators then demanded detailed and verifiable information on terrorist operations planned against the United States, including the names, phone numbers, email addresses, weapon caches, and safe houses of anyone involved. CIA records describe Abu Zubaydah as appearing apprehensive. Each time Abu Zubaydah denied having additional information, the interrogators would perform a facial slap or face grab. |186| At approximately 6:20 PM, Abu Zubaydah was waterboarded for the first time. Over a two-and-a-half-hour period, Abu Zubaydah coughed, vomited, and had "involuntary spasms of the torso and extremities" during waterboarding. |187| Detention site personnel noted that "throughout the process [Abu Zubaydah] was asked and given the opportunity to respond to questions about threats" to the United States, but Abu Zubaydah continued to maintain that he did not have any additional information to provide. |188| In an email to OMS leadership entitled, "So it begins," a medical officer wrote:

"The sessions accelerated rapidly progressing quickly to the water board after large box, walling, and small box periods. [Abu Zubaydah] seems very resistant to the water board. Longest time with the cloth over his face so far has been 17 seconds. This is sure to increase shortly. NO useful information so far.. ..He did vomit a couple of times during the water board with some beans and rice. It's been 10 hours since he ate so this is surprising and disturbing. We plan to only feed Ensure for a while now. I'm head[ing] back for another water board session." |189|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques– including "walling, attention grasps, slapping, facial hold, stress positions, cramped confinement, white noise and sleep deprivation"–continued in "varying combinations, 24 hours a day" for 17 straight days, through August 20, 2002. |190| When Abu Zubaydah was left alone during this period, he was placed in a stress position, left on the waterboard with a cloth over his face, or locked in one of two confinement boxes. According to the cables, Abu Zubaydah was also subjected to the waterboard "2-4 times a day...with multiple iterations of the watering cycle during each application." |191|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The "aggressive phase of interrogation" continued until August 23, 2002. |192| Over the course of the entire 20 day "aggressive phase of interrogation," Abu Zubaydah spent a total of 266 hours (11 days, 2 hours) in the large (coffin size) confinement box and 29 hours in a small confinement box, which had a width of 21 inches, a depth of 2.5 feet, and a height of 2.5 feet. The CIA interrogators told Abu Zubaydah that the only way he would leave the facility was in the coffin-shaped confinement box. |193|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) According to the daily cables from DETENTION SITE GREEN, Abu Zubaydah frequently "cried," "begged," "pleaded," and "whimpered," but continued to deny that he had any additional information on current threats to, or operatives in, the United States. |194|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) By August 9, 2002, the sixth day of the interrogation period, the interrogation team informed CIA Headquarters that they had come to the "collective preliminary assessment" that it was unlikely Abu Zubaydah "had actionable new information about current threats to the United States." |195| On August 10, 2002, the interrogation team stated that it was "highly unlikely" that Abu Zubaydah possessed the information they were seeking. |196| On the same day, the interrogation team reiterated a request for personnel from CIA Headquarters to travel to the detention site to view the interrogations. A cable stated that the team believed that a "first-hand, on-the-ground look is best," but if CIA Headquarters personnel could not visit, a video teleconference would suffice. |197| DETENTION SITE GREEN personnel also informed CIA Headquarters that it was their assessment that the application of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was "approach[ing] the legal limit." |198| The chief of CTC, Jose Rodriguez, responded:

"Strongly urge that any speculative language as to the legality of given activities or, more precisely, judgment calls as to their legality vis-a-vis operational guidelines for this activity agreed upon and vetted at the most senior levels of the agency, be refrained from in written traffic (email or cable traffic). Such language is not helpful." |199|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) DETENTION SITE GREEN cables describe Abu Zubaydah as "compliant," informing CIA Headquarters that when the interrogator "raised his eyebrow, without instructions," Abu Zubaydah "slowly walked on his own to the water table and sat down." |200| When the interrogator "snapped his fingers twice," Abu Zubaydah would lie flat on the waterboard. |201| Despite the assessment of personnel at the detention site that Abu Zubaydah was compliant, CIA Headquarters stated that they continued to believe that Abu Zubaydah was withholding threat information and instructed the CIA interrogators to continue using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. |202|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) At times Abu Zubaydah was described as "hysterical" |203| and "distressed to the level that he was unable to effectively communicate." |204| Waterboarding sessions "resulted in immediate fluid intake and involuntary leg, chest and arm spasms" and "hysterical pleas." |205| In at least one waterboarding session, Abu Zubaydah "became completely unresponsive, with bubbles rising through his open, full mouth." |206| According to CIA records, Abu Zubaydah remained unresponsive until medical intervention, when he regained consciousness and expelled "copious amounts of liquid." This experience with the waterboard was referenced in emails, but was not documented or otherwise noted in CIA cables. |207| When two CIA Headquarters officers later compared the Abu Zubaydah interrogation videotapes to the cable record, neither commented on this session. A review of the catalog of videotapes, however, found that recordings of a 21-hour period, which included two waterboarding sessions, were missing. |208|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) CIA personnel at DETENTION SITE GREEN reported being disturbed by the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah. CIA records include the following reactions and comments by CIA personnel:

August 5, 2002: "want to caution [medical officer] that this is almost certainly not a place he's ever been before in his medical career...It is visually and psychologically very uncomfortable." |209|
August 8, 2002: "Today's first session.. .had a profound effect on all staff members present.. .it seems the collective opinion that we should not go much further... everyone seems strong for now but if the group has to continue... we cannot guarantee how much longer." |210|
August 8, 2002: "Several on the team profoundly affected.. .some to the point of tears and choking up." |211|
August 9, 2002: "two, perhaps three [personnel] likely to elect transfer" away from the detention site if the decision is made to continue with the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. |212|
August 11, 2002: Viewing the pressures on Abu Zubaydah on video "has produced strong feelings of futility (and legality) of escalating or even maintaining the pressure." Per viewing the tapes, "prepare for something not seen previously." |213|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) After the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques ended, CIA personnel at the detention site concluded that Abu Zubaydah had been truthful and that he did not possess any new terrorist threat information. |214|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) As noted, CIA records indicate that Abu Zubaydah never provided the information for which the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were justified and approved: information on the next terrorist attack and operatives in the United States. Furthermore, as compared to the period prior to August 2002, the quantity and type of intelligence produced by Abu Zubaydah remained largely unchanged during and after the August 2002 use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. |215| Nonetheless, CIA Headquarters informed the National Security Council that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques used against Abu Zubaydah were effective and were "producing meaningful results." |216| A cable from DETENTION SITE GREEN, which CIA records indicate was authored by SWIGERT and DUNBAR, also viewed the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah as a success. The cable recommended that "the aggressive phase at [DETENTION SITE GREEN] should be used as a template for future interrogation of high value captives," |217| not because the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques produced useful information, but rather because their use confirmed that Abu Zubaydah did not possess the intelligence that CIA Headquarters had assessed Abu Zubaydah to have. The cable from the detention site stated:

"Our goal was to reach the stage where we have broken any will or ability of subject to resist or deny providing us information (intelligence) to which he had access. We additionally sought to bring subject to the point that we confidently assess that he does not/not possess undisclosed threat information, or intelligence that could prevent a terrorist event." |218|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The cable further recommended that psychologists–a likely reference to contractors SWIGERT and DUNBAR – "familiar with interrogation, exploitation and resistance to interrogation should shape compliance of high value captives prior to debriefing by substantive experts." |219|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) From Abu Zubaydah's capture on March 28, 2002, to his transfer to Department of Defense custody on September 5, 2006, information provided by Abu Zubaydah resulted in 766 disseminated intelligence reports. |220| According to CIA documents, Abu Zubaydah provided information on "al-Qa'ida activities, plans, capabilities, and relationships," in addition to information on "its leadership structure, including personalities, decision-making processes, training, and tactics." |221| As noted, this type of information was provided by Abu Zubaydah before, during, and after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. At no time during or after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques did Abu Zubaydah provide information about operatives in, or future attacks against, the United States. |222|

10. A CIA Presidential Daily Brief Provides Inaccurate Information on the Interrogation of Abu Zubaydah

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Although CIA personnel at DETENTION SITE GREEN agreed that Abu Zubaydah was compliant and cooperative, personnel at CIA Headquarters prepared a Presidential Daily Brief (PDB) in October 2002 that, according to a cable, "accurately reflected] the collective HQS view of the information provided [by Abu Zubaydah] to date." |223| The October 2002 PDB stated Abu Zubaydah was still withholding "significant threat information," including information on operatives in the United States, and that Abu "Zubaydah resisted providing useful information until becoming more cooperative in early August, probably in the hope of improving his living conditions." |224| The PDB made no reference to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques or the counter-assessment from the detention site interrogation team indicating that Abu Zubaydah was cooperative and not withholding information. |225|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) CIA documents identified the "key intelligence" acquired from Abu Zubaydah as information related to suspected terrorists Jose Padilla and Binyam Mohammad, information on English-speaking al-Qa'ida member Jaffar al-Tayyar, and information identifying KSM as the mastermind of the September 11, 2001, attacks who used the alias "Mukhtar." |226| All of this information was acquired by FBI special agents shortly after Abu Zubaydah's capture. |227|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The CIA has consistently represented that Abu Zubaydah stated that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were necessary to gain his cooperation. For example, the CIA informed the OLC that:

"As Zubaydah himself explained with respect to enhanced techniques, 'brothers who are captured and interrogated are permitted by Allah to provide information when they believe they have 'reached the limit of their ability to withhold it' in the face of psychological and physical hardships.'" |228|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) As is described in greater detail in the full Committee Study, CIA records do not support the CIA representation that Abu Zubaydah made these statements. |229| CIA records indicate that Abu Zubaydah maintained that he always intended to talk and never believed he could withhold information from interrogators. |230| In February 2003, Abu Zubaydah told a CIA psychologist that he believed prior to his capture that every captured "brother" would talk in detention and that he told individuals at a terrorist training camp that "brothers should be able to expect that the organization will make adjustments to protect people and plans when someone with knowledge is captured." |231|

11. The CIA Does Not Brief the Committee on the Interrogation of Abu Zubaydah

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In contrast to relatively open communications that the CIA had with the Committee following the issuance of the September 17, 2001, MON, the CIA significantly limited its communications with the Committee on its detention and interrogation activities after Abu Zubaydah's capture on March 28, 2002. |232| In responses to three different sets of Committee Questions for the Record addressed to the CIA regarding the MON authorities in the spring and summer of 2002, the CIA provided no indication that the CIA had established DETENTION SITE GREEN, or was using, or considering using, coercive interrogation techniques. |233|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On September 27, 2002, CIA officials provided a briefing on Abu Zubaydah's interrogation only to Committee Chairman Bob Graham, Vice Chairman Richard Shelby, and their staff directors. After this briefing Chairman Graham made multiple and specific requests for additional information on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. Internal CIA emails include discussion of how the CIA could "get... off the hook on the cheap" regarding Chairman Graham's requests for additional information. |234| In the end, CIA officials simply did not respond to Graham's requests prior to his departure from the Committee in January 2003.

C. Interrogation in Country [XXX] and the January 2003 Guidelines

1. The CIA Establishes DETENTION SITE COBALT, Places Inexperienced First-Tour Officer in Charge

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Plans for a specialized CIA detention facility in Country [XXX] began in April 2002, with the intention that it would be "totally under [[XXX]]/Station Control." |235| On June 6, 2002, CIA Headquarters approved more than $200,000 for the construction of the facility, identified in this summary as "DETENTION SITE COBALT." |236| In a 2003 interview with the CIA Office of Inspector General, Associate Deputy Director for Operations [XXX] described his views of this facility and "stated that [DETENTION SITE COBALT] was opened because there needed to be a detention site in [Country [XXX]] for those detainees enroute [XXX] to [DETENTION SITE GREEN]. It was not a place for the use of EITs." |237|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) DETENTION SITE COBALT, constructed with CIA funding, opened in Country [XXX] in September 2002. |238| According to CIA records, the windows at DETENTION SITE COBALT were blacked out and detainees were kept in total darkness. The [XXX] guards monitored detainees using headlamps and loud music was played constantly in the facility. While in their cells, detainees were shackled to the wall and given buckets for human waste. Four of the twenty cells at the facility included a bar across the top of the cell. |239| Later reports describe detainees being shackled to the bar with their hands above their heads, forcing them to stand, and therefore not allowing the detainees to sleep. |240|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The CIA officer in charge of DETENTION SITE COBALT, [XXX] [CIA OFFICER 1], was a junior officer on his first overseas assignment with no previous experience or training in handling prisoners or conducting interrogations. [XXX] [CIA OFFICER 1] was the DETENTION SITE COBALT manager during the period in which a CIA detainee died and numerous CIA detainees were subjected to unapproved coercive interrogation techniques. |241| A review of CIA records found that prior to [XXX] [CIA OFFICER 1's] deployment and assignment as the CIA's DETENTION SITE COBALT manager, other CIA officers recommended [XXX] [CIA OFFICER 1] not have continued access to classified information due to a "lack of honesty, judgment, and maturity." |242| According to records, "the chief of CTC told [CIA OFFICER 1]] that he would not want [him] in his overseas station." |243| A supervising officer assessed that [XXX] [CIA OFFICER 1]:

"has issues with judgment and maturity, [and his] potential behavior in the field is also worrisome. [The officer] further advised that [[XXX] [CIA OFFICER 1]] was only put into processing for an overseas position so that someone would evaluate all of the evidence of this situation all together. [The officer further noted that [[XXX] [CIA OFFICER 1]] might not listen to his chief of station when in the field." |244|

2. CIA Records Lack Information on CIA Detainees and Details of Interrogations in Country [XXX]

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Detainees held in Country [XXX] were detained under the authority of the MON; however, CIA officers conducted no written assessment of whether these detainees "pose[d] a continuing, serious threat of violence or death to U.S. persons and interests or... [we]re planning terrorist activities." The CIA maintained such poor records of its detainees in Country [XXX] during this period that the CI A remains unable to determine the number and identity of the individuals it detained. The full details of the CIA interrogations there remain largely unknown, as DETENTION SITE COBALT was later found to have not reported multiple uses of sleep deprivation, required standing, loud music, sensory deprivation, extended isolation, reduced quantity and quality of food, nudity, and "rough treatment" of CIA detainees. |245|

3. CIA Headquarters Recommends That Untrained Interrogators in Country [XXX] Use the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques on Ridha al-Najjar

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Ridha al-Najjar was the first CIA detainee to be held at DETENTION SITE COBALT. Al-Najjar, along with Hassan Muhammad Abu Bakr and a number of other individuals, was arrested in Karachi, Pakistan, after raids conducted [XXX] by [XXX] Pakistan[XXX] in late May 2002. |246| Al-Najjar was identified by the CIA as a former bodyguard for Usama bin Laden, |247| and was rendered with Abu Bakr to CIA custody at a Country [XXX] [XXX] detention facility on June [XXX], 2002. |248| Ridha al-Najjar was transferred to DETENTION SITE COBALT on September [XXX], 2002. |249|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) While the CIA was describing to the Department of Justice why it needed to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah, a parallel internal discussion at the CIA was taking place regarding Ridha al-Najjar. An ALEC Station cable from a CTC officer stated that, on June 27, 2002:

"ALEC/HQS held a strategy session regarding the interrogation of high priority [XXX] detainee Ridha Ahmed al-Najjar in [Country [XXX]]. The goal of the session was to review the progress of the interrogation to date and to devise a general plan as to how best to proceed once the new [Country [XXX] detention/debriefing facility [i.e., DETENTION SITE COBALT] is completed." |250|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The meeting participants included individuals who were also involved in discussions related to Abu Zubaydah's interrogation, including deputy chief of ALEC Station, [XXX], [XXX]CTC Legal (TS//[XXX]//NF), and the chief of the [XXX]. |251| A cable followed on July 16, 2002, to the CIA Station in Country [XXX] suggesting possible interrogation techniques to use against Ridha al-Najjar, including:

utilizing "Najjar's fear for the well-being of his family to our benefit," with the cable explicitly stating that interrogators could not "threaten his family with imminent death";
using "vague threats" to create a "mind virus" that would cause al-Najjar to believe that his situation would continue to get worse until he cooperated; |252|
manipulating Ridha al-Najjar's environment using a hood, restraints, and music; and
employing sleep deprivation through the use of round-the-clock interrogations. |253|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The cable went on to note that the "possibility that [al-Najjar] may have current threat or lead information demands that we keep up the pressure on him." |254| With the exception of a brief mention of "diminished returns from the most recent interviews of al-Najjar," and references to the detainee's complaints about physical ailments, the cable offers no evidence al-Najjar was actively resisting CIA interrogators. |255|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Ten days later, on July 26, 2002, CIA officers in Country [XXX], none of whom had been trained in the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, proposed putting al-Najjar in isolation |256| and using "sound disorientation techniques," "sense of time deprivation," limited light, cold temperatures, and sleep deprivation. |257| The CIA officers added that they felt they had a "reasonable chance of breaking Najjar" to get "the intelligence and locator lead information on UBL and Bin Ladin's family." |258| The plan for al-Najjar was circulated to senior CIA officers as part of the Daily DCI Operations Update. |259|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On August 5, 2002, the day after Abu Zubaydah's interrogation using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques at DETENTION SITE GREEN began, CIA Headquarters authorized the proposed interrogation plan for al-Najjar, to include the use of loud music (at less than the level that would cause physical harm such as permanent hearing loss), worse food (as long as it was nutritionally adequate for sustenance), sleep deprivation, and hooding. |260|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) More than a month later, on September 21, 2002, CIA interrogators described al-Najjar as "clearly a broken man" and "on the verge of complete breakdown" as result of the isolation. |261| The cable added that al-Najjar was willing to do whatever the CIA officer asked. |262|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In October 2002, officers from the U.S. military conducted a short debriefing of al-Najjar at DETENTION SITE COBALT and subsequently expressed an interest in a more thorough debriefing. |263| On November [XXX], 2002, a U.S. military legal advisor visited DETENTION SITE COBALT and described it as a "CIA detention facility," noting that "while CIA is the only user of the facility they contend it is a [Country [XXX]] facility." |264| The U.S. military officer also noted that the junior CIA officer designated as warden of the facility "has little to no experience with interrogating or handling prisoners." With respect to al-Najjar specifically, the legal advisor indicated that the CIA's interrogation plan included "isolation in total darkness; lowering the quality of his food; keeping him at an uncomfortable temperature (cold); [playing music] 24 hours a day; and keeping him shackled and hooded." In addition, al-Najjar was described as having been left hanging–which involved handcuffing one or both wrists to an overhead bar which would not allow him to lower his arms–for 22 hours each day for two consecutive days, in order to "'break' his resistance." It was also noted al-Najjar was wearing a diaper and had no access to toilet facilities. |265|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The U.S. military legal advisor concluded that, because of al-Najjar' s treatment, and the concealment of the facility from the ICRC, military participation in al-Najjar's interrogation would involve risks for the U.S. military [XXX]. The legal advisor recommended briefing the CIA's detention and interrogation activities to U.S. [XXX] [combatant command] to alert the command of the risks prior to the U.S. military [XXX] being involved in any aspect of the interrogation of al-Najjar. |266| According to the CIA inspector general, the detention and interrogation of Ridha al-Najjar "became the model" for handling other CIA detainees at DETENTION SITE COBALT. |267| The CIA disseminated one intelligence report from its detention and interrogation of Ridha al-Najjar. |268|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In November 2002, ALEC Station officers requested that CIA contract interrogator Hammond DUNBAR, one of the two primary interrogators of Abu Zubaydah in August 2002, travel to DETENTION SITE COBALT to assess a detainee for the possible use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. |269| While DUNBAR was present at DETENTION SITE COBALT, he assisted [XXX] [CIA OFFICER 1] in the interrogations of Gul Rahman, a suspected Islamic extremist. As reported to CIA Headquarters, this interrogation included "48 hours of sleep deprivation, auditory overload, total darkness, isolation, a cold shower, and rough treatment." CIA Headquarters did not approve these interrogation techniques in advance. Upon receipt of these cables, however, officers at CIA Headquarters responded that they were "motivated to extract any and all operational information on al-Qa'ida and Hezbi Islami from Gul Rahman" and suggested that "enhanced measures" might be needed to gain Gul Rahman's compliance. CIA Headquarters also requested that a psychological assessment of Rahman be completed. |270| Prior to DUNBAR's departure from the detention site on November [XXX], 2002, [a few days before the death of Gul Rahman] DUNBAR proposed the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on other detainees and offered suggestions to [XXX] [CIA OFFICER 1], the site manager, on the use of such techniques. |271|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On November [XXX], 2002, [XXX] [CIA OFFICER 1] ordered that Gul Rahman be shackled to the wall of his cell in a position that required the detainee to rest on the bare concrete floor. Rahman was wearing only a sweatshirt, as [XXX] [CIA OFFICER 1] had ordered that Rahman's clothing be removed when he had been judged to be uncooperative during an earlier interrogation. The next day, the guards found Gul Rahman's dead body. An internal CIA review and autopsy assessed that Rahman likely died from hypothermia–in part from having been forced to sit on the bare concrete floor without pants. |272| [XXX] [CIA OFFICER 1's] initial cable to CIA Headquarters on Rahman's death included a number of misstatements and omissions that were not discovered until internal investigations into Rahman's death. |273|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The death of Gul Rahman resulted in increased attention to CIA detention and interrogation activities in Country [XXX] by CIA Headquarters. The CTC formally designated the CTC's Renditions Group |274| as the responsible entity for the management and maintenance of all CIA interrogation facilities, including DETENTION SITE COBALT, in early December 2002. |275| Despite this change, many of the same individuals within the CIA– including DUNBAR, officers at DETENTION SITE COBALT, and officers within ALEC Station who had recommended the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Gul Rahman–remained key figures in the CIA interrogation program and received no reprimand or sanction for Rahman's death. Instead, in March 2003, just four months after the death of Gul Rahman, the CIA Station in Country [XXX] recommended that [XXX] [CIA OFFICER 1] receive a "cash award" of $2,500 for his "consistently superior work." |276| [XXX] [CIA OFFICER 1] remained in his position as manager of the detention site until July 2003 and continued to be involved in the interrogations of other CIA detainees. He was formally certified as a CIA interrogator in April 2003 after the practical portion of his training requirement was waived because of his past experience with interrogations at DETENTION SITE COBALT. |277|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Later investigations of DETENTION SITE COBALT conducted by the CIA inspector general and the deputy director of operations following the death of Gul Rahman found that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques–and other coercive interrogation techniques–was more widespread than was reported in contemporaneous CIA cables. Specifically, the interrogation techniques that went unreported in CIA cables included standing sleep deprivation in which a detainee's arms were shackled above his head, nudity, dietary manipulation, exposure to cold temperatures, cold showers, "rough takedowns," and, in at least two instances, the use of mock executions. |278|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On November 18, 2002, staff from the CIA's Office of Inspector General contacted [XXX]CTC Legal, [XXX], to indicate their interest in being briefed by CTC on the detention facility in Country [XXX]. At their meeting with the DDO and the chief of CTC on November [XXX], 2002, the OIG staff explained that, while in that country on a separate matter, the staff had overheard a conversation that included references to "war crimes" and "torture" at a CIA detention facility and were therefore seeking to follow-up on this information. According to notes from the meeting, the DDO described the "most recent event concerning Gul Rahman"–his death, which occurred on November [XXX], 2002. |279|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In January 2003, CIA Inspector General John Helgerson began a formal review of the death of Gul Rahman and began a separate review of the entire CIA Detention and Interrogation Program. The resulting Special Review of Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities ("Special Review") found that there were no guidelines for the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques at DETENTION SITE COBALT prior to December 2002, and that interrogators, some with little or no training, were "left to their own devices in working with detainees." |280|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The Inspector General's Special Review also revealed the lack of oversight of DETENTION SITE COBALT by CIA leadership. DCI Tenet stated that he was "not very familiar" with DETENTION SITE COBALT and "what the CIA is doing with medium value targets." |281| Associate Deputy Director of Operations [XXX] stated that he was unaware that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were being used there. |282| In August 2003, CIA General Counsel Scott Muller relayed that he was under the impression that DETENTION SITE COBALT was only a holding facility and that he had "no idea who is responsible for [COBALT]." |283| Senior Deputy General Counsel John Rizzo informed the OIG that he knew little about DETENTION SITE COBALT and that his focus was on DETENTION SITE GREEN and DETENTION SITE BLUE. |284| CTC Chief of Operations [XXX] stated that he had much less knowledge of operations at DETENTION SITE COBALT, and that the CIA's GREEN and BLUE detention sites were much more important to him. |285| Finally, Chief of CTC Jose Rodriguez stated that he did not focus on DETENTION SITE COBALT because he had "other higher priorities." |286|

5. The CIA Begins Training New Interrogators; Interrogation Techniques Not Reviewed by the Department of Justice Included in the Training Syllabus

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The CIA's CTC Renditions Group began preparing for the first CIA interrogator training course in August 2002–during the period in which Abu Zubaydah was being interrogated using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques at DETENTION SITE GREEN. [XXX], the CIA's chief of interrogations, |287| and [XXX], the CIA officer with OTS who had spent [XXX] years as a SERE Instructor with JPRA, led the interrogation training. The first interrogation training, conducted with the assistance of JPRA personnel, occurred from November 12, 2002, to November 18, 2002. |288| The class included eight students who were seeking to become CIA interrogators and three students seeking to support the CIA interrogation process. |289| The CIA training program involved 65 hours of instruction and training on the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, including at least two interrogation techniques whose legality had not been evaluated by the Department of Justice: the "abdominal slap" and the "finger press." Although a number of personnel at CIA Headquarters reviewed the training materials, there are no CIA records of any CIA officer raising objections to the techniques being included in the syllabus. |290|

6. Despite Recommendation from CIA Attorneys, the CIA Fails to Adequately Screen Potential Interrogators in 2002 and 2003

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On November [XXX], 2002, after the completion of the first formal training class, [XXX]CTC Legal, [XXX], asked CTC attorney [XXX] to "[m]ake it known that from now on, CTC/LGL must vet all personnel who are enrolled in, observing or teaching - or otherwise associated with - the class." |291| [XXX] added:

"Moreover, we will be forced to DISapprove [sic] the participation of specific personnel in the use of enhanced techniques unless we have ourselves vetted them and are satisfied with their qualifications and suitability for what are clearly unusual measures that are lawful only when practiced correctly by personnel whose records clearly demonstrate their suitability for that role. The vetting process will not be that dissimilar from the checks that are provided by the OIG, OS, etc. in certain cases before individuals are promoted or receive awards, and the selection and training of aggressive interrogators certainly warrants a similar vetting process." |292|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The chief of CTC, Jose Rodriguez, objected to this approach, stating:

"I do not think that CTC/LGL should or would want to get into the business of vetting participants, observers, instructors or others that are involved in this program. It is simply not your job. Your job is to tell all what are the acceptable legal standards for conducting interrogations per the authorities obtained from Justice and agreed upon by the White House." |293|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Contrary to statements later made by CIA Director Michael Hayden and other CIA officials that "[a]ll those involved in the questioning of detainees are carefully chosen and screened for demonstrated professional judgment and maturity," |294| CIA records suggest that the vetting sought by [XXX] did not take place. The Committee reviewed CIA records related to several CIA officers and contractors involved in the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, most of whom conducted interrogations. The Committee identified a number of personnel whose backgrounds include notable derogatory information calling into question their eligibility for employment, their access to classified information, and their participation in CIA interrogation activities. In nearly all cases, the derogatory information was known to the CIA prior to the assignment of the CIA officers to the Detention and Interrogation Program. This group of officers included individuals who, among other issues, had engaged in inappropriate detainee interrogations, had workplace anger management issues, and had reportedly admitted to sexual assault. |295|

7. Bureau of Prisons "WOW'ed" by Level of Deprivation at CIA's COBALT Detention Site

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In December 2002, the CIA's Renditions Group sent a team of recently trained interrogators to DETENTION SITE COBALT to engage in interrogations. The interrogation plans proposed by that team for at least three detainees at DETENTION SITE COBALT included the use of interrupted sleep, loud music, and reduction in food quality and quantity. Less than a month after the death of Gul Rahman from suspected hypothermia, the plans also called for detainees' clothes to be removed in a facility that was described to be 45 degrees Fahrenheit. CIA Headquarters approved the proposals for these detainees, whom the CIA described as "Medium Value." |296|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Prior to this, in November 2002, a delegation of several officers from the Federal Bureau of Prisons conducted an assessment of DETENTION SITE COBALT. Following the November [XXX], 2002, through November [XXX], 2002, visit, |297| CIA officers in Country [XXX] remarked that the Federal Bureau of Prisons assessments, along with recommendations and training, had "made a noticeable improvement on how the day to day operations at the facility are performed," and made the detention site a "more secure and safer working environment for [XXX] officers." |298|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On December 4, 2002, officers at CIA Headquarters met with individuals from the Federal Bureau of Prisons to learn more about their inspection of DETENTION SITE COBALT and their training of [XXX] security staff. |299| During that meeting, the Federal Bureau of Prisons personnel described DETENTION SITE COBALT and stated that there was "absolutely no talking inside the facility," that the guards do not interact with the prisoners, and that "[everything is done in silence and [in] the dark." |300| According to a CIA officer, the Federal Bureau of Prisons staff also commented that "they were 'WOW'ed'" at first by the facility, because:

"They have never been in a facility where individuals are so sensory deprived, i.e., constant white noise, no talking, everyone in the dark, with the guards wearing a light on their head when they collected and escorted a detainee to an interrogation cell, detainees constantly being shackled to the wall or floor, and the starkness of each cell (concrete and bars). There is nothing like this in the Federal Bureau of Prisons. They then explained that they understood the mission and it was their collective assessment that in spite of all this sensory deprivation, the detainees were not being treated in humanely [sic]. They explained that the facility was sanitary, there was medical care and the guard force and our staff did not mistreat the detainee[s]." |301|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) By the end of December 2002, the CIA Renditions Group that had visited DETENTION SITE COBALT had concluded that the detention facility's initial "baseline conditions" involved so much deprivation that any further deprivation would have limited impact on the interrogations. The team thus recommended that "experts and authorities other than the individuals who crafted the process" review the interrogation process and conditions, and that a legal review be conducted. |302| CIA Headquarters does not appear to have taken action on these recommendations.

8. The CIA Places CIA Detainees in Country [XXX] Facilities Because They Did Not Meet the MON Standard for Detention

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In the spring of 2003, the CIA continued to hold detainees at facilities in Country [XXX] who were known not to meet the MON standard for detention. CIA officer [XXX] [CIA OFFICER 1] described the arrangement he had with Country [XXX] officers in an email, writing:

"[XXX]. They also happen to have 3 or 4 rooms where they can lock up people discretely [sic]. I give them a few hundred bucks a month and they use the rooms for whoever I bring over - no questions asked. It is very useful for housing guys that shouldn't be in [DETENTION SITE COBALT] for one reason or another but still need to be kept isolated and held in secret detention." |303|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) CIA cables indicate that CIA officers transferred at least four detainees to these Country [XXX] facilities because they did not meet the standard for CIA detention under the MON. |304|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In total, four CIA detention facilities were established in Country [XXX]. CIA records indicate that DETENTION SITE COBALT held a total of 64 detainees during the period of its operation between September 2002 and [XXX] 2004, while DETENTION SITE GRAY held eight detainees between [XXX] 2003 and [XXX] 2003. The CIA later established two other CIA facilities in Country [XXX]: DETENTION SITE ORANGE, which held 34 detainees between [XXX] B2004 and [XXX] 2006; and DETENTION SITE BROWN, which held 12 detainees between [XXX] 2006 and 2008. |305|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In late January 2003, in response to the death of CIA detainee Gul Rahman and the use of a gun and a drill in the CIA interrogations of 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri (described later in this summary), DCI Tenet signed the first formal interrogation and confinement guidelines for the program. |306| In contrast to proposals from late 2001, when CIA personnel expected that any detention facility would have to meet U.S. prison standards, the confinement guidelines signed in January 2003 set forth minimal standards for a detention facility. The confinement guidelines required only that the facility be sufficient to meet basic health needs, meaning that even a facility like DETENTION SITE COBALT, in which detainees were kept shackled in complete darkness and isolation, with a bucket for human waste, and without notable heat during the winter months, met the standard. |307|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The guidelines also required quarterly assessments of the conditions at the detention facilities. The first quarterly review of detention facilities covered the period from January 2003 to April 2003, and examined conditions at DETENTION SITE COBALT, as well as at DETENTION SITE BLUE in a different country, Country [XXX]. |308| At that time, DETENTION SITE BLUE, which was initially designed for two detainees, was housing five detainees. Nonetheless, the site review team found that conditions at DETENTION SITE BLUE –including the three purpose-built "holding units"–met "the minimum standards set by the CIA" in the January 2003 guidance. Detainees received bi-weekly medical evaluations, brushed their teeth once a day, washed their hands prior to each meal, and could bathe once a week. Amenities such as solid food, clothing (sweatshirts, sweatpants, and slippers), reading materials, prayer rugs, and Korans were available depending on the detainee's degree of cooperation with interrogators. |309|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The first quarter 2003 review also found that conditions at DETENTION SITE COBALT satisfied the January 2003 guidance, citing "significant improvements" such as space heaters and weekly medical evaluations. The review noted that a new facility was under construction in Country [XXX] to replace DETENTION SITE COBALT, and that this new detention facility, DETENTION SITE ORANGE, "will be a quantum leap forward" because "[it] will incorporate heating/air conditioning, conventional plumbing, appropriate lighting, shower, and laundry facilities." |310| DETENTION SITE ORANGE opened in [XXX] 2004. Although some of the cells at DETENTION SITE ORANGE included plumbing, detainees undergoing interrogation were kept in smaller cells, with waste buckets rather than toilet facilities. |311|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The DCI's January 2003 interrogation guidelines listed 12 "enhanced techniques" that could be used with prior approval of the director of CTC, including two–use of diapers for "prolonged periods" and the abdominal slap–that had not been evaluated by the OLC. The "enhanced techniques" were only to be employed by "approved interrogators for use with [a] specific detainee." The guidelines also identified "standard techniques"–including sleep deprivation up to 72 hours, reduced caloric intake, use of loud music, isolation, and the use of diapers "generally not to exceed 72 hours"–that required advance approval "whenever feasible," and directed that their use be documented. The "standard techniques" were described as "techniques that do not incorporate physical or substantial psychological pressure." The guidelines provided no description or further limitations on the use of either the enhanced or standard interrogation techniques. |312|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Although the DCI interrogation guidelines were prepared as a reaction to the death of Gul Rahman and the use of unauthorized interrogation techniques on 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, they did not reference all interrogation practices that had been employed at CIA detention sites. The guidelines, for example, did not address whether interrogation techniques such as the "rough take down," |313| the use of cold water showers, |314| and prolonged light deprivation were prohibited. In addition, by requiring advance approval of "standard techniques" "whenever feasible," the guidelines allowed CIA officers a significant amount of discretion to determine who could be subjected to the CIA's "standard" interrogation techniques, when those techniques could be applied, and when it was not "feasible" to request advance approval from CIA Headquarters. Thus, consistent with the interrogation guidelines, throughout much of 2003, CIA officers (including personnel not trained in interrogation) could, at their discretion, strip a detainee naked, shackle him in the standing position for up to 72 hours, and douse the detainee repeatedly with cold water |315|–without approval from CIA Headquarters if those officers judged CIA Headquarters approval was not "feasible." In practice, CIA personnel routinely applied these types of interrogation techniques without obtaining prior approval. |316|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The DCI interrogation guidelines also included the first requirements related to recordkeeping, instructing that, for "each interrogation session in which an enhanced technique is employed," the field prepare a "substantially contemporaneous record... setting forth the nature and duration of each such technique employed, the identities of those present, and a citation to the required Headquarters approval cable." |317| In practice, these guidelines were not followed. |318|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) There were also administrative changes to the program. As noted, on December 3, 2002, CTC's Renditions Group formally assumed responsibility for the management and maintenance of all CIA detention and interrogation facilities. |319| Prior to that time, the interrogation program was "joined at the hip" with CTC's ALEC Station, according to [XXX]CTC Legal, although another CTC attorney who was directly involved in the program informed the CIA OIG that she "was never sure what group in CTC was responsible for interrogation activities." |320| Even after the formal designation of the CIA's Renditions Group, |321| tensions continued, particularly between CTC personnel who supported SWIGERT and DUNBAR's continued role, and the Renditions Group, which designated [XXX] as the CIA's chief interrogator. |322| As late as June 2003, SWIGERT and DUNBAR, operating outside of the direct management of the Renditions Group, were deployed to DETENTION SITE BLUE to both interrogate and conduct psychological reviews of detainees. |323| The dispute extended to interrogation practices. The Renditions Group's leadership considered the waterboard, which Chief of Interrogations [XXX] was not certified to use, as "life threatening," and complained to the OIG that some CIA officers in the Directorate of Operations believed that, as a result, the Renditions Group was "running a 'sissified' interrogation program." |324| At the same time, CIA CTC personnel criticized the Renditions Group and [XXX] for their use of painful stress positions, as well as for the conditions at DETENTION SITE COBALT. |325|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) There were also concerns about possible conflicts of interest related to the contractors, SWIGERT and DUNBAR. On January 30, 2003, a cable from CIA Headquarters stated that "the individual at the interrogation site who administers the techniques is not the same person who issues the psychological assessment of record," and that only a staff psychologist, not a contractor, could issue an assessment of record." |326| In June 2003, however, SWIGERT and DUNBAR were deployed to DETENTION SITE BLUE to interrogate KSM, as well as to assess KSM's "psychological stability" and "resistance posture." |327| As described later in this summary, the contractors had earlier subjected KSM to the waterboard and other CIA enhanced interrogation techniques. The decision to send the contract psychologists to DETENTION SITE BLUE prompted an OMS psychologist to write to OMS leadership that "[a]ny data collected by them from detainees with whom they previously interacted as interrogators will always be suspect." |328| [XXX]OMS then informed the management of the Renditions Group that "no professional in the field would credit [SWIGERT and DUNBAR's] later judgments as psychologists assessing the subjects of their enhanced measures." |329| At the end of their deployment, in June 2003, SWIGERT and DUNBAR provided their assessment of KSM and recommended that he should be evaluated on a monthly basis by "an experienced interrogator known to him" who would assess how forthcoming he is and "remind him that there are differing consequences for cooperating or not cooperating." |330| In his response to the draft Inspector General Special Review, [XXX]OMS noted that "OMS concerns about conflict of interest... were nowhere more graphic than in the setting in which the same individuals applied an EIT which only they were approved to employ, judged both its effectiveness and detainee resilience, and implicitly proposed continued use of the technique - at a daily compensation reported to be $1800/day, or four times that of interrogators who could not use the technique." |331|

D. The Detention and Interrogation of 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri

1. CIA Interrogators Disagree with CIA Headquarters About Al-Nashiri"s Level of Cooperation; Interrogators Oppose Continued Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques

(TS//[XXX]//NF) 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, |332| assessed by the CIA to be an al-Qa'ida "terrorist operations planner" who was "intimately involved" in planning both the USS Cole bombing and the 1998 East Africa U.S. Embassy bombings, was captured in the United Arab Emirates in mid-October 2002. |333| He provided information while in the custody of a foreign government, including on plotting in the Persian Gulf, |334| and was then rendered by the CIA to DETENTION SITE COBALT in Country [XXX] on November [XXX], 2002, where he was held for [XXX] days before being transferred to DETENTION SITE GREEN on November [XXX], 2002. |335| At DETENTION SITE GREEN, al-Nashiri was interrogated using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, including being subjected to the waterboard at least three times. |336| In December 2002, when DETENTION SITE GREEN was closed, al-Nashiri and Abu Zubaydah were rendered to DETENTION SITE BLUE. |337|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In total, al-Nashiri was subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques during at least four separate periods, with each period typically ending with an assessment from on-site interrogators that al-Nashiri was compliant and cooperative. |338| Officers at CIA Headquarters disagreed with these assessments, with the deputy chief of ALEC Station, [XXX], commenting that DETENTION SITE BLUE interrogators should not make "sweeping statements" in cable traffic regarding al-Nashiri's compliance. |339| Officers at CIA Headquarters sought to reinstate the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques based on their belief that al-Nashiri had not yet provided actionable intelligence on imminent attacks. |340|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Shortly after al-Nashiri arrived at DETENTION SITE BLUE, CIA interrogators at the detention site judged al-Nashiri's cooperation and compliance by his engagement and willingness to answer questions, while CIA Headquarters personnel judged his compliance based on the specific actionable intelligence he had provided (or the lack thereof). For example, in December 2002, interrogators informed CIA Headquarters that al-Nashiri was "cooperative and truthful," and that the "consensus" at the detention site was that al-Nashiri was "a compliant detainee" who was not "withholding important threat information." |341| Officers from the CIA's ALEC Station at CIA Headquarters responded:

"it is inconceivable to us that al-Nashiri cannot provide us concrete leads.... When we are able to capture other terrorists based on his leads and to thwart future plots based on his reporting, we will have much more confidence that he is, indeed, genuinely cooperative on some level." |342|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Later, after multiple follow-up debriefings, DETENTION SITE BLUE officers again wrote that they had "reluctantly concluded" that al-Nashiri was providing "logical and rational explanations" to questions provided by CIA Headquarters and therefore they recommended "against resuming enhanced measures" unless ALEC Station had evidence al-Nashiri was lying. |343| A cable from the detention site stated:

"without tangible proof of lying or intentional withholding, however, we believe employing enhanced measures will accomplish nothing except show [al-Nashiri] that he will be punished whether he cooperates or not, thus eroding any remaining desire to continue cooperating.... [The] bottom line is that we think [al-Nashiri] is being cooperative, and if subjected to indiscriminate and prolonged enhanced measures, there is a good chance he will either fold up and cease cooperation, or suffer the sort of permanent mental harm prohibited by the statute. Therefore, a decision to resume enhanced measures must be grounded in fact and not general feelings." |344|

2. CIA Headquarters Sends Untrained Interrogator to Resume Al-Nashiri's Interrogations; Interrogator Threatens al-Nashiri with a Gun and a Drill

(TS//[XXX]//NF) After the DETENTION SITE BLUE chief of Base sent two interrogators back to the United States because of "prolonged absences from family" and the "fact that enhanced measures are no longer required for al-Nashiri," CIA Headquarters sent [XXX] [CIA OFFICER 2], a CIA [XXX] officer who had not been trained or qualified as an interrogator, to DETENTION SITE BLUE to question and assess al-Nashiri. |345|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In late December 2002, following a meeting at CIA Headquarters to discuss resuming the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against al-Nashiri, [XXX], the chief of RDG |346|–the entity that managed the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program–objected to sending [XXX] [CIA OFFICER 2] to the detention site because he "had not been through the interrogation training" and because [XXX] "had heard from some colleagues that [[XXX] [CIAOFFICER 2]] was too confident, had a temper, and had some security issues." [XXX] later learned from other CIA officials that "[CTC chief of operations [XXX]] wanted [[XXX] [CIA OFFICER 2]] at [DETENTION SITE BLUE] over the holidays." [XXX] told the Office of Inspector General that "his assessment is that the Agency management felt that the [RDG] interrogators were being too lenient with al-Nashiri and that [XXX [CIA OFFICER 2]] was sent to [DETENTION SITE BLUE] to 'fix' the situation." |347|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) [XXX] [CIA OFFICER 2] arrived at DETENTION SITE BLUE on December [XXX], 2002, and the CIA resumed the use of its enhanced interrogation techniques on al-Nashiri shortly thereafter, despite the fact that [XXX] [CIA OFFICER 2] had not been trained, certified, or approved to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. [XXX] [CIA OFFICER 2] wrote in a cable to CIA Headquarters that "[al]-Nashiri responds well to harsh treatment" and suggested that the interrogators continue to administer "various degrees of mild punishment," but still allow for "a small degree of 'hope,' by introducing some 'minute rewards.'" |348|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) It was later learned that during these interrogation sessions, [XXX] [CIA OFFICER 2], with the permission and participation of the DETENTION SITE BLUE chief of Base, who also had not been trained and qualified as an interrogator, used a series of unauthorized interrogation techniques against al-Nashiri. For example, [XXX] [CIA OFFICER 2] placed al-Nashiri in a "standing stress position" with "his hands affixed over his head" for approximately two and a half days. |349| Later, during the course of al-Nashiri's debriefings, while he was blindfolded, [XXX] [CIA OFFICER 2] placed a pistol near al-Nashiri's head and operated a cordless drill near al-Nashiri's body. |350| Al-Nashiri did not provide any additional threat information during, or after, these interrogations. |351|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Based on a report from CTC, the CIA Office of Inspector General conducted a review of these interrogation incidents, and issued a report of investigation in the fall of 2003. |352| The Office of Inspector General later described additional allegations of unauthorized techniques used against al-Nashiri by [XXX] [CIA OFFICER 2] and other interrogators, including slapping al-Nashiri multiple times on the back of the head during interrogations; implying that his mother would be brought before him and sexually abused; blowing cigar smoke in al-Nashiri's face; giving al-Nashiri a forced bath using a stiff brush; and using improvised stress positions that caused cuts and bruises resulting in the intervention of a medical officer, who was concerned that al-Nashiri's shoulders would be dislocated using the stress positions. |353| When interviewed by the Office of Inspector General, the DETENTION SITE BLUE chief of Base stated he did not object to using the gun and drill in the interrogations because he believed [XXX] [CIA OFFICER 2] was sent from CIA Headquarters "to resolve the matter of al-Nashiri's cooperation" and that he believed [XXX] [CIA OFFICER 2] had permission to use the interrogation techniques. |354| The chief of Base added that his own on-site approval was based on this and "the pressure he felt from Headquarters to obtain imminent threat information from al-Nashiri on 9/11-style attacks." |355| In April 2004, [XXX] [CIA OFFICER 2] and the chief of Base were disciplined. |356|

3. CIA Contractor Recommends Continued Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Against Al-Nashiri; Chief Interrogator Threatens to Quit Because Additional Techniques Might "Push [Al-Nashiri] Over The Edge Psychologically, " Refers to the CIA Program As a "Train Wreak [sic] Waiting to Happen "

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On January [XXX], 2003, CIA contractor DUNBAR arrived at DETENTION SITE BLUE to conduct a "Psychological Interrogation Assessment" to judge al-Nashiri's suitability for the additional use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques and develop recommendations for his interrogation. The resulting interrogation plan proposed that the interrogators would have the "latitude to use the full range of enhanced exploitation and interrogation measures," adding that "the use of the water board would require additional support from" fellow CIA contractor Grayson SWIGERT. According to the interrogation plan, once the interrogators had eliminated al-Nashiri's "sense of control and predictability" and established a "desired level of helplessness," they would reduce the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques and transition to a debriefing phase once again. |357|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) After receiving the proposed interrogation plan for al-Nashiri on January 21, 2003, [XXX], the CIA's chief of interrogations–whose presence had previously prompted al-Nashiri to tremble in fear |358|–emailed CIA colleagues to notify them that he had "informed the front office of CTC" that he would "no longer be associated in any way with the interrogation program due to serious reservation[s] [he had] about the current state of affairs" and would instead be "retiring shortly." In the same email, [XXX] wrote, "[t]his is a train wreak [sic] waiting to happen and I intend to get the hell off the train before it happens." |359| [XXX] drafted a cable for CIA Headquarters to send to DETENTION SITE BLUE raising a number of concerns that he, the chief of interrogations, believed should be "entered for the record." The CIA Headquarters cable–which does not appear to have been disseminated to DETENTION SITE BLUE–included the following:

"we have serious reservations with the continued use of enhanced techniques with [al-Nashiri] and its long term impact on him. [Al-Nashiri] has been held for three months in very difficult conditions, both physically and mentally. It is the assessment of the prior interrogators that [al-Nashiri] has been mainly truthful and is not withholding significant information. To continue to use enhanced technique[s] without clear indications that he [is] withholding important info is excessive and may cause him to cease cooperation on any level. [Al-Nashiri] may come to the conclusion that whether he cooperates or not, he will continually be subjected to enhanced techniques, therefore, what is the incentive for continued cooperation. Also, both C/CTC/RG [Chief of CTC RDG [XXX]] and HVT Interrogator [[XXX]] who departed [DETENTION SITE BLUE] in [XXX] January, believe continued enhanced methods may push [al-Nashiri] over the edge psychologically." |360|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The draft cable from [XXX] also raised "conflict of responsibility" concerns, stating:

"Another area of concern is the use of the psychologist as an interrogator. The role of the ops psychologist is to be a detached observer and serve as a check on the interrogator to prevent the interrogator from any unintentional excess of pressure which might cause permanent psychological harm to the subject. The medical officer is on hand to provide the same protection from physical actions that might harm the subject. Therefore, the medical officer and the psychologist should not serve as an interrogator, which is a conflict of responsibility. We note that [theproposedplan] contains a psychological interrogation assessment by [XXX] psychologist [DUNBAR] which is to be carried out by interrogator [DUNBAR]. We have a problem with him conducting both roles simultaneously." |361|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Rather than releasing the cable that was drafted by [XXX], CIA Headquarters approved a plan to reinstitute the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against al-Nashiri, beginning with shaving him, removing his clothing, and placing him in a standing sleep deprivation position with his arms affixed over his head. |362| CIA cables describing subsequent interrogations indicate that al-Nashiri was nude and, at times, "put in the standing position, handcuffed and shackled." |363| According to cables, CIA interrogators decided to provide al-Nashiri clothes to "hopefully stabilize his physiological symptoms and prevent them from deteriorating," |364| noting in a cable the next day that al-Nashiri was suffering from a head cold which caused his body to shake for approximately ten minutes during an interrogation. |365|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Beginning in June 2003, the CIA transferred al-Nashiri to five different CIA detention facilities before he was transferred to U.S. military custody on September 5, 2006. |366| In the interim, he was diagnosed by some CIA psychologists as having "anxiety" and "major depressive" disorder, |367| while others found no symptoms of either illness. |368| He was a difficult and uncooperative detainee and engaged in repeated belligerent acts, including attempts to assault CIA detention site personnel and efforts to damage items in his cell. |369| Over a period of years, al-Nashiri accused the CIA staff of drugging or poisoning his food, and complained of bodily pain and insomnia. |370| At one point, al-Nashiri launched a short-lived hunger strike that resulted in the CIA force feeding him rectally. |371|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In October 2004, 21 months after the final documented use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against al-Nashiri, an assessment by CIA contract interrogator DUNBAR and another CIA interrogator concluded that al-Nashiri provided "essentially no actionable information," and that "the probability that he has much more to contribute is low." |372| Over the course of al-Nashiri's detention and interrogation by the CIA, the CIA disseminated 145 intelligence reports based on his debriefings. Al-Nashiri provided information on past operational plotting, associates whom he expected to participate in plots, details on completed operations, and background on al-Qa'ida's structure and methods of operation. |373| Al-Nashiri did not provide the information that the CIA's ALEC Station sought and believed al-Nashiri possessed, specifically "perishable threat information to help [CIA] thwart future attacks and capture additional operatives." |374|

E. Tensions with Country [XXX] Relating to the CIA Detention Facility and the Arrival of New Detainees

(TS//[XXX]//NF) According to CIA records, three weeks after [XXX] and political leadership of Country [XXX] agreed to host a CIA detention facility, the CIA informed the U.S. ambassador, because, as was noted in a cable, by not doing so, the CIA was "risking that he hear of this initiative" from Country [XXX] officials. |375| As was the case in other host countries, the ambassador in Country [XXX] was told by the CIA not to speak with any other State Department official about the arrangement. |376|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Prior to the opening of the CIA detention facility in Country [XXX], [XXX]CTC Legal, [XXX], warned of possible legal actions against CIA employees in countries that "take a different view of the detention and interrogation practices employed by [the CIA]." |377| He further recommended against the establishment of CIA facilities in countries that [XXX]. |378| [XXX]'s advice was not heeded and, in December 2002, the two individuals then being detained by the CIA in Country [XXX] (Abu Zubaydah and 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri) were transferred to Country [XXX]. |379|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The agreement to host a CIA detention facility in Country [XXX] created multiple, ongoing difficulties between Country [XXX] and the CIA. Country [XXX]'s [XXX] proposed a written "Memorandum of Understanding" covering the relative roles and responsibilities of the CIA and [XXX], which the CIA ultimately refused to sign. |380| Four months after the detention site began hosting CIA detainees, Country [XXX] rejected the transfer of [XXX], which included Khalid Shaykh Muhammad. The decision was reversed only after the U.S. ambassador intervened with the political leadership of Country [XXX] on the CIA's behalf. |381| The following month, the CIA provided $[XXX] million to Country [XXX]'s [XXX] |382| after which [XXX] officials, speaking for [XXX] and the Country [XXX] political leadership, indicated that Country [XXX] was now flexible with regard to the number of CIA detainees at the facility and when the facility would eventually be closed. |383| The facility, which was described by the CIA as "over capacity," was nonetheless closed, as had been previously agreed, in [XXX] [the fall of] 2003. |384|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) According to CIA cables, years later, [XXX] officials in Country [XXX] reacted with "deep shock and regret" [XXX] which they acknowledged was "[XXX]." |385| [Country [XXX]] officials were "extremely upset" |386| at the CIA's inability to keep secrets and were "deeply disappointed" in not having had more warning of President Bush's September 2006 public acknowledgment of the CIA program. |387| The CIA Station, for its part, described the [XXX] as a "serious blow" to the bilateral relationship. |388|

F. The Detention and Interrogation of Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh

1. Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh Provides Information While in Foreign Government Custody, Prior to Rendition to CIA Custody

As early as September 15, 2001, Ramzi bin al-Shibh was assessed by the CIA to be a facilitator for the September 11, 2001, attacks and an associate of the 9/11 hijackers. |389| While targeting another terrorist, Hassan Ghul, [XXX] Pakistani officials unexpectedly captured bin al-Shibh during raids in Pakistan on September 11, 2002. |390| On September [XXX], 2002, bin al-Shibh was rendered to a foreign government, [XXX]. |391| Approximately five months later, on February [XXX], 2003, bin al-Shibh was rendered from the custody of [XXX] to CIA custody, becoming the 41st CIA detainee. |392|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) As with Abu Zubaydah and 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, personnel at CIA Headquarters–often in ALEC Station–overestimated the information bin al-Shibh would have access to within al-Qa'ida, writing that bin al-Shibh "likely has critical information on upcoming attacks and locations of senior al-Qa'ida operatives." |393| Later, after bin al-Shibh was interrogated using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques for an estimated 34 days, the CIA's ALEC Station concluded that bin al-Shibh was not a senior member of al-Qa'ida and was not in a position to know details about al-Qa'ida's plans for future attacks. |394| In another parallel, officers at CIA Headquarters requested and directed the continued use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against bin al-Shibh when CIA detention site personnel recommended ending such measures. |395|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Ramzi bin al-Shibh was initially interrogated by a foreign government. |396| While officers at CIA Headquarters were dissatisfied with the intelligence production from his five months of detention in foreign government custody, CIA officers in that country were satisfied with bin al-Shibh's reporting. |397| Those CIA officers wrote that bin al-Shibh had provided information used in approximately 50 CIA intelligence reports, including information on potential future threats, to include a potential attack on London's Heathrow Airport and al-Nashiri's planning for potential operations in the Arabian Peninsula. The CIA officers [XXX] [in-country] also noted that they found bin al-Shibh's information to be generally accurate and that they "found few cases where he openly/clearly misstated facts." |398| In a cable to CIA Headquarters, the CIA officers in [XXX] [the country where Ramzi bin al-Shibh was being held] concluded, "overall, he provided what was needed." The same cable stated that bin al-Shibh's interrogation was similar to other interrogations they had participated in, and that the most effective interrogation tool was having information available to confront him when he tried to mislead or provide incomplete information. |399| Personnel at CIA Headquarters concluded in 2005 that the most significant intelligence derived from bin al-Shibh was obtained during his detention in foreign government custody, which was prior to his rendition to CIA custody and the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. |400|

2. Interrogation Plan for Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh Proposes Immediate Use of Nudity and Shackling with Hands Above the Head; Plan Becomes Template for Future Detainees

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Despite the aforementioned assessments from CIA officers in [XXX] concerning bin al-Shibh's cooperation, officers at CIA Headquarters decided the CIA

should obtain [XXX] custody of bin al-Shibh and render him to DETENTION SITE BLUE in Country [XXX] |401|. On February [XXX], 2003, in anticipation of bin al-Shibh's arrival, interrogators at the detention site, led by the CIA's chief interrogator, [XXX], prepared an interrogation plan for bin al-Shibh. |402| The plan became a template, and subsequent requests to CIA Headquarters to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against other detainees relied upon near identical language. |403|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The interrogation plan proposed that immediately following the psychological and medical assessments conducted upon his arrival, bin al-Shibh would be subjected to "sensory dislocation." |404| The proposed sensory dislocation included shaving bin al-Shibh's head and face, exposing him to loud noise in a white room with white lights, keeping him "unclothed and subjected to uncomfortably cool temperatures," and shackling him "hand and foot with arms outstretched over his head (with his feet firmly on the floor and not allowed to support his weight with his arms)." |405| Contrary to CIA representations made later to the Committee that detainees were always offered the opportunity to cooperate before being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, the plan stated that bin al-Shibh would be shackled nude with his arms overhead in a cold room prior to any discussion with interrogators or any assessment of his level of cooperation. |406| According to a cable, only after the interrogators determined that his "initial resistance level [had] been diminished by the conditions" would the questioning and interrogation phase begin. |407|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The interrogation phase described in the plan included near constant interrogations, as well as continued sensory deprivation, a liquid diet, and sleep deprivation. In addition, the interrogation plan stated that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques would be used, including the "attention grasp, walling, the facial hold, the facial slap... the abdominal slap, cramped confinement, wall standing, stress positions, sleep deprivation beyond 72 hours, and the waterboard, as appropriate to [bin al-Shibh's] level of resistance." |408|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Based on versions of this interrogation plan, at least six detainees were stripped and shackled nude, placed in the standing position for sleep deprivation, or subjected to other CIA enhanced interrogation techniques prior to being questioned by an inteiTogator in 2003. |409| Five of these detainees were shackled naked in the standing position with their hands above their head immediately after their medical check. |410| These interrogation plans typically made no reference to the information the interrogators sought and why the detainee was believed to possess the information. |411|

3. CIA Headquarters Urges Continued Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques, Despite Interrogators' Assessment That Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh Was Cooperative

(TS//[XXX]//NF) When CIA interrogators at DETENTION SITE BLUE assessed that bin al-Shibh was cooperative and did not have additional knowledge of future attacks, |412| CIA Headquarters disagreed and instructed the interrogators to continue using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, which failed to elicit the information sought by CIA Headquarters. |413| On February 11, 2003, interrogators asked CIA Headquarters for questions that ALEC Station was "85 percent certain [bin al-Shibh ] will be able to answer," in order to verify bin al-Shibh's level of cooperation. |414| The interrogators stated that information from Abu Zubaydah and al-Nashiri suggested that bin al-Shibh would not have been given a new assignment or trusted with significant information given his high-profile links to the September 11, 2001, attacks. |415| They further stated that bin al-Shibh had "achieved substantial notoriety after 11 September," but was still unproven in al-Qa'ida circles and may have "been privy to information more as a bystander than as an active participant." |416|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The CIA's ALEC Station disagreed with the assessment of the detention site personnel, responding that it did not believe the portrayals of bin al-Shibh offered by Abu Zubaydah and al-Nashiri were accurate and that CIA Headquarters assessed that bin al-Shibh must have actionable information due to his proximity to KSM and CIA Headquarters' belief that bin al-Shibh had a history of withholding information from interrogators. ALEC Station wrote:

"As base [DETENTION SITE BLUE] is well aware, Ramzi had long been deliberately withholding and/or providing misleading information to his interrogators in [a foreign government].... From our optic, it is imperative to focus Ramzi exclusively on two issues: 1) What are the next attacks planned for the US and 2) Who and where are the operatives inside the United States." |417|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The ALEC Station cable stated that bin al-Shibh had "spent extensive time with [KSM]," and "must have heard discussions of other targets." The cable added that "HQS strongly believes that Binalshibh was involved in efforts on behalf of KSM to identify and place operatives in the West." The February 13, 2003, cable concluded:

"We think Binalshibh is uniquely positioned to give us much needed critical information to help us thwart large-scale attacks inside the United States, and we want to do our utmost to get it as soon as possible. Good luck." |418|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) CIA officers at DETENTION SITE BLUE therefore continued to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against bin al-Shibh for approximately three additional weeks after this exchange, including sleep deprivation, nudity, dietary manipulation, facial holds, attention grasps, abdominal slaps, facial slaps, and walling. |419| Bin al-Shibh did not provide the information sought on "operatives inside the United States" or "large-scale attacks inside the United States." |420|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) CIA records indicate that the CIA interrogators at DETENTION SITE BLUE questioning Ramzi bin al-Shibh were unaware of the intelligence bin al-Shibh had previouslv provided in foreign government custody, even though [XXX] and the intelligence from those interrogations had been disseminated by the CIA. On multiple occasions, personnel at the detention site drafted intelligence reports that contained information previously disseminated from interrogations of bin al-Shibh while he was in foreign government custody, under the faulty understanding that bin al-Shibh was providing new information. |421|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Ramzi bin al-Shibh was subjected to interrogation techniques and conditions of confinement that were not approved by CIA Headquarters. CIA interrogators used the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques for behavior adjustment purposes, in response to perceived disrespect, and on several occasions, before bin al-Shibh had an opportunity to respond to an interrogator's questions or before a question was asked. The CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were applied when bin al-Shibh failed to address an interrogator as "sir," when interrogators noted bin al-Shibh had a "blank stare" on his face, and when bin al-Shibh complained of stomach pain. |422| Further, despite CIA policy at the time to keep detainees under constant light for security purposes, bin al-Shibh was kept in total darkness to heighten his sense of fear. |423|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) CIA psychological assessments of bin al-Shibh were slow to recognize the onset of psychological problems brought about, according to later CIA assessments, by bin al-Shibh's long-term social isolation and his anxiety that the CIA would return to using its enhanced interrogation techniques against him. The symptoms included visions, paranoia, insomnia, and attempts at self-harm. |424| In April 2005, a CIA psychologist stated that bin al-Shibh "has remained in social isolation" for as long as two and half years and the isolation was having a "clear and escalating effect on his psychological functioning." The officer continued, "in [bin al-Shibh's] case, it is important to keep in mind that he was previously a relatively high-functioning individual, making his deterioration over the past several months more alarming." |425| The psychologist wrote, "significant alterations to RBS'[s] detention environment must occur soon to prevent further and more serious psychological disturbance." |426| On September 5, 2006, bin al-Shibh was transferred to U.S. military custody at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. |427| After his arrival, bin al-Shibh was placed on anti-psychotic medications. |428|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The CIA disseminated 109 intelligence reports from the CIA interrogations of Ramzi bin al-Shibh. |429| A CIA assessment, which included intelligence from his time in foreign government custody, as well as his reporting in CIA custody before, during, and after being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, |430| concluded that:

"Much of [bin al-Shibh's] statements on the 11 September attacks have been speculative, and many of the details could be found in media accounts of the attacks that appeared before he was detained. In the few instances where his reporting was unique and plausible, we cannot verify or refute the information... he has been sketchy on some aspects of the 9/11 plot, perhaps in order to downplay his role in the plot. His information on individuals is non-specific; he has given us nothing on the Saudi hijackers or others who played a role... The overall quality of his reporting has steadily declined since 2003." |431|

G. The Detention and Interrogation of Khalid Shaykh Muhammad

1. KSM Held in Pakistani Custody, Provides Limited Information; Rendered to CIA Custody at DETENTION SITE COBALT, KSM Is Immediately Subjected to the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The capture of KSM was attributable to a single CIA source who first came to the CIA's attention in the spring of 2001. |432| The source [XXX] led the CIA and Pakistan authorities directly to KSM. KSM was held in Pakistani custody from the time of his capture on March 1, 2003, to March [XXX], 2003, and was interrogated by CIA officers and Pakistani officials. According to CIA records, while in Pakistani custody, KSM was subjected to some sleep deprivation, but there are no indications of other coercive interrogation techniques being used. |433| While KSM denied knowledge of attack plans and the locations of Usama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, |434| he did provide limited information on various al-Qa'ida leaders and operatives who had already been captured. KSM's willingness to discuss operatives when confronted with information about their capture–behavior noted by CIA officers on-site in Pakistan–was a recurring theme throughout KSM's subsequent detention and interrogation in CIA custody. |435|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Less than two hours after KSM's capture, anticipating KSM's arrival at DETENTION SITE COBALT, the chief of interrogations, [XXX], sent an email to CIA Headquarters with the subject line, "Let's roll with the new guy." The email requested permission to "press [KSM] for threat info right away." |436| Later that day, CIA Headquarters authorized to use a number of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against KSM. The cable from CIA Headquarters did not require that non-coercive interrogation techniques be used first. |437| On March [XXX], 2003, two days before KSM's arrival at the detention site, CIA Headquarters approved an interrogation plan for KSM. |438|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) According to CIA records, interrogators began using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques at DETENTION SITE COBALT a "few minutes" after the questioning of KSM began. KSM was subjected to facial and abdominal slaps, the facial grab, stress positions, standing sleep deprivation (with his hands at or above head level), nudity, and water dousing. |439| Chief of Interrogations [XXX] also ordered the rectal rehydration of KSM without a determination of medical need, a procedure that the chief of interrogations would later characterize as illustrative of the interrogator's "total control over the detainee." |440| At the end of the day, the psychologist on-site concluded that the interrogation team would likely have more success by "avoiding confrontations that allow [KSM] to transform the interrogation into battles of will with the interrogator." |441| KSM's reporting during his first day in CIA custody included an accurate description of a Pakistani/British operative, which was dismissed as having been provided during the initial "'throwaway' stage" of information collection when the CIA believed detainees provided false or worthless information. |442|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On March 5, 2003, and March 6, 2003, while he was still at DETENTION SITE COBALT, KSM was subjected to nudity and sleep deprivation. On March 5, 2003, KSM was also subjected to additional rectal rehydration, |443| which [XXX]OMS, [XXX], described as helping to "clear a person's head" and effective in getting KSM to talk. |444| On March 6, 2003, [XXX] adopted a "softer Mr- Rogers' persona" after the interrogation team concluded that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques had caused KSM to "clam up." |445| During this session KSM was described as "more cooperative," and the day's interrogation was deemed the "best session held to date" by the interrogation team. |446| During this period KSM fabricated information on an individual whom he described as the protector of his children. |447| That information resulted in the capture and CIA detention of two innocent individuals. |448|

2. The CIA Transfers KSM to DETENTION SITE BLUE, Anticipates Use of the Waterboard Prior to His Arrival

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Within hours of KSM's capture, ALEC Station successfully argued that CIA contractors SWIGERT and DUNBAR should take over the interrogation of KSM upon KSM's arrival at DETENTION SITE BLUE. |449| On March 3, 2003, CIA Headquarters approved an interrogation plan indicating that KSM "will be subjected to immediate interrogation techniques," and that "the interrogation techniques will increase in intensity from standard to enhanced techniques commensurate with [KSM's] level of resistance, until he indicates initial cooperation." |450| On March [XXX], 2003, the day of KSM's arrival at DETENTION SITE BLUE, the on-site medical officer described the use of the waterboard on KSM as inevitable:

"[T]he team here apparently looks to use the water board in two different contexts. One is as a tool of regression and control in which it is used up front and aggressively. The second is to vet information on an as needed basis. Given the various pressures from home vs what is happening on the ground, I think the team's expectation is that [KSM] will [be] getting treatment somewhere in between. I don't think they believe that it will be possible to entirely avoid the water board given the high and immediate threat to US and allied interests. It is an interesting dynamic because they are well aware of the toll it will take on the team vs. the detainee. The requirements coming from home are really unbelievable in terms of breadth and detail." |451|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Meanwhile, OMS completed draft guidelines on the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, specifically addressing the waterboard interrogation technique. These guidelines were sent to the medical personnel at the detention site. The guidelines included a warning that the risk of the waterboard was "directly related to number of exposures and may well accelerate as exposures increase," that concerns about cumulative effects would emerge after three to five days, and that there should be an upper limit on the total number of waterboard exposures, "perhaps 20 in a week." CIA records indicate that, as of the day of KSM's arrival at DETENTION SITE BLUE, the interrogation team had not reviewed the draft OMS guidelines. |452|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) KSM arrived at DETENTION SITE BLUE at approximately 6:00 PM local time on March [XXX], 2003, and was immediately stripped and placed in the standing sleep deprivation position. |453| At 6:38 PM, after the medical and psychological personnel who had traveled with KSM from DETENTION SITE COBALT cleared KSM for the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, the detention site requested CIA Headquarters' approval to begin the interrogation process. |454| The detention site received the approvals at 7:18 PM, |455| at which point the interrogators began using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on KSM. |456|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Between March [XXX], 2003, and March 9, 2003, contractors SWIGERT and DUNBAR, and a CIA interrogator, [XXX], used the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against KSM, including nudity, standing sleep deprivation, the attention grab and insult slap, the facial grab, the abdominal slap, the kneeling stress position, and walling. |457| There were no debriefers present. According to the CIA interrogator, during KSM's first day at DETENTION SITE BLUE, SWIGERT and DUNBAR first began threatening KSM's children. |458| [XXX]CTC Legal, [XXX], later told the inspector general that these threats were legal so long as the threats were "conditional." |459| On March 9, 2003, KSM fabricated information indicating that Jaffar al-Tayyar and Jose Padilla were plotting together |460| because, as he explained on April 23, 2003, he "felt some pressure to produce information about operations in the United States in the initial phases of his interrogation." |461|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On March [XXX], 2003, Deputy Chief of ALEC Station [XXX], and a second ALEC Station officer, [XXX] arrived at DETENTION SITE BLUE to serve as debriefers. The detention site also reportedly received a phone call from CIA Headquarters conveying the views of the CIA's Deputy Director of Operations James Pavitt on the interrogation of KSM. |462| Pavitt later told the inspector general that he "did not recall specifically ordering that a detainee be waterboarded right away," but he "did not discount that possibility." According to records of the interview, "Pavitt did recall saying, 'I want to know what he knows, and I want to know it fast.'" |463| The on-site medical officer later wrote in an email that the CIA interrogators "felt that the [waterboard] was the big stick and that HQ was more or less demanding that it be used early and often." |464|

3. The CIA Waterboards KSM at Least 183 Times; KSM's Reporting Includes Significant Fabricated Information

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On March 10, 2003, KSM was subjected to the first of his 15 separate waterboarding sessions. The first waterboarding session, which lasted 30 minutes (10 more than anticipated in the Office of Legal Counsel's August 1, 2002, opinion), was followed by the use of a horizontal stress position that had not previously been approved by CIA Headquarters. |465| The chief of Base, worried about the legal implications, prohibited the on-site medical officer from reporting on the interrogation directly to OMS outside of official CIA cable traffic. |466|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On March 12, 2003, KSM provided information on the Heathrow Airport and Canary Wharf plotting. KSM stated that he showed a sketch in his notebook of a building in Canary Wharf (a major business district in London) to Ammar al-Baluchi. |467| He also provided statements about directing prospective pilots to study at flight schools, |468| and stated that Jaffar al-Tayyar was involved in the Heathrow Plot. |469| KSM retracted all of this information later in his detention. |470| There are no CIA records indicating that these and other retractions were assessed to be false.

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The March 12, 2003, reporting from KSM on the Heathrow Airport plotting was deemed at the time by CIA interrogators to be an effort by KSM to avoid discussion of plotting inside the United States and thus contributed to the decision to subject KSM to two waterboarding sessions that day. |471| During these sessions, KSM ingested a significant amount of water. CIA records state that KSM's "abdomen was somewhat distended and he expressed water when the abdomen was pressed." |472| KSM's gastric contents were so diluted by water that the medical officer present was "not concerned about regurgitated gastric acid damaging KSM's esophagus." |473| The officer was, however, concerned about water intoxication and dilution of electrolytes and requested that the interrogators use saline in future waterboarding sessions. |474| The medical officer later wrote to [XXX]OMS that KSM was "ingesting and aspiration [sic] a LOT of water," and that "[i]n the new technique we are basically doing a series of near drownings." |475| During the day, KSM was also subjected to the attention grasp, insult slap, abdominal slap, and walling. |476|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On March 13, 2003, after KSM again denied that al-Qa'ida had operations planned for inside the United States, CIA interrogators decided on a "day of intensive waterboard sessions." |477| During the first of three waterboarding sessions that day, interrogators responded to KSM's efforts to breathe during the sessions by holding KSM's lips and directing the water at his mouth. |478| According to a cable from the detention site, KSM "would begin signaling by pointing upward with his two index fingers as the water pouring approached the established time limit." The cable noted that "[t]his behavior indicates that the subject remains alert and has become familiar with key aspects of the process." |479| CIA records state that KSM "yelled and twisted" when he was secured to the waterboard for the second session of the day, but "appeared resigned to tolerating the board and stated he had nothing new to say" about terrorist plots inside the United States. |480|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Prior to the third waterboard session of that calendar day, the on-site medical officer raised concerns that the waterboard session–which would be the fourth in 14 hours–would exceed the limits included in draft OMS guidelines that had been distributed the previous afternoon. |481| Those draft guidelines stated that up to three waterboard sessions in a 24-hour period was acceptable. |482| At the time, KSM had been subjected to more than 65 applications of water during the four waterboarding sessions between the afternoon of March 12, 2003, and the morning of March 13, 2003. In response to a request for approval from the chief of Base, CTC attorney [XXX] assured detention site personnel that the medical officer "is incorrect that these guidelines have been approved and/or fully coordinated." |483| [XXX] sent an email to the detention site authorizing the additional waterboarding session. |484| Despite indications from [XXX] that the detention site personnel would receive a formal authorizing cable, no such authorization from CIA Headquarters was provided. At the end of the day, the medical officer wrote [XXX]OMS that "[t]hings are slowly evolving form [sic] OMS being viewed as the institutional conscience and the limiting factor to the ones who are dedicated to maximizing the benefit in a safe manner and keeping everyone's butt out of trouble." The medical officer noted that his communication with [XXX]BOMS was no longer "viewed with suspicion." |485| On the afternoon of March 13, 2003, KSM was subjected to his third waterboard session of that calendar day and fifth in 25 hours. CIA records note that KSM vomited during and after the procedure. |486|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Shortly thereafter, CIA Headquarters began reevaluating the use of the waterboard interrogation technique. According to a March 14, 2003, email from an interrogator who was not at DETENTION SITE BLUE, but was reviewing cable traffic, the "[o]verall view seems to be" that the waterboard "is not working in gaining KSM['s] compliance." |487| The deputy chief of the CIA interrogation program responded in agreement, adding that "[a]gainst KSM it has proven ineffective," and that "[t]he potential for physical harm is far greater with the waterboard than with the other techniques, bringing into question the issue of risk vs. gain...." The deputy chief further suggested that the waterboard was counterproductive, stating that "[w]e seem to have lost ground" with KSM since progress made at DETENTION SITE COBALT, and as a result, the CIA should "consider the possibility" that the introduction of the waterboard interrogation technique "may poison the well." |488| The email in which these sentiments were expressed was sent to [XXX], the CTC attorney overseeing the interrogation of KSM. Despite these reservations and assessments, the waterboarding of KSM continued for another 10 days. |489|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On March 15, 2003, KSM was waterboarded for failing to confirm references in signals intercepts on al-Qa'ida's efforts to obtain "nuclear suitcases." |490| Subsequent signals intercepts and information from a foreign government would later indicate that the nuclear suitcase threat was an orchestrated scam. |491| KSM was waterboarded a second time that day after failing to provide information on operations against the United States or on al-Qa'ida nuclear capabilities. |492| During the waterboarding sessions that day, the application of the interrogation technique further evolved, with the interrogators now using their hands to maintain a one-inch deep "pool" of water over KSM's nose and mouth in an effort to make it impossible for KSM to ingest all the water being poured. |493| At one point, SWIGERT and DUNBAR waited for KSM to talk before pouring water over his mouth. |494|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On the afternoon of March 17, 2003, and into the morning of March l8, 2003, [XXX], [XXX]OMS, exchanged emails with the medical officer at DETENTION SITE BLUE on the waterboarding of KSM. According to the waterboard interrogation technique had "moved even further from the SERE model." |495| [XXX] also wrote:

"Truthfully, though, I don't recall that the WB [waterboard] produced anything actionable in AZ [Abu Zubaydah] any earlier than another technique might have. This may be different with KSM, but that is still as much a statement of faith as anything else - since we don't seem to study the question as we go... it's been many more days of constant WB repetitions, with the evidence of progress through most of them not being actionable intel but rather that 'he looks like he's weakening.' The WB may actually be the best; just don't like to base it on religion." |496|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On March 18, 2003, KSM was confronted with the reporting of Majid Khan, who was then in the custody of a foreign government, |497| regarding plotting against gas stations inside the United States, information that KSM had not previously discussed. In assessing the session, DETENTION SITE BLUE personnel noted that "KSM will selectively lie, provide partial truths, and misdirect when he believes he will not be found out and held accountable." On the other hand, they wrote that "KSM appears more inclined to make accurate disclosures when he believes people, emails, or other source material are available to the USG for checking his responses." |498|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The same day, KSM provided additional information on the Heathrow Airport plotting, much of which he would recant in 2004. |499| KSM also discussed Jaffar al-Tayyar again, prompting the detention site personnel to refer to the "all-purpose" al-Tayyar whom KSM had "woven... into practically every story, each time with a different role." |500| After KSM had included al-Tayyar in his discussion of Majid Khan's gas station plot, KSM debriefer [XXX] wrote in an email that "[t]oday [al-Tayyar's] working with Majid Khan, yesterday the London crowd, the day before Padilla - you get the point." |501| Beginning the evening of March 18, 2003, KSM began a period of sleep deprivation, most of it in the standing position, which would last for seven and a half days, or approximately 180 hours. |502|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On March 19, 2003, the interrogators at the detention site decided to waterboard KSM due to KSM's inconsistent information about Jaffar al-Tayyar's passport. |503| According to CIA cables, after assuming his position on the waterboard, KSM "seemed to lose control" and appeared "somewhat frantic," stating that he "had been forced to lie, and ma[k]e up stories about" Jaffar al-Tayyar because of his interrogators. |504| KSM then stated that his reporting on al-Tayyar's role in Majid Khan's plotting was a "complete fabrication" and that al-Tayyar had been compromised as an operative and that as a result, al-Tayyar could not be used for a terrorist operation. |505| In response, the interrogators told KSM that they only wanted to hear him speak if he was revealing information on the next attack. |506| Deputy Chief of ALEC Station [XXX] later told the inspector general that it was around this time that contract interrogator DUNBAR stated that "he had not seen a 'resistor' [sic] like KSM, and was 'going to go to school on this guy.'" |507| According to CIA records, the interrogators then "devote[d] all measures to pressuring [KSM] on the single issue of the 'next attack on America,'" including attention grabs, insult slaps, walling, water dousing, and additional waterboard sessions. |508|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On March 20, 2003, KSM continued to be subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques throughout the day, including a period of "intense questioning and walling." |509| KSM was described as "[t]ired and sore," with abrasions on his ankles, shins, and wrists, as well as on the back of his head. |510| He also suffered from pedal edema resulting from extended standing. |511| After having concluded that there was "no further movement" in the interrogation, the detention site personnel hung a picture of KSM's sons in his cell as a way to "[heighten] his imagination concerning where they are, who has them, [and] what is in store for them." |512|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The waterboarding of KSM on March 21, 2003, and March 22, 2003, was based on a misreading of intelligence provided by Majid Khan by Deputy Chief of ALEC Station [XXX]. According to a cable from the CIA's [XXX], Khan, who was in foreign government custody, had stated that KSM wanted to use "two to three unknown Black American Muslim converts who were currently training in Afghanistan," to "conduct attacks" on gas stations in the United States, and that "KSM was interested inusinj anyone with US status to assist with this operation." |513| Upon receipt of this reporting, [XXX] wrote in an email "i love the Black American Muslim at AQ camps in Afghanuistan [sic] ... Mukie [KSM] is going to be hatin' life on this one." |514| However, her subsequent questioning of KSM was not based on Khan's actual reporting, which was about potential operatives already in Afghanistan, but rather something Khan had not said–that KSM directed him to make contact with African-American converts in the United States. |515| According to CIA records, in a "contentious" session that lasted for hours and involved the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, KSM "flatly denied" any efforts to recruit African-American Muslim converts. KSM was then waterboarded. |516| Later in the day, facing the threat of a second waterboarding session, KSM "relented and said that maybe he had told Khan that he should see if he could make contact with members of the Black American Muslim convert community." The CIA interrogators then returned KSM to the standing sleep deprivation position without a second waterboarding session. |517|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The next day, March 22, 2003, interrogators subjected KSM to "intense" questioning and walling, but when KSM provided no new information on African-American Muslim converts or threats inside the United States, he was subjected to additional waterboarding. |518| An hour later, KSM stated that he was "ready to talk." |519| He told the CIA interrogators that he had sent Abu Issa al-Britani to Montana to recruit African-American Muslim converts, a mission he said had been prompted by discussions with a London-based shaykh whose bodyguards had families in Montana. |520| KSM also stated that he tasked Majid Khan with attending Muslim conferences in the United States to "spot and assess potential extremists" who would assist in the gas station plot. |521| In June 2003, KSM admitted that he fabricated the story about Abu Issa al-Britani and Montana, explaining that he was "under 'enhanced measures' when he made these claims and simply told his interrogators what he thought they wanted to hear." |522| In August 2003, KSM reiterated that he had no plans to recruit or use "black American Muslim" converts operationally. |523| In December 2005, he denied ever asking Majid Khan to recruit converts or attend Islamic conferences. |524|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On March 24, 2003, KSM underwent his fifteenth and final documented waterboarding session due to his "intransigence" in failing to identify suspected Abu Bakr al-Azdi operations in the United States, and for having "lied about poison and biological warfare programs." |525| KSM was described in the session as being "composed, stoic, and resigned." |526|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) That evening, the detention site received two reports. The first recounted the reporting of Majid Khan, who was still in the custody of a foreign government, on Uzhair, who ran the New York branch of his father's Karachi-based import-export business, and on Uzhair's father. |527| According to Khan, his meetings with the two were facilitated by Ammar al-Baluchi. |528| The second report described the reporting of Iyman Faris, who was in FBI custody, on a plot to cut the suspension cables on the Brooklyn Bridge and exploration of plans to derail trains and conduct an attack in Washington, D.C. |529| KSM, whom detention site personnel described as "boxed in" by the new reporting, |530| then stated that Uzhair's father, Sayf al-Rahman Paracha, had agreed to smuggle explosives into the United States. |531| As described elsewhere in this summary, the purported parties to the agreement denied that such an agreement existed. |532| In confirming Faris's reporting, KSM exhibited what the Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism would later describe as an effort to "stay obvious/general" and "provide little information that might enable the US to thwart attacks." |533|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) With the exception of sleep deprivation, which continued for one more day, the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against KSM stopped abruptly on March 24, 2003. |534| There are no CIA records directing the interrogation team to cease using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against KSM, nor any contemporaneous documentation explaining the decision. |535|

4. After the Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Against KSM Ends, the CIA Continues to Assess That KSM Is Withholding and Fabricating Information

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On April 3, 2003, the Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism produced an assessment of KSM's intelligence entitled, "Precious Truths, Surrounded by a Bodyguard of Lies." The assessment concluded that KSM was withholding or lying about terrorist plots and operatives targeting the United States. It also identified contradictions between KSM's reporting on CBRN and other sources. |536|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On April 24, 2003, FBI Director Robert Mueller began seeking direct FBI access to KSM in order to better understand CIA reporting indicating threats to U.S. cities. |537| Despite personal commitments from DCI Tenet to Director Mueller that access would be forthcoming, the CIA's CTC successfully formulated a CIA position whereby the FBI would not be provided access to KSM until his anticipated transfer to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Neither the CIA nor the FBI knew at the time that the transfer would not occur until September 2006. |538|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Between April 2003 and July 2003, KSM frustrated the CIA on a number of fronts. On May 7, 2003, after more than two months of conflicting reporting, ALEC Station concluded that KSM "consistently wavers" on issues of UBL's location, protectors, and hosts, and that his information "conveniently lack[s] sufficient detail [to be] actionable intelligence." |539| On June 12, 2003, CIA Headquarters indicated that it "remained] highly suspicious that KSM is withholding, exaggerating, misdirecting, or outright fabricating information on CBRN issues." |540| At the end of April 2003, KSM was shown pictures of the recently captured Ammar al-Baluchi and Khallad bin Attash, after which he provided additional information related to their plotting in Karachi. |541| ALEC Station wrote in a May 20, 2003, cable that "[w]e consider KSM's long-standing omission of [this] information to be a serious concern, especially as this omission may well have cost American lives had Pakistani authorities not been diligent in following up on unrelated criminal leads that led to the capture of Ammar, bin Attash, and other probable operatives involved in the attack plans." |542|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In May and June 2003, Ammar al-Baluchi and Khallad bin Attash provided reporting that contradicted KSM's statements about the Heathrow Airport plotting and included information that KSM had not provided. |543| After KSM was confronted with this reporting, Deputy Chief of ALEC Station [XXX] wrote in an email, "OK, that's it... yet again he lies and ONLY ADMITS details when he knows we know them from someone else." |544| On April 19, 2003, KSM was questioned for the first time about summer 2002 reporting from Masran bin Arshad, who was in the custody of a foreign government, regarding the "Second Wave" plot. Informed that bin Arshad had been detained, KSM stated, "I have forgotten about him, he is not in my mind at all." |545| In response, ALEC Station noted that it "remain[e]d concerned that KSM's progression towards full debriefing status is not yet apparent where it counts most, in relation to threats to US interests, especially inside CONUS." |546| In June 2003, almost three months after the CIA had stopped using its enhanced interrogation techniques against KSM, senior ALEC Station and RDG officers met at least twice to discuss concerns about KSM's lack of cooperation. |547| As an ALEC Station cable noted at the time, "KSM's pattern of behavior over the past three months, trying to control his environment, lying and then admitting things only when pressed that others have been caught and have likely admitted the plot, is a cause for concern." |548| In an email, one CIA officer noted that "what KSM's doing is fairly typical of other detainees... KSM, Khallad [bin Attash], and others are doing what makes sense in their situation - pretend cooperation." |549|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In the fall of 2003, after KSM's explanations about how to decrypt phone numbers related to British operative Issa al-Britani (KSM did not identify the operative as "Issa al-Hindi," or by his true name, Dhiren Barot) yielded no results, and after KSM misidentified another individual, known not to be Issa, as Issa, Deputy Chief of ALEC Station [XXX] stated in an email that KSM was "obstructing our ability to acquire good information," noting that KSM "misidentifie[s] photos when he knows we are fishing" and "misleads us on telephone numbers." |550| Later, after KSM's transfer to DETENTION SITE BLACK, ALEC Station wrote that KSM "may never be fully forthcoming and honest" on the topic of UBL's whereabouts. |551| Despite repeated challenges, KSM maintained that he lacked information on UBL's location. |552|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) KSM was transferred to DETENTION SITE [XXX] on [XXX], 2005, |553| to DETENTION SITE BROWN on March [XXX], 2006, |554| and to U.S. military detention at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, on September 5, 2006. |555| The CIA disseminated 831 intelligence reports from the interrogations of KSM over a period of 3.5 years. While KSM provided more intelligence reporting than any other CIA detainee (nearly 15 percent of all CIA detainee intelligence reporting), CIA records indicate that KSM also received the most intelligence requirements and attention from CIA interrogators, debriefers, analysts, and senior CIA leadership. Further, as noted, a significant amount of the disseminated intelligence reporting from KSM that the CIA identified as important threat reporting was later identified as fabricated. |556|

H. The Growth of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program

1. Fifty-Three CIA Detainees Enter the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program in 2003

(TS//[XXX]//NF) While me CIA neld detainees from 2002 to 2008, early 2003 was the most active period of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. Of the 119 detainees identified by the Committee as held by the CIA, 53 were brought into custody in 2003, and of the 39 detainees the Committee has found to have been subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, 17 were subjected to such techniques between January 2003 and August 2003. The CIA's enhanced interrogations during that time were primarily used at DETENTION SITE COBALT and DETENTION SITE BLUE. |557| Other interrogations using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques took place at a CIA [XXX] in Country [XXX], at which at least one CIA detainee was submerged in a bathtub filled with ice water. |558|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In 2003, CIA interrogators sought and received approval to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against at least five detainees prior to their arrival at a CIA detention facility. |559| In two of those cases, CIA Headquarters approved the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques before they were requested by CIA personnel at the detention sites. |560|

2. The CIA Establishes DETENTION SITE BLACK in Country [XXX] and DETENTION SITE VIOLET in Country [XXX]

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The CIA entered into an agreement with the [XXX] in Country [XXX] to host a CIA detention facility in [XXX] 2002. |561| In [XXX] 2003, CIA Headquarters invited the CIA Station in Country [XXX] to identify ways to support the [XXX] in Country [XXX] to "demonstrate to [XXX] and the highest levels of the [Country [XXX]] government that we deeply appreciate their cooperation and support" for the detention program. |562| The Station responded with an $[XXX] million "wish list" [XXX]; |563| CIA Headquarters provided the Station with $[XXX] million more than was requested for the purposes of the subsidy. |564| CIA detainees were transferred to DETENTION SITE BLACK in Country [XXX] in the fall of 2003. |565|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In August 2003, the U.S. ambassador in Country [XXX] sought to contact State Department officials to ensure that the State Department was aware of the CIA detention facility and its "potential impact on our policy vis-a-vis the [Country [XXX]] government." |566| The U.S. ambassador was told by the CIA Station that this was not possible, and that no one at the State Department, including the secretary of state, was informed about the CIA detention facility in Country [XXX]. Describing the CIA's position as "unacceptable," the ambassador then requested a signed document from "at least the President's National Security Advisor" describing the authorities for the program, including a statement that the CIA's interrogation techniques met "legal and human rights standards," and an explicit order to him not to discuss the program with the secretary of state. |567| CIA Headquarters then sought the intervention of Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, who called the U.S. ambassador. Deputy Secretary Armitage told the CIA to keep him and the secretary of state informed so that they would not be caught unaware when an ambassador raised concerns. |568|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Nearly a year later, in May 2004, revelations about U.S. detainee abuses at the U.S. military prison in Abu Ghraib, Iraq, prompted the same U.S. ambassador in Country [XXX] to seek information on CIA detention standards and interrogation methods. |569| In the fall of 2004, when [XXX] U.S. ambassador to Country [XXX] sought documents authorizing the program, the CIA again sought the intervention of Deputy Secretary Armitage, who once again made "strong remarks" to the CIA about how he and the secretary of state were "cut out of the NSC [National Security Council] clearance/coordination process" with regard to the CIA program. According to CIA records, Armitage also questioned the efficacy of the program and the value of the intelligence derived from the program. |570| While it is unclear how the [XXX] ambassador's concerns were resolved, he later joined the chief of Station in making a presentation to Country [XXX]'s [XXX] on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. The presentation talking points did not describe the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, but represented that "[w]ithout the full range of these interrogation measures, we would not have succeeded in overcoming the resistance of [Khalid Shaykh Muhammad] and other equally resistant HVDs." The talking points included many of the same inaccurate representations |571| made to U.S. policymakers and others, attributing to CIA detainees critical information on the "Karachi Plot," the "Heathrow Plot," the "Second Wave Plot," and the "Guraba Cell"; as well as intelligence related to Issa al-Hindi, Abu Talha al-Pakistani, Hambali, Jose Padilla, Binyam Mohammed, Sajid Badat, and Jaffar al-Tayyar. The presentation also noted that the president of the United States had directed that he not be informed of the locations of the CIA detention facilities to ensure he would not accidentally disclose the information. |572|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In a separate country, Country [XXX], the CIA obtained the approval of the [XXX] and the political leadership to establish a detention facility before informing the U.S. ambassador. |573| As the CIA chief of Station stated in his request to CIA Headquarters to brief the ambassador, Country [XXX]'s and the [XXX] probably would ask the ambassador about the CIA detention facility. |574| After [XXX] delayed briefing the [XXX] for [XXX] months, to the consternation of the CIA Station, which wanted political approval prior to the arrival of CIA detainees. |575| The [XXX] Country [XXX] official outside of the [XXX] aware of the facility, was described as "shocked," but nonetheless approved. |576|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) By mid-2003 the CIA had concluded that its completed, but still unused "holding cell" in Country [XXX] was insufficient, given the growing number of CIA detainees in the program and the CIA's interest in interrogating multiple detainees at the same detention site. The CIA thus sought to build a new, expanded detention facility in the country. |577| The CIA also offered $[XXX] million to the [XXX] to "show appreciation" for the [XXX] support for the program. |578| According to a CIA cable, however, the [XXX]." |579| While the plan to construct the expanded facility was approved by the [XXX] of Country [XXX], the CIA and [XXX] developed complex mechanisms to [XXX] in order to provide the $[XXX] million to the [XXX]. |580|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) [XXX] in Country [XXX] complicated the arrangements. [XXX] when the Country [XXX] [XXX] requested an update on planning for the CIA detention site, he was told [XXX]–inaccurately–that the planning had been discontinued. |581| In [XXX], when the facility received its first CIA detainees, [XXX] informed the CIA [XXX] that the [XXX] of Country [XXX] "probably has an incomplete notion [regarding the facility's] actual function, i.e., he probably believes that it is some sort of [XXX] center. |582|

3. At Least 17 CIA Detainees Subjected to the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Without CIA Headquarters Authorization

(TS//[XXX]//NF) CIA cables from the spring of 2003 and afterwards describe multiple examples of interrogation practices at CIA detention sites that were inconsistent with the CIA's detention and interrogation guidelines. CIA officers at DETENTION SITE COBALT–led principally by Chief of Interrogations [XXX]–also described a number of interrogation activities in cables that were not approved by CIA Headquarters. CIA Headquarters failed to respond, inquire, or investigate:

Cables revealing that the CIA's chief of interrogations used water dousing against detainees, including with cold water and/or ice water baths, as an interrogation technique without prior approval from CIA Headquarters; |583|
Cables and records indicating that CIA detainees who were undergoing or had undergone the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were subjected to rectal rehydration, without evidence of medical necessity, and that others were threatened with it; |584|
Cables noting that groups of four or more interrogators, who required practical experience to acquire their CIA interrogation "certification," were allowed to apply the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques as a group against a single detainee; |585| and
Cables revealing that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were used at CIA [XXX] that were not designated as CIA detention sites. |586|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In the first half of 2003, the CIA interrogated four detainees with medical complications in their lower extremities: two detainees had a broken foot, one detainee had a sprained ankle, and one detainee had a prosthetic leg. |587| CIA interrogators shackled each of these detainees in the standing position for sleep deprivation for extended periods of time until medical personnel assessed that they could not maintain the position. The two detainees that each had a broken foot were also subjected to walling, stress positions, and cramped confinement, despite the note in their interrogation plans that these specific enhanced interrogation techniques were not requested because of the medical condition of the detainees. |588| CIA Headquarters did not react to the site's use of these CIA enhanced interrogation techniques despite the lack of approval.

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Over the course of the CIA program, at least 39 detainees were subjected to one or more of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. |589| CIA records indicate that there were at least 17 CIA detainees who were subjected to one or more CIA enhanced interrogation techniques without CIA Headquarters approval. This count includes detainees who were approved for the use of some techniques, but were subjected to unapproved techniques, as well as detainees for whom interrogators had no approvals to use any of the techniques. This count also takes into account distinctions between techniques categorized as "enhanced" or "standard" by the CIA at the time they were applied. |590| The 17 detainees who were subjected to techniques without the approval of CIA Headquarters were: Rafiq Bashir al-Hami, |591| Tawfiq Nasir Awad al-Bihandi, |592| Hikmat Nafi Shaukat, |593| Lufti al-Arabi al-Gharisi, |594| Muhammad Ahmad Ghulam Rabbani aka Abu Badr, |595| Gul Rahman, |596| Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, |597| Ramzi bin al-Shibh, |598| Asadallah, |599| Mustafa al-Hawsawi, |600| Abu Khalid, |601| Laid bin Duhman aka Abu Hudhaifa, |602| Abd al-Karim, |603| Abu Hazim, |604| Sayyid Ibrahim, |605| Abu Yasir al-Jaza'iri, |606| and Suleiman Abdullah. |607| In every case except al-Nashiri, the unauthorized interrogation techniques were detailed in CIA cables, but CIA Headquarters did not respond or take action against the CIA personnel applying the unauthorized interrogation techniques. |608|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) This list does not include examples in which CIA interrogators were authorized to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, but then implemented the techniques in a manner that diverged from the authorization. Examples include Abu Zubair |609| and, as detailed, KSM, whose interrogators developed methods of applying the waterboard in a manner that differed from how the technique had previously been used and how it had been described to the Department of Justice. This count also excludes additional allegations of the unauthorized use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. |610|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Oyer me course of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, numerous detainees were subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques by untrained interrogators. As noted, the CIA did not conduct its first training course until November 2002, by which time at least nine detainees had already been subjected to the techniques. |611| The DCI's January 28, 2003, guidelines, which stated that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques "may be employed only by approved interrogators for use with specific detainees," raised the additional issue of approved techniques used by unapproved interrogators. |612| The January 28, 2003, DCI guidelines did not explicitly require CIA Headquarters to approve who could use the CIA's "standard" interrogation techniques, including techniques that were not previously considered "standard" and that would later be reclassified as "enhanced" interrogation techniques. Rather, the DCI guidelines required only that "all personnel directly engaged in the interrogation" be "appropriately screened," that they review the guidelines, and that they receive "appropriate training" in the implementation of the guidelines. |613|

4. CIA Headquarters Authorizes Water Dousing Without Department of Justice Approval; Application of Technique Reported as Approximating Waterboarding

(TS//[XXX]//NF) CIA Headquarters approved requests to use water dousing, nudity, the abdominal slap, and dietary manipulation, despite the fact that the techniques had not been reviewed by the Department of Justice. |614| Interrogators used the water dousing technique in various ways. At DETENTION SITE COBALT, detainees were often held down, naked, on a tarp on the floor, with the tarp pulled up around them to form a makeshift tub, while cold or refrigerated water was poured on them. |615| Others were hosed down repeatedly while they were shackled naked, in the standing sleep deprivation position. These same detainees were subsequently placed in rooms with temperatures ranging from 59 to 80 degrees Fahrenheit. |616| Other accounts suggest detainees were water doused while placed on a waterboard. |617| Although CIA Headquarters approved the use of the "water dousing" interrogation technique on several detainees, interrogators used it extensively on a number of detainees without seeking or obtaining prior authorization from CIA Headquarters. |618|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In interrogation sessions on April 5, 2003, and April 6, 2003, senior CIA interrogator [XXX] and another interrogator used the water dousing technique on detainee Mustafa al-Hawsawi at DETENTION SITE COBALT. Al-Hawsawi later described the session to a different CIA interrogator, [XXX], who wrote that al-Hawsawi might have been waterboarded or subjected to treatment that "could be indistinguishable from the waterboard." |619| An email from the interrogator stated that:

"We did not prompt al-Hawsawi - he described the process and the table on his own. As you know, I have serious reservations about watering them in a prone position because if not done with care, the net effect can approach the effect of the water board. If one is held down on his back, on the table or on the floor, with water poured in his face I think it goes beyond dousing and the effect, to the recipient, could be indistinguishable from the water board.

I have real problems with putting one of them on the water board for 'dousing.' Putting him in a head down attitude and pouring water around his chest and face is just too close to the water board, and if it is continued may lead to problems for us." |620|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Several months later, the incident was referred to the CIA inspector general for investigation. A December 6, 2006, inspector general report summarized the findings of this investigation, indicating that water was poured on al-Hawsawi while he was lying on the floor in a prone position, which, in the opinion of at least one CIA interrogator quoted in the report, "can easily approximate waterboarding." |621| The OIG could not corroborate whether al-Hawsawi was strapped to the waterboard when he was interrogated at DETENTION SITE COBALT. Both of the interrogators who subjected al-Hawsawi to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on April 6, 2003, said that al-Hawsawi cried out for God while the water was being poured on him and one of the interrogators asserted that this was because of the cold temperature of the water. Both of the interrogators also stated that al-Hawsawi saw the waterboard and that its purpose was made clear to him. The inspector general report also indicates that al-Hawsawi's experience reflected "the way water dousing was done at [DETENTION SITE COBALT]," and that this method was developed with guidance from CIA CTC attorneys and the CIA's Office of Medical Services. |622|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) During the same time that al-Hawsawi claimed he was placed on the waterboard in April 2003, a CIA linguist claimed that CIA detainee Abu Hazim had also been water doused in a way that approximated waterboarding. |623| [XXX], a linguist in Country [XXX] from [XXX], 2003, until [XXX], 2003, told the OIG that:

"when water dousing was used on Abu Hazim, a cloth covered Abu Hazim's face, and [[XXX]] [CIA OFFICER 1]] poured cold water directly on Abu Hazim's face to disrupt his breathing. [The linguist] said that when Abu Hazim turned blue, Physician's Assistant [[XXX]] removed the cloth so that Abu Hazim could breathe." |624|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) This allegation was reported to the CIA inspector general on August 18, 2004. The CIA reported this incident as a possible criminal violation on September 10, 2004, to the U.S. Attorney's Office in the Eastern District of Virginia. |625| The inspector general report concluded that there was no corroboration of the linguist's allegation, stating, "[t]here is no evidence that a cloth was placed over Abu Hazim's face during water dousing or that his breathing was impaired." |626|

5. Hambali Fabricates Information While Being Subjected to the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In the summer of 2003, the CIA captured three Southeast Asian operatives: Zubair, |627| Lillie, |628| and Hambali. (These captures are discussed later in this summary in the section entitled, "The Capture of Hambali.") |629|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In August 2003, Hambali was captured and transferred to CIA custody. |630| Despite assessments that Hambali was cooperative in the interview process without "the use of more intrusive standard interrogation procedures much less the enhanced measures," CIA interrogators requested and obtained approval to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Hambali approximately a month after his transfer to CIA custody. |631| In late 2003, Hambali recanted most of the significant information he had provided to interrogators during the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, recantations CIA officers assessed to be credible. |632| According to a CIA cable:

"he had provided the false information in an attempt to reduce the pressure on himself ... and to give an account that was consistent with what [Hambali] assessed the questioners wanted to hear." |633|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) CIA officers later suggested that the misleading answers and resistance to interrogation that CIA interrogators cited in their requests to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Hambali and an associated CIA detainee, Lillie, may not have been resistance to interrogation, but rather the result of issues related to culture and their poor English language skills. |634|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In October 2003, the CIA interrogated Arsala Khan, an Afghan national in his mid-fifties who was believed to have assisted Usama bin Laden in his escape through the Tora Bora Mountains in late 2001. |635| After 56 hours of standing sleep deprivation, Arsala Khan was described as barely able to enunciate, and being "visibly shaken by his hallucinations depicting dogs mauling and killing his sons and family." According to CIA cables, Arsala Khan "stated that [the interrogator] was responsible for killing them and feeding them to the dogs." |636|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Arsala Khan was subsequently allowed to sleep. |637| Two days later, however, the interrogators returned him to standing sleep deprivation. After subjecting Khan to 21 additional hours of sleep deprivation, interrogators stopped using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques "[d]ue to lack of information from [Arsala Khan] pinning him directly to a recent activity." |638| Three days after the reporting about Khan's hallucinations, and after the interrogators had already subjected Khan to the additional 21 hours of standing sleep deprivation (beyond the initial 56 hours), CIA Headquarters sent a cable stating that RDG and the Office of Medical Services believed that Arsala Khan should not be subjected to additional standing sleep deprivation beyond the 56 hours because of his hallucinations. |639|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) After approximately a month of detention and the extensive use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Arsala Khan, the CIA concluded that the "detainee Arsala Khan does not appear to be the subject involved in... current plans or activities against U.S. personnel or facilities," and recommended that he be released to his village with a cash payment. |640| CIA interrogators at DETENTION SITE COBALT instead transferred him to U.S. military custody, where he was held for an additional four years despite the development of significant intelligence indicating that the source who reported that Arsala Khan had aided Usama bin Laden had a vendetta against Arsala Khan's family. |641|

7. A Year After DETENTION SITE COBALT Opens, the CIA Reports "Unsettling Discovery That We Are Holding a Number of Detainees About Whom We Know Very Little"

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In the fall of 2003, CIA officers began to take a closer look at the CIA detainees being held in Country [XXX], raising concerns about both the number and types of detainees being held by the CIA. CIA officers in Country [XXX] provided a list of CIA detainees to CIA Headquarters, resulting in the observation by CIA Headquarters that they had not previously had the names of all 44 CIA detainees being held in that country. At the direction of CIA Headquarters, the Station in Country [XXX] "completed an exhaustive search of all available records in an attempt to develop a clearer understanding of the [CIA] detainees." A December 2003 cable from the Station in Country [XXX] to CIA Headquarters stated that:

"In the process of this research, we have made the unsettling discovery that we are holding a number of detainees about whom we know very little. The majority of [CIA] detainees in [Country [XXX]] have not been debriefed for months and, in some cases, for over a year. Many of them appear to us to have no further intelligence value for [the CIA] and should more properly be turned over to the [U.S. military], to [Country [XXX]] authorities or to third countries for further investigation and possibly prosecution. In a few cases, there does not appear to be enough evidence to continue incarceration, and, if this is in fact the case, the detainees should be released." |642|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Records indicate that all of these CIA detainees had been kept in solitary confinement. The vast majority of these detainees were later released, with some receiving CIA payments for having been held in detention. |643|

8. CIA Detention Sites in Country [XXX] Lack Sufficient Personnel and Translators to Support the Interrogations of Detainees

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Throughout 2003, the CIA lacked sufficient personnel and adequate translators to conduct debriefings and interrogations in Country [XXX]. Because of this personnel shortage, a number of detainees who were transferred to CIA custody were not interrogated or debriefed by anyone for days or weeks after their arrival at CIA detention facilities in Country [XXX]. |644| As noted in a cable from the CIA Station in Country [XXX], in April 2003:

"Station is supporting the debriefing and/or interrogation of a large number of individuals... and is constrained by a lack of personnel which would allow us to fully process them in a timely manner." |645|

I. Other Medical, Psychological, and Behavioral Issues

1. CIA Interrogations Take Precedence Over Medical Care

(TS//[XXX]//NF) While CIA Headquarters informed the Department of Justice in July 2002 "that steps will be taken to ensure that [Abu Zubaydah's] injury is not in any way exacerbated by the use of these [enhanced interrogation] methods," |646| CIA Headquarters informed CIA interrogators that the interrogation process would take "precedence" over Abu Zubaydah's medical care. |647| Beginning on August 4, 2002, Abu Zubaydah was kept naked, fed a "bare bones" liquid diet, and subjected to the non-stop use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. |648| On August 15, 2002, medical personnel described how Abu Zubaydah's interrogation resulted in the "steady deterioration" of his surgical wound from April 2002. |649| On August 20, 2002, medical officers wrote that Abu Zubaydah's wound had undergone "significant" deterioration. |650| Later, after one of Abu Zubaydah's eyes began to deteriorate, |651| CIA officers requested a test of Abu Zubaydah's other eye, stating that the request was "driven by our intelligence needs vice humanitarian concern for AZ." The cable relayed, "[w]e have a lot riding upon his ability to see, read and write." |652|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In April 2003, CIA detainees Abu Hazim and Abd al-Karim each broke a foot while trying to escape capture and were placed in casts. |653| CIA cables requesting the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on the two detainees stated that the interrogators would "forego cramped confinement, stress positions, walling, and vertical shackling (due to [the detainees'] injury)." |654| Notwithstanding medical concerns related to the injuries, both of these detainees were subjected to one or more of these CIA enhanced interrogation techniques prior to obtaining CIA Headquarters approval. |655|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In the case of Abu Hazim, on May 4, 2003, the CIA regional medical officer examined Abu Hazim and recommended that he avoid all weight bearing activities for an additional five weeks due to his broken foot. |656| In the case of Abd al-Karim, on April 18, 2003, a CIA physician assistant recommended that al-Karim avoid extended standing for "a couple of weeks." |657| Six days later, on April 24, 2003, CIA Headquarters reviewed x-rays of al-Karim's foot, diagnosing him with a broken foot, and recommending no weight bearing and the use of crutches for a total of three months. |658| Despite these recommendations, on May 10, 2003, CIA interrogators believed that both Hazim and al-Karim were "strong mentally and physically due to [their] ability to sleep in the sitting position." |659| On May 12, 2003, a different CIA physician assistant, who had not been involved in the previous examinations determining the need for the detainees to avoid weight bearing, stated that it was his "opinion" that Abu Hazim's and Abd al-Karim's injuries were "sufficiently healed to allow being placed in the standing sleep deprivation position." |660| He further reported that he had "consulted with [CIA's Office of Medical Services] via secure phone and OMS medical officer concurred in this assessment." |661| CIA Headquarters approved the use of standing sleep deprivation against both detainees shortly thereafter. |662| As a result, both detainees were placed in standing sleep deprivation. Abu Hazim underwent 52 hours of standing sleep deprivation from June 3-5, 2003, |663| and Abd al-Karim underwent an unspecified period of standing sleep deprivation on May 15, 2003. |664|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) CIA detainee Asadallah was left in the standing sleep deprivation position despite a sprained ankle. Later, when Asadallah was placed in stress positions on his knees, he complained of discomfort and asked to sit. Asadallah was told he could not sit unless he answered questions truthfully. |665|

2. CIA Detainees Exhibit Psychological and Behavioral Issues

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Psychological and behavioral problems experienced by CIA detainees, who were held in austere conditions and in solitary confinement, also posed management challenges for the CIA. |666| For example, later in his detention, Ramzi bin al-Shibh exhibited behavioral and psychological problems, including visions, paranoia, insomnia, and attempts at self-harm. |667| CIA psychologists linked bin al-Shibh's deteriorating mental state to his isolation and inability to cope with his long-term detention. |668| Similarly, 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri's unpredictable and disruptive behavior in detention made him one of the most difficult detainees for the CIA to manage. Al-Nashiri engaged in repeated belligerent acts, including throwing his food tray, |669| attempting to assault detention site personnel, |670| and trying to damage items in his cell. |671| Over a period of years, al-Nashiri accused the CIA staff of drugging or poisoning his food and complained of bodily pain and insomnia. |672| As noted, at one point, al-Nashiri launched a short-lived hunger strike, and the CIA responded by force feeding him rectally. |673| An October 2004 psychological assessment of al-Nashiri was used by the CIA to advance its discussions with National Security Council officials on establishing an "endgame" for the program. |674| In July 2005, CIA Headquarters expressed concern regarding al-Nashiri's "continued state of depression and uncooperative attitude." |675| Days later a CIA psychologist assessed that al-Nashiri was on the "verge of a breakdown." |676|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Beginning in March 2004, and continuing until his rendition to U.S. military custody at Guantanamo Bay in September 2006, Majid Khan engaged in a series of hunger strikes and attempts at self-mutilation that required significant attention from CIA detention site personnel. In response to Majid Khan's hunger strikes, medical personnel implemented various techniques to provide fluids and nutrients, including the use of a nasogastric tube and the provision of intravenous fluids. CIA records indicate that Majid Khan cooperated with the feedings and was permitted to infuse the fluids and nutrients himself. |677| After approximately three weeks, the CIA developed a more aggressive treatment regimen "without unnecessary conversation." |678| Majid Khan was then subjected to involuntary rectal feeding and rectal hydration, which included two bottles of Ensure. Later that same day, Majid Khan's "lunch tray," consisting of hummus, pasta with sauce, nuts, and raisins, was "pureed" and rectally infused. |679| Additional sessions of rectal feeding and hydration followed. |680| In addition to his hunger strikes, Majid Khan engaged in acts of self-harm that included attempting to cut his wrist on two occasions, |681| an attempt to chew into his arm at the inner elbow, |682| an attempt to cut a vein in the top of his foot, |683| and an attempt to cut into his skin at the elbow joint using a filed toothbrush. |684|

J. The CIA Seeks Reaffirmation of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program in 2003

1. Administration Statements About the Humane Treatment of Detainees Raise Concerns at the CIA About Possible Lack of Policy Support for CIA Interrogation Activities

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On several occasions in early 2003, CIA General Counsel Scott Muller expressed concern to the National Security Council principals, White House staff, and Department of Justice personnel that the CIA's program might be inconsistent with public statements from the Administration that the U.S. Government's treatment of detainees was "humane." |685| CIA General Counsel Muller therefore sought to verify with White House and Department of Justice personnel that a February 7, 2002, Presidential Memorandum requiring the U.S. military to treat detainees humanely did not apply to the CIA. |686| Following those discussions in early 2003, the White House press secretary was advised to avoid using the term "humane treatment" when discussing the detention of al-Qa'ida and Taliban personnel. |687|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In mid-2003, CIA officials also engaged in discussions with the Department of Justice, the Department of Defense, and attorneys in the White House on whether representations could be made that the U.S. Government complied with certain requirements arising out of the Convention Against Torture, namely that the treatment of detainees was consistent with constitutional standards in the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. |688| In late June 2003, after numerous inter-agency discussions, William Haynes, the general counsel of the Department of Defense, responded to a letter from Senator Patrick Leahy stating that it was U.S. policy to comply with these standards. |689| According to a memorandum from the CIA's [XXX]CTC Legal, [XXX], the August 1, 2002, OLC opinion provided a legal "safe harbor" for the CIA's use of its enhanced interrogation techniques. |690| The August 1, 2002, opinion did not, however, address the constitutional standards described in the letter from William Haynes.

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In July 2003, after the White House made a number of statements again suggesting that U.S. treatment of detainees was "humane," the CIA asked the national security advisor for policy reaffirmation of the CIA's use of its enhanced interrogation techniques. During the time that request was being considered, CIA Headquarters stopped approving requests from CIA officers to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. |691| Because of this stand-down, CIA interrogators, with CIA Headquarters approval, instead used repeated applications of the CIA's "standard" interrogation techniques. These "standard" techniques were coercive, but not considered to be as coercive as the CIA's "enhanced" interrogation techniques. At this time, sleep deprivation beyond 72 hours was considered an "enhanced" interrogation technique, while sleep deprivation under 72 hours was defined as a "standard" CIA interrogation technique. To avoid using an "enhanced" interrogation technique, CIA officers subjected Khallad bin Attash to 70 hours of standing sleep deprivation, two hours less than the maximum. After allowing him four hours of sleep, bin Attash was subjected to an additional 23 hours of standing sleep deprivation, followed immediately by 20 hours of seated sleep deprivation. |692|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Unlike during most of the CIA's interrogation program, during the time that CIA Headquarters was seeking policy reaffirmation, the CIA responded to infractions in the interrogation program as reported through CIA cables and other communications. Although [XXX], the chief of the interrogations program in RDG, does not appear to have been investigated or reprimanded for training interrogators on the abdominal slap before its use was approved, |693| training significant numbers of new interrogators to conduct interrogations on potentially compliant detainees, |694| or conducting large numbers of water dousing on detainees without requesting or obtaining authorization; |695| the CIA removed his certification to conduct interrogations in late July 2003 for placing a broom handle behind the knees of a detainee while that detainee was in a stress position. |696| CIA Headquarters also decertified two other interrogators, [XXX] [CIA OFFICER 1] and [XXX], in the same period, although there are no official records of why those decertifications occurred. |697|

2. The CIA Provides Inaccurate Information to Select Members of the National Security Council, Represents that "Termination of This Program Will Result in Loss of Life, Possibly Extensive"; Policymakers Reauthorize Program

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On July 29, 2003, DCI Tenet and CIA General Counsel Muller attended a meeting with Vice President Cheney, National Security Advisor Rice, Attorney General Ashcroft, and White House Counsel Gonzales, among others, seeking policy reaffirmation of its coercive interrogation program. The presentation included a list of the CIA's standard and enhanced interrogation techniques. CIA General Counsel Muller also provided a description of the waterboard interrogation technique, including the inaccurate representation that it had been used against KSM 119 times and Abu Zubaydah 42 times. |698| The presentation warned National Security Council principals in attendance that "termination of this program will result in loss of life, possibly extensive." The CIA officers further noted that 50 percent of CIA intelligence reports on al-Qaida were derived from detainee reporting, and that "major threats were countered and attacks averted" because of the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. The CIA provided specific examples of "attacks averted" as a result of using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, including references to the U.S. Consulate in Karachi, the Heathrow Plot, the Second Wave Plot, and Iyman Faris. |699| As described later in this summary, and in greater detail in Volume II, these claims were inaccurate. After the CIA's presentation, Vice President Cheney stated, and National Security Advisor Rice agreed, that the CIA was executing Administration policy in carrying out its interrogation program. |700|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The National Security Council principals at the July 2003 briefing initially concluded it was "not necessary or advisable to have a full Principals Committee meeting to review and reaffirm the Program." |701| A CIA email noted that the official reason for not having a full briefing was to avoid press disclosures, but added that:

"it is clear to us from some of the runup meetings we had with [White House] Counsel that the [White House] is extremely concerned [Secretary of State] Powell would blow his stack if he were to be briefed on what's been going on." |702|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) National Security Advisor Rice, however, subsequently decided that Secretary of State Colin Powell and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld should be briefed on the CIA interrogation program prior to recertification of the covert action. |703| As described, both were then formally briefed on the CIA program for the first time in a 25 minute briefing on September 16, 2003. |704|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On September 4, 2003, CIA records indicate that CIA officials may have provided Chairman Roberts, Vice Chairman Rockefeller, and their staff directors a briefing regarding the Administration's reaffirmation of the program. |705| Neither the CIA nor the Committee has a contemporaneous report on the content of the briefing or any confirmation that the briefing occurred.

K. Additional Oversight and Outside Pressure in 2004: ICRC, Inspector General, Congress, and the U.S. Supreme Court

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In January 2004, the ICRC sent a letter to [XXX] indicating that it was aware that the United States Government was holding unacknowledged detainees in several facilities in Country [XXX] "incommunicado for extensive periods of time, subjected to unacceptable conditions of internment, to ill treatment and torture, while deprived of any possible recourse." |706| According to the CIA, the letter included a "fairly complete list" of CIA detainees to whom the ICRC had not had access. |707| This prompted CIA Headquarters to conclude that it was necessary to reduce the number of detainees in CIA custody. |708| The CIA subsequently transferred at least 25 of its detainees in Country [XXX] to the U.S. military and foreign governments. The CIA also released five detainees. |709|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The CIA provided a factually incorrect description to the Department of Defense concerning one of the 18 CIA detainees transferred to U.S. military custody in March 2004. The transfer letter described CIA detainee Ali Jan as "the most trusted bodyguard of Jaluluddin Haqqani (a top AQ target of the USG)" who was captured in the village of [XXX] on June [XXX], 2002. |710| Although there was an individual named Ali Jan captured in the village of [XXX] on June [XXX], 2002, |711| CIA records indicate that he was not the detainee being held by the CIA in the Country [XXX] facility. The Ali Jan in CIA custody was apprehended circa early August 2003, during the U.S. military operation [XXX] in Zormat Valley, Paktia Province, Afghanistan. |712| CIA records indicate that Ali Jan was transferred to CIA custody after his satellite phone rang while he was in military custody, and the translator indicated the caller was speaking in Arabic. |713| After his transfer to U.S. military custody, Ali Jan was eventually released on July [XXX], 2004. |714|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In response to the ICRC's formal complaint about detainees being kept in Country [XXX] without ICRC access, State Department officials met with senior ICRC officials in Geneva, and indicated that it was U.S. policy to encourage all countries to provide ICRC access to detainees, including Country [XXX]. |715| While the State Department made these official representations to the ICRC, the CIA was repeatedly directing the same country to deny the ICRC access to the CIA detainees. In June 2004, the secretary of state ordered the U.S. ambassador in that country to deliver a demarche, "in essence demanding [the country] provide full access to all [country [XXX]] detainees," which included detainees being held at the CIA's behest. |716| These conflicting messages from the United States Government, as well as increased ICRC pressure on the country for failing to provide access, created significant tension between the United States and the country in question. |717|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Later that year, in advance of a National Security Council Principals Committee meeting on September 14, 2004, officials from the Department of Defense called the CIA to inform the CIA that Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz would not support the CIA's position that notifying the ICRC of all detainees in U.S. Government custody would harm U.S. national security. According to an internal CIA email following the call, the deputy secretary of defense had listened to the CIA's arguments for nondisclosure, but believed that it was time for full notification. The email stated that the Department of Defense supported the U.S. Government's position that there should be full disclosure to the ICRC, unless there were compelling reasons of military necessity or national security. The email added that the Department of Defense did not believe an adequate articulation of military necessity or national security reasons warranting nondisclosure existed, that "DoD is tired of 'taking hits' for CIA 'ghost detainees,'" and that the U.S. government "should not be in the position of causing people to 'disappear.'" |718|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Despite numerous meetings and communications within the executive branch throughout 2004, the United States did not formally respond to the January 6, 2004, ICRC letter until June 13, 2005. |719|

2. CIA Leadership Calls Draft Inspector General Special Review of the Program "Imbalanced and Inaccurate," Responds with Inaccurate Information; CIA Seeks to Limit Further Review of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program by the Inspector General

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The CIA's Office of the Inspector General (OIG) was first informed of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program in November 2002, nine months after Abu Zubaydah became the CIA's first detainee. As described, the information was conveyed by the DDO, who also informed the OIG of the death of Gul Rahman. In January 2003, the DDO further requested that the OIG investigate allegations of unauthorized interrogation techniques against 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri. Separately, the OIG "received information that some employees were concerned that certain covert Agency activities at an overseas detention and interrogation site might involve violations of human rights," according to the OIG's Special Review. |720|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) During the course of the OIG's interviews, numerous CIA officers expressed concerns about the CIA's lack of preparedness for the detention and interrogation of Abu Zubaydah. |721| Other CIA officers expressed concern about the analytical assumptions driving interrogations, |722| as well as the lack of language and cultural background among members of the interrogation teams. |723| Some CIA officers described pressure from CIA Headquarters to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, which they attributed to faulty analyticalassumptions about what detainees should know. |724| As the chief of RDG, [XXX], stated to the OIG in a February 2003 interview:

"CTC does not know a lot about al-Qa'ida and as a result, Headquarters analysts have constructed 'models' of what al-Qa'ida represents to them. [[XXX]] noted that the Agency does not have the linguists or subject matter experts it needs. The questions sent from CTC/Usama bin Laden (UBL) to the interrogators are based on SIGINT [signals intelligence] and other intelligence that often times is incomplete or wrong. When the detainee does not respond to the question, the assumption at Headquarters is that the detainee is holding back and 'knows' more, and consequently, Headquarters recommends resumption of EITs. This difference of opinion between the interrogators and Headquarters as to whether the detainee is 'compliant' is the type of ongoing pressure the interrogation team is exposed to. [[XXX]] believes the waterboard was used 'recklessly' - 'too many times' on Abu Zubaydah at [DETENTION SITE GREEN], based in part on faulty intelligence." |725|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) One senior interrogator, [XXX], informed the OIG that differences between CIA Headquarters and the interrogators at the CIA detention sites were not part of the official record. According to [XXX], "all of the fighting and criticism is done over the phone and is not put into cables," and that CIA "[c]ables reflect things that are 'all rosy."' |726|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) As is described elsewhere, and reflected in the final OIG Special Review, CIA officers discussed numerous other topics with the OIG, including conditions at DETENTION SITE COBALT, specific interrogations, the video taping of interrogations, the administration of the program, and concerns about the lack of an "end game" for CIA detainees, as well as the impact of possible public revelations concerning the existence and operation of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. |727|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In January 2004, the CIA inspector general circulated for comment to various offices within the CIA a draft of the OIG Special Review of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. Among other matters, the OIG Special Review described divergences between the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques as applied and as described to the Department of Justice in 2002, the use of unauthorized techniques, and oversight problems related to DETENTION SITE COBALT. The draft OIG Special Review elicited responses from the CIA's deputy director for operations, the deputy director for science and technology, the Office of General Counsel, and the Office of Medical Services. Several of the responses– particularly those from CIA General Counsel Scott Muller and CIA Deputy Director for Operations James Pavitt–were highly critical of the inspector general's draft Special Review. General Counsel Muller wrote that the OIG Special Review presented "an imbalanced and inaccurate picture of the Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program," and claimed the OIG Special Review, "[o]n occasion," "quoted or summarized selectively and misleadingly" from CIA documents. |728| Deputy Director for Operations James Pavitt wrote that the OIG Special Review should have come to the "conclusion that our efforts have thwarted attacks and saved lives," and that "EITs (including the water board) have been indispensable to our successes." Pavitt attached to his response a document describing information the CIA obtained "as a result of the lawful use of EITs" that stated, "[t]he evidence points clearly to the fact that without the use of such techniques, we and our allies would [have] suffered major terrorist attacks involving hundreds, if not thousands, of casualties." |729| A review of CIA records found that the representations in the Pavitt materials were almost entirely inaccurate. |730|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In addition to conveying inaccurate information on the operation, management, and effectiveness of the CIA program, CIA leadership continued to impede the OIG in its efforts to oversee the program. In July 2005, Director Goss sent a memorandum to the inspector general to "express several concerns regarding the in-depth, multi-faceted review" of the CIA's CTC. The CIA director wrote that he was "increasingly concerned about the cumulative impact of the OIG's work on CTC's performance," adding that "I believe it makes sense to complete existing reviews... before opening new ones." Director Goss added, "[t]o my knowledge, Congress is satisfied that you are meeting its requirements" with regard to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. |731| At the time, however, the vice chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence was seeking a Committee investigation of the CIA program, in part because of the aspects of the program that were not being investigated by the Office of Inspector General. |732| In April 2007, CIA Director Michael Hayden had his "Senior Councilor"–an individual within the CIA who was accountable only to the CIA director– conduct a review of the inspector general's practices. Defending the decision to review the OIG, the CIA told the Committee that there were "morale issues that the [CIA] director needs to be mindful of," and that the review had uncovered instances of "bias" among OIG personnel against the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. |733| In 2008, the CIA director announced the results of his review of the OIG to the CIA work force and stated that the inspector general had "chosen to take a number of steps to heighten the efficiency, assure the quality, and increase the transparency of the investigative process." |734|

3. The CIA Does Not Satisfy Inspector General Special Review Recommendation to Assess the Effectiveness of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The final May 2004 OIG Special Review included a recommendation that the CIA's DDO conduct a study of the effectiveness of the CIA's interrogation techniques within 90 days. Prompted by the recommendation, the CIA tasked two senior CIA officers to lead "an informal operational assessment of the CIA detainee program." The reviewers were tasked with responding to 12 specific terms of reference, including an assessment of "the effectiveness of each interrogation technique and environmental deprivation" to determine if any techniques or deprivation should be "added, modified, or discontinued." |735| According to a CIA memorandum from the reviewers, their review was based on briefings by CTC personnel, "a discussion with three senior CTC managers who played key roles in running the CIA detainee program," and a review of nine documents, including the OIG Special Review and an article by the CIA contractors who developed the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, Hammond DUNBAR and Grayson SWIGERT. |736| As described in this summary, and in more detail in Volume II, these documents contained numerous inaccurate representations regarding the operation and effectiveness of the CIA program. There are no records to indicate the two senior CIA officers reviewed the underlying interrogation cables and intelligence records related to the representations. Their resulting assessment repeated information found in the documents provided to them and reported that the "CIA Detainee Program is a success, providing unique and valuable intelligence at the tactical level for the benefit of policymakers, war fighters, and the CIA's covert action operators." The assessment also reported that regulations and procedures for handling detainees were "adequate and clear," and that the program had responded swiftly, fairly, and completely to deviations from the structured program. |737| Nonetheless, the assessment came to the conclusion that detention and interrogations activities should not be conducted by the CIA, but by "experienced U.S. law enforcement officers," stating:

"The Directorate of Operations (DO) should not be in the business of running prisons or 'temporary detention facilities.' The DO should focus on its core mission: clandestine intelligence operations. Accordingly, the DO should continue to hunt, capture, and render targets, and then exploit them for intelligence and ops leads once in custody. The management of their incarceration and interrogation should be conducted by appropriately experienced U.S. law enforcement officers, because that is their charter and they have the training and experience." |738|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The assessment noted that the CIA program required significant resources at a time when the CIA was already stretched thin. Finally, the authors wrote that they "strongly believe" that the president and congressional oversight members should receive a comprehensive update on the program, "[g]iven the intense interest and controversy surrounding the detainee issue." |739|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On January 26, 2005, DCI Goss forwarded the senior officer review to Inspector General John Helgerson. |740| The DCI asked whether the review would satisfy the inspector general recommendation for an independent review of the program. |741| On January 28, 2005, the inspector general responded that the senior officer review would not satisfy the recommendation for an independent review. |742| The inspector general also responded to a concern raised by [XXX]OMS that studying the results of CIA interrogations would amount to human experimentation, stating:

"I fear there was a misunderstanding. OIG did not have in mind doing additional, guinea pig research on human beings. What we are recommending is that the Agency undertake a careful review of its experience to date in using the various techniques and that it draw conclusions about their safety, effectiveness, etc., that can guide CIA officers as we move ahead. We make this recommendation because we have found that the Agency over the decades has continued to get itself in messes related to interrogation programs for one overriding reason: we do not document and learn from our experience - each generation of officers is left to improvise anew, with problematic results for our officers as individuals and for our Agency. We are not unaware that there are subtleties to this matter, as the effectiveness of techniques varies among individuals, over time, as administered, in combination with one another, and so on. All the more reason to document these important findings." |743|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In November and December 2004, the CIA responded to National Security Advisor Rice's questions about the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques by asserting that an effectiveness review was not possible, while highlighting examples of "[k]ey intelligence" the CIA represented was obtained after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. The December 2004 memorandum prepared for the national security advisor entitled, "Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques," begins:

"Action Requested: None. This memorandum responds to your request for an independent study of the foreign intelligence efficacy of using enhanced interrogation techniques. There is no way to conduct such a study. What we can do, however, if [sic] set forth below the intelligence the Agency obtained from detainees who, before their interrogations, were not providing any information of intelligence [value]." |744|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Under a section of the memorandum entitled, "Results," the CIA memo asserts that the "CIA's use of DOJ-approved enhanced interrogation techniques, as part of a comprehensive interrogation approach, has enabled CIA to disrupt terrorist plots [and] capture additional terrorists." The memorandum then lists examples of "[k]ey intelligence collected from HVD interrogations after applying interrogation techniques," which led to "disrupte[ed] terrorist plots" and the "capture [of] additional terrorists." The examples include: the "Karachi Plot," the "Heathrow Plot," "the 'Second Wave'" plotting, the identification of the "the Guraba Cell," the identification of "Issa al-Hindi," the arrest of Abu Talha al-Pakistani, "Hambali's Capture," information on Jaffar al-Tayyar, the "Dirty Bomb" plot, the arrest of Sajid Badat, and information on Shkai, Pakistan. CIA records do not indicate when, or if, this memorandum was provided to the national security advisor. |745|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) A subsequent CIA memorandum, dated March 5, 2005, concerning an upcoming meeting between the CIA director and the national security advisor on the CIA's progress in completing the OIG recommended review of the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques states, "we [CIA] believe this study is much needed and should be headed up by highly respected national-level political figures with widely recognized reputations for independence and fairness." |746|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On March 21, 2005, the director of the CTC formally proposed the "establishment of an independent 'blue ribbon' commission... with a charter to study our EITs." |747| The CIA then began the process of establishing a panel that included [XXX] and [XXX]. Both panelists received briefings and papers from CIA personnel who participated in the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. [XXX] [the first panelist] wrote: "It is clear from our discussions with both DO and DI officers that the program is deemed by them to be a great success, and I would concur. The EITs, as part of the overall program, are credited with enabling the US to disrupt terrorist plots, capture additional terrorists, and collect a high volume of useful intelligence on al-Qa'ida (AQ).... There are accounts of numerous plots against the US and the West that were revealed as a result of HVD interrogations." He also observed, however, that "[n]either my background nor field of expertise particularly lend themselves to judgingtheeffectiveness of interrogation techniques, taken individually or collectively." |748| [XXX] [the second panelist] concluded that "there is no objective way to answer the question of efficacy," but stated it was possible to "make some general observations" about the program based on CIA personnel assessments of "the quality of the intelligence provided" by CIA detainees. Regarding the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, he wrote: "here enters the epistemological problem. We can never know whether or not this intelligence could have been extracted though alternative procedures. Spokesmen from within the organization firmly believe it could not have been." |749|

4. The CIA Wrongfully Detains Khalid Al-Masri; CIA Director Rejects Accountability for Officer Involved

(TS//[XXX]//NF) After the dissemination of the draft CIA Inspector General Special Review in early 2004, approvals from CIA Headquarters to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques adhered more closely to the language of the DCI guidelines. Nonetheless, CIA records indicate that officers at CIA Headquarters continued to fail to properly monitor justifications for the capture and detention of detainees, as well as the justification for the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on particular detainees. |750|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) For example, on January [XXX], 2004, the CIA rendered German citizen Khalid al-Masri to a Country [XXX] facility used by the CIA for detention purposes. The rendition was based on the determination by officers in the CIA's ALEC Station that "al-Masri knows key information that could assist in the capture of other al-Qa'ida operatives that pose a serious threat of violence or death to U.S. persons and interests and who may be planning terrorist activities." |751| The cable did not state that Khalid al-Masri himself posed a serious threat of violence or death, the standard required for detention under the September 17, 2001, Memorandum of Notification (MON).

(TS//[XXX]//NF) CIA debriefing cables from Country [XXX] on January 27, 2004, and January 28, 2004, note that Khalid al-Masri "seemed bewildered on why he has been sent to this particular prison," |752| and was "adamant that [CIA] has the wrong person." |753| Despite doubts from CIA officers in Country [XXX] about Khalid al-Masri's links to terrorists, and RDG's concurrence with those doubts, different components within the CIA disagreed on the process for his release. |754| As later described by the CIA inspector general, officers in ALEC Station continued to think that releasing Khalid al-Masri would pose a threat to U.S. interests and that monitoring should be required, while those in the CIA's [XXX] Division did not want to notify the German government about the rendition of a German citizen. |755| Because of the significance of the dispute, the National Security Council settled the matter, concluding that al-Masri should be repatriated and that the Germans should be told about al-Masri's rendition. |756|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On May [XXX], 2004, Khalid al-Masri was transferred from Country [XXX] to [XXX]. |757| After al-Masri arrived in [XXX], CIA officers released him and sent him toward a fake border crossing, where the officers told him he would be sent back to Germany because he had entered [XXX] illegally. |758| At the time of his release, al-Masri was provided 14,500 Euros, |759| as well as his belongings. |760|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On July 16, 2007, the CIA inspector general issued a Report of Investigation on the rendition and detention of Khalid al-Masri, concluding that "[a]vailable intelligence information did not provide a sufficient basis to render and detain Khalid al-Masri," and that the "Agency's prolonged detention of al-Masri was unjustified." |761| On October 9, 2007, the CIA informed the Committee that it "lacked sufficient basis to render and detain al-Masri," and that the judgment by operations officers that al-Masri was associated with terrorists who posed a threat to U.S. interests "was not supported by available intelligence." The CIA director nonetheless decided that no further action was warranted against [XXX], then the deputy chief of ALEC Station, who advocated for al-Masri's rendition, because "[t]he Director strongly believes that mistakes should be expected in a business filled with uncertainty and that, when they result from performance that meets reasonable standards, CIA leadership must stand behind the officers who make them." The notification also stated that "with regard to counterterrorism operations in general and the al-Masri matter in particular, the Director believes the scale tips decisively in favor of accepting mistakes that over connect the dots against those that under connect them." |762|

5. Hassan Ghul Provides Substantial Information–Including Information on a Key UBL Facilitator–Prior to the CIA's Use of Enhanced Interrogation Techniques

(TS//[XXX]//NF) [XXX] foreign authorities captured Hassan Ghul in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region on January [XXX], 2004. |763| After his identity was confirmed on January [XXX], 2004, |764| Ghul was rendered from U.S. military custody to CIA custody at DETENTION SITE COBALT on January [XXX], 2004. |765| The detention site interrogators, who, according to CIA records, did not use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Ghul, sent at least 21 intelligence reports to CIA Headquarters based on their debriefings of Hassan Ghul from the two days he spent at the facility. |766|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) As detailed in this summary, and in greater detail in Volume II, CIA records indicate that the most accurate CIA detainee reporting on the facilitator who led to Usama bin Laden (UBL) was acquired from Hassan Ghul–prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. |767| Ghul speculated that "UBL was likely living in [the] Peshawar area," and that "it was well known that he was always with Abu Ahmed [al-Kuwaiti]." |768| Ghul described Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti as UBL's "closest assistant," |769| who couriered messages to al-Qa'ida's chief of operations, and listed al-Kuwaiti as one of three individuals likely with UBL. |770| Ghul further speculated that:

"UBL's security apparatus would be minimal, and that the group likely lived in a house with a family somewhere in Pakistan.... Ghul speculated that Abu Ahmed likely handled all of UBL's needs, including moving messages out to Abu Faraj [al-Libi]...." |771|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) During this same period, prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, Ghul provided information related to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Abu Faraj al-Libi (including his role in delivering messages from UBL), Jaffar al-Tayyar, 'Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi, Hamza Rabi'a, Shaik Sa'id al-Masri, Sharif al-Masri, Abu 'Abd al-Rahman al-Najdi, Abu Talha al-Pakistani, and numerous other al-Qa'ida operatives. He also provided information on the locations, movements, operational security, and training of al-Qa'ida leaders living in Shkai, Pakistan, as well as on the visits of other leaders and operatives to Shkai. |772| Ghul's reporting on Shkai, which was included in at least 16 of the 21 intelligence reports, |773| confirmed earlier reporting that the Shkai valley served as al-Qa'ida's command and control center after the group's 2001 exodus from Afghanistan. |774| Notwithstanding these facts, in March 2005, the CIA represented to the Department of Justice that Hassan Ghul's reporting on Shkai was acquired "after" the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. |775|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) After two days of questioning at DETENTION SITE COBALT and the dissemination of 21 intelligence reports, Ghul was transferred to DETENTION SITE BLACK. |776| According to CIA records, upon arrival, Ghul was "shaved and barbered, stripped, and placed in the standing position against the wall" with "his hands above his head" with plans to lower his hands after two hours. |777| The CIA interrogators at the detention site then requested to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Ghul, writing:

"[the] interrogation team believes, based on [Hassan Ghul's] reaction to the initial contact, that his al-Qa'ida briefings and his earlier experiences with U.S. military interrogators have convinced him there are limits to the physical contact interrogators can have with him. The interrogation team believes the approval and employment of enhanced measures should sufficiently shift [Hassan Ghul's] paradigm of what he expects to happen. The lack of these increasd [sic] measures may limit the team's capability to collect critical and reliable information in a timely manner." |778|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) CIA Headquarters approved the request the same day. |779| Following 59 hours of sleep deprivation, |780| Hassan Ghul experienced hallucinations, but was told by a psychologist that his reactions were "consistent with what many others experience in his condition," and that he should calm himself by telling himself his experiences are normal and will subside when he decides to be truthful. |781| The sleep deprivation, as well as other enhanced interrogations, continued, |782| as did Ghul's hallucinations. |783| Ghul also complained of back pain and asked to see a doctor, |784| but interrogators responded that the "pain was normal, and would stop when [Ghul] was confirmed as telling the truth." A cable states that "[i]nterrogators told [Ghul] they did not care if he was in pain, but cared only if he provided complete and truthful information." |785| A CIA physician assistant later observed that Hassan Ghul was experiencing "notable physiological fatigue," including "abdominal and back muscle pain/spasm, 'heaviness' and mild paralysis of arms, legs and feet [that] are secondary to his hanging position and extreme degree of sleep deprivation," but that Ghul was clinically stable and had "essentially normal vital signs," despite an "occasional premature heart beat" that the cable linked to Ghul's fatigue. |786| Throughout this period, Ghul provided no actionable threat information, and as detailed later in this summary, much of his reporting on the al-Qa'ida presence in Shkai was repetitive of his reporting prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. Ghul also provided no other information of substance on UBL facilitator Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti. |787| Nonetheless, on May 5, 2011, the CIA provided a document to the Committee entitled, "Detainee Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti," which lists Hassan Ghul as a CIA detainee who was subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques and who provided "Tier One" information "link[ing] Abu Ahmad to Bin Ladin." |788| Hassan Ghul was [XXX], and later released. |789| [XXX]. |790|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In March 2004, the CIA took custody of an Afghan national who had sought employment at a U.S. military base because he had the same name (Gul Rahman) as an individual believed to be targeting U.S. military forces in Afghanistan. |791| During the period in which the Afghan was detained, the CIA obtained signals intelligence of their true target communicating with his associates. DNA results later showed conclusively that the Afghan in custody was not the target. Nonetheless, the CIA held the detainee in solitary confinement for approximately a month before he was released with a nominal payment. |792|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In the spring of 2004, after two detainees were transferred to CIA custody, CIA interrogators proposed, and CIA Headquarters approved, using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on one of the two detainees because it might cause the detainee to provide information that could identify inconsistencies in the other detainee's story. |793| After both detainees had spent approximately 24 hours shackled in the standing sleep deprivation position, CIA Headquarters confirmed that the detainees were former CIA sources. |794| The two detainees had tried to contact the CIA on multiple occasions prior to their detention to inform the CIA of their activities and provide intelligence. The messages they had sent to the CIA [XXX] were not translated until after the detainees were subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. |795|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) During this same period in early 2004, CIA interrogators interrogated Adnan al-Libi, a member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group. CIA Headquarters did not approve the use of the CIA's enhanced techniques against al-Libi, but indicated that interrogators could use "standard" interrogation techniques, which included up to 48 hours of sleep deprivation. |796| CIA interrogators subsequently reported subjecting Adnan al-Libi to sleep deprivation sessions of 46.5 hours, 24 hours, and 48 hours, with a combined three hours of sleep between sessions. |797|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Beginning in late April 2004, a number of media outlets published photographs of detainee abuse at the Department of Defense-run Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. The media reports caused members of the Committee and individuals in the executive branch to focus on detainee issues. On May 12, 2004, the Committee held a lengthy hearing on detainee issues with Department of Defense and CIA witnesses. The CIA used the Abu Ghraib abuses as a contrasting reference point for its detention and interrogation activities. In a response to a question from a Committee member, CIA Deputy Director McLaughlin said, "we are not authorized in [the CIA program] to do anything like what you have seen in those photographs." |798| In response, a member of the Committee said, "I understand," and expressed the understanding, consistent with past CIA briefings to the Committee, that the "norm" of CIA's interrogations was "transparent law enforcement procedures [that] had developed to such a high level... that you could get pretty much what you wanted." The CIA did not correct the Committee member's misunderstanding that CIA interrogation techniques were similar to techniques used by U.S. law enforcement. |799|

7. The CIA Suspends the Use of its Enhanced Interrogation Techniques, Resumes Use of the Techniques on an Individual Basis; Interrogations are Based on Fabricated, Single Source Information

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In May 2004, the OLC, then led by Assistant Attorney General Jack Goldsmith, informed the CIA's Office of General Counsel that it had never formally opined on whether the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques in the CIA's program was consistent with U.S. constitutional standards. |800| Goldsmith also raised concerns about divergences between the CIA's proposed enhanced interrogation techniques, as described in the August 1, 2002, memorandum, and their actual application, as described in the CIA Inspector General's Special Review. |801| In late May 2004, DCI Tenet suspended the use of the CIA's "enhanced" and "standard" interrogation techniques, pending updated approvals from the OLC. |802| On June 4, 2004, DCI Tenet issued a formal memorandum suspending the use of the CIA's interrogation techniques, pending policy and legal review. |803| The same day, the CIA sought reaffirmation of the program from the National Security Council. |804| National Security Advisor Rice responded, noting that the "next logical step is for the Attorney General to complete the relevant legal analysis now in preparation." |805|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On June [XXX], 2004, a foreign government captured Janat Gul, an individual believed, based on reporting from a CIA source, to have information about al-Qa'ida plans to attack the United States prior to the 2004 presidential election. |806| In October 2004, the CIA source who provided the information on the "pre-election" threat and implicated Gul and others admitted to fabricating the information. However, as early as March 2004, CIA officials internally expressed doubts about the validity of the CIA source's information. |807|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On July 2, 2004, the CIA met with National Security Advisor Rice, other National Security Council officials, White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, as well as the attorney general and the deputy attorney general, to seek authorization to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, specifically on Janat Gul. |808| The CIA represented that CIA "interrogations have saved American lives," that more than half of the CIA detainees would not cooperate until they were interrogated using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, |809| and that "unless CIA interrogators can use a full range of enhanced interrogation methods, it is unlikely that CIA will be able to obtain current threat information from Gul in a timely manner." |810| Janat Gul was not yet in CIA custody. |811|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On July 6, 2004, National Security Advisor Rice sent a memorandum to DCI Tenet stating that the CIA was "permitted to use previously approved enhanced interrogation methods for Janat Gul, with the exception of the waterboard." Rice offered "to assist [the CIA] in obtaining additional guidance from the Attorney General and NSC Principals on an expedited basis" and noted the CIA's agreement to provide additional information about the waterboard technique in order for the Department of Justice to assess its legality. Rice's memorandum further documented that the CIA had informed her that "Gul likely has information about preelection terrorist attacks against the United States as a result of Gul's close ties to individuals involved in these alleged plots." |812|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In a meeting on July 20, 2004, National Security Council principals, including the vice president, provided their authorization for the CIA to use its enhanced interrogation techniques–again, with the exception of the waterboard–on Janat Gul. They also directed the Department of Justice to prepare a legal opinion on whether the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were consistent with the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. |813| On July 22, 2004, Attorney General John Ashcroft sent a letter to Acting DCI John McLaughlin stating that nine interrogation techniques (those addressed in the August 1, 2002, memorandum, with the exception of the waterboard) did not violate the U.S. Constitution or any statute or U.S. treaty obligations, in the context of the interrogation of Janat Gul. |814| For the remainder of 2004, the CIA used its enhanced interrogation techniques on three detainees–Janat Gul, Sharif al-Masri, and Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani–with individualized approval from the Department of Justice. |815|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) After being rendered to CIA custody on July [XXX], 2004, Janat Gul was subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, including continuous sleep deprivation, facial holds, attention grasps, facial slaps, stress positions, and walling, |816| until he experienced auditory and visual hallucinations. |817| According to a cable, Janat Gul was "not oriented to time or place" and told CIA officers that he saw "his wife and children in the mirror and had heard their voices in the white noise." |818| The questioning of Janat Gul continued, although the CIA ceased using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques for several days. According to a CIA cable, "[Gul] asked to die, or just be killed." |819| After continued interrogation sessions with Gul, on August 19, 2004, CIA detention site personnel wrote that the interrogation "team does not believe [Gul] is withholding imminent threat information." |820| On August 21, 2004, a cable from CIA Headquarters stated that Janat Gul "is believed" to possess threat information, and that the "use of enhanced techniques is appropriate in order to obtain that information." |821| On that day, August 21, 2004, CIA interrogators resumed using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Gul. |822| Gul continued not to provide any reporting on the pre-election threat described by the CIA source. |823| On August 25, 2004, CIA interrogators sent a cable to CIA Headquarters stating that Janat Gul "may not possess all that [the CIA] believes him to know." |824| The interrogators added that "many issues linking [Gul] to al-Qaida are derived from single source reporting" (the CIA source). |825| Nonetheless, CIA interrogators continued to question Gul on the pre-election threat. According to an August 26, 2004, cable, after a 47-hour session of standing sleep deprivation, Janat Gul was returned to his cell, allowed to remove his diaper, given a towel and a meal, and permitted to sleep. |826| In October 2004, the CIA conducted a [XXX] of the CIA source who had identified Gul as having knowledge of attack planning for the pre-election threat. [XXX], the CIA source admitted to fabricating the information. |827| Gul was subsequently transferred to a foreign government. On [XXX] informed the CIA that Janat Gul had been released. |828|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Janat Gul never provided the threat information the CIA originally told the National Security Council that Gul possessed. Nor did the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Gul produce the "immediate threat information that could save American lives," which had been the basis for the CIA to seek authorization to use the techniques. As described elsewhere in this summary, the CIA's justification for employing its enhanced interrogation techniques on Janat Gul–the first detainee to be subjected to the techniques following the May 2004 suspension–changed over time. After having initially cited Gul's knowledge of the pre-election threat, as reported by the CIA's source, the CIA began representing that its enhanced interrogation techniques were required for Gul to deny the existence of the threat, thereby disproving the credibility of the CIA source. |829|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On August 11, 2004, in the midst of the interrogation of Janat Gul using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, CIA attorney [XXX] wrote a letter to Acting Assistant Attorney General Dan Levin with "brief biographies" of four individuals whom the CIA hoped to detain. Given the requirement at the time that the CIA seek individual approval from the Department of Justice before using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against a detainee, the CIA letter states, "[w]e are providing these preliminary biographies in preparation for a future request for a legal opinion on their subsequent interrogation in CIA control." Two of the individuals–Abu Faraj al-Libi and Hamza Rabi'a– had not yet been captured, and thus the "biographies" made no reference to their interrogations or the need to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. The third individual, Abu Talha al-Pakistani, was in foreign government custody. His debriefings by a foreign government, [XXX], were described in the letter as "only moderately effective" because Abu Talha was "distracting [those questioning him] with noncritical information that is truthful, but is not related to operational planning." The fourth individual, Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, was also in foreign government custody and being debriefed by foreign government officials [XXX]. According to the letter, Ghailani's foreign government debriefings were "ineffective" because Ghailani had "denied knowledge of current threats." The letter described reporting on the pre-election threat–much of which came from the CIA source–in the context of all four individuals. |830| Ahmed Ghailani and Abu Faraj al-Libi were eventually rendered to CIA custody and subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On September [XXX], 2004, after the CIA had initiated a counterintelligence review of the CIA source who had reported on the pre-election threat, but prior to the CIA source's [XXX], the CIA took custody of Sharif al-Masri, whom the CIA source had reported would also have information about the threat. |831| Intelligence provided by Sharif al-Masri while he was in foreign government custody resulted in the dissemination of more than 30 CIA intelligence reports. |832| After entering CIA custody, Sharif al-Masri expressed his intent to cooperate with the CIA, indicating that he was frightened of interrogations because he had been tortured while being interrogated in [XXX]. |833| The CIA nonetheless sought approval to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against al-Masri because of his failure to provide information on the pre-election threat. |834|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) After approximately a week of interrogating al-Masri using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, including sleep deprivation that coincided with auditory hallucinations, CIA interrogators reported that al-Masri had been "motivated to participate" at the time of his arrival. |835| Despite al-Masri's repeated descriptions of torture in [XXX], the CIA transferred al-Masri to that government's custody after approximately three months of CIA detention. |836|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) As in the case of Janat Gul and Sharif al-Masri, the CIA's requests for OLC advice on the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani were based on the fabricated reporting on the pre-election threat from the same CIA source. |837| Like Janat Gul and Sharif al-Masri, Ghailani also experienced auditory hallucinations following sleep deprivation. |838| As described in this summary, after having opined on the legality of using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on these three individual detainees, the OLC did not opine again on the CIA's enhanced interrogation program until May 2005.

8. Country [XXX] Detains Individuals on the CIA's Behalf

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Consideration of a detention facility in Country [XXX] began in [XXX] 2003, when the CIA sought to transfer Ramzi bin al-Shibh from the custody of a foreign government to CIA custody. |839| [XXX], which had not yet informed the country's political leadership of the CIA's request to establish a clandestine detention facility in Country [XXX], surveyed potential sites for the facility, while the CIA set aside $[XXX] million for its construction. |840| In [XXX] 2003, the CIA arranged for a "temporary patch" involving placing two CIA detainees (Ramzi bin al-Shibh and 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri) within an already existing Country [XXX] detention facility, until the CIA's own facility could be built. |841| That spring, as the CIA was offering millions of dollars in subsidies to [XXX] in Countries [XXX], [XXX], and [XXX], |842| CIA Headquarters directed the CIA Station in Country [XXX] to "think big" about how CIA Headquarters could support Country [XXX]'s [XXX]. |843| After the Station initially submitted relatively modest proposals, CIA Headquarters reiterated the directive, adding that the Station should provide a "wish list." |844| In [XXX] 2003, the Station proposed a more expansive $[XXX] million in subsidies. |845| [XXX] subsidy payments, intended in part as compensation for support of the CIA detention program, rose as high as $[XXX] million. |846| By [XXX] 2003, after an extension of five months beyond the originally agreed upon timeframe for concluding CIA detention activities in Country [XXX], both bin al-Shibh and al-Nashiri had been transferred out of Country [XXX] to the CIA detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. |847|

9. U.S. Supreme Court Action in the Case ofRasul v. Bush Forces Transfer of CIA Detainees from Guantanamo Bay to Country [XXX]

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Beginning in September 2003, the CIA held a number of detainees at CIA facilities on the grounds of, but separate from, the U.S. military detention facilities at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. |848| In early January 2004, the CIA and the Department of Justice began discussing the possibility that a pending U.S. Supreme Court case, Rasul v. Bush, might grant habeas corpus rights to the five CIA detainees then being held at a CIA detention facility at Guantanamo Bay. |849| Shortly after these discussions, CIA officers approached the [XXX] in Country [XXX] to determine if it would again be willing to host these CIA detainees, who would remain in CIA custody within an already existing Country [XXX] facility. |850| By January [XXX], 2004, the [XXX] in Country [XXX] had agreed to this arrangement for a limited period of time. |851|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Meanwhile, CIA General Counsel Scott Muller asked the Department of Justice, the National Security Council, and the White House Counsel for advice on whether the five CIA detainees being held at Guantanamo Bay should remain at Guantanamo Bay or be moved pending the Supreme Court's decision. |852| After consultation with the U.S. solicitor general in February 2004, the Department of Justice recommended that the CIA move four detainees out of a CIA detention facility at Guantanamo Bay pending the Supreme Court's resolution of the case. |853| The Department of Justice concluded that a fifth detainee, Ibn Shaykh al-Libi, did not need to be transferred because he had originally been detained under military authority and had been declared to the ICRC. |854| Nonetheless, by April [XXX], 2004, all five CIA detainees were transferred from Guantanamo Bay to other CIA detention facilities. |855|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Shortly after placing CIA detainees within an already existing Country [XXX] facility for a second time, tensions arose between the CIA and [XXX] Country [XXX]. |856| In [XXX] 2004, CIA detainees in a Country [XXX] facility claimed to hear cries of pain from other detainees presumed to be in the [XXX] facility. |857| When the CIA chief of Station approached the [XXX] about the accounts of the CIA detainees, the [XXX] stated with "bitter dismay" that the bilateral relationship was being "tested." |858| There were also counterintelligence concerns relating to CIA detainee Ramzi bin al-Shibh, who had attempted to influence a Country [XXX] officer. |859| These concerns contributed to a request from [XXX] in [XXX] 2004 for the CIA to remove all CIA detainees from Country [XXX]. |860|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In [XXX] 20004, when the chief of Station in Country [XXX] again approached the [XXX] with allegations from CIA detainees about the mistreatment of Country [XXX] detainees [XXX] in the facility, the chief of Station received an angry response that, as he reported to CIA Headquarters, "starkly illustrated the inherent challenges [of] [XXX]." According to the chief of Station, Country [XXX] saw the CIA as "querulous and unappreciative recipients of their [XXX] cooperation." |861| By the end of 2004, relations between the CIA and Country [XXX] deteriorated, particularly with regard to intelligence cooperation. |862| The CIA detainees were transferred out of Country [XXX] in [XXX] 2005. |863|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Beginning in [XXX] 2005, the [XXX] in Country [XXX] insisted, over the CIA's opposition, to brief Country [XXX]'s [XXX] on the effort to establish a more permanent and unilateral CIA detention facility, which was under construction. A proposed phone call to the [XXX] from Vice President Cheney to solidify support for CIA operations in Country [XXX] was complicated by the fact that Vice President Cheney had not been told about the locations of the CIA detention facilities. The CIA wrote that there was a "primary need" to "eliminate any possibility that [[XXX]] could explicitly or implicitly refer to the existence of a black site in [the country]" during the call with the vice president. |864| There are no indications that the call occurred. The [XXX] of Country [XXX] nonetheless approved the unilateral CIA detention facility, which cost $[XXX] million, but was never used by the CIA. |865| By [XXX] 2006, the CIA was working with Country [XXX] to decommission what was described as the "aborted" project. |866|

L. The Pace of CIA Operations Slows; Chief of Base Concerned About "Inexperienced, Marginal, Underperforming" CIA Personnel; Inspector General Describes Lack of Debriefers As "Ongoing Problem"

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In the fall of 2004, CIA officers began considering "end games," or the final disposition of detainees in CIA custody. A draft CIA presentation for National Security Council principals dated August 19, 2004, identified the drawbacks of ongoing indefinite detention by the CIA, including: the need for regular relocation of detainees, the "tiny pool of potential host countries" available "due to high risks," the fact that "prolonged detention without legal process increases likelihood of HVD health, psychological problems [and] curtails intel flow," criticism of the U.S. government if legal process were delayed or denied, and the likelihood that the delay would "complicate, and possibly reduce the prospects of successful prosecutions of these detainees." |867| CIA draft talking points produced a month later state that transfer to Department of Defense or Department of Justice custody was the "preferred endgame for 13 detainees currently in [CIA] control, none of whom we believe should ever leave USG custody." |868|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) By the end of 2004, the overwhelming majority of CIA detainees–113 of the 119 identified in the Committee Study–had already entered CIA custody. Most of the detainees remaining in custody were no longer undergoing active interrogations; rather, they were infrequently questioned and awaiting a final disposition. The CIA took custody of only six new detainees between 2005 and January 2009: four detainees in 2005, one in 2006, and one–the CIA's final detainee, Muhammad Rahim–in 2007. |869|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In 2004, CIA detainees were being held in three countries: at DETENTION SITE BLACK in Country [XXX], at the [XXX] facility [XXX] in Country [XXX], as well as at detention facilities in Country [XXX]. DETENTION SITE VIOLET in Country [XXX] opened in early 2005. |870| On April 15, 2005, the chief of Base at DETENTION SITE BLACK in Country [XXX] sent the management of RDG an email expressing his concerns about the detention site and the program in general. He commented that "we have seen clear indications that various Headquarters elements are experiencing mission fatigue vis-a-vis their interaction with the program," resulting in a "decline in the overall quality and level of experience of deployed personnel," and a decline in "level and quality of requirements." He wrote that because of the length of time most of the CIA detainees had been in detention, "[the] detainees have been all but drained of actionable intelligence," and their remaining value was in providing "information that can be incorporated into strategic, analytical think pieces that deal with motivation, structure and goals." The chief of Base observed that, during the course of the year, the detention site transitioned from an intelligence production facility to a long-term detention facility, which raised "a host of new challenges." These challenges included the need to address the "natural and progressive effects of long-term solitary confinement on detainees" and ongoing behavioral problems. |871|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) With respect to the personnel at DETENTION SITE BLACK, the chief of Base wrote:

"I am concerned at what appears to be a lack of resolve at Headquarters to deploy to the field the brightest and most qualified officers for service at [the detention site]. Over the course of the last year the quality of personnel (debriefers and [security protective officers]) has declined significantly. With regard to debriefers, most are mediocre, a handfull [sic] are exceptional and more than a few are basically incompetent. From what we can determine there is no established methodology as to the selection of debriefers. Rather than look for their best, managers seem to be selecting either problem, underperforming officers, new, totally inexperienced officers or whomever seems to be willing and able to deploy at any given time. We see no evidence that thought is being given to deploying an 'A-Team.' The result, quite naturally, is the production of mediocre or, I dare say, useless intelligence....

We have seen a similar deterioration in the quality of the security personnel deployed to the site.... If this program truly does represent one of the agency's most secret activities then it defies logic why inexperienced, marginal, underperforming and/or officers with potentially significant [counterintelligence] problems are permitted to deploy to this site. It is also important that we immediately inact [sic] some form of rigorous training program." |872|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) A CIA OIG audit completed in June 2006 "found that personnel assigned to CIA-controlled detention facilities, for the most part, complied with the standards and guidelines in carrying out their duties and responsibilities." The OIG also found that, "except for the shortage of debriefers, the facilities were staffed with sufficient numbers and types of personnel." The lack of debriefers, however, was described as "an ongoing problem" for the program. According to the audit, there were extended periods in 2005 when the CIA's DETENTION SITE ORANGE in Country [XXX] had either one or no debriefers. At least twice in the summer of 2005, the chief of Station in that country requested additional debriefers, warning that intelligence collection could suffer. Months later, in January 2006, the chief of Base at the detention site advised CIA Headquarters that "the facility still lacked debriefers to support intelligence collection requirements, that critical requirements were 'stacking up,' and that gaps in the debriefing of detainees were impacting the quantity and quality of intelligence reporting and would make the work of future debriefers more difficult." |873|

M. Legal and Operational Challenges in 2005

1. Department of Justice Renews Approval for the Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques in May 2005

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On May 10, 2005, the new acting assistant attorney general for OLC, Steven Bradbury, issued two legal memoranda. The first analyzed whether the individual use of the CIA's 13 enhanced interrogation techniques–including waterboarding, as well as a number of interrogation techniques that had been used in 2003 and 2004, but had not been analyzed in the original August 1, 2002, OLC memorandum–were consistent with the criminal prohibition on torture. |874| The second memorandum considered the combined use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. |875| Both legal memoranda concluded that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques did not violate the torture statute.

(TS//[XXX]//NF) May 26, 2005, the CIA inspector general, who had been provided with the two OLC memoranda, wrote a memo to the CIA director recommending that the CIA seek additional legal guidance on whether the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques and conditions of confinement met the standard under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture. |876| The inspector general noted that "a strong case can be made that the Agency's authorized interrogation techniques are the kinds of actions that Article 16 undertakes to prevent," adding that the use of the waterboard may be "cruel" and "extended detention with no clothing would be considered 'degrading' in most cultures, particularly Muslim." The inspector general further urged that the analysis of conditions was equally important, noting that the inspector general's staff had "found a number of instances of detainee treatment which arguably violate the prohibition on cruel, inhuman, and/or degrading treatment." |877|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On May 30, 2005, a third OLC memorandum examining U.S. obligations under the Convention Against Torture was completed. |878| The conclusions in this opinion were based largely on the CIA's representations about the effectiveness of the CIA interrogation program in obtaining unique and "otherwise unavailable actionable intelligence." As described later in this summary, and in more detail in Volume II, the CIA's effectiveness representations were almost entirely inaccurate.

2. Abu Faraj Al-Libi Subjected to the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Prior to Department of Justice Memorandum on U.S. Obligations Under the Convention Against Torture; CIA Subjects Abu Faraj Al-Libi to the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques When He Complains of Hearing Problems

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On May 2, 2005, when Abu Faraj al-Libi, al-Qa'ida's chief of operations, was captured in Pakistan, the OLC had not yet issued the three aforementioned May 2005 legal memoranda. |879| CIA officers described Abu Faraj al-Libi's capture as the "most important al-Qa'ida capture since Khalid Shaykh Muhammad." |880| Shortly after al-Libi's capture, the CIA began discussing the possibility that Abu Faraj al-Libi might be rendered to U.S. custody. |881|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On May [XXX], 2005, four days before the rendition of Abu Faraj al-Libi to CIA custody, Director of CTC Robert Grenier asked CIA Director Porter Goss to send a memorandum to the national security advisor and the director of national intelligence "informing them of the CIA's plans to take custody of Abu Faraj al-Libi and to employ interrogation techniques if warranted and medically safe." |882| On May 24, 2005, the White House informed the CIA that a National Security Council Principals Committee meeting would be necessary to discuss the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Abu Faraj al-Libi, but the travel schedule of one of the principals was delaying such a meeting. |883| CIA Director Goss instructed CIA officers to proceed as planned, indicating that he would call the principals individually and inform them that, if Abu Faraj al-Libi was found not to be cooperating and there were no contraindications to such an interrogation, he would approve the use of all of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques other than the waterboard, without waiting for a meeting of the principals. |884| Abu Faraj al-Libi was rendered to CIA custody at DETENTION SITE ORANGE on May [XXX], 2005, |885| and transferred to DETENTION SITE BLACK on May [XXX], 2005. |886|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On May [XXX], 2005, CIA Director Goss formally notified National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley and Director of National Intelligence (DNI) John Negroponte that Abu Faraj al-Libi would be rendered to the unilateral custody of the CIA. |887| Director Goss's memorandum stated:

"[s]hould Abu Faraj resist cooperating in CIA debriefings, and pending a finding of no medical or psychological contraindictations [sic], to interrogation, I will authorize CIA trained and certified interrogators to employ one or more of the thirteen specific interrogation techniques for which CIA recently received two signed legal opinions from the Department of Justice (DOJ), Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) that these techniques, both individually and used collectively, are lawful." |888|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The memorandum from Director Goss described Abu Faraj al-Libi as holding the third most important position in al-Qa'ida, and "play[ing] a leading role in directing al-Qa'ida's global operations, including attack planning against the US homeland." Abu Faraj al-Libi was also described as possibly overseeing al-Qa'ida's "highly compartmented anthrax efforts." |889|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On May [XXX], 2005, one day after al-Libi's arrival at DETENTION SITE BLACK, CIA interrogators received CIA Headquarters approval for the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Abu Faraj al-Libi. |890| CIA interrogators began using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Abu Faraj al-Libi on May 28, 2005, two days before the OLC issued its memorandum analyzing whether the techniques violated U.S. obligations under the Convention Against Torture. |891|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The CIA interrogated Abu Faraj al-Libi for more than a month using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. On a number of occasions, CIA interrogators applied the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques to Abu Faraj al-Libi when he complained of a loss of hearing, repeatedly telling him to stop pretending he could not hear well. |892| Although the interrogators indicated that they believed al-Libi's complaint was an interrogation resistance technique, Abu Faraj al-Libi was fitted for a hearing aid after his transfer to U.S. military custody at Guantanamo Bay in 2006. |893| Despite the repeated and extensive use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Abu Faraj al-Libi, CIA Headquarters continued to insist throughout the summer and fall of 2005 that Abu Faraj al-Libi was withholding information and pressed for the renewed use of the techniques. The use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Abu Faraj al-Libi was eventually discontinued because CIA officers stated that they had no intelligence to demonstrate that Abu Faraj al-Libi continued to withhold information, and because CIA medical officers expressed concern that additional use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques "may come with unacceptable medical or psychological risks." |894| After the discontinuation of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, the CIA asked Abu Faraj al-Libi about UBL facilitator Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti for the first time. |895| Abu Faraj al-Libi denied knowledge of al-Kuwaiti. |896|

3. CIA Acquires Two Detainees from the U.S. Military

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Another legal issue in late 2005 was related to the U.S. Department of Defense's involvement in CIA detention activities. In September 2005, the CIA and the Department of Defense signed a Memorandum of Understanding on this subject, |897| and the U.S. military agreed to transfer two detainees, Ibrahim Jan and Abu Ja'far al-Iraqi, to CIA custody. Both were held by the U.S. military without being registered with the ICRC for over 30 days, pending their transfer to CIA custody. |898| The transfer of Abu Ja'far al-Iraqi took place notwithstanding Department of State concerns that the transfer would be inconsistent with statements made by the secretary of state that U.S. forces in Iraq would remain committed to the law of armed conflict, including the Geneva Conventions. |899|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In late 2005, during the period the U.S. Senate was debating the Detainee Treatment Act barring "cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment," |900| the CIA subjected Abu Ja'far al-Iraqi to its enhanced interrogation techniques. |901| A draft Presidential Daily Brief (PDB) stated that Abu Ja'far al-Iraqi provided "almost no information that could be used to locate former colleagues or disrupt attack plots"–the type of information sought by the CIA, and the CIA's justification for the use of its enhanced interrogation techniques. |902| Later, the statement that Abu Ja'far al-Iraqi provided "almost no information that could be used to locate former colleagues or disrupt attack plots" was deleted from the draft PDB. |903| Abu Ja'far al-Iraqi remained in CIA custody until early September 2006, when he was transferred to U.S. military custody in Iraq. |904|

4. The CIA Seeks "End Game" for Detainees in Early 2005 Due to Limited Support From Liaison Partners

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In early 2005, the CIA again sought an "endgame" policy for its detainees, citing its unstable relations with host governments and its difficulty in identifying additional countries to host CIA detention facilities. |905| Talking points prepared for the CIA director for a meeting with the national security advisor made the following appeal:

"CIA urgently needs [the President of the United States] and Principals Committee direction to establish a long-term disposition policy for the 12 High-Value detainees (HVD)s we hold in overseas detention sites. Our liaison partners who host these sites are deeply concerned by [REDACTED] |906| press leaks, and they are increasingly skeptical of the [U.S. government's] commitment to keep secret their cooperation.... A combination of press leaks, international scrutiny of alleged [U.S. government] detainee abuse, and the perception that [U.S. government] policy on detainees lacks direction is eroding our partners' trust in U.S. resolve to protect their identities and supporting roles. If a [U.S. government] plan for long-term [detainee] disposition does not emerge soon, the handful of liaison partners who cooperate may ask us to close down our facilities on their territory. Few countries are willing to accept the huge risks associated with hosting a CIA detention site, so shrinkage of the already small pool of willing candidates could force us to curtail our highly successful interrogation and detention program. Fear of public exposure may also prompt previously cooperative liaison partners not to accept custody of detainees we have captured and interrogated. Establishment of a clear, publicly announced [detainee] 'endgame' - one sanctioned by [the President of the United States] and supported by Congress - will reduce our partners' concerns and rekindle their enthusiasm for helping the US in the War on Terrorism." |907|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In March 2005, talking points prepared for the CIA director for a discussion with the National Security Council Principals Committee stated that it was:

"only a matter of time before our remaining handful of current blacksite hosts concludes that [U.S. government] policy on [detainees] lacks direction and... [the blacksite hosts] ask us to depart from their soil.... Continuation of status quo will exacerbate tensions in these very valuable relationships and cause them to withdraw their critical support and cooperation with the [U.S. government]." |908|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) During this period, the U.S. solicitor general, however, expressed concern that if CIA detainees were transferred back to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, they might be entitled to file a habeas petition and have access to an attorney. |909| Meanwhile, the National Security Council continued to discuss a public roll-out, and as described later in this summary, the CIA engaged the media directly in order to defend and promote the program. |910|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The question of what to do with the remaining detainees in CIA custody remained unresolved throughout 2005, during which time the CIA pursued agreements with additional countries to establish clandestine CIA detention facilities. |911| The Detainee Treatment Act was passed by Congress on December 23, 2005, as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006. That day, the CIA suspended its interrogation program again. |912| As described later in this summary, in February 2006, the CIA informed the National Security Council principals that the CIA would not seek continued use of all of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. |913|

5. Press Stories and the CIA's Inability to Provide Emergency Medical Care to Detainees Result in the Closing of CIA Detention Facilities in Countries [XXX] and [XXX]

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In October 2005, the CIA learned that Washington Post reporter Dana Priest had information about the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, [XXX]. The CIA then conducted a series of negotiations with the Washington Post in which it sought to prevent the newspaper from publishing information on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. |914| Fearful that [XXX], the CIA recommended the immediate transfer of CIA detainees to Department of Defense custody. |915| When the Department of Defense rejected the proposal, the National Security Council directed the CIA to prepare other options. |916| Meanwhile, two U.S. ambassadors, one in [XXX] and another in [XXX], inquired whether Secretary of State Rice had been briefed on the impending Washington Post article and sought to speak to the secretary herself to ensure that the CIA program was authorized. According to CIA documents, Secretary Rice was not aware of the specific countries where the CIA detention facilities were located. |917| In lieu of a phone call from Secretary Rice, the CIA recommended that the State Department's Counterterrorism Coordinator and former CTC DDO, Henry Crumpton, call the ambassadors. |918| The Washington Post published an article about CIA detention sites on November 2, 2005. |919|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The publication of the Washington Post article resulted in a demarche to the United States from [XXX], which also suggested that [XXX] contribution [XXX] could be in jeopardy. |920| The United States also received a demarche from [XXX]. |921| According to a CIA cable, U.S. representatives to [XXX] feared that "if another shoe were to drop," there would be considerable ramifications for U.S. relations with [XXX] on a number of issues that depended on U.S. credibility in the area of human rights. The representatives also "questioned whether the gravity of this potential problem is fully appreciated in Washington." |922|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The CIA catalogued how the Washington Post story created tensions in its bilateral counterterrorism relations with [XXX] allies and determined that:

"[t]he article is prompting our partners to reassess the benefits and costs of cooperating with the [U.S. government] and CIA. These services have conducted aggressive, high-impact operations with CIA against... targets, including [XXX]. We no longer expect the services to be as aggressive or cooperative." |923|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In April 2006, [XXX] informed CIA officers that press stories on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program led the [XXX] government to prohibit [XXX] from providing "information that could lead to the rendition or detention of al-Qa'ida or other terrorists to U.S. Government custody for interrogation, including CIA and the Department of Defense." |924|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Media leaks also created tensions with countries that had hosted or continued to host CIA detention facilities. For example, leaks prompted Country [XXX] officials to convey their intent to communicate directly with the Departments of Justice and State. They then formally demarched the U.S. government. |925| As late as [XXX] 2009, the [XXX] of Country [XXX] raised with CIA Director Panetta the "problem of the secret detention facility" that had "tested and strained" the bilateral partnership. The [XXX] of Country [XXX] also stated that assurances were needed that future cooperation with the CIA would be safeguarded. |926|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) After publication of the Washington Post article, [XXX] Country [XXX] demanded the closure of DETENTION SITE BLACK within [XXX] hours. |927| The CIA transferred the [XXX] remaining CIA detainees out of the facility shortly thereafter. |928|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) [XXX], |929| [XXX]. In [XXX] Country [XXX] [XXX] officers refused to admit CIA detainee Mustafa Ahmad al-Hawsawi to a local hospital despite earlier discussions with country representatives about how a detainee's medical emergency would be handled. |930| While the CIA understood the [XXX] officers' reluctance to place a CIA detainee in a local hospital given media reports, CIA Headquarters also questioned the "willingness of [XXX] to participate as originally agreed/planned with regard to provision of emergency medical care." |931| After failing to gain assistance from the Department of Defense, |932| the CIA was forced to seek assistance from three third-party countries in providing medical care to al-Hawsawi and four other CIA detainees with acute ailments. Ultimately, the CIA paid the [XXX] more than $[XXX] million for the treatment of [XXX] and [XXX]; |933| paid the [XXX] approximately $[XXX] for the treatment of [XXX]; |934| and made arrangements for [XXX] and [XXX] to be treated in [XXX]. |935| The medical issues resulted in the closing of DETENTION SITE VIOLET in Country [XXX] in [XXX] 2006. |936| The CIA then transferred its remaining detainees to DETENTION SITE BROWN. At that point, all CIA detainees were located in Country [XXX]. |937|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Meanwhile, the pressures on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program brought about by the Washington Post story prompted the CIA to consider new options among what it called the "[d]windling pool [XXX] partners willing to host CIA Blacksites." |938| The CIA thus renewed earlier efforts to establish a detention facility in Country [XXX]. The CIA had earlier provided $[XXX] million to Country [XXX]'s [XXX] in preparation for a potential CIA detention site, prompting the chief of Station to comment, "Do you realize you can buy [Country [XXX]] for $[XXX]?" |939| On December [XXX], 2005, the chief of Station in Country [XXX] met with the [XXX], who was not concerned about the CIA's detention of terrorists in his country, but wanted assurances that the CIA interrogation program did not include the use of torture. |940| In providing his approval, the [XXX] agreed to a request from the chief of Station not to inform the U.S. ambassador in Country [XXX]. |941| The CIA also reached an agreement with another country, Country [XXX], to establish a CIA detention facility in that country and arranged with the leadership of Country [XXX] not to inform die U.S. ambassador there. |942| The CIA ultimately did not detain individuals in either country.

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In late October 2005, days before the publication of the Washington Post article, the CIA asked a separate country, Country [XXX], to temporarily house [XXX] CIA detainees. |943| The chief of Station briefed the U.S. ambassador in Country [XXX], who requested that the National Security Council and the White House be briefed on the plan. |944| There are no CIA records to indicate the briefing occurred. Country [XXX]'s [XXX] then provided approval, while seeking assurances that the CIA would develop a contingency plan in case the detention site was exposed in the press. |945| While the CIA Station and the [XXX] considered [XXX] in Country [XXX], CIA Headquarters directed that a long-term CIA detention facility be established in the country. Country [XXX]'s [XXX] approved a plan to build a CIA detention facility [XXX], but noted his ongoing concerns about the lack of a CIA "exit strategy." |946|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The lack of emergency medical care for detainees, the issue that had forced the closing of DETENTION SITE VIOLET in Country [XXX], was raised repeatedly in the context of the construction of the CIA detention facility in Country [XXX]. On March [XXX], 2006, CIA Headquarters requested that the CIA Station in Country [XXX] ask Country [XXX] to arrange discreet access to the nearest hospital and medical staff. The cable stated that the CIA "look[s] forward to a favorable response, prior to commencing with the construction of our detention facility." |947| Construction nonetheless began on the facility without the issue of emergency medical care having been resolved. In [XXX] 2006, after the deputy chief of the CIA Station in Country [XXX], the deputy chief of RDG, and an OMS officer met with [XXX] officers, the Station reported that the establishment of emergency medical care proximal to the site was "not tenable." |948| In July 2006, an OMS representative informed the chief of [XXX] at CIA Headquarters that the facility in Country [XXX] "should not be activated without a clear, committed plan for medical provider coverage." |949|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) By the time a CIA team visited the Country [XXX] detention site in late 2006, the CIA had already invested $[XXX] million in the new facility. Describing the absence of adequate emergency medical care options as "unacceptable," the chief of RDG recommended in a draft memo that construction efforts be abandoned for this reason. |950| The following day, an edited version of the same memo described the issue as a "challenge," but did not recommend that the CIA cease construction of the facility. |951| The resulting CIA detention facility, which would eventually cost $[XXX] million, was never used by the CIA. Press reports about the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program that appeared in [XXX] and [XXX] eventually forced the CIA to pass possession of the unused facility to the Country [XXX] government. |952|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In early January 2006, officials at the Department of Defense informed CIA officers that Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld had made a formal decision not to accept any CIA detainees at the U.S. military base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. |953| At the time, the CIA was holding 28 detainees in its two remaining facilities, DETENTION SITE VIOLET, in Country [XXX], and DETENTION SITE ORANGE, in Country [XXX]. |954| In preparation for a meeting with Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld on January 6, 2006, CIA Director Goss was provided a document indicating that the Department of Defense's position not to allow the transfer of CIA detainees to U.S. military custody at Guantanamo Bay "would cripple legitimate end game planning" for the CIA. |955| The talking points for that meeting suggested that Director Goss tell Secretary Rumsfeld that the:

"only viable 'endgame' for continued US Government custody of these most dangerous terrorists is a transfer to GTMO... [a]bsent the availability of GTMO and eventual DoD custody, CIA will necessarily have to begin transferring those detainees no longer producing intelligence to third countries, which may release them, or [the CIA itself may need to] outright release them." |956|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) After Secretary Rumsfeld declined to reconsider his decision not to allow the transfer of CIA detainees to U.S. military custody at Guantanamo Bay, CIA officers proposed elevating the issue to the president. CIA officers prepared talking points for Director Goss to meet with the president on the "Way Forward" on the program on January 12, 2006. |957| The talking points recommended that the CIA director "stress that absent a decision on the long-term issue (so called 'endgame') we are stymied and the program could collapse of its own weight." |958| There are no records to indicate whether Director Goss made this presentation to the president.

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In 2005 and 2006, the CIA transferred detainees from its custody to at least nine countries, including [XXX], as well as to the U.S. military in Iraq. Many of these detainees were subsequently released. |959| By May 2006, the CIA had 11 detainees whom it had identified as candidates for prosecution by a U.S. military commission. The remaining detainees were described as having "repatriation options open." |960|

6. The CIA Considers Changes to the CIA Detention and Interrogation Program Following the Detainee Treatment Act, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Following the passage of the Detainee Treatment Act in December 2005, the CIA conducted numerous discussions with the National Security Council principals about modifications to the program that would be acceptable from a policy and legal standpoint. In February 2006, talking points prepared for CIA Director Goss noted that National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley:

"asked to be informed of the criteria CIA will use before accepting a detainee into its CIA Counterterrorist Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation Program, stating that he believed CIA had in the past accepted detainees it should not have." |961|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The CIA director proposed future criteria that would require not only that CIA detainees meet the standard in the MON, but that they possess information about threats to the citizens of the United States or other nations, and that detention in a CIA facility was appropriate for intelligence exploitation. |962| A few months later, [XXX]CTC Legal, [XXX], wrote to Acting Assistant Attorney General Steven Bradbury suggesting a modified standard for applying the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. The suggested new standard was that "the specific detainee is believed to possess critical intelligence of high value to the United States." While the proposed modification included the requirement that a detainee have "critical intelligence of high value," it represented an expansion of CIA authorities, insofar as it covered the detention and interrogation of an individual with information that "would assist in locating the most senior leadership of al-Qa'ida of [sic] an associated terrorist organization," even if that detainee was not assessed to have knowledge of, or be directly involved in, imminent terrorist threats. |963|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Discussions with the National Security Council principals also resulted in a March 2006 CIA proposal for an interrogation program involving only seven of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques: sleep deprivation, nudity, dietary manipulation, facial grasp, facial slap, abdominal slap, and the attention grab. |964| This proposal was not acted upon at the time. The proposal for sleep deprivation of up to 180 hours, however, raised concerns among the National Security Council principals. |965|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In April 2006, the CIA briefed the president on the "current status" of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. According to an internal CIA review, this was the first time the CIA had briefed the president on the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. |966| As previously noted, the president expressed concern at the April 2006 briefing about the "image of a detainee, chained to the ceiling, clothed in a diaper, and forced to go to the bathroom on himself." |967|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On June 29, 2006, the Supreme Court issued its decision in the case of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, concluding that the military commission convened to try Salim Hamdan, a detainee at Guantanamo Bay, was inconsistent with statutory requirements and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. The implication of the decision was that treating a detainee in a manner inconsistent with the requirements of Common Article 3 would constitute a violation of federal criminal law. CIA attorneys analyzed the Hamdan decision, noting that it could have a significant impact on "current CIA interrogation practices." |968| Their memorandum also referenced that Acting Assistant Attorney General Steven Bradbury had the "preliminary view ... that the opinion 'calls into real question' whether CIA could continue its CT interrogation program involving enhanced interrogation techniques," as the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques "could be construed as inconsistent with the provisions of Common Article 3 prohibiting 'outrages upon personal dignity' and violence to life and person." |969|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The case of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld prompted the OLC to withdraw a draft memorandum on the impact of the Detainee Treatment Act on the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. |970| The CIA did not use its enhanced interrogation techniques again until July 2007, by which time the OLC had interpreted the Military Commissions Act, signed by the president on October 17, 2006, in such a way as to allow the CIA to resume the use of the techniques. |971|

N. The Final Disposition of CIA Detainees and the End of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program

1. President Bush Publicly Acknowledges the Existence of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program

(TS//[XXX]//NF) After significant discussions throughout 2006 among the National Security Council principals, the Department of Defense ultimately agreed to accept the transfer of a number of CIA detainees to U.S. military custody. |972|

(U) On September 6, 2006, President George W. Bush delivered a public speech acknowledging that the United States had held al-Qaida operatives in secret detention, stating that the CIA had employed an "alternative set of procedures" in interrogating these detainees, and describing information obtained from those detainees while in CIA custody. |973| As described later in this summary, the speech, which was based on CIA information and vetted by the CIA, contained significant inaccurate statements, especially regarding the significance of information acquired from CIA detainees and the effectiveness of the CIA's interrogation techniques. |974|

(U) In the speech, the president announced the transfer of 14 detainees to Department of Defense custody at Guantanamo Bay and the submission to Congress of proposed legislation on military commissions. |975| As all other detainees in the CIA's custody had been transferred to other nations, the CIA had no detainees in its custody at the time of the speech. |976|

2. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Gains Access to CIA Detainees After Their Transfer to U.S. Military Custody in September 2006

(TS//[XXX]//NF) After tne 14 CIA detainees arrived at the U.S. military base at Guantanamo Bay, they were housed in a separate building from other U.S. military detainees and remained under the operational control of the CIA. |977| In October 2006, the 14 detainees were allowed meetings with the ICRC and described in detail similar stories regarding their detention, treatment, and interrogation while in CIA custody. The ICRC provided information on these claims to the CIA. |978| Acting CIA General Counsel John Rizzo emailed tiie CIA director and other CIA senior leaders, following a November 8, 2006, meeting with the ICRC, stating:

"[a]s described to us, albeit in summary form, what the detainees allege actually does not sound that far removed from the reality... the ICRC, for its part, seems to find their stories largely credible, having put much stock in the fact that the story each detainee has told about his transfer, treatment and conditions of confinement was basically consistent, even though they had been incommunicado with each other throughout their detention by us." |979|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In February 2007 the ICRC transmitted to the CIA its final report on the "Treatment of Fourteen 'High Value Detainees' in CIA Custody." The ICRC report concluded that "the ICRC clearly considers that the allegations of the fourteen include descriptions of treatment and interrogation techniques - singly or in combination - that amounted to torture and/or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment." |980| Notwithstanding Rizzo's comments, the CIA disagreed with a number of the ICRC's findings, provided rebuttals to the ICRC in writing, and informed the Committee that "numerous false allegations of physical or threatened abuses and faulty legal assumptions and analysis in the report undermine its overall credibility." |981| The ICRC report was acquired by The New York Review of Books and posted on the Review's website in April 2009. |982| The Committee found the ICRC report to be largely consistent with information contained in CIA interrogation records. |983|

3. The CIA Considers Future of the Program Following the Military Commissions Act

(TS//[XXX]//NF) As noted, in June 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court case of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld prompted the OLC to withdraw a draft legal memorandum on the impact of the Detainee Treatment Act on the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. |984| The administration determined that the CIA would need new legislation to continue to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. |985| The Military Commissions Act addressed the issues raised by the Hamdan decision and provided the president the authority to issue an Executive Order detailing permissible conduct under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. The bill passed the Senate on September 28, 2006, and the House of Representatives the following day. |986|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On November [XXX], 2006, when Abd Hadi al-Iraqi was rendered to CIA custody, the draft Executive Order and an updated OLC memorandum had not yet been prepared. |987| Although Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi was consistently assessed as being cooperative, interrogators also believed he was withholding information on operational plots and the locations of high-value targets. |988| The CIA believed his [XXX] in February 2007 supported this conclusion, |989| prompting discussions at CIA Headquarters about the possible use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against him. By the end of the month, however, the CIA had determined there was "insufficient intelligence...that [Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi] possesses actionable information... to justify the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. |990|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In October 2006, a panel of CIA interrogators recommended that four CIA enhanced interrogation techniques–the abdominal slap, cramped confinement, nudity, and the waterboard–be eliminated, but that the remainder of the interrogation techniques be retained. |991| Under this proposal, the CIA would have been authorized to subject detainees to dietary manipulation, sleep deprivation, the facial slap, the facial grasp, the attention grab, walling, stress positions, and water dousing. There are few CIA records describing the panel's deliberations, or the CIA's response to its recommendations. The panel proposed dropping two of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques–nudity and the abdominal slap–that the CIA director had proposed retaining in March 2006, while recommending that the CIA retain three other techniques– walling, stress positions, and water dousing–that had not otherwise been requested for retention. |992|

4. The CIA Develops Modified Enhanced Interrogation Program After Passage of the Military Commissions Act

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In the spring of 2007, the OLC completed a draft of a legal opinion concluding that the use of the CIA's seven proposed enhanced interrogation techniques–sleep deprivation, nudity, dietary manipulation, facial grasp, facial slap, abdominal slap, and the attention grab–would be consistent with the requirements of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and the Military Commissions Act. This draft generated significant disagreement between the State Department's legal advisor, John Bellinger, and the Acting Assistant Attorney General Steven Bradbury, resulting in Secretary of State Rice refusing to concur with the proposed Executive Order. |993|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In June 2007, in an effort to gain Secretary Rice's support, the CIA asked CIA contractors SWIGERT and DUNBAR to brief Secretary Rice on the CIA's interrogation program. During that briefing, Secretary Rice expressed her concern about the use of nudity and a detainee being shackled in the standing position for the purpose of sleep deprivation. According to CIA records, in early July 2007, after the capture of Muhammad Rahim, Secretary Rice indicated that she would not concur with an interrogation program that included nudity, but that she would not continue to object to the CIA's proposed interrogation program if it was reduced to six of the enhanced interrogation techniques listed in the draft OLC memorandum: (1) sleep deprivation, (2) dietary manipulation, (3) facial grasp, (4) facial slap, (5) abdominal slap, and (6) the attention grab. |994|

5. Muhammad Rahim, the CIA's Last Detainee, is Subjected to Extensive Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques, Provides No Intelligence

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On June 25, 2007, al-Qa'ida facilitator Muhammad Rahim was captured in Pakistan. |995| Based on reports of debriefings of Rahim in foreign government custody and other intelligence, CIA personnel assessed that Rahim likely possessed information related to the location of Usama bin Laden and other al-Qa'ida leaders. |996| On July 3, 2007, Acting CIA General Counsel John Rizzo informed Acting Assistant Attorney General Steven Bradbury that the CIA was anticipating a "new guest," and that the CIA "would need the signed DOJ opinion 'in a matter of days.'" |997|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Muhammad Rahim was rendered to CIA custody at DETENTION SITE BROWN in Country [XXX] on [XXX] July, 2007. |998| Upon his arrival, CIA interrogators had a single discussion with Rahim during which he declined to provide answers to questions about threats to the United States and the locations of top al-Qa'ida leaders. |999| Based on this interaction, CIA interrogators reported that Rahim was unlikely to be cooperative. As a result, CIA Director Michael Hayden sent a letter to the president formally requesting that the president issue the Executive Order interpreting the Geneva Conventions in a manner to allow the CIA to interrogate Rahim using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. A classified legal opinion from OLC concluding that the use of the CIA's six enhanced interrogation techniques proposed for use on Rahim (sleep deprivation, dietary manipulation, facial grasp, facial slap, abdominal slap, and the attention grab) did not violate applicable laws was issued on July 20, 2007. The accompanying unclassified Executive Order was issued the same day. |1000| Although Rahim had been described by the CIA as "one of a handful of al-Qa'ida facilitators working directly for Bin Ladin and Zawahiri," |1001| Rahim remained in a CIA cell without being questioned for a week, while CIA interrogators waited for approval to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against him. |1002|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) CIA interrogators initially expressed optimism about their ability to acquire information from Rahim using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. A cable sent from the CIA detention site stated:

"Senior interrogators on site, with experience in almost every HVD [high-value detainee] interrogation conducted by [CIA], believe the employment of interrogation with measures would likely provide the impetus to shock [Rahim] from his current resistance posture and provide an opportunity to influence his behavior to begin truthful participation." |1003|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Four CIA interrogators present at the CIA detention site began applying the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on July 21, 2007. |1004| According to CIA records, the interrogators "employed interrogation measures of facial slap, abdominal slap, and facial hold, and explained to [Rahim] that his assumptions of how he would be treated were wrong." |1005| The interrogators emphasized to Rahim that "his situation was the result of his deception, he would stay in this position until interrogators chose to remove him from it, and he could always correct a previous misstatement." |1006| According to the cable describing the interrogation, Rahim then threatened to fabricate information:

"[Rahim] reiterated several times during the session that he would make up information if interrogators pressured him, and that he was at the complete mercy of the interrogators and they could even kill him if they wanted. Interrogators emphasized to [Rahim] that they would not allow him to die because then he could not give them information, but that he would, eventually, tell interrogators the truth." |1007|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) During the interrogation of Rahim using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, Rahim was subjected to eight extensive sleep deprivation sessions, |1008| as well as to the attention grasp, facial holds, abdominal slaps, and the facial slap. |1009| During sleep deprivation sessions, Rahim was usually shackled in a standing position, wearing a diaper and a pair of shorts. |1010| Rahim's diet was almost entirely limited to water and liquid Ensure meals. |1011| CIA interrogators would provide Rahim with a cloth to further cover himself as an incentive to cooperate. For example, a July 27, 2007, cable from the CIA detention site states that when Rahim showed a willingness to engage in questioning about "historical information," he was "provided a large towel to cover his torso" as a "subtle reward." |1012| CIA interrogators asked Rahim a variety of questions during these interrogations, seeking information about the current location of senior al-Qa'ida leaders, which he did not provide. |1013|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On September 8, 2007, CIA Director Hayden approved an extension of Muhammad Rahim's CIA detention. |1014| The Director of the National Clandestine Service Jose Rodriguez disagreed with the approved extension, writing:

"I did not sign because I do not concur with extending Rahim's detention for another 60 days. I do not believe the tools in our tool box will allow us to overcome Rahim's resistance techniques. J.A.R." |1015|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Shortly after the September 2007 extension, CIA personnel were directed to stop the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Rahim. Rahim was then left in his cell with minimal contact with CIA personnel for approximately six weeks. |1016| On September 10, 2007, Rahim's interrogators reported to CIA Headquarters that Rahim had "demonstrated that the physical corrective measures available to HVDIs |1017| have become predictable and bearable." |1018| The use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Rahim resumed on November 2, 2007, with a sleep deprivation session that lasted until November 8, 2007, for a total of 138.5 hours. This sleep deprivation session, the longest to which Rahim had been subjected, was his eighth and final session. Rahim was also subjected to dietary manipulation during this period. |1019|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) According to CIA records, intermittent questioning of Rahim continued until December 9, 2007, when all questioning of Rahim ceased for nearly three weeks. During this time, CIA detention site personnel discussed and proposed new ways to encourage Rahim's cooperation. These new proposals included suggestions that Rahim could be told that audiotapes of his interrogations might be passed to his family, or that [XXX] Rahim was cooperating with U.S. forces. On December 18, 2007, CIA Headquarters directed the detention site to stand down on the proposals. |1020|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The CIA's detention and interrogation of Mohammad Rahim resulted in no disseminated intelligence reports. |1021| On March [XXX], 2008, Muhammad Rahim was [XXX] by the CI A to [XXX], where [XXX] took custody of Rahim. The [XXX] government immediately transferred Rahim to the custody of [XXX] at which point Rahim was transferred back to CIA custody and rendered by the CIA to U.S. military custody at Guantanamo Bay. |1022|

6. CIA After-Action Review of Rahim Interrogation Calls for Study of Effectiveness of Interrogation Techniques and Recommends Greater Use of Rapport-Building Techniques in Future CIA Interrogations

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On April 21, 2008, and April 22, 2008, the CIA's RDG convened an after-action review of the CIA's interrogation of Muhammad Rahim. According to summary documents, the CIA review panel attempted to determine why the CIA had been unsuccessful in acquiring useful information from Rahim. The summary documents emphasized that the primary factors that contributed to Rahim's unresponsiveness were the interrogation team's lack of knowledge of Rahim, the decision to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques immediately after the short "neutral probe" and subsequent isolation period, the lack of clarity about whether the non-coercive techniques described in the Army Field Manual were permitted, the team's inability to confront Rahim with incriminating evidence, and the use of multiple improvised interrogation approaches despite the lack of any indication that these approaches might be effective. |1023| The summary documents recommended that future CIA interrogations should incorporate rapport-building techniques, social interaction, loss of predictability, and deception to a greater extent. |1024| The documents also recommended that the CIA conduct a survey of interrogation techniques used by other U.S. government agencies and other countries in an effort to develop effective interrogation methods. |1025|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Muhammad Rahim was the last CIA detainee in the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. |1026|

7. CIA Contracting Expenses Related to Company Formed by SWIGERT and DUNBAR

(TS//[XXX]//NF) CIA contractors SWIGERT and DUNBAR, who played a central role in the development of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques in the summer of 2002, and then used the techniques as contract interrogators, formed a company in 2005 [XXX] ["Company Y"]. |1027| In addition to providing interrogators for the CIA's interrogation program, Company Y was granted a sole source contract to provide operational psychologists, debriefers, and security personnel at CIA detention sites. |1028| Under the contract, Company Y was tasked with conducting ongoing conversations with CIA detainees to learn about the terrorist mind set (this project was named the "Terrorist Think Tank" or "T³"), developing [XXX] strategies, and writing the history of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. |1029| Later descriptions of their services note that–on behalf of the CIA–Company Y officers participated in the interrogations of detainees held in foreign government custody and served as intermediaries between entities of those governments and the CIA. |1030|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) By 2006, the value of the base contract for their company, with all options exercised, was in excess of $180 million. |1031| As of May 2007, Company Y had hired [XXX] former CIA staff officers, many of whom had previously been involved with the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. Company Y's chief operating officer was the former chief of [XXX], the division of the CIA supervising the Renditions and Detention Group. In addition, Company Y hired at least [XXX] CIA security protective officers to work on Company Y's CIA contracts. In March 2006, a list of projected staff and contractors within CIA's Renditions and Detention Group included [XXX] separate positions. |1032| Of those [XXX] positions, [XXX] [73%] were for contractors, the majority of whom were contractors from Company Y. |1033| By June 2007, RDG reported having [XXX] staff officers and [XXX] contractors. |1034| By 2008, RDG had a total of [XXX] positions, with [XXX] staff officers and [XXX] [85%] contractors, according to the CIA. |1035|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The CIA's contract with Company Y was terminated in mid-2009. From the time of the company's creation in 2005 through the close-out of its contract in 2010, the CIA paid Company Y more than $75 million for services in conjunction with the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. |1036| The CIA also certified Company Y's office in [XXX], as a Secure Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF), which required a CIA officer to be detailed to [XXX], and provided Company Y access to CIA internal computer networks at its facility. In 2008, the CIA authorized an additional payment to Company Y of approximately $570,000, after CompaivyY indicated that it had incurred costs for conducting countersurveillance of its officers when [XXX] appeared in the press in conjunction with the program. The CIA agreed to a $5 million indemnification contract for the company that covered, among other expenses, criminal prosecution. |1037| Company Y hired a prominent [XXX] law firm for representation in 2007, |1038| and billed the CIA $1.1 million for legal expenses from 2007 through 2012 per its indemnification agreement. |1039| Part of these expenses included legal representation at a Committee staff briefing by SWIGERT and DUNBAR on November [XXX], 2008. |1040| Under the CIA's indemnification contract, the CIA is obligated to pay Company Y's legal expenses through 2021. |1041|

8. The CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program Ends

(U) On December 5, 2007, fewer than nine months after Director Hayden told the European Union that the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program was not a CIA program, but "America's program," the House-Senate conference for the Fiscal Year 2008 Intelligence Authorization Act voted to include an amendment that banned coercive interrogation techniques and established the Army Field Manual on Human Intelligence Collector Operations as the interrogation standard for all U.S. government interrogations. |1042| The conference report passed both the House and the Senate with bipartisan majorities. |1043|

(U) On March 8, 2008, President Bush vetoed the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 that banned coercive interrogations. In a radio address explaining the decision, the president stated "[t]he bill Congress sent me would take away one of the most valuable tools in the war on terror–the CIA program to detain and question key terrorist leaders and operatives." Addressing the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, President Bush stated that the "main reason" the CIA program "has been effective is that it allows the CIA to use specialized interrogation procedures to question a small number of the most dangerous terrorists under careful supervision." The president stated that the CIA program had a "proven track record," and that the CIA obtained "critical intelligence" as a result of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques related to the Camp Lemonier plotting, the Karachi plotting, the Second Wave plotting, and the Heathrow Airport plotting. The president then repeated a warning the CIA had previously provided to the White House, that to "restrict the CIA to [interrogation] methods in the [Army] Field Manual," "could cost American lives." |1044| As is described in this summary, and detailed more extensively in the full Committee Study, the CIA's representations to the White House regarding the role of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques in the thwarting of the referenced plots were inaccurate.

(U) On March 11, 2008, by a vote of 225-188, the House of Representatives failed to override the presidential veto. |1045|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In December 2008 and January 2009, CIA officers briefed the transition team for President-elect Barack Obama on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. CIA Director Hayden prepared a statement that relayed, "despite what you have heard or read in a variety of public fora, these [enhanced interrogation] techniques and this program did work." |1046| The prepared materials included inaccurate information on the operation and management of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, as well as the same set of examples of the "effectiveness" of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques that the CIA had provided to policymakers over several years. |1047| The examples provided were nearly entirely inaccurate.

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On January 22, 2009, President Obama issued Executive Order 13491, which required the CIA to "close as expeditiously as possible any detention facilities that it currently operates and... not operate any such detention facility in the future." The Executive Order prohibited any U.S. government employee from using interrogation techniques other than those in the Army Field Manual 2-22.3 on Human Intelligence Collector Operations. |1048|

III. Intelligence Acquired and CIA Representations on the Effectiveness of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques to Multiple Constituencies

A. Background on CIA Effectiveness Representations

(TS//[XXX]//NF) From 2002 through 2009, in order to obtain policy authorizations and legal approvals, the CIA made a series of representations to officials at the White House, |1049| the Department of Justice, and the Congress, asserting that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were uniquely effective and necessary to produce otherwise unavailable intelligence that the U.S. government could not obtain from other sources. |1050| The CIA further represented that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques "saved lives" and "enabled the CIA to disrupt terrorist plots, capture additional terrorists, and collect a high volume of critical intelligence on al-Qa'ida." |1051| The Department of Justice used these representations of effectiveness to assess whether the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were legal; |1052| policymakers at the White House used these representations–and the legal analysis by the Department of Justice–to assess whether the CIA interrogation program should be approved as a matter of policy; |1053| and members of Congress relied on the CIA representations in overseeing and assessing the program, providing funding, and crafting related legislation. |1054|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In CIA presentations to the executive and legislative branches, the CIA represented that other parties had consented to, or endorsed, the CIA's interrogation program. As an example, during a policy review of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques in July 2003, the CIA informed a subset of the National Security Council principals that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was "approved by the attorney general," and was "fully disclosed to the SSCI and HPSCI leadership." In the same presentation, the CIA represented that the CIA interrogation program "had produced significant intelligence information that had, in the view of CIA professionals, saved lives." The CIA then provided examples of "attacks averted" as a direct result of the CIA interrogation program, and warned policymakers that "[t]ermination of this program will result in loss of life, possibly extensive." |1055|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) When the CIA was asked by White House officials to review and provide further evidence for the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques in 2004, the CIA responded that it was "difficult, if not impossible" to conduct such a review, but assured White House officials that "this program works," "the techniques are effective," and the program produces "results." |1056| The "results" provided by the CIA consisted of the "disruption" of specific terrorist plots and the capture of specific terrorists. The CIA further represented that the information acquired as a result of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was unique and "otherwise unavailable." |1057| These specific CIA claims played an especially important role in the Department of Justice's legal review of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. |1058| Department of Justice documents stated that an analysis of the legality of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was a "highly context-specific, fact-dependent question" and highlighted the importance of the CIA representation that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques produced "substantial quantities of otherwise unavailable actionable intelligence," and were "largely responsible for preventing a subsequent attack within the United States." |1059|

B. Past Efforts to Review the Effectiveness of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques

(TS//[XXX]//NF) During the period in which the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program was operational, from 2002 to 2009, there were three reviews that addressed the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques: (1) the CIA Office of Inspector General Special Review, released in May 2004; (2) an internal review conducted by two senior CIA officers in 2004; and (3) a 2005 "Blue Ribbon" panel consisting of two individuals not employed by the CIA. According to CIA records, as of the spring of 2007, the CIA had not "conducted any other studies on the effectiveness of interrogation techniques." |1060|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Each of the previous reviews relied on interviews with CIA personnel involved in the program, as well as documents prepared by CIA personnel, which represented that the CIA interrogation program was effective, and that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques had "enabled the CIA to disrupt terrorist plots, capture additional terrorists, and collect a high-volume of critical intelligence on al-Qa'ida." |1061| CIA personnel represented: "[t]his is information that CTC could not have gotten any other way." |1062|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) There are no indications in CIA records that any of the past reviews attempted to independently validate the intelligence claims related to the CIA's use of its enhanced interrogation techniques that were presented by CIA personnel in interviews and in documents. As such, no previous review confirmed whether the specific intelligence cited by the CIA was acquired from a CIA detainee during or after being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, or if the intelligence acquired was otherwise unknown to the United States government ("otherwise unavailable"), and therefore uniquely valuable.

C. The Origins of CIA Representations Regarding the Effectiveness of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques As Having "Saved Lives," "Thwarted Plots," and "Captured Terrorists"

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Before the CIA took custody of its first detainee, CIA attorneys researched the limits of coercive interrogations and the legal definitions of torture. On November 26, 2001, CIA Office of General Counsel (OGC) attorneys circulated a draft legal memorandum entitled "Hostile Interrogations: Legal Considerations for CIA Officers." |1063| The memorandum listed interrogation techniques considered to be torture by a foreign government and a specific nongovernmental organization, including "cold torture," "forced positions," "enforced physical exhaustion," "sensory deprivation," "perceptual deprivation," "social deprivation," "threats and humiliation," "conditioning techniques," and "deprivation of sleep." |1064| The draft memorandum described various prohibitions on torture and the potential use of "necessity" as a legal defense against charges of torture, stating:

"[i]t would, therefore, be a novel application of the necessity defense to avoid prosecution of U.S. officials who tortured to obtain information that saved many lives... A policy decision must be made with regard to U.S. use of torture in light of our obligations under international law, with consideration given to the circumstances and to international opinion on our current campaign against terrorism–states may be very unwilling to call the U.S. to task for torture when it resulted in saving thousands of lives" |1065|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On February 1, 2002, a CTC attorney researched the impact of the application of the Geneva Conventions (GC) on future CIA interrogation activities. |1066| The attorney wrote:

"If the detainee is a POW and enjoys GC coverage, then the optic becomes how legally defensible is a particular act that probably violates the convention, but ultimately saves lives. I believe that [a named CIA attorney]'s papers reflecting on necessity and anticipatory self defense are the two most obvious defenses available." |1067|

(U) The Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) included the "necessity defense" in its August 1, 2002, memorandum to the White House Counsel, determining, among other things, that "under the current circumstances, necessity or self-defense may justify interrogation methods that might violate" the criminal prohibition against torture. |1068| The OLC memorandum states:

"It appears to us that under the current circumstances the necessity defense could be successfully maintained in response to an allegation of a Section 2340A violation. ...Under these circumstances, a detainee may possess information that could enable the United States to prevent attacks that potentially could equal or surpass the September 11 attacks in their magnitude. Clearly, any harm that might occur during an interrogation would pale to insignificance compared to the harm avoided by preventing such an attack, which could take hundreds or thousands of lives." |1069|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) According to a report by the Department of Justice Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR), released in July 2009, Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Yoo "acknowledged that the CIA may have indirectly suggested the new sections [related to Commander-in-Chief authority and possible defenses, including the necessity defense] by asking him what would happen in a case where an interrogator went 'over the line' and inadvertently violated the statute." Yoo also told the OPR that he drafted those relevant sections. Another senior Department of Justice lawyer at the time, Patrick Philbin, informed the OPR that when he told Yoo that the sections were superfluous and should be removed, Yoo responded, "They want it in there." The CIA's former Deputy General Counsel John Rizzo told the OPR that the CIA did not request the addition of the sections. |1070| In his response to the OPR report, Assistant Attorney General Jay Bybee stated that the "ticking time bomb" that could justify the necessity defense was, in fact, a "real world" scenario. According to Bybee, "the OLC attorneys working on the [August 1, 2002] Memo had been briefed on the apprehension of Jose Padilla on May 8, 2002. Padilla was believed to have built and planted a dirty bomb." |1071| The August 1, 2002, memorandum states that the "[i]nterrogation of captured al Qaida operatives allegedly allowed U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies to track Padilla and to detain him upon his entry into the United States." |1072| This information was inaccurate. |1073|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) With the issuance on August 1, 2002, of a second OLC memorandum specific to Abu Zubaydah, |1074| the CIA initiated the use of its enhanced interrogation techniques. After the CIA subjected Abu Zubaydah and other CIA detainees to the techniques, the CIA made increasingly stronger assertions about the effectiveness of the CIA's interrogation program, eventually asserting that the CIA interrogation program "saved lives," |1075| and that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was necessary, as the intelligence obtained could not have been acquired in any other way. |1076|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Many of the representations made by the CIA about the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were first made in the spring of 2003 and evolved over the course of the year and into early 2004. In April 2003, CIA officers told the CIA's Office of Inspector General (OIG) that KSM, who had been subjected to the techniques between March [XXX], 2003, and March 25, 2003, was still not fully cooperative. For example, on April 3, 2003, more than a week after the CIA had discontinued the use of its enhanced interrogation techniques on KSM, the deputy chief of ALEC Station, [XXX], informed the OIG that KSM had made "remarkable progress," but there was "a lot more to be done." [XXX] did not cite any specific intelligence obtained from KSM in this context. |1077|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On June 27, 2003, more than three months after the CIA had ceased using its enhanced interrogation techniques against KSM, CTC Chief of Operations [XXX] told the OIG that he was convinced that KSM "knows more and is just waiting for us to ask the right questions." |1078| [XXX] then provided two examples of information that KSM had not provided until he was asked specifically about the matters by CIA interrogators: information on the "tallest building in California" plot (also known as the "Second Wave" plot), and the inclusion of a building in Canary Wharf as a target in the plotting against Heathrow Airport. |1079| Asked if he could think of any instances in which information from CIA detainees had led to the arrest of a terrorist, [XXX] stated only that Majid Khan provided information that led to the arrest of Iyman Faris by the FBI. |1080| This information was inaccurate, as Majid Khan was not in CIA custody when he provided information on Iyman Faris. |1081|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) [XXX] represented to the OIG that the CIA's interrogation program was "very effective," and that the intelligence obtained from CIA detainees was "the main criteria for judging the success of the program; specifically, intelligence that has allowed CTC to take other terrorists off the street and to prevent terrorist attacks." [XXX] also told the OIG that the information obtained from CIA interrogations was "information that CTC could not have gotten any other way." |1082|

(U) On June 26, 2003, President Bush issued a statement for the United Nations International Day in Support of Victims of Torture. That statement–referenced in multiple news articles– relayed that the:

"United States is committed to the world-wide elimination of torture and we are leading this fight by example. I call on all governments to join with the United States and the community of law-abiding nations in prohibiting, investigating, and prosecuting all acts of torture and in undertaking to prevent other cruel and unusual punishment." |1083|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The following day, after the Washington Post published an article on the Administration's detainee policy, CIA Deputy General Counsel John Rizzo called John Bellinger, the legal advisor to the National Security Council. According to an email from Rizzo to other senior CIA officers, Rizzo called Bellinger to:

"express our surprise and concern at some of the statements attributed to the Administration in the piece, particularly the Presidential statement on the UN International Day in Support of Victims of Torture as well as a quote from the Deputy White House Press Secretary Scott McClellan that all prisoners being held by the USG are being treated 'humanely.'" |1084|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) While Rizzo expressed the view that the presidential statement did not appear to contain anything "we can't live with," Rizzo conveyed to senior CIA leaders that it "might well be appropriate for us to seek written reaffirmation by some senior White House official that the Agency's ongoing practices... are to continue." |1085|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On July 3, 2003, DCI George Tenet sent a memorandum to National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice seeking reaffirmation of the Administration's support for the CIA's detention and interrogation policies and practices. The memorandum stated that the reaffirmation was sought because:

"recent Administration responses to inquiries and resulting media reporting about the Administration's position have created the impression that these [interrogation] techniques are not used by U.S. personnel and are no longer approved as a policy matter." |1086|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) While the CIA was preparing to meet with the White House on the reaffirmation of the CIA interrogation program, CIA personnel provided additional inaccurate information about the "effectiveness" of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques to the OIG, as well as to senior CIA leadership. These inaccurate representations described the "thwarting" of specific plots and the capture of specific terrorists attributed to the interrogation of CIA detainees and the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On July 16, 2003, Deputy Chief of ALEC Station [XXX] was interviewed again by the OIG. In this interview [XXX] asserted that KSM "provided information that helped lead to the arrest of Iyman Faris, Uzhair Paracha, Saleh al-Marri, Majid Khan, and Ammar al-Baluchi. |1087| These representations were almost entirely inaccurate. |1088|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) [XXX] also informed the OIG that information from CIA detainees "provided a wealth of information about Al-Qa'ida plots," including: a terrorist plot in Saudi Arabia against Israel; a plot against the U.S. Consulate in Karachi, Pakistan; a plot against Heathrow Airport and Canary Wharf; a plot to derail trains; a plot against subways; a gas station plot; a plot against the "tallest building" in California; a plot against suspension bridges; and a plot to poison water supplies. |1089| Much of this information was inaccurate. |1090| According to OIG records, "[o]n the question of whether actual plots had been thwarted, [[XXX]] opined that since the operatives involved in many of the above plots had been arrested, [CTC had], in effect, thwarted the operation[s]." [XXX] provided a list to the OIG of terrorists captured and the plots with which they were associated. None of the individuals listed by were captured as a result of reporting from CIA detainees. |1091|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) During this same period in 2003, CIA officers were compiling similar information for CIA leadership. On July 18, 2003, the chief of ALEC Station, [XXX], wrote an email to ALEC Station officers requesting information on the "value and impact" of CIA detainee information on behalf of the CIA Renditions Group (RDG), |1092| which he stated was being compiled for senior CIA leadership. |1093| [XXX] wrote that "[o]ne way to assist now is to provide input to RDG on highlights of intel and ops reporting from the detainees," in particular "reporting that helped reveal or stop plots, reporting that clinched the identity of terrorist suspects, etc." |1094| The first portion of the response, compiled by ALEC Station, was drafted by Deputy Chief of ALEC Station [XXX], who wrote that CIA detainee reporting "plays a key role in our ability to identify and capture al-Qa'ida terrorists, including those who were planning to attack inside the United States." In an email, [XXX] wrote that "[t]he ability of the detainees to identify many operatives previously unknown to us or to the FBI resulted in the successful capture/detention of several terrorists," and that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was "key" to acquiring this information on these operatives. As examples of operatives "previously unknown" to the CIA and the FBI and identified by CIA detainees, [XXX] cited Jose Padilla, Binyam Mohammed, Majid Khan, Iyman Faris, and Sayf al-Rahman Paracha. |1095| These representations were inaccurate. |1096| [XXX] email concluded:

"Simply put, detainee information has saved countless American lives inside the US and abroad. We believe there is no doubt al-Qa'ida would have succeeded in launching additional attacks in the US and that the information obtained from these detainees through the use of enhanced measures was key to unlocking this information. It is our assessment that if CIA loses the ability to interrogate and use enhanced measures in a responsible way, we will not be able to effectively prosecute this war." |1097|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The information relayed from ALEC Station to RDG in July 2003 for CIA leadership also included information from a CIA assessment entitled "Significant Detainee Reporting." |1098| That document included information that was largely congruent with CIA records. It stated that KSM provided details on the Heathrow Airport Plot and the Karachi Plots only after being confronted with the capture of Khallad bin Attash and Ammar al-Baluchi; |1099| that with regard to plots inside the United States, KSM had only admitted to plots that had been abandoned or already disrupted; that KSM fabricated information in order to tell CIA interrogators "what he thought they wanted to hear"; and that KSM generally only provided information when "boxed in" by information already known to CIA debriefers. |1100| This information was not included in CIA representations to policymakers later that month.

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On July 29, 2003, as a result of DCI Tenet's July 3, 2003, request seeking reaffirmation of the CIA's detention and interrogation policies and practices, Tenet and CIA General Counsel Scott Muller conducted a briefing for a subset of the National Security Council principals. |1101| According to a CIA memorandum, Muller represented that CIA "detainees subject to the use of Enhanced Techniques of one kind or another had produced significant intelligence information that had, in the view of CIA professionals, saved lives." |1102|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The CIA briefing provided the "results" of using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques in briefing slides with the heading: "RESULTS: MAJOR THREAT INFO." The slides represented that KSM provided information on "[a]ttack plans against US Capitol, other US landmarks"; "[a]ttacks against Chicago, New York, Los Angeles; against towers, subways, trains, reservoirs, Hebrew centers, Nuclear power plants"; and the "Heathrow and Canary Wharf Plot." The slides also represented that KSM identified Iyman Faris, the "Majid Khan family," and Sayf al-Rahman Paracha. |1103| These representations were largely inaccurate. |1104|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The CIA slides represented that "major threat" information was obtained from the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on CIA detainee 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri regarding "US Navy Ships in the Straits of Hormuz." This representation was inaccurate and omitted material facts. |1105| The CIA slides further indicated that "major threat" information was obtained from the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against CIA detainee Ramzi bin al-Shibh–specifically that bin al-Shibh "[i]dentified Hawsawi" and provided "major threat" information on "[a]ttacks against Nuclear Power Plants, Hebrew Centers." This representation was inaccurate and omitted material facts. |1106|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In the context of "[m]ajor threats [that] were countered and attacks averted," the CIA slides represented that "major threat" information was obtained from the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Khallad bin Attash on an "[a]ttack against U.S. Consulate in Karachi." This representation was inaccurate. |1107| The CIA slides further represented that "major threat" information was obtained from the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on CIA detainee Abu Zubaydah, resulting in the "[i]dentification of [Jose] Padilla, Richard Reid," as well as information on "[a]ttacks on banks, subways, petroleum and aircraft industries." These representations were inaccurate. |1108|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The briefing slides, which contained additional inaccuracies detailed in Volume II of the Committee Study, were used, at least in part, for CIA briefings for Secretary of State Powell and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, |1109| as well as for Assistant Attorney General Jack Goldsmith. |1110|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In subsequent interviews of CIA personnel, the OIG received information that contradicted other CIA representations about the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. The chief of the [XXX] Branch of the UBL Group at CTC described at length how the arrests of Majid Khan and Iyman Faris were unrelated to reporting from CIA detainees. |1111| The deputy director for law enforcement for the FBI's Counterterrorism Division told the OIG how Uzhair Paracha and FBI operational activities were ultimately responsible for the capture of Sayf al-Rahman Paracha. |1112| The chief of targeting and special requirements for CTC's al-Qa'ida Department and former chief of the Abu Zubaydah Task Force, [XXX], told the OIG that "the often-cited example of Zubaydah identifying Padilla is not quite accurate." |1113| According to [XXX], "[n]ot only did [Abu Zubaydah] not tell us who Padilla was, his information alone would never have led us to Padilla." [XXX] stated that the Pakistanis had told the CIA about Jose Padilla and his partner prior to Abu Zubaydah providing any information on the pair, relaying, "[i]n essence, CTC got lucky." |1114|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) At the same time, however, CIA personnel provided inaccurate examples of the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques to the OIG. The deputy chief of the Al-Qa'ida Department of CTC told the OIG that "KSM gave us Majid Khan and Uzair Paracha." |1115| Deputy DCI John McLaughlin told the OIG that information from KSM "led to the capture" of Majid Khan, which in turn led to the capture of Hambali. McLaughlin also represented that "the capture of Richard Reid was a result of modus operandi information obtained from [Abu] Zubaydah." |1116| These representations were inaccurate. |1117|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In addition to these specific inaccurate examples, CIA leadership made additional general claims to the OIG about the effectiveness of the CIA interrogation program that highlighted the "critical threat information" that could only be acquired by using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against CIA detainees. Jose Rodriguez, then CTC director, told the CIA OIG that "the use of EITs has saved lives and prevented terrorist operations from occurring." |1118| Deputy DCI McLaughlin told the OIG that he "believes the use of EITs has proven critical to CIA's efforts in the war on terrorism." |1119| DDO Pavitt stated that the program was "invaluable to U.S. national security," that "American lives have been saved as a result of information received from detainees," and that the CIA "has been able to obtain information that would not have been obtained without the use of EITs." |1120| According to OIG records, DCI Tenet stated he "firmly believes that the interrogation program, and specifically the use of EITs, has saved many lives." Tenet added that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was "extremely valuable" in obtaining "enormous amounts of critical threat information," and that he did not believe that the information could have been gained any other way. |1121|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On January 2, 2004, CIA Inspector General John Helgerson provided a draft of the OIG Special Review, entitled "Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program," to senior CIA officials for comment. The draft Special Review, which was based on numerous interviews of CIA personnel, as well as additional research by the OIG, described the origins of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, the detention sites that were operational at the time of the review, and the guidance that had been provided on both interrogation and detention. The draft also identified a number of unauthorized interrogation techniques that had been used, |1122| and concluded that, in a number of cases, CIA interrogations went "well beyond what was articulated in the written DOJ legal opinion of 1 August 2002." |1123|

The draft report repeated the inaccurate examples of the "effectiveness" of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques that had been conveyed by CIA officers to OIG personnel, |1124| but nonetheless concluded:

"[w]ith the capture of some of the operatives for the above-mentioned plots, it is not clear whether these plots have been thwarted or if they remain viable or even if they were fabricated in the first place. This Review did not uncover any evidence that these plots were imminent." |1125|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) After reviewing the draft Special Review, including the OIG's qualified conclusions about the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, the CIA's CTC began preparing a highly critical response. In preparation for that response, [XXX]CTC Lcgal, [XXX], requested additional information that could be used as evidence for the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques from CTC personnel. [XXX] sent an email seeking "a list of specific plots that have been thwarted by the use of detainee reporting that we acquired following the use of enhanced techniques." [XXX] noted that he would compile the information, "emphasizing that hundreds or thousands of innocent lives have been saved as a result of our use of those techniques... ," |1126| In a separate email, [XXX] emphasized that it was "critical" that the information "establish direct links between the application of the enhanced interrogation techniques and the production of intelligence that directly enabled the saving of innocent lives," that the intelligence obtained after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques be "significantly different in nature from the intelligence acquired before the use of the enhanced techniques," and that the information be "absolutely ironclad" and "demonstrably supported by cable citations, analytical pieces, or what have you." |1127| [XXX] further noted that "[w]e can expect to need to present these data to appropriately cleared personnel at the IG and on the Hill, to the Attorney General, and quite possibly to the President at some point, and they must be absolutely verifiable." He concluded, "[i]t is not an exaggeration to say that the future of the program, and the consequent saving of innocent lives, may depend substantially upon the input you provide." |1128|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Responding to the request for information, Deputy Chief of ALEC Station [XXX] sent an email describing intelligence from KSM in which she wrote, "let's be foward [sic] leaning." |1129| The content of [XXX]'s email would serve as a template on which future justifications for the CIA program and the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were based. |1130| [XXX]'s email stated that "Khalid Shaykh Muhammad's information alone has saved at least several hundred, possibly thousands, of lives." She then wrote that KSM "identified" Iyman Faris, "who is now serving time in the US for his support to al-Qa'ida," and "identified a photograph" of Saleh al-Marri, "whom the FBI suspected of some involvement with al-Qa'ida, but against whom we had no concrete information," adding that al-Marri "is now being held on a material witness warrant." [XXX]'s email stated that KSM "provided information" on Majid Khan, who "is now in custody," "identified a mechanism for al-Qa'ida to smuggle explosives into the US," and "identified" Jaffar al-Tayyar. |1131| [XXX]'s email also represented that "[a]fter the use of enhanced [interrogation techniques], [Abu Zubaydah] grew into what is now our most cooperative detainee," and that Abu Zubaydah's information "produced concrete results that helped saved lives." |1132| These representations were almost entirely inaccurate. |1133| As she had in an interview with the OIG, [XXX], former chief of the Abu Zubaydah Task Force, refuted this view, writing in an email that Abu Zubaydah "never really gave 'this is the plot' type of information," that Abu Zubaydah discussed Jose Padilla prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, and that "he never really gave us actionable intel to get them." |1134| Separately, Deputy Chief of ALEC Station [XXX] forwarded additional inaccurate information from CIA personnel in ALEC Station to CTC Legal related to KSM, |1135| al-Nashiri, |1136| and Hambali. |1137|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On February 27, 2004, DDO Pavitt submitted his formal response to the OIG draft Special Review in the form of a memorandum to the inspector general. Pavitt urged the CIA OIG not to "shy away from the conclusion that our efforts have thwarted attacks and saved lives," and to "make it clear as well that the EITs (including the waterboard) have been indispensable to our successes." |1138| Pavitt's memorandum included an attachment describing the "Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities," and why the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were necessary. The attachment stated:

"Information we received from detained terrorists as a result of the lawful use of enhanced interrogation techniques ('EITs') has almost certainly saved countless American lives inside the United States and abroad. The evidence points clearly to the fact that without the use of such techniques, we and our allies would [have] suffered major terrorist attacks involving hundreds, if not thousands, of casualties." |1139|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The attachment to Pavitt's memorandum repeated much of the inaccurate information contained in Deputy Chief of ALEC Station [XXX]'s email about KSM and Abu Zubaydah, as well as the additional information ALEC Station personnel provided on KSM, al-Nashiri, and Hambali. In Pavitt's memorandum, every intelligence success claim was preceded with some version of the phrase, "as a result of the lawful use of EITs." |1140| Inaccurate information provided to the OIG during interviews and in the Pavitt memorandum was included in the final version of the OIG's Special Review. |1141| The relevant portion of the Special Review, including much of the inaccurate information, has been declassified. |1142|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) As [XXX]CTC Legal [XXX] anticipated February 10, 2004, email, much of the information provided to the inspector general on the "effectiveness" of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was later provided to policymakers and the Department of Justice as evidence for the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. |1143|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In late 2004, as the National Security Council was considering "endgame" options for CIA detainees, the CIA proposed a public relations campaign that would include disclosures about the "effectiveness" of the CIA program. CIA talking points prepared in December 2004 for the DCI to use with National Security Council principals stated that "[i]f done cleverly, selected disclosure of intelligence results could heighten the anxiety of terrorists at large about the sophistication of USG methods and underscore the seriousness of American commitment to prosecute aggressively the War on Terrorism." |1144| The following month, the CIA proposed that the public information campaign include details on the "intelligence gained and lives saved in HVD interrogations." |1145| There was no immediate decision by the National Security Council about an "endgame" for CIA detainees or the proposed public information campaign.

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In early April 2005, [XXX], chief of ALEC Station, asked that information on the success of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program be compiled in anticipation of interviews of CIA personnel by Tom Brokaw of NBC News. The first draft included effectiveness claims relating to the "Second Wave" plotting, the Heathrow Airport plotting, the Karachi plotting, and the identification of a second shoe bomber. |1146| A subsequent draft sought to limit the information provided to what was already in the public record and included assertions about Issa al-Hindi, Iyman Faris, and Sajid Badat. |1147| That day, Deputy Director of CTC Philip Mudd told [XXX] that "we either get out and sell, or we get hammered, which has implications beyond the media. [C]ongress reads it, cuts our authorities, messes up our budget." |1148| The following day, the draft was cleared for release to the media. |1149|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On April 20, 2005, the same examples were circulated as part of an anticipated official public campaign to promote the "effectiveness" of the still-classified CIA program. |1150| In response, [XXX]CTC Legal, [XXX], expressed concern that "the examples cited, while true, and perhaps as far as we can go, are not nearly the most striking examples of lives saved." Referencing KSM's reporting on Iyman Faris, [XXX] noted that "we risk making ourselves look silly if the best we can do is the Brooklyn Bridge - perhaps we should omit specific examples rather than 'damn ourselves with faint praise.'" [XXX], who offered the Heathrow Airport plot as an example, made the following suggestion: "Can [Office of Public Affairs] be more strongly declarative - 'while we can't provide details' (or maybe we can) 'the program has produced intelligence that has directly saved 100's/1000's of American and other innocent lives'?" [XXX] then attached claims originally compiled in February 2004 for the purpose of responding to the draft OIG Special Review which, he wrote, described "some of the actionable intelligence acquired as a result of the Program and the lawful use of such techniques." |1151| The examples were inaccurate. |1152|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On June 24, 2005, Dateline NBC aired a program, accompanied by several online articles, which quoted CIA Director Goss and Deputy Director of CTC Mudd, as well as anonymous "top American intelligence officials." Among other claims, NBC reported that the capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh "le[d] ultimately" to the captures of KSM and Khallad bin Attash. |1153| This information was inaccurate. |1154|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) At the end of 2005, congressional concerns about the treatment of detainees again spurred interest at the CIA for public disclosures on the "effectiveness" of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. Specifically, congressional action on the Detainee Treatment Act (the "McCain amendment") prompted a CIA attorney working at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to express concern that legislative support was needed for the CIA to continue to use its enhanced interrogation techniques, and that a public information campaign would be required to garner that support. The CIA attorney described the "striking" similarities between the public debate surrounding the McCain amendment and the situation in Israel in 1999, in which the Israeli Supreme Court had "ruled that several... techniques were possibly permissible, but require some form of legislative sanction," and that the Israeli government "ultimately got limited legislative authority for a few specific techniques." |1155| The CIA attorney then wrote:

"Once this became a political reality here, it became incumbent on the Administration to publicly put forth some facts, if it wanted to preserve these powers. Yet, to date, the Administration has refused to put forth any specific examples of significant intelligence it adduced as a result of using any technique that could not reasonably be construed as cruel, inhuman or degrading. Not even any historical stuff from three or four years ago. What conclusions are to be drawn from the utter failure to offer a specific justification: That no such proof exists? That the Administration does not recognize the legitimacy of the political process on this issue? Or, that need to reserve the right to use these techniques really is not important enough to justify the compromise of even historical intelligence?" |1156|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) As described in more detail in the full Committee Study, the Administration sought legislative support to continue the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, and chose to do so by publicly disclosing the program in a 2006 speech by President Bush. The speech, which was based on CIA-provided information and vetted by the CIA, included numerous inaccurate representations about the CIA program and the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. The CIA's vetting of the speech is detailed in CIA "validation" documents, which include CIA concurrence and citations to records to support specific passages of the speech. For example, the CIA "Validation of Remarks" document includes the following:

"'...questioning the detainees in this program has given us information that has saved innocent lives by helping us to stop new attacks - here in the United States and across the world.'

CIA concurs with this assessment. Information from detainees prevented -among others - the West Coast airliner plot, a plot to blow up an apartment building in the United States, a plot to attack various targets in the United Kingdom, and plots against targets in Karachi and the Arabian Gulf. These attacks would undoubtedly have killed thousands." |1157|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Multiple iterations of the CIA "validation" documents reflect changes to the speech as it was being prepared. One week before the scheduled speech, a passage in the draft speech made inaccurate claims about the role played by Abu Zubaydah in the capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh and the role of Abu Zubaydah and Ramzi bin al-Shibh in the capture of KSM, but did not explicitly connect these claims to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. In an August 31, 2006, email exchange, CIA officers proposed the following language for the speech:

"That same year, information from Zubaydah led the CIA to the trail of one of KSM's accomplices, Ramzi bin al Shibh. Information from Zubaydah together with information from Shibh gave the CIA insight into al-Qa'ida's 9/11 attack planning and the importance of KSM. With the knowledge that KSM was the 'mastermind,' [XXX] Pakistani partners planned and mounted an operation that resulted in his eventual capture and detention." |1158|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The August 31, 2006, email exchange included citations to CIA cables to support the proposed passage; however, neither the cables, nor any other CIA records, support the assertions. |1159|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Within a few days, the passage in the draft speech relating to the captures of Ramzi bin al-Shibh and KSM was modified to connect the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah to the capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh. The updated draft now credited information from Abu Zubaydah and Ramzi bin al-Shibh with "help[ing] in the planning and execution of the operation that captured Khalid Sheikh Mohammed." The updated draft speech stated:

"Zubaydah [zoo-BAY-da] was questioned using these [interrogation] procedures, and he soon began to provide information on key al-Qaida operatives - including information that helped us find and capture more of those responsible for the attacks of Nine-Eleven. For example, Zubaydah [zoo-BAY-da] identified one of KSM's accomplices in the Nine-Eleven attacks - a terrorist named Ramzi bin al Shibh [SHEEB]. The information Zubaydah [zoo-BAY-da] provided helped lead to the capture of bin al Shibh. And together these two terrorists provided information that helped in the planning and execution of the operation that captured Khalid Sheikh Mohammed." |1160|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) An updated CIA "validation" document concurring with the proposed passage provided a modified list of CIA cables as "sources" to support the passage. Cable citations to Abu Zubaydah's reporting prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were removed. |1161| Like the previous version, the CIA's updated "validation" document did not cite to any cables demonstrating that information from Abu Zubaydah "helped lead to the capture of [Ramzi] bin al-Shibh." |1162| Similarly, none of the cables cited to support the passage indicated that information from Abu Zubaydah and Ramzi bin al-Shibh (who was in foreign government custody when he provided the information cited by the CIA) "helped in the planning and execution of the operation that captured [KSM]." |1163| As described elsewhere in this summary, there are no CIA records to support these claims. |1164|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The CIA documents validating the president's speech addressed other passages that were likewise unsupported by the CIA's cited cables. For example, the speech included an inaccurate claim regarding KSM that had been part of the CIA's representations on the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques since 2003. The speech stated:

"Once in our custody, KSM was questioned by the CIA using these procedures, and he soon provided information that helped us stop another planned attack on the United States. During questioning, KSM told us about another al Qaeda operative he knew was in CIA custody - a terrorist named Majid Khan. KSM revealed that [Majid] Khan had been told to deliver $50,000 to individuals working for a suspected terrorist leader named Hambali, the leader of al Qaeda's Southeast Asian affiliate known as 'J-I.' CIA officers confronted Khan with this information. Khan confirmed that the money had been delivered to an operative named Zubair, and provided both a physical description and contact number for this operative. Based on that information, Zubair was captured in June of 2003, and he soon provided information that helped lead to the capture of Hambali." |1165|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) As support for this passage, the CIA cited a June 2003 cable describing a CIA interrogation of Majid Khan in which Majid Khan discussed Zubair. |1166| The CIA "validation" document did not include cable citations from March 2003 that would have revealed that Majid Khan provided this information while in foreign government custody, prior to the reporting from KSM. |1167|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On September 6, 2006, President Bush delivered the speech based on the CIA-vetted information. |1168| On September 8, 2006, the chief of the [XXX] Department in CTC, who had participated in the CIA's validation of the speech, distributed the "final validation document" for possible updates or changes. In an email, [XXX] urged the recipients to "[p]lease look very carefully, as this is going to be a very important document." |1169|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On September 11, 2006, a CIA officer responded, questioning the passage in the speech related to the capture of KSM, as well as the relevance of the CIA cables cited in the validation document to support the passage. The CIA officer questioned whether a CIA cable describing Ramzi bin al-Shibh's identification of "Ammar" supported the claim that bin al-Shibh's reporting helped lead to the capture of KSM. The officer wrote:

"I presume the information in this cable that supports the statement is Ramzi's admission regarding Ammar?? Did that actually help lead us to KSM?? not sure who did this section, but we may want to double-check this and provide additional cables on how this actually 'assisted us'. This also seems to be a point critics in the press seem to be picking on. I will do some digging on my own as well." |1170|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) There are no CIA records to indicate that the CIA officer's comments about the inadequate sourcing were further addressed. As described in this summary, and in more detail in Volume II, there are no CIA records to support the passage in the speech related to the capture of KSM.

(TS//[XXX]//NF) After the speech, press accounts challenging aspects of the speech became the subject of internal discussion among some CIA officers. On September 7, 2006, the chief of the [XXX] Department in CTC, [XXX], sent an email stating: "The NY Times has posted a story predictably poking holes in the President's speech." Defending the passage in the speech asserting that, after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, Abu Zubaydah provided information "that helped lead to the capture of bin al-Shibh," [XXX] explained:

"...we knew Ramzi bin al-Shibh was involved in 9/11 before AZ was captured; however, AZ gave us information on his recent activities that–when added into other information–helped us track him. Again, on this point, we were very careful and the speech is accurate in what it says about bin al-Shibh." |1171|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) [XXX]'s statement, that Abu Zubaydah provided "information on [bin al-Shibh's] recent activities" that "helped [CIA] track him," was not supported by the cables cited in the CIA's "validation" document, or any other CIA record. [XXX]'s email did not address the other representation in the president's speech–that Abu Zubaydah "identified" Ramzi bin al-Shibh. |1172|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The New York Times article also challenged the representation in the speech that Abu Zubaydah "disclosed" that KSM was the "mastermind behind the 9/11 attacks and used the alias 'Mukhtar,'" and that "[t]his was a vital piece of the puzzle that helped our intelligence community pursue KSM." As the New York Times article noted, the 9/11 Commission had pointed to a cable from August 2001 that identified KSM as "Mukhtar." In her email, acknowledged the August 2001 report identifying KSM as "Mukhtar" and provided additional information on the drafting of the speech:

"[O]n 28 August, 2001, in fact, [CIA's] [database] does show a report from [a source] stating that Mohammad Rahim's brother Zadran told him that KSM was now being called 'Mukhtar.' Moreover, we were suspicious that KSM might have been behind 9/11 as early as 12 Sept 2001, and we had some reporting indicating he was the mastermind. We explained this latter fact to the White House, although the 28 August report escaped our notice." |1173|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In her email, [XXX] stated that "[t]he fact that the 9/11 commission, with 20-20 hindsight, thinks we should have known this in August 2001 does not alter the fact that we didn't." |1174|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In addition to the New York Times article, the CIA was concerned about an article by Ron Suskind in Time Magazine that also challenged the assertions in the speech about the captures of Ramzi bin al-Shibh and KSM. |1175| In a September 11, 2006, email, the chief of the [XXX] Department in CTC, [XXX], wrote: "[w]e are not claiming [Abu Zubaydah] provided exact locational information, merely that he provided us with information that helped in our targeting efforts." [XXX]'s email did not address the representations in the president's speech that Abu Zubaydah "identified" Ramzi bin al-Shibh and that the information from Abu Zubaydah "helped lead to the capture" of bin al-Shibh. With regard to the capture of KSM, [XXX]'s email acknowledged that Suskind's assertion that "the key was a cooperative source" was "correct as far as it goes, but the priority with which we pursued KSM changed once AZ conclusively identified him as the mastermind of 9/11." |1176| [XXX]'s email did not address the representation in the president's speech that Abu Zubaydah, along with Ramzi bin al-Shibh, "helped in the planning and execution of the operation that captured Khalid Sheikh Mohammed." [XXX]'s statements about the captures of Ramzi bin al-Shibh and KSM are not supported by CIA records. |1177|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The president's September 6, 2006, speech, which was based on CIA-provided information and vetted by the CIA, was the first detailed, formal public representation about the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. |1178| The inaccurate representations in the speech have been repeated in numerous articles, books, and broadcasts. The speech was also relied upon by the OLC in its July 20, 2007, memorandum on the legality of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, specifically to support the premise that the use of the techniques was effective in "producing substantial quantities of otherwise unavailable intelligence." |1179|

D. CIA Representations About the Effectiveness of Its Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Against Specific CIA Detainees

(TS//[XXX]//NF) While the CIA made numerous general representations about the effectiveness of its enhanced interrogation techniques, CIA representations on specific detainees focused almost exclusively on two CIA detainees, Abu Zubaydah, detained on March 28, 2002, and KSM, detained on March 1, 2003. |1180|

1. Abu Zubaydah

(TS//[XXX]//NF) As described in greater detail in the full Committee Study, the CIA provided significant information to policymakers and the Department of Justice on the CIA's decision to use the newly developed CIA "enhanced interrogation techniques" on Abu Zubaydah and the effects of doing so. These representations were provided by the CIA to the CIA OIG, |1181| the White House, |1182| the Department of Justice, |1183| Congress, |1184| and the American public. |1185| The representations include that: (1) Abu Zubaydah told the CIA he believed "the general US population was 'weak,' lacked resilience, and would be unable to 'do what was necessary"; |1186| (2) Abu Zubaydah stopped cooperating with U.S. government personnel using traditional interrogation techniques; |1187| (3) Abu Zubaydah's interrogation team believed the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques would result in critical information on terrorist operatives and plotting; |1188| and (4) the use of CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Abu Zubaydah was effective in eliciting critical intelligence from Abu Zubaydah. |1189| These representations are not supported by internal CIA records.

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The CIA representation that Abu Zubaydah "expressed [his] belief that the general US population was 'weak,' lacked resilience, and would be unable to 'do what was necessary' to prevent the terrorists from succeeding in their goals" is not supported by CIA records. |1190| On August 30, 2006, a CIA officer from the CIA's al-Qa'ida Plans and Organization Group wrote: "we have no records that 'he declared that America was weak, and lacking in resilience and that our society did not have the will to 'do what was necessary' to prevent the terrorists from succeeding in their goals.'" |1191| In a CIA Sametime communication that same day, a CIA ALEC Station officer wrote, "I can find no reference to AZ being deifant [sic] and declaring America weak... in fact everything I have read indicated he used a non deifiant [sic] resistance strategy." In response, the chief of the [XXX] Department in CTC, [XXX], wrote: "I've certainly heard that said of AZ for years, but don't know why...." The CIA ALEC Station officer replied, "probably a combo of [deputy chief of ALEC Station, [XXX]] and [[XXX]]... I'll leave it at that." The chief of the [XXX] Department completed the exchange, writing "yes, believe so... and agree, we shall pass over in silence." |1192|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The CIA representation that Abu Zubaydah stopped cooperating with debriefers using traditional interrogation techniques is also not supported by CIA records. |1193| In early June 2002, Abu Zubaydah's interrogators recommended that Abu Zubaydah spend several weeks in isolation while the interrogation team members traveled [XXX] "as a means of keeping [Abu Zubaydah] off-balance and to allow the team needed time off for a break and to attend to personal matters [XXX]," as well as to discuss "the endgame" for Abu Zubaydah [XXX] with officers from CIA Headquarters. |1194| As a result, Abu Zubaydah spent much of June 2002, and all of July 2002, 47 days in total, in isolation. When CIA officers next interrogated Abu Zubaydah, they immediately used the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, including the waterboard. |1195| Prior to this isolation period, Abu Zubaydah provided information on al-Qa'ida activities, plans, capabilities, and relationships, in addition to information on its leadership structure, including personalities, decision-making processes, training, and tactics. |1196| Abu Zubaydah provided the same type of information prior to, during, and after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. |1197| Abu Zubaydah's inability to provide information on the next attack in the United States–and operatives in the United States–provided the basis for CIA representations that Abu Zubaydah was "uncooperative," as well as for the CIA's determination that Abu Zubaydah required the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques to become "compliant" and reveal the information that CIA Headquarters believed he was withholding. The CIA further stated that Abu Zubaydah could stop the application of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, like the waterboard, by providing the names of operatives in the United States or information to stop the next attack. |1198| At no point during or after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques did Abu Zubaydah provide this type of information. |1199|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The CIA representation that Abu Zubaydah's interrogation team believed the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques would result in new information on operatives in the United States and terrorist plotting is also incongruent with CIA records. While Abu Zubaydah was in isolation in July 2002, CIA Headquarters informed the Department of Justice and White House officials that Abu Zubaydah's interrogation team believed Abu Zubaydah possessed information on terrorist threats to, and al-Qa'ida operatives in, the United States. |1200| The CIA officials further represented that the interrogation team had concluded that the use of more aggressive methods "is required to persuade Abu Zubaydah to provide the critical information needed to safeguard the lives of innumerable innocent men, women, and children within the United States and abroad," and warned "countless more Americans may die unless we can persuade AZ to tell us what he knows." |1201| However, according to CIA cables, the interrogation team at the detention site had not determined that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were required for Abu Zubaydah to provide such threat information. Rather, the interrogation team wrote "[o]ur assumption is the objective of this operation is to achieve a high degree of confidence that [Abu Zubaydah] is not holding back actionable information concerning threats to the United States beyond that which [Abu Zubaydah] has already provided." |1202|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The CIA representation that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Abu Zubaydah was effective in producing critical threat information on terrorists and terrorist plotting against the United States is also not supported by CIA records. Abu Zubaydah did not provide the information for which the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were justified and approved–information on the next attack and operatives in the United States. |1203| According to CIA records, Abu Zubaydah provided information on "al-Qa'ida activities, plans, capabilities, and relationships," in addition to information on "its leadership structure, including personalities, decision-making processes, training, and tactics." |1204| This type of information was provided by Abu Zubaydah prior to, during, and after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. |1205| At no point during or after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques did Abu Zubaydah provide information on al-Qa'ida cells in the United States or operational plans for terrorist attacks against the United States. |1206| Further, a quantitative review of Abu Zubaydah's intelligence reporting indicates that more intelligence reports were disseminated from Abu Zubaydah's first two months of interrogation, before the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques and when FBI special agents were directly participating, than were derived during the next two-month phase of interrogations, which included the non-stop use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques 24 hours a day for 17 days. |1207| Nonetheless, on August 30, 2002, the CIA informed the National Security Council that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were effective and "producing meaningful results." |1208| Shortly thereafter, however, in October 2002, CIA records indicate that President Bush was informed in a Presidential Daily Brief (PDB) that "Abu Zubaydah resisted providing useful information until becoming more cooperative in early August, probably in the hope of improving his living conditions." The PDB made no reference to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. |1209| Subsequently, the CIA represented to other senior policymakers and the Department of Justice that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were successfully used to elicit critical information from Abu Zubaydah. |1210| For example, in a March 2, 2005, CIA memorandum to the Department of Justice, the CIA represented that information obtained from Abu Zubaydah on the "Dirty Bomb Plot" and Jose Padilla was acquired only "after applying [enhanced] interrogation techniques." |1211| This CIA representation was repeated in numerous CIA communications with policymakers and the Department of Justice. |1212| The information provided by the CIA was inaccurate. On the evening of April 20, 2002, prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, Abu Zubaydah provided this information to FBI officers who were using rapport building interrogation techniques. |1213|

2. Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM)

(TS//[XXX]//NF) As described in more detail in the full Committee Study, the CIA provided significant inaccurate information to policymakers on the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques in the interrogation of KSM. These representations were provided by the CIA to the OIG, |1214| the White House, |1215| the Department of Justice, |1216| the Congress, |1217| and the American public. |1218| The representations include that: (1) KSM provided little threat information or actionable intelligence prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques; |1219| (2) the CIA overcame KSM's resistance through the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques; |1220| (3) the CIA's waterboard interrogation technique was particularly effective in eliciting information from KSM; |1221| (4) KSM "recanted little of the information" he had provided, and KSM's information was "generally accurate" and "consistent"; |1222| (5) KSM made a statement to CIA personnel–"soon, you will know"– indicating an attack was imminent upon his arrest; and (6) KSM believed "the general US population was 'weak,' lacked resilience, and would be unable to 'do what was necessary." |1223| These representations are not supported by internal CIA records.

(TS//[XXX]//NF) While the CIA represented to multiple parties that KSM provided little threat information or actionable intelligence prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, CIA records indicate that KSM was subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques within "a few minutes" of first being questioned by CIA interrogators. |1224| This material fact was omitted from CIA representations.

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The CIA represented that the CIA overcame KSM's resistance to interrogation by using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. |1225| CIA records do not support this statement. To the contrary, there are multiple CIA records describing the ineffectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques in gaining KSM's cooperation. On March 26, 2003, the day after the CIA last used its enhanced interrogation techniques on KSM, KSM was described as likely lying and engaged in an effort "to renew a possible resistance stance." |1226| On April 2, 2003, the Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism (IICT) produced an assessment of KSM's intelligence entitled, "Precious Truths, Surrounded by a Bodyguard of Lies." The assessment concluded that KSM was withholding information or lying about terrorist plots and operatives targeting the United States. |1227| During and after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, the CIA repeatedly expressed concern that KSM was lying and withholding information in the context of CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear) programs, |1228| plotting against U.S. interests in Karachi, Pakistan, |1229| plotting against Heathrow Airport, |1230| Abu Issa al-Britani, |1231| as well as the "Second Wave" plotting against the "tallest building in California," which prompted the CIA's ALEC Station to note in a cable dated April 22, 2003, that it "remain[e]d concerned that KSM's progression towards full debriefing status is not yet apparent where it counts most, in relation to threats to US interests, especially inside CONUS." |1232|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The CIA repeatedly represented that the CIA's waterboard interrogation technique was particularly effective in eliciting information from KSM. |1233| This representation is not supported by CIA records. Numerous CIA personnel, including members of KSM's interrogation team, expressed their belief that the waterboard interrogation technique was ineffective on KSM. The on-site medical officer told the inspector general that after three or four days it became apparent that the waterboard was ineffective and that KSM "hated it but knew he could manage." |1234| KSM debriefer and Deputy Chief of ALEC Station [XXX] told the inspector general that KSM "figured out a way to deal with [the waterboard]," |1235| and she relayed in a 2005 Sametime communication that "we broke KSM... using the Majid Khan stuff... and the emails;"in other words by confronting KSM with information from other sources. |1236| [XXX]CTC Legal, [XXX] told the inspector general that the waterboard "was of limited use on KSM." |1237| A KSM interrogator told the inspector general that KSM had "beat the system," |1238| and assessed that KSM responded to "creature comforts and sense of importance" and not to "confrontational" approaches. |1239| The interrogator later wrote in a Sametime communication that KSM and Abu Zubaydah "held back" despite the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, adding "I'm ostracized whenever I suggest those two did not tell us everything. How dare I think KSM was holding back." |1240| In April 2003, [XXX]OMS told the inspector general that the waterboard had "not been very effective on KSM." He also "questioned how the repeated use of the waterboard was categorically different from 'beating the bottom of my feet,' or from torture in general." |1241|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The CIA repeatedly represented that KSM had "recanted little of the information" he had provided, and that KSM's information was "generally accurate" and "consistent." |1242| This assertion is not supported by CIA records. Throughout the period during which KSM was subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, KSM provided inaccurate information, much of which he would later acknowledge was fabricated and recant. Specifically, KSM's fabrications and recantations covered his activities immediately before his capture, |1243| the identity of an individual whom he described as the protector of his children, |1244| plotting against a U.S. aircraft carrier, a meeting with Abu Faraj al-Libi, and the location of Hassan Ghul. |1245| KSM fabricated significant information, which he would later recant, related to Jaffar al-Tayyar, stating that al-Tayyar and Jose Padilla were plotting together, |1246| linking al-Tayyar to Heathrow Airport plotting |1247| and to Majid Khan's plotting, |1248| and producing what CIA officials described as an "elaborate tale" linking al-Tayyar to an assassination plot against former President Jimmy Carter. |1249| KSM later explained that "he had been forced to lie" about al-Tayyar due to the pressure from CIA interrogators. |1250| KSM recanted other information about the Heathrow Airport plotting, including information regarding the targeting, |1251| additional operatives, and the tasking of prospective pilots to study at flight schools. |1252| KSM provided significant information on Abu Issa al-Britani (Dhiren Barot) that he would later recant, including linking Abu Issa al-Britani to Jaffar al-Tayyar and to the Heathrow Airport plot. |1253| Under direct threat of additional waterboarding, |1254| KSM told CIA interrogators that he had sent Abu Issa al-Britani to Montana to recruit African-American Muslim converts. |1255| In June 2003, KSM stated he fabricated the story because he was "under 'enhanced measures' when he made these claims and simply told his interrogators what he thought they wanted to hear." |1256| KSM also stated that he tasked Majid Khan with recruiting Muslims in the United States, |1257| which he would later recant. |1258| On May 3, 2003, CIA officers recommended revisiting the information KSM had provided "during earlier stages of his interrogation process," noting that "he has told us that he said some things during this phase to get the enhanced measures to stop, therefore some of this information may be suspect." |1259|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The CIA also repeatedly referred to a comment made by KSM while he was still in Pakistani custody as indicating that KSM had information on an imminent attack. In reports to the inspector general, |1260| the national security advisor, |1261| and the Department of Justice, |1262| among others, the CIA represented that:

"When asked about future attacks planned against the United States, he coldly replied 'Soon, you will know.' In fact, soon we did know - after we initiated enhanced measures." |1263|

Contrary to CIA representations, CIA records indicate that KSM's comment was interpreted by CIA officers with KSM at the time as meaning that KSM was seeking to use his future cooperation as a "bargaining chip" with more senior CIA officers. |1264|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Finally, the CIA attributed to KSM, along with Abu Zubaydah, the statement that "the general US population was 'weak,' lacked resilience, and would be unable to 'do what was necessary' to prevent the terrorists from succeeding in their goals." |1265| There are no CIA operational or interrogation records to support the representation that KSM or Abu Zubaydah made these statements.

E. CIA Effectiveness Claims Regarding a "High Volume of Critical Intelligence"

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The CIA represented that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques resulted in the collection of "a high volume of critical intelligence |1266| on al-Qa'ida." |1267| The Committee evaluated the "high volume" of intelligence collected by compiling the total number of sole source and multi-source disseminated intelligence reports from the 119 known CIA detainees. |1268|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The CIA informed the Committee that its interrogation program was successful in developing intelligence and suggested that all CIA detainees produced disseminated intelligence reporting. For example, in September 2006, CIA Director Michael Hayden provided the following testimony to the Committee:

Senator Bayh: "I was impressed by your statement about how effective the [CIA's enhanced interrogation] techniques have been in eliciting important information to the country, at one point up to 50 percent of our information about al-Qa'ida. I think you said 9000 different intelligence reports?"

Director Hayden: "Over 8000, sir."

Senator Bayh: "And yet this has come from, I guess, only thirty individuals."

Director Hayden: "No, sir, 96, all 96." |1269|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In APril 2007, CIA Director Hayden testified that the CIA's interrogation program existed "for one purpose - intelligence," and that it is "the most successful program being conducted by American intelligence today" for "preventing attacks, disabling al-Qa'ida." |1270| At this hearing Director Hayden again suggested that the CIA interrogation program was successful in obtaining intelligence from all CIA detainees. |1271| A transcript of that hearing included the following exchange:

Senator Snowe: "General Hayden. Of the 8000 intelligence reports that were provided, as you said, by 30 of the detainees."

Director Hayden: "By all 97, ma'am." |1272|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The suggestion that all CIA detainees provided information that resulted in intelligence reporting is not supported by CIA records. CIA records reveal that 34 percent of the 119 known CIA detainees produced no intelligence reports, and nearly 70 percent produced fewer than 15 intelligence reports. Of the 39 detainees who were, according to CIA records, subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, nearly 20 percent produced no intelligence reports, while 40 percent produced fewer than 15 intelligence reports. While the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program did produce significant amounts of disseminated intelligence reporting (5,874 sole-source intelligence reports), this reporting was overwhelmingly derived from a small subset of CIA detainees. For example, of the 119 CIA detainees identified in the Study, 89 percent of all disseminated intelligence reporting was derived from 25 CIA detainees. Five CIA detainees produced more than 40 percent of all intelligence reporting from the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. CIA records indicate that two of the five detainees were not subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. |1273|

F. The Eight Primary CIA Effectiveness Representations–the Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques "Enabled the CIA to Disrupt Terrorist Plots" and "Capture Additional Terrorists"

(TS//[XXX]//NF) From 2003 through 2009, |1274| the CIA consistently and repeatedly represented that its enhanced interrogation techniques were effective and necessary to produce critical intelligence that "enabled the CIA to disrupt terrorist plots, capture additional terrorists, and collect a high-volume of critical intelligence on al-Qa'ida." The CIA further stated that the information acquired as a result of the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques could not have been acquired by the U.S. government in any other way ("otherwise unavailable"). |1275| The CIA also represented that the best measure of effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was examples of specific terrorist plots "thwarted" and specific terrorists captured as a result of the use of the CIA's techniques.

(TS//[XXX]//NF) For example, in a December 2004 CIA memorandum prepared for the national security advisor, the CIA wrote that there was "no way to conduct" an "independent study of the foreign intelligence efficacy of using enhanced interrogation techniques," but stated, "[t]he Central Intelligence Agency can advise you that this program works and the techniques are effective in producing foreign intelligence." To illustrate the effectiveness of the CIA's interrogation techniques, the CIA provided 11 examples of "[k]ey intelligence collected from HVD interrogations after applying interrogation techniques," nine of which referenced specific terrorist plots or the capture of specific terrorists. |1276| Similarly, under the heading, "Plots Discovered as a Result of EITs," a CIA briefing prepared for President Bush in November 2007 states, "reporting statistics alone will not provide a fair and accurate measure of the effectiveness of EITs." Instead, the CIA provided eight "examples of key intelligence collected from CIA detainee interrogations after applying the waterboard along with other interrogation techniques," seven of which referenced specific terrorist plots or the capture of specific terrorists. |1277|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The Committee selected 20 CIA documents that include CIA representations about the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques from 2003 through 2009. The 20 CIA documents, which were consistent with a broader set of CIA representations made during this period, include materials the CIA prepared for the White House, the Department of Justice, the Congress, the CIA Office of Inspector General, as well as incoming members of President Obama's national security team, and the public. The Committee selected the following 20 CIA documents:

1. July and September 2003: CIA Briefing Documents Seeking Policy Reaffirmation of the CIA Interrogation Program from White House Officials, "Review of Interrogation Program." |1278|

2. February 2004: The CIA's Response to the Draft Inspector General Special Review, CIA "Comments to Draft IG Special Review, 'Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program,'" and attachment, "Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities." |1279|

3. July 2004: CIA Intelligence Assessment, "Khalid Shaykh Muhammad: Preeminent Source on Al-Qa'ida." |1280|

4. December 2004: CIA Memorandum for the President's National Security Advisor, "Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques." |1281|

5. March 2005: CIA Memorandum for the Office of Legal Counsel, "Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques." |1282|

6. March 2005: CIA "Briefing for Vice President Cheney: CIA Detention and Interrogation Program." |1283|

7. March 2005: CIA Talking Points for the National Security Council, "Effectiveness of the High-Value Detainee Interrogation (HVDI) Techniques." |1284|

8. April 2005: CIA "Briefing Notes on the Value of Detainee Reporting" provided to the Department of Justice for the OLC's assessment of the legality of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. |1285|

9. April 2005: CIA "Materials of KSM and Abu Zubaydah" and additional CIA documents provided to the Department of Justice for the OLC's assessment of the legality of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. |1286|

10. June 2005: CIA Intelligence Assessment, "Detainee Reporting Pivotal for the War Against Al-Qa'ida." |1287|

11. December 2005: CIA Document entitled, "Future of CIA's Counterterrorist Detention and Interrogation Program," with the attachment, "Impact of the Loss of the Detainee Program to CT Operations and Analysis," from CIA Director Porter Goss to Stephen Hadley, Assistant to the President/National Security Advisor, Frances Townsend, Assistant to the President/Homeland Security Advisor, and Ambassador John Negroponte, the Director of National Intelligence. |1288|

12. May 2006: CIA Briefing for the President's Chief of Staff, "CIA Rendition, Detention and Interrogation Programs," on the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. |1289|

13. July 2006: CIA Memorandum for the Director of National Intelligence, "Detainee Intelligence Value Update." |1290|

14. September 2006: CIA documents supporting the President's September 6, 2006, speech, including representations on the effectiveness of the CIA's interrogation program, including: "DRAFT Potential Public Briefing of CIA's High-Value Terrorist Interrogations Program," "CIA Validation of Remarks on Detainee Policy," and "Summary of the High Value Terrorist Detainee Program." |1291|

15. April 2007: CIA Director Michael Hayden's Testimony to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence describing the effectiveness of the CIA's interrogation program. |1292|

16. October 2007: CIA Talking Points for the Senate Appropriations Committee, addressing the effectiveness of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, entitled, "Talking Points Appeal of the $[XXX] Million Reduction in CIA/CTC's Rendition and Detention Program." |1293|

17. November 2007: CIA Director Talking Points for the President, entitled, "Waterboard 06 November 2007," on the effectiveness of the CIA's waterboard interrogation technique. |1294|

18. January 2009: CIA Briefing for President-elect Obama's National Security Transition Team on the value of the CIA's "Renditions, Detentions, and Interrogations (RDI)." |1295|

19. February 2009: CIA Briefing for CIA Director Leon Panetta on the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, including "DCIA Briefing on RDI Program-18FEB.2009," "Key Intelligence and Reporting Derived from Abu Zubaydah and Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM)," "EITs and Effectiveness," "Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment (AZ and KSM)," "Background on Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment," and "Background on Key Captures and Plots Disrupted," among other CIA documents. |1296|

20. March 2009: CIA Memorandum for the Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, including representations on the "Key Captures and Disrupted Plots Gained from HVDs in the RDI Program." |1297|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) From the 20 CIA documents, the Committee identified the CIA's eight most frequently cited examples of "thwarted" plots and captured terrorists that the CIA attributed to information acquired from the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques:

Eight Most Frequently Cited Examples of Plots "Thwarted" and Terrorists Captured Provided by the CIA as Evidence for the Effectiveness of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Referenced X Number of Times in the 20 CIA Documents

1 The Thwarting of the Dirty Bomb/Tall Buildings Plot and the Capture of Jose Padilla 17/20

2 The Thwarting of the Karachi Plots 17/20

3 The Thwarting of the Second Wave Plot and the Discovery of the al-Ghuraba Group 18/20

4 The Thwarting of the United Kingdom Urban Targets Plot and the Capture of Dhiren Barot, aka Issa al-Hindi 17/20

5 The Identification, Capture, and Arrest of Iyman Faris 7/20

6 The Identification, Capture, and Arrest of Sajid Badat 17/20

7 The Thwarting of the Heathrow Airport and Canary Wharf Plotting 20/20

8 The Capture of Hambali 18/20

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The Committee sought to confirm that the CIA's representations about the most frequently cited examples of "thwarted" plots and captured terrorists were consistent with the more than six million pages of CIA detention and interrogation records provided to the Committee. Specifically, the Committee assessed whether the CIA's representations that its enhanced interrogation techniques produced unique, otherwise unavailable intelligence |1298| that led to the capture of specific terrorists and the "thwarting" of specific plots were accurate. |1299| The Committee found the CIA's representations to be inaccurate and unsupported by CIA records.

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Below are the summaries of the CIA's eight most frequently cited examples of "thwarted" plots and captured terrorists, as well as a description of the CIA's claims and an explanation for why the CIA representations were inaccurate and unsupported by CIA records. |1300|

1. The Thwarting of the Dirty Bomb/Tall Buildings Plot and the Capture of Jose Padilla

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Summary: The CIA represented that its enhanced interrogation techniques were effective and necessary to produce critical, otherwise unavailable intelligence, which enabled the CIA to disrupt terrorist plots, capture terrorists, and save lives. Over a period of years, the CIA provided the thwarting of terrorist plotting associated with, and the capture of, Jose Padilla, as evidence for the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. These CIA representations were inaccurate. The CIA first received reporting on the terrorist threat posed by Jose Padilla from a foreign government. Eight days later, Abu Zubaydah provided information on the terrorist plotting of two individuals, whom he did not identify by true name, to FBI special agents. Abu Zubaydah provided this information in April 2002, prior to the commencement of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques in August 2002. The plots associated with Jose Padilla were assessed by the Intelligence Community to be infeasible.

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Further Details: The Dirty Bomb/Tall Buildings plotting refers to terrorist plotting involving U.S. citizen Jose Padilla. Padilla and his associate, Binyam Mohammed, conceived the "Dirty Bomb Plot" after locating information, derived from what the CIA described as "a satirical internet article" entitled "How to Make an H-bomb," on a computer at a Pakistani safe house in early 2002. |1301| The article instructed would-be bomb makers to enrich uranium by placing it "in a bucket, attaching it to a six foot rope, and swinging it around your head as fast as possible for 45 minutes." |1302| Padilla and Mohammed approached Abu Zubaydah in early 2002, and later KSM, with their idea to build and use this device in the United States. |1303| Neither Abu Zubaydah nor KSM believed the plan was viable, |1304| but KSM provided funding for, and tasked Padilla to conduct, an operation using natural gas to create explosions in tall buildings in the United States, |1305| later known as the "Tall Buildings Plot." |1306|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The capture of, and the thwarting of terrorist plotting associated with Jose Padilla, is one of the eight most frequently cited examples provided by the CIA as evidence for the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. Over a period of years, CIA documents prepared for and provided to senior policymakers, intelligence officials, and the Department of Justice represent the identification and/or the capture of Jose Padilla, and/or the disruption of the "Dirty Bomb," and/or the "Tall Buildings" plotting, as examples of how "[k]ey intelligence collected from HVD interrogations after applying interrogation techniques" had "enabled CIA to disrupt terrorist plots" and "capture additional terrorists." |1307| The CIA farther represented that the intelligence acquired from the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was "otherwise unavailable" and "saved lives." |1308|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) For example, a document prepared for Vice President Cheney in advance of a March 8, 2005, National Security Council principals meeting states, under a section entitled "INTERROGATION RESULTS," that:

"Use of DOJ-authorized enhanced interrogation techniques, as part of a comprehensive interrogation approach, has enabled us to disrupt terrorist plots...

...Dirty Bomb Plot: Operatives Jose Padilla and Binyam Mohammed planned to build and detonate a 'dirty bomb' in the Washington DC area. Plot disrupted. Source: Abu Zubaydah." |1309|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Likewise, the July 20, 2007, Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) memorandum on the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques used CIA-provided information on Jose Padilla to describe the threat posed by al-Qa'ida and the success of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques to date. The July 20, 2007, OLC memorandum states:

"The CIA interrogation program–and, in particular, its use of enhanced interrogation techniques–is intended to serve this paramount interest [security of the Nation] by producing substantial quantities of otherwise unavailable intelligence. The CIA believes that this program 'has been a key reason why al-Qa'ida has failed to launch a spectacular attack in the West since 11 September 2001'... We understand that use of enhanced techniques has produced significant intelligence that the Government has used to keep the Nation safe. As the President explained [in his September 6, 2006 speech], 'by giving us information about terrorist plans we could not get anywhere else, the program has saved innocent lives'.. .For example, we understand that enhanced interrogation techniques proved particularly crucial in the interrogations of Khalid Shaykh Muhammad and Abu Zubaydah... Interrogations of Zubaydah–again, once enhanced techniques were employed–revealed two al-Qaeda operatives already in the United States |1310| and planning to destroy a high rise apartment building and to detonate a radiological bomb in Washington, D.C." |1311|

On April 21, 2009, a CIA spokesperson confirmed the accuracy of the information in the OLC memorandum in response to the partial declassification of this and other memoranda. |1312|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The CIA provided similar inaccurate representations regarding the thwarting of the Dirty Bomb plotting, the thwarting of the Tall Buildings plotting, and/or the capture of Jose Padilla in 17 of the 20 documents provided to policymakers and the Department of Justice between July 2003 and March 2009. |1313|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) A review of CIA operational cables and other CIA records found that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques played no role in the identification of "Jose Padilla" or the thwarting of the Dirty Bomb or Tall Buildings plotting. CIA records indicate that: (1) there was significant intelligence in CIA databases acquired prior to–and independently of–the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program to fully identify Jose Padilla as a terrorist threat and to disrupt any terrorist plotting associated with him; |1314| (2) Abu Zubaydah provided information on the terrorist plotting of two individuals who proposed an idea to conduct a "Dirty Bomb" attack, but did not identify their true names; (3) Abu Zubaydah provided this information to FBI special agents who were using rapport-building techniques, |1315| in April 2002, more than three months prior to the CIA's "use of DOJ-approved enhanced interrogation techniques"; |1316| and (4) the Intelligence Community internally assessed that the "Dirty Bomb" |1317| and "Tall Buildings" |1318| plots were infeasible as envisioned. |1319|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Prior to the capture of Abu Zubaydah on March 28, 2002, the CIA was alerted to the threat posed by Jose Padilla. In early 2001, U.S. government records indicated that a Jose Padilla came to the U.S. Consulate in Karachi to report a lost passport. These records indicated that Jose Padilla provided a "sketchy" story about overstaying his Pakistani visa and that he was "allegedly studying Islamic law in Egypt." A search of the State Department's Consular Lookout and Support System was conducted at the time, which resulted in "multiple" hits for "Jose Padilla." |1320| State Department records confirmed that Jose Padilla had sought a new passport at the U.S. Consulate in Karachi in February 2001, and was subsequently provided with a replacement on March 21, 2001. |1321|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On December 15, 2001, the CIA provided the FBI with documents obtained in Afghanistan from a purported al-Qa'ida-related safe house. Included in the binder were 180 terrorist training camp application forms entitled, "Mujahideen Identification Form / New Applicant Form." An application form for a then 33-year-old individual with the alias "Abu Abdullah al-Muhajir" from "America" was among the forms. "Al-Muhajir's" form–dated July 24, 2000–listed other identifying information, to include a "10/18/70" date of birth; language skills to include English, Spanish, and Arabic; travels to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen; and the individual's marital status. |1322|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On April 10, 2002, the CIA disseminated a cable with intelligence derived from the exploitation of documents obtained during the raids in which Abu Zubaydah was captured. Included in the CIA cable is a translation of a letter from mid-March 2002 that references a 33-year-old English-speaking individual. The cable states that the CIA believed this individual might be involved in "a martyrdom operation." The translation disseminated states: "There is a brother from Argentina, he speaks Spanish, English and Arabic, he is 33 years old, he is married and has two little children. He is a great brother. He knows business and studies English language. He trains [in] self defense, he is a good looking man." |1323|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The next day, April 11, 2002, the CIA was provided with information from Pakistani officials on a 33-year-old U.S. citizen named "Jose Padilla," with a date of birth of October 18, 1970, who was briefly detained by Pakistani officials on April 4, 2002. The Pakistani government provided a copy of Jose Padilla's U.S. passport and relayed that Jose Padilla had overstayed his travel visa, and that there were inconsistencies with Jose Padilla's appearance and accent. The CIA's [XXX] wrote that they would provide the information on "Jose Padilla" to the State Department's Regional Security Officer, and "would follow-up with [Pakistani officials] on this matter." |1324| The date of birth and travel information included with Jose Padilla's passport matched information on the "Mujahideen Identification Form" (33-year-old "American" referenced as "Abu Abdullah al-Muhajir") the CIA had provided to the FBI on December 15, 2001. |1325|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On April 12, 2002, Pakistani officials provided additional information to the CIA's [XXX], specifically that they had detained a U.S. passport holder named Jose Padilla and a British passport holder named "Fouad Zouaoui" (later identified as Binyam Muhammad), who had suspiciously attempted to depart Pakistan. According to the CIA cable, Pakistani authorities provided the information on the pair "due to concerns about possible terrorist activity." |1326| The cable noted that Pakistani authorities had to release Padilla, but that Padilla's associate remained in detention. |1327| (When questioned further, the Pakistani authorities stated that they suspected Jose Padilla of being "an al-Qa'ida member.") |1328| The information identifying Jose Padilla and "Fouad Zouaoui" as potential terrorists had been provided by the CIA's [XXX] to CIA Headquarters, several CIA Stations, and the State Department's Regional Security Officer (RSO) in Karachi by April 12, 2002. |1329| Using the identifying information in Jose Padilla's passport, provided by the Pakistani government, the CIA's [XXX] requested that CIA Headquarters and the CIA's [XXX] Station conduct "[XXX]" (a database search) using the name "Jose Padilla" and the other identifying information provided. |1330| The CIA's [XXX] requested that CIA Headquarters and the CIA's [XXX] Station do the same for Padilla's associate, Fouad Zouaoui. |1331| As a result, by April 12, 2002, the CIA was already alerted that a named U.S. citizen, "Jose Padilla," had spent significant time in Pakistan and was engaged in "possible terrorist activity." |1332|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Eight days after the CIA was informed that U.S. citizen Jose Padilla was engaged in "possible terrorist activity," on the evening of April 20, 2002, Abu Zubaydah told FBI special agents about two men who approached him with a plan to detonate a uranium-based explosive device in the United States (the "dirty bomb"). Abu Zubaydah stated he did not believe the plan was viable and did not know the true names of the two individuals, but did provide physical descriptions of the pair. |1333| This information was acquired after Abu Zubaydah was confronted with emails that indicated Abu Zubaydah had sent two individuals to KSM. |1334| The FBI special agents who acquired this information from Abu Zubaydah believed it was provided as a result of rapport-building interrogation techniques. |1335| Abu Zubaydah would not be subjected to the "use of DOJ-approved enhanced interrogation techniques" until August 2002, more than three months later. |1336|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Within two hours of the dissemination of this information, CIA officers [XXX] sent cables to CIA Headquarters and select CIA Stations calling attention to the similarities between Abu Zubaydah's reporting and their request from April 12, 2002, for information on Jose Padilla and Fouad Zouaoui, which had not yet been acted upon by the receiving offices. |1337| A travel alert was then initiated for Jose Padilla based on the previous information provided by the Pakistani government. Padilla was located and unknowingly escorted back to the United States by an FBI special agent on May 8, 2002. |1338| Upon his arrival in the United States Padilla was found to be carrying $10,526 in U.S. currency, an amount he failed to report. |1339| Padilla was interviewed and taken into FBI custody on a material witness warrant. |1340| The exploitation of Jose Padilla's pocket litter |1341| and phone revealed significant connections to known terrorists, including subjects of FBI terrorism investigations in the United States. |1342|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In separate debriefings, Padilla and his associate, Binyam Mohammed, maintained they had no intention of engaging in terrorist plotting, but proposed the "Dirty Bomb" plot in order to depart Pakistan, avoid combat in Afghanistan, and return home. |1343|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Over several years CIA officers identified errors in the CIA's representations concerning the "effectiveness" of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques in relation to the Abu Zubaydah reporting pertaining to Jose Padilla and Padilla's alleged plotting. In response to one such representation, the chief of the Abu Zubaydah Task Force wrote to [XXX]CTC Legal in 2002 that "AZ's info alone would never have allowed us to find [Jose Padilla and Binyam Mohammed]." |1344| In 2004, she sought to correct inaccurate CIA representations again, telling colleagues:

"AZ never really gave 'this is the plot' type of information. He claimed every plot/operation he had knowledge of and/or was working on was only preliminary. (Padilla and the dirty bomb plot was prior to enhanced and he never really gave us actionable intel to get them)." |1345|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In October 2005, the chief of CTC's CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear) Group wrote, under the heading, "Don't Put All Your Uranium in One Bucket":

"Jose Padilla: we'll never be able to successfully expunge Padilla and the 'dirty bomb' plot from the lore of disruption, but once again I'd like to go on the record that Padilla admitted that the only reason he came up with so-called 'dirty bomb' was that he wanted to get out of Afghanistan and figured that if he came up with something spectacular, they'd finance him. Even KSM says Padilla had a screw loose. He's a petty criminal who is well-versed in US criminal justice (he's got a rap sheet as long as my arm). Anyone who believes you can build an IND or RDD by 'putting uranium in buckets and spinning them clockwise over your head to separate the uranium' is not going to advance al-Qa'ida's nuclear capabilities." |1346|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) CIA and other U.S. government assessments also called into question the "Tall Buildings" plotting, which was loosely based on attacks that were conducted in Moscow in September 1999 using conventional explosives. The "Tall Buildings" plotting did not envision the use of conventional explosives. |1347| Instead, the plotting envisioned using natural gas to destroy high-rise residential buildings. As planned, the Intelligence Community assessed the plotting was not viable. |1348| An August 4, 2008, U.S. government assessment stated: "On the surface, the idea is simplistic, if not amateurish... the probability of an efficient fuel air explosion is low." |1349|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Jose Padilla was detained on a material witness warrant from May 8, 2002, to June 9, 2002, when he was transferred to U.S. military custody and designated an "enemy combatant." On January 3, 2006, Jose Padilla was transferred to U.S. law enforcement custody and tried in federal court. On August 16, 2007, Jose Padilla and two co-defendants, Adham Hassoun and Kifah Jayyousi, were found guilty of three criminal offenses relating to terrorist support activities from October 1993 to November 1, 2001. |1350| The case against Jose Padilla centered on his attendance at a terrorist training camp in Afghanistan in the fall of 2000–specifically, the terrorist training camp application form acquired by the CIA and provided to the FBI in December 2001. The form was found to have Jose Padilla's fingerprints, as well as identifying data to include his date of birth, languages spoken, and travels. |1351| On January 22, 2008, Jose Padilla was sentenced to 17 years in prison. On September 19, 2011, the U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled the sentence was too lenient in part because it did not take in account Jose Padilla's prior criminal offenses. |1352|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) After being detained in Pakistan, Jose Padilla's associate Binyam Mohammad was rendered by the CIA [XXX] on July [XXX], 2002, where he was held by the [XXX] government. On January [XXX], 2004, Binyam Mohammad was rendered to CIA custody. |1353| On May [XXX], 2004, Binyam Mohammad was transferred to the custody of the U.S. military in Bagram, Afghanistan. |1354| On September 21, 2004, he was transferred to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. |1355| Binyam Mohammad was then transferred from U.S. military custody to the United Kingdom on February 23, 2009. [XXX]. |1356| Lawyers representing Binyam Mohammad sued the government of the United Kingdom to compel the release of documents relating to his whereabouts and treatment after his initial detention in April 2002. |1357| In February 2010, a British court compelled the release "of a summary of the torture" to which Binyam Mohammed was subjected during his detention. In the fall of 2010, the British government awarded Binyam Mohammed a reported �1 million in compensation. |1358|

2. The Thwarting of the Karachi Plots

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Further Details: The Karachi Plot(s) refers to terrorist plotting that targeted a variety of U.S. and Western interests in the Karachi area, to include the U.S. Consulate, named hotels near the airport and beach, U.S. vehicles traveling between the Consulate and the airport, U.S. diplomatic housing, U.S. personnel subject to potential sniper attacks, as well as Pakistan's Faisal Army Base. |1359| CIA records indicate the CIA became aware of the initial plotting as early as September 2002, and that it was disrupted in April 2003, when the remaining plot leaders were arrested in a unilateral operation by Pakistani authorities. |1360| While the plot leaders were captured in the process of procuring explosives, they maintained that they were still in the process of locating vehicles, a safe house, and suicide operatives at the time of their arrest. |1361|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The thwarting of the Karachi Plot(s) is one of the eight most frequently cited examples provided by the CIA as evidence for the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. |1362| Over a period of years, CIA documents prepared for and provided to senior policymakers, intelligence officials, and the Department of Justice represent the Karachi Plot(s) as an example of how "[k]ey intelligence collected from HVD interrogations after applying interrogation techniques" had "enabled CIA to disrupt terrorist plots" and capture additional terrorists. |1363| The CIA further represented that the intelligence acquired from the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was "otherwise unavailable" and "saved lives." |1364|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) For example, in November 2007, the CIA prepared and provided a set of talking points to the CIA director for an "upcoming meeting with the President regarding the Waterboard Enhanced Interrogation Technique." |1365| The document includes a section entitled, "Plots Discovered as a Result of EITs," which states "reporting statistics alone will not provide a fair and accurate measure of the effectiveness of EITs." The document then provides a list of "Key Intelligence Derived through use of EITs," stating:

"CIA's use of DOJ-approved enhanced interrogation techniques, as part of a comprehensive interrogation approach, has enabled CIA to disrupt terrorist plots... The following are examples of key intelligence collected from CIA detainee interrogations after applying the waterboard along with other interrogation techniques: ...The Karachi Plot: This plan to conduct attacks against the US Consulate and other US interests in Pakistan was uncovered during the initial interrogations of Khallad Bin Attash and Ammar al-Baluchi and later confirmed by KSM." |1366|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Likewise, a CIA-prepared briefing for Vice President Cheney on the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques in March 2005, under a section of the briefing called, "INTERROGATION RESULTS," asserts:

"Use of DOJ-authorized enhanced interrogation techniques, as part of a comprehensive interrogation approach, has enabled us to disrupt terrorist plots, capture additional terrorists...The Karachi Plot: Plan to conduct attacks against the US Consulate and other US interests in Pakistan. Plot disrupted. Sources: Khallad Bin Attash, Ammar al-Baluchi. KSM also provided info on the plot after we showed him capture photos of Ammar and Khallad." |1367|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The CIA provided similar inaccurate representations regarding the thwarting of the Karachi Plot(s) in 17 of the 20 documents provided to policymakers and the Department of Justice between July 2003 and March 2009. |1368|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) A review of CIA operational cables and other documents found that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques–to include the waterboard–played no role in the disruption of the Karachi Plot(s). CIA records indicate that the Karachi Plot(s) was thwarted by the arrest of operatives and the interdiction of explosives by Pakistani authorities, specifically [XXX]. |1369|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The CIA had information regarding the Karachi terrorist plotting as early as September 11, 2002. |1370| On that day, a [XXX] raid conducted by [XXX] Pakistani authorities [XXX], of an al-Qaida safe house in Karachi, Pakistan, uncovered the "perfume letter," named as such because the term "perfumes" is used as a code word. The letter, written in May 2002, was from KSM to Hamza al-Zubayr, a known al-Qa'ida member who was killed in the raids. |1371| KSM's letter to al-Zubayr states, "Dear Brother, we have the green light for the hotels," and suggests "making it three instead of one." |1372| By early October 2002, the CIA had completed a search of the names identified in the "perfume letter" in its databases and found many of the individuals who "had assigned roles in support of the operation" were arrested by Pakistani authorities during the raids. |1373| At least one person in the letter, Khallad bin Attash, a known al-Qa'ida operative, remained at large. |1374|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) What remained of the Karachi plotting was disrupted unilaterally by Pakistani authorities as a result of a criminal lead. On April [XXX], 2003, Pakistani authorities, specifically [XXX], received a report that explosives and weapons were to be transported in a pickup truck to a specific location in Karachi. |1375| Pakistani authorities made arrangements to intercede, and, on April 29, 2003, they intercepted the vehicle and confiscated explosives, detonators, and ammunition. The driver of the vehicle provided the location where the explosives were being delivered, leading to the capture of several operatives, including Ammar al-Baluchi and Khallad bin Attash, as well as to the discovery of another explosives cache. A third captured individual stated that the explosives had belonged to Hamza al-Zubayr, the known and now deceased al-Qa'ida operative, as well as others residing in the home raided on September 11, 2002, where the "perfume letter" was discovered. |1376|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) While being arrested, Ammar al-Baluchi was asked by a Pakistani officer about his intentions regarding the seized explosives. Al-Baluchi responded that he was planning to attack the U.S. Consulate in Karachi. |1377| In foreign government custody–and prior to being rendered to CIA custody and subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques–Ammar al-Baluchi continued to provide information about the Karachi plotting to a foreign government officer who was using rapport-building interrogation techniques. |1378| The information provided by Ammar al-Baluchi on the plotting included the surveillance conducted, the envisioned targets, and the exact method of attack that was considered for the U.S. Consulate in Karachi and other hard targets. Ammar al-Baluchi discussed the use of a motorcycle with a bomb to breach the perimeter wall of the consulate and then how the operatives would seek to exploit that breach with a vehicle filled with explosives. |1379| Ammar al-Baluchi and Khallad bin Attash remained in foreign government custody for approximately [XXX] weeks, with Ammar al-Baluchi–and to a lesser extent bin Attash |1380|–responding to questions on a variety of matters, including the Karachi plotting. |1381|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On May [XXX], 2003, Ammar al-Baluchi and Khallad bin Attash were rendered to CIA custody and immediately subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. |1382| The next day, the CIA disseminated two intelligence reports on the Karachi Plot(s) from the interrogations of Ammar al-Baluchi and Khallad bin Attash. |1383| The reporting relayed that: (1) al-Qa'ida was targeting Western interests in Karachi, including the U.S. Consulate and Western housing in a specific neighborhood of Karachi; and (2) the attack could have occurred as early as "late May/early June 2003," but the plotters were still in the process of finding vehicles, a safe house, and the suicide operatives at the time of their arrest. |1384| These disseminated intelligence reports were used to support CIA representations in finished intelligence products, |1385| talking points, briefing documents, and President Bush's September 6, 2006, speech that the Karachi Plot(s) was "thwarted," "disrupted," or "uncovered" as a result of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. However, within 24 hours of the dissemination of these intelligence reports, CIA personnel in Karachi responded in an official cable that the information acquired from the CIA detainees and disseminated was already known to the CIA and U.S. Consulate officials. The cable stated:

"[w]hile reporting from both [al-Baluchi and bin Attash] was chilling- [CIA officers] had become aware of most of this reporting either through previous information or through interviews of al-Baluchi and [Khallad bin] Attash prior to their transfer out of Karachi." |1386|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The CIA personnel in Karachi reassured addressees that, in December 2002, [XXX] the U.S. Consulate in Karachi took increased steps to protect U.S. Consulate personnel based on similar terrorist threat reporting. According to the cable, Americans in the referenced housing area had already been vacated from the "area for several months," the potential for "attacks targeting Americans at the airport" had been "recognized several months ago," and new procedures and security measures had been put in place to minimize the risks associated with the potential terrorist attacks. |1387|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) As noted, in November 2007, the CIA prepared and provided a set of talking points to the CIA director for an "upcoming meeting with the President regarding the Waterboard Enhanced Interrogation Technique." Under a section entitled, "Plots Discovered as a Result of EITs," the document lists the "Karachi Plot," staring the disruption was the result of "key intelligence collected from CIA detainee interrogations after applying the waterboard along with other interrogation techniques," and that the plotting was "uncovered during the initial interrogations of Khallad Bin Attash and Ammar al-Baluchi and later confirmed by KSM." |1388| While Ammar al-Baluchi and Khallad bin Attash were subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, there are no CIA records to indicate that either was ever subjected to the CIA's waterboard interrogation technique. KSM did provide information on the plotting, but was assessed by CIA personnel to be withholding information on the plotting, more than a month after the CIA stopped using its enhanced interrogation techniques against KSM. In late April 2003, CIA interrogators confronted KSM with photographs demonstrating that Ammar al-Baluchi and Khallad bin Attash had been captured. When the CIA interrogators asked what Ammar al-Baluchi and Khallad bin Attash were "up to" in Karachi, KSM provided information regarding potential targets in Karachi. |1389| KSM's belated reporting prompted the CIA's ALEC Station to write a cable stating:

"We were disappointed to see that KSM only made these new admissions of planned attacks in Pakistan after seeing the capture photographs of Ammar al-Baluchi and Khallad. We consider KSM's long-standing omission of [this] information to be a serious concern, especially as this omission may well have cost American lives had Pakistani authorities not been diligent in following up on unrelated criminal leads that led to the capture of Ammar, bin Attash, and other probable operatives involved in the attack plans... Simply put, KSM has had every opportunity to come clean on this threat and, from our optic, he deliberately withheld the information until he was confronted with evidence that we already knew about it, or soon would know about it from Ammar and Khallad... KSM's provision of the Pakistan threat reporting - only after he was made aware of the capture of the attack planners - is viewed as a clear illustration of continued and deliberate withholding of threat information which he believed had not yet been compromised." |1390|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Ammar al-Baluchi, Khallad bin Attash, and KSM remained in CIA custody until their transfer to U.S. military custody at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in September 2006. |1391| All three remain in U.S. military custody.

3. The Thwarting of the Second Wave Plot and the Discovery of the Al-Ghuraba Group

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Further Details: Al-Qa'ida's "Second Wave" plotting refers to two efforts by KSM to strike the West Coast of the United States with airplanes using non-Arab passport holders. While intelligence reporting often conflated the "Second Wave" plotting, KSM viewed the plotting as two separate efforts. |1392| Neither of the two efforts was assessed to be imminent, as KSM was still engaged in the process of identifying suicide operatives and obtaining pilot training for potential participants when each effort was disrupted through the arrest or identification of the suspected operatives and operational planners. |1393|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The al-Ghuraba student group was established in late 1999 by Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) leaders primarily to educate the sons of jailed JI leaders and to groom the students for potential leadership and operational roles in JI. Some members of the al-Ghuraba group reportedly completed militant training in Afghanistan and Pakistan while enrolled at Islamic universities in Karachi. |1394| Despite CIA representations to the contrary, intelligence and open source reporting indicate the group was not "tasked with," witting, or involved in any aspect of KSM's Second Wave plotting. |1395|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The "discovery" and disruption of the "Second Wave Plot" (also known as the "West Coast Plot" and the "Tallest Building Plot"), |1396| along with the associated identification, discovery, and capture of the al-Ghuraba "cell," is one of the eight most frequently cited examples provided by the CIA as evidence for the effectiveness of CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. |1397| Over a period of years, CIA documents prepared for and provided to senior policymakers, intelligence officials, and the Department of Justice represent the thwarting and discovery of the "Second Wave" plotting and the identification, discovery, or arrest of the al-Ghuraba group members as an example of how "[k]ey intelligence collected from HVD interrogations after applying interrogation techniques" had "enabled CIA to disrupt terrorist plots" and "capture additional terrorists." |1398| The CIA further represented that the intelligence acquired from the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was "otherwise unavailable" and "saved lives." |1399|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) For example, in November 2007, the CIA prepared a briefing for President Bush. Under a section entitled, "Plots Discovered as a Result of EITs," the CIA represented that the CIA "learned" about the "Second Wave" plotting and the al-Ghuraba group only "after applying the waterboard along with other interrogation techniques." |1400|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Likewise, on March 2, 2005, the CIA provided the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) with a document entitled, "Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques." The CIA memorandum stated that the "Central Intelligence Agency can advise you that this program works and the techniques are effective in producing foreign intelligence." |1401| The CIA stated that "enhanced interrogation techniques... [have] enabled CIA to disrupt plots" and "capture additional terrorists." The document then listed 11 examples of "key intelligence collected from HVD interrogations after applying interrogation techniques," |1402| including:

"The 'Second Wave': This was a KSM plot to use East Asian operatives to crash a hijacked airliner into the tallest building on the US West Coast (Los Angeles) as a follow-on to 9/11. We learned this during the initial interrogation of KSM and later confirmed it through the interrogation of Hambali and Khallad.

...The Guraba Cell: We learned of this 17-member Jemaah Islamiyah cell from Hambali, who confirmed that some of the cell's operatives were identified as candidates to train as pilots as part of KSM's 'second wave' attack against the US...." |1403|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The ensuing May 30, 2005, OLC memorandum, now declassified and publicly available, states:

"[The CIA has] informed us that the interrogation of KSM–once [enhanced] interrogation techniques were employed–led to the discovery of a KSM plot, the 'Second Wave'...and the discovery of the Ghuraba Cell, a 17-member Jemaah Islamiyah cell tasked with executing the 'Second Wave.'" |1404|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The CIA provided similar inaccurate representations regarding the "discovery" and thwarting of the Second Wave plotting and/or the "discovery" of the al-Ghuraba Group in 18 of the 20 documents provided to senior policymakers and the Department of Justice between July 2003 and March 2009. |1405|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) A review of CIA operational cables and other documents found that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques played no role in the "discovery" or thwarting of either "Second Wave" plot. Likewise, records indicate that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques played no role in the "discovery" of a 17-member "cell tasked with executing the 'Second Wave.'" |1406|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Intelligence Community records indicate that the initial "Second Wave" effort began in parallel with the planning for the September 11, 2001, attacks and included two operatives who were tasked with seeking pilot training. The thwarting of this plotting was unrelated to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. The two operatives, Zacarias Moussaoui and Faruq al-Tunisi (aka Abderraouf Jdey), were known to be engaged in terrorist activity prior to any reporting from CIA detainees. |1407| On August 16, 2001, Zacarias Moussaoui, a French citizen, was arrested on immigration charges by the FBI in Minnesota. |1408| At the time of his arrest, the FBI informed the CIA that the FBI considered Moussaoui to be a "suspected airline suicide attacker." |1409| On January 17, 2002, the FBI publicly released a statement identifying Faruq al-Tunisi, aka Abderraouf Jdey, a Canadian citizen, as an al-Qa'ida operative possibly "prepared to commit future suicide terrorist attacks." |1410| Intelligence indicates that al-Tunisi, who remains at large, withdrew from participating in al-Qa'ida operations. |1411| His whereabouts remain unknown. |1412|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The subsequent "Second Wave" effort began with KSM's tasking of several Malaysian nationals–led by Masran bin Arshad–in late 2001 to attack the "tallest building in California" using shoe-bomb explosive devices to gain access to a plane's cockpit. |1413| The thwarting of this plotting was also unrelated to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. This plot was disrupted with the arrest of Masran bin Arshad in January 2002. This arrest was unrelated to CIA detainee reporting. |1414| Bin Arshad claimed the effort had "not advanced beyond the initial planning stages" when KSM "shelve[d] the plan" in December 2001 when Richard Reid exposed the "shoe bomb" explosive method. |1415| Beginning in July 2002, while in the custody of a foreign government, and after the extensive use of rapport-building interrogation techniques, |1416| bin Arshad provided detailed information on this "Second Wave" plotting, the Malaysian operatives (details on Affifi, Lilhe, and "Tawfiq"), and the proposed method of attack. |1417| This information would later be corroborated by other intelligence collection, including, to a limited extent, reporting from CIA detainees in the spring of 2003. |1418| Another Malaysian national associated with Masran bin Arshad, Zaini Zakaria, was identified by a foreign government as a potential operative seeking pilot training as early as July 2002. |1419| Zakaria was tasked with obtaining such training by al-Qa'ida, but failed to follow through with the tasking. |1420| Zakaria turned himself in to Malaysian authorities on December 18, 2002. Malaysian authorities released Zakaria in February 2009. |1421| In 2006, in a White House briefing on the "West Coast Terrorist Plot," the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism announced that the plot had been disrupted with the arrest of the cell leader, Masran bin Arshad. |1422|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Contrary to CIA representations, the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against KSM did not result in the "discovery" of KSM's "Second Wave" plotting. On March 1, 2003, KSM was captured. He was rendered to CIA custody on March [XXX], 2003, and was immediately subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. While being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, and in the weeks afterwards, KSM did not discuss the "Second Wave" plotting. |1423| On April 19, 2003–24 days after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques had ceased–interrogators questioned KSM about Masran bin Arshad and his role in developing a cell for the "Second Wave" attacks. After being told that Masran bin Arshad had been arrested, KSM told his interrogators, "I have forgotten about him, he is not in my mind at all." KSM also denied that "he knew anything about a plot to take out the 'tallest building' in California." |1424| KSM's reporting prompted ALEC Station to write in a cable that "we remain concerned that KSM's progression towards full debriefing status is not yet apparent where it counts most, in relation to threats to US interests, especially inside CONUS." |1425|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) According to a CIA cable, on May 5, 2003, KSM "eventually admitted to tasking Masran bin Arshad to target the tallest building in California." |1426| KSM continued, however, to deny aspects of the plotting–such as denying the use of shoe-bombs in the operation, only to confirm the planned use of shoe-bombs in later interrogations. |1427| On June 23, 2003, an ALEC Station officer wrote that "[g]iven that KSM only admitted knowledge of this operation upon learning of Masran's detention, we assess he is not telling all he knows, but rather is providing information he believes we already possess." |1428| KSM was asked about detained Malaysian national Zaini Zakaria for the first time on July 3, 2003. During the interrogation, the CIA debriefer stated that there was information suggesting that Zakaria was funded by al-Qa'ida to take flight lessons in September 2001. |1429| KSM denied knowing the name Zaini Zakaria, but later described "Mussa." The CIA suspected this was an alias for Zakaria. CIA officers at the detention site where KSM was being interrogated then wrote in a cable, "[t]he core problem, once again, is the appearance that KSM gave up this critical information only after being presented with the idea that we might already know something about it." |1430|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) With regard to the al-Ghuraba group, contrary to CIA representations, a wide body of intelligence reporting indicates that the al-Ghuraba group was not "discovered" as a result of reporting from KSM or Hambali, nor was the al-Ghuraba group "tasked" with, or witting of, any aspect of KSM's "Second Wave" plotting. |1431| Rather, while in foreign government custody, Hambali's brother, Gun Gun Ruswan Gunawan, identified "a group of Malaysian and Indonesian students in Karachi" witting of Gunawan's affiliation with Jemaah Islamiyah. |1432| CIA records indicate that Gunawan stated that the students were in Karachi "at the request of Hambali." |1433| In a cable conveying this information, CIA officers recalled intelligence reporting indicating KSM planned to use Malaysians in the "next wave of attacks," and stated Gunawan had just identified "a group of 16 individuals, most all of whom are Malaysians." |1434| The cable closed by stating, "we need to question Hambali if this collection is part of his 'next wave' cell." |1435| (From July through December 2002, foreign government reporting described KSM's use of Malaysians in the "next wave attacks." The reporting included Masran bin Arshad's information, provided while he was in foreign government custody, on his four-person Malaysian cell tasked by KSM |1436| to be part of an operation targeting the West Coast of the United States, as well as July 2002 reporting on Malaysian national Zaini Zakaria seeking pilot training. |1437|)

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Contrary to CIA representations, the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Hambali did not result in the "discovery" of "the Guraba Cell" that was "tasked with executing the 'Second Wave'" plotting. As noted, in foreign government custody, Hambali's brother, Gun Gun Ruswan Gunawan, identified "a group of Malaysian and Indonesian students in Karachi" witting of Gunawan's affiliation with Jemaah Islamiyah. |1438| The cable conveying this information recommended "confronting Hambali" with this information. |1439| While being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, Hambali was questioned about the al-Ghuraba group and KSM's effort to use airplanes to attack the United States. Hambali told his CIA interrogators "that some of the members of [the al-Ghuraba group] were destined to work for al-Qa'ida if everything had gone according to plan," that one member of the group had "ambitions to become a pilot," that he (Hambali) was going to send three individuals to KSM in response to KSM's "tasking to find pilot candidates, but never got around to asking these people," and that "KSM told him to provide as many pilots as he could." |1440| Months later, on November 30, 2003, after three weeks of being questioned by a debriefer "almost entirely in Bahasa Indonesia," Hambali admitted to fabricating a number of statements during the period he was being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, including information on efforts to locate pilots for KSM. Specifically, Hambali stated "he lied about the pilot because he was constantly asked about it and under stress, and so decided to fabricate." According to a cable, Hambali said he fabricated these claims "in an attempt to reduce the pressure on himself," and "to give an account that was consistent with what [Hambali] assessed the questioners wanted to hear." |1441| The November 30, 2003, cable noted that CIA personnel "assesse[d] [Hambali]'s admission of previous fabrication to be credible." |1442| Hambali then consistently described "the al-Ghuraba organization" as a "development camp for potential future JI operatives and leadership, vice a JI cell or an orchestrated attempt by JI to initiate JI operations outside of Southeast Asia." |1443| This description was corroborative of other intelligence reporting. |1444|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) An October 27, 2006, CIA cable states that "all of the members of the JI al-Ghuraba cell have been released," |1445| while an April 18, 2008, CIA intelligence report focusing on the Jemaah Islamiyah and referencing the al-Ghuraba group makes no reference to the group serving as potential operatives for KSM's "Second Wave" plotting. |1446|

4. The Thwarting of the United Kingdom Urban Targets Plot and the Capture ofDhiren Barot, aka Issa al-Hindi

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Summary: The CIA represented that its enhanced interrogation techniques were effective and necessary to produce critical, otherwise unavailable intelligence, which enabled the CIA to disrupt terrorist plots, capture terrorists, and save lives. Over a period of years, the CIA provided the capture of Dhiren Barot, aka Issa al-Hindi, and the thwarting of Barot's United Kingdom Urban Targets Plot as evidence for the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. These representations were inaccurate. The operation that resulted in the identification of a U.K.-based "Issa," the identification of "Issa" as Dhiren Barot, Dhiren Barot's arrest, and the thwarting of his plotting, resulted from the investigative activities of U.K. government authorities. Contrary to CIA representations, KSM did not provide the first reporting on a U.K.-based "Issa," nor are there records to support the CIA representation that reporting from CIA detainees subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques resulted in Dhiren Barot's arrest. After the arrest of Dhiren Barot, CIA officers prepared a document for U.K. authorities which stated: "while KSM tasked al-Hindi to go to the US to surveil targets, he was not aware of the extent to which Barot's planning had progressed, who Issa's co-conspirators were, or that Issa's planning had come to focus on the UK." The plotting associated with Dhiren Barot was assessed by experts to be "amateurish," "defective," and unlikely to succeed.

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Further Details: Dhiren Barot, aka Issa al-Hindi, |1447| met with al-Qa'ida leaders in Pakistan in early 2004 to discuss potential terrorist attacks against targets in the United Kingdom. |1448| Intelligence reporting indicates that Barot spent February and March 2004 in Pakistan with senior al-Qa'ida explosives expert 'Abd al-Rahman al-Muhajir, likely refining plans to use vehicle-based bombs against U.K. targets. |1449| In July 2004, casing reports associated with "Issa" were recovered in a raid in Pakistan associated with the capture of Abu Talha al-Pakistani. |1450| During questioning in foreign government custody, "Abu Talha stated the U.S. casing reports were from Abu Issa." |1451| Further debriefings of Abu Talha revealed that Issa, aka Dhiren Barot, was the "operational manager" for al-Qa'ida in the United Kingdom. |1452| Additional information about Dhiren Barot's U.K. plotting was recovered from the hard drives confiscated during the raid that resulted in the arrest of Dhiren Barot. A document describing the plotting was divided into two parts. The first part included "the Gas Limos project," which envisioned parking explosives-laden courier vans or limousines in underground garages. The second part, the "radiation (dirty bomb) project," proposed using 10,000 smoke detectors as part of an explosive device to spread a radioactive element contained in the detectors. Dhiren Barot's plotting was referred to as the United Kingdom Urban Targets Plot. |1453| The U.K. Urban Targets Plot was disrupted when Dhiren Barot and his U.K.-based associates were detained in the United Kingdom in early August 2004. |1454| On August 24, 2004, U.K. authorities informed the CIA that the criminal charges against Barot and his co-conspirators "were mainly possible owing to the recovery of terrorist-related materials during searches of associated properties and vehicles following their arrests." |1455| In September 2004, an Intelligence Community assessment stated that Dhiren Barot was "in an early phase of operational planning at the time of his capture," and that there was no evidence to indicate that Barot had acquired the envisioned materials for the attacks. |1456| In December 2005, an FBI assessment stated, "the main plot presented in the Gas Limos Project is unlikely to be as successful as described," concluding, "we assess that the Gas Limos Project, while ambitious and creative, is far-fetched." |1457| On November 7, 2006, Dhiren Barot was sentenced to life in prison. On May 16, 2007, Barot's sentence was reduced from life in prison to 30 years after a British Court of Appeal found that expert assessments describing the plot as "amateurish," "defective," and unlikely to succeed were not provided to the sentencing judge. |1458|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The thwarting of the United Kingdom Urban Targets Plot and the identification and/or capture of Dhiren Barot, aka Issa al-Hindi, is one of the eight most frequently cited examples provided by the CIA as evidence for the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. Over a period of years, CIA documents prepared for and provided to senior policymakers, intelligence officials, and the Department of Justice represent the identification and/or arrest of Dhiren Barot, and/or the disruption of his U.K. plotting, as an example of how "[k]ey intelligence collected from HVD interrogations after applying interrogation techniques" had "enabled CIA to disrupt terrorist plots" and "capture additional terrorists." |1459| In at least one document prepared for the president, the CIA specifically highlighted the waterboard technique in enabling the "disruption of [Dhiren Barot's] sleeper cell." |1460| The CIA further represented that the intelligence acquired from the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was "otherwise unavailable" and "saved lives." |1461|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) For example, documents prepared in February 2009 for CIA Director Leon Panetta on the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques state that the "CIA assesses...the techniques were effective in producing foreign intelligence," and that "most, if not all, of the timely intelligence acquired from detainees in this program would not have been discovered or reported by other means." The document provides examples of "some of the key captures, disrupted plots, and intelligence" attributed to CIA interrogations. The document includes the following:

"Key Captures from HVD Interrogations: .. .arrest of Dhiren Barot (aka Issa al-Hindi) in the United Kingdom." |1462|

The materials for Director Panetta also include a chart entitled, "Key Intelligence and Reporting Derived from Abu Zubaydah and Khalid Shaykh Muhammad," that identifies two pieces of "key intelligence" acquired from KSM, one related to Majid Khan |1463| and the other to Dhiren Barot:

"KSM reports on an unidentified UK-based operative, Issa al-Hindi, which touches off an intensive CIA, FBI and [United Kingdom] manhunt." |1464|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Likewise, a December 2004 CIA memorandum prepared for National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice responded to a request "for an independent study of the foreign intelligence efficacy of using enhanced interrogation techniques." The CIA responded, "[f]here is no way to conduct such a study," but stated that the "CIA's use of DOJ-approved enhanced interrogation techniques, as part of a comprehensive interrogation approach, has enabled CIA to disrupt terrorist plots, capture additional terrorists, and collect a high volume of critical intelligence on al-Qa'ida." The document then provides examples of "[k]ey intelligence collected from HVD interrogations after applying interrogation techniques," |1465| including:

"Issa al-Hindi: KSM first |1466| identified Issa al-Hindi as an operative he sent to the US prior to 9/11 to case potential targets in NYC and Washington. When shown surveillance photos provided by [XXX] [foreign partner authorities], HVDs confirmed al-Hindi's identity. Al-Hindi's capture by the British resulted in the disruption of a sleeper cell and led to the arrest of other operatives." |1467|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Similarly, CIA Director Michael Hayden represented to the Committee on April 12, 2007, that "KSM also provided the first lead to an operative known as 'Issa al-Hindi,' with other detainees giving additional identifying information." |1468|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The CIA provided similar inaccurate representations regarding the thwarting of the United Kingdom Urban Targets Plot and the identification and/or arrest of Dhiren Barot, aka Abu Issa al-Hindi, in 17 of the 20 documents provided to policymakers and the Department of Justice between July 2003 and March 2009. |1469|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) A review of CIA operational cables and other documents found that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques did not result in the unique intelligence that the CIA represented led to the arrest of Dhiren Barot or the thwarting of his plotting. |1470| The review found that the intelligence that alerted security officials to: (1) the potential terrorist threat posed by one or more U.K.-based operatives with the alias "Issa"; (2) Issa's more common alias, "Issa al-Hindi"; (3) Issa al-Hindi's location; (4) Issa al-Hindi's true name, Dhiren Barot; and (5) information on Dhiren Barot's U.K. plotting, all came from intelligence sources unrelated to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. |1471| Contrary to CIA representations, reporting from CIA detainees subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques did not lead to the arrest of Dhiren Barot or the thwarting of the United Kingdom Urban Targets Plot, nor did KSM provide the first reporting on a U.K.-based "Issa." Rather, the disruption of the United Kingdom Urban Targets Plot and the identification and arrest of Dhiren Barot (aka Issa al-Hindi) was attributable to the efforts of U.K. law enforcement [XXX], as well as [XXX] [a review of computer hard drives], [XXX] [collected communications], and reporting from detainees in the custody of the U.S. Department of Justice, the U.S. military, and a foreign government. While records indicate KSM did provide the initial information on "Issa's" tasking to conduct casings in the United States prior to the September 11, 2001, attacks, |1472| as well as information on an email address related to Issa, |1473| this information was provided within a larger body of fabricated reporting KSM provided on Issa. The CIA was unable to distinguish between the accurate and inaccurate reporting, and KSM's varied reporting led CIA officers to conclude that KSM was "protecting" Issa |1474| and "obstructing [the CIA's] ability to acquire good information" on the U.K.-based operative well after the CIA ceased using enhanced interrogation techniques against KSM. |1475|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) According to information provided to the CIA by the United Kingdom, Dhiren Barot, aka Issa al-Hindi, appeared in [XXX] reporting related to "terrorist training" and participation "in jihad in occupied Kashmir, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Malaysia throughout the 1990s." |1476| Information concerning a book written by Dhiren Barot (under the alias "Esa al-Hindi") on jihad in Kashmir appeared in [XXX] and CIA intelligence records as early as December 1999. |1477| At that time U.K. authorities had a number of U.K.-based extremists under investigation, including Moazzem Begg. |1478| Begg's Maktabah al-Ansar bookstore was described as "a known jihadist gathering place." |1479| According to intelligence reports, in 1999, [XXX] "[XXX] 'Abu Issa' stayed with Moazzem Begg |1480| at the Maktabah al-Ansar bookstore in Birmingham, U.K.," and that this "Issa" was in contact with other U.K. extremists. |1481| According to reporting, Begg was associated with two "al-Qa'ida operatives" arrested in 1999 for their involvement in terrorist plotting and later released. |1482| A report from August 1, 2000, stated that U.K. authorities raided Begg's bookstore and found an invoice for 5000 copies of a book entitled, "The Army of Madina in Kashmir." |1483| A search of computers associated with the two aforementioned "al-Qa'ida operatives" described the book as their "project" written by "a brother from England who was a Hindu and became a Muslim." According to the reporting, the U.K.-based author of the book "got training in Afghanistan" before fighting jihad in Kashmir. |1484| (The book advocates for "worldwide jihad" and the author is listed on the cover of the book as "Esa al-Hindi." |1485|) Additional reporting on "Issa" appeared in CIA records again in July 2001. At that time the FBI reported that Ahmed Ressam, who was in a U.S. federal prison (arrested by U.S. border patrol with explosives in his vehicle in December 1999), reported that a U.K. national named "Issa" attended a terrorist training camp associated with al-Qa'ida in Afghanistan. |1486|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In February 2002, Moazzem Begg was arrested at an al-Qa'ida safe house in Islamabad, Pakistan, and subsequently transferred to U.S. military custody at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. |1487| While still in Pakistani custody, Begg provided reporting on U.K.-based extremists in the context of terrorist training camps, including information on an individual who would play a key role in "Issa's" identification and capture, "Sulayman" (variant Sulyman). |1488| In May 2002, the CIA was seeking to learn more about "Sulyman." |1489| [XXX] [foreign partner] authorities informed the CIA that Sulyman was a person of interest to U.K. authorities for his connections to U.K. extremists and his suspected travel to Kashmir multiple times for terrorist activity. The [XXX] [foreign partner] further reported that Sulyman may have been involved [XXX] The same intelligence report provided by [XXX] [foreign partner] included Sulyman's likely true name, Nisar Jilal, as well as his date of birth and place of employment. |1490|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Beginning in mid-2002, there was increasing intelligence reporting on one or more U.K.-based individuals referred to as "Issa" who were connected to KSM and possibly planning attacks in the United Kingdom. |1491| This reporting resulted in efforts by U.K. authorities to identify and locate this "Issa." |1492| In August 2002, |1493| and again in October 2002, [XXX] [foreign partner] informed the CIA that it was seeking to identify a U.K.-based "Abu Issa" who was reportedly "an English speaker and trusted [terrorist] operative." |1494|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In September 2002, an email address ("Lazylozy") was recovered during raids related to the capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh that would later be found to be in contact with "Issa." Information on the email address was disseminated in intelligence reporting. |1495| The same email address was found on March 1, 2003, during the raids that led to the capture of KSM. CIA records indicate that [XXX] sought [XXX] coverage for the email account. |1496| Within days, the Intelligence Community was collecting information from the account and had reported that the user of the account was in contact with other covered accounts and that the message content was in English. |1497|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) KSM was captured on March 1, 2003. On March [XXX], 2003, KSM was rendered to CIA custody and immediately subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques–including at least 183 applications of the waterboard interrogation technique–until March 25, 2003. |1498| During the month of March 2003, KSM provided information on a variety of matters, including on a U.K.-based Abu Issa al-Britani. The information provided by KSM on "Issa" included both accurate and inaccurate information. At the time, the CIA was unable to discern between the two. During interrogation sessions in March 2003, KSM first discussed an "Issa al-Britani" among a list of individuals who were connected to KSM's Heathrow Airport plotting. |1499| On March 17, 2003, KSM stated that, prior to the September 11, 2001, attacks, he tasked Issa to travel to the United States to "collect information on economic targets." On March 21, 2003, KSM was waterboarded for failing to confirm interrogators' suspicions that KSM sought to recruit individuals from among the African American Muslim community. KSM then stated that he had talked with "Issa" about contacting African American Muslim groups prior to September 11, 2001. |1500| The next day KSM was waterboarded for failing to provide more information on the recruitment of African American Muslims. One hour after the waterboarding session, KSM stated that he tasked Issa "to make contact with black U.S. citizen converts to Islam in Montana," and that he instructed Issa to use his ties to Shaykh Abu Hamza al-Masri, a U.K.-based Imam, to facilitate his recruitment efforts. |1501| KSM later stated that Issa's mission in the United States was to surveil forests to potentially ignite forest fires. |1502| During this period, KSM was confronted with a series of emails that included the aforementioned "Lazylozy" email' account and another email account ("[XXX]"). KSM confirmed that the emails were established for communication between Issa al-Britani and Ammar al-Baluchi and stated that Issa used the "Lazylozy" account, and that al-Baluchi used the "[XXX]" account. |1503| (A month later the CIA reported that Issa did not use the "Lazylozy" email address, but the other email address.) |1504| Over the next six months, KSM retracted or provided conflicting reporting on Issa. On June 22, 2003, CIA interrogators reported that "[KSM] nervously explained to debriefer that he was under 'enhanced measures' when he made these claims" about terrorist recruitment in Montana, and "simply told his interrogators what he thought they wanted to hear." |1505| A CIA Headquarters response cable stated that the CIA's ALEC Station believed KSM's fabrication claims were "another resistance/manipulation ploy" and characterized KSM's contention that he "felt 'forced' to make admissions" under enhanced interrogation techniques as "convenient excuses." As a result, ALEC Station urged CIA officers at the detention site to get KSM to reveal "who is the key contact person in Montana?" |1506| By June 30, 2005, ALEC Station had concluded that KSM's reporting about African American Muslims in Montana was "an outright fabrication." |1507|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On April 4, 2003, the CIA provided reporting to the U.K. on "Issa," stating that "we realize that Abu Issa is a target of interest to your service." The information compiled by the CIA included an August 2002 report (unrelated to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program) that stated that a U.K. national "Abu Issa Al-Pakistani" was slated by al-Qa'ida for "terrorist operations against foreign targets." |1508| On April 18, 2003, a [XXX] cable to the U.K. relayed that the correct email for Abu Issa al-Britani is ("[XXX]"). It further noted that "the Abu Issa account" is "under [XXX] coverage, and [XXX]." The same cable notes that KSM had changed his reporting on Issa's background. According to the cable, KSM originally stated Issa was of Pakistani origin, but now claimed that Issa was of Indian origin. The CIA wrote that KSM's reporting:

"tracks with reporting from another detainee. As you are aware, Feroz Abbasi and other detainees at Guantanmo [sic] Bay have described an Abu Issa that worked for the al-Qa'ida media Committee run by KSM... Abassi [at] one time related that Abu Issa described himself as Indian." |1509|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On May 11, 2003, [XXX] cable noted that the email address associated with Abu Issa ("[XXX]") was used and tracked to a specific address in Wembley, a suburb of London. |1510|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On May 28, 2003, a CIA cable documented intelligence obtained by the FBI from interviews of James Ujaama (aka Bilal Ahmed), who was in FBI custody. Ujaama, who had spent time in the U.K. extremist community, reported on an "Issa" in the U.K. who was known as "Issa al-Hindi" and was "good friends with a Pakistani male named Sulyman." |1511| [XXX] nad already disseminated intelligence indicating that Sulyman was likely Nisar Jalal, based on reporting from U.S military detainee Moazzem Begg. |1512| Ujaama provided the FBI with the name of the U.K. law office where Sulyman (aka Nisar Jalal) worked, which matched reporting provided to the CIA by [XXX] [foreign partner] authorities in [XXX] 2002. |1513|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On June 2, 2003, KSM was shown a sketch of Issa al-Hindi provided to the CIA by the FBI and based on reporting by James Ujaama. KSM stated that the sketch did not look like anyone he knew. |1514|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) A June 5, 2003, cable states that the FBI had "gleaned new clues about Issa in recent days from detainees, including [from Moazzem] Begg," who was in U.S. military custody. According to the cable, Begg told FBI special agents "that Issa is likely from Wembley, Alperton, or Sudbury." A [XXX] noted that [XXX] [technical collection indicated that Issa was located in Wembley]. |1515| U.K. officials highlighted that Issa's reported "good friend," Nisar Jilal (aka Sulyman), also had an address in Wembley. |1516|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On September 13, 2003, KSM explained a coding system for telephone numbers for Issa that produced no results. |1517| On October 16, 2003, KSM identified a picture of an individual known as "Nakuda," as Abu Issa al-Britani. |1518| CIA relayed this information to U.K. officials, who responded that this identification was "extremely unlikely." |1519| CIA detainee Khallad bin Attash was shown the same photograph and stated that the photo "definitely" was not Issa. |1520| CIA officers wrote that KSM "is obstructing our ability to acquire good information" on Issa and noting that KSM has "misidentified photos when he knows we are fishing" and "misleads us on telephone numbers." |1521| A cable from the CIA's ALEC Station stated that "KSM appears to have knowingly led us astray on this potentially important, albeit historical, lead [the phone numbers] to one of our most hotly pursued targets." |1522|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In October 2003, CIA officers wrote:

"even with all we have learned from our on-going partnership with [the United Kingdom] and various detainees, we have not been able to obtain accurate locational information, including confirmed phone numbers and timely information on email addresses. Our latest information, based on [foreign partner reporting] and a detainee's assessment [Moazzem Begg in U.S. military custody], is that Issa is believed to currently be located in Wembley, a suburb of London." |1523|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In January 2004, [XXX] urged [XXX] [foreign partner] officials to [XXX] interview Nisar Jilal (aka Sulyman) "in light of Ujaama's reporting" from the FBI confirming a relationship between Issa al-Hindi and Nisar Jilal. |1524| Instead, [foreign partner] officials began planning an operation [XXX]. |1525| [XXX]. One individual [XXX] personally saw Issa al-Hindi on June [XXX], 2003, in the Wembley area of South London. Based on the FBI reporting and the email coverage, U.K. authorities continuously surveilled Nisar Jilal (aka Sulyman) and photographed his associates. |1526| A specific series of photographs was passed by [XXX] [foreign partner] officials to CIA officials [XXX] depicting an individual whom CIA officials wrote "bears a striking resemblance" to the Issa al-Hindi sketch provided by Moazzem Begg, the detainee in U.S. military custody. |1527| The CIA would later write that Moazzem Begg's "description and resulting sketch of U.K. contact Issa al-Hindi" was "compared to a still shot of an unidentified man taken from a surveillance video of UK extremists," and the comparison "revealed that the man in the video probably [was] the elusive Issa al-Hindi." |1528|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) With the suspicion that the photo was Issa al-Hindi, the CIA's [XXX] requested the photo be "shown to detainees" and requested "immediate feedback." |1529| According to a CIA cable dated June 17, 2004, the suspected Issa al-Hindi photograph was shown to KSM, who "confirmed that the unidentified photo depicts al-Hindi." |1530|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) By July 2, 2004, [XXX] [foreign partner] authorities had informed the CIA that they felt "confident" that Issa's true name was "Dhiren Barot." According to [XXX] reporting, while under surveillance, Issa was observed talking for an extended period of time [XXX] in the vicinity where James Ujaama (in FBI custody) had placed Issa. |1531| [XXX] [foreign partner] authorities observed that Issa drove [XXX] to a residence in Wembley. A record search of the address in Wembley by U.K. authorities identified a passport application with a photograph that matched the Issa under surveillance. The name on the passport application was Issa's true name, Dhiren Barot. |1532|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Once identified, Dhiren Barot remained under U.K. surveillance as the U.K. collected additional information on Dhiren Barot and his activities. On July [XXX], 2004, an al-Qa'ida associate named Abu Talha al-Pakistani was arrested and detained by Pakistani officials. |1533| CIA records indicate that the arrest occurred after [XXX] identified when and where Abu Talha al-Pakistani would be at [XXX]. |1534| On July [XXX], 2004, after Abu Talha's capture, Pakistani authorities conducted a series of raids and seized a laptop computer that was shared with the U.S. government. |1535| The computer was suspected of belonging to senior al-Qa'ida member, Hamza Rabi'a, |1536| and contained a series of undated, English-language casing reports. In all, the computer contained over 500 photographs, maps, sketches, and scanned documents associated with apparent casings. |1537|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On July 31, 2004, KSM was questioned about the casing reports. KSM stated that he did not know of any al-Qa'ida plans by Abu Talha or anyone else to target the Citigroup/Citibank building, Prudential Group building, or the United Nations building in New York described in the documents. |1538| On the same day, Abu Talha, who was in the custody of a foreign government, stated the "U.S. casing reports were from Abu Issa." |1539| Issa, aka Dhiren Barot, was still under surveillance by U.K. authorities at this time. |1540|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On August 1, 2004, Abu Talha was shown a photograph of Dhiren Barot and "immediately identified him as Issa." Abu Talha–who was cooperating with foreign government authorities–described Issa's visit to Pakistan from February to April 2004, during which he stated "Issa" (aka Dhiren Barot) met with Hamza al-Rabi'a on multiple occasions to "discuss operations in the United Kingdom and targets already cased in the United States." Abu Talha stated that Issa believed his activities and identity were not known to the authorities. |1541|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) An August 3, 2004, cable stated that "analysis of information on [the] hard drive" of the computer seized "revealed a document... that is a detailed study on the methodologies to affect a terrorist attack." According to the cable, "the study describes the operational and logistics environment in the UK." The document is divided into two main parts. The first part includes seven chapters on the topic entitled "rough presentation for gas limo project." The second part is entitled "rough presentation for radiation (dirty bomb) project." The "gas limo project" section concludes that the most feasible option would be to use a limousine to deliver explosives, while the "dirty bomb" project section states that smoke detectors could be used to deliver the radioactive substance americium-147. The document proposes to use 10,000 smoke detectors as part of an explosive device to spread this radioactive element. In addition, the document discusses the vulnerabilities of trains and the possibilities of hijacking and utilizing gasoline tankers to conduct a terrorist attack. |1542|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On the same day the analysis was disseminated, August 3, 2004, U.K. authorities arrested Dhiren Barot and 12 other individuals, and seized "over 100 hard-drives." |1543| On August 7, 2004, the U.K. shared [XXX] associated with Dhiren Barot with the U.S. government. The [information provided] included copies of casing reports related to the United States and the United Kingdom. |1544| On August 17, 2004, U.K. authorities charged nine individuals in relation to the Dhiren Barot, aka Issa al-Hindi, investigation. |1545| U.K. authorities informed the CIA that "[d]espite intelligence about the activities of the network, the recent charges of the individuals involved or linked to this planning were mainly possible owing to the recovery of terrorist-related materials during searches of associated properties and vehicles following their arrests." |1546|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On August 23, 2004, the CIA received an update from [XXX] [foreign partner] authorities that noted the "research conducted by the [Barot] network into central London hotels and railway stations [is] likelyto be exploratory rather than representing a detailed operational plan." |1547| A report from the [XXX] [foreign partner] stated:

"material that is emerging from [the United Kingdom] investigation, combined with detainee reporting from senior al-Qa'ida members [an apparent reference to Abu Talha al-Pakistani's reporting on U.K. targeting in Pakistani custody], strongly suggests that Barot's cell was planning a terrorist attack in the U.K., what is not yet clear is how close the cell was to mounting an attack or what, if any, targets had been finalized." |1548|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On August 30, 2004, talking points on the Dhiren Barot case were prepared by CIA officers. A CIA officer wrote that KSM's reporting on contact numbers for Issa was "a dead end" and "that it appears KSM was protecting al-Hindi." |1549| The talking points highlighted the cyber capabilities enabled by the USA PATRIOT Act in the investigation of Dhiren Barot, stating:

"Probably the most important intelligence tool we used in breaking this [Dhiren Barot] case was our cyber capability enabled by the USA Patriot Act. From beginning to end cyber played a role, but it was not the only tool that was used. HUMINT and SIGINT threads were followed and contributed to our understanding of the cyber messages and also in finding new cyber leads. Exploitation of computers and other information obtained in raids before and during the case also contributed significantly, as did surveillance. However, none of these tools are stand-alones. Good old fashioned hard targeting and analysis of these maddeningly vague and disparate and incomplete threads of information was the glue that put it all together." |1550|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On September 10, 2004, the Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism (IICT) disseminated a report entitled, "Homeland: Reappraising al-Qa'ida's Election Threat," which states:

"We do not know the projected timeframe for any attacks Issa was planning to execute in the UK, but it is unlikely he would have been ready to strike in the near term. Upon returning to the UK in mid-2004, Issa attempted to gather materials to build explosives for future attacks in the UK... [U.K.] authorities have been unable to locate any explosives precursors, and it is possible he had not yet acquired the necessary materials at the time of his detention. The detainee [Abu Talha al-Pakistani] also noted that some of Issa's operatives required further training–most likely in explosives–and that [Issa] intended to send an associate to Pakistan for three months to receive instruction from senior al-Qa'ida explosives experts." |1551|

The assessment adds, "Issa appears to have been in an early phase of operational planning at the time of his capture." |1552|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In November 2004, [XXX] authorities informed the CIA that "it was largely through the investigation of Nisar Jalal's associates that [the U.K.] was able to identify Dhiren Barot as being [identifiable] with Issa al-Hindi." |1553|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) A December 14, 2004, FBI Intelligence Assessment entitled, "The Gas Limos Project: An al-Qa'ida Urban Attack Plan Assessment," evaluated "the feasibility and lethality of this plot" based on "documents captured during raids" against "al-Qa'ida operatives in Pakistan and the United Kingdom in July and August 2004, and on custodial interviews conducted in the weeks following these raids." The FBI concluded that "the main plot presented in the Gas Limos Project is unlikely to be as successful as described." The report continued: "We assess that the Gas Limos Project, while ambitious and creative, is far-fetched." |1554|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On December 12, 2005, the CIA assessed that "while KSM tasked al-Hindi to go to the US to surveil targets, he was not aware of the extent to which Barot's planning had progressed, who Issa's co-conspirators were, or that Issa's planning had come to focus on the UK." |1555|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On November 7, 2006, Dhiren Barot was sentenced to life imprisonment in the United Kingdom. On May 16, 2007, Dhiren Barot's sentence was reduced to 30 years after a British Court of Appeal found that expert assessments describing the plot as "amateurish," "defective," and unlikely to succeed were not provided to the sentencing judge. |1556|

5. The Identification, Capture, and Arrest of Iyman Faris

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Summary: The CIA represented that its enhanced interrogation techniques were effective and produced critical, otherwise unavailable intelligence, which thwarted plots and saved lives. Over a period of years, the CIA provided the "identification," "arrest," "capture," "investigation," and "prosecution" of Iyman Faris as evidence for the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. These representations were inaccurate. Iyman Faris was identified, investigated, and linked directly to al-Qa'ida prior to any mention of Iyman Faris by KSM or any other CIA detainee. When approached by law enforcement, Iyman Faris voluntarily provided information and made self-incriminating statements. On May 1, 2003, Iyman Faris pled guilty to terrorism-related charges and admitted "to casing a New York City bridge for al Qaeda, and researching and providing information to al Qaeda regarding the tools necessary for possible attacks on U.S. targets."

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Further Details: Iyman Faris was an Ohio-based truck driver tasked by KSM with procuring "tools and devices needed to collapse suspension bridges," as well as tools that could be used to derail trains. |1557| Faris had met KSM through his self-described "best friend," Maqsood Khan, |1558| who was a Pakistan-based al-Qa'ida facilitator and Majid Khan's uncle. |1559|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The identification and arrest of Iyman Faris is one of the eight most frequently cited examples provided by the CIA as evidence for the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. Over a period of years, CIA documents prepared for and provided to senior policymakers, intelligence officials, and the Department of Justice represent the identification, capture, and/or arrest of Iyman Faris as an example of how "[k]ey intelligence collected from HVD interrogations after applying interrogation techniques" had "enabled CIA to disrupt terrorist plots" and "capture additional terrorists." |1560| The CIA further represented that the intelligence acquired from the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was "otherwise unavailable" and "saved lives." |1561|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) For example, in a July 2003 CIA briefing for White House officials on the CIA interrogation program, the CIA represented that "[m]ajor threats were countered and attacks averted," and that "[t]ermination of this [CIA] program will result in loss of life, possibly extensive." The CIA further represented that "the use of the [CIA's enhanced interrogation] techniques has produced significant results" and "saved lives." |1562| Under the heading, "RESULTS: MAJOR THREAT INFO," a briefing slides states:

"KSM: Al-Qa'ida Chief of Operations... - Identification of Iyman Faris" |1563|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Similarly, on February 27, 2004, DDO James Pavitt responded to the CIA Inspector General's draft Special Review and included a representation related to Iyman Faris. Pavitt stated that the Inspector General's Special Review should have come to the "conclusion that our efforts have thwarted attacks and saved lives," and that "EITs (including the water board) have been indispensable to our successes." |1564| Pavitt provided materials to the OIG that stated:

"Specifically, as a result of the lawful use of EITs, KSM identified a truck driver who is now serving time in the United States for his support to al-Qa'ida." |1565|

The final CIA Inspector General Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program," published in May 2004, states:

"Khalid Shaykh Muhammad's information also led to the investigation and prosecution of Iyman Faris, the truck driver arrested in early 2003 in Ohio." |1566|

This passage in the CIA Inspector General Special Review was declassified and publicly released on August 24, 2009. |1567|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Likewise, information prepared by the CIA for CIA Director Leon Panetta in February 2009 on the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques states that the "CIA assesses... the techniques were effective in producing foreign intelligence," and that "most, if not all, of the timely intelligence acquired from detainees in this program would not have been discovered or reported by other means." The document provides examples of "some of the key captures, disrupted plots, and intelligence gained from HVDs interrogated," including the "arrest of Iyman Faris." |1568| In March 2009, the CIA provided a three-page document to the chairman of the Committee stating, "CIA assesses that most, if not all, of the timely intelligence acquired from detainees in this program would not have been discovered or reported by any other means," before listing "Iyman Faris" as one of the "key captures" resulting from the CIA interrogation program. |1569|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The CIA provided similar inaccurate representations regarding the identification and capture of Iyman Faris in nine of the 20 documents and briefings provided to policymakers and the Department of Justice between July 2003 and March 2009. |1570|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) A review of CIA operational cables and other records found that the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program and the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques played no role in the identification and capture of Iyman Faris. |1571|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) CIA records indicate that Iyman Faris was known to the U.S. Intelligence Community prior to the attacks of September 11, 2001. On March [XXX], 2001, the FBI opened an international terrorism investigation targeting Iyman Faris. |1572| According to CIA records, the "predication of the [FBI] Faris investigation was information provided by [foreign] authorities that [revealed] Faris' telephone number had been called by Islamic extremists operating in France, Belgium, Turkey and Canada," including "millennium bomber" Ahmad Ressam. |1573| Ressam, currently serving a 65-year U.S. prison term, was arrested on December 14, 1999, en route to Los Angeles International Airport with explosives in the trunk of his car. According to CIA records, as "a result of a post 9/11 lead," the FBI interviewed Iyman Faris shortly after the attacks of September 11, 2001. |1574| On November [XXX], 2001, the FBI closed its investigation of Iyman Faris for unknown reasons. |1575|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On March 5, 2003, Majid Khan was taken into Pakistani custody. |1576| That same day, FISA coverage of Majid Khan's residence in Maryland indicated that Majid Khan's [XXX] made a suspicious phone call to an individual at a residence associated with Iyman Faris. |1577| The call included discussion of Majid Khan's possible arrest and potential FBI surveillance of [XXX], who asked the individual in Ohio if he had been approached and questioned. |1578| [XXX] warned the Ohio-based individual not to contact anyone using his phone. |1579| That same day, [XXX] informed FBI special agents that the other party to the intercepted conversation was Iyman Faris. |1580| By March 6, 2003, the FBI had officially reopened its international terrorism investigation of Iyman Faris. |1581|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) While U.S. law enforcement investigations of Iyman Faris moved forward, Majid Khan, in foreign government custody, was being questioned by foreign government interrogators. According to CIA records, the interrogators were using rapport-building techniques, confronting Khan with inconsistencies in his story and obtaining information on Majid Khan's al-Qa'ida connections. |1582| On March 11, 2003, Majid Khan identified a photo of Iyman Faris. |1583| Majid Khan stated that he knew Faris as "Abdul Raof," and claimed Faris was a 35-year-old truck driver of Pakistani origin who was a "business partner of his father." |1584| In addition to describing business deals Iyman Faris was involved in with Khan's family, Majid Khan stated that Faris spoke Urdu and excellent English and had a "colorful personality." |1585| The next day, while still in foreign government custody, Majid Khan stated that Iyman Faris was "an Islamic extremist." |1586| According to CIA cables, on March 14, 2003, Majid Khan provided "more damning information" on Iyman Faris, specifically that Faris was a "mujahudden during the Afghan/Soviet period" and was a close associate of his uncle, Maqsood Khan. Maqsood was a known al-Qa'ida associate whom Majid Khan had already admitted was in contact with senior al-Qa'ida members. Majid Khan told foreign government interrogators that it was Maqsood who provided the money for Majid Khan's al-Qa'ida-related travels. |1587| Majid Khan further stated that "after the KSM arrest became public knowledge," Iyman Faris contacted Majid Khan's family and requested the family pass a message to Maqsood Khan regarding the status of KSM. |1588| This information on Iyman Faris was acquired prior to– and independently of–any reporting from the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. |1589|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On March 10, 2003, in response to a requirements cable from CIA Headquarters reporting that al-Qa'ida was targeting U.S. suspension bridges, |1590| KSM stated that any such plans were "theoretical" and only "on paper." He also stated that no one was currently pursuing such a plot. |1591| KSM repeated this assertion on March 16, 2003, |1592| noting that, while UBL officially endorsed attacks against suspension bridges in the United States, he "had no planned targets in the US which were pending attack and that after 9/11 the US had become too hard a target." |1593| On neither occasion did KSM reference Iyman Faris.

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On March 15, 2003, deputy chief of ALEC Station, [XXX], who was reading the intelligence from the foreign government interrogations of Majid Khan, requested a photograph of Majid Khan and additional information to use with KSM. |1594| In response, CIA Headquarters sent the detention site photographs of Majid Khan's family and associates, including Iyman Faris. |1595|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On March 17, 2003, eleven days after the FBI officially reopened its investigation of Iyman Faris, KSM was shown photographs of both Iyman Faris and Majid Khan. |1596| According to CIA cables, KSM was also asked detailed questions based on email communications, which a cable stated served as "an effective means to convey to [KSM] the impression that the USG already possessed considerable information and that the information would be used to check the accuracy of his statements." |1597| In this context, KSM identified the photograph of Iyman Faris as a "truck driver" and a relative of Majid Khan. KSM claimed that he could not remember the truck driver's name. KSM described the "truck driver" as a "colorful character who liked to drink and have girlfriends and was very interested in business." |1598| The next day, March 18, 2003, KSM stated that in February 2002 he tasked the "truck driver" to procure specialized machine tools that would be useful to al-Qa'ida to loosen the nuts and bolts of suspension bridges in the United States. According to KSM, in March 2002, the "truck driver" asked Mansour Khan [son of Maqsood Khan] |1599| to inform KSM that he (the "truck driver") could not find such tools. KSM stated that he made no further requests of the "truck driver." |1600|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) According to a CIA cable, on the evening of March 20, 2003, the FBI informed the CIA that "Ohio police had been following [Iyman] Faris for 'some time,' and had stopped him and questioned him about his relationship to Shoukat Ali Khan [Majid Khan's father] of Baltimore." |1601| According to a CIA officer, "[w]hen the FBI approached Faris he talked voluntarily." |1602| Records indicate that Faris "initially claimed to know Shoukat Ali Khan though the gas station business" and agreed to take a polygraph examination. According to FBI records, prior to the polygraph, Faris admitted to being associated with KSM and provided details on his relationships with al-Qa'ida members in Pakistan. |1603| Specifically, Iyman Faris told FBI and Ohio police that he had met KSM twice and had been "tasked with procuring items." Faris detailed how KSM had a plan "to cut the suspension cables on the Brooklyn Bridge to cause its collapse using gas cutters." |1604| Faris maintained that he "thought that the task to take down the bridge was impossible" |1605| and did not take further action. |1606|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Over several weeks Iyman Faris continued to voluntarily cooperate with law enforcement officials and engaged in efforts to assist in the capture of Maqsood Khan. |1607| Faris provided additional details on his activities related to the Khan family, KSM, his meeting with UBL, and two extremists in the United States who had discussed wanting "to kill Americans in a Columbus area shopping mall with a Kalashnikov automatic rifle." |1608| On April 22, 2003, "Faris had accepted a plea agreement" |1609| and continued to cooperate, including by sending email messages to al-Qa'ida members in Pakistan for the purposes of intelligence collection. |1610| On May 1, 2003, Faris was transported from Quandco, Virginia, where he was voluntarily residing and working with the FBI, to a federal court in Alexandria, Virginia, where he pled guilty to material support to terrorism charges. |1611| He was subsequently sentenced to 20 years in prison. |1612|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On April 3, 2003, the Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism (IICT) assessed that the use of tools to loosen the bolts of suspension bridges were "methods that appear to be unrealistic." |1613|

6.The Identification, Capture, and Arrest of Sajid Badat

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Further Details: Sajid Badat |1614| was selected by al-Qa'ida leaders, including Abu Hafs al-Masri and Sayf al-'Adl, to carry out an attack against a Western airliner with Richard Reid using a shoe bomb explosive device in December 2001. |1615| Sajid Badat returned to the United Kingdom in late 2001 and sent a message to his al-Qa'ida handler, Ammar al-Baluchi, stating that he was withdrawing from the operation. |1616| On December 22, 2001, Richard Reid attempted to detonate a shoe bomb on a flight from Paris, France, to Miami, Florida. The plane was diverted to Boston, Massachusetts, and Reid was taken into custody. |1617|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The discovery, identification, capture, and arrest of Sajid Badat, "the shoe bomber," is one of the eight most frequently cited examples provided by the CIA as evidence for the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. Over a period of years, CIA documents prepared for and provided to senior policymakers, intelligence officials, and the Department of Justice represent the discovery, identification, capture, and/or arrest of Sajid Badat as an example of how "[k]ey intelligence collected from HVD interrogations after applying interrogation techniques" had "enabled CIA to disrupt terrorist plots" and "capture additional terrorists." |1618| In at least one CIA document prepared for the president, the CIA specifically highlighted the waterboard interrogation technique in enabling the CIA to learn "that Sajid Badat was the operative slated to launch a simultaneous shoe bomb attack with Richard Reid in 2001." |1619| The CIA further represented that the intelligence acquired from the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was "otherwise unavailable" and "saved lives." |1620|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) As an example, on October 26, 2007, the CIA faxed a document to the Senate Appropriations Committee appealing a proposed elimination of funding for the CIA's Rendition and Detention Program. The CIA appeal states that "[m]ost, if not all, of the intelligence acquired from high-value detainees in this program would likely not have been discovered or reported in any other way." Representing the success of the CIA interrogation program, the document states:

"Detainees have... permitted discovery of terrorist cells, key individuals and the interdiction of numerous plots, including... the discovery of an operative who was preparing another attack |1621| like that attempted by 'shoe bomber' Richard Reid." |1622|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Similarly, in early March 2005, the CIA compiled talking points on the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques for use in a meeting with the National Security Council. The document states, "[t]he Central Intelligence Agency can advise you that this program works and the techniques are effective in producing foreign intelligence." The document states that "after applying interrogation techniques," the CIA "learned from KSM and Ammar that Sajid Badat was the operative slated to launch a simultaneous shoe bomb attack with Richard Reid in December 2001." |1623| A month later, on April 15, 2005, the CIA faxed an eight-page document to the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel entitled, "Briefing Notes on the Value of Detainee Reporting" which contained similar information. |1624| The Office of Legal Counsel used the information to support its May 30, 2005, legal opinion on whether certain "enhanced interrogation techniques" were consistent with United States obligations under Article 16 of the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. |1625| The CIA-provided document states:

"Identifying the 'other' shoe bomber. Leads provided by KSM in November 2003 led directly to the arrest of shoe bomber Richard Reid's one-time partner Sajid Badat in the UK. KSM had volunteered the existence of Badat–whom he knew as Tssa al-Pakistani' |1626|–as the operative who was slated to launch a simultaneous shoe bomb attack with Richard Reid in December 2001." |1627|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The CIA provided similar inaccurate representations regarding the purported role of KSM and Ammar al-Baluchi |1628| in the discovery, identification, capture, and arrest of Sajid Badat in 16 of the 20 documents provided to policymakers and the Department of Justice between July 2003 and March 2009. |1629| However, in an additional case, a March 4, 2005, CIA briefing for Vice President Cheney, the CIA credited Abu Zubaydah with identifying Sajid Badat, |1630| despite a lack of any reporting on Sajid Badat from Abu Zubaydah. |1631|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Contrary to CIA representations, a review of CIA operational cables and other documents found that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques did not result in otherwise unavailable intelligence leading to the discovery, identification, capture, or arrest of Sajid Badat. According to CIA records and the U.K.'s own investigative summary, |1632| the investigation of Sajid Badat was a United Kingdom-led operation, and the intelligence that alerted security officials to: (1) a U.K.-based "Issa" (aka, Sajid Badat); (2) a potential second "shoe bomber" related to Richard Reid; |1633| (3) a suspected U.K. terrorist named "Sajid Badat"; |1634| (4) Sajid Badat's connection to Richard Reid; (5) Sajid Badat's physical description; (6) Sajid Badat's location; and (7) the initial identification of a U.K. surveillance photo of Sajid Badat, the "shoe bomber," |1635| was unrelated to information acquired from CIA detainees during or after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. CIA records indicate that the information that led to Sajid Badat's arrest and U.K. criminal prosecution was also not derived from the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. |1636|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Prior to any reporting from CIA detainees, and as early as January 14, 2002, the FBI informed the CIA that Richard Reid "had an unidentified partner who allegedly backed out of the operation at the last minute." |1637| This information was later corroborated by a credible CIA source prior to any reporting from the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. |1638| In July 2002, a foreign government reported that pre-paid phone cards recovered by the FBI from Richard Reid upon his arrest were used by an individual named Sajid Badat to call a known terrorist, Nizar Trabelsi. |1639| FBI interviews of Trabelsi–officially relayed to the CIA in July 2002–reported that "L. Badad Sajid" was "involved in operations targeting American interests." |1640| The CIA highlighted in a July 2002 cable that this information matched previous reporting from a European government that identified a "Saajid Badat," of Gloucester, United Kingdom, with a date of birth of March 28, 1979, as a person suspected of being involved in terrorist activity. |1641| Additional analysis of the phone card connecting Badat and Reid–as well as other intelligence–placed Sajid Badat and Richard Reid together in Belgium in September 2001. |1642|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) According to [XXX], Sajid Badat was linked to other well-known extremists in the United Kingdom who were already under investigation. Specifically, Badat was known to [XXX] as "a member of Babar Ahmad's group," and was a "particularly close associate of Mirza Beg." [XXX] reporting also determined that Badat had attended a jihad training camp in Afghanistan." |1643|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Concurrent with the emergence of information linking Sajid Badat to Richard Reid, there was an ongoing international effort to identify one or more U.K.-based al-Qa'ida operatives known as "Issa." |1644| As early as June 2002, CIA records indicate that an individual in the custody of a foreign government, Abu Zubair al-Ha'ili, repeatedly referenced an "Abu Issa al-Pakistani" as a British-born Pakistani associated with Richard Reid and engaged in plotting in the United Kingdom at the behest of KSM. |1645| This information was corroborative of other intelligence reporting. |1646| In May 2003, this detainee met with CIA officers to produce several sketches that were described as having "achieved a 95% likeness" of this individual. |1647| OnAugust 17, 2003, CIA officers noted that a photograph of Sajid Badat provided by [XXX] [a foreign partner] looked "an awful lot like the sketches" of the Richard Reid associate made with the assistance of the detainee in foreign government custody. |1648|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) CIA Headquarters requested that the photograph be shown to CIA detainees. According to CIA records, on August 18, 2003, "KSM viewed the picture for a while, but said he did not recognize the person in the photo." When KSM was asked if Issa's name could be Sajid Badat, "KSM shrugged and said that the Badat name was not the name he recalled." Pressed further, KSM stated, "he was confident that the name Sajid Badat was not Issa's name." |1649| On August 22, 2003, emails among CIA officers stated that "CTC believes that Abu Issa's true name is Sajid Badat... KSM says that Badat is not Abu Issa–but he might be lying." |1650| On August 23, 2003, the detailed sketches derived from interviews of the detainee in foreign custody, Abu Zubair al-Ha'ili–the sketches CIA officers stated so closely resembled the [XXX] [foreign partner]-provided photos of Sajid Badat–were shown to KSM. KSM stated he did not recognize the individual in the sketches. |1651|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Meanwhile, on August 21, 2003, a CIA cable noted that the [XXX] [foreign partner] had informed the CIA that joint interviews by the FBI and [XXX] [foreign partner] authorities of an individual in FBI custody, James Ujaama, led investigators in the U.K. to a home "formerly occupied by both Mirza [Beg] and Sajid [Badat]." |1652| The [XXX] [foreign partner] authorities relayed to the CIA that "at least one of these men was known by the alias Issa," and that the subjects were related to a separate ongoing terrorism investigation. |1653| On September 2, 2003, [XXX] [foreign partner] authorities informed the CIA that "secret and reliable" reporting indicated that Sajid Badat is the Richard Reid associate and shoe bomber. According to the [XXX] [foreign partner] report, [XXX] [foreign partner information] linked Badat to a larger [XXX] network in the United Kingdom, which was part of the larger aforementioned [XXX] [foreign partner] investigation. |1654|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On September 9, 2003, a detainee in U.S. military custody at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, identified a photograph of Sajid Badat to a visiting U.K. official as Abu Issa the "shoe bomber." |1655| The next day, KSM identified a photograph of Sajid Badat as "Issa al-Britani, aka Issa Richard"–the associate of Richard Reid. Other detainees in U.S. military custody subsequently identified the same photograph of Sajid Badat as "Abu Issa" the "shoebomber." |1656|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) After conducting extensive surveillance of Sajid Badat, U.K. authorities arrested Badat on November 27, 2003. |1657| Badat immediately cooperated with U.K. investigators and confirmed he withdrew from a shoe bomb operation with Richard Reid in December 2001. |1658| On November 28, 2003, the United Kingdom provided a detailed account to the CIA on how investigative efforts in the United Kingdom led to the identification of Sajid Badat, noting that "key aspects" of reporting acquired from CIA, U.S. military, and foreign government detainees matched those of a "[XXX]" [specific U.K. intelligence collection on Sajid Badat]. The "[XXX]" [specific U.K. intelligence collection on Sajid Badat] was not previously referenced in U.K. investigative updates to the CIA. |1659|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) After pleading guilty in a U.K. court on February 28, 2005, to terrorism-related charges, Sajid Badat was sentenced to 13 years in prison. [XXX] Sajid "Badat was voluntarily cooperative throughout much of his pre-sentencing incarceration." |1660| On November 13, 2009, Sajid Badat's 13-year prison sentence was reduced to 11 years. In March 2010, approximately five years after his sentencing, Sajid Badat was released under an agreement whereby Badat became a cooperating witness for U.S. and U.K. authorities. |1661| The legal agreement came to light when Sajid Badat testified against Adis Medunjanin, a U.S. terrorism suspect on trial in New York, via a video-link from the United Kingdom in April 2012. |1662|

7. The Thwarting of the Heathrow Airport and Canary Wharf Plotting

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Summary: The CIA represented that its enhanced interrogation techniques were effective and produced critical, otherwise unavailable intelligence, which thwarted plots and saved lives. Over a period of years, the CIA provided the identification and thwarting of the Heathrow Airport Plot as evidence for the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. These representations were inaccurate. A review of records indicates that the Heathrow Airport and Canary Wharf plotting had not progressed beyond the initial planning stages when the operation was fully disrupted with the detentions of Ramzi bin al-Shibh, KSM, Ammar-al-Baluchi, and Khallad bin Attash. None of these individuals were captured as a result of reporting obtained during or after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against CIA detainees.

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Further Details: After the September 11, 2001, attacks against the United States, KSM sought to target the United Kingdom using hijacked aircraft and surmised that Heathrow Airport and a building in Canary Wharf, a major business district in London, were powerful economic symbols. |1663| The initial plan was for al-Qa'ida operatives to hijack multiple airplanes departing Heathrow Airport, turn them around, and crash them into the airport itself. Security was assessed to be too tight at Heathrow Airport and the plan was altered to focus on aircrafts departing from mainly Eastern European airports to conduct attacks against Heathrow Airport. Al-Qa'ida was unable to locate pilots to conduct these attacks. |1664| Once KSM was detained in Pakistan on March 1, 2003, responsibility for the planning was passed to Ammar al-Baluchi and Khallad bin Attash, who were at the time focused on carrying out attacks against Western interests in Karachi, Pakistan. |1665|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The thwarting of the Heathrow Airport and Canary Wharf plotting is one of the eight most frequently cited examples provided by the CIA as evidence for the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. Over a period of years, CIA documents prepared for and provided to senior policymakers, intelligence officials, and the Department of Justice represent the Heathrow Airport and Canary Wharf plotting as an example of how "[k]ey intelligence collected from HVD interrogations after applying interrogation techniques" had "enabled CIA to disrupt terrorist plots" and "capture additional terrorists." |1666| The CIA further represented that the intelligence acquired from the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was "otherwise unavailable" and "saved lives." |1667|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) For example, on December 23, 2005, CIA Director Porter Goss explained in a letter to National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley, Homeland Security Advisor Frances Townsend, and Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte, that he was suspending the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques because of the passage of the Detainee Treatment Act (the "McCain amendment"). The letter stated:

"...only 29 [CIA detainees] have undergone an interrogation that used one or more of the 13 [CIA enhanced interrogation] techniques. |1668| These interrogations produced intelligence that allowed the U.S., and its partners, to disrupt attacks such as 911-style attacks planned for the U.S. West Coast and for Heathrow airport. I can inform you with confidence that this program has allowed the U.S. to save hundreds, if not thousands, of lives." |1669|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Similarly, the CIA informed the CIA inspector general on February 27, 2004, that:

"As a result of the lawful use of EITs, KSM also provided information on an al-Qa'ida plot for suicide airplane attacks outside of the United States that would have killed thousands of people in the United Kingdom. ...Of note, even after KSM reported that al-Qa'ida was planning to target Heathrow, he at first repeatedly denied there was any other target than the airport. Only after the repeated lawful use of EITs did he stop lying and admit that the sketch of a beam labeled Canary Wharf in his notebook was in fact an illustration that KSM the engineer drew himself in order to show another AQ operative that the beams in the Wharf - like those in the World Trade Center would likely melt and collapse the building, killing all inside.... We are still debriefing detainees and following up on leads to destroy this cell, but at a minimum the lawful use of EIT's on KSM provided us with critical information that alerted us to these threats... ." |1670|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The CIA provided similar inaccurate representations regarding the Heathrow and Canary Wharf Plotting in 20 of the 20 documents provided to policymakers and the Department of Justice between July 2003 and March 2009. |1671|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) A review of CIA operational cables and other documents found that contrary to CIA representations, information acquired during or after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques played no role in "alert[ing]" the CIA to the threat to–or "disrupt[ing]" the plotting against–Heathrow Airport and Canary Wharf. |1672|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Prior to the detention and interrogation of the CIA detainees credited by the CIA with providing information on the plot, the CIA and other intelligence agencies were already "alerted" to al-Qa'ida's efforts to target Heathrow Airport. Specifically, the CIA knew that: (1) KSM and al-Qa'ida were targeting "a national symbol in the United Kingdom" and that this symbol was the "Heathrow airport"; |1673| (2) the attack plan called for hijacking commercial aircraft and crashing them directly into Heathrow airport; |1674| (3) no pilots had been identified by al-Qa'ida and the planned attack was not imminent; |1675| (4) KSM, Ammar al-Baluchi, and Ramzi bin al-Shibh were involved in or knowledgeable about the plotting; |1676| (5) al-Qa'ida was seeking to recruit numerous operatives, but potentially already had two operatives in place in the United Kingdom named "Abu Yusif" and "Abu Adel," although the two operatives were unwitting of the plot; |1677| and (6) KSM was seeking Saudi and British passport holders over the age of 30 for the attack. |1678|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) A review of records indicates that the Heathrow Airport plotting had not progressed beyond the initial planning stages when the operation was fully disrupted with the detentions of Ramzi bin al-Shibh (detained on September 11, 2002), |1679| KSM (detained on March 1, 2003), |1680| Ammar-al-Baluchi (detained on April 29, 2003), and Khallad bin Attash (detained on April 29, 2003,). |1681| There are no CIA records to indicate that any of the individuals were captured as a result of CIA detainee reporting. A draft National Terrorism Bulletin from March 2006 states: "the [Heathrow Airport] operation was disrupted mid-cycle, around the spring of 2003, when several of the key plotters, including KSM, were detained." |1682| Foreign government intelligence analysis came to the same conclusion. |1683|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) While each of these four detainees provided information on the plotting during their detentions, none of this information played any role in the disruption of the plot. A wide body of intelligence reporting indicated that no operatives were informed of the plot, no pilots were ever identified by al-Qa'ida for the attacks, and only schedules of potential flights were collected for review. |1684|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) CIA detainee records indicate that reporting from CIA detainees on aspects of the Heathrow plotting was often unreliable and not believed by CIA officers. For example, KSM retracted information he provided while being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, including information linking Jaffar al-Tayyar to the Heathrow Plot. |1685| On May 20, 2003, nearly two months after the CIA ceased using its enhanced interrogation techniques against KSM, a CIA analyst wrote that KSM had provided three different stories related to the Heathrow plotting, writing to CIA colleagues: "Bottom Line: KSM knows more about this plot than he's letting on." |1686| By late June 2004, KSM had retracted much of the varied reporting he had provided on the Heathrow plotting, most importantly the information KSM provided on tasking potential operatives to obtain flight training. |1687| KSM stated that during March 2003–when he was being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques–"he may have given false information," and that, in many cases, the information he provided was "just speculation." |1688| The value of other CIA detainee reporting was also questioned by CIA officers. |1689| In July 2003, a cable from the CIA's ALEC Station stated that "HQS/ALEC remains concerned with what we believe to be paltry information coming from detainees about operations in the U.K." |1690|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In addition, KSM withheld information linking Abu Talha al-Pakistani to the Heathrow plotting. According to CIA interrogation records, KSM discussed Canary Wharf the first time he was shown his notebook, in which the words "Canary Wharf' were written. |1691| KSM stated, however, that he had drawn the sketch for Ammar al-Baluchi. In June 2003, after being confronted with contradictory reporting from Ammar al-Baluchi, KSM admitted that he had actually shown the sketch to "Talha," whom KSM had not previously mentioned. |1692|

8. The Capture of Hambali

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Summary: The CIA represented that its enhanced interrogation techniques were effective and produced critical, otherwise unavailable intelligence, which thwarted plots and saved lives. Over a period of years, the CIA provided the capture of Hambali as evidence for the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. Specifically, the CIA consistently represented that, as a result of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, KSM provided the "first" information on a money transfer by Majid Khan that eventually led to Hambali's capture. These CIA representations were inaccurate. Majid Khan, who was in foreign government custody, provided this information prior to any reporting from KSM. CIA records indicate that the intelligence that led to Hambali's capture in Thailand was based on signals intelligence, a CIA source, and Thai investigative activities.

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Further Details: Riduan bin Isomuddin, aka Hambali, was a senior member of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), a Southeast Asia-based terrorist group, and served as an interface between the JI and al-Qa'ida. Hambali was linked to terrorist activity prior to the September 11, 2001, attacks. Shortly after those attacks, Hambali was described as the CIA's "number one target" in Southeast Asia. |1693| When the October 12, 2002, terrorist attacks occurred on the Indonesian island of Bali, killing more than 200 individuals, Hambali was immediately suspected of being the "mastermind" of the attacks and was further described as "one of the world's most wanted terrorists." |1694|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The capture of Hambali is one of the eight most frequently cited examples provided by the CIA as evidence for the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. Over a period of years, CIA documents prepared for and provided to senior policy makers, intelligence officials, and the Department of Justice represent the capture of Hambali as an example of how "[k]ey intelligence collected from HVD interrogations after applying interrogation techniques" had "enabled CIA to disrupt terrorist plots" and "capture additional terrorists." |1695| The CIA further represented that the intelligence acquired from the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was "otherwise unavailable" and "saved lives." |1696|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) As an example, in a briefing prepared for the president's chief of staff, Josh Bolten, on May 2, 2006, the CIA represented that the "[u]se of the DOJ-authorized enhanced interrogation techniques, as part of a comprehensive interrogation approach, has enabled us to disrupt terrorist plots, capture additional terrorists, and collect a high volume of critical intelligence on al-Qa'ida." |1697| The briefing document represents that "[assessing the effectiveness of individual interrogation techniques is difficult," but provides 11 specific examples of "Key Intelligence Collected from HVD Interrogations," including:

"Hambali's Capture: During KSM's interrogation we acquired information that led to the capture of Hambali in August 2003 and to the partial dismantling of the Jemaah Islamiyah leadership in SE Asia. KSM first told us about Majid Khan's role in delivering $50,000 to Hambali operatives for an attack KSM believed was imminent. We then confronted Khan with KSM's admission and [signals intelligence] confirming the money transfer and Khan's travel to Bangkok. Khan admitted he delivered the money to an operative named 'Zubair,' whom we subsequently identified and captured. Zubair's capture led to the identification and subsequent capture of an operative named Lilie who was providing forged passports to Hambali. Lilie identified the house in Bangkok where Hambali was hiding." |1698|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Similarly, on July 13, 2004, the CIA disseminated an Intelligence Assessment entitled, "Khalid Shaykh Muhammad: Preeminent Source on Al-Qa'ida." |1699| On April 22, 2005, the paper, as well as other materials on CIA detainee reporting, was faxed from [XXX]CTC Legal, to the Office of Legal Counsel at the Department of Justice, to support the OLC's legal review of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. |1700| The document states:

"...information that KSM provided on Majid Khan in the spring of 2003 was the crucial first link in the chain that led us to the capture of prominent JI leader and al-Qa'ida associate Hambali in August 2003, and more than a dozen Southeast Asian operatives slated for attacks against the US homeland. KSM told us about [Majid] Khan's role in delivering $50,000 in December 2002 to operatives associated with Hambali. ... [Majid] Khan–who had been detained in Pakistan in early 2003–was confronted with KSM's information about the money and acknowledged that he delivered the money to an operative named 'Zubair.' .. .Based on that information, Zubair was captured in June 2003. |1701|

On August 24, 2009, this document was declassified with redactions and publicly released with the inaccurate information unredacted. |1702|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The CIA provided similar inaccurate representations regarding the capture of Hambali in 18 of the 20 documents provided to policymakers and the Department of Justice between July 2003 and March 2009. |1703| In these representations, the CIA consistently asserted that "after applying" the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, KSM provided "the crucial first link" that led to the capture of Hambali. |1704|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) A review of CIA operational cables and other records found that information obtained from KSM during and after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques played no role in the capture of Hambali. A review of CIA records further found that prior to reporting from CIA detainees subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, the CIA had intelligence on: (1) Hambali's role in the Jemaah Islamiyah; (2) funding by al-Qa'ida and KSM of Hambali's terrorist activities; (3) the operative to whom Majid Khan delivered the money, Zubair, and Zubair's links to terrorism, Jemaah Islamiyah, and Hambali; and (4) Majid Khan's $50,000 money transfer from al-Qa'ida to Zubair in December 2002. CIA records indicate that the intelligence that led to Hambali's capture was based on signals intelligence, a CIA source, and Thai investigative activities in Thailand. |1705|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Prior to his capture, Hambali was known to have played a supporting role in the KSM and Ramzi Yousef "Bojinka Plot," an effort in early 1995 to place explosives on 12 United States-flagged aircraft and destroy them mid-flight. |1706| By the end of 2001, Hambali was suspected of playing a supporting role in the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, as well as helping to enroll Zacarias Moussaoui in flight school. |1707| By early 2002, a body of intelligence reporting unrelated to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program indicated that KSM was providing Hambali with funding to conduct terrorist operations in Southeast Asia. |1708| In March 2002, Hambali was described as the CIA's "number one target" in Southeast Asia. |1709| That same month, the FBI provided information to the CIA stating that foreign government detainee reporting indicated that KSM reimbursed terrorism-related expenditures made by Hambali for the JI. |1710| By June of 2002, the CIA had entered into discussions with representatives of the [XXX] government regarding their willingness to accept custody of Hambali once he was captured. |1711| On September 25, 2002, the CIA reported that an individual in FBI custody since May 2002, Mohammed Mansour Jabarah, reported that in November 2001, he collected $50,000 from KSM for a Hambali-directed terrorist operation targeting U.S. interests, as well as at least one other $10,000 payment. |1712| On the same day, September 25, 2002, a CIA cable stated that Masran bin Arshad, while in the custody of a foreign government, had detailed his connections to Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti and KSM. |1713| According to bin Arshad, after KSM's "Second Wave" plotting was "abandoned" in late 2001, bin Arshad was tasked by KSM to meet with Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti in Pakistan and to deliver $50,000 to Hambali for terrorist operations. Bin Arshad stated he was unable to deliver the money. |1714| When the October 12, 2002, terrorist attacks occurred on the Indonesian island of Bali, killing more than 200 individuals, Hambali was immediately suspected of being the "mastermind" of the attacks and was further described as "one of the world's most wanted terrorists." |1715| Open source information in October 2002 identified the funding for the Bali bombings as flowing through Hambali from al-Qa'ida leadership in Pakistan. Through November 2002, news reports highlighted links between senior al-Qa'ida leadership–including KSM–and JI in the context of the Bali bombings. Hambali continued to be identified as a potential mastermind of the bombing and likely residing in Thailand. These same reports identified a Malaysian named "Zubair" as one of three individuals sought by security officials for the Hambali-linked Bali bombings. |1716|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In early January 2003, coverage of a known al-Qa'ida email account uncovered communications between that account and the account of a former Baltimore, Maryland, resident, Majid Khan. The communications indicated that Majid Khan traveled to Bangkok, Thailand, in December 2002 for terrorist support activities and was in contact there with a "Zubair." |1717| By this time, the CIA had significant information–prior to KSM's capture–indicating that a "Zubair" played a central supporting role in the JI, was affiliated with al-Qa'ida figures like KSM, had expertise in [XXX] in Southeast Asia, and was suspected of playing a role in Hambali's October 12, 2002, Bali bombings. |1718| This information was derived from traditional intelligence collection, open source reporting, and FBI debriefings of Abu Zubaydah (prior to Abu Zubaydah being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques). |1719| On March 4, 2003, the day before Majid Khan's capture, the FBI requested additional information from the CIA on the "Zubair" referenced in Majid Khan's emails. |1720|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On March 6, 2003, the day after Majid Khan was captured in Pakistan, and while being questioned by foreign government interrogators using rapport-building techniques, |1721| Majid Khan described how he traveled to Bangkok in December 2002 and provided $50,000 USD to "Zubair" at the behest of al-Qa'ida. Khan also stated that he updated KSM's nephew, Ammar al-Baluchi, via email about the money exchange. Majid Khan's physical description of Zubair matched previous intelligence reporting already collected on Zubair. |1722| On March 10, 2003, the CIA [XXX] requested that information about Majid Khan's travel to Thailand and his delivery of money to "Zubair" be shared with Thai authorities, along with the physical description of "Zubair" and a phone number for Zubair provided by Majid Khan. CIA [XXX] proposed that it inform the Thais that "[w]e are very concerned that the money nentioned may be funding terrorist activities, as well as the individuals in question," and that [XXX] request the Thai government "provide any details regarding these individuals and phone numbers." |1723|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On March 11, 2003, after being confronted with information that confirmed KSM's financial support to Hambali, KSM admitted to providing Hambali with $50,000 to conduct a terrorist attack "in approximately November 2002." KSM made no reference to Majid Khan or Zubair. |1724| On March 17, 2003, after being confronted with Majid Khan's reporting and a photograph of Majid Khan, KSM confirmed that Majid Khan–whom he stated he knew only as "Yusif–was involved in the money transfer to Hambali. |1725| KSM denied knowing Zubair–who would be the critical link to Hambali's capture–or any other Hambali representative in Thailand. |1726|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) By May 2003, the CIA had learned that a source the CIA had been developing [XXX] received a call from a phone number associated with Zubair. When the source was contacted by the CIA, he described a Malaysian man [XXX]. |1727| CIA officers suspected this individual was the "Zubair" associated with Hambali and Majid Khan. |1728| [XXX] later, the source alerted the CIA that the person suspected of being Zubair would be [XXX]. When Zubair arrived at [XXX], he was photographed and followed by Thai authorities. |1729| A detainee in foreign government custody confirmed the individual in the surveillance photo was Zubair. |1730| On June 8, 2003, Zubair was detained by the government of Thailand. |1731| While still in Thai custody, Zubair was questioned about his efforts to obtain fraudulent [XXX] documents, as well as his phone contact with [XXX] [Business Q]. |1732| Zubair admitted to seeking documents on behalf of Hambali, as well as using [XXX] [Business Q] [XXX]. |1733| Signals intelligence had alerted the CIA that a phone number associated with Zubair had been in frequent contact with [XXX] [Business Q]. |1734| After being transferred to CIA custody and rendered to the CIA's COBALT detention site, Zubair was immediately subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. |1735| Days later, Zubair was asked about his efforts to obtain illegal [XXX] documents for Hambali, at which point he acknowledged using [XXX] [Business Q]. |1736| When Thai authorities unilaterally approached a "contact" at [XXX] [Business Q], they obtained [XXX]. |1737| An operation targeting [XXX] was developed that focused on surveillance of [XXX] [Business Q]. As a result of this surveillance, and the cooperation of [XXX], Hambali associate Amer was arrested on August 11, 2003. |1738| Amer was immediately cooperative and assisted in an operation that led to the arrest of Lillie, aka Bashir bin Lap, that same day. |1739| Lillie was found to have a key fob in his possession imprinted with an address of an apartment building in Ayutthaya, Thailand. In response to questioning, "within minutes of capture," Lillie admitted that the address on the key fob was the address where Hambali was located. Fewer than four hours later, an operation successfully led to Hambali's capture at the address found on the key fob. |1740|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On November 28, 2005, the chief of the CTC's Southeast Asia Branch explained how Hambali was captured in an interview with the CIA's Oral History Program, stating:

"Frankly, we stumbled onto Hambali. We stumbled onto the [the source] ...picking up the phone and calling his case officer to say there's [XXX] [related to Zubair]. ...we really stumbled over it. It wasn't police work, it wasn't good targeting, it was we stumbled over it and it yielded up Hambali. What I tell my people is you work really, really hard to be in a position to get lucky." |1741|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Hambali was rendered to CIA custody on August [XXX], 2003, and almost immediately subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. |1742| On September 4, 2006, he was transferred to U.S. military custody. |1743|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In addition to the eight most frequently cited "thwarted" plots and terrorists captured, the Committee examined 12 other less frequendy cited intelligence successes that the CIA has attributed to the effectiveness of its enhanced interrogation techniques. |1744| These representations are listed below:

Additional Intelligence the CIA Has Attributed to the Effectiveness of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques

1 The Identification of Khalid Shaykh Mohammad (KSM) as the Mastermind of the September 11, 2001, Attacks

2 The Identification of KSM's "Mukhtar" Alias

3 The Capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh

4 The Capture of KSM

5 The Capture of Majid Khan

6 The Thwarting of the Camp Lemonier Plotting

7 The Assertion That Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Help Validate Sources

8 The Identification and Arrests of Uzhair and Saifullah Paracha

9 Critical Intelligence Alerting the CIA to Jaffar al-Tayyar

10 The Identification and Arrest of Saleh al-Marri

11 The Collection of Critical Tactical Intelligence on Shkai, Pakistan

12 Information on the Facilitator That Led to the UBL Operation

1. The Identification of Khalid Shaykh Mohammad (KSM) as the Mastermind of the September 11, 2001, Attacks

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The CIA represented that CIA detainee Abu Zubaydah provided "important" and "vital" information by identifying Khalid Shaykh Mohammed (KSM) as the mastermind behind the attacks of September 11, 2001. |1745| CIA Director Hayden told the Committee on April 12, 2007, that:

"...it was Abu Zubaydah, early in his detention, who identified KSM as the mastermind of 9/11. Until that time, KSM did not even appear in our chart of key al-Qa'ida members and associates." |1746|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On at least two prominent occasions, the CIA represented, inaccurately, that Abu Zubaydah provided this information after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. On May 30, 2005, the Office of Legal Counsel wrote in a now-declassified memorandum:

"Interrogations of [Abu] Zubaydah–again, once enhanced interrogation techniques were employed–furnished detailed information regarding al Qaeda's 'organization structure, key operatives, and modus operandi' and identified KSM as the mastermind of the September 11 attacks." |1747|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The OLC memorandum cited a document provided by the CIA to support the statement. |1748| The OLC memorandum further stated that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques provide the U.S. government with "otherwise unavailable actionable intelligence," that "ordinary interrogation techniques had little effect on...Zubaydah," and that the CIA had "reviewed and confirmed the accuracy of [the OLC's] description of the interrogation program, including its purposes, methods, limitations, and results." |1749|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In November 2007, the CIA prepared a set of documents and talking points for the CIA director to use in a briefing with the president on the effectiveness of the CIA's waterboard interrogation technique. The documents prepared assert that Abu Zubaydah identified KSM as the "mastermind" of the September 11, 2001, attacks after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. |1750|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) While Abu Zubaydah did provide information on KSM's role in the September 11, 2001, attacks, this information was corroborative of information already in CIA databases and was obtained prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. There is no evidence to support the statement that Abu Zubaydah's information–obtained by FBI interrogators prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques and while Abu Zubaydah was hospitalized–was uniquely important in the identification of KSM as the "mastermind" of the 9/11 attacks.

(U) The following describes information available to the CIA prior to the capture of Abu Zubaydah:

(U) Both the Congressional Joint Inquiry Into the Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, and the CIA Office of the Inspector General Report on CIA Accountability With Respect to the 9/11 Attacks include lengthy chronologies of the Intelligence Community's interest in KSM prior to the attacks of September 11, 2001. The timelines begin in 1995, when the United States determined that KSM was linked to the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, leading to the determination by the National Security Council's Policy Coordination Group that KSM was a top priority target for the United States. |1751| The Congressional Joint Inquiry further noted that information obtained prior to the September 11, 2001, attacks "led the CIA to see KSM as part of Bin Ladin's organization." |1752| There was also CIA reporting in 1998 that KSM was "very close" to UBL. |1753| On June 12, 2001, it was reported that "Khaled" was actively recruiting people to travel outside Afghanistan, including to the United States where colleagues were reportedly already in the country to meet them, to carry out terrorist-related activities for UBL. According to the 9/11 Commission Report, the CIA presumed this "Khaled" was KSM. |1754|
(TS//[XXX]//NF) On September 12, 2001, a foreign government source, described as a member of al-Qa'ida, stated "the 11 September attacks had been masterminded from Kabul by three people," to include "Shaykh Khalid," who was related to Ramzi Yousef. |1755|
(TS//[XXX]//NF) Also on September 12, 2001, a CIA officer familiar with KSM wrote a cable stating that "[o]ne of the individuals who has the capability to organize the kind of strikes we saw in the World Trade Center and the Pentagon is Khalid Shaykh Mohammad." |1756|
(TS//[XXX]//NF) On September 15, 2001, a CIA officer wrote to a number of senior CTC officers, "I would say the percentages are pretty high that Khalid Sheikh Mohammad is involved [in the September 11, 2001, attacks]." |1757|
(TS//[XXX]//NF) On October 16, 2001, an email from a CTC officer who had been tracking KSM since 1997, stated that although more proof was needed, "I believe KSM may have been the mastermind behind the 9-11 attacks." |1758|
(TS//[XXX]//NF) A foreign government informed the CIA that in late December 2001, [XXX] source, [XXX], provided information on the attacks of September, 11, 2001, and stated, "Khalid Shayk Muhammad, the maternal uncle of Ramzi [Yousef]... was the person who supervised the 'final touches' of the operation." |1759|
(TS//[XXX]//NF) Other reporting prior to the capture of Abu Zubaydah stated that KSM was: "one of the individuals considered the potential mastermind"; |1760| "one of the top candidates for having been involved in the planning for the 11 September attacks" and one of "the masterminds"; |1761| and "one of the leading candidates to have been a hands-on planner in the 9/11 attacks." |1762|

2. The Identification of KSM's "Mukhtar" Alias

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The CIA represented that CIA detainee Abu Zubaydah provided "important" and "vital" information by identifying Khalid Shaykh Mohammed's (KSM) alias, "Mukhtar." |1763| In at least one instance in November 2007, in a set of documents and talking points for the CIA director to use in a briefing with the president on the effectiveness of the CIA's waterboard interrogation technique, the CIA asserted that Abu Zubaydah identified KSM as "Mukhtar" after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. |1764|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) While Abu Zubaydah did provide information on KSM's alias, this information was provided by Abu Zubaydah to FBI interrogators prior to the initiation of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques–and while Abu Zubaydah was still in the intensive care unit of a hospital recovering from a gunshot wound incurred during his capture. Further, the information was corroborative of information already in CIA databases. |1765| Prior to the information provided by Abu Zubaydah, the CIA had intelligence, including a cable from August 28, 2001, indicating that KSM was now being called "Mukhtar." |1766|

3. The Capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The CIA has represented that information acquired from CIA detainee Abu Zubaydah, as a result of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, led to the capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh. This CIA representation was included in President Bush's September 6, 2006, speech on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. The speech, which was based on CIA information and vetted by the CIA, stated that the intelligence provided by CIA detainees "cannot be found any other place," and that the nation's "security depends on getting this kind of information." |1767| The speech included the following:

"Zubaydah was questioned using these procedures [the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques], and soon he began to provide information on key al-Qa'ida operatives, including information that helped us find and capture more of those responsible for the attacks on September the 11th. |1768| For example, Zubaydah identified one of KSM's accomplices in the 9/11 attacks, a terrorist named Ramzi bin al-Shibh. The information Zubaydah provided helped lead to the capture of bin al-Shibh. And together these two terrorists provided information that helped in the planning and execution of the operation that captured Khalid Sheikh Mohammed." |1769|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) While the speech provided no additional detail on the capture of bin al-Shibh, an internal email among senior CIA personnel provided additional background for why the CIA included "the capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh" in the president's speech as an example of the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. After the speech, the chief of the [XXX] Department in CTC, [XXX], sent an email to the chief of CTC, [XXX], [XXX] CTC Legal, [XXX], and two officers in the CIA Office of Public Affairs, among others. The email addressed press speculation that the intelligence successes attributed to CIA detainees and the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques in the president's speech were not accurate. Defending the accuracy of the speech, the chief of the [XXX] Department in CTC wrote: "The NY Times has posted a story predictably poking holes in the President's speech." Regarding the CIA assertion that Abu Zubaydah provided information after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques that led to the capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh, the chief explained:

"...we knew Ramzi bin al-Shibh was involved in 9/11 before AZ was captured; however, AZ gave us information on his recent activities that -when added into other information–helped us track him. Again, on this point, we were very careful and the speech is accurate in what it says about bin al-Shibh." |1770|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In addition, on February 17, 2007, the deputy chief of the [XXX] Department in CTC, [XXX], testified to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that Abu Zubaydah "led us to Ramzi bin al-Shibh, who in kind of [sic] started the chain of events" that led to the capture of KSM. |1771|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) A review of CIA records found no connection between Abu Zubaydah's reporting on Ramzi bin al-Shibh and Ramzi bin al-Shibh's capture. CIA records indicate that Ramzi bin al-Shibh was captured unexpectedly–on September 11, 2002, when Pakistani authorities, [XXX], were conducting raids targeting Hassan Ghul in Pakistan. |1772|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) While CIA records indicate that Abu Zubaydah provided information on Ramzi bin al-Shibh, there is no indication in CIA records that Abu Zubaydah provided information on bin al-Shibh's whereabouts. Further, while Abu Zubaydah provided information on bin al-Shibh while being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, he provided similar information to FBI special agents prior to the initiation of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. |1773| Prior to the application of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, during interrogation sessions on May 19, 2003, and May 20, 2003, Abu Zubaydah reviewed photographs of individuals known by his interrogators to be associated with the bombing of the USS Cole, as well as the September 11, 2001, attacks. Abu Zubaydah identified a picture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh as "al-Shiba" and "noted that he is always with" KSM. |1774| Another record of this interrogation stated that showing Abu Zubaydah the photos:

"was done to gauge his willingness to cooperate and provide details about people, the last times he saw them, where they were going, etc. He appeared to be very cooperative, provided details on people that we expected him to know, the collective groups when they departed Afghanistan, where he thinks they may now be, etc." |1775|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Shortly thereafter, on June 2, 2002, an FBI special agent showed Abu Zubaydah the FBI "PENTTBOM photobook" |1776| which contained photographs numbered 1-35. A cable states that Abu Zubaydah was volunteering information and was "forthcoming and responding] directly to questioning." Abu Zubaydah, who was not asked any "preparatory questions regarding these photographs," identified photograph #31, known to the interrogators as Ramzi bin al-Shibh, as a man he knew as al-Shiba, and stated al-Shiba was with KSM in Qandahar circa December 2001. Abu Zubaydah stated that al-Shiba spoke Arabic like a Yemeni and noted that al-Shiba was in the media after the September 11, 2001, attacks. |1777|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In early June 2002, Abu Zubaydah's interrogators recommended that Abu Zubaydah spend several weeks in isolation while the interrogation team members traveled [XXX] "as a means of keeping [Abu Zubaydah] off-balance and to allow the team needed time off for a break and to attend to personal matters [XXX]," as well as to discuss "the endgame" of Abu Zubaydah [XXX] with officers from CIA Headquarters. |1778| As a result, on June 18, 2002, Abu Zubaydah was placed in isolation. |1779| Abu Zubaydah spent the remainder of June 2002 and all of July 2002, 47 days in total, in solitary detention without being asked any questions. During this period, Abu Zubaydah's interrogators [XXX]. The FBI special agents never returned to the detention site. |1780|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) When CIA officers next interrogated Abu Zubaydah, on August 4, 2002, they immediately used the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Abu Zubaydah, including the waterboard. |1781| On August 21, 2002, while Abu Zubaydah was still being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, a CIA cable noted that Abu Zubaydah was shown several photographs and "immediately recognized the photograph of Ramzi bin al-Shibh." |1782| Abu Zubaydah described bin al-Shibh as having "very dark, almost African looking" skin and noted that he first met bin al-Shibh after the 9/11 attacks in Kandahar, but added that he "did not have in-depth conversations with him." |1783| A cable stated that, after being shown the photograph of bin al-Shibh, Abu Zubaydah told interrogators that he was told bin al-Shibh stayed at the same safe house that KSM "had established for the pilots and others destined to be involved in the 9/11 attacks." |1784| An accompanying intelligence cable stated that Abu Zubaydah informed interrogators that he did not know–and did not ask–whether bin al-Shibh had been involved in the attacks of September 11, 2001, but did state that he believed that bin al-Shibh was "one of the operatives working for Mukhtar aka Khalid Shaykh Mohammad." |1785|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The information Abu Zubaydah provided while being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was described by CIA interrogators as "significant new details." |1786| However, the information provided by Abu Zubaydah was similar to information Abu Zubaydah provided prior to the application of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, or was otherwise already known to the CIA. CIA records indicate that as early as September 15, 2001, Ramzi bin al-Shibh was identified as an associate of the September 11, 2001, hijackers who attempted to obtain flight training in Florida. |1787| A July 27, 2002, cable from the CIA's ALEC Station provided "background information" on bin al-Shibh and stated that he was "suspected of being the original '20th hijacker,' whose participation in the 11 September attacks was thwarted by his inability to obtain a visa to enter the United States." |1788| Ramzi bin al-Shibh was also identified as "a member of the Hamburg cell that included hijacker Mohammed Atta," |1789| and bin al-Shibh was featured in one of "five suicide testimonial videos found in December 2001 at the residence of former UBL [Usama bin Ladin] lieutenant Mohammad Atef in Afghanistan." |1790|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) None of the above information resulted in Ramzi bin al-Shibh's capture. As detailed below, Ramzi bin al-Shibh was captured unexpectedly during raids in Pakistan on September 11, 2002, targeting Hassan Ghul. |1791|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Prior to Abu Zubaydah's capture, the CIA considered Hassan Ghul a "First Priority Raid Target," based on reporting that:

"Ghul has been a major support player within the al-Qa'ida network and has assisted al-Qa'ida and Mujahadin operatives by facilitating their travel. He is a senior aide to Abu Zubaydah who was heavily involved in fund raising for a terrorist operation in spring 2001." |1792|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Additional reporting noted that Hassan Ghul's phone number had been linked to a terrorist operative who "was ready to conduct a 'surgical operation' at any time," |1793| while other reporting indicated that Hassan Ghul was working on a "program" believed to be related to terrorist activity. |1794|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) According to CIA cables, once captured, and prior to the initiation of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, Abu Zubaydah confirmed that Hassan Ghul was a high-level al-Qa'ida facilitator who had contact with senior al-Qa'ida members, including Hamza Rabi'a and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. |1795| Abu Zubaydah also corroborated intelligence in CIA databases that Ghul was involved in al-Qa'ida fundraising efforts. |1796| During this same period, the CIA continued to receive additional intelligence on Ghul from foreign governments, including that Ghul was responsible for facilitating the movement of Saudi fighters through Pakistan. |1797| As noted, on June 18, 2002, Abu Zubaydah was placed in isolation and was not asked any questions for 47 days. |1798|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In early July 2002, Pakistani authorities and the CIA were continuing their efforts to locate and capture Hassan Ghul. A detainee in Pakistani custody, [XXX], [XXX], was providing detailed information to Pakistani authorities on Hassan Ghul. |1799| [XXX] [the detainee in Pakistani custody] had been arrested with [XXX] in [XXX], on May [XXX], 2002, during [XXX] government raids on multiple residences thought to be associated with al-Qa'ida. |1800| During interviews with Pakistani authorities concerning how to locate and capture Hassan Ghul, [XXX] [the detainee in Pakistani custody] identified [XXX] [a well-known associate of Hassan Ghul] and the location of the [well-known associate's] home. |1801|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On July [XXX], 2002, seeking to capture Hassan Ghul, Pakistani authorities [XXX] raided the home of [XXX] [the well-known associate of Hassan Ghul]. When the raid occurred, present at the home was [XXX] [the well-known associate], [XXX] [and family members of the well-known associate]. A [XXX] providing details on the raid states that "[XXX] [the well-known associate] was interviewed on the spot and was fully cooperative with [Pakistani authorities]." [XXX] [the well-known associate] stated that he had not seen Hassan Ghul or [XXX] since June 3, 2002, but that he believed they were still in Karachi. According to [XXX] [the well-known associate], he had already informed Pakistani authorities that Hassan Ghul was an al-Qa'ida member. According to a cable [XXX] [the well-known associate] stated that, as a result of his reporting on Ghul to Pakistani officials, he received "a death threat from Hassan Ghul," causing Ghul to "cease coming to the [XXX] [the well-known associate's] house." |1802|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) CIA records indicate that Pakistani authorities continued to interview the [XXX] [the well-known associate] in an effort to acquire information and capture Hassan Ghul. A CIA cable dated July [XXX], 2002, states that the Pakistani government "is keying on any information which could get [XXX] closer to bagging [Hassan] Ghul," specifically "through ongoing interviews of [XXX] [the well-known associate of Hassan Ghul]." According to the cable, during one of the interviews, [XXX] [the well-known associate] told Pakistani authorities about an address where Hassan Ghul used to reside circa December 2001. [XXX] [the well-known associate] sent with the Pakistani officers to identify the home. |1803| The CIA officers wrote that the location "is extremely close to (if not an exact match)" to a location where KSM once resided, according to a June 18, 2002, report from the FBI. |1804| The identified home was raided, but found empty. The CIA wrote "[XXX] are hitting the right places [safe houses], albeit at the wrong time. Our efforts have got us closer than ever to at least Hassan Ghul." |1805| During the meetings between the Pakistani authorities and [XXX] [the well-known associate], [XXX] [the well-known associate] provided the Pakistani authorities with a copy of [XXX] "reportedly belonging to Hassan Ghul" [XXX]." In the same cable, the CIA reported that [XXX] [the well-known associate] had "approached the police for assistance in retrieving [XXX]," who was [XXX] [a specific family member of the well-known associate]. |1806|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On July [XXX], 2002, CTC officers at CIA Headquarters wrote that they were reading the cables from the CIA [XXX], noting they were "particularly interested in the interview of raid target [XXX] [the well-known associate of Hassan Ghul], who admitted [XXX] to his knowledge of Ghul's involvement in al-Qa'ida activities." The cable stated:

"[r]ecognize that [XXX] [the well-known associate] claims his contact with Ghul stopped approximately one month ago, when he reported Ghul to the Pakistani authorities. However, given [XXX] [his close association to one of our high interest targets, request [XXX] initiate technical surveillance of [XXX] [the well-known associate's] telephone... to determine if they may yield any information on Ghul's current whereabouts." |1807|

CIA records do not indicate if "technical surveillance" of [XXX] [the well-known associate's] telephone was conducted. |1808|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) According to CIA records, once captured, and prior to the initiation of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, Abu Zubaydah confirmed that Hassan Ghul was a high-level al-Qa'ida facilitator who had contact with senior al-Qa'ida members, including Hamza Rabi'a and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Abu Zubaydah also corroborated intelligence in CIA databases that Ghul was involved in al-Qa'ida fundraising efforts. |1809| As noted, on June 18, 2002, Abu Zubaydah was placed in isolation and therefore was not questioned on the July 2002 raids on [XXX] [the well-known associate's] home or the information acquired from the interviews of [XXX] [the well-known associate] conducted by Pakistani authorities. |1810| On August 4, 2002, after Abu Zubaydah spent 47 days in isolation, CIA interrogators entered his cell and immediately began subjecting Abu Zubaydah to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, including the waterboard. |1811| As he had before the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, when asked questions, Abu Zubaydah continued to provide intelligence, including on Hassan Ghul. On August 20, 2002–while still being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques–Abu Zubaydah was asked specifically how he would find Hassan Ghul. There are no records indicating that Abu Zubaydah had previously been asked this question. In response, Abu Zubaydah provided corroborative reporting: that Hassan Ghul could possibly be located through [XXX] [the well-known associate of Hassan Ghul]. |1812| There are no CIA records indicating that Abu Zubaydah provided information on the location of [XXX] [the well-known associate's] home, which, as noted, had been raided weeks earlier, on July [XXX], 2002, and was already known to the CIA and Pakistani authorities. |1813|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Nine days after Abu Zubaydah referenced [XXX] [the well-known associate of Hassan Ghul], on August 29, 2002, CIA Headquarters asked to request that Pakistani authorities "reinterview [XXX] [the well-known associate] for additional intelligence on Hassan Ghul." |1814| The next day, August 30, 2002, [XXX] informed CIA Headquarters that Pakistani authorities were "in contact with the [XXX] [the well-known associate]," but that [XXX] would nonetheless ask the Pakistani authorities to question [XXX] [the well-known associate] again about Hassan Ghul's location. |1815| On August 31, 2002, [XXX] relayed that Pakistani authorities and believed it was possible that [XXX] [the well-known associate] was not being fuly truthful in his interviews with Pakistani authorities. |1816| On September 3, 2002, [XXX] reported that Pakistani authorities had re-interviewed [XXX] [the known associate] an unknown number of times, and that the Pakistani authorities noted that at times [XXX] [the well-known associate] contradicted himself. |1817| Approximately one week later, on September 9, 2002, Pakistani authorities returned again to [XXX] [the well-known associate's] home and interviewed [XXX] [a specific family member of the well-known associate], who had recently returned to [XXX] [the well-known associate's home]. |1818|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In interviews with Pakistani authorities, [XXX] the specific family member of the well-known associate] was cooperative and told the Pakistani authorities where Hassan Ghul's last apartment was located. |1819| Based on the information provided on Ghul's apartment, Pakistani authorities conducted a raid, but found the apartment empty. |1820|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Pakistani authorities then located and interviewed [XXX] [a third individual at the apartment complex]. From the interview [of the third individual], Pakistani authorities learned that while Hassan Ghul had vacated the apartment, he was scheduled to return to the complex [XXX]. Based on this information, Pakistani authorities placed the complex under surveillance and waited for Hassan Ghul to return. |1821| On September 10, 2002, Pakistani authorities arrested two individuals believed to be Hassan Ghul and his driver outside of the apartment complex. |1822| A CIA cable noted that "Ghul had returned to the apartment to [XXX], however, he got more than he bargained for." |1823| Another CIA cable stated:

"Interestingly, he denies being Hassan Ghul - claiming Hassan Ghul is someone else. While [XXX] are fairly certain we do in fact have Hassan Ghul in custody, we would like to make every effort to verify." |1824|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) By September 11, 2002, it was determined that an individual named Muhammad Ahmad Ghulam Rabbani, aka Abu Badr, and his driver were arrested, not Hassan Ghul. |1825| Abu Badr's driver, Muhammad Madni, was immediately cooperative and told the arresting officers that Abu Badr was a "major al-Qa'ida [facilitator]." He then proceeded to provide Pakistani authorities with information about al-Qa'ida-affiliated residences and safe houses in Karachi. |1826|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Based on the information provided by Muhammad Madni, Pakistani authorities [XXX] conducted [XXX] raids in Karachi over the next two days. |1827| Raids of the initial sites resulted in the recovery of "a number of modified electrical switch type mechanisms, modified circuit and 'game' boards and other miscellaneous wires with alligator clips and battery attachments." |1828| On September 11, 2002, additional raids resulted in the arrest of 11 individuals, including Ramzi bin al-Shibh. |1829| According to CIA records, bin al-Shibh initially identified himself as 'Umar Muhammad 'Abdullah ba-'Amr, aka "Abu 'Ubyadah," but the CIA noted:

"This individual strongly resembled pictures of Ramzi bin al-Shibh. When asked if he was videotaped in al-Qa'ida videos, he answered yes." |1830|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Shortly thereafter the CIA confirmed Ramzi bin al-Shibh was the individual in Pakistani custody. |1831|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Hassan Ghul was ultimately captured by foreign authorities in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region, on January [XXX], 2004. |1832| Hassan Ghul's capture was unrelated to any reporting from the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. |1833|

4. The Capture of Khalid Shaykh Mohammad (KSM)

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On September 6, 2006, President Bush delivered a speech based on information provided by the CIA, and vetted by the CIA, that included the following statement:

"Zubaydah was questioned using these procedures [the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques], and soon he began to provide information on key al-Qa'ida operatives, including information that helped us find and capture more of those responsible for the attacks on September the 11th. For example, Zubaydah identified one of KSM's accomplices in the 9/11 attacks, a terrorist named Ramzi bin al-Shibh. The information Zubaydah provided helped lead to the capture of bin al-Shibh. And together these two terrorists provided information that helped in the planning and execution of the operation that captured Khalid Sheikh Mohammed." |1834|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Contrary to CIA representations, there are no CIA records to support the assertion that Abu Zubaydah, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, or any other CIA detainee played any role in the "the planning and execution of the operation that captured Khalid Sheikh Mohammed." CIA records clearly describe how the capture of KSM was attributable to a unilateral CIA asset ("ASSET X" |1835|) who gained access to KSM through [XXX], with whom the CIA asset had prior independent connections. ASSET X's possible access to KSM through [XXX] was apparent to the CIA as early as the fall of 2001, prior to his formal recruitment. The CIA had multiple opportunities to exploit ASSET X's access to KSM's [XXX] in 2001, and in 2002, after he was recruited, but did not. In February-March 2003, ASSET X led the CIA directly to KSM. The contemporaneous documentary record of this narrative is supported by numerous after-action interviews conducted by the CIA's Oral History Program. As the CIA officer who "handled" ASSET X and who was directly involved in the capture of KSM stated, "[t]he operation] was a HUMINT op pretty much from start to finish." |1836|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Within days after the attacks of September 11, 2001, CTC officers suspected KSM of playing a key role in the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. |1837| Shortly thereafter, CTC officers also noted the "striking similarities" between the September 11, 2001, attacks, and the 1993 World Trade Center bombing by KSM's nephew, Ramzi Yousef, [XXX]. |1838| On September 26, 2001, the CIA's ALEC Station issued a cable on KSM and Ramzi Yousef that described extensive derogatory information on [XXX]. |1839| The CIA officer who drafted the September 26, 2001, cable wrote in an email that [XXX] were "associated with terrorists," and that [XXX] "probably is a close associate of KSM." |1840| In a separate email, the CIA officer wrote that, "at a minimum, we should go after" [XXX]. Both emails were sent to CIA officers who, a few days later, would consider [XXX] ASSET X, a potential CIA source whose access to KSM through [XXX] was readily apparent. |1841|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) ASSET X came to the CIA's attention in the spring of 2001 [XXX]. However, CIA officers did not meet with ASSET X until after the September 11, 2001, attacks. |1842| On September 28, 2001, ALEC Station sent a cable [XXX], noting that "[g]iven the events of 11 September... [w]e are very interested in exploring whatever information [ASSET X] may have with regard to terrorist plans by [UBL]." |1843| The CIA held its first meeting with ASSET X on [XXX], 2001, at which time ASSET X indicated that he knew [XXX]. |1844| The cable describing the first meeting states that "[ASSET X's] knowledge [XXX] appears to check out and demonstrates some degree of access/knowledge [XXX]." |1845| On [XXX], 2001, the cable describing the first meeting with ASSET X was forwarded by the drafter of the September 26, 2001, cable on the derogatory information concerning [XXX] to a number of CTC officers in an email with the subject line: "Re: [ASSET X] Information Re [XXX]." |1846| The following day, the cable was forwarded again to CTC officers with the subject line: "Access to Khalid Shaykh Muhammad." |1847|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On [XXX], 2001, ASSET X held his second meeting with CIA officers, who described ASSET X as "very willing to clandestinely assist the USG as directed." |1848| At the same meeting, ASSET X identified a photograph [XXX]. |1849| On [XXX], 2001, CIA Headquarters wrote that the CIA would be "keenly interested" if ASSET X "can dig into the [KSM] [XXX]. |1850|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In [XXX] 2001, ASSET X proposed multiple times to the CIA that he use his contacts to locate KSM through [XXX]–the same approach that would lead the CIA to KSM more than 15 months later. |1851| ASSET X also argued for "a more aggressive and proactive approach [XXX]," but was eventually convinced by CIA officers to [XXX], instead. |1852| After ALEC Station rejected the CIA case officer's recommended financial compensation for ASSET X, ASSET X declined to work with the CIA as a CIA source. |1853| Over the next nine months, the CIA continued to believe that ASSET X had the potential to develop information on KSM and his location, and sought, but was unable to reestablish contact with ASSET X. |1854| During this time, the CIA continued to collect intelligence on KSM's [XXX], |1855| and sought other opportunities to gain access to KSM through [XXX]. |1856| In July 2002, a detainee in foreign government custody provided extensive information on KSM's [XXX] and confirmed that KSM was "very close" to [XXX] who "should know how to contact KSM." |1857|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) When the CIA finally located and met again with ASSET X on [XXX], 2002, ASSET X stated that "he could [XXX] within a few weeks," and was "willing to travel [XXX] to locate [XXX]." |1858| ASSET X was recruited as a source by the CIA, but, despite his offer to track KSM's [XXX], ASSET X was dispatched by the CIA to [XXX]. |1859| [XXX]. |1860|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) By the time ASSET X returned to [XXX] 2002, |1861| his previous CIA case officer "handler" there had departed for another CIA assignment [XXX]. ASSET X was thus handled by a new CIA officer who was unfamiliar with ASSET X's potential utility in tracking KSM. |1862| Seeking guidance on how to proceed with ASSET X, the new CIA case officer sent several cables to CIA Headquarters, which he later described as disappearing into a "black hole." According to an interview of a CIA officer involved in the operation, the cables were being sent to a special compartment at CIA Headquarters which had been previously used by the team [XXX]. With the dispersal of that CIA team, however, the compartment was idle and no one at CIA Headquarters was receiving and reading the cables being sent to the special compartment. |1863| When the CIA case officer received no response to the cables he was sending to CIA Headquarters, he made preparations to terminate the CIA's relationship with ASSET X. According to interviews, in [XXX] 2002, the CIA officer [XXX] and was on his way to meet ASSET X to terminate the asset's relationship with the CIA. By chance, a CIA officer who had previously handled ASSET X [XXX] was visiting [XXX]. This visiting CIA officer overheard the discussion between the chief of Base and the CIA case officer concerning the CIA's termination of ASSET X as a CIA source. The discussion included names that ASSET X had been discussing with the case officer [XXX]–names that the visiting officer recognized [XXX]. The visiting CIA officer interceded and recommended that the CIA Base delay the termination of ASSET X as a CIA source. |1864| At the next meeting, ASSET X again demonstrated that he had direct access to KSM's [XXX]. |1865| As a result, the CIA decided not to terminate ASSET X's work as a CIA source. |1866|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Shortly thereafter, in [XXX] 2003, ASSET X traveled on his own volition, and without prior discussion with the CIA, to [XXX], and [XXX] a face-to-face meeting with KSM. When ASSET X later informed CIA officers about his trip, direct access to KSM [XXX]. |1867| |1868| [XXX]. |1869| The internal debate within the CIA continued, however, with the [XXX], and ASSET X and his CIA handlers urging the CIA to delay action and wait for an opportunity for ASSET X to locate KSM. |1870| ALEC Station initially supported immediate action to capture any KSM associate ASSET X could lead them to, before reversing its position on February [XXX], 2003. |1871| The next day, ASSET X arrived in Islamabad [XXX]. [XXX], where he was surprised to find KSM. [XXX], ASSET X [XXX] sent a text message to his CIA handler stating: "I M W KSM." |1872|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) [XXX]. |1873| [XXX]. |1874| [XXX], ASSET X contacted the CIA and conveyed what had just occurred. |1875|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) [XXX]. |1876| In an interview with the CIA's Oral History Program, the CIA case officer described what happened:

"We went around, you know, [XXX]. [ASSET X] turns around to me and says, look I don't know, I guess I'm nervous, [XXX]. I said' 'Look brother there are twenty five million frigging reasons why you need to find [XXX].' That's what the reward was. He looks at me and says, 'I understand. I understand.'" |1877|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Shortly thereafter, ASSET X found [XXX] and, in the early morning hours of March 1, 2003, Pakistani authorities conducted a raid and captured KSM. |1878| On March [XXX], 2003, KSM was rendered to CIA custody. |1879|

5. The Capture of Majid Khan

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The CIA represented that intelligence derived from the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against CIA detainee KSM led to the capture of Majid Khan. These representations were inaccurate.

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In multiple interviews with the CIA Office of Inspector General, CIA officers stated that "information from KSM led to the capture of [Majid] Kahn [sic]," and that "KSM gave us Majid Khan." |1880| The deputy chief of ALEC Station and former KSM debriefer [XXX] represented that KSM "provided information that helped lead to the arrest of... Majid Khan, an operative who could get into the U.S. easily." |1881| The draft OIG Special Review repeated the representations of [XXX] and others, stating that KSM "provided information that helped lead to the arrests of terrorists including... Majid Khan, an operative who could enter the United States easily and was tasked to research attacks against U.S. water reservoirs." |1882| On February 27, 2004, DDO James Pavitt submitted the CIA's formal response to the draft Inspector General Special Review. Pavitt's submission represented that Majid Khan was in custody "because of the information we were able lawfully to obtain from KSM." |1883| The final, and now declassified, CIA Inspector General Special Review states that KSM "provided information that helped lead to the arrests of terrorists including... Majid Khan, an operative who could enter the United States easily and was tasked to research attacks...." |1884| In its analysis of the legality of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, the OLC relied on passages of the Inspector General's Special Review that included this inaccurate representation. |1885|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On July 29, 2003, CIA leadership met with select members of the National Security Council to obtain reaffirmation of the CIA interrogation program. The CIA stated that "detainees subject[ed] to the use of Enhanced Techniques of one kind or another had produced significant intelligence information that had, in the view of CIA professionals, saved lives." |1886| Briefing slides provided by the CIA stated that "major threat" information was acquired, providing the "Identification of... the Majid Khan Family" by KSM as an example. |1887| The same slides were used, at least in part, for subsequent briefings. |1888| On September 16, 2003, a briefing was conducted for Secretary of State Colin Powell and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, the content of which was described as "virtually identical" to the July 29, 2003, briefing. |1889| The slides were also used in an October 7, 2003, briefing for Assistant Attorney General Jack Goldsmith. |1890|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) CIA records indicate that Majid Khan was identified and located prior to any reporting from KSM. There is no indication in CIA records that reporting from KSM–or any other CIA detainee–played any role in the identification and capture of Majid Khan. |1891|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On January 10, 2003, the FBI's Baltimore Field Office opened a full field international terrorism investigation on the email account "BobDesi(@)hotmail.com." According to FBI investigative records, the investigation was "predicated upon information received through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) concerning" a known al-Qa'ida email account that was already "under FTSA coverage [XXX]." |1892| Six days later, on January 16, 2003, open source research related to the "BobDesi" email account "revealed a personal website for the user, Majid Khan." |1893| In February 2003, [XXX] was tracking Majid Khan's Internet activity and was confident he was located at his brother's house in Karachi, Pakistan. |1894| On March 4, 2003, ALEC Station noted that activity on an al-Qa'ida email account–associated with Khallad bin Attash–that was in contact with Majid Khan, had been dormant. ALEC Station recommended that [XXX] move to capture Majid Khan in the hope that Majid Khan could lead CIA officers to Khallad bin Attash. |1895| The following morning, March 5, 2003, officers from Pakistan [XXX] carried out a raid on Majid Khan's brother's house, detaining Majid Khan. |1896|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On March 15, 2003, Deputy Chief of ALEC Station sent an email to CIA Headquarters noting that she had read the reporting from Majid Khan's foreign government interrogations and was requesting photographs of Majid Khan and his associates to use in the KSM interrogations. |1897| CIA Headquarters provided the photographs the same day. |1898| On March 17, 2003, KSM was shown the photograph of Majid Khan and discussed the person he stated he knew as "Yusif," for the first time. |1899|

6. The Thwarting of the Camp Lemonier Plotting

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The CIA represented that intelligence derived from the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques thwarted plotting against the U.S. military base, Camp Lemonier, in Djibouti. These representations were inaccurate.

(U) In the September 6, 2006, speech, acknowledging the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, which was based on CIA-provided information and vetted by the CIA, President George W. Bush stated:

"This is intelligence that cannot be found any other place. And our security depends on getting this kind of information."

The speech continued:

"These are some of the plots that have been stopped because of information from this vital program. Terrorists held in CIA custody have also provided information that helped stop the planned strike on U.S. Marines at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti." |1900|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) An Office of the Director of National Intelligence public release accompanying the September 6, 2006, speech, states that "the CIA designed a new interrogation program that would be safe, effective, and legal." The document asserts: "In early 2004, shortly after his capture, al-Qa'ida facilitator Gouled Hassan Dourad revealed that in mid-2003 al-Qa'ida East Africa cell leader Abu Talha al-Sudani sent him from Mogadishu to Djibouti to case the US Marine base Camp Lemonier, as part of a plot to send suicide bombers with a truck bomb." |1901|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Similarly, in a prepared briefing for the chairman of the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, John Murtha, on October 30, 2007, the CIA represented that the CIA could not conduct its detention operations at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, because "interrogations conducted on US military installations must comply with the Army Field Manual." The CIA presentation stated that the CIA program was "critical to [the CIA's] ability to protect the American homeland and US forces and citizens abroad from terrorist attack," that "[m]ost, if not all, of the intelligence acquired from high-value detainees in this [CIA] program would likely not have been discovered or reported in any other way," that the CIA program "is in no way comparable to the detainee programs run by our military," and that the CIA used information derived from the program "to disrupt terrorist plots–including against our military." |1902| The CIA presentation then stated:

"[A CIA detainee] informed us |1903| of an operation underway to attack the U.S. military at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti. We believe our understanding of this plot helped us to prevent the attack." |1904|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) A review of CIA records found that: (1) the detainee to whom the CIA's representations refer–Guleed (variant, Gouled) Hassan Dourad–was not subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques; (2) the CIA was aware of and reported on the terrorist threat to Camp Lemonier prior to receiving any information from CIA detainees; |1905| (3) Guleed provided corroborative reporting on the threat prior to being transferred to CIA custody; and (4) contrary to CIA representations, the plotting did not "stop" because of information acquired from CIA detainee Guleed in 2004, but rather, continued well into 2007. |1906|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On March 4, 2004, Guleed was captured in Djibouti based on information obtained from a foreign government and a CIA source. |1907| Prior to entering CIA custody, Guleed was confronted with information acquired from signals intelligence, and he confirmed that he cased Camp Lemonier for a potential terrorist attack. |1908| CIA sought to render Guleed to CIA custody in order to question Guleed about senior al-Qa'ida East Africa members Abu Talha al-Sudani and Saleh ali Saleh Nabhan. A CIA cable states:

"Guleed represents the closest we have come to an individual with first hand, face-to-face knowledge of Abu Talha [al-Sudani] and Nabhan, and our hope is that Guleed will provide key intelligence necessary for the capture of these senior al-Qa'ida members." |1909|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Prior to Guleed's rendition to CIA custody, he provided detailed information on his casing of Camp Lemonier to CIA officers. |1910| On March [XXX], 2004, Guleed was rendered to CIA custody. |1911| There are no records to indicate that Guleed was subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, nor are there any CIA records to indicate that Guleed provided the information that was the basis for his rendition to CIA custody– information leading to the capture of Abu Talha al-Sudani or Saleh ali Saleh Nabhan.

(TS//[XXX]//NF) While in CIA custody, Guleed continued to provide information on his targeting of Camp Lemonier. Guleed stated that Abu Talha al-Sudani had not yet picked the operatives for the attack against Camp Lemonier, |1912| that the attack was "on hold while they- raised the necessary funds via the bank robbery operation," |1913| and that "he [Guleed] was not informed of the operational plan." |1914|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Neither the detention of Guleed, nor the information he provided, thwarted terrorist plotting against Camp Lemonier; and CIA records indicate that attack planning against Camp Lemonier continued well after Guleed's capture in March 2004, to include a time period beyond the president's September 6, 2006, speech. In March 2005, the CIA sought approval to render an associate of Guleed whom the CIA stated was "planning terrorist attacks on U.S. targets in East Africa, particularly against Camp Lemonier in Djibouti." |1915| In October 2005, a cable stated, "a body of reporting indicates that East Africa al-Qa'ida network operatives are currently planning attacks on U.S. interests in the region, particularly... the U.S. military base Camp Lemonier in Djibouti." |1916| In April 2007, the continued terrorist threat reporting against Camp Lemonier resulted in a request for the Camp to further "alter their security practices." |1917|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In October 2007, in light of the ongoing threat reporting related to Camp Lemonier, CIA officer [XXX] attempted to explain the CIA-validated statement in the president's September 6, 2006, speech that "[t]errorists held in CIA custody "helped stop the planned strike on U.S. Marines at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti." |1918| [XXX], who was involved in vetting of the speech, wrote to a CIA colleague tracking the ongoing threats to Camp Lemonier that:

"The reasoning behind [the CIA] validation of the language in the speech–and remember, we can argue about whether or not 'planning' consistitutes [sic] a 'plot' and about whether anything is ever disrupted–was that the detainee reporting increased our awareness of attack plotting against the base, leading to heightened security." |1919|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) A review of CIA records, however, found no indication that CIA detainee reporting from Guleed, or any other CIA detainee, alerted the CIA or the U.S. military to increased terrorist targeting of Camp Lemonier. To the contrary, CIA records indicate that the CIA was in possession of substantial threat reporting demonstrating that Camp Lemonier in Djibouti was being targeted by al-Qa'ida and al-Qa'ida affiliated extremists prior to the detention of Guleed on March 4, 2004. |1920| For example, on January 28, 2003, a foreign government report disseminated by the CIA stated that al-Qa'ida operatives were planning "to ram an explosives-laden truck into a military base, probably Camp Lemonier." |1921| On March 10, 2003, a "Terrorist Advisory" was issued, which stated that "U.S. forces stationed at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti... could be targeted." |1922| Similar reporting continued through 2003, and by the end of the year, the CIA had [XXX] coverage |1923| indicating that Guleed and other identified operatives were being directed by Abu Talha al-Sudani to target Camp Lemonier. |1924| By the end of December 2003, Djiboutian authorities confirmed that Guleed had cased Camp Lemonier and that Guleed appeared to have "formulate[d] a complete targeting package, which included an escape route." |1925| It was this reporting that led [XXX] to capture Guleed on March 4, 2004. |1926|

7. The Assertion that CIA Detainees Subjected to Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Help Validate CIA Sources

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In addition to CIA claims that information produced during or after the use of CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques led to the disruption of terrorist plots and the capture of specific terrorists, the CIA also represented that its enhanced interrogation techniques were necessary to validate CIA sources. The claim was based on one CIA detainee–Janat Gul–contradicting the reporting of one CIA asset.

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The CIA repeatedly represented to policymakers that information acquired after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques helped to "validate" CIA sources. For example, CIA Director Michael Hayden provided testimony to the Committee on April 12, 2007, that:

"Detainee information is a key tool for validating clandestine sources. In fact, in one case, the detainee's information proved to be the accurate story, and the clandestine source was confronted and subsequently admitted to embellishing or fabricating some or all [of] the details in his report." |1927|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Similarly, in January 2009, the CIA compiled a detailed briefing book for a planned three-hour briefing of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program for President-elect Obama's national security staff. Included in the materials was a document that stated, "[k]ey intelligence [was] collected from HVD interrogations after applying [the CIA's enhanced] interrogation techniques." After this statement, the CIA provided examples, including that the "most significant reporting" acquired from CIA detainee Janat Gul after applying the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was information that helped the CIA "validate a CIA asset." |1928| The document states:

"Pakistan-based facilitator Janat Gul's most significant reporting helped us validate a CIA asset who was providing information about the 2004 pre-election threat. The asset claimed that Gul had arranged a meeting between himself and al-Qa'ida's chief of finance, Shaykh Sa'id, a claim that Gul vehemently denied. Gul's reporting was later matched with information obtained from Sharif al-Masri and Abu Talha al-Pakistani, captured after Gul. With this reporting in hand, CIA [XXX] the asset, who subsequently admitted to fabricating his reporting about the meeting." |1929|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The CIA representation that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques produced information that allowed the CIA to identify the reporting of a CIA asset as fabricated lacked critical contextual information. The CIA representations did not describe how the CIA asset's reporting was already doubted by CIA officers prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Gul. Nor did the CIA representations acknowledge that the asset's fabricated reporting was the reason that Janat Gul was subjected to the techniques in the first place. The CIA concluded that Janat Gul was not a high-level al-Qa'ida figure and did not possess threat information, but this conclusion was not included in CIA representations.

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In March 2004, the CIA received reporting from a CIA asset, "ASSET Y," |1930| that Janat Gul was planning with senior al-Qa'ida leaders to conduct attacks inside the United States. The attacks were reportedly planned to occur prior to the U.S. elections in November 2004. |1931| ASSET Y, who cited Janat Gul as the source of the information, stated that Gul was going to facilitate a meeting between Abu Faraj al-Libi and ASSET Y in support of the operation. |1932| As noted, CIA officers expressed doubts about ASSET Y's reporting at the time it was received. |1933| A senior CIA officer, [XXX], who formerly served as chief of the Bin Ladin Unit, raised questions about the reliability of the asset's reporting on March [XXX], 2004, stating that the reporting was "vague" and "worthless in terms of actionable intelligence," and that al-Qa'ida "loses nothing" by disclosing the information. He further stated that, given an al-Qa'ida statement emphasizing a lack of desire to strike before the U.S. election, and al-Qa'ida's knowledge that "threat reporting causes panic in Washington" and "leaks soon after it is received," the report "would be an easy way [for al-Qa'ida] to test" ASSET Y. |1934| ALEC Station officer expressed similar doubts about the source's reporting in response to the email. |1935|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Less than three months later, Janat Gul was captured in [XXX] on June [XXX], 2004. |1936| On June [XXX], 2004, CIA's [XXX] proposed that Gul be rendered to CIA custody, citing ASSET Y's reporting. |1937| During this period, however, the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques had been suspended by the CIA director. |1938| On June 29, 2004, a draft memorandum from DCI Tenet to National Security Adviser Rice sought special approval from the National Security Council Principals Committee to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Janat Gul to learn more about the threat reporting from ASSET Y. |1939| The memorandum referenced ASSET Y's reporting and stated that if the CIA could use the techniques, "the Agency would be in an optimum position to obtain from Gul critical intelligence necessary to save American lives by disrupting the pre-election plot, locating senior al-Qa'ida leaders still at large, and learning how Usama Bin Laden communicates with his operatives." The memorandum further stated that "[g]iven the magnitude of the danger posed by the pre-election plot, and [Janat] Gul's almost certain knowledge of any intelligence about that plot, I request the fastest possible resolution of the above issues." |1940|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On July 2, 2004, the day that CIA Headquarters approved the rendition of Janat Gul to CIA custody, |1941| the CIA represented to select members of the National Security Council that Janat Gul was one of the "most senior radical Islamic facilitators in Pakistan," and noted that he was "assessed by a key source on [the] pre-election plot to be involved in or [to] have information on the plot." |1942| On July 15, 2004, based on the reporting of ASSET Y, the CIA represented to the chairman and vice chairman of the Committee that Janat Gul was associated with a pre-election plot to conduct an attack in the United States. |1943| On July 20, 2004, select National Security Council principals met again, and according to CIA records, agreed that, "[g]iven the current threat and risk of delay, CIA was authorized and directed to utilize the techniques with Janat Gul as necessary." |1944| On July 22, 2004, Attorney General Ashcroft approved the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Janat Gul based on ASSET Y's reporting. |1945|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Janat Gul was rendered to CIA custody on July [XXX], 2004. |1946| On August 2, 2004, Janat Gul denied knowledge of any imminent threats against the United States homeland. Gul's denial was deemed a "strong resistance posture" by CIA detention site personnel. |1947| Janat Gul was then subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques from August 3, 2004, to August 10, 2004, and then again from August 21, 2004, to August 25, 2004. |1948|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) 0n August 19, 2004, CIA personnel wrote that the interrogation "team does not believe [Gul] is withholding imminent threat information." |1949| On August 25, 2004, CIA interrogators sent a cable to CIA Headquarters stating that Janat Gul "may not possess all that [the CIA] believes him to know." The interrogators added that the interrogation "team maintains a degree of caution in some areas, as many issues linking [Gul] to al-Qaida are derived from single source reporting," a reference to the CIA source, ASSET Y. |1950|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) That same day, August 25, 2004, the CIA's associate general counsel provided a letter to the DOJ seeking approval to use additional CIA enhanced interrogation techniques against Janat Gul: dietary manipulation, nudity, water dousing, and the abdominal slap. The letter asserted that Janat Gul had information concerning "imminent threats to the United States" and "information that might assist in locating senior al-Qa'ida operatives whose removal from the battlefield could severely disrupt planned terrorist attacks against the United States." The letter stated:

"In addition, CIA understands that before his capture, Gul had been working to facilitate a direct meeting between the [XXX] CIA [XXX] source reporting on the pre-election threat [ASSET Y] and Abu Faraj himself; Gul had arranged a previous meeting between [ASSET Y] and al-Qa'ida finance chief Shaykh Sa'id at which elements of the pre-election threat were discussed." |1951|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Tne letter from tne CIA's associate general counsel asserted that Janat Gul's "resistance increases when questioned about matters that may connect him to al-Qa'ida or evidence he has direct knowledge of operational terrorist activities." |1952| The letter stated that the CIA sought approval to add four enhanced interrogation techniques to Janat Gul's interrogation plan "in order to reduce markedly Gul's strong resistance posture and provide an opportunity for the interrogation team to obtain his cooperation." |1953| On August 26, 2004, Acting Assistant Attorney General Dan Levin informed CIA Acting General Counsel Rizzo that the use of the four additional enhanced interrogation techniques did not violate any U.S. statutes, the U.S. Constitution, or U.S. treaty obligations. Levin's letter stated that "[w]e understand that [Janat] Gul is a high-value al Qaeda operative who is believed to possess information concerning an imminent terrorist threat to the United States." |1954|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On August 27, 2004, Gul's CIA interrogators reported that "in terms of overt indications of resistance, [Gul's] overall resistance is currently judged to be minimal." |1955| Nonetheless, on August 31, 2004, the CIA interrogators asked CIA Headquarters to approve an extension of all CIA enhanced interrogation techniques against Janat Gul. |1956| The CIA's associate general counsel objected, writing:

"In the end, its [sic] going to be an operational call. I just want to be sure that the record is clear that we're not acting precipitously and are taking into consideration everything we're learning about this guy. We open ourselves up to possible criminal liability if we misuse the interrogation techniques. I reflect again on the cable or cables from the interrogation team that opines that physical EITs (facial slap, walling, etc.) do not work on him. I would strongly encourage, then, HQS not to approval [sic] the use of physical interrogation techniques because if they don't work, then our motives are questionable. If our motives might be questioned, then we get ourselves in trouble." |1957|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Despite these concerns, on September 3, 2004, CIA Headquarters released a cable extending approval for sleep deprivation for 30 days. CIA records indicate, however, that Gul was not subjected to sleep deprivation, or any other enhanced interrogation technique, following this approval. |1958|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On September 7, 2004, more than a month after Janat Gul was rendered to CIA custody, a CIA officer who had observed the interrogations of Gul prepared a memorandum for the leadership of the CIA's Renditions, Detentions, and Interrogations Group, stating:

"The definition of an HVD has probably become blurred over the past year as [CIA] began to render a higher number of MVDs [medium value detainees], but [Janat Gul] would not be considered an HVD when compared to Abu Zubaydah, KSM, and similar level HVDs. [Janat Gul] should likewise not be considered an operational planner or even an operator. It is very likely that [Janat Gul] came into contact with operational information, but we lack credible information that ties him to pre-election threat information or direct operational planning against the United States, at home or abroad. Likewise, we lack any substantive information that connects [Janat Gul] to UBL, Zawahiri, and Abu Faraj Al-Libi." |1959|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On September 16, 2004, CIA detention site personnel wrote that Janat Gul's reporting directly contradicted information from ASSET Y from March 2004, and stated that, "[m]uch of our derogatory information on [Gul] came from [ASSET Y] reporting, as did much of our pre-election threat information." |1960|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On September 17, 2004, following the reports about the discrepancies between the comments made by Janat Gul and ASSET Y, as well as similar denials from Sharif al-Masri, who was in foreign government custody, the CIA undertook a counterintelligence review of ASSET Y to assess the validity of ASSET Y's reporting. |1961|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On October [XXX], 2004, and October [XXX], 2004, CIA officers provided a [XXX] assessment of ASSET Y. That [XXX] assessment indicated that ASSET Y was deceptive in response to questions regarding his alleged meeting with a senior al-Qa'ida official, Shaykh Sa'id, at which ASSET Y claimed to have learned about the pre-election threat. ASSET Y then admitted to having fabricated the information about the meeting. |1962|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Despite the recantation of reporting from ASSET Y, officers from the CIA's ALEC Station continued to assess that Janat Gul "was one of the highest-ranking facilitators in Pakistan with long-standing access to senior leaders in al-Qa' ida" and other groups. |1963| This assessment was not shared by CIA personnel involved in Gul's interrogation. On November 10, 2004, the CIA's chief of Base at DETENTION SITE BLACK, the CIA detention site hosting Gul, wrote that the words used by ALEC Station to describe Janat Gul:

"...fly in the face of what is now a rather long history of debriefings which, I would assert, paint a very different picture of him. While [Janat Gul] was certainly a facilitator, describing him as 'highest-ranking' gives him a stature which is undeserved, overblown and misleading. Stating that he had 'long standing access to senior leaders in al-Qa'ida' is simply wrong.... To put it simply, [Janat Gul] is not the man we thought he was. While he no doubt had associations and interactions with people of interest, [Janat Gul] is not the pivotal figure our pre-detention descriptions of him suggest. We do a disservice to ourselves, the mission and even [Janat Gul] by allowing misperceptions of this man to persist." |1964|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On November 22, 2004, a CIA officer noted the discrepancy between the CIA's description of Janat Gul as a "potential source of intelligence information regarding an attack by al-Qa'ida" in a draft OLC memorandum and the current assessment of Janat Gul. |1965| In an email, the CIA officer indicated that he had spoken to the CIA's associate general counsel, [XXX], who had informed him that "the state of our knowledge about Gul had evolved since he was captured." The email noted that, "[a]t first, we believed he had attack information of a more imminent nature," but "[n]ow it appears that he does not have such information." The email indicated that [XXX] would talk to personnel at OLC about the issue to "[amend] the draft opinion to reflect the state of our knowledge." |1966| The OLC memorandum was not updated.

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On December 19, 2004, CIA detention site personnel wrote again that Janat Gul was "not/not the man [CIA Headquarters] made him out to be," and that "[h]e is a very simple man who, no doubt, did a capable job as a facilitator but he is not the link to senior AQ leaders that [CIA Headquarters] said he was/is." |1967|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On April 6, 2005, as the OLC approached completion of its analysis of the legality of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, the OLC asked the CIA about the interrogation of Gul using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, specifically, "what [the CIA] got from Janat Gul, was it valuable, [and] did it help anything...." |1968| The CIA did not immediately respond to this request and the CIA's Associate General Counsel [XXX] noted that OLC personnel had "taken to calling [him] daily" for information. |1969| On April 14, 2005, a CIA officer emailed [XXX] talking points stating that:

"Pakistan-based facilitator Janat Gul's most significant reporting helped us validate a CIA asset who was providing information about the 2004 pre-election threat. The asset claimed that Gul had arranged a meeting between himself and al-Qa'ida's chief of finance, Shaykh Sa'id, a claim that Gul vehemently denied.

Gul's reporting was later matched with information obtained from Sharif al-Masri and Abu Talha, captured after Gul. With this reporting in hand, CIA [XXX] the asset, who subsequently admitted to fabricating his reporting about the meeting." |1970|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On May 10, 2005, the OLC issued a formal memorandum that included a discussion of the legality of the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Janat Gul. |1971| Citing information provided in the CIA's August 25, 2004, letter, the OLC memorandum stated:

"You asked for our advice concerning these interrogation techniques in connection with their use on a specific high value al Qaeda detainee named Janat Gul. You informed us that the CIA believed Gul had information about al Qaeda's plans to launch an attack within the United States. According to CIA's information, Gul had extensive connections to various al Qaeda leaders, members of the Taliban, and the al-Zarqawi network, and had arranged meetings between an associate and al Qaeda's finance chief to discuss such an attack. .. .Our conclusions depend on these assessments." |1972|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On May 30, 2005, the OLC issued a memorandum concluding that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against CIA detainees did not violate Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture. |1973| In the memorandum, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Steven G. Bradbury used the example of Janat Gul as a detainee who was "representative of the high value detainees on whom enhanced techniques have been, or might be, used." |1974|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Citing information from the CIA's August 25, 2004, letter, Bradbury wrote:

"the CIA believed [that Janat Gul] had actionable intelligence concerning the pre-election threat to the United States... Gul had extensive connections to various al Qaeda leaders, members of the Taliban, and the al-Zarqawi network, and intelligence indicated that 'Gul had arranged a... meeting between [a [XXX] source] and al-Qa'ida finance chief Shaykh Sa'id at which elements of the pre-election threat were discussed.'" |1975|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) As noted, the CIA had represented that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was necessary for Janat Gul to provide information on an imminent threat to the United States, the pre-election threat. As further noted, Gul did not provide this information and records indicate that the threat was based on fabricated CIA source reporting. When the OLC requested the results of using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Janat Gul, the CIA represented that "Gul has provided information that has helped the CIA with validating one of its key assets reporting on the pre-election threat." This information was included in the May 30, 2005, OLC memorandum, which also stated that Gul's information "contradicted the asset's contention that Gul met with Shaykh Sa'id," and that, "[a]rmed with Gul's assertions, the CIA the asset, who then admitted that he had< lied about the meeting." |1976| There are no indications in the memorandum that the CIA informed the OLC that CIA officers had concluded that Gul had no information about the pre-election threat and had determined that Gul was "not the man we thought he was." |1977| As noted, after the May 30, 2005, OLC memorandum, the CIA continued to represent that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques allowed the CIA to validate sources. |1978|

8. The Identification and Arrests of Uzhair and Saifullah Paracha

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The CIA represented that information obtained through the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques produced otherwise unavailable intelligence that led to the identification and/or arrest of Uzhair Paracha and his father Saifullah Paracha (aka, Sayf al-Rahman Paracha). These CIA representations include inaccurate information and omit significant material information–specifically a body of intelligence reporting acquired prior to CIA detainee reporting that linked the Parachas to al-Qa'ida-related activities.

(TS//[XXX]//NF) CIA representations also credit the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques with the identification of a plot to smuggle explosives into the United States involving the Parachas. |1979| CIA records indicate that the plotting was denied by the supposed participants, and that at least one senior CIA counterterrorism official questioned the plausibility of the explosives smuggling plot given the relative ease of acquiring explosive material in the United States. |1980|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The CIA provided information to the CIA Office of Inspector General that "EITs (including the water board) have been indispensable to our successes," and stated that the CIA OIG Special Review should have come to the "conclusion that our efforts have thwarted attacks and saved lives." |1981| The CIA further represented to the OIG that KSM "provided information that helped lead to the arrest of... Uzair Paracha, a smuggler," |1982| and that "as a result of the lawful use of EITs":

"KSM identified a mechanism for al-Qa'ida to smuggle explosives into the US via a Pakistani businessman and textile merchant who shipped his material to the US. The businessman had agreed to use this method to help al-Qa'ida smuggle in explosives for follow-on attacks to 9/11." |1983|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Similarly, on July 29, 2003, the CIA made a presentation to a select group of National Security Council principals, including Vice President Cheney, seeking policy reaffirmation of the CIA interrogation program. The CIA briefing materials state that "the use of the [CIA interrogation] techniques has produced significant results," and warned that "[t]ermination of this [CIA] program will result in loss of life, possibly extensive." The CIA conveyed that "[m]ajor threats were countered and attacks averted," and under a briefing slide entitled "RESULTS: MAJOR THREAT INFO," represented that information obtained from KSM after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques led to the "identification" of Saifullah Paracha. |1984|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) A widely disseminated CIA Intelligence Assessment, entitled "Detainee Reporting Pivotal for the War Against Al-Qa'ida," that was described in internal CIA emails as being "put together using past assessments" and initially intended for the White House only, with "marching orders" to "throw everything in it," |1985| states:

"Since 11 September 2001, detainee reporting has become a crucial pillar of US counterterrorism efforts, aiding... operations to capture additional terrorists, helping to thwart terrorist plots... KSM's revelation in March 2003 that he was plotting with Sayf al-Rahman Paracha–who also used the name Saifullah al-Rahman Paracha–to smuggle explosives into the United States for a planned attack in New York prompted the FBI to investigate Paracha's business ties in the United States." |1986|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) CIA representations related to the "identification" of the Parachas and/or the arrest of Uzair Paracha–as well as the identification of an explosives smuggling plot–omit significant information acquired by the Intelligence Community prior to any reporting from CIA detainees. Specifically, prior to KSM's reporting, the Intelligence Community had already collected and acted upon significant information related to the Paracha family's connections to al-Qa'ida and international terrorism:

Information on Saifullah Paracha was found in documents seized during a March 28, 2002, raid against al-Qa'ida targets associated with Hassan Ghul, which resulted in the capture of Abu Zubaydah. The documents identified "Saifullah Piracha" (the spelling found in the document seized during the raid) and phone numbers, which would be associated with his Karachi-based business, International Merchandise Pvt Ltd, as early as April 2002. An address associated with the business was also identified. |1987|
The name "Saifullah Piracha" was provided to Pakistani officials by the CIA in December 2002. The CIA wrote: "Information below leads us to believe that the following individual and phone numbers may have a connection to al-Qa'ida and international terrorism.... We request your assistance in investigating this individual to determine if he is involved in terrorist activity." The request included three phone numbers found in the documents seized on March 28, 2002, one of which was associated with Saifullah Paracha's Karachi-based company, International Merchandise Pvt Ltd. |1988|
In April 2002, the FBI opened an investigation on another [XXX], at a New York-based business associated with Saifullah Paracha. During the course of the investigation, the FBI interviewed an employer at a New York address and acquired additional information on the business and the Parachas. [XXX] business card, identifying him as an employee of International Merchandise Limited, was found among documents seized during the April 2002 Karachi raid. |1989|
Months later, financial documents seized during the September 11, 2002, raids that resulted in the capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh identified an email address attributed to International Merchandise Pvt Ltd., with the same contact–Saifullah A. Paracha–as well as the same address and phone number as the business identified after the March 2002 raid. |1990|
Based on the information obtained during the September 2002 raids, the CIA informed the FBI, the NSA, and the Department of Treasury that they suspected "Saifullah Paracha" was engaged in terrorist financing activities, specifically for al-Qa'ida. The cable included detailed information on Saifullah Paracha and International Merchandise Pvt Ltd in Karachi, and noted the CIA's ongoing interest in, and analysis of, the information. |1991|
FBI investigative activity of terrorism subject Iyman Faris found that Faris was linked to Paracha Imports via his Ohio-based housemates. |1992|
Majid Khan, who was in foreign government custody, provided reporting that "Uzhair" ran the New York branch of his father's Karachi-based import-export business. According to the reporting, Uzhair was assisting Majid Khan and Ammar al-Baluchi in their efforts to resettle Majid Khan in the United States for terrorism-related purposes. Khan provided a detailed physical description of both Uzhair and his father. |1993|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) KSM was captured on March 1, 2003. On March [XXX], 2003, KSM was rendered to CIA custody and immediately subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. |1994| A CIA interrogation report from March 24, 2003, states that during the afternoon, KSM continued to be subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, including the waterboard, for failing to provide information on operations in the United States and for having "lied about poison and biological warfare programs." |1995| That evening, KSM's interrogators received reports on information being provided by Majid Khan, |1996| who was in foreign government custody and being interviewed by FBI special agents and foreign government officers. The information included details on a U.S.-based individual associated with al-Qa'ida named Uzhair. According to Khan, this Uzhair ran the New York branch of his father's Karachi-based import-export business. |1997| CIA cables describe KSM as being "boxed in" by reporting from Majid Khan |1998| before providing the following information on the Parachas and a smuggling plot:

KSM corroborated reporting from Majid Khan that Ammar al-Baluchi and Majid Khan approached Uzhair Paracha for assistance in resettling Majid Khan in the United States. |1999|
KSM stated that he was close to Uzhair's father, Sayf al-Rahman Paracha, who provided assistance through his business and by helping to find safe houses in Karachi |2000|
KSM claimed that Ammar al-Baluchi and Majid Khan approached Sayf al-Rahman Paracha with a plan to use Sayf al-Rahman Paracha's textile business to smuggle explosives into the United States. KSM stated that Paracha agreed to this plan and was arranging the details with Ammar al-Baluchi and Majid Khan at the time of his (KSM's) capture. |2001| A later CIA cable provided additional background, stating: "KSM did not volunteer [the explosives plot] information on Paracha. He provided this reporting only when confronted with details on his role and other information on the plot, which had been provided by detainee Majid Khan," who was in foreign government custody. |2002|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) According to CIA records, on March 28, 2003, at a FBI field office, Uzhair Paracha provided significant information to interviewing FBI special agents on his father's links to al-Qa'ida and his own efforts to assist Majid Khan's reentry to the United States. Uzhair denied knowing anything about an explosives smuggling plot. |2003|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On April 29, 2003, Ammar al-Baluchi was detained by Pakistani authorities as a result of reporting unrelated to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. Records indicate Ammar al-Baluchi provided significant information prior to being transferred to CIA custody. |2004| On May [XXX], 2003, Ammar al-Baluchi was rendered to CIA custody and immediately subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. |2005| The CIA stopped using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Ammar al-Baluchi on May 20, 2003. |2006| A June 18, 2003, cable states that Ammar al-Baluchi denied that he and Sayf al-Rahman Paracha agreed to smuggle explosives into the United States. Ammar al-Baluchi stated he only asked Sayf al-Rahman Paracha questions and made inquiries about how explosives shipping could be done. Ammar al-Baluchi maintained that he did not take any action based on the discussion. |2007|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On July 5, 2003, Saifullah Paracha was detained in [XXX], in an operation orchestrated by the FBI. |2008| Shortly thereafter, Saifullah Paracha was rendered to U.S. military custody at Bagram Air Force Base. |2009| At Bagram, Saifullah Paracha was questioned by an FBI special agent. |2010| A CIA cable from July 17, 2003, relays that Saifullah Paracha stated that Ammar al-Baluchi had asked if he knew a forwarding agent who could ship garments and "materials" to Europe, which Saifullah Paracha inferred were either explosives or chemicals. Paracha stated he had no information to provide to Ammar al-Baluchi on this topic and that no further action was taken on the matter. |2011|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) With regards to the explosives smuggling reporting, a senior CIA counterterrorism official commented:

"again, another ksm op worthy of the lamentable knuckleheads... why 'smuggle' in explosives when you can get them here? neither fertilizer for bombs or regular explosives are that hard to come by. ramzi yousef came to conus with a suitcase and hundred bucks and got everything he needed right here, this may be true, but it just seems damn odd to me." |2012|

9. Critical Intelligence Alerting the CIA to Jaffar al-Tayyar

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The CIA made repeated claims that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques resulted in "key intelligence" from Abu Zubaydah and KSM on an operative named Jaffar al-Tayyar, |2013| later identified as Adnan el-Shukrijumah. |2014| These CIA representations frequently asserted that information obtained from KSM after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques resulted in an FBI investigation that prompted al-Tayyar to flee the United States. These representations were inaccurate. KSM was captured on March 1, 2003. Jaffar al-Tayyar departed the United States in May 2001. |2015|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) CIA representations also omitted key contextual facts, including that: (1) the Intelligence Community was interested in the Florida-based Adnan el-Shukrijumah prior to the detention of the CIA's first detainee; |2016| (2) CIA detainee Abu Zubaydah provided a description and information on a KSM associate named Jaffar al-Tayyar to FBI special agents in May 2002, prior to being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques; |2017| (3) CIA personnel distrusted KSM's reporting on Jaffar al-Tayyar–stating that KSM fabricated information and had inserted al-Tayyar "into practically every story, each time with a different role"; |2018| (4) other CIA detainee reporting differed from KSM's reporting in significant ways; |2019| and (5) CIA records indicate that KSM did not identify al-Tayyar's true name and that it was Jose Padilla–in military custody and being questioned by the FBI–who provided al-Tayyar's true name as Adnan el-Shukrijumah. |2020| Finally, the CIA attributed to KSM the characterization of al-Tayyar as the "next Mohammed Atta," despite clarifications from KSM to the contrary. |2021|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) For example, in a March 2, 2005, CIA memorandum with the subject line, "Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques," the CIA responded to a request from the Office of Legal Counsel "for the intelligence the Agency obtained from detainees who, before their interrogations, were not providing any information of intelligence [value]." Under a section entitled, "Results," the CIA stated:

"CIA's use of DOJ-approved enhanced interrogation techniques, as part of a comprehensive interrogation approach, has enabled CIA to disrupt terrorist plots, capture additional terrorists, and collect a high volume of critical intelligence on al-Qa'ida. We believe that intelligence acquired from these interrogations has been a key reason why al-Qa'ida has failed to launch a spectacular attack in the West since 11 September 2001. Key intelligence collected from HVD interrogations after applying interrogation techniques:" |2022|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The CIA then listed "Jafaar al-Tayyar" as one of 11 examples, stating:

"Jafaar al-Tayyar: Tayyar is an al-Qa'ida operative who was conducting casing in the US for KSM prior to 9/11, according to KSM and other HVDs. KSM confirmed that he recruited Tayyar–who is still at large–to conduct a major operation against US interests. KSM described Tayyar as the next Muhammad Atta. Tayyar's family is in Florida and we have identified many of his extremist contacts. Acting on this information, the FBI quickly publicized Tayyar's true name and aggressively followed up with his family and friends in the United States, causing Tayyar to flee the United States. [XXX] and we are actively pursuing his capture. [XXX] |2023|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In January 2009, the CIA compiled a detailed briefing book–and CIA Director Hayden produced his own prepared remarks–for a three-hour briefing on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program for President-elect Obama's national security staff. |2024| Included in the materials was a document entitled, "Key Impacts," which states:

"Results: CIA's use of DOJ-approved enhanced interrogation techniques, as part of a comprehensive interrogation approach, has enabled CIA to disrupt terrorist plots, capture additional terrorists, and collect a high volume of critical intelligence on al-Qa'ida. We believe that intelligence acquired from these interrogations has been a key reason why al-Qa'ida has failed to launch a spectacular attack in the West since 11 September 2001. Key intelligence collected from HVD interrogations after applying interrogation techniques: |2025|

... Jafaar al-Tayyar: Tayyar is an al-Qa'ida operative who was conducting casing in the US for KSM prior to 9/11, according to KSM and other HVDs. KSM confirmed that he recruited Tayyar–who is still at large–to conduct a major operation against US interests. KSM described Tayyar as the next Muhammad Atta. Tayyar's family is in Florida and we have identified many of his extremist contacts. Acting on this information, the FBI quickly publicized Tayyar's true name and aggressively followed up with his family and friends in the United States, causing Tayyar to flee the United States. |2026| [XXX] and we are actively pursuing his capture. [XXX] |2027|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Prior to receiving information from the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, the U.S. Intelligence Community was interested in Adnan el-Shukrijumah. According to CIA and open source records, the FBI interviewed the parents of Adnan el-Shukrijumah several times between September 2001 and October 2002 concerning their son and his suspected contact with a known extremist. The family provided no significant information on their son, except to alert the FBI that he had departed the United States circa May 2001. |2028|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) CIA representations that Jaffar al-Tayyar fled the United States in 2003 in response to an investigation prompted by reporting from KSM were incongruent with CIA records at the time of the representations, which indicated that al-Tayyar had already relocated to Pakistan. In March 2003, when Jose Padilla identified Jaffar al-Tayyar as Adnan al-Shukrijumah, he stated that he had last seen al-Tayyar at a KSM safehouse in Karachi, Pakistan, in March 2002. |2029| Other reporting indicated al-Tayyar's presence in Pakistan in 2002 and 2003, as well. For example, KSM consistently reported that al-Tayyar was not in the United States and noted during a 2004 interrogation that al-Tayyar "would not return to the United States because his name was known to U.S. authorities." |2030| Further, [XXX] |2031|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On May 20, 2002, prior to the initiation of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques–and while being questioned by FBI special agents–CIA detainee Abu Zubaydah provided information on "Abu Jafar al-Tayer" in the context of discussing associates of KSM. Abu Zubaydah provided a detailed description of "Abu Jafar al-Tayer" and stated that he was an English speaker who had studied in the United States. Abu Zubaydah stated that he first met "Abu Jafar al-Tayer" in Birmal, Afghanistan, circa January 2002, and that "Abu Jafar al-Tayer" was at that time seeking to travel to Pakistan. Abu Zubaydah repeated that "Abu Jafar al-Tayer" spoke "very good English" and was "short and stocky with black hair and dark skin." |2032| Abu Zubaydah did not provide significant additional information on Abu Jaffar al-Tayyar after the CIA used its enhanced interrogation techniques against him in August 2002. |2033|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On September 11, 2002, Ramzi bin al-Shibh was captured in Karachi, Pakistan. |2034| During the capture operation, a letter referencing Jaffar al-Tayyar was seized. According to a translation of the letter, it stated "tell an unidentified pilot named Ja'far that he should be ready for travel." |2035| Shortly after his capture, bin al-Shibh was rendered to foreign government custody. |2036| In November 2002, while still in foreign government custody, bin al-Shibh was questioned on "Ja'far the Pilot" and provided a physical description of "Ja'far." |2037|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On March 1, 2003, KSM was captured. A notebook associated with KSM retrieved during the capture operation included the name "Jafar al-TAYYAR." |2038| After his capture, KSM was rendered to CIA custody, and immediately subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. |2039|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On March 7, 2003, CIA Headquarters sent information on Jaffar al-Tayyar to the CIA's DETENTION SITE BLUE, where KSM was located, for use in the interrogation of KSM. |2040| The documents included the following:

a "targeting study" on Jaffar al-Tayyar completed by the CIA in January 2003; |2041|
a letter from KSM to bin al-Shibh referencing "Jafar the Pilot" and indicating that "Jafar" "ought to prepare himself to smuggle himself from Mexico into an unspecified country;
a letter from Jaffar al-Tayyar to Ramzi bin al-Shibh asking for clarification of KSM's letter; and
additional background and reporting information on Jaffar al-Tayyar. |2042|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The requirements cable from CIA Headquarters to the detention site included numerous specific questions, relying on the information already known about Jaffar al-Tayyar. |2043|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) According to CIA records, on March 9, 2003–while KSM was being interrogated using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, but before he was subjected to the waterboard interrogation technique–the CIA interrogation team used two letters referencing al-Tayyar as the "interrogation vehicle" to elicit information from KSM on Jaffar al-Tayyar. |2044| CIA cables state that KSM did not provide–and claimed not to know–Jaffar al-Tayyar's true name. However, KSM stated that Jaffar al-Tayyar's father lived in Florida and was named "Shukri Sherdil." |2045| This information was not accurate. Open source reporting indicates that Jaffar al-Tayyar's father's true name was "Gulshair El Shukrijumah. |2046|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Over the course of the next two weeks, during the period when KSM was being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques–including the waterboard–KSM referred to Jaffar al-Tayyar as being engaged in multiple terrorist operations. As a result, the CIA's detention site began describing Jaffar as the "all-purpose" al-Tayyar whom KSM had "woven... into practically every story, each time with a different role." |2047| CIA records confirm that KSM made numerous statements about Jaffar al-Tayyar's terrorist plotting that were deemed not to be credible by CIA personnel, |2048| including, but not limited to, statements that:

al-Tayyar was engaged in terrorist plotting with Jose Padilla; |2049|
al-Tayyar was engaged in terrorist plots against Heathrow Airport; |2050|
al-Tayyar was involved in terrorist plotting with Majid Khan; |2051| and
al-Tayyar was engaged in an assassination plot against former President Jimmy Carter. |2052|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On March 12, 2003, when KSM was confronted with a page in his notebook about al-Tayyar, KSM stated that he "considered al-Tayyar to be the 'next 'emir' for an attack against the US, in the same role that Muhammad Atta had for 11 September." |2053| On March 16, 2003, KSM stated that the only comparison between Atta and al-Tayyar was their education and experience in the West. |2054|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) An email exchange the afternoon of March 18, 2003, between CIA personnel expressed the views of interrogators and officers at CIA Headquarters with regard to KSM and Jaffar al-Tayyar. The email from KSM debriefer [XXX] stated:

"we've finally gotten [KSM] to admit that al-Tayyar is meant for a plan in the US, but I'm still not sure he's fessing up as to what Jafar's role/plan really is. Today he's working with Majid Khan, yesterday the London crowd, the day before Padilla - you get the point. Anyway, I'm still worried he might be misdirecting us on Jafar." |2055|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) An officer from CIA Headquarters responded, "I agree.. .KSM is yanking our chain about Jafar... really trying hard to throw us off course... suggesting whatever Jafar really is up to must be baaaad [sic]." The officer noted that "[a]nother big hole is Jafar's true name," and relayed that KSM's use of "another Abu name... Abu Arif... doesn't get us far." |2056| When KSM was confronted with the reporting he had provided on Jaffar al-Tayyar, KSM claimed that he had been forced to lie about al-Tayyar because of the pressure he was under from his CIA interrogators, who had been subjecting KSM to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques since his rendition to CIA custody. |2057|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Additional CIA records from this period indicate that, while KSM claimed not to know Jaffar al-Tayyar's true name, KSM suggested that Jose Padilla, then in U.S. military custody, would know his name. According to CIA records, the "FBI began participating in the military debriefings [of Jose Padilla] in March 2003, after KSM reported Padilla might know the true name of a US-bound al-Qa'ida operative known at the time only as Jaffar al-Tayyar. Padilla confirmed Jaffar al-Tayyar's true name as Adnan El Shukrijumah." |2058|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In March 2003, a senior CTC officer noted differences between KSM's reporting and reporting from Ramzi bin al-Shibh. |2059| In April 2003, an Intelligence Community assessment concluded, based on comments from other detainees–including those not in CIA custody–that "[i]t seemed obvious that KSM was lying with regard to Jaffar al-Tayyar." |2060| In July 2003, after Ammar al-Baluchi stated that Jaffar al-Tayyar was not suited to be an operative and was "not doing much of anything," the deputy chairman of the Community Counterterrorism Board warned:

"If [KSM] has pulled off focusing us on a person who is actually no threat, it would mean that our interrogation techniques have not/not broken down his resistance to any appreciable extent - and that we will have to doubt even more strongly anything he says." |2061|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In December 2005, an NCTC Red Team report, entitled "Ja'far al-Tayyar: An Unlikely Al-Qa'ida Operational Threat," highlighted the possibility that the information provided by KSM on al-Tayyar's capabilities and terrorist plotting was simply "deception." The report described a large body of other detainee reporting–from Abu Faraj al-Libi, Abu Talha al-Pakistani, 'Abd al-Rahim Ghulam Rabbani, and Ammar al-Baluchi– consisting of largely dismissive statements about Jaffar al-Tayyar's capabilities and role in al-Qa'ida. |2062|

10. The Identification and Arrest of Saleh al-Marri

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The CIA represented to the CIA Office of Inspector General that "as a result of the lawful use of EITs," |2063| KSM "provided information that helped lead to the arrests of terrorists including... Saleh Almari, a sleeper operative in New York." |2064| This information was included in the final version of the OIG's May 2004 Special Review under the heading, "Effectiveness." |2065| This CIA representation is inaccurate. KSM was captured on March 1, 2003. |2066| Saleh al-Marri was arrested in December 2001. |2067|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The inaccurate statements about al-Marri to the OIG began with the July 16, 2003, OIG interview of Deputy Chief of ALEC Station [XXX], |2068| and were repeated in DDO Pavitt's formal response to the draft OIG Special Review. |2069| The inaccurate statements were then included in the final May 2004 Special Review. |2070| The "Effectiveness" section of the Special Review was used repeatedly as evidence for the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, including in CIA representations to the Department of Justice. The passage in the OIG Special Review that includes the inaccurate CIA representation that KSM provided information helping to lead to the arrest of al-Marri was referenced in the May 30, 2005, OLC memorandum analyzing the legality of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. |2071| The portion of the Special Review discussing al-Marri has been declassified, as has the OLC memorandum. |2072|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The CIA also represented, in Pavitt's formal response to the OIG, that prior to reporting from KSM, the CIA possessed "no concrete information" on al-Marri. |2073| This representation is incongruent with CIA records. CIA records indicate that prior to the CIA's detention of KSM, the CIA possessed significant information on al-Marri, who was arrested after making attempts to contact a telephone number associated with al-Qa'ida member and suspected 9/11 facilitator, Mustafa al-Hawsawi. |2074| CIA records indicate that al-Marri had suspicious information on his computer upon his arrest, |2075| that al-Marri's brother had travelled to Afghanistan in 2001 to join in jihad against the United States, |2076| and that al-Marri was directly associated with KSM, as well as with al-Hawsawi. |2077|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The FBI also had extensive records on al-Marri. On March 26, 2002, a year before any reporting from KSM, the FBI provided the Committee with biographical and derogatory information on al-Marri, including al-Marri's links to Mustafa al-Hawsawi, suspicious information found on al-Marri's computer, and al-Marri's connections to other extremists. |2078|

11. The Collection of Critical Tactical Intelligence on Shkai, Pakistan

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In the context of the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, the CIA represented to policymakers over several years that "key intelligence" was obtained from the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques that revealed Shkai, Pakistan, to be "a major al-Qa'ida hub in the tribal areas," and resulted in "tactical intelligence [XXX] in Shkai, Pakistan." |2079| These CIA representations were based on the CIA's experience with one CIA detainee, Hassan Ghul. While CIA records indicate that Hassan Ghul did provide information on Shkai, Pakistan, a review of CIA records found that: (1) the vast majority of this information, including the identities, activities, and locations of senior al-Qa'ida operatives in Shkai, was provided prior to Hassan Ghul being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques; (2) CIA's [XXX] assessed that Ghul's reporting prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques contained sufficient detail to press the Pakistani [XXX]; and (3) the CIA assessed that the infonnation provided by Ghul corroborated earlier reporting that the Shkai valley of Pakistan served as al-Qa'ida's command and control center after the group's 2001 exodus from Afghanistan. |2080|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) As an example of one of the CIA's representations on Shkai, Pakistan, and the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, on March 2, 2005, the CIA responded to a request from the OLC "for the intelligence the Agency obtained from detainees who, before their interrogations, were not providing any information of intelligence [value]." The resulting CIA memorandum, with the subject line "Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques," included the following under the heading, "Results":

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The CIA then listed "Shkai, Pakistan" as an example, stating:

"Shkai, Pakistan: The interrogation of Hassan Ghul provided detailed tactical intelligence showing that Shkai, Pakistan was a major Al-Qa'ida hub in the tribal areas. Through use of [XXX] during the Ghul interrogation, we mapped out and pinpointed the residences of key AQ leaders in Shkai. This intelligence was provided [XXX]." |2082|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The CIA representation that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques produced otherwise unavailable tactical intelligence related to Shkai, Pakistan, was provided to senior policymakers and the Department of Justice between 2004 and 2009. |2083|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Hassan Ghul was captured on January [XXX], 2004, by foreign authorities in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region. |2084| Ghul was reportedly first interrogated by [XXX], |2085| then transferred to U.S. military custody and questioned, and then rendered to CIA custody on January [XXX], 2004. |2086| Hassan Ghul spent two days at DETENTION SITE COBALT before being transferred to the CIA's DETENTION SITE BLACK on January [XXX], 2004. Prior to his capture, the CIA assessed that Ghul possessed substantial knowledge of al-Qa'ida facilities and procedures in Wana and Shkai, Pakistan. |2087|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) During Hassan Ghul's two days at DETENTION SITE COBALT, CIA interrogators did not use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Ghul. Instead, CIA cables state that upon his arrival at the CIA detention site, Hassan Ghul was "examined, and placed in a cell, given adequate clothing, bedding, water and a waste bucket." |2088| During this two-day period (January [XXX], 2004, and January [XXX], 2004), |2089| Ghul provided information for at least 21 intelligence reports. |2090| As detailed below, Ghul's reporting on Shkai, Pakistan, and al-Qa'ida operatives who resided in or visited Shkai, was included in at least 16 of these intelligence reports. |2091| The reports included information on the locations, movements, and operational security and training of senior al-Qa'ida leaders living in Shkai, Pakistan, as well as the visits of leaders and operatives to the area. The information provided by Ghul included details on various groups operating in Shkai, Pakistan, and conflicts among the groups. Hassan Ghul also identified and decoded phone numbers and email addresses contained in a notebook seized with him, some of which were associated with Shkai-based operatives. |2092|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Hassan Ghul described the origins of al-Qa'ida's presence in Shkai, including how Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi became the original group's military commander and its al-Qa'ida representative. |2093| He discussed tensions between al-Hadi and others in Shkai, the mediating role of Abu Faraj al-Libi, and the role of Khalid Habib. |2094| Hassan Ghul explained how he moved to Shkai due to concerns about Abu Musa'b al-Baluchi's contacts with [XXX], how he traveled to Shkai to make contact with Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi, and how Abu Faraj mediated between Ghul and Hamza Rabi'a. |2095| Ghul stated that he last saw Abu Faraj in the summer of 2003, when Ghul was seeking Abu Faraj's assistance in moving money from Saudi Arabia to deliver to al-Hadi for support of their community in Shkai. |2096|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) According to Hassan Ghul, Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi moved periodically among various houses within the village, including that of Abu Hussein and [XXX], whom he described as "senior media people for al-Qa'ida." |2097| Elaborating on al-Hadi's location, Hassan Ghul described the importance of both a madrassa and a guesthouse in Shkai known as the "bachelor house," where unaccompanied men stayed. Ghul stated that he last saw al-Hadi in December 2003 when al-Hadi came to the "bachelor house" to visit with other Arabs. |2098| Ghul also identified other permanent and transient residents of the "bachelor house." |2099| He stated that al-Hadi, who he believed was seeking another safehouse in Shkai at which to hold meetings, had approximately 40 to 50 men under his command. Hassan Ghul also identified a phone number used to contact al-Hadi. |2100|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) According to Hassan Ghul, as of December 2003, approximately 60 Arab males and between 150 and 200 Turkic/Uzbek males were living in Shkai, along with a "significant population" of Baluchis who assisted the Arabs and Uzbeks. |2101| Ghul described al-Qa'ida training, including an electronics course taught in the fall of 2003 by Abu Bakr al-Suri at the house of Hamza Rabi'a where, he believed, individuals were being trained for an ongoing operation. |2102| Ghul discerned from the training and Rabi'a's statements that al-Qa'ida operatives in Shkai were involved in an assassination attempt against Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf. |2103| Ghul stated Hamza Rabi'a was also likely planning operations into Afghanistan, but had no specifics. |2104|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Hassan Ghul elaborated on numerous other al-Qa'ida operatives he said resided in or visited Shkai, Pakistan, including Shaikh Sa'id al-Masri, |2105| Sharif al-Masri, |2106| Abu Maryam, |2107| Janat Gul, |2108| Khalil Deek, |2109| Abu Talha al-Pakistani, |2110| Finis, |2111| and others. |2112|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Finally, Hassan Ghul described his interactions with Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, which also related to al-Qa'ida figures in Shkai, in particular Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi. |2113| Ghul described al-Zarqawi's request to al-Hadi for money, explosive experts, and electronic experts, and provided details of his own trip to Iraq on behalf of al-Hadi. |2114| Hassan Ghul identified four email addresses for contacting al-Zarqawi directly, |2115| and described a phone code he would use to communicate with al-Zarqawi. |2116| Ghul also described his conversations with al-Zarqawi, interpreted the notes he had taken of the last of his conversations with al-Zarqawi, identified operatives whom al-Zarqawi and al-Hadi agreed to send to Iraq, |2117| and discussed strategic differences between al-Zarqawi and al-Hadi related to Iraq. |2118|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On January [XXX], 2004, after two days at DETENTION SITE COBALT, during which Hassan Ghul provided the aforementioned information about al-Qa'ida activities in Shkai and other matters, Ghul was transferred to the CIA's DETENTION SITE BLACK. |2119| Ghul was immediately, and for the first time, subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. He was "shaved and barbered, stripped, and placed in the standing position." |2120| According to a CIA cable, Hassan Ghul provided no new information during this period and was immediately placed in standing sleep deprivation with his hands above his head, with plans to lower his hands after two hours. |2121| In their request to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Ghul, CIA detention site personnel wrote:

"The interrogation team believes, based on [Hassan Ghul's] reaction to the initial contact, that his al-Qa'ida briefings and his earlier experiences with U.S. military interrogators have convinced him there are limits to the physical contact interrogators can have with him. The interrogation team believes the approval and employment of enhanced measures should sufficiently shift [Hassan Ghul's] paradigm of what he expects to happen. The lack of these increasd [sic] measures may limit the team's capability to collect critical and reliable information in a timely manner." |2122|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) CIA Headquarters approved the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Hassan Ghul in order to "sufficiently shift [Ghul's] paradigm of what he can expect from the interrogation process, and to increase base's capability to collect critical and reliable threat information in a timely manner." |2123| CIA records do not indicate that information provided by Ghul during this period, or after, resulted in the identification or capture of any al-Qa'ida leaders. After his arrival at DETENTION SITE BLACK, Ghul was asked to identify locations on [XXX] and line drawings of Shkai provided to him, for the first time, by interrogators. |2124|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Hassan Ghul's reporting on Shkai prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was compiled by the CIA for passage to the Pakistani government. On January 28, 2004, [XXX] issued a cable stating that the information on Shkai provided by Hassan Ghul prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, combined with reporting unrelated to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, "moved Shkai to the forefront [XXX]," and that "[a]s a result, Station is currently its Shkai [XXX]." |2125| On January 29, 2004, ALEC Station proposed that [XXX] initiate a discussion with the Pakistanis on "possible Arabs in Shkai," and concurred with a tear-line that requests that Pakistan "undertake to verify" the presence of "a large number of Arabs" in Shkai "as soon as possible." |2126|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On January 31, 2004, CIA's [XXX] drafted a cable with an extensive "tear-line" for Pakistan, much of it related to Shkai. The cable from [XXX] referenced nine cables describing Hassan Ghul's reporting prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, |2127| and no cables describing Ghul's reporting after the use of the techniques. |2128| The cable from [XXX] then stated that "Station sees the type of information coming from [Hassan Ghul's] interrogations as perfect fodder for pressing [Pakistan] into action against [XXX] associates of Hassan Ghul in Pakistan, [XXX], and other terrorist [XXX] in Pakistan [XXX]." The tear-line for Pakistan included extensive information provided by Hassan Ghul prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. |2129| On February 3, 2004, CIA Headquarters requested that the tear-line be passed to the Pakistanis, but deferred to [XXX] on the portions dealing with Shkai. |2130| As CIA's [XXX] informed CIA Headquarters on February 9, 2004, it intended to hold the information on Shkai until the DCI's visit to Pakistan the following day. As Station noted, "this tearline will prove critical [XXX]." |2131| In the meantime and afterwards, additional tear-lines were prepared for the Pakistanis that were based primarily on reporting from Hassan Ghul prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, combined with Ghul's subsequent reporting, and information from sources unrelated to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. |2132|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In July 2004, the CIA assessed [XXX] that "al-Qa'ida operatives [XXX] are continuing with their activities and waiting for the situation to normalize in the tribal areas." In particular, "[a]l-Qa'ida's senior operatives who were in Shkai before the military's offensive remained in South Waziristan as of mid-June [2004]." |2133| Later, in December 2005, a CIA detainee profile of Hassan Ghul assessed that the information provided by Ghul confirmed earlier reporting in CIA's possession that the Shkai valley of Pakistan served as al-Qa'ida's command and control center after the group's 2001 exodus from Afghanistan. |2134| Hassan Ghul was [XXX], and later released. |2135| [XXX]. |2136|

12. Information on the Facilitator that Led to the UBL Operation

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Shortly after the raid on the Usama bin Ladin (UBL) compound on May 1, 2011, which resulted in UBL's death, CIA officials described the role of reporting from the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program in the operation–and in some cases connected the reporting to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. |2137| The vast majority of the documents, statements, and testimony highlighting information obtained from the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, or from CIA detainees more generally, was inaccurate and incongruent with CIA records.

(TS//[XXX]//NF) CIA records indicate that: (1) the CIA had extensive reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti (variant Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti), |2138| the UBL facilitator whose identification and tracking led to the identification of UBL's compound and the operation that resulted in UBL's death, prior to and independent of information from CIA detainees; (2) the most accurate information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti obtained from a CIA detainee was provided by a CIA detainee who had not yet been subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques; and (3) CIA detainees who were subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques withheld and fabricated information about Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti.

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Within days of the raid on UBL's compound, CIA officials represented that CIA detainees provided the "tipoff" |2139| information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti. |2140| A review of CIA records found that the initial intelligence obtained, as well as the information the CIA identified as the most critical–or the most valuable–on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, |2141| was not related to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. |2142|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The CIA did not receive any information from CIA detainees on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti until 2003. Nonetheless, by the end of 2002, the CIA was actively targeting Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti and had collected significant reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti–to include reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti's close links to UBL. CIA records indicate that prior to receiving any information from CIA detainees, the CIA had collected:

Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti's Telephonic Activity: A phone number associated with Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was under U.S. government intelligence collection as early as January 1, 2002. |2143| In March 2002, this phone number would be found in Abu Zubaydah's address book under the heading "Abu Ahmad K. |2144| In April 2002, the same phone number was found to be in contact with UBL family members. |2145| In June 2002, a person using the identified phone number and believed at the time to be "al-Kuwaiti" called a number associated with KSM. |2146| All of this information was acquired in 2002, prior to any reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti from CIA detainees.
Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti's Email Communications: In July 2002, the CIA had obtained an email address believed to be associated with Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti. |2147| As early as August 24, 2002, the CIA was collecting and tracking al-Kuwaiti's email activity. A cable from that day states that an email account associated with KSM "intermediary Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti" remained active in Karachi. |2148| On September 17, 2002, the CIA received reporting on al-Kuwaiti's email address from a detainee in the custody of a foreign government. The detainee reported that al-Kuwaiti shared an email address with Ammar al-Baluchi, and that al-Kuwaiti was "coordinating martyrdom operations." |2149| When KSM was captured on March 1, 2003, an email address associated with al-Kuwaiti was found on a laptop believed to be used by KSM. |2150| All of this information was acquired prior to any reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti from CIA detainees.
A Body of Intelligence Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti's Involvement in Operational Attack Planning with KSM–Including Targeting of the United States: On June 10, 2002, the CIA received reporting from a detainee in the custody of a foreign government indicating that Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was engaged in operational attack planning with KSM. |2151| On June 25, 2002, the CIA received reporting from another detainee in the custody of a foreign government corroborating information that al-Kuwaiti was close with KSM, as well as reporting that al-Kuwaiti worked on "secret operations" with KSM prior to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. |2152| By August 9, 2002, the CIA had received reporting from a third detainee in the custody of a foreign government indicating that Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was supporting KSM's operational attack planning targeting the United States. |2153| By October 20, 2002, the CIA had received reporting from a fourth detainee in the custody of a foreign government indicating that a known terrorist–Hassan Ghul–"received funding and instructions primarily from Abu Ahmad, a close associate of KSM." |2154| All of this information was acquired in 2002, prior to any reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti from CIA detainees.
Significant Corroborative Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti's Age, Physical Description, and Family–Including Information the CIA Would Later Cite As Pivotal: In September 2001, the CIA received reporting on al-Kuwaiti's family that the CIA would later cite as pivotal in identifying al-Kuwaiti's true name. |2155| From January 2002 through October 2002, the CIA received significant corroborative reporting on al-Kuwaiti's age, physical appearance, and family from detainees held in the custody of foreign governments and the U.S. military. |2156| All of this information was acquired prior to any reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti from CIA detainees.
Multiple Reports on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti's Close Association with UBL and His Frequent Travel to See UBL: |2157| As early as April 2002, CIA had signals intelligence linking a phone number associated with al-Kuwaiti with UBL's family, specifically al-Qa'ida member Sa'ad Bin Ladin. |2158| On June 5, 2002, the CIA received reporting from a detainee in the custody of a foreign government indicating that "Abu Ahmad" was one of three al-Qa'ida associated individuals–to include Sa'ad bin Ladin and KSM–who visited him. The detainee–Ridha al-Najjar–was a former UBL caretaker. |2159| On June 25, 2002, the CIA received reporting from another detainee in the custody of a foreign government–Riyadh the Facilitator– suggesting al-Kuwaiti may have served as a courier for UBL. Riyadh the Facilitator highlighted that al-Kuwaiti was "actively working in secret locations in Karachi, but traveled frequently" to "meet with Usama bin Ladin." |2160| Months earlier the CIA disseminated signals intelligence indicating that Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti and Riyadh the Facilitator were in phone contact with each other. |2161| In August 2002, another detainee in the custody of a foreign government with known links to al-Kuwaiti |2162|–Abu Zubair al-Ha'ili–reported that al-Kuwaiti "was one of a few close associates of Usama bin Ladin." |2163| All of this information was acquired in 2002, prior to any reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti from CIA detainees. |2164|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Within a day of the UBL operation, the CIA began providing classified briefings to Congress on the overall operation and the intelligence that led to the raid and UBL's death. |2165| On May 2, 2011, CIA officials, including CIA Deputy Director Michael Morell, briefed the Committee. A second briefing occurred on May 4, 2011, when CIA Director Leon Panetta and other CIA officials briefed both the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Armed Services Committee. Both of these briefings indicated that CIA detainee information–and the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques–played a substantial role in developing intelligence that led to the UBL operation. The testimony contained significant inaccurate information.

(TS//[XXX]//NF) For example, in the May 2, 2011, briefing, the CIA informed the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that:

"However, there remained one primary line of investigation that was proving the most difficult to run to ground, and that was the case of a courier named Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti. Abu Ahmed had totally dropped off our radar in about the 2002-2003 time frame after several detainees in our custody had highlighted him as a key facilitator for bin Ladin." |2166|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The information above is not fully congruent with CIA records. As described, the CIA was targeting Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti prior to any reporting from CIA detainees. Al-Kuwaiti was identified as early as 2002 as an al-Qa'ida member engaged in operational planning who "traveled frequently" to see UBL. |2167| No CIA detainee provided reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti in 2002. While CIA detainees eventually did provide some information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti beginning in the spring of 2003, the majority of the accurate intelligence acquired on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was collected outside of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, either from detainees not in CIA custody, or from other intelligence sources and methods unrelated to detainees, to include human sources and foreign partners. |2168| The most accurate CIA detainee-related intelligence was obtained in early 2004, from a CIA detainee who had not yet been subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. |2169| That detainee–Hassan Ghul–listed Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti as one of three individuals likely to be with UBL, |2170| stated that "it was well known that [UBL] was always with Abu Ahmed [al-Kuwaiti]," |2171| and described al-Kuwaiti as UBL's "closest assistant," |2172| who "likely handled all of UBL's needs." |2173| The detainee further relayed that he believed "UBL's security apparatus would be minimal, and that the group likely lived in a house with a family somewhere in Pakistan." |2174|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In the May 4, 2011, briefing, CIA Director Leon Panetta provided the following statement to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Armed Services Committee (which mirrored similar statements by a "senior administration official" in a White House Press Briefing from May 2, 2011) |2175|:

"The detainees in the post-9/11 period flagged for us that there were individuals that provided direct support to bin Ladin... and one of those identified was a courier who had the nickname Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti. That was back in 2002." |2176|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) As previously detailed, no CIA detainees provided information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti in 2002. As such, for the statement to be accurate, it can only be a reference to detainees in foreign government custody who provided information in 2002. |2177| As noted, prior to any reporting from CIA detainees, the CIA was targeting Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti–to include al-Kuwaiti's phone number and email address. |2178| Further, prior to 2003, the CIA possessed a body of intelligence reporting linking Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti to KSM and UBL and to operational targeting of the United States, as well as reporting that Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was "one of a few close associates of Usama bin Ladin" |2179| and "traveled frequendy" to "meet with Usama bin Ladin." |2180|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In the same May 4, 2011, briefing, a CIA officer elaborated on the previously provided statements and provided additional detail on how "a couple of early detainees" "identi[fied]" Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti as someone close to UBL:

"I think the clearest way to think about this is, in 2002 a couple of early detainees, Abu Zubaydah and an individual, Riyadh the Facilitator, talked about the activities of an Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti. At this point we don't have his true name. And they identify him as somebody involved with AQ and facilitation and some potential ties to bin Ladin." |2181|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) This testimony is inaccurate. There are no CIA records of Abu Zubaydah discussing Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti in 2002. |2182| The first reference to Abu Zubaydah providing information related to al-Kuwaiti is on July 7, 2003, when Abu Zubaydah denied knowing the name. |2183| CIA records indicate that the information in 2002 that the CIA has represented as the initial lead information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was not obtained from the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, but was collected by the CIA from other intelligence sources, including from detainees in foreign government custody. Riyadh the Facilitator provided substantial information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti in 2002, including information suggesting al-Kuwaiti may have served as a courier, as al-Kuwaiti reportedly "traveled frequently" to see UBL. |2184| Consistent with the testimony, CIA records indicate that the information provided by Riyadh the Facilitator was important information; however, Riyadh the Facilitator was not in CIA custody in 2002, but was in the custody of a foreign government. |2185| Riyadh the Facilitator was not transferred to CIA custody until January [XXX], 2004. |2186| As noted, in 2002, the CIA received additional reporting from another detainee in the custody of a foreign government, Abu Zubair al-Ha'ili, that "Ahmad al-Kuwaiti" was "one of a few close associates of Usama bin Ladin." |2187|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) At the May 4, 2011, briefing, a Senator asked, "I guess what we're trying to get at here, or certainly I am, was any of this information obtained through [enhanced] interrogation measures?" A CIA officer replied:

"Senator, these individuals were in our program and were subject to some form of enhanced interrogation. Because of the time involved and the relationship to the information and the fact that I'm not a specialist on that program, I would ask that you allow us to come back to you with some detail." |2188|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The information above is not fully congruent with CIA records. As is detailed in the intelligence chronology in Volume II, the vast majority of the intelligence acquired on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was originally acquired from sources unrelated to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, and the most accurate information acquired from a CIA detainee was provided prior to the CIA subjecting the detainee to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. |2189| As detailed in CIA records, and acknowledged by the CIA in testimony, information from CIA detainees subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques–to include CIA detainees who had clear links to Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti based on a large body of intelligence reporting–provided fabricated, inconsistent, and generally unreliable information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti throughout their detention. |2190|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) At the May 4, 2011, briefing, a Senator asked, "of the people that you talked about as detainees that were interrogated, which of those were waterboarded and did they provide unique intelligence in order to make this whole mission possible?" |2191| CIA Director Panetta responded:

"I want to be able to get back to you with specifics, but right now we think there were about 12 detainees that were interviewed, |2192| and about three of them were probably subject to the waterboarding process. |2193| Now what came from those interviews, how important was it, I really do want to stress the fact that we had a lot of streams of intelligence here that kind of tipped us off there, but we had imagery, we had assets on the ground, we had information that came from a number of directions in order to piece this together. But clearly the tipoff |2194| on the couriers came from those interviews." |2195|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) As previously detailed, the "tipoff on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti in 2002 did not come from the interrogation of CIA detainees and was obtained prior to any CIA detainee reporting. The CIA was already targeting Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti and collecting intelligence on at least one phone number and an email address associated with al-Kuwaiti in 2002. |2196| No CIA detainee provided information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti in 2002, and prior to receiving any information from CIA detainees, the CIA possessed a body of intelligence reporting linking Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti to KSM and UBL and to operational targeting of the United States, as well as reporting that Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was "one of a few close associates of Usama bin Ladin" |2197| and "traveled frequently" to "meet with Usama bin Ladin." |2198|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The day after the classified briefing, on May 5, 2011, the CIA provided the Committee with a six-page chart entitled, "Detainee Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti," which accompanied a one-page document compiled by the CIA's CTC, entitled "Background Detainee Information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti." |2199| In total, the CIA chart identifies 25 "mid-value and high-value detainees" who "discussed Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti's long-time membership in al-Qa'ida and his historic role as courier for Usama Bin Ladin." The 25 detainees are divided into two categories. The chart prominently lists 12 detainees–all identified as having been in CIA custody–"who linked Abu Ahmad to Bin Ladin," which the CIA labeled as the most important, "Tier 1" information. The document states that nine of the 12 (9/12: 75 percent) CIA detainees providing "Tier 1" information were subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, and that of those nine detainees, two (2/9: 20 percent) were subjected to the CIA's waterboard interrogation technique. The chart then includes a list of 13 detainees "who provided general information on Abu Ahmad," labeled as "Tier 2" information. The CIA document states that four of the 13 (4/13: 30 percent) "Tier 2" detainees were in CIA custody and that all four (4/4: 100 percent) "CIA detainees" were subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. |2200|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On October 3, 2012, the CIA provided the Committee with a document entitled, "Lessons for the Hunt for Bin Ladin," completed in September 2012 by the CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence. The CIA Lessons Learned document states, "[i]n sum, 25 detainees provided information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, his al-Qa'ida membership, and his historic role as a courier for Bin Ladin." The CIA document then states that 16 of the 25 detainees who reported on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti were in CIA custody, and that "[o]f the 16 held in CIA custody, all but three [13] had given information after being subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques (EITs)," before noting that "only two (KSM and Abu Zubaydah) had been waterboarded." |2201|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) A review of CIA records found that these CIA documents contained inaccurate information and omitted important and material facts.

The May 5, 2011, CIA chart represents that all 12 detainees (12/12: 100 percent) providing "Tier 1" intelligence–information that "linked Abu Ahmad to Bin Ladin" |2202|–were detainees in CIA custody. A review of CIA records found that the CIA document omitted the fact that five of the 12 listed detainees (5/12: 41 percent) provided intelligence on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti prior to entering CIA custody. |2203| In addition, other detainees–not in CIA custody–provided information that "linked Abu Ahmad to Bin Ladin," but were not included in the CIA list. For example, the first detainee-related information identified in CIA records indicating a close relationship between UBL and Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was acquired in July 2002, from a detainee in the custody of a foreign government, Abu Zubair al-Ha'ili (Zubair). According to CIA records, Zubair provided a detailed physical description of Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, information on Abu Ahmad's family, his close connection to KSM, and that "Ahmad al-Kuwaiti: was a one of a few close associates of Usama bin Ladin." |2204| This information would be used to question other detainees, but was omitted in the CIA's "Detainee Reporting on Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti" chart.
The May 5, 2011, CIA chart also states that nine of the 12 (9/12: 75 percent) "CIA detainees" providing "Tier 1" intelligence were subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. A review of CIA records found that of the nine detainees the CIA identified as having been subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques and providing "Tier 1" information on links between Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti and UBL, five of the 9 (5/9: 55 percent) provided information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti prior to being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. |2205| This information was omitted from the CIA document. Of the remaining four detainees who did not provide information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti until after being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, three were not substantially questioned on any topic prior to the CIA's use of enhanced interrogation techniques. |2206| All three provided information the CIA assessed to be fabricated and intentionally misleading. |2207| The fourth, Abu Zubaydah, who was detained on March 28, 2002, and subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques in August 2002, to include the waterboard technique, did not provide information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti until August 25, 2005, intelligence that was described by CIA officers at the time as "speculative." |2208| These relevant details were omitted from the CIA documents. |2209|
The May 5, 2011, CIA chart also states that of the 13 detainees "who provided general information on Abu Ahmad," labeled as "Tier 2" information, four of the 13 (4/13: 30 percent) detainees were in CIA custody and that all four (4/4:100 percent) were subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. |2210| A review of CIA records found the CIA document omitted that two of the four (2/4: 50 percent) "CIA detainees" who were described as subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques provided intelligence on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti prior to entering CIA custody, and therefore prior to being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. |2211| Finally, there were additional detainees in foreign government custody "who provided general information on Abu Ahmad" that were not included in the list of 13 detainees. For example, in January 2002, the CIA received reporting from a detainee in the custody of a foreign government who provided a physical description of a Kuwaiti named Abu Ahmad who attended a terrorist training camp. |2212|
The October 3, 2012, "Lessons for the Hunt for Bin Ladin" document states that "[i]n sum, 25 detainees provided information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, his al-Qa'ida membership, and his historic role as a courier for Bin Ladin." This is incorrect. As described, additional detainees–not in CIA custody–provided information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, including 2002 reporting that al-Kuwaiti "was one of a few close associates of Usama bin Ladin." |2213|
The October 3, 2012, "Lessons for the Hunt for Bin Ladin " document also states that 16 of the 25 (16/25: 65 percent) detainees who reported on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti were in CIA custody. This is incorrect. At least seven of the 16 detainees (7/16: 45 percent) that the CIA listed as detainees in CIA custody provided reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti prior to being transferred to CIA custody. |2214|
The October 3, 2012, "Lessons for the Hunt for Bin Ladin" document also states that "[o]f the 16 held in CIA custody, all but three [13] had given information after being subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques (EITs)." |2215| This is incorrect. Seven of the 13 detainees that the CIA listed as having been subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques provided information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti prior to being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. |2216| Of the remaining six detainees who did not provide information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti until after being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, five were not substantially questioned on any topic prior to the CIA's use of enhanced interrogation techniques. |2217| (Of the five detainees, three provided information the CIA assessed to be fabricated and intentionally misleading. |2218| The remaining two provided limited, non-unique, corroborative reporting. |2219|) The sixth, Abu Zubaydah, who was detained on March 28, 2002, and subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques in August 2002, did not provide information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti until August 25, 2005, intelligence that, as noted, was described by CIA officers at the time as "speculative." |2220|
The October 3, 2012, "Lessons for the Hunt for Bin Ladin" document also states that "only two [detainees 1 (KSM and Abu Zubaydah) had been waterboarded. Even so, KSM gave false information about Abu Ahmad...." |2221| The CIA's May 5, 2011, Chart, "Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti," states that Abu Zubaydah and KSM provided "Tier 1" intelligence that "linked Abu Ahmad to Bin Ladin." CIA records indicate that both detainees denied any significant connection between al-Kuwaiti and UBL. CIA records further indicate that Abu Zubaydah and KSM, who were both subjected to the CIA's waterboard interrogation technique, withheld information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti:

Abu Zubaydah: "Abu Ahmad K." and a phone number associated with Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was found on page 8 of a 27-page address book captured with Abu Zubaydah on March 28, 2002. In July 2003, Abu Zubaydah stated that he was not familiar with the name Abu Ahmad al-Kuwairi, or the description provided to him by CIA officers. In April 2004, Abu Zubaydah again stated that he did not recognize the name "Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti." |2222| According to a CIA cable, in August 2005, Abu Zubaydah provided information on "an individual whose name he did not know, but who might be identifiable with Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, aka Abu Ahmad al-Pakistani." According to the cable, Abu Zubaydah speculated that this individual knew UBL and al-Zawahiri, but did not think their relationship would be close. Days later a CIA cable elaborated that Abu Zubaydah had speculated on a family of brothers from Karachi that may have included Abu Ahmad. |2223|
KSM: When KSM was captured on March 1, 2003, an email address associated with Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was found on a laptop believed to be used by KSM. As detailed in this review, KSM first acknowledged Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti in May 2003, after being confronted with reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti from a detainee who was not in CIA custody. KSM provided various reports on Abu Ahmad that the CIA described as "pithy." In August 2005, KSM claimed that al-Kuwaiti was not a courier, and that he had never heard of Abu Ahmad transporting letters for UBL. In May 2007, the CIA reported that the denials of KSM and another detainee, combined with conflicting reporting from other detainees, added to the CIA's belief that Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was a significant figure. |2224|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The CIA detainee who provided the most accurate "Tier 1" information linking Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti to UBL, Hassan Ghul, provided the information prior to being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. |2225| Hassan Ghul was captured on January [XXX], 2004, by foreign authorities in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region. |2226| Ghul was reportedly first interrogated by [XXX], then transferred to U.S. military custody and questioned, and then rendered to CIA custody at DETENTION SITE COBALT on January [XXX], 2004. |2227| From January [XXX], 2004, to January [XXX], 2004, Hassan Ghul was questioned by the CIA at DETENTION SITE COBALT. During this period the CIA disseminated 21 intelligence reports based on Ghul's reporting. |2228| A CIA officer told the CIA Office of Inspector General that Hassan Ghul "opened up right away and was cooperative from the outset." |2229| During the January [XXX], 2004, to January [XXX], 2004, sessions, Ghul was questioned on the location of UBL. According to a cable, Ghul speculated that "UBL was likely living in Peshawar area," and that "it was well known that [UBL] was always with Abu Ahmed [al-Kuwaiti]." |2230| Ghul described Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti as UBL's "closest assistant" |2231| and listed him as one of three individuals likely to be with UBL. |2232| Ghul further speculated that:

"UBL's security apparatus would be minimal, and that the group likely lived in a House with a family somewhere in Pakistan. Ghul commented that after UBL's bodyguard entourage was apprehended entering Pakistan following the fall of Afghanistan, UBL likely has maintained a small security signature of circa one or two persons. Ghul speculated that Abu Ahmed likely handled all of UBL's needs, including moving messages out to Abu Faraj [al-Libi]...." |2233|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The next day, January [XXX], 2004, Hassan Ghul was transferred to the CIA's DETENTION SITE BLACK. |2234| Upon arrival, Ghul was "shaved and bartered, stripped, and placed in the standing position against the wall" with "his hands above his head" for forty minutes. |2235| The CIA interrogators at the detention site immediately requested permission to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Ghul, writing that, during the forty minutes, Ghul did not provide any new information, did not show the fear that was typical of other recent captures, and "was somewhat arrogant and self important." The CIA interrogators wrote that they "judged" that Ghul "has the expectation that in U.S. hands, his treatment will not be severe." |2236| The request to CIA Headquarters to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques further stated:

(TS//[XXX]//NF) CIA Headquarters approved the request the same day, stating that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques would "increase base's capability to collect critical and reliable threat information in a timely manner." |2238| During and after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, Ghul provided no other information of substance on al-Kuwaiti. |2239| Hassan Ghul was [XXX] later released. |2240| [XXX]. |2241| The fact that Hassan Ghul provided the detailed information linking Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti to UBL prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was omitted from CIA documents and testimony. |2242|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) While CIA documents and testimony highlighted reporting that the CIA claimed was obtained from CIA detainees–and in some cases from CIA detainees subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques–the CIA internally noted that reporting from CIA detainees–specifically CIA detainees subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques–was insufficient, fabricated, and/or unreliable.

(TS//[XXX]//NF) A September 1, 2005, CIA report on the search for UBL states:

"Bin Ladin Couriers: Low-level couriers who wittingly or unwittingly facilitate communications between Bin Ladin and his gatekeepers remain largely invisible to us until a detainee reveals them. |2243| Even then, detainees provide few actionable leads, and we have to consider the possibility that they are creating fictitious characters to distract us or to absolve themselves of direct knowledge about Bin Ladin. We nonetheless continue the hunt for Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti–an alleged courier between Bin Ladin and KSM–and Abu 'Abd al Khaliq Jan, who[m] Abu Faraj identified as his go-between with Bin Ladin since mid-2003, in order to get one step closer to Bin Ladin." |2244|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) A May 20, 2007, CIA "targeting study" for Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti states:

"Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM) described Abu Ahmad as a relatively minor figure and Abu Faraj al-Libi denied all knowledge of Abu Ahmad. Station assesses that KSM and Abu Faraj's reporting is not credible on this topic, and their attempts to downplay Abu Ahmad's importance or deny knowledge of Abu Ahmad are likely part of an effort to withhold information on UBL or his close associates. These denials, combined with reporting from other detainees |2245| indicating that Abu Ahmad worked closely with KSM and Abu Faraj, add to our belief that Abu Ahmad is an HVT courier or facilitator." |2246|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Additional CIA documents contrasted the lack of intelligence obtained from CIA detainees subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques with the value of intelligence obtained from other sources. A November 23, 2007, CIA intelligence product, "Al-Qa'ida Watch," with the title, "Probable Identification of Suspected Bin Ladin Facilitator Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaid," details how a:

"review of 2002 debriefings of a [foreign government] detainee who claimed to have traveled in 2000 from Kuwait to Afghanistan with an 'Ahmad al-Kuwaiti' provided the breakthrough leading to the likely identification of Habib al-Rahman as Abu Ahmad. The [foreign government] subsequently informed [the CIA] that Habib al-Rahman currently is living in Pakistan, probably in the greater Peshawar area–according to our analysis of a body of reporting." |2247|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) This CIA intelligence product highlighted how reporting from Abu Faraj al-Libi, who was subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques and denied knowing Abu Ahmad, differed from that of Hassan Ghul, who–prior to the application of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques–stated that "Bin Ladin was always with Abu Ahmad," and that Abu Ahmad had delivered a message to senior al-Qa'ida leaders in late 2003, "probably through Abu Faraj." The document further states that KSM "has consistently maintained that Abu Ahmad 'retired' from al-Qa'ida work in 2002." The CIA document states that the CIA will be working with [XXX] and the [XXX] government, as well as utilizing a database of [XXX] to follow-up on an individual traveling within Pakistan with a similar name and date of birth. |2248|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) CIA cable records from early 2008 highlight how the discovery and exploitation of phone numbers associated with al-Kuwaiti [XXX] had been critical in collecting intelligence and locating the target, |2249| and state:

"...debriefings of the senior most detainees who were involved in caring for bin Ladin have produced little locational information, and it is the final nugget that detainees hold on to in debriefings (over threat info and even Zawahiri LOCINT) given their loyalty to the al-Qa'ida leader. We assess that Abu Ahmad would likely be in the same category as Khalid Shaykh Muhammad and Abu Faraj al-Libi, so we advocate building as much of a targeting picture of where and when Habib/Abu Ahmad travels to flesh out current leads to bin Ladin." |2250|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On May 1, 2008, a CIA Headquarters cable entitled, "targeting efforts against suspected UBL facilitator Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti," documents that the CIA had a number of collection platforms established to collect intelligence on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti in order to locate UBL. The cable closes by stating:

"although we want to refrain from addressing endgame strategies, HQS judges that detaining Habib should be a last resort, since we have had no/no success in eliciting actionable intelligence on bin Ladin's location from any detainees." |2251|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) While the aforementioned CIA assessments highlight the unreliability of reporting from senior al-Qa'ida leaders in CIA custody, specifically "that KSM and Abu Faraj's reporting" was assessed to be "not credible"–and that their denials "add[ed] to [the CIA's] belief that Abu Ahmad is an HVT courier or facilitator" |2252|–the CIA assessments also highlight that "reporting from other detainees indicating that Abu Ahmad worked closely with KSM and Abu Faraj" was useful. |2253| As documented, the initial detainee-related information linking Abu Ahmad to UBL and KSM did not come from CIA detainees, but from detainees who were not in CIA custody. |2254|

IV. Overview of CIA Representations to the Media While the Program Was Classified

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In seeking to shape press reporting on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, CIA officers and the CIA's Office of Public Affairs (OPA) provided unattributed background information on the program to journalists for books, articles, and broadcasts, including when the existence of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program was still classified. |2255| When the journalists to whom the CIA had provided background information published classified information, the CIA did not, as a matter of policy, submit crimes reports. For example, as described in internal emails, the CIA's [XXX] never opened an investigation related to Ronald Kessler's book The CIA at War, despite the inclusion of classified information, because "the book contained no first time disclosures," and because "OPA provided assistance with the book." |2256| Senior Deputy General Counsel John Rizzo wrote that the CIA made the determination because the CIA's cooperation with Kessler had been "blessed" by the CIA director. |2257| In another example, CIA officers and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence raised concerns that an article by Douglas Jehl in the New York Times contained significant classified information. |2258| [XXX]CTC Legal wrote in an email that "part of this article was based on 'background' provided by OPA. That, essentially, negates any use in making an unauthorized disclosure [report]." |2259|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Both the Kessler book and the Jehl article included inaccurate claims about the effectiveness of CIA interrogations, much of it consistent with the inaccurate information being provided by the CIA to policymakers at the time. For example, Kessler's book stated that the FBI arrest of Iyman Faris was "[b]ased on information from the CIA's interrogation of [KSM]," and that the arrest of Khallad bin Attash was the "result" of CIA interrogations of KSM. |2260| The Jehl article stated that a "secret program to transfer suspected terrorists to foreign countries for interrogation has been carried out by the Central Intelligence Agency... according to current and former government officials." The article stated that a "senior United States official" had "provid[ed] a detailed description of the program," and quoted the official as claiming that "[t]he intelligence obtained by those rendered, detained and interrogated ha[d] disrupted terrorist operations." The senior official added, "[i]t has saved lives in the United States and abroad, and it has resulted in the capture of other terrorists." |2261|

B. Senior CIA Officials Discuss Need to "Put Out Our Story" to Shape Public and Congressional Opinion Prior to the Full Committee Being Briefed

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In early April 2005, [XXX], chief of ALEC Station, asked CTC officers to compile information on the success of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program in preparation for interviews of CIA officers by Tom Brokaw of NBC News. |2262| As [XXX] remarked in a Sametime communication with Deputy CTC Director Philip Mudd, during World War II, the Pentagon had an Office of War Information (OWI), whereas the CIA's predecessor, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), did not. [XXX] then noted that "we need an OWI, at least every now and then...." |2263| According to Mudd, concerns within the CIA about defending the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program in the press were misplaced: |2264|

"maybe people should know we're trying to sell their program, if they complain, they should know that we're trying to protect our capability to continue, we're not just out there to brag... they don't realize that we have few options here, we either get out and sell, or we get hammered, which has implications beyond the media, congress reads it, cuts our authorities, messes up our budget, we need to make sure the impression of what we do is positive... we must be more aggressive out there, we either put out our story or we get eaten, there is no middle ground." |2265|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Mudd counseled not to "advertise" the discussions between CIA personnel and the media with the CIA "workforce," because "they'd misread it." |2266| After [XXX] promised to keep the media outreach "real close hold," Mudd wrote:

"most of them [CIA personnel] do not know that when the w post/ny times quotes 'senior intel official,' it's us... authorized and directed by opa." |2267|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) [XXX] sent a draft compilation of plot disruptions to [XXX]CTC Legal to determine whether the release of the information would pose any "legal problems." |2268| According to CIA attorneys, information on Issa al-Britani posed no problems because it was sourced to the 9/11 Commission. They also determined that information about Iyman Faris and Sajid Badat that was sourced to press stories posed no legal problems because Faris had already pled guilty and Badat was not being prosecuted in the United States. |2269| On April 15, 2005, a CIA officer expressed concerns in an email to several CIA attorneys about the CIA releasing classified information to the media. There are no CIA records indicating a response to the CIA officer's email. |2270|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) That day, April 15, 2005, the National Security Council Principals Committee discussed a public campaign for the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. After the meeting, ALEC Station personnel informed [XXX]CTC Legal that scheduled interviews with NBC News of Director Porter Goss and Deputy CTC Director Philip Mudd should not proceed so that "we don't get a head [sic] of ourselves...." |2271| On June 24, 2005, however, Dateline NBC aired a program that included on-the-record quotes from Goss and Mudd, as well as quotes from "top American intelligence officials." |2272| The program and Dateline NBC's associated online articles included classified information about the capture and interrogation of CIA detainees and quoted "senior U.S. intelligence analysts" stating that intelligence obtained from CIA interrogations "approaches or surpasses any other intelligence on the subject of al-Qaida and the construction of the network." |2273| The Dateline NBC articles stated that "Al-Qaida leaders suddenly found themselves bundled onto a CIA Gulfstream V or Boeing 737 jet headed for long months of interrogation," and indicated that Abu Zubaydah, KSM, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, and Abu Faraj al-Libi were "picked up and bundled off to interrogation centers." The articles also stated that the capture of bin al-Shibh led to the captures of KSM and Khallad bin Attash. |2274| This information was inaccurate. |2275| There are no CIA records to indicate that there was any investigation or crimes report submitted in connection with the Dateline NBC program and its associated reporting.

C. CIA Attorneys Caution that Classified Information Provided to the Media Should Not Be Attributed to the CIA

(TS//[XXX]//NF) After the April 15, 2005, National Security Council Principals Committee meedng, the CIA drafted an extensive document describing the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program for an anticipated media campaign. CIA attorneys, discussing aspects of the campaign involving off-the-record disclosures, cautioned against attributing the information to the CIA itself. One senior attorney stated that the proposed press briefing was "minimally acceptable, but only if not attributed to a CIA official." The CIA attorney continued: "This should be attributed to an 'official knowledgeable' about the program (or some similar obfuscation), but should not be attributed to a CIA or intelligence official." Referring to CIA efforts to deny Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests for previously acknowledged information, the attorney noted that, "[o]ur Glomar figleaf is getting pretty thin." |2276| Another CIA attorney noted that the draft "makes the [legal] declaration I just wrote about the secrecy of the interrogation program a work of fiction...." |2277| [XXX]CTC Legal urged that CIA leadership needed to "confront the inconsistency" between CIA court declarations "about how critical it is to keep this information secret" and the CIA "planning to reveal darn near the entire program." |2278|

D. The CIA Engages with Journalists and Conveys an Inaccurate Account of the Interrogation of Abu Zubaydah

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In late 2005, the CIA decided to cooperate again with Douglas Jehl of the New York Times, despite his intention to publish information about the program. A CIA officer wrote about Jehl's proposed article, which was largely about the CIA's detention and interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, "[t]his is not necessarily an unflattering story." |2279| Jehl, who provided the CIA with a detailed outline of his proposed story, informed the CIA that he would emphasize that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques worked, that they were approved through an inter-agency process, and that the CIA went to great lengths to ensure that the interrogation program was authorized by the White House and the Department of Justice. |2280| CIA records indicate that the CIA decided not to dissuade Jehl from describing the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques because, as [XXX]CTC Legal [XXX] noted, "[t]he EITs have already been out there." |2281| The CIA's chief of ALEC Station, [XXX], who wondered whether cooperation with Jehl would be "undercutting our complaint against those leakers," nonetheless suggested informing Jehl of other examples of CIA "detainee exploitation success." |2282|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) While the New York Times did not publish Jehl's story, on September 7, 2006, the day after President Bush publicly acknowledged the program, David Johnston of the New York Times called the CIA's OPA with a proposed news story about the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah. In an email with the subject line, "We Can't Let This Go Unanswered," the CIA's director of public affairs in OPA, Mark Mansfield, described Johnston's proposed narrative as "bullshit" and biased toward the FBI, adding that "we need to push back." |2283| While it is unclear if Mansfield responded to Johnston's proposed story, Mansfield later wrote in an email that there was "[n]o need to worry." |2284| On September 10, 2006, the New York Times published an article by Johnston, entitled, "At a Secret Interrogation, Dispute Flared Over Tactics," that described "sharply contrasting accounts" of the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah. The article cited officials "more closely allied with law enforcement," who stated that Abu Zubaydah "cooperated with F.B.I, interviewers," as well as officials "closely tied to intelligence agencies," who stated that Abu Zubaydah "was lying, and things were going nowhere," and that "[i]t was clear that he had information about an imminent attack and time was of the essence." The article included the frequent CIA representation that, after the use of "tougher tactics," Abu Zubaydah "soon began to provide information on key Al Qaeda operators to help us find and capture those responsible for the 9/11 attacks." |2285| This characterization of Abu Zubaydah's interrogation is incongruent with CIA interrogation records. |2286| CTC stated that the article resulted in questions to the CIA from the country [XXX], and assessed that "[d]isclosures of this nature could adversely [have an] impact on future joint CT operations with... [XXX] partners." |2287| There are no indications that the CIA filed a crimes report in connection with the article. |2288|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) In early 2007, the CIA cooperated with Ronald Kessler again on another book. According to CIA records, the purpose of the cooperation was to "push back" on Kessler's proposed accounts of intelligence related to the attacks of September 11, 2001, and the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, |2289| which a CIA officer noted "give undue credit to the FBI for CIA accomplishments." |2290| After another CIA officer drafted information for passage to Kessler, |2291| [XXX]CTC Legal, [XXX], wrote, "[o]f course being the lawyer, I would recommend not telling Kessler anything." [XXX] then wrote that if, "for policy reasons," the CIA decided to cooperate with the author, there was certain information that should not be disclosed. [XXX] then suggested that "if we are going to do this," the CIA could provide information to Kessler that would "undercut the FBI agents," who [XXX] stated had "leaked that they would have gotten everything anyway" from Abu Zubaydah. |2292|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) After Kessler provided a draft of his book to the CIA and met with CIA officers, the CIA's director of public affairs, Mark Mansfield, described what he viewed as the problems in Kessler's narrative. According to Mansfield, Kessler was "vastly overstating the FBI's role in thwarting terrorism and, frankly, giving other USG agencies–including CIA– short shrift." Moreover, "[t]he draft also didn't reflect the enormously valuable intelligence the USG gleaned from CIA's interrogation program" and "had unnamed FBI officers questioning our methods and claiming their own way of eliciting information is much more effective." According to Mansfield, the CIA "made some headway" in its meeting with Kessler and that, as a result of the CIA's intervention, his book would be "more balanced than it would have been." |2293|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Later, in an email to Mansfield, Kessler provided the "substantive changes" he had made to his draft following his meeting with CIA officials. The changes included the statement that Abu Zubaydah was subjected to "coercive interrogation techniques" after he "stopped cooperating." Kessler's revised text further stated that "the CIA could point to a string of successes and dozens of plots that were rolled up because of coercive interrogation techniques." The statements in the revised text on the "successes" attributable to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were similar to CIA representations to policymakers and were incongruent with CIA records. |2294|

(TS//[XXX]//NF) Kessler's "substantive changes" made after his meeting with CIA officials included the statement that many members of Congress and members of the media "have made careers for themselves by belittling and undercutting the efforts of the heroic men and women who are trying to protect us." Kessler's revised text contended that, "[w]ithout winning the war being waged by the media against our own government, we are going to lose the war on terror because the tools that are needed will be taken away by a Congress swayed by a misinformed public and by other countries unwilling to cooperate with the CIA or FBI because they fear mindless exposure by the press." Finally, Kessler's changes, made after his meeting with CIA officers, included the statement that "[t]oo many Americans are intent on demonizing those who are trying to protect us." |2295|

V. Review of CIA Representations to the Department of Justice

A. August 1, 2002, OLC Memorandum Relies on Inaccurate Information Regarding Abu Zubaydah

(TS//[XXX]//NF) The Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) in the Department of Justice wrote several legal memoranda and letters on the legality of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program between 2002 and 2007. The OLC requested, and relied on, information provided by the CIA to conduct the legal analysis included in these memoranda and letters. Much of the information the CIA provided to the OLC was inaccurate in material respects.

(TS//[XXX]//NF) On August 1, 2002, the OLC issued a memorandum advising that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah would not violate prohibitions against torture found in Section 2340A of Title 18 of the United States Code. |2296| The techniques were: (1) attention grasp, (2) walling, (3) facial hold, (4) facial slap (insult slap), (5) cramped confinement, (6) wall standing, (7) stress positions, (8) sleep deprivation, (9) insects placed in a confinement box, and (10) the waterboard. The memorandum relied on CIA representations about Abu Zubaydah's status in al-Qa'ida, his role in al-Qa'ida plots, his expertise in interrogation resistance training, and his withholding of information on pending terrorist attacks. |2297| The OLC memorandum included the following statement about OLC's

Information
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*Eight Most Frequently Cited Examples of Plots "Thwarted" and Terrorists Captured Provided by the CIA as Evidence for the Effectiveness of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques*		*Referenced X Number of Times in the 20 CIA Documents*
1	The Thwarting of the Dirty Bomb/Tall Buildings Plot and the Capture of Jose Padilla	17/20
2	The Thwarting of the Karachi Plots	17/20
3	The Thwarting of the Second Wave Plot and the Discovery of the al-Ghuraba Group	18/20
4	The Thwarting of the United Kingdom Urban Targets Plot and the Capture of Dhiren Barot, aka Issa al-Hindi	17/20
5	The Identification, Capture, and Arrest of Iyman Faris	7/20
6	The Identification, Capture, and Arrest of Sajid Badat	17/20
7	The Thwarting of the Heathrow Airport and Canary Wharf Plotting	20/20
8	The Capture of Hambali	18/20

*Additional Intelligence the CIA Has Attributed to the Effectiveness of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques*
1	The Identification of Khalid Shaykh Mohammad (KSM) as the Mastermind of the September 11, 2001, Attacks
2	The Identification of KSM's "Mukhtar" Alias
3	The Capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh
4	The Capture of KSM
5	The Capture of Majid Khan
6	The Thwarting of the Camp Lemonier Plotting
7	The Assertion That Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Help Validate Sources
8	The Identification and Arrests of Uzhair and Saifullah Paracha
9	Critical Intelligence Alerting the CIA to Jaffar al-Tayyar
10	The Identification and Arrest of Saleh al-Marri
11	The Collection of Critical Tactical Intelligence on Shkai, Pakistan
12	Information on the Facilitator That Led to the UBL Operation

13Dec12

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program