Defining International Aggression
The Search for World Peace

III. Opinion of the Permanent Advisory Commission Regarding Assembly
Resolutions XIV and XV |1|

The Permanent Advisory Commission, which met at Geneva from April 16th to 23rd, 1923, to consider Assembly Resolutions XIV and XV with regard to Treaties of Mutual Guarantee was unable, in consequence of divergencies in the instructions given to members by their respective Governments to express a unanimous opinion on this matter.

The British Delegation, not having received instructions from its Government, was, unable to take part in the discussion.

The Italian Delegation stated that it was unable to discuss the question of partial treaties.


A. Opinion of the Belgian, Brazilian, French and Swedish Delegations in regard to :

B. Opinion of the Belgian, Brazilian and French Delegations in regard to :

    IV. Partial treaties and regional agreements.

C. Opinion of the Swedish Delegation in regard to :

    IV. Partial Treaties.

D. V. Conclusions and Résumé of the Belgian, Brazilian and French Delegations.

E. Observations by the Spanish and Italian Delegations (otherwise in agreement with almost all the considerations of a military nature set forth in the preceding Opinions), to which the Japanese Delegation adheres in principle :

    I. General conditions to be fulfilled by any Treaty of Guarantee.
    II. General Treaty.
    III. Conclusion.


The BELGIAN, BRAZILIAN, FRENCH and SWEDISH DELEGATIONS express the following opinions in regard to :


Our object is to prevent war and not to bring progressively into action the forces which will carry a war to a successful conclusion. Any system which did not immediately confront the aggressor with forces considerably superior to his own would be fundamentally unsound : instead of stopping the conflict at the beginning, it would allow it time to develop, and would thus lead to a long war, with all the irreparable damage and loss of life which such a war involves.

This postulate implies the following conditions :

(a) The system to be established should be such that the aggressor:

    Could not even imagine the possibility of coming into conflict with it (ideal solution);

    Would be very quickly crushed in a short war (acceptable solution) ;

    Would have no hope of success in a long war (dangerous solution).

(b) In no case must a State which is attacked suffer invasion.

This condition assumes the existence of a mutual guarantee which can be brought into action immediately. The necessity of such a guarantee is proportionate to the directness of the threat which overshadows a country owing to " historical, geographical or other " circumstances, which entail, for some countries, the " special dangers " recognised by the Assembly.

(c) As war is carried on in every sphere, mutual assistance must also be given in every sphere. It is not, however, equally effective in all the forms and in all the combinations of circumstances considered.

The only form of assistance which is really effective at the beginning of a war is military, naval or air assistance.

Other forms of assistance - economic, financial, etc. - can only play a subsidiary part, which, however great its importance, is only felt, as a rule, in course of time, during a long war. Moreover, the very nature of these forms of assistance renders it impossible to estimate the guarantees that they afford, and consequently to apply one of the principles laid down in Resolution XIV - namely, that the reduction of armaments should be " proportionate to the guarantees " offered by the Treaty.

(d) If the assistance is to be " immediate and effective " it must be given " in accordance with a pre-arranged plan ", as stated in Resolution XIV ; and if this pre-arranged plan, which will necessarily involve detailed provision, is to be carried out without delay - that is, without discussion - it is important that it should he made an integral part of the treaty of guarantee.

(e) As the methods of attack and defence are constantly changing, it is essential :

That any treaty of guarantee involving reductions in armaments should be periodically revised with a view to maintaining its efficacy;

That some form of control should be exercised with the double object of revealing secret armaments or preparations before it is too late, and of ensuring that the guarantee nations maintain a minimum quantity of sufficiently modern armaments to enable them to fulfil, if necessary, their obligation to provide assistance. Even if it is practicable to ensure by some form of control that each State maintains the minimum quantity of armaments which it has undertaken to maintain, it will be very difficult, if not impossible, to exercise control in respect of excess of armaments in an effective manner and without infringing the sovereignty of the States required to submit to such control.

To sum up, it will be seen that a treaty of mutual guarantee should in theory :

    Take instant effect with a force which would discourage any idea of aggression, would protect the State attacked from invasion and would shorten the war;

    Include in its text a detailed and pre-arranged plan of common action in every sphere, but particularly in the sphere of military, naval and air operations ;

    Organise some form of preventive control ;

    Provide for periodical revisions.


The conditions considered above have already brought to light the difficulties involved in the conclusion of treaties of guarantee. It will now be observed that, by their very nature, though in varying degrees according to the system of which they are a part, treaties of this kind contain inevitable weaknesses.

(a) In the first place, the guarantees to be given from outside will in all cases be of less intrinsic value than similar guarantees secured to a State by its own resources. A few obvious reasons may readily be given in connection with armed forces providing assistance.

    The preparations for their action cannot be carried so far;

    Their arrival at the seat of operations will be subject to many risks (delay or interruption to land transport in foreign territory, or of sea transport if the command of the sea is not assured);

    The plan of concentration (and to some extent the plan of operations) will be known to so many persons that it will be impossible to preserve that secrecy which is an essential factor of success in war ;

    The value of the auxiliary forces will vary and will depend upon their organisation, arms, officers, training and individual qualities.

(b) The relative value of foreign intervention will depend upon the peace-time military organisation of the co-operating State. If a long war is to be avoided, the initial operations must be regarded as decisive. To ensure their success, it is better that units of comparatively small value should be immediately available at the outset than that better- trained troops should arrive too late. Now, those countries which only maintain small professional armies, and for which mobilisation involves the training of their national man-power, will not be able to put any considerable effectives into the field until after several months, if not longer.

(c) Foreign troops, the despatch of which depends on the goodwill of their Governments and on a vote of their Parliaments, will never be available with certainty and in every event. This point brings us to the following question, which is of capital importance and governs the whole problem :

(d) How can the mutual assistance provided for by a treaty of guarantee be automatically brought into play ?

It is not enough merely to repeat the familiar formula, " unprovoked aggression ": for under the conditions of modern warfare it would seem impossible to decide, even in theory, what constitutes a case of aggression. Thus :

    Aggression should be defined in the treaty ;

    The signs should be visible, so that the treaty may be applicable ;

    Lastly, the signs should be universally recognised, in order to make the operation of the treaty certain.


Hitherto, aggression could be defined as mobilisation or the violation of a frontier. This double test has lost its value.

Mobilisation, which consisted, until quite recently, of a few comparatively simple operations (calling up of reserves, purchases or requisitions and establishment of war industries, after the calling up of the men), has become infinitely more complicated and more difficult both to discover at its origin and to follow in its development. In future, mobilisation will apply not merely to the army but to the whole country before the outbreak of hostilities (collection of stocks of raw materials and munitions of war, industrial mobilisation, establishment or increased output of industries). All these measures which give evidence of an intention to go to war may lead to discussions and conflicting interpretations, thus securing decisive advantages to the aggressor unless action be taken.

The violation of a frontier by " armed forces " will not necessarily be, in future, such an obvious act of violence as it has hitherto been. The expression " armed forces " has now become somewhat indefinite, as certain States possess police forces and irregular troops which may or may not be legally constituted, but which have a definite military value. Frontiers themselves are not easy to define, since the treaties of 1919-1920 have created neutral zones, since political and military frontiers no longer necessarily coincide, and since air forces take no account of either.

Moreover, the passage of the frontier by the troops of another country does not always mean that the latter country is the aggressor. Particularly in the case of small States, the object of such action may be to establish an initial position which shall be as advantageous as possible for the defending country, and to do so before the adversary has had time to mass his superior forces. A military offensive of as rapid a character as possible may therefore be a means, and perhaps the only means, whereby the weaker party can defend himself against the stronger. It is also conceivable that a small nation might be compelled to make use of its air forces in order to forestall the superior forces of the enemy and take what advantage was possible from such action.

Finally, the hostilities between two naval Powers generally begin on sea by the capture of merchant vessels, or other acts of violence - very possibly on the high seas outside territorial waters. The same applies to air operations, which may take place without any violation of the air frontiers of States.

These few considerations illustrate some of the difficulties inherent in any attempt to define the expression " cases of aggression " and raise doubt as to the possibility of accurately defining this expression a priori in a treaty, from the mililary point of view, especially as the question is often invested with a political character.


But, even supposing that we have defined the circumstances which constitute aggression, the existence of a case of aggression must be definitely established. It may be taken that the signs would appear in the following order :

    1. Organisation on paper of industrial mobilisation.
    2. Actual organisation of industrial mobilsation.
    3. Collection of stocks of raw materials.
    4. Setting-on-foot of war industries.
    5. Preparation for military mobilisation.
    6. Actual military mobilisation.
    7. Hostilities.

Numbers 1 and 5 (and to some extent Number 2), which are in all cases difficult to recognise, may, in those countries which are not subject under the Peace Treaties to any obligation to disarm, represent precautions which every Government is entitled to take.

Number 3 may be justified by economic reasons, such as profiting by an advantageous market or collecting stocks in order to guard against the possible closing of certain channels of supply owing to strikes, etc.

Number 4 (setting-on-foot of war industries) is the first which may be definitely taken as showing an intention to commit aggression; it will, however, be easy to conceal this measure for a long period in countries which are under no military supervision.

When Numbers 6 and 7 are known to have taken place, it is too late.


In the absence of any indisputable test, Governments can only judge by an impression based upon the most various factors, such as :

    The political attitude of the possible aggressor ;
    His propaganda ;
    The attitude of his Press and population ;
    His policy on the international market, etc.

Now, the impression thus produced will not be the same on the nations which are directly threatened as upon the guarantor nations ; thus, as every Government has its own individual standpoint, no simultaneous and universal agreement as to the imminence of an attack is possible.

It will be seen, in short, that the first act of war will precede the outbreak of military hostilities by several months or even more, and that there is no reason to expect any unanimous agreement as to the signs which betoken the imminence of danger. There is therefore a risk that the mutual assistance would only come into action in reply to military mobilisation or hostilities on the part of the aggressor. Such assistance, not being preventive, will always come too late, and will therefore only allow of a slight reduction in the individual provision which must be made by each nation for the organisation of its own defence.

Despite these points, in which " collective guarantees " are inferior to " national guarantees ", we must not abandon the former class, nor must we give up our attempts to strengthen them. They involve, however, important results as regards the latter class, and those results we must now enumerate.

(a) Whatever external guarantees may be in contemplation, no country can be expected, if attacked, to refrain from mobilising as quickly as possible all its forces of every kind. Such a country must therefore maintain, in peace-time, armaments proportionate to possible attacks organised that complete mobilisation will be easy at any time.

(b) The final decision as to the value of external support and the efficiency of the machinery by which this supports is to be brougt into action must necessarily be left to each of the Goverments concerned. Vhe same stipulation should therefore apply to the reductions in armaments which may be rendered possible by these new guarantees. Any ideal of a scale of armaments calculated a priori on a more or less arbitrary basis is thus excluded. As each Government remaids the sole judge of the minimum quantity of armaments which is necessary for its security, it is only to the extent to wihch external support takes the place of a portion of the national armamants that the latter can and should be reduced.

Further, it will be advisable, in calculating the" substitutiod value " of external support, to find a suitable and variable co-efficient of reduction which will express the relation of each of the elements making up this support to the corresponding elements in the national forces.

(c) As the word " guarantee " implies the idea of real security, it would be preferable, in order to avoid misleading public opinion, to refer to the treaty as one of "mutual assistance" rather than of " mutual guarantee ".


It would doubtless be highly desirable that as many countries as possible should automatical come, in one form or another, to the assistance of any one or more of their number which may be attached.

The principle of a guarantee of this kind is laid down, in theory, in Article 10 of the Covenant of the League. It would be well, however, to strengthen this principle by means of a General Treaty for the practical application of those articles of the Covenant which relate to it, although the amendment adopted by the Second Assembly must seriously reduce the efficacy of the economic weapon placed in the hands of the League by Article 16.

The ideal and the practical do not, however, always coincide ; and it must be asked in this case whether the vagueness which so often characterises general contracts can be reconciled with the degree of confidence which would be implied by any considerable reduction in the armaments of each State. This question can only be answered by taking the following points in order :

(a) Is a general treaty of mutual assistance, defining the obligations under Articles 10 and 16 of the Covenant, calculated, in case of war, to provide effective support for the State attacked; and, if so, in what form ?

A distinction must be drawn between wars in which an attacked State is directly involved and those in which such a State would be obliged to intervene as a co-operating State. In the former case the important points for the country concerned are the nature and value of the support immediately available from abroad; in the latter case, the chief importance attaches to the obligations which the country must undertake and the burdens it will thus incur. A further distinction must be drawn regarding the actualnature of the war, according as its form is predominantly military (land warfare) or predominantly naval (sea warfare). In other words, the necessity of adapting armaments to the nature and magnitude of the dangers against which they are intended to guard involves the basing of all calculations upon potential offensive power of the possible aggressor. Even this first condition appeal's to be incompatible with the very nature of a general treaty, which should be valid in all cases of aggression; for every aggressor gives rise to a " particular case" which does not come within the scope of a general treaty.

Similarly, a country which has decided to attack at a convenient moment will take measures to destroy, at least for a considerable time, the efficacy of the only weapon which could come immediately into action under a general treaty - the blockade. It would, of course, be difficult for small or average countries, whose resources and industrial capacity are limited, to carry out in all its various forms such a preparation for attack. But a treaty of guarantee which only gave security against the weak would be immoral and valueless. Now a guarantee against the strong could only be provided by a continental study of the potential offensive power of all possible aggressors. To attain this object, therefore, a general treaty would have to be split up into a series of separate treaties, each of which would provide in the greatest detail against a certain hypothetical case of aggression The treaty would thus retain no characteristics which could be called general, except the name.

It may readily be imagined that the different risks involved may incline some Governments towards the idea of a general treaty and others towards that of partial treaties. For the former class, the risks consist in naval dangers, which may interfere with or close their channels of supply without striking directly at their national existence. For the latter class, the danger represents the direct threat of an invasion of their territory. Though the former class of Government may consider general guarantees of a more or less vague and uncertain character to be sufficient, the other Governments cannot be so easily satisfied. In any case, this distinction may in course of time lose its validity as a result of the increasingly far-reaching changes which will probably be introduced by air warfare. The value of natural barriers will decrease in proportion, as they can be more easily crossed by large air forces, and as, without regard to distance, a nation becomes immediately vulnerable in its population and resources of every kind, wherever they may be situated.

If we start from the assumption that, at least in a land war, the first few months of operalions will be decisive, the question which arises is what military, naval or air assistance can be given immediately,or with very little delay, by any country to anyother country which is attacked.

From the military standpoint, this assistance will depend upon the time taken by the co-operating State to mobilise, on transport facilities and on the organisation of channels of supply and special bases for each nationality. It is well known that the action of land forces cannot be efficient unless detailed preparations have been made for it. Thus the scheme of transport should comprise the selection of the lines of transport and, in some cases, of alternative lines, their equipment for military transport, and the formation of a technical staff to ensure the immediate working of the lines in case of need, should the ordinary staff not be available (owing to strikes or any other reason). The plan of supply would require the compulsory collection of stocks of material for the various expeditionary forces. It is clear that, while such preparations could be carried out for a limited number of countries under certain definite conditions, they become technically impossible if an attempt is made to apply them to a very large number of States simultaneously, owing to the great variety of the hypothetical cases for which provision must be made.

From the naval standpoint, the technical problem is, comparatively, simpler. Naval forces are not subject to the same conditions of mobilisation as land forces. The number of possible cases to be considered appears to be smaller, and the potential naval power of possible enemies can be more easily determined. Nevertheless, the naval forces of the co-operating States will not necessarily be concentrated at the moment of the outbreak of war. Their use also involves the necessity of drawing up a plan of action, of ensuring its execution, of establishing bases of supply, etc. ; and, while recognising that naval forces are more quickly available than land forces, we must be under no illusion regarding the very relative rapidity with which they can be brought into action.

The naval forces of a number of Powers are often composed of units whose qualities (seagoing capability, radius of action, etc.) seriously diminish the possibility of their employ. This circumstance adds still further to the difficulties of a practical application of a general treaty from the fact that the employment of such naval forces must necessarily be limited to special theatres of operations.

Furthermore, their action may be technically ineffective, particularly at the outset, in many land wars. They cannot guard against the invasion of a country, and their effect as instruments of a blockade is only felt during the course of a long war.

From the air standpoint, it is generally admitted that the immediately available air forces are those which can start from aerodromes situated not more than 250 kilometres from their objectives. Beyond that radius they cannot act, unless previous preparations have been made for their transport and supply. Now, immediate action will be of great importance as regards defence, to prevent the passage of enemy bombing machines, and, as regards the offensive, to impede the enemy's concentration. Under these conditions, the available air forces will generally be confined to those which can be provided by the adjacent countries. As these countries will undoubtedly retain their fighting machines for their own defence, we can only reckon upon a contingent of bombing machines.

The impossibility of satisfying, by means of a general treaty, the principles laid down by the Assembly of " immediate and effective assistance in accordance with a pre-arranged plan " is rendered still more obvious by another consideration. The number and variety of the possible cases to be considered in a single continent is further complicated by the fact that any country may be, at different times, assisted or assisting, and that its position may change in the course of a single war. Reserving for later consideration the problem of deciding whether aggression has been committed (which, as will be seen below, is insoluble in the case of a general treaty), we may therefore lay it down that the military, naval or air assistance afforded by such a treaty would be uncertain, and would in any case come too late to protect a State from invasion if attacked and to ensure, in every event, the decisive success of the initial operations.

(b) Can the military, naval or air support given by a general treaty be calculated with sufficient exactitude to allow Governments to reduce their armaments below the minimum now considered necessary by theim, such reduction being proportionate to the guarantees afforded by the treaty ?

It has been seen to be impossible, owing to the number and variety of the possible cases, to determine the nature and value of the assistance to be given in each of these cases by each of the States signatory to a general treaty. It follows that no relation can be established between two factors, one of which (guarantees) remains indefinite, while the other (reduction of armaments) should be definite. Some States may display sufficient confidence in the cooperating countries to consider that their risks are not so great as to debar them from consenting to a certain reduction of armaments. But it is also possible that other States may be requested, in the name of international co-operation, to increase the military burden which they formerly regarded as sufficient for their own defence. For, though certain countries run special risks, " owing to their historical and geographical situation ", others may consider that, from both these points of view, their own situation renders them comparatively immune from the threat of immediate danger.

It is therefore possible that a general treaty may lead to certain reductions of armaments, but it is impossible to state this definitely, and still more so to indicate without further evidence how far these reductions would go. They would, in any case, be based, not upon organised and actual assistance, as was recommended by the Assembly, but on a feeling of confidence which has no connection with the principles embodied in Rtesolution XIV.

(c) As the military, naval or air support afforded by a general treaty could not be inmediately or sufficiently effective, what would be the nature and the value of the other forms of assistance (economic, financial, etc.), and could they lead to reductions of armaments ?

One of the advantages of a general treaty would, of course, consist in the fact that it would assure the State attacked of a measure of economic, industrial and financial assistance which would enable it to fill any gaps of this nature in its national organisation. It must be clearly realised, however, that, in the case of a general treaty, every State which entered the war without knowing the limits of its liabililies would, to a large extent, retain its own resources for its own use. The assistance given in the forms which we have mentioned would, moreover, only be felt after a certain lapse of time, and its full value would only be seen in a long war. Having no influence on the initial operations, it would not allow of any reduction in peace-time armaments. And even if such a reduction were contemplated, it could not be made proportionate to the assistance expected, as no definite relation can be established between, for example, an amount of financial support and a reduction of effectives.

(d) In what contingencies would mutual assistance be required, and by what procedure could it be brought into action so that the participating States could place full reliance upon it and thus gain the necessary confidence to reduce their national armaments ?

This question touches the most delicate point in the problem. We need only refer to what has been said above regarding the weaknesses inherent in any treaty of guarantee (pages 120 to 122) in order to realise the impossibility, in the case of a general treaty, of bringing mutual assistance into action in time.

According to the suggestions put forward in the report of the Temporary Mixed Commission, the machinery would work somewhat on the following lines:

The threatened country would approach the Council of the League, giving information regarding the plans of its general staff, the forces which it could put in the field, the total forces which it considered necessary to achieve success, the countries which, in its opinion, should supply these forces, and its plans for their employment. The Council, with the assistance of the Permanent Advisory Commission, would consider how far these applications were reasonable and practical, and would invite the Governments concerned to take all necessary steps to furnish the forces required.

It is needless to attempt to prove that, even if this machinery could work, it would work with a slowness which would be inadmissible. It is impossible to solve in a few days, or even in a few weeks, a problem of preparation which, merely in its technical aspect, supposing all the political difficulties to have been overcome, would require months.

Such an argument would, moreover, assume that the vital question as to whether there was aggression had been decided. Independently of the fact that the " territorial " definition of aggression as a violation of the frontier is altogether too general and, as has been explained on pages 120 to 122, in no way corresponds to the realities of modern warfare, it would appear that the actual procedure suggested by the Temporary Mixed Commission could not be carried into effect either within the limits indicated by the Commission or even within substantially wider limits. In other words, a State threatened by direct attack would find no guarantee in a Treaty the text of which did not contain a precise statement of the actual hostilities which that State might have to fear.

The foregoing considerations afford evidence of the danger involved in a Treaty of Guarantee which merely lays down principles and, as appears to be suggested in the last paragraph of Resolution XIV, admits that " the plan of the machinery, both political and military, necessary to bring them clearly into effect " might only be established " subsequently ". The difficulties which would be experienced in drawing up such a plan would doubtless lead to its postponement, and possibly even to its abandonment. Nothing would remain but a treaty which, from the point of view of guarantees, would be a mere sham, while, from the point of view of the reduction of armaments, it would appear to hold out a prospect of relief on a large scale to a public which had been deluded and lulled into a sense of false security.


1. Resolution XIV (a). The Assembly, having considered the report of the Temporary Mixed Commission on the question of a general Treaty of Mutual Guarantee, being of opinion that this report can in no way affect the complete validity of all the Treaties of Peace or other agreements which are known to exist between States; and considering that this report contains valuable suggestions as to the methods by which a Treaty of Mutual Guarantee could be made effective, is of the opinion that :

    (1) No scheme for the reduction of armaments, within the meaning of Article 8 of the Covenant. can be fully successful unless it is general.
    (2) In the present state of the world, many Governments would be unable to accept the responsibility for a serious reduction of armaments unless they received in exchange a satisfactory guarantee of thse safety of their country.
    (3) Such a guarantee can be found in a defensive agreement which should be open to all countries, binding them to provide immediate and effective assistance in accordance with a pre-arranged plan in the event of one of them being attacked, provided that the obligation to render assistance to a country attacked shall be limited in principle to those countries situated in the same part ot the globe. In cases, however, where, for historical, geographical, or other reasons, a country is in special danger of attack, detailed arrangements should be made for its defence in accordance with the above-mentioned plan.
    (4) As a general reduction of armaments is the object of the three preceding statements, and the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee the means of achieving that object, previous consent to this reduction is therefore the first condition for the Treaty.
    This reduction could be carried out either by means of a general Treaty, which is the most desirable plan, or by means of partial treaties designed to be extended and open to all countries.
    In the former case, the Treaty will carry with it a general reduction of armaments. In the later case, the reduction should be proportionate to the guarantees afforded by the Treaty.
    The Council of the League, after having taken the advice of the Temporary Mixed Commission, which will examine how each of these two systems could be carried out, should further formulate and submit to the Governments for their consideration and sovereign decision the plan of the machinery, both political and military, necessary to bring them clearly into effect.

(b) The Assembly requests the Council to submit to the various Governmets the above proposals for their observations, and requests the Temporary Mixed Commission to continue its investigations, and, in order to give precision to the above statements, to prepare a draft Treaty embodying the principles contained therein.

Resolution XV. The Assembly,

Whilst declaring that the reduction of armaments contemplated by Article 8 of the Covenant cannot achieve its full effect for world-peace unless it be general:
Desires to emphasise the insportance of regional agreements for the purpose of reducing armaments - agreements which, if necessary, might even go beyond the measures decided upon in respect of general reduction ;
And requests the Council to ask the Temporary Mixed Commission Io take into consideration, during its subsequent work, the possibility of recommending the conclusion of similar agreements to States which might be concerned. [Back]

Source: League of Nations, Opinion of the Permanent Advisory Commission Regarding Assembly Resolutions XIV and XV, Records of the Fourth Assembly, Minutes of the Third Committee, League of Nations Official Journal (Special Supplement No. 16), 1923, pp. 114-120.
Editorial Note: This is a true copy of an extract (pp. 114-120) of the Opinion of the Permanent Advisory Commission Regarding Assembly Resolutions XIV and XV, as referenced above. This document is reproduced in Benjamin B. Ferencz's work "Defining International Aggression - The Search for World Peace", Vol. 1, as Document No. 2 (a).

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