EQUIPO NIZKOR |
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Report on Forced Displacement in Colombia - 1999
Developed by the Support Group for Displaced People Organizations - GAD
"Three years after our displacement / In the middle of the war, we will begin our homecoming / carrying on our shoulders the grief / for our dead and disappeared people; / In our hands, seeds and tools / In our faces, smiles of hope / And in our hearts, the supportive presence / Of those who have helped / To keep the dreams alive / And hope fresh"
Autodeterminación, Vida y Dignidad Community (Self-determination, life and dignity) of Cacarica River. Chocó - Colombia, 1999.
Where we come from... / The world we know is the peasant world we come from / The rural world we come from is the one we could talk about... / Our hands are big and callous, we work with a machete, an axe, motorsaw, paddle and a boat bar... / That is our history, that is our truth.
Ancient people were violently wrenched from Africa and cruelly thrown in America three hundred years ago; today, we are violently wrenched from our fields and cruelly thrown in Quibdó...
Where we want to arrive... / It is where we come from where we want to arrive. / It is nothing else, but it is nothing less. / We want impunity to stop; that the government stops being accessory - because its action or omission - to the armed groups that uprooted us. / We want the land to be for those who work on it, not for the one who exploit it / We want the President, the Governor and the Mayor to make up and develop a real policy for displaced people. / We want damages to be repaired. / We want that those who menaced, tortured and massacred our people to be punished. / We want the solution to our list of negotiation. / We want justice, we want dignity.
Excerpts from statement made before International commission and Colombian authorities by displaced people of the middle Atrato river. Quibdó - Chocó, 1999.
The response of the international community and the civil society
Conclusions and recommendations
Documentation Note.
IntroductionColombia has one of the highest rates of forced internal displacement in the world(1). This situation constitutes the greatest humanitarian crisis in the western hemisphere today. The plight of the displaced persons becomes worse year after year and remains without a solution in sight.(2)Forty percent of Colombia's municipalities(3)have suffered from the forced expulsion of some of their population in the last three years(4). This indicates that there are almost no safe places left to seek refuge after displacement and has meant an increased migration towards the cities.
Colombia ended 1999 with the desolating internal panorama of an unstoppable and out of control armed confrontation employing new methods of warfare that increasingly involved the civilian population in direct disregard for their rights. This situation that takes place amid the worst economic recession in history, mainly due to the high levels of concentration of income and property(5). Throughout the year there were attacks against the civilian population by the armed groups, showing their lack of willingness and capability to embark upon the political and social solutions that the country urgently demands. One of the most visible results of the armed conflict was the increase in victims of mass, family or individual displacement who were forced to flee in defence of their lives.
In the principal cities of the country there were dramatic scenes of displaced people in the streets trying to find ways to survive, in overcrowded slums, put up in friends or relative's houses or camped out in public places to pressurise the authorities into granting them their rights.
According to official documents 400,000 displaced persons are estimated to exist in the country,(6)while the non-governmental organisation, Consultoría para los derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento (Human Rights and Displacement Advisory Office - CODHES) puts the number of people displaced in the last five years at more than a million. However, this significant discrepancy, a critical point in the diagnosis of the situation, does not prevent the comprehension of its seriousness in terms of the enormous suffering brought upon many human beings and the consequences on the social structure.
During 1999 the phenomenon of forced displacement spread over a larger area of the national territory while the numbers of victims dropped slightly with respect to the previous year. At the same time, however, the Colombian State's obligations in prevention, attention and protection were acutely lacking and showed high levels of inefficiency.
The year 1998 ended with the President of the Republic, Andrés Pastrana's announcements on a government peace plan by means of direct high level talks with the armed actors. During 1999 the results of the intermittent dialogues were observed, disrupted by many conflicts of interests and the underlying impetus of the war itself.
On 6 May 1999 both sides officially announced the agreement of a Common Agenda for Change towards a New Colombia. Twelve basic points were included in this document, among them the following are highlighted: a commitment to reach a negotiated political settlement; to bring in an integral agrarian reform; to fight drug-trafficking and corruption; to implement a political reform; a restructuring of the judicial system; and the application of International Humanitarian Law. Specific solutions for victims of forced displacement were not set out on this peace agenda.
Throughout the course of the year the demilitarised zone(7) solicited by the Fuerzas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia -FARC) was maintained in five municipalities within their area of influence while the talks were put on ice due to a lack of agreement on: a) The conformation of a Verification Commission in the demilitarised zone, a proposal which was refused by the FARC; b) The lack or absence of measures taken by the state against the paramilitaries; and c) The exchange of soldiers held by the FARC in return for guerrillas held in different prisons of the country. At the same time hundreds of civilians from the municipalities in the demilitarised zone were forced to move to different parts of the country as a result of threats and abuses against them.
Working committees were set up on 24 October to establish agreements on each point of the peace agenda as well as a methodology for this purpose. The deal struck between the two sides was to advance in the peace talks in the midst of the armed conflict. On this same day various sectors of the population held demonstrations in every city of the country under the slogan No más a la guerra,(No More War).
Attempts to set up a peace process with the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Army -ELN) met with many obstacles. This was mainly due to the impossibility of designating the demilitarised zone solicited by the insurgent group to hold the Convención Nacional (peace talks) with the government. In the midst of these difficulties, the armed group sought to demonstrate its military capacity in different actions involving the civilian population.
Paramilitary organisations tried to attain a certain political status, as valid players in the talks seeking a solution to the conflict,(8)at the same time as carrying out massacres and torture, destroying villages and threatening the civilian population. These actions caused the greater part of the massive and individual displacements in 1999.
As a result of various paramilitary attacks the police and armed forces' complicity or negligence in their obligations was denounced. A worrying fact is that during the year some of the paramilitary groups' large-scale movements and prolonged attacks in different regions of the country occurred in areas with army or naval bases. The police and armed forces' response was late and did not guarantee lasting protection for the population.
By diverse strategies and methods that kept involving the civilian population in the war, the armed groups have consolidated forced displacement as a way of gaining strategic territories. Thus, displacement continues to be an effect of the armed conflict but with increasing frequency it is becoming a strategy of war itself.
This report seeks to give an overview of the state of forced displacement in Colombia in 1999.The first part will provide a quantitative approximation of the population and regions affected, the situation of human rights and international humanitarian law with regard to the events that cause displacement and the current conditions of the population displaced by violence.
The second part will examine the institutional state response in light of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, recently published in Colombia(9). This section is illustrated with descriptions of the most serious regional cases revealing the fundamental aspects of government policy on the issue with regard to its design and execution.
The third part will summarise the civil society's participation in the formulation of supportive and integral responses to the situation of internal displacement. The report ends with a list of GAD's recommendations to the state, the international community and national non-governmental sectors that are involved in attention to populations displaced by the violence and the pursuit of lasting solutions to prevent and overcome forced displacement.
1. Forced displacement in 19991.1 Context and characteristics
The human rights situation deteriorated notably in 1999 amid the worsening of the armed conflict and other social and political problems facing the country. While in 1998 an average of nine people per day were victims to the violence, the figure went up to 12 in 1999: six people lost their lives in extra-judicial executions; one person was disappeared; four died in combat; and one was murdered for belonging to a marginalised social sector. Of the total human rights violations and infringements of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) reported in Colombia in 1999, 73% of the cases were attributed to paramilitary groups, 22% to guerrilla groups and 5% to the police and armed forces(10).
Forced displacement due to the political and social violence in Colombia continued to spread in 1999. CODHES estimates the population of people forcibly displaced in 1999 at 288,000. Out of the 28 departments affected, those that showed the greatest influx of this population, in decreasing order, were: Cundinamarca, Bolívar, Antioquia, Santander, Valle del Cauca, Norte de Santander and Córdoba, jointly registering the arrival of 65% of the displaced persons. While in 1998 the arrival of internally displaced persons (IDPs) was registered in 210 municipalities of the country, in 1999 this figure reached 400 municipalities(11). Eighty-nine of them received IDPs throughout the whole year.
As was stated in the 1998 GAD report(12)and is confirmed in the examples summarised in this report the immediate destination of IDPs is the closest municipal capital or principal village of the corregimiento. However, when security conditions or humanitarian aid become difficult the displaced people head towards larger city centres in the hope of adequate solutions. Therefore, the classification of municipalities as expellers or receptors does not allow the specific events of each forced displacement to be correlated. Therefore the estimates given may include information for populations that were displaced before 1999 and have travelled from place to place in search of refuge and assistance.
Around 30% of the displaced persons in 1999 were part of massive exoduses. The departments most affected, in decreasing order, were,: Bolívar, Córdoba, Valle del Cauca, Norte de Santander, Antioquia, Santander, Chocó, Sucre and Magdalena(13). The immediate causes were related to actions by armed groups and their regional repercussions -threats, massacres, selective murders, and fighting that affected the civilian population and their property.
1.2 Events causing displacement1.2.1 Massive Human Rights violations
The Defensoría del Pueblo (Human Rights Ombudsman's Office) registered 402 massacres in 1999, leaving 1863 victims. This indicates a dramatic rise with respect to 1998 (235 massacres), 1997 (286 massacres) and the period between 1991-96 (152 massacres on average)(14). The total number of people murdered rose by 36% with respect to 1998(15). The participation in these events by the majority of armed groups in the conflict indicates that these crimes have been consolidated as a strategy of war.
Twenty-seven percent of the massacres occurred in the department of Antioquia, also the department most affected by these events in 1998(16). Another 26% occurred in Norte de Santander, Valle de Cauca, Bolívar and Cesar, indicating a notable increase in these departments. In Cáqueta, Cauca, Córdoba, Putumayo, Santander and Tolima 20% of the massacres were committed, also showing an escalation with respect to the previous year.
Comparing the statistics, the departments of Antioquia, Córdoba, Bolívar, Santander, Norte de Santander and Valle del Cauca showed the highest number of massacres, the most massive displacements and the greatest influx of IDPs in 1999.
According to the Human Rights Ombudsman's report, responsibility for 37.8% of the massacres is attributed to paramilitary groups that were able to act due to the collaboration or negligence of the police and armed forces; 16.6% is attributed to guerrilla groups and 2% to the police and armed forces. The Human Rights Ombudsman's Office classifies the rest of those responsible as 'armed groups' (8.96%) and 'others' (35%). These undetermined actors contribute to making the situation of the armed conflict in Colombia more complex and unpredictable.
1.2.2 Actions by paramilitary groups
In 1999 the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (United Self-Defence Groups of Colombia -AUC) carried out massive and systematic attacks covering complete regions. The paramilitary commands established a method that was repeated almost without variation: the target population was isolated, the inhabitants were forced to leave their houses, to gather together and identify themselves; various people were separated off according to a list held by the attackers, then they were brutally tortured and murdered under the accusation of collaborating with guerrilla groups; later, a subsequent 'cleansing' process of the guerrillas in the area was announced. In many attacks, the paramilitaries gave the villagers a fixed deadline to leave the area under threat of losing their lives or accepting the armed group's authority.
This systematic act was applied throughout the year in Norte de Santander, in the central part of the department of El Valle and in the south of Bolívar, where massive displacements took place as a result of the paramilitary attacks. These occurred with greatest frequency in the outlying hamlets of villages, which in many cases, were completely destroyed. The above procedure was made possible by the absence of the police and armed forces or negligence on their part in counteracting the paramilitary phenomenon. It established an atmosphere of terror that became unmanageable for the communities(17).
In their first offensive of 1999, between 5 and 10 January, a considerable number of paramilitary commandos acted in a simultaneous manner in the departments of Antioquia (18 municipalities), Bolívar, Cesar, Magdalena, Sucre, Putumayo, and La Guajira. Between 130 and 140 peasant farmers were murdered, accused by the paramilitaries of helping the guerrillas. In some of the villages, the inhabitants received prior warnings to leave the area, and in others, such as Playón de Orozco (Magdalena), the cruelty of the attack was such that it led to the exodus of all the villagers. During the same period, 75 state employees, including nine mayors, from the department of Cauca were declared 'military targets' by the paramilitaries. Some 6000 peasant farmers from five communities in the department of Putumayo abandoned their homes; after the massacre in the hamlet of El Tigre, 2100 of its 2500 inhabitants fled the area.
In the negotiations for the return of the peasants displaced from the south of Bolívar and the Valle del Cimitarra in 1998, the government recognised that "...[the] paramilitary groups have systematically employed the practices of forced disappearance, torture, massacre, murder, massive and individual displacement and other criminal activities on people unconnected to the conflict, generally poor peasant farmers"(18).
On that occasion, the government indicated that police and military units present in areas where paramilitary commandos operated were under the obligation to intensify their actions and provide immediate and convincing results in the fight against these groups. It also reiterated its political willingness to prevent and combat the punishable association between these groups and various military and police agents. It also restated its commitment to implement a state policy against the paramilitary phenomenon.
However, in 1999 the Colombian Government received numerous recommendations from international organisations regarding the situation, nearly all of which coincided in their expression of the seriousness and extent of human rights violations in the country; the support for paramilitary groups from members of the armed forces and police; the lack of consistent efforts in the persecution and dismantling of these groups; deficiencies in the judicial system concerning negligence on the part of state agents; the seriousness of forced displacement; and the fact that recommendations made in previous years by the United Nations to improve the situation have not been put into practice(19).
The panorama of paramilitary attacks in 1999 showed the capacity of these groups to extend their presence throughout the greater part of the country; the non-existence of effective state measures to combat them, even when they act in areas of high military and police presence; the lack of protection towards the civilian population with respect to the frequent occurrence of crimes against humanity; and the generalised impunity of those directly responsible and the social sectors that support these groups.
1.2.3 Actions by guerrilla groups
In 1999 the practice of mass civilian kidnapping(20)was consolidated by guerrilla groups. Spectacular acts were also employed, for example, the hijacking of the passengers on an internal flight(21)and the kidnapping of a group of churchgoers during mass, both carried out by the ELN. Throughout the year190 electricity pylons were blown up causing a generalised rationing of the electricity supply in the Northwest of the country in the last few months
After the series of attacks en masse against military garrisons in the past few years, the FARC have systematically been implementing the use of home-made explosives of great potential and little accuracy(22)in their attacks against the police stations of municipal capitals. As a result of the use of these weapons, the number of victims injured or killed among the non-combatant population has increased considerably and so has the destruction of civilian property, helping to create the conditions for displacement.
Tens of municipal capitals suffered armed attacks by the guerrillas in 1999. The consequences of these attacks on the civilian population were serious taking into account the slow rate of urban renovation in rural communities and the extensive difficulties involved in attaining a minimum social infrastructure. For example the villages of Ataco, Dolores, Prado Villarica and La Arada (Tolima) were seriously damaged after attacks by the FARC at the end of the year, resulting in losses estimated at $10,000 million Colombian pesos (US$5 million). The town of Nariño (Antioquia), attacked by the ELN, suffered damage to its infrastructure to the value of $2.000 million pesos (more than US$1 million).
Complaints about abuses by the FARC have been made at various times by the civilian population living in the demilitarised zone. These have been recorded by organisations such as the Human Rights Ombudsman's Office and Amnesty International in the absence of the verification committee not agreed by the sides in the negotiation. CODHES estimates that 3900 people were forced to leave the demilitarised zone in 1999(23). This displacement was associated with abuses against the civilian population such as threats, detentions, accusations of collaborating with the armed forces or paramilitary groups, extortion, forced recruitment of children or young people as well as the uncertainty of the way the peace process itself would develop and the consequences of its failure in light of the increased paramilitary presence in the surrounding area.
1.2.4 Actions by the armed forces
Within a process of operative reorganisation the army has established mobile units and new strategies to pursue armed groups on the fringes of the law. In practice an increased force has been used in response to guerrilla attacks, based on the use spy and fighter planes in addition to employing heavy artillery over areas where these groups are concentrated.
Although the Army insists that the so-called 'smart bombs' have not caused damage to civilian property, this has been called into question by opposing reports from communities in various cases(24). Aerial machine-gunning has continued to cause displacements towards the main towns in areas where military operations have been carried out; isolation of the communities in villages caught in the cross fire; prolonged restrictions on the inhabitants' movements; and the destruction of crops.
An illustration of the above is the case of the municipality of Tame in the department of Arauca. On 12 December 1998, clashes began between guerrillas and army units that were supported in their pursuit of the insurgent group by planes and helicopters of the Colombian Air Force. The planes flew over the hamlet of Santo Domingo that day and at the following dawn letting off bursts of machine gun fire and dropping bombs that caused destruction in the whole area, including damage to various houses. On both occasions the inhabitants gathered on the main road and waved white-coloured clothing to draw attention to their non-combatant position. The explosions and shrapnel killed 16 people, among them six children and seriously or permanently injured another 27 people(25).
Despite the media reporting the magnitude of destruction of the houses in the hamlet, the official version indicated that the gun fire had been directed towards the forest area where the guerrillas were supposed to have been hiding(26). Between 200 and 300 people had to leave the area, taking refuge in Tame and when they returned a month later they had to begin negotiations with the government to rebuild the village and seek compensation for the damages(27).
On various occasions, the army's response made the situation of the civilian population worse instead of offering them protection when they were forcibly displaced as a result of actions by armed groups. In the first few days of September 1999 approximately 500 peasant farmers from the border region between Yalí and Yolombó (Antioquia) were displaced due to paramilitary threats; for various days these groups had been fighting ELN guerrillas. Various armed forces helicopters used machine gun fire to make the area safe for the entry on the ground of the XIV Brigade and the peasants were forced to flee through the mountainous zone(28).
1.3 Causes of forced displacementIt is necessary to differentiate between the following two concepts in the escalation of the armed conflict in Colombia in 1999. On the one hand, there has been an increase in the severity of the combats while the application of IHL by the armed groups is almost non-existent. On the other hand, the civilian population has been subjected to direct aggression in what constitutes massive violations of human rights. This has been witnessed, for example, in the paramilitary strategy, labelled as a 'counter-subversive struggle' in the propaganda attempting to cover it up(29). This has lead to a permanent confusion in the treatment of the conflict by some government officials and the media, fuelling the idea that the state's chief responsibility is to carry out successful negotiations with the armed groups over and above complying with its duties in guaranteeing the rights of the population.(30)
In the majority of the cases, human rights violations and infringements of IHL committed against the civilian population, or the threat of their occurrence, either precede direct confrontation between armed groups or are completely independent of them. The fierce territorial dispute manifests itself in attempts to gain control over the civilian population and in the destruction of their ties to any of the sides in the conflict, be they real, alleged or forced. To such an extent that the presence of one or other of the armed groups in a region is met with intimidation or aggression towards the inhabitants by the opposing side. This trend in the armed conflict, characteristic of 1998, did not abate in1999.
An attack by one of the armed groups against a village where the police are not present or have been pulled out and the presence of the armed forces is occasional, creates the conditions for a subsequent 'retaliatory' attack by the opposing group. The attack is justified by the claim that the previous aggressors were given some kind of backing by the inhabitants. This continual change in pressure and intimidation contributes to individual and family displacement that may not be recorded in its totality.
It should also be emphasised that in 1999 the armed conflict became more acute in regions where armed groups showed a heightened interest in increasing their territorial control due to these area's strategic location, their wealth of natural resources or for reasons of military importance(31).
At the end of the 80s and at the beginning of the 90s, internal displacement (ID) was identified only as product or secondary effect of the armed conflict. However, the political projects that fuel displacement processes cannot be explained by just a description of the confrontation and the identification of those directly responsible. Today it is recognised, even in official declarations(32), that in many cases forced displacement is a necessary requisite for taking possession of or dominating territories.
With regard to this issue, different research projects show that in regions where complex social conflicts exist, the uprooting of the peasant population has implications on land ownership; strategies for the accumulation of wealth; speculation in agricultural or potentially valuable land; and the eventual implication of new development models. The latter is made more serious when the armed groups exert pressure on Afro-Colombian or indigenous communities whose ancestral lands are still in process of being legally formalised(33).
The destabilising grasp that social conflicts of rural origin have on Colombia are historically associated with the strengthening of political power by the concentration of agrarian property and income(34). Within the context of the opening-up of the economy(35)and the agricultural crisis, other appreciative factors influence the choice of land considered for appropriation: the availability of water sources to sustain agro-industrial projects; the location of the land with respect to projects for road or waterway infrastructure or ports; the existence of minerals or other subsoil resources; biodiversity; the ease of establishing illegal crops; and the possibilities for urbanisation. These new factors underlie the differences to the typical conflicts at the time of the expansion of the large estates. At present the range of social actors involved is broader and the pressure of the associated investments more intense.
1.4 Trends in forced displacement in 1999The territorial dispute of the armed groups was characterised by:
- The strengthening of paramilitary groups and the geographic expansion of their displacement-creating activities, such as in the departments of Valle del Cauca, Norte de Santander and Putumayo. Threats against the civilian population, massacres and restrictions on movement by paramilitary groups have been the greatest causes of massive displacements.
- The employment of methods of combat that cause indiscriminate damage by the army as much as by the guerrillas has caused people to flee the areas of confrontation.
- The non-application of the principles of differentiation and immunity of the non-combatant civilian population by the armed groups when pressurising their participation in the conflict, their joining of one of the sides, or leaving the region and their property.
The following consequences of the armed conflict became more serious in 1999:
- The search for temporary resettlement in less dangerous areas, especially urban areas. According to information from CODHES, 47.7% of the IDPs in 1999 sought refuge in departmental capitals.
- The insecurity of Peace Communities established in war zones. For example, in the Bajo Atrato and Medio Atrato (in the region of Urabá in the department of Chocó) paramilitary groups circulate freely and control the transport of passengers, food and medicines to communities in the process of returning to their previous or new homes.
- Ignorance of the declarations of neutrality made by indigenous communities with respect to the armed conflict, especially in the departments of Arauca, Cauca, Antioquia, Córdoba and Chocó(36).
- The increase in cross-border displacement. Around 11,700 displaced persons fled across the borders to Panama, Venezuela and Ecuador in 1999(37). The governments of these countries still do not recognise Colombians that flee the violence as refugees, even in cases when the victims arrive en masse as a consequence of serious fighting in the border zones. Such is the case of those displaced by the paramilitary attacks on La Gabarra (Norte de Santander) and the clashes in Juradó (Chocó).
- Internal displacement particularly continues to affect children. According to the previously mentioned reports by CODHES, 86% of the families forcibly displaced include children and young people under the age of 18. They constituted around 65% of the IDP population in 1999(38).
- The majority of IDPs consists of individuals or families that often are forced to leave homes, property and jobs without the situation being registered. This is made more serious due to deficiencies in humanitarian aid and the lack of protection guarantees that the institutions responsible in the sites of refuge should make. This situation includes cases of massive displacements.
Serious deficiencies were confirmed in the state's response to the situation of forced displacement and the needs of those displaced by the violence in 1999:
- Solutions conditioned to the development of the negotiations with the armed groups and to future prevention, as is set out in the Action Plan for the Prevention and Attention of Forced Displacement(39).
- Evident political unwillingness to pursue and dismantle paramilitary groups, neutralise their forced displacement strategies and break links between these organisations and the members of the police and armed forces.
- A growing time lag between the worsening situation of ID and the state's poor capability to establish a policy oriented at resolving it.
- A decrease in the displaced population's confidence in the government as a consequence of the latter not complying with pacts and promises
- Lack of confidence on the part of the government towards the displaced population's spokespersons and the legitimacy of their demands. They were forced to embark upon negotiations to guarantee their fundamental rights.
- Exclusion of the displaced population and NGOs in the formulation of government policies on the issue as well as temporary and permanent solutions.
- The government policies do not contemplate the right to compensation of the victims of ID, nor is there a development of the issue in the proposals for lasting solutions for the IDPs.
2. Monitoring of state policies2.1 The internal displacement issue in the Plan Colombia
The central theme of the National Development Plan 1998-2002 is the government's policy for peace, serving as a basis for the so-called Plan Colombia. Parts of the Plan Colombia are known but a final version has not yet been made public. Each section has been tailor-made for the different states or bodies that might contribute to the funding needed to put it into practice.
The Plan Colombia, as is described in the official paper "The Road to Peace", will make investments in infrastructure, agriculture and the social sectors as part of three strategies considered complementary: a)Special plan for areas affected by the conflict; b) Alternative development plan for the substitution of illegal crops; and c) Policy for attention to the displaced population. The latter sets out to provide adequate humanitarian aid for the victims in the short term and create the conditions needed for the return to their places of origin or the establishment of the resettled community in a dignified manner.
At the end of 1999 there was complete uncertainty as to the funding of the Plan Colombia. The government is currently carrying out diplomatic efforts to obtain the necessary funding from the multilateral credit entities -the World Bank, the IMF and the IDB-, and the European Union and United States to complete the US$3,500 million in foreign aid. The national government will put up an extra US$4,000 million to complete its funding. However, the Second Commission of the Senate raised objections about the process and stated that the source of the government contribution was still unclear at a moment of severe budgetary restrictions.
The source and amount of funding for each part of the Plan Colombia still has not been decided. Its official text(40)emphasises the strengthening of the armed forces' military capacity in the eradication of illegal crops. With respect to this, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the United States Congress(41)studied a request for additional aid to the amount of US$1,500 million that included 954 million dollars for the armed forces; 50 for economic alternatives in areas of illegal crops; and 70 to support the application of the law, human rights and peace. This last category covers seven areas, one of which is aid for IDPs. Out of the total sum for the armed forces, at least US$740 million is destined for the army, implying a profound change in the United States military aid strategy for anti-drugs operations.
Aerial fumigation has been highly questioned, its results so far are poor with respect to its aims as well as counterproductive in social and environmental terms. There is also no guarantee that the financial aid will not be used in war operations, leading to an intensification in the internal conflict. In this sense the target of this economic aid is unilateral with regard to the mentioned strategies in the Plan Colombia and prevents it having a coherent effect on the social problems that are among the plan's objectives.
With reference to assistance for IDPs, the strategy set out by the government would be coordinated with the peace process and run by the municipal administrations in conjunction with non-governmental organisations under the leadership of the Red de Solidaridad Social (Social Solidarity Network -RSS)(42). The document does not differentiate between the obligatory nature of the state's response towards the IDPs' legally demandable rights and the nature of the civil society's response of solidarity. The latter reaction can be complementary to the activities of the state provided that a coherent and viable state policy exists. Furthermore, it does not take into account the generalised financial crisis currently being experienced by the municipalities and the local administrations' repeated pronouncements to the effect of their incapability in providing attention to internally displaced persons.
2.2 Instruments for the execution of policies on internal displacementFrom the perspective of the International Law of Human Rights, the International Humanitarian Law and Colombia's Constitution, it is evident that responsibility for the phenomenon of forced displacement due to the internal conflict comes under the jurisdiction of the state. This responsibility has been built into the regulations on the issue, especially since 1995(43).
After the institutional absence in attention to ID caused by the change in government in August 1998, four events defined the government policy in 1999: 1) The Consejería Presidencial para los Desplazados (Presidential Advisory Board on the Displaced) was abolished in March and its functions were given over to the Social Solidarity Network(44); 2) Control of the Fondo Nacional de Atención Integral a la Población Desplazada por la Violencia (National Fund for Integral Attention to the Population Displaced by Violence) was taken over by the RSS(45) in August; 3) The issuing of CONPES Document No.3057(46)in November; 4) The formulation of working strategies for the RSS(47)the end of the year.
2.2.1 The handling of internal displacement by the Social Solidarity Network
The RSS is responsible for coordinating the National System for Integral Attention to IDPs. This system includes 14 national institutions, among them Ministries and decentralised institutions; and 12 to 16 local institutions. These authorities almost never meet and until now the RSS has not had sufficient capacity in summoning them into action and coordinating their activities. This has had a negative influence on the fulfilment of Law 387/97.
At the time of the transfer of power from the Presidential Advisory Board to the RSS, between March and June 1999, the following critical observations were made:
a) The non-existence of a coherent and sustainable state policy.
b) An excessively centralised management of the issue, demonstrated by the very nature of a Presidential Advisory Board and Home Office entity. This situation was especially obvious in the inefficient registration of the displaced persons.
c) The fragmentation of responsibilities within the entities in charge of attention to ID.
d) The exclusion of the IDPs and civil society organisations in the formulation of policies and strategies.
e) Attention to ID was centred on emergency humanitarian aid without being coordinated to procedures oriented at overcoming it.
f) Financial weaknesses. Only at the end of 1999 was a solid financial structure defined, through the creation of the National Fund for Integral Attention to the Population Displaced by the Violence.
g) Excessive emphasis in the registration of the displaced persons as a prerequisite for their admission to attention programmes.
With respect to the above points, important regulatory advances have been made since. The difficulties now lie in the development of the established instruments in the coordination of the entities involved and the assignation of a budget. It is also evident that the state must seek the real and effective participation of all civil society to be able to attend the problem with some degree of efficiency.
It is hoped that the RSS will overcome the mentioned problems now that it counts upon a solid structure of local offices throughout the country for the development of its programmes. The entity should also direct its programmes in the manner of a state policy to ensure a continuity of the processes in accordance with the scale and complexity of ID. However, key issues, such as the prevention of ID, protection towards its victims and reparation (in the sense that the state admits responsibility) for their violated rights are above and beyond the capabilities and responsibilities of this entity. These aspects need explicit commitments and immediate actions on the part of the National Executive with regard to the police and armed forces, the administration of justice and social investment in the regions.
Up2.2.2 The work of the Social Solidarity Network
Although this entity was given the responsibility to coordinate the System of Attention to IDPs in March 1999, it only began concrete activities within the programmes established by the institutions that conform it in September(48). More than a year later the Strategic Plan was submitted to President Pastrana's Government. The cost of its execution is calculated at US$360.8 million ($703,560 million pesos) and goals are outlined until the year 2002 on the following issues:
Improvement of the emergency humanitarian aid programmes. Special activities are set out with respect to this point in health and education in 20 IDP receptor municipalities. However, it should be pointed out that the coverage of these programmes is minimal compared to the reported extension of forced displacement and that 1999 was a critical year in the maintenance of local entities due to the financial crisis in the country. For example, educational coverage is limited by the municipalities' capacity in granting school places(49)but even disregarding this, in many cases parents cannot give their children the bare necessities with respect to food, clothing and equipment to make the schooling worthwhile.
Development and consolidation of programmes for return, resettlement and social and economic development. With respect to the goals concerning this issue, a special package of measures was designed in 1999 to cover the temporary sustenance of returned or resettled families setting up an agricultural project. The aim is to establish definite solutions for 64,000 families by the year 2002. It should be taken into account that the Action Plan for Attention and Prevention of Forced Displacement states that since 1996, 25,000 families have been displaced each year(50).
Development and consolidation of the programmes for the prevention of displacement and the protection of the returned or resettled population. With respect to the goals concerning this issue, the design and implementation of an operative action plan for the police and armed forces has been set out, as well as the definition of their responsibilities. An Early Warning System has also been designed. No results are known so far of any government actions that have actually prevented forced displacement or that have given protection to threatened populations.
The Observatory Body on displacement is still in the developmental stage even though it has already been itemised in the national budget. It is worth mentioning that the civil society has made important contributions towards the installation of this watchdog, considering it a highly significant means to prevent ID as well as in monitoring state policies(51).
Improvement of the institutional capacity for response in two components: a) strengthening of the institutional scheme; b) coordination of national and international state and private contributions to set up the National Fund for Integral Attention to the Population Displaced by Violence. Only after August was the RSS authorised to make use of this funding. At the end of 1999 the fund stood at $50 thousand million pesos (US$26 million). The RSS financial report showed promised funding of US$2.9 million for 1999, as well as US$1 million from other governmental bodies.
Integration, development and consolidation of the registration, information, monitoring and evaluation systems. By the end of December 1999 the RSS had registered 6500 displaced persons, i.e. 1.6% of IDPs as estimated by the government. With respect to this point, the RSS states that it has established a single protocol for the national registration of displaced persons. This protocol will be put to the test in three cities from the beginning of the year 2000, namely, Bogota, Villavicencio and Cartagena.
The goals of the policy on attention to ID are based on mechanisms and instruments that have not been developed yet. The prevention of the phenomenon and reduction of ID are envisaged in future projects such as advances in the peace process and the implementation of the Plan Colombia. These conditions, in conjunction with a weak implementation of Law 387/97 (described below), reflect the critical situation that the displaced persons experienced in Colombia in 1999.
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2.3 Recognition of the condition of being displacedThe Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement reflect international regulations on HR and IHL. They constitute an integral mechanism with which to monitor the actions or omissions of the state and degree of the suitability of their policies with respect to the ID situation(52). Due to this GAD has decided to adopt them as its main instrument in monitoring the state policies.
The Guiding principles (GP) 1 to 4 establish that displaced persons enjoy the same rights and freedoms as all other citizens of the country since their situation does not afford them a different legal status nor an inferior condition within society. They also establish that the national authorities have the primary obligation and responsibility to offer protection and humanitarian assistance to the internally displaced persons.
The first requisite for the displaced persons' access to programmes for humanitarian aid and lasting solutions is the official recognition of their status. Victims of ID must present their identification documents and give a declaration of the circumstances leading to the expulsion from their places of origin(53). This first step presents the following difficulties: a) Assembling all the identification documents, which have often been lost; b) Credibility given to the testimonies; c) Criteria for the verification of the information are not known.
The difficulties experienced by the individual or single family victims of displacement in obtaining state assistance has led to risky return or resettlement attempts based on their own initiative or second displacements that lead to urban integration in miserable conditions. The inefficient registration and monitoring of these victims is made more serious given that the massive displacements are the ones receiving most attention from the government entities in charge of the programmes. The process involved in registration has actually worsened the problem for an enormous number of displaced persons that are not officially entitled to receive humanitarian aid. For others, once having been registered they are then excluded from programmes of economic stabilisation(54). In these conditions, the legally demandable right for state attention to victims at every stage of displacement remains in doubt.
The weakness of the system for attention to IDPs at municipal level is portrayed in a progressive fragmentation of the affected communities, also visible in the cases of massive displacement. The access to attention programmes at different times and places makes it difficult for joint institutional actions, up until now deficient, to contribute to the process of finding lasting solutions for ID. As the victims travel through different areas and their marginal situation is reinforced, the return to their homes appears more as an individual option rather than a possibility for the reconstruction of the social structure in each site of expulsion.
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2.4 The prevention stageThe Guiding Principle number 5 reminds the authorities of their duty to respect and demand respect in all circumstances for the obligations of International Law, including HR and IHL with the purpose of preventing forced displacement. Principle number 6 declares the right of every person to be protected against ID, especially in situations of armed conflict, unless it is a requirement for the security of the civilian population.
A prevention policy requires a comprehensive definition of the structural causes of forced displacement to be able to design concrete and efficient actions oriented at redressing them. This is of critical importance in the current situation of ID in Colombia, characterised by a permanent increase in populations and communities affected. Regarding the immediate causes of displacement, it is necessary to make progress in the public debate of the issue, with a wide participation of the rural community, to enable the creation of mechanisms and conditions for a trusting relationship between the inhabitants of risk zones and state security bodies.
With reference to prevention, state policies consider aspects concerned with the construction of Early Warning Systems; the neutralisation of the armed conflict; activities aimed at the peaceful resolution of conflicts; and the promotion of HR and IHL. However, in 1999 there were few such activities, limited to the occasional workshops that did not sufficiently guarantee the required coverage nor monitoring.
Warning was given in advance of the majority of the violent acts that caused most of the displacements in 1999 by the threatened communities and human rights organisations; in many cases the responsible authorities showed an negligent attitude towards the warnings.
The members of the communities affected by the paramilitary attacks in January lacked the protection of the police and military, even though, in some cases, the risk of attacks of this kind had been forewarned. Regarding this matter, the office of the United Nations High Commission for Human Rights (UNHCHR) stated that it had warned the government on several occasions of the situation in many municipalities threatened by paramilitary groups, providing detailed information on the operations and permanent bases of their members. It also drew up concrete recommendations for the prevention of attacks and the adoption of necessary measures to guarantee the security of the affected population(55).
The events in the department of Norte de Santander illustrate the lack of protection towards the civilian population with regard to the systematic actions of paramilitary groups, despite having been forewarned by the communities, HR organisations and the civilian authorities. Despite the seriousness of the crimes committed in May and the appearance of a numerous group of paramilitaries in the region of Tibú, the massacres continued and intensified in the area over the following three months without the victims receiving efficient protection from the police and military before and during the forced displacements(56).
The Human Rights Ombudsman's Office and CODHES are currently running information systems to determine areas where there is risk of HR violations or displacement. Throughout the year they gave public warning of the critical situation of different regions. However, there is no information to suggest that any early warnings managed to prevent the exodus of communities by means of an efficient reaction by the authorities(57). An important factor identifying the problem of prevention is that responsibility for this issue is in the hands of incompetent local entities or that are lacking in political willingness to exercise control over the appropriate police and military units that would have to act in the event of receiving an early warning.
Even though the definition of Internal Displacement expressed in Law 387 covers the majority of the registered causes of forced displacement, one can see the concurrence of political violence and human rights violations in areas where large investment projects are being carried out. These projects affect the members of traditional communities whose demands create a conflict of interests between them and the investors and government's plans. The GP 9 indicates a specific responsibility on the part of the state to protect indigenous and other minority groups that have a special dependence on their land against forced displacement.
An example of the non-application of this principle is that of the indigenous community living in the region of the Nudo de Paramillo, currently facing a concurrence of threats to its ancestral territory; the construction of a infrastructure project that would substantially alter the natural environment of the region and the dispute between armed actors (AUC and FARC) for control of the area. As a consequence of one or other of the factors several families have left the reserve, but the majority of the population is resisting displacement and does not consider it as an alternative, even though the future of the community is seriously threatened(58).
Up2.4.1 Protection for victims of displacement
Protection is one of the state's principle duties towards its population. And even more so when the population has been internally displaced and is therefore defenceless and vulnerable. This protection refers to people's life, physical integrity and property, to an equal degree in sites of refuge as in return processes begun under the IPDs' own initiative.
The GP 10 sets out the legal duty to protect displaced persons against murder, genocide and forced disappearance. An extreme example of this duty not being observed is the case of the spokespersons of the peasant displacement from the south of the department of Bolívar that have been missing since 27 November 1999. An attempt was made to ensure their protection on the part of the state by explicitly including the issue in agreements made for the return of the displaced persons(59).
The GPs 11 and 12 prohibit threats or acts of violence against displaced persons not participating in hostilities; the deprivation of food as a means of combat; and using IDPs to facilitate or impede military operations and attacks against their settlements among other acts of violence. The GPs 13 and 14 prohibit the recruitment of IDPs into armed groups, especially children; and the right to unhindered movement in and outside the settlements. These principles are applied to cases where the communities have publicly reaffirmed their condition of being a non-combatant population.
The proposal for autonomy with regard to the armed actors, taken up by the displaced communities in Urabá, witnessed a dynamic increase in 1999. This proposal was also taken up by different indigenous organisations in the same region and in the departments of Cauca and La Guajira among others under the concept of active neutrality. At the end of the year various declarations of this concept were also made in municipalities of the departments of Arauca, Antioquia and Cesar as expressions of a joint consensus with the local administrations to demand the respect of the armed groups towards the civilian population.
The 'Peace Communities' are an emergency alternative resulting from the impossibility of the communities being able to count on real and lasting guarantees of protection from the police and military. They are also a civilian response that attempts to break the vicious circle of accusations and retaliations in areas of prolonged territorial dispute by the armed groups. In this way, they are a political expression of community identity with respect to the conflict and its recent evolution characterised by the attacks against the civilian population, rather than being concerned with the direct fighting between the armed actors(60).
The absence of commitments to respect the civilian population in the midst the conflict and the unrecognised condition of non-combatant by the all the armed groups has meant that the communities' declarations have met with no response from these groups. In 1999 the difficulties of the proposal were made obvious in that all the armed actors did not accept the concept of neutrality in the civilian population:
The army considers inadmissible the existence of areas where their presence is not permitted. They argue that the armed forces and police exert state sovereignty in the whole nation and that this is an irrevocable legal duty. The military high command rejects that the army be considered an armed actor by the communities in the same category as the illegal armed actors. They consider that their exclusion from the area of conflict would make their obligation in combating those groups difficult(61). On some occasions it was considered that citizens could not invoke neutrality with respect to institutions and so was deemed as verging on complicity(62).
Various statements by guerrilla groups, in particular the FARC, accuse the peace communities of being a mechanism to weaken their presence in zones of conflict and a manipulation of the population in favour of the counterinsurgency strategies of paramilitary groups or the armed forces and police. In January, members of the V Front of the FARC arrived at the community of Guapá in Chigorodó (Antioquia) looking for food. As a result of the community's negative response in supplying food to the guerrilla group, pointing out their position of neutrality with respect to the armed conflict, they suffered the sacking of their communal houses, the theft of the community's money and the kidnapping of two of their leaders who were later murdered(63).
Although paramilitary groups have participated in agreements allowing the formation of some of the Peace Communities, they keep up pressure and checks on the populations and on various occasions have declared that the communities harbour subversive activities within them. With basis on this belief, a paramilitary commando of the Autodefensas Unidas de Córdoba y Urabá (United Self-defence Groups of Córdoba and Urabá -ACCU) entered the community of San José de Apartadó on 4 April accusing its members of belonging to the guerrilla. Three inhabitants were killed and later when the paramilitaries opened fire indiscriminately on the rest of the population, three other members of the community were injured. Four days later, the AUC attacked several hamlets in Riosucio (Chocó) where the peace community of San Francisco de Asís is located and murdered 5 peasant farmers, accusing them of being guerrillas. The community returned to its lands after being displaced for several months in Pavarandó (corregimiento of Mutatá, Antioquia)(64).
The peace communities refer to the principles and precepts of IHL(65)whose application in the Colombian internal armed conflict is almost nonexistent. The treatment of civilians by the armed groups is controlled by internal norms or by arbitrary conceptions following a pragmatic scheme that has no interest in leaving the non-combatant population out of the hostilities since the dispute often seems to be centred on them and their property.
The Peace Community and active neutrality initiatives are maintained by the cohesion of the community and their decision to find their own way to come to terms with the consequences of the conflict. There is no verification mechanism that guarantees the keeping of the agreements made with the armed actors, if they exist, or that legitimises the tremendous determination of the community. In the current preliminary talks or negotiations with the armed actors there is also no clear recognition of these initiatives. This has led to a relative isolation of the inhabitants of the sites of refuge or resettlement, with extremely strict controls over their movements, the transportation of supplies and serious risks for them in the nearby rural areas.
Thus the GP are founded upon the population displaced or in risk of becoming so, enjoying in equal conditions, all the basic guarantees and freedoms that international and internal law recognise for the other citizens of the country. In this way the mechanisms proposed for the communities should not imply the suspension of the rights to freedom of thought, association, movement and expression and neither the right to prompt and efficient justice.
Up2.4.2 Displacement towards the borders
In the series of displacements across the border into Venezuela from the department of Norte de Santander the duty of protecting the victims presented additional deficiencies. The regulations of the Guiding Principles cannot be interpreted in such a way that they limit, modify or infringe upon the regulations of any other international HR or IHL instrument or the rights conceded to persons as part of internal law, in particular in soliciting and obtaining asylum in other countries -GPs 2 and 15.
Similarly to the condition of being displaced, the status of refugee is a de facto condition and not governed by legalities. The states parties to the Convention on Refugees must attend to the population that is forced to cross the border by persecution or violence. Part of this attention consists of protection and guarantees for their security implying that the refugees should not be forced to return. Although the first displaced persons from Norte de Santander received humanitarian aid while they were in Venezuelan territory they were not able to rely on the alternative of asylum: the 'Operation Refuge' coordinated by the two countries had the concrete effect of preventing the displaced persons from getting access to international protection mechanisms. The Colombian Government sponsored the repatriation operation without providing adequate conditions for immediate attention to a population of this size and without being able to guarantee short term security for their return to the region.(66)
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2.5 Humanitarian aidAccording to GPs 24 to 27, humanitarian aid is given in accordance to the principles of humanity and impartiality without any discrimination. The national authorities have the primary obligation and responsibility to provide this humanitarian aid.
As mentioned above, the majority of the state's actions has been concentrated in humanitarian aid -in the form of food aid, health care and support in paying rent- with a time limit varying between three and six months according to article 15 of Law 387/1997. In general the criteria have been to respond to the most demanding needs, just within the bounds of possibility, and conceiving IDPs presence as a breach of the peace. With regard to this service, the UNHCR Liaison Office made the following statement:
"In terms of basic needs; moderate and in some cases severe cases of malnutrition have been reported among the displaced population, particularly in the more vulnerable groups. Furthermore, there is a general lack of basic housing. Eighty percent of the population do not have access to basic medical services and 95% of the displaced women do not receive medical attention during pregnancy. A recent study on land owning rights of displaced persons concluded that before displacement 43% of those interviewed held the rights over their land while after displacement 95% of them had abandoned their lands and did not know what state they were currently in"(67).
During the first week of June, Mr Olara Otunnu, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General for Children and Armed Conflict, visited our country. Mr Otunnu expressed his deep concern for the serious situation of the displaced population and in his official report he stated:
"These displaced communities in Colombia are on their own. Apart from the limited presence of some NGOs and the Church, the communities that I visited in Soacha [Cundinamarca], Turbo [Antioquia] and Quibdó [Chocó] receive very little, if any, government or international community assistance"(68).
The most frequent difficulty in providing emergency humanitarian attention is the lack of specific resources for this purpose and the budgetary constraints of the IDP receptor municipalities. As well as this, armed groups exert pressure on businesspeople and the community into not paying their taxes as the local mayors are obliged to hand over part of this money to the opposing group(69). In 1999 threats, attacks and kidnaps against local mayors increased and it is estimated that in approximately 500 municipalities the armed groups pressurised these officials into resigning, as well as candidates for seats on municipal councils with the purpose of imposing local government officials sympathetic to their strategy of war(70).
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2.6 Return, resettlement and reintegrationThe principal objective of the official policy on displacement is to create suitable conditions for the return of the population; relocation(71)is reserved for exceptional cases related to the security situation. This policy comprises of protection, access to land, housing problems and social and economic stabilisation.
The CONPES document No. 3057/99 includes a report on the activities carried out by the RSS in the return processes of the communities of the Cacarica Basin (Riosucio - Chocó), Tierralta (Córdoba), San Pablo (Bolívar), Carepa (Antioquia) and Carmen de Atrato. These return programmes consist of housing projects in addition to ensuring a food supply and agricultural aid. The report also describes support given to relocation processes through agricultural projects and housing aid in nine municipalities of the country.
The nonexistence of suitable responses at the prevention, protection and humanitarian aid stages determines the majority of the problems in the later stages of return or resettlement. For example, if suitable conditions of protection do not exist, return is not an alternative. This was expressed by one of the displaced wanting to return:
"At the moment the conditions are not right to return, not even the government will commit itself to guaranteeing them. There are people displaced by the state forces themselves, how are we going to trust the security that the army provides? At no time have they told us they'll make sure we get back the land and animals that we abandoned"(72).
Some cases of return projects accompanied by national NGOs(73)have been the object of discredit by the authorities. They consider that the community wants to avoid and hinder state authority to the benefit of the guerrillas. Tragic cases such as that of San José de Apartadó are evidence of paramilitary attacks against displaced populations in return processes that have proclaimed themselves Peace Communities and declared neutrality with respect to the conflict.
The GPs 28 to 30 establish that the responsible authorities are under the primary obligation and responsibility to provide the conditions and means to allow the voluntary, dignified and safe return of the internally displaced persons to their places of origin or their voluntary resettlement in another part of the country. The authorities will try to facilitate the reintegration of the internally displaced persons that have returned or that have settled in another part of the country. Special efforts will be made to ensure the full participation of the internally displaced persons in the planning and management of their return or reintegration.
Up2.6.1 Agreement for the return of displaced peasant farmers in the south of Bolívar and the Valle del Cimitarra
The situation of forced displacement in the south of the department of Bolívar and the Valle del Cimitarra was one of the worst of 1999. In this region, contrary to other expulsion zones last year such as Antioquia and Valle de Cauca, intensification in displacement came after agreements between the population and the state had been signed as a result of peasant demonstrations during 1998. A large part of these agreements was directly related to key factors in the prevention of displacement and although they are stipulated in Law 387, they were hardly put into practice.
The conditions of the conflict are worsened by the extensive areas of illegal crops and commercial centres for intermediaries in the drugs trade resulting from the prolonged deterioration process in agricultural production and the absence of rural development policies.
After a long negotiation process with the displaced persons, President Pastrana's government established a series of short- and medium-term agreements(74). A general summary follows:
a) Guarantees for life, integrity, freedom and the right to justice: state commitment was reaffirmed in ensuring the full enforcement of human rights; preventing and punishing the behaviour of state officials leading to HR violation; guaranteeing the right to truth, justice and integral compensation for victims; putting into practice a state policy to pursue and eliminate paramilitary groups; taking legislative initiatives with regard to the offence of forced disappearance.
b) Human rights development and protection plan for the Magdalena Medio region under the coordination and guidance of the Regional Committee for Permanent Work Towards Peace; strengthening of the agricultural and formal education sectors and the tertiary road infrastructure; investment in health and basic services; mining projects; the establishment of areas reserved for subsistence farming.
c) Safe conditions and integral, economic and social reconstruction for the return: contingency plans in education, health and attention to infants; food safety projects; protection during the return; emergency humanitarian aid.
From the prevention perspective(75), the peasants' demands identified the factors that had caused the displacement. This represented a change in the level of their dialogue with the state, since they were not just victims now, but social actors. In this case these factors were also fundamental for the viability of the return in terms of protection and socio-economic stabilisation.
Since the peasants returned to the south of Bolívar at the end of 1998, paramilitary attacks have not ceased, nor have their controls over the roads and waterways. In the first month after the return 110 people were murdered and 689 houses were burnt.
Amid the guerrilla groups' response and the armed forces' intervention, security for the inhabitants of the region was at an absolute minimum in 1999. Monitoring and verification by state control agencies(76)was insufficient, a situation made worse by the increasing difficulties in reporting the events due to the terror instigated in the area. Displacement was continual in the regions of San Pablo, Simití, Santa Rosa and Arenal: 70 families in January, 3821 people in March, 100 people in April.
In April 1999, peasant farmers that participated in the massive exodus of June 1998 occupied the local council offices in Barrancabermeja (Santander department) to protest at the incompliance of agreements signed with the government. They demanded concrete actions against the paramilitaries and the observance of the government's promise to guarantee respect for human rights and life as well as the implementation of the social investment plan for the region.
From 12 April onwards, bombings and indiscriminate aerial machine gunning affected the municipalities of Simití and Santa Rosa, near the Serranía de San Lucas as part of the armed forces' persecution of the hijackers of a passenger plane. Armed forces and police support for a paramilitary siege of San Pablo and Simití was reported as well as joint activities to control the population. The siege restricted the transport of food and access for humanitarian aid.
The same month, the AUC began to establish a base in Monterrey (Simití): 60 people were murdered and more than 800 houses were burnt. The paramilitaries attempted to restrict the movement of the inhabitants of the corregimiento of Monterrey when clashes with the guerrilla intensified. However, 80 families, defying the threats, sought refuge in San Pablo.
The commercial centre of the coca business in the south of Bolívar is located in Monterrey, a town of 1000 inhabitants with complete unsatisfied basic needs. According to estimates by some regional authorities, at least US$3.5 million are handled per month in this business. The paramilitaries oblige the buyers of the coca base to centre their dealings in Monterrey and Pozo Azul.
After a meeting on 9 May 1999 with representatives from the Home Office, an agreement was reached for the return of the peasant farmers. To verify the presence of paramilitary bases in the municipalities of San Pablo, Simití, and Santa Rosa (Bolívar) a commission of representatives from the Attorney General's Office, the Human Rights Ombudsman's Office, the UNHCHR office and non-governmental organisations was to be established under the control of the Home Office. The results would be handed in to the government Human Rights Commission. A meeting was also agreed to be held with government representatives to evaluate the Integral Development Plan for the Magdalena Medio, south of Bolívar and Valle de Cimitarra.
Despite the agreements the armed conflict and attacks against the civilian population worsened in the second half of 1999 until they culminated in more massive displacements. In October, some 400 paramilitaries took control of the roads and waterways between the municipalities of San Pablo and Simití isolating more than 14 hamlets at the same time as a military operation was being carried out in the vicinity. One of the outlying hamlets was totally destroyed and the paramilitaries killed an undetermined number of people.
Around 3200 people were forced to cross the open country towards the hamlets of the municipality of Cantagallo (Bolívar) and Yondó and Remedios (Antioquia) looking for a route to Barrancabermeja (Santander) without being able to receive protection nor assistance(77). The AUC also prevented the humanitarian aid sent by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) from getting through.
The situation in this region illustrates the nonexistence of efficient protection mechanisms for populations during forced displacement and their return. The reports from the inhabitants and the accompanying organisations seriously implicate the police and military in the preparation and maintenance of paramilitary activities(78). The work of the state control agencies is slow and inefficient, a situation fuelled by the complexity of the events and the difficulty in verifying them appropriately.
Apart from the gravity of the situation itself and the non-functioning of the state plans to overcome it, it is logical that the communities that supported the negotiations in Barrancabermeja with the government should take on an untrusting attitude. On the other hand, even if the promises signed by the government with respect to the social programmes had been kept(79), the extreme insecurity for the population would make them unworkable.
The guarantees of protection necessary for the return of the population to the south of Bolívar, in their majority, are also the same measures that are required to prevent future displacements. It is also the legal duty of the state to embark upon these actions, independent of the fact that they have been explicitly proposed in the displaced population's list of demands.
In promoting military and police actions against the 'perturbing factors' the government will have to take into account all the situations that could provoke additional risks of displacement such as bombings and or aerial machine gunning, or that violate the population's security conditions and the right not to be displaced.
Faced with a violent process of social destructurisation in the communities of the region, silence, slowness and confusion is not acceptable in making decisions to comply with conditions laid down by the law. Furthermore, the part played by the armed forces and police in the regional conflict increases the distrust that this institution already commands and strengthens the accusation of collusion with paramilitary groups. The government should clearly state, without ambiguity, what the army's operative mission is in those areas where guerrillas and paramilitaries are fighting for territory in pitched battles or attacking the civilian population.
The desperate choice of the displaced population to head for the jungle is another sign of the absence of an effective prevention and emergency attention system. Despite the permanent presence of the armed forces and police in the region, one year after signing the agreements of Barrancabermeja, the population did not even have the guarantees to choose displacement with the minimum conditions of protection.
Up2.6.2 The return of the displaced communities to the Cacarica Basin
The return process of the communities of the Cacarica Basin(80)in the region of the Bajo Atrato (Chocó department) has been the most significant in terms of organisation of the victims, capacity for dialogue with the state and development of accompaniment strategies by the accompanying organisations. Out of the approximately 4000 displaced persons, the following numbers participated in the process: 1000-1200 people in Turbo; 120 in Bocas de Atrato; and 300 in Bahía Cupica.
To overcome the problem of emergency humanitarian aid the community drew up(81)a List of Demands in 1998 based on:
The necessity to establish internal protection mechanisms given the persistent armed conflict in the region. The proposal consists in a collective return and does not allow the entry of any armed actor to the settlements.
The recognition of their right to cultural identity and property through the collective land titling of territories in the Cacarica basin(82).
Fulfilment of the state's obligations with respect to protection and the regulations of international law on HR and IHL: conformation of a Mixed Verification Commission(83)(MVC), unarmed state presence by means of the casa de justicia(84), recognition and guarantees for the work of international accompaniment, an observatory body to check agreements are kept.
Social and economic reparation covering a first transitory phase of the return and then a plan for consolidation and stability.
Moral reparation through mechanisms that clarify responsibility for the HR violations and allow the investigation and trial of those responsible.
The MVC has been the backdrop to negotiations for the List of Demands and is an ad hoc mechanism in answer to the state institutions' incapability of providing a response as decreed in Law 387/97. At the end of 1998, after a period of stoppage due to changes in the entities providing attention to IDPs, the process was reactivated with a series of fine adjustments to the List of Demands(85). Visits were made to verify conditions of security and protection for the return proposal, the boundaries of the collective territory and the work required to unblock the waterways.
However, by June 1999 sufficient progress had not been made with respect to the List of Demand to allow the first phase of the return project to go ahead. The RSS committed itself to playing a more efficient role in the coordination of the state entities and government programmes for ID. Between June and August contracts and contributions were finalised for the housing programme, eco-agricultural projects, the casa de justicia, the collective land titling and protection mechanisms.
The return process of the communities of the Cacarica Basin allows a large phase lag to be seen between the organisational process of the victims and government response to their needs. The strengthening of cultural and community links through solidarity and the pursuit of autonomy allowed the displaced persons of the Cacarica Basin to put together an integral proposal whose content went beyond the concepts and realities of state policy.
In the first place, it recognised the victims as being subjects of a social process based on a decision to separate community life from the actions of the armed groups. This does not just mean obligatory measures to avoid becoming targets of one or other of the armed groups in the conflict. It is linked to a 'Life Project', a conception of social justice and an awareness of the right to reparation as victims of forced displacement(86).
In second place, resistance was shown against losing the traditional agricultural methods and relationship with the environment. The agricultural proposals were designed to maintain the sowing and harvesting methods that the communities have developed over a long period of adaptation to the natural conditions of the area and are based upon a sustainable exploitation(87).
Thus, the promise to obey the community authorities, participate in joint activities, share individual earnings, respect the reserves and traditions of the indigenous communities and seek peaceful forms of conflict resolution are fundamental for the community to be able to come to terms with the internal and external pressures on their resources(88).
During the displacement the community reported an intensive and indiscriminate logging activity in the region. This exploitation was declared illegal by the Corporación Autónoma Regional del Chocó (Autonomous Regional Corporation of the Chocó -CODECHOCO)(89)but there is still no control mechanism over the logging and timber companies. The strong economic interests that exist over these resources are an influencing factor in pressures on the territory. The handing over of the control of the timber resource to the community through the collective land titling of 103,024 hectares makes the need for effective safety guarantees more critical.
In October a group of displaced persons began an exploratory visit to the River Perancho in the Cacarica Basin where one of the settlement sites is planned. The purpose was to prepare the land for sowing and to check on the security of the region in preparation for the progressive return(90). However, agreements resulting from the List of Demands have still only been partially kept and various components are blocked by bureaucratic processes and budgetary problems(91).
One of the key points in the protection strategy for the return is ensuring an adequate means of transport. The principal difficulty of this lies in the regular sedimentation of the rivers and tributaries. The communities of the Cacarica Basin have demanded the dredging of the mouth of the River Atrato to avoid the stagnation of the tributaries but they have not had a prompt response. During 1999 the populations of the Bajo Atrato suffered a continuous emergency situation due to the rising river levels(92).
Despite the official complaints made by social organisations of the region, the United Self-defence Groups of Cordóba and Urabá -ACCU- continue to dominate the whole of the Atrato without efficient measures having been taken against them. The ACCU have restricted the transport of food, fuel and medicines against malaria. They also control the sale of rice and the extraction of timber, they force the inhabitants to abandon fields in areas used by the guerrillas as corridors and they prohibit the use of motor launches after six o'clock in the evening(93).
The government considers the Return Project to the Cacarica Basin as the return experience with the greatest impact(94). This could be true with regard to its potential - a result of the proposal-making capability developed by the community. But this appraisal of importance did not correspond to the willingness of state officials and institutions to support it in an effective manner and make it a viable short-term project(95).
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With regard to relocation and return, government proposals and actions have a weakness concerning their socio-economic studies that still do not specify the real needs of the displaced persons, causing difficulties in the agreement processes. The GP 29 states the responsible authorities' obligation to assist displaced persons in the recovery of the property or possessions that they had to abandon. When this is not possible they must provide adequate compensation or another kind of just reparation.
According to Law 387/97 and the National Development Plan, when the return of abandoned land is not possible, the displaced persons will be included as subjects in the agrarian reform. In this case a special legal mechanism that establishes favourable conditions and reparation for victims of ID does not exist. Consequently all the beneficiaries of the allocation of land have to pay 30% of its value(96). With relation to the above, it is not possible to affirm that a suitable and efficient agrarian reform policy exists in Colombia. Therefore the development of viable agricultural projects comes up against the generalised difficulties of the agricultural crisis, giving rise to doubts about the real possibilities of social and economic stabilisation.
The purposes of the Development Plan with respect to guarantees for return or relocation; strengthening of community processes; infrastructure and basic services; credit facilities; tax incentives; support for company management; marketing mechanisms; expanding regional markets; training; institutional strengthening, etc. present the policy for attention to the displaced population as a mechanism for the "recovery of the state's credibility". However, this should rather be the conceptual basis for a policy on the prevention of displacement.
The conditions and requisites have not yet been set out for housing programmes for displaced persons, to be applied according to Law 418/97; new components on this issue in the government peace policy have not yet been defined either. A specific sum has not been budgeted to attend to the housing needs of this population.
It is a fact that if the authorities in charge of providing attention to IDPs cannot coordinate adequate mechanisms to supply humanitarian aid, they will be even more unlikely to be able to take on the more complex process of rural or urban reintegration. Similarly it is evident that deficiencies in the application of existent regulations for IDPs are also shown in areas of urban settlement where violence derived from the internal armed conflict is less intense. An example of this is the resettlement process that the displaced community is managing in Neiva (Huila department)(97).
2.7 Conclusions on state policiesWith respect to the above, several conclusions can be drawn regarding the state policies on the treatment of ID:
The design and execution of state policies emphasise a humanitarian response that does not take into account the context of human rights violations where forced displacement occurs. For this reason the obligation to provide reparation for violated rights is a missing component.
Despite the state policies and ideas taking up the terms and issues of the international law of HR and IHL and the Guiding Principles, their application is still a long way from becoming reality.
The absence of a state policy is made evident in the nonrecognition of former agreements and the reinvention of programmes and projects after transitions from one government to another.
The progress made so far is represented by the discursive plan and in the formulation of laws, decrees and CONPES documents. However, the lack of regulations in Law 387/97 has a negative effect on the clarity of the responsibilities and in the execution of the mandates of institutions in charge of dealing with the issue.
The prevention and protection of forced displacement, or a population at risk or under threat of being displaced are state responsibilities that have not yet been taken on. The omission of the government to act against the paramilitary phenomenon is a recurring cause and effect of its worsening.
There is still a lack of special attention to the most vulnerable groups of the IDPs such as women, children and senior citizens. There has been no differentiated treatment as recommended by the United Nations.
The design and development of state policies has been excluding in that it has not been possible to count on the active participation of the of the displaced persons' organisations themselves.
The specific responsibility of state entities with respect to IDPs has been assumed partially by some and in no way at all by others. Similarly some local entities do not feel obliged to act in their duties of reception and attention with the argument that they do not even manage to take care of their responsibilities towards the local population. The cite the enormous crisis in the transference of national government funds and the share of national taxes destined to local government as the reason for this lack of action. Therefore none of them has budgeted specifically to attend to the displaced population.
The state continues not to recognise the condition among IDPs of being victims to human rights violations; this fact means that the displaced persons have to negotiate their rights with the state and demand them using forms of pressure and public social protest.
The inefficiency in the registration process is one of the greatest factors in the lack of information on the majority of those that need attention. It also shows a refusal on the part of the state to recognise their responsibilities towards them. All people should be entitled to their rights whether registered or not.
The state as such does not have experience in emergency attention and neither in providing lasting integral solutions. These tasks have been carried out for a long time now, with greater experience, by non-governmental organisations. However, the state still shows no willingness to co-operate more with those that could provide these services.
Individual or single family displacement continues to be the most unprotected, since the few attention measures that are currently being taken correspond to collective displacements as they are more visible and have more political implications. This situation was reflected in the protests that some groups of IDPs held during the year at the headquarters of the UNHCR and the International Committee of the Red Cross in Bogota.
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3. The response of the international community and the civil societyIn response to the seriousness of the problem the international community and civil society's(98)solidarity was seen in the majority of the regions throughout 1999, providing humanitarian aid, accompaniment, counselling, training, protection and in many cases help in facilitating communication between the local and governmental authorities.
3.1 The international communityThe international community was represented by international intergovernmental organisations and agencies and has sought to make an impact in different and active ways through: a) recommendations to the state, proposals for policy design and support for the protection mechanisms towards IDPs; b) economic aid for humanitarian assistance and some agricultural projects; c) encouraging and facilitating contact between the government and the communities; d) support in carrying out and publishing studies and research projects on the issue.
Some of the most noteworthy actions in 1999 were:
3.1.1 Visit of the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General for Internal Displacement, Francis Deng
Francis Deng made a second official visit to Colombia between 21 and 27 May. The representative's mission had the following objectives: to evaluate the development of ID in Colombia since his first visit in 1996 and the degree of application of the recommendations made at that time; to study the current situation of ID in Colombia and with this basis, to make new recommendations for managing the situation.
The representative emphasised the progress made since his last visit: there is greater recognition of the difficulties faced by displaced people in Colombia; the government explicitly recognises its responsibility with respect to IDPs; it has adopted a regulatory framework to manage the ID situation; it has defined institutional mechanisms. In spite of this, the representative observed that the ID situation had deteriorated to a serious extent in the same period, the number of displaced persons had increased dramatically, threats against the physical integrity of displaced persons and those who work for them still existed and humanitarian aid for IDPs had been scarce and inefficient.
With respect to the coverage of the assistance to IDPs, the Representative indicated that the government could improve the situation by abolishing the absurd regulations governing the 'certification' process. This system currently obliges the displaced persons that have lost their identification documents to return to their places of origin to obtain the necessary approval to claim the benefits provided by the law. As well as being a violation of international law, it also puts the victims at risk and results in many of them remaining without documents and without access to the aid programmes(99).
Among the critical points emphasised by Francis Deng towards an integral strategy against ID in Colombia are:
- The inclusion of attention to ID as a central part of the peace process in its humanitarian and human rights aspects.
- Respect by the combatants towards the non-combatants and the regulations that protect the civilian population, in accordance with the IHL.
- An effective response from the responsible authorities in preventing and protecting against arbitrary displacement, especially when it has been forewarned.
- Protection of the physical integrity of the displaced persons and defenders of human rights that work with them.
- Suitable and opportune assistance to attend to the needs of the IDPs, providing special attention to the particular needs of women and children.
- Guarantees for the security of displaced people that return to their places of origin or are resettled. Restitution or compensation for lost property.
- Clarification of the national regulatory framework, the policies and institutional responsibilities towards IDPs as well as intensified efforts in their application.
- Strengthening of the coordination between national and local institutions, NGOs and the international community.
- Allocation of resources in the national budget for attention to IDPs and their prompt transference to local authorities in accordance with their responsibilities.
- Design and execution of a publicity and sensitisation campaign on the issue of displacement and displaced persons' rights.
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3.1.2 Publicising the Guiding Principles on internal displacement
Under the auspices of the United States Committee for Refugees (USCR), the Brookings Institution (Internal Displacement Project), the Norwegian Refugee Council and GAD, a conference was held in May to publicise the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement in Colombia. The results of a two-day seminar were presented at the meeting on each of the sections of the Guiding Principles: protection against displacement, protection during displacement, humanitarian aid, return, resettlement and reintegration.
Those participating were: representatives of national and international NGOs that have worked with IDPs in the last few years; representatives of government institutions in charge of designing and executing state policies on internal displacement; UN and OAS cooperation agencies.
It was concluded that within a context of the humanitarian crisis and the worsening of the armed conflict the GPs should be put into practice as a minimum parameter to be respected and guaranteed by and for all Colombians. The GPs provide general guidelines concerning the behaviour of the state, the non-state armed actors, the international community and NGOs. They are beneficial to the efficient prevention of the causes of displacement as well as for the adequate integral protection and attention of the displaced population.
A large part of the legislation and policy planning papers on displacement in Colombia are already based on the obligations and rights put forward in the Guiding Principles. Steps to ensure their implementation and compliance require sufficient funding, efficient action and participation on the part of the state control agencies.
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3.1.3 The mission of the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General for Children and Armed Conflict, Olara Otunnu
Olara Otunnu carried out a humanitarian mission in Colombia between 30 May and 6 June 1999. The representative sought to evaluate and emphasise the armed conflict's impact on children; identify concrete measures to guarantee greater protection towards children affected by the war; and to impress upon the sides involved in the conflict the importance of respecting humanitarian norms. The forced recruitment of children by the different armed groups is one of the causes given for family displacements in various parts of the country.
During the visit, Mr. Otunnu visited displaced communities in San José de Apartadó, Turbo, Medellín (Antioquia), Quibdó (Chocó), San Vicente del Caguán (Caquetá) and Soacha (Cundinamarca). The representative appealed to the government to attend to the urgent needs of the displaced communities, especially with respect to health, education, sanitary conditions, accommodation, water, registration and economic opportunities. The government should also guarantee physical protection and the necessary conditions for the return or resettlement of the displaced populations.
Mr. Otunnu expressed the international community's concern over the protection of the civilian population in the midst of the armed conflict in Colombia. He called upon all the armed actors to observe the humanitarian principles and regulations, particularly concerning the protection and the rights of the most vulnerable sectors such as children, women and displaced populations.
At the end of his visit, the Special Representative inaugurated a broad coalition composed of members of the United Nations system, NGOs and civil society representatives to coordinate and raise the profile of the efforts made in meeting the needs of children affected by the war in Colombia. The representative also announced the FARC's commitment not to recruit children under 15 and the army's policy of not conscripting under 18's, decisions that could alleviate one of the immediate causes of family displacements in Colombia.
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3.1.4 United Nations High Commission for Refugees Liaison Office -UNHCR
The Colombian Government and the UNHCR signed a preliminary agreement(100)concerning cooperation in the treatment of forced displacement in the areas of: preventive action; protection and solutions; compliance of internal regulations; strengthening of coordination mechanisms; strengthening of international cooperation; and publicising and application of international law for refugees.
The UNHCR's intention of participating in the following activities was highlighted: early warning mechanisms, formulation of policies and methodologies for their evaluation, technical assistance for local committees envisaged in the law, the establishment and putting into practice of the Observatory Body on Displacement.
The UNHCR office in Colombia proposed the establishment of six regional offices in areas where forced displacement is most serious. Initially offices were set up in Barrancabermeja (Santander), Apartadó (Antioquia) and Puerto Asís (Putumayo).
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3.1.5 The Inter-institutional Commission in Riosucio
From the 12 to 16 April, an inter-institutional commission visited various areas in the municipality of Riosucio, in the department of Chocó to verify the violent events of the first week in April(101).
According to information given by the communities affected, civilian and military authorities, on 4 April a group of between 300 and 600 paramilitaries of the AUC entered the hamlets of Caño Seco, Arenal and Villahermosa along the River La Balsa. Here they murdered 12 people, kidnapped another seven, stole food and property, retained several identity documents and filmed and interrogated the villagers. A helicopter was also reported to have dropped explosives in one of its flights over the area. The presence of FARC militia in some of the settlements was also described to the commission.
Among the victims were leaders and members of the San Francisco de Asís Peace Community that had participated in the return process. As a result of the fear and anxiety caused by the attacks more than 200 people fled to the municipal capital of Riosucio, including almost the entire population of the hamlet of Clavellino.
The commission demanded that the AUC and the FARC respect the civilian population of the region. They requested government measures to guarantee security and protection for the communities and their leaders by the armed forces; the tightening of controls on transport by land, air and river; the permanent presence of the state control agencies and the Public Prosecutor's office; support from the RSS in prevention, protection and humanitarian aid for the affected communities in accordance with its responsibilities established under Law 387/97.
They also urged the fulfilment of agreements signed by the government guaranteeing the necessary security conditions on the part of the armed forces for the definitive return of the communities still in situations of displacement or on their way back to their places of origin in the Cacarica and Salaquí Basins. They also demanded guarantees for the work of the national and international organisations providing support and humanitarian aid to the displaced communities.
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3.1.6 Accompaniment for the protection of human rights
The mere physical presence of observers from the international community is not enough to provide adequate protection for displaced persons and those working for them. Specific plans or strategies on this issue are not usually included in the plans of international NGOs involved in human rights or humanitarian aid. In Colombia, the observers maintain a permanent or periodic presence in different regions, they regularly communicate with the authorities and publish information on the issue. It is an accompaniment that protects against possible HR violations in a dissuasive manner(102).
The presence of international observers or accompanying groups is only one of many factors necessary for the protection of IDPs. Pressure from armed groups puts the viability of return projects at risk as well as the security that Peace Communities can offer. If a regulation is broken by the state or by a group over which the state has power to act, the international accompaniment is effective due to the fact that an international NGO is able to exert pressure on either body. However, in situations of conflict in which the government cannot maintain its executive role within the state, the international NGOs lose their persuasive power(103).
A possible example of this situation is the recent attack against a humanitarian commission in the Chocó. On 18 November a commission of ten people was returning to Quibdó after carrying out the last phase of the European Union humanitarian aid project in the Murindó region. They had also been evaluating the emergency situation of the communities living on the banks of the River Atrato due to its flooding. The wooden boat which bore the name of the Spanish NGO Paz y Tercer Mundo, was rammed by a fast motor boat carrying a group of paramilitaries. Two members of the commission lost their lives as a result of the collision. The dioceses of Apartadó and Quibdó later reported the accusations that paramilitary groups had made against people working on social organisation and humanitarian aid projects in the area(104).
Six days later, after requests of collaboration in clearing up the crime from the Basque Country Regional Government, the police captured nine suspects, all of which were members of the AUC. The paramilitaries threatened to burn the corregimiento of Las Mercedes (Quibdó) and kill its inhabitants in reprisal, accusing them of having given the information to police. Seventy families (around 400 people) were forced to flee to the municipal capital as a consequence(105).
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3.2 Civil society3.2.1 The Church
From the perspective of solidarity against human suffering, the Church provided the first response to displaced persons and groups when the phenomenon was still invisible. Its actions were focused on providing accompaniment and humanitarian aid to the victims, evaluations of the situation, gathering of information, mediation with the respective civilian and military authorities and protection of the victims.
Information is collected in the Parishes that act as social bases, and registers are taken of displaced persons and families. The Movilidad Humana section of the Colombian Synod has a large and detailed database which has been used to make statistical projections and maps of the areas of reception and expulsion. This system is being studied by the working groups on displacement in the cities of Bogota and Neiva.
Currently, the Catholic Church and other churches, for instance the Mennonites, respond to the situation through measures such as research, humanitarian aid and drawing up proposals to overcome the problem(106).
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3.2.2 Forum on agrarian resettlement with dignity for displaced communities
As a result of the meeting held in July 1998(107), the issues of reparation and restitution of violated rights in situations of forced displacement were studied in more depth in September1999. A topic that has been given a marginal position as much in the Guiding Principles as in Law 387. Furthermore, the stage of stabilisation and consolidation of IDPs in Colombia has been given the least attention and with the least success.
The right to reparation is a human right within international regulatory machinery: the Inter-American Convention against Forced Disappearance; the United Nations declaration on the issue; the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, etc. The Declaration on Human Rights Defenders adopted by the United Nations, recognises the right of the victims of violations to make a complaint to the authorities, that it will be promptly studied and in obtaining a decision in favour of reparation will include the compensation due. This is fundamental in recovering social peace and promoting reconciliation. Without this mechanism the reintegration into society of displaced persons cannot be successful.
The guidelines on the right of victims of serious violations of HR and IHL to obtain reparation include: prevention, investigation, the trial of those responsible, the provision of adequate and efficient legal resources for those affected and the reparation of the victims.
The state should provide disciplinary, administrative, civil and penal procedures that are quick and effective to ensure an adequate reparation that is easily accessible. Reparation seeks to provide a legal solution, eliminating or making amends for the consequences of the damage suffered as well as preventing new violations being committed.
Reparation should be proportional to the seriousness of the individual or collective violations and the damage suffered, adopting four non-exclusive forms: restitution, compensation, rehabilitation and guarantees of satisfaction and against reoccurrence.
Up3.2.3 Children's conference on human rights and peace
In August 1999, representatives of the young population of 13 displaced communities(108)met to share experiences of work aimed at recognising and protecting children's rights. They also discussed the construction of processes oriented at changing their reality and that of their communities in which they play a leading role.
The purposes of the conference were to:
- Identify the reality that displaced children experience.
- Contribute to the construction of work schemes supporting the development of communication and proposal-making capabilities and initiatives in these issues.
- Promote the formulation and implementation (by the state) of specific programmes for the young displaced population.
- Contribute ideas for the humanitarian work of the nongovernmental organisations.
Specific activities were carried out during the conference with the organisers of the children's ventures to identify strengths and weaknesses in their work.
Several communities of displaced persons have implemented activities aimed at children in the areas of education, recreation, communication and responses to their particular material needs. However, a lack of training was detected in the organisers that voluntarily take on this work as well as a shortage of equipment to carry it out.
The community initiatives in attention to children has shown up the gaps in the governmental programmes for attention to IDPs. The destruction of the social network and the dispersion of families resulting from forced displacement has worsened the situation of children's rights. They suffer discrimination in the settlement sites and at some schools where they have managed to get in. Their marginal condition exposes them to multiple risks and in many cases they have to work to help support their families.
The participants in the conference concluded that their work should begin with the premise that they are children above "displaced persons". In this way they would take on an active role in the community, participate in the recovery and defence of their cultural identity and contribute to strengthening values of solidarity.
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3.2.4 Academic Institutions
The participation of university institutions in the study of ID has been reflected in different research projects and the introduction of the issue onto different courses and seminars.
The evaluation of the IDPs in Soacha (Cundinamarca)(109)is among the studies worth highlighting. This municipality on the outskirts of Bogota receives a high influx of displaced persons. They now constitute 24% of the population, an increase of more than 100% compared with 1995 figures. In their majority they come from the south of Tolima and Cáqueta, but also from further afield such as the south of Bolívar, Chocó or Guaviare, which implies a dramatic uprooting and adaptation to the new environment.
Sixty-five percent of IDPs in Soacha are younger than 19 and 50% of the families are headed by women. Before displacement, 78% of the families interviewed owned to a certain extent and farmed agricultural land. Housing conditions and public services are inadequate in the current settlements, added to the high rate of unemployment this serves to reinforce the marginal circumstances of the IDPs. The situation is made worse by insufficient or no institutional attention programmes.
University participation is essential to ensure the autonomy and independence of the Observatory Body on Internal Displacement due to Violence, set out in article 13 of Law 387/97. This body aims to compile and analyse information on ID with the purpose of producing regular reports concerning its size, trends and the results of state policies in favour of IDPs.
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3.3 The population displaced by violence as part of the social movementIn reception sites for displaced individuals or families, e.g. cities such as Bogota, Medellin, Villavicencio and Neiva, the IDPs are disperse, anonymous and do not have institutional mechanisms of attention. However, the organisational process of the victims has shown some important progress. The NGOs, Fundación para la educación y el desarrollo (Education and Development Foundation -FEDES) and ILSA and the corporation Sembrar are assessing and accompanying training programmes to strengthen the social organisation of these communities.
Different organisations are involved in the working groups on displacement: Social organisations of displaced persons; state control agencies; human rights organisations; churches involved in the issue; international cooperation agencies; governmental entities. These organisations provide an opportunity for joint reflection and ventures in pursuit of activities aimed at overcoming the forced displacement phenomenon. They are based on the premise that ID is the responsibility of the Colombian State as it is defined in Law 387/97.
Converting the phenomenon into a process of social responsibility, not just that of the state should be interpreted as willingness on the part of the state to guarantee the conditions for the autonomous work of national and international humanitarian aid NGOs in providing opportunities and means for dialogue. This has been expressed since the approval of Law 387.
The implementation of programmes should start by guaranteeing the participation of representatives of the displaced persons and NGOs. Their proposals should be studied at the design stage of policies on displacement. This would guarantee the displaced persons prompt access to programmes in their capacity as victims and not a social problem. On the other hand, the organisation itself of the IDPs constitutes a fundamental contribution to the viability and sustainability of these programmes. This aspect has been undervalued by the institutions responsible so far.
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3.4 ConclusionsThere was an important change in 1999 with respect to the understanding and uptake of the rights of victims of ID. An increased awareness was also shown of the fact that these rights are legally demandable. Below are some of the indicators that illustrate this trend:
Specialised documents and texts on the issue, from social, political and legal perspectives.
There is growing awareness that of the fact that the economic, social and cultural rights of the IDPs are legally demandable.
A transition in the demands of the IDPs has been observed from the mere request for humanitarian aid to demands for lasting solutions.
By the close of the year advances had been made in the displaced persons' capacity for social organisation as well as their participation in negotiations and activities in pursuit of solutions.
The psychosocial effects of ID on its victims and their behaviour have been studied in more depth; assistance and counselling on the issue is being offered on a small scale to individuals, families and groups(110).
Displaced communities are attempting to coordinate demands with respect to specific and differentiated needs, as in the case of Afro-Colombian groups.
There is a greater association between national NGOs and international cooperation agencies through joint and complementary activities in humanitarian aid and in pursuit of lasting solutions.
A more active participation of the displaced persons has been achieved in the provision of humanitarian aid as well as contributions to technical studies on nutrition and integral proposals for lasting socio-economic solutions in rural and urban areas.
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4. Conclusions and recommendationsConcerning Prevention of Forced Displacement
1. Colombia does not have a policy on prevention of forced displacement that is presently being implemented. Prevention of displacement necessarily includes the protection and guarantee of human rights and the respect for the International Humanitarian Law.
With respect to this, it is necessary that the State implement strategies in order to achieve the effective and real protection of human rights. Respect for International Humanitarian Law must be promoted and demanded from armed groups.
Protection must include other elements related to the development of infrastructure and large-scale economic projec